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The Manchester Guardian
HISTORY
of the
WAR



GENERAL LOUIS BOTHA, South African Prime Minister.

Published in
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
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Examining a Torpedo.

[Gale and Polden.]

CHAPTER XXIV.

GERMAN MINES AND SUBMARINES.

THE ADMIRAL SCOTT CONTROVERSY—THE EFFECTS OF SUBMARINES ON NAVAL STRATEGY—BLOCKADE NO LONGER CLOSE—THE SINKING OF THE THREE CRUISERS—COAST RAIDS EASIER—THE GERMAN USE OF MINES—THE CLOSING OF THE NORTH SEA—LORD FISHER AGAIN AT THE ADMIRALTY.

TWO months before the war began, Admiral Sir Percy Scott, a naval officer of great distinction, declared that the day of the gun was over, and that the future of naval power was with the submarine and the aeroplane. He had "a bad press," and the experts were as little in agreement with him as the newspapers; but his argument was perhaps not so novel as it seemed. Ever since the first invention of the torpedo there had been a school of naval thought, particularly strong in France, which held that sooner or later it was sure to make the gun obsolete. The early torpedo boats were fragile, and only fit for harbour defence; but, small as they were, they were not invisible, and armoured ships found quite sufficient protection in quick-firing guns and search-lights. The torpedo could not surprise, and it could only strengthen itself against gunfire and extend its radius of action by increasing its size and so diminishing its chance of being unobserved. Then came the submarine, which gave the torpedo what it most wanted—invisibility. At the same time the torpedo developed rapidly in power, and the submarine increased its size and became a sea-going craft, with a wide radius of action.

All the old arguments of the French school, unjustified

by the early torpedo, received a posthumous vindication in the modern improved submarine. But they received a further reinforcement in the growing size of the capital gunships. There had long been in the British Navy an undercurrent of criticism of the tendencies in shipbuilding policy which matured in the Dreadnoughts. The tactical idea in building these ships was to obtain the greatest possible intensity of fire at the longest possible range, and in order to give the freedom of manoeuvre necessary for this long-range fighting to combine this heavy gun fire with high speed. All this meant inevitably an increase in the size of capital ships. At the very moment, therefore, that the submarine was raising the effectiveness of the torpedo, the increasing size in capital ships was making the rewards of a successful torpedo bigger and bigger. It is easier, rather than more difficult, for a submarine to sink the bigger than the smaller ship.

Admiral Sir Percy Scott's conversion from the gun, for which he had done so much, to the torpedo was not, therefore, so paradoxical or so sudden as it seemed. It was the emergence above the surface of naval ideas which had a very long history, and had been slowly maturing in the progress of mechanical invention. Nor is it necessary to suppose that the official views of the

Admiralty were wholly out of sympathy with his. In November of 1913, Mr. Churchill spoke of the time when the ships of the Dreadnought era would follow the mammoth and the mastodon into extinction. The question raised by Sir Percy Scott was not whether the submarine had superseded the gunship for some purposes—that was far more generally admitted than was commonly supposed—but whether it had, with the help of the aeroplane, superseded it for all purposes, as he contended that it had. A fair general measure of agreement amongst students of naval tactics was expressed by the *Manchester Guardian* in an article on the naval mobilisation at Spithead, which took place just before the Balkan crisis began to threaten danger to European peace. After opining that the time was coming when utility in narrow and inshore waters might settle the prevailing types of ships of war, the article continued:—

"In enclosed waters the case for the submarine is much stronger. Already it seems very doubtful whether battleships will ever take a very active part in blockade. The Japanese used them at Port Arthur, but the blockade was never, until the destruction of the Russian fleet, very close, and in fact it was rather expensive, for two great ships were sunk by mines in the blockade. Had the Russians had an active fleet of submarines within, it is doubtful whether the Japanese battleships would have survived a long blockade. Certainly, battleships will never be used again in maintaining a commercial blockade as distinguished from the siege of a fortified place. Even here, however, the uses of the battleship would seem to be limited. It will probably not risk its valuable sides against modern coast defences. For covering a landing of troops where there are no fixed shore fortifications the battleship will still have uses that can hardly be discharged by any other craft, certainly not by submarines, but that is to reduce the battleship to a mere subsidiary of land operations. Dogmatism on these matters is hardly seemly in laymen, but there seems strong reason for thinking that for the purposes of coast defence and for most inshore operations the submarine will very soon have a decided advantage over the battleship, and we are inclined to agree with the opinion expressed by Lieutenant Dewar in the course of the recent controversy that, though Dreadnoughts will not be driven off the ocean, they may be driven out to it."


CLOSE BLOCKADE NO LONGER POSSIBLE.

The stronger naval Power naturally tends to be somewhat conservative in its views of naval policy, and the weaker power to look to newer weapons to repair its inferiority in the older and established types. The German hopes of success in the war of attrition, by which they hoped to wear down our naval superiority, were fixed on the submarine. Our own Admiralty, as has been seen, had not neglected the uses of the submarine, but the Germans possessed many advantages. In the first place, it was not necessary for their ships to keep the sea. They surrendered the whole of their sea-borne trade, and made no attempt to keep open their com-


munications with foreign countries. Except for occasional raids, they had no craft at all in the North Sea except submarines. In the second place, whereas our ports for the most part lie open to the sea, theirs lie some distance up river with tortuous channels, and difficult of navigation. Further, their coastline on the North Sea is not very short, but the further protection of chains of islands with shallow seas between them and the mainland, and passages between them easily commanded by fortifications. These were ideal bases for submarine attack, and the worst possible places to attack a submarine.

The changes in the character of naval war from that to which former wars have accustomed

were more or less directly attributable to the submarine. The first change was that no such thing as a close blockade of German coasts was possible, or even attempted, by our navy. There was a blockade, but it was conducted from the two ends of the North Sea. The widest exit was at the north end, and here, therefore, the bulk of our fighting fleet was concentrated. As the seas narrowed to the Straits of Dover our task became easier, for here the blockade could be kept by submarines and small craft, and the advantages of narrow, confined waters, elsewhere on the side of Germany, favoured us. The experience



Taking a submarine mine out of stores. [Gale and Polden.]



A British submarine running on the surface of the water.


[L.N.A.]

our Dutch wars had taught us that the chief danger of evasion lay at the north end, and Germany had the great advantage of two sally doors, one by the north of Denmark—in the same latitude as Aberdeen—and the other by the Kiel Canal, in the latitude of Hull. Owing to the necessity of closing the northern passage out of the North Sea, our main fleet had to lie well to the north of the waters between the main German bases at Wilhelmshaven and Emden. Between the main fleet in the north and the narrow waters to the south there was thus a wide area which was patrolled by us, but from which our main fleet was absent. These patrols invited attack, and the Germans were not slow to use their opportunities.

THE SINKING OF THE CRESSY.


On September 22nd occurred the most serious naval disaster that we had yet suffered in the war. In the early morning, the *Cressy*, the *Aboukir*, and *Hogue* were on patrol duty off the coast of Holland. They were large armoured cruisers, of 12,000 tons, fourteen years old, and becoming obsolescent, but still capable of useful service, and carrying each of them a crew of 750 men. They were not attended by their destroyers, which, it is to be presumed, had gone off for relief and had not been replaced. Between 6-15 and 6-30 the *Aboukir*, which was nearest the coast, was struck by a torpedo. No submarine had then been seen, but soon afterwards one was sighted to port, which, on the view taken in the diagram of the direction in which the cruisers were steering, would be the seaward side of the *Cressy*. After the *Aboukir* was struck, and was seen

to be in danger of sinking, her two companions closed up, the *Hogue* ahead, the *Cressy* astern on the seaward side. The *Cressy* launched her boats to save the men from the *Aboukir*, which began to sink almost immediately, and, as the cutters full of rescued men were returning to the *Cressy*, the *Hogue* was struck by two torpedoes, both on her starboard, that is, her landward side. Almost immediately afterwards, a periscope was seen on the seaward side of the *Cressy*. It seems unlikely that a single submarine, after discharging two torpedoes on the landward side of the *Hogue*, could have been seen "almost immediately afterwards" 300 yards on the seaward side of the *Cressy*, and the probability is that there were two submarines engaged. Fire was immediately opened from the *Cressy* on the submarine that was seen, and the men on deck believed that she was sunk. If a submarine was sunk, however, it was not the one that did the damage, for all the successful torpedoes seem to have come from the landward side, where "another periscope" was seen very soon afterwards. The *Cressy* by this time was rendering assistance to the men of the *Hogue* and the *Aboukir*. It was about 7-15, forty minutes after the *Aboukir* had been struck, and the *Cressy* must have been quite stationary. Finding a good target presented, the submarine that had just been sighted, which was the one that had already sent the *Aboukir* to the bottom—she sank about seven o'clock—and had mortally wounded the *Hogue*, launched a torpedo at the *Cressy*. The torpedo was fired at a range of 500-600 yards, and its track was plainly visible from the *Cressy*'s deck, clear sign that she had no weigh on her. The torpedo struck the *Cressy*.



H.M.S. Aboukir.

[Symonds and Co., Portsmouth (S. and G.).



H.M.S. Hogue.

[Symonds and Co., Portsmouth (S. and G.).

A second was launched very soon afterwards, but missed her, and passed over the place where the *Aboukir* had sunk, passing astern of the *Cressy*; but at 7-20 another torpedo—the sixth that is known to have been fired in the action—hit her, and she began to heel over, and finally sank at 7-55, an hour and a half after the *Aboukir* was struck.

The lives of sixty officers and 1,400 men were lost in this sad affair. The rest of the crews were rescued by a Lowestoft trawler and two Dutch ships which were near, and are said to have behaved with great kindness, as indeed they might, for some of the men were rescued from drowning for the second time in a couple of hours. At least one man was rescued three times, first from the *Aboukir*, then from the *Hogue*, and then from the *Cressy*. The men who were rescued by the Dutch ships were taken to Holland, but afterwards released, on the ground that they could not have been captured by the enemy, and were, therefore, not captured but shipwrecked men.

The disaster made a great impression in England, especially when it appeared that all three ships had been sunk by one submarine; but it did not bear all the inferences that were drawn from it of the dangerousness of the submarine. The cruisers, as has already been noted, were without destroyers, and were, therefore, particularly exposed to submarine attack. But it is further quite clear from the accounts that the disaster would have been much less serious than it was if, when the first ship was struck, the other two had not stood by to rescue the crew. In doing so, they deprived themselves of the movement which is the best protection against submarine attack; and though

the instinct which led the *Hogue* and the *Cressy* to act as they did was honourably humane, the Admiralty regarded it as an error of judgment, though a pardonable one. It issued instructions "for the future guidance of His Majesty's ships that the conditions which prevail when one vessel of a squadron is injured in a mine field or is exposed to submarine attack are analogous to those which occur in an action, and that the rule of leaving disabled ships to their own resources is applicable. So far, at any rate, as large vessels are concerned, no act of humanity, whether to friend or foe, should lead to the neglect of the proper precautions and dispositions of war, and no measures can be taken to save life which prejudice the military situation. Small craft of all kinds should, however, be directed by wireless to close with the damaged ship with all speed."


COAST RAIDS BECOME EASIER.

Another result of the distant blockade which was forced on us by the submarine was that our coasts were not immune from raids. There was no question now of sealing the enemy's fleet up in his harbours. He had always a certain amount of open water before him, and under favourable conditions—

able to tell him from time to time when the conditions were favourable—he was able to sally forth from his naval bases and reach the East Coast of England without encountering a superior naval force on the way, or even being observed.

The first of these raids was on November 2nd, when three German cruisers which had left Wilhelmshaven late in the previous evening, appeared early in the morning, and after sinking a small coast-guard gunboat, the *Halcyon*, attempted to shell Yarmouth. Their shells, however, fell short of the town, and no damage was done, and when our cruisers gathered the Germans beat a precipitate retreat. The rearmost German cruiser threw out mines in her retirement, and a British submarine, *D 5*, which was pursuing, struck one of them and sank. One of the raiding cruisers, said to have been the *Yorch*, fouled one of her own mines on entering Jaldie Bay and was lost, with half her crew. The raid was, therefore, a somewhat costly one to the Germans. More serious was the second raid, on December 16th. At least three battle cruisers took part in it, and again they appeared off the English coast at breakfast time. Scarborough, which was an undefended town, and ought, therefore, by the rules of war, to which


Germany had herself subscribed, to have been immune from bombardment, was shelled for half an hour, property was destroyed, and there was some loss of life. Whitby, too, was bombarded, but the town which suffered worst was Hartlepool. An account of the raid will be found on a later page (Chapter XXXVI); it is mentioned here merely as one of the effects of the



The sinking of the three cruisers.

submarine, which, by making a close blockade of the enemy's ports by our warships impossible, exposed parts of our East Coast to a danger from which it had been popularly supposed that they were immune.

But the blockade, though distant, was none the less effective. Unsuccessful attempts were made by the German submarines to use their torpedoes among the Grand Fleet; but though the story of these attempts has not yet been told, it is probable that they were not made without loss to the attack. The only success of the submarines in the northern waters of the North Sea was the attack on the *Theseus* and the *Hawke* on October 15th. The torpedoes missed the *Theseus*, an armoured cruiser of 7,350 tons, but the *Hawke* was struck and sank very rapidly, with nearly all her crew. At the other end of the North Sea, in the Straits of Dover, the cruiser *Hermes* was torpedoed, on October 31st, as she was returning from Dunkirk, but nearly all her crew was saved. On November 11th, the *Niger* was torpedoed in the Downs. These losses, though regrettable, were, after all, only incidents in a blockade which was successfully maintained. Nor were the losses from submarines all on our side. In the middle of September a small German cruiser, the *Hela*, was sunk by a British submarine off



A Torpedo Tube and the torpedo ready for insertion.

[Record Press.



H.M.S. Niger.

[L.N.A.

Heligoland, and on October 24th a German submarine was credibly reported as having been rammed by the *Badger*.

THE MINES OFF IRELAND.

The mine is an unpropelled torpedo, sometimes anchored, sometimes loose (as in the case of the mines discharged by the German cruiser after the raid on Yarmouth). The action of the Germans in sowing mines in the North Sea has already (page 71) been described, and there is reason to believe that they made an improper use of the neutral flag in the execution of their designs. Unfortunately, the minelaying was not confined to the North Sea, or to belligerent waters. In the last week of October a large German minelayer was discovered off the north coast of Ireland. On October 28th, the *Manchester Commerce*, a merchantman, was sunk in this field, and shortly afterwards the great White Star liner *Olympic*, crowded with passengers from the United States, escaped destruction in the same field by the merest good luck. The British Navy was also reported in American papers to have sustained a serious loss from the same cause, though the facts are still obscure. It was necessary to take strong measures. Prince Louis of Battenberg had just retired from the post of First Sea Lord, not because of any disagreement in policy or for any lack of confidence in his professional ability, but because popular sentiment was against the employment, in perhaps the most responsible of all the offices under the Crown, of anyone, however distinguished, who had a German name. Lord Fisher, an ex-First Lord, and a man of great originality and vigour of mind, succeeded him. On November 2nd the Admiralty announced, in consequence of the German mine-laying policy, its intention to convert the whole of the North Sea into a closed military area.

"During the last week the Germans have scattered mines indiscriminately in the open sea on the main trade route from America to Liverpool via the North of Ireland. Peaceful merchant ships have already been blown up, with loss of life, by this agency. The White Star liner *Olympic* escaped disaster by pure good luck. But for the warnings given by British cruisers, other British and neutral merchant and passenger vessels would have been destroyed. These mines cannot have been laid by any German ship of war. They have been laid by some merchant vessel flying a neutral flag, which has come along the trade route as if for the purposes of peaceful commerce, and, while profiting to the full by the submarine policy, has

neutral merchant ships, has wantonly and recklessly endangered the lives of all who travel on the sea, regardless of whether they are friend or foe, civilian or military in character.


"Mine-laying under a neutral flag and reconnaissance conducted by trawlers, hospital ships, and neutral vessels are the ordinary features of German naval warfare. In these circumstances, having regard to the great interests entrusted to the British navy, to the safety of peaceful commerce on the high seas, and to the maintenance within the limits of international law of trade between neutral countries, the Admiralty feel it necessary to adopt exceptional measures appropriate to the novel conditions under which this war is being waged."

The hand of Lord Fisher is clearly visible in the new policy, though there is no reason to think that it would not have commanded the assent of his predecessor under

the same circumstances. It was denounced by the German press as an interference with the rights of neutral shipping. In fact, it laid down the only conditions on which neutral shipping could avoid the risk of destruction from mines. The only right recognised by the German policy was the right of being sunk if they chose to take certain risks which the Germans did their best to conceal. The new British policy drew a line from the northern point of the Hebrides, through the Faroe Islands, to Iceland, and announced that it was our intention to sow this area with mines, and that all ships who crossed the line would do so at their peril. At the same time, it created a minefield between Ostend and Dover, leaving a channel alongside the English Coast through which neutral ships were invited to come, and promised that if they did they would be given sailing instructions which would take them up the English Coast free from all danger from British mines.

The changes made by mines and submarines in our naval policy and tactics were very great, and, if they

did not justify all that Admiral Sir Percy Scott had said in his controversy on the effects of the submarine and aeroplane on naval warfare, they certainly confuted the theories and prophesies of his hostile critics. Some of these changes were in our favour, for mines and submarines undoubtedly made it easier to hold the Straits of Dover than it would otherwise have been. Others were against us, for they made it impossible to maintain a close blockade of German harbours, and so exposed patrolling squadrons in the middle reaches of the North Sea to attack and our East Coast to raids. Yet other changes told against neutrals, for we had ourselves to fall back on the use of mines, not only in the south, but in the north,



[Gale and Polden.

Exploding a submarine mine.

and to prohibit access to the North Sea except through one narrow channel.

This was a regrettable necessity forced upon us by the action of the Germans; but though it inflicted inconvenience on neutrals, it was the only course open to us,

and the inconvenience was far less serious to neutral shipping than the risk of destruction to which the surreptitious and in some cases almost treacherous sowing of mines on the high-roads of commerce, far from the scene of naval hostilities, had exposed it.



[*Sport and General.*
A floating mine washed up on the East Coast.



Mustering a South African Commando.

[Central News.

CHAPTER XXV.

THE WAR IN AFRICA.

THE ATTACK ON GERMAN SOUTH-WEST AFRICA—THE TREACHERY OF MARITZ—REVOLT IN THE FREE STATE AND TRANSVAAL—BOTHAS AS COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF—DEATH OF BEYERS AND CAPTURE OF DE WET—FRONTIER FIGHTING IN EAST AFRICA—A DISASTROUS EXPEDITION—OPERATIONS IN TOGOLAND AND KAMERUN.

THE extension of the war to the African Continent raised at once issues far wider than the simple one of the supremacy of the Triple Entente or the Triple Alliance. Would the dominion and prestige of the white man over the black—maintained in many parts against odds of a thousand to one and more—survive a contest between the chief races that had parcelled out among them the lands and allegiance of the tribesmen; or would any attempt to alter the map of Africa by force add to a European war the horror of a native upheaval? Would the Union of South Africa, based on the newly-welded friendship of Boer and Briton, stand the greatest strain to which it could be put, or would the loyalty of the Dutch South African turn to apathy or worse when the need came to fight the people that had shown him most sympathy in his struggle of fifteen years before? Had German preparedness for war been extended in full to her colonies; and even if it had, how would a military genius that relied on numbers and heavy artillery acquit itself in the warfare of little battles where numbers meant little and resource and veldt craft everything—where blockhouses stood for Liéges and Namurs, and the capture of a water-hole might count as much as the crossing of the Marne? These were the main

questions raised by the operations in Africa, and the answers to most of them emerged in the first few months of the war.

The operations fall naturally into three divisions, according as they took place in the South, East, or West of the Continent. The first of these divisions includes both the attack on German South-West Africa and the rebellion in the Union. The grouping of these is not a mere geographical convenience, for General Botha's decision to comply with the request of the home Government by using the Union Defence Force for operations against German South-West Africa was a prime cause of discontent in the Union, and the adhesion of the traitor Maritz to the German cause delayed the attack on the German colony until the Union should be cleared of what were virtually German forces.

We have already (Chapter IX.) seen what was the situation in South Africa immediately after the outbreak of war. The Imperial Government had, at the suggestion of the Union Government, withdrawn the British garrison of some 6,000 men from the dominion. General Botha had asked his Government for *carte blanche* in taking offensive measures against the neighbouring German colony and obtained it, but had failed to reconcile a powerful minority,

who thought the Union need not, and should not, take aggressive measures. General Beyers resigned his post as Chief of the Union Defence Force nominally on this issue, and he was known to have the sympathy of the narrow Dutch nationalism represented by Generals Hertzog, De Wet, and Delarey. The violent death of General Delarey, who, on September 16th, was shot by a sentry while motoring with General Beyers, because he either did not or would not stop his car when challenged, contributed to the growing bitterness. The question whether German or British forces took the first step in the frontier fighting—which would ordinarily have been an academic one, and was in fact robbed of its importance by the discovery later that Germany had made preparations for aiding rebellion in the Union that would in any case have demanded the most vigorous reprisals possible—was hotly debated at the beginning, because the dissentients in the Union held that the aggressive use of the Defence Force was rendered the less justifiable by the absence of any German designs on South Africa. In Parliament, on September 11th, General Botha was able to counter this criticism with the news that not only were considerable German forces arrayed on the Union frontier before Union mobilisation had taken place, but there had been more than one affair of outposts caused by small German forces crossing the frontier, and even entrenching themselves.

GERMAN SOUTH-WEST AFRICA.

The problem of making an effective attack on German South-West Africa would have been a difficult one for the Union even if internal troubles had not complicated it. The colony, which was founded by a Bremen merchant, Luderitz, who established a factory at the port now called after him, in the course of the scramble for Africa—which took an acute phase after the formation of the German Colonial Society in 1882—grew to have an area of 326,000 square miles, or about three times that of the United Kingdom.

Mainly a pastoral country, it had been made the subject of experiments in cotton, tobacco, vine, and silk growing successful enough to refute the old South African belief that it was a profitless place to colonise. Diamond mines of moderate value had been discovered near Luderitz Bay, and other mineral wealth awaited development. Most of the eastern part of the colony has the semi-desert character of British Bechuanaland, from which it is separated by an artificial frontier; and the southern part, which is divided from Cape Colony by the Orange River, is arid and sparsely populated. In the thousand or so miles of coast line on the west, broken only by the little British possession, Walfish Bay, Luderitz Bay was the one considerable port, though a second was in course of


construction at Swakopmund. To the north lay Portuguese West Africa.

The Colony, then, could be attacked on the east only by long marching through desert country both before and after crossing the frontier, and from the west only by a landing at Walfish Bay or Luderitz Bay. Difficulties of attack from the south were increased by the fact that whereas the administrative centre of the German colony at Windhoek was connected almost with the Orange River by a railway, which made the transport of troops to that frontier a simple matter, the railways in Union territory, running as they do north-east from Cape Town, leave isolated a vast tract of barren country abutting on the German colony with a scattered population of natives, half-castes, and low-grade whites, and presenting military difficulties whose gravity was well shown in the South African war. Thus, while Union troops marching on the German colony must traverse some hundreds of miles of very hard country, German raids into British territory could


be made from a rail-head base not far distant. There was, however, one alternative line of advance for Union troops from the south. From Port Nolloth, on the extreme north-west coast of the Union, a small, isolated railway runs inland to the copper mining country that lies just south of the Orange River. From one of the stations on it, Steinkop, a track, sixty miles long, leads to Ramans Drift, on the Orange River, and thence to the southern terminus of the railway system in German South-West Africa. Transport to Port Nolloth, rail to Steinkop, and a march *via* Ramans Drift, was therefore a means of advance which the Union must keep open.

The German colony had made warlike preparations on a scale much more elaborate than her neighbours had thought necessary to meet ordinary contingencies. In


official publications the colony admitted to a police and military force of some 3,500 men, enrolled from a European population of 14,000 and a native population of 80,000. This was not excessive, but a very different account of her military resources was given by those who visited her before the outbreak of war. A correspondent of the *Cape Times* put her armed strength at 10,000 well-equipped mounted infantry and artillery, a camel corps of 500, and sixty six-gun batteries of machine guns. Thirty-two of these were concentrated at Keetmanshoop, in the south of the colony—an easy stage from the Orange River frontier. The country offered many natural defensive positions, and these were occupied by blockhouses defended by artillery. The communications throughout the colony had been brought to a high state of efficiency, and provision had been made for arming the considerable number of Boer farmers in the southern territory on whose sympathy Germany counted.



General Louis Botha. [Russell and Sons.]



THE FRONTIERS OF GERMAN AND BRITISH SOUTH AFRICA.



THE WANDERINGS OF DE WET.

FRONTIER FIGHTING.

Operations began with the rushing by German forces of the Union police posts on the frontier. By a series of surprise attacks, made usually at daybreak by vastly superior forces, the Germans succeeded in gaining possession of the posts along the twentieth degree of longitude, which on the east marks the frontier between the two colonies. At one of these, Nakob, just north of where the Orange River and the twentieth degree join, 250 Germans, with two maxims, met with considerable resistance from the little body of eight police, of whom three escaped, three were taken prisoner, one killed, and one was wounded. Rietfontein, on the border further north, was also occupied, and for some weeks the Upington kopjes north of Nakob were held by the enemy. These movements proved to be rather a safeguard against observance by our outposts of German preparations than the preliminaries of an invasion, for by the end of September the Union police had returned to some of their posts, which they found abandoned by the enemy, with the water-holes undamaged.

Meanwhile, a considerable German force had occupied Ramans Drift with the intention of entrenching themselves there and commanding the Steinkop-Warmbad road. Colonel Dawson, with the Fourth South African Rifles, marched the sixty miles from Steinkop to the Drift, through country choked with sand and parched by a fierce sun, in two days, and at the expense of only two casualties surprised and dislodged the enemy. An interesting feature of the relative positions of the German and British possessions in South West Africa was the menace to Rhodesia of the German territory known as the Caprivi strip. This thin neck of land, jutting from the north-east corner of the German

colony far into Rhodesia, was obtained by the German Chancellor Caprivi to give access to the Zambesi River. (See Map, page 235.) It meets the Zambesi not far from the great Victoria Falls and the British settlement of Livingstone, where the river is crossed by a bridge, 420 feet high and 650 feet long, that carries the railway from Bulawayo northwards. The safeguarding of this vitally important link fell to the Rhodesian police, and they were able not only to secure it against raids, but in September to occupy the German post of Shuckmannsberg in the Caprivi strip, and arrange for the temporary administration of the German territory. A success of even more importance was scored on September 18th, when a Union

force occupied Luderitz Bay without meeting resistance, and hoisted the Union Jack on the Town Hall. The German garrison retreated after blowing up the railway line of which the port is the western terminus. The Union now commanded two good positions from which German South-West Africa could be attacked; and but for the emergence of grave trouble in South Africa itself, the attack would doubtless have been pressed without delay.

THE REBELLION OF MARITZ.

Ever since the resignation of General Beyers it had been clear that the forces operating in the north-western district of the Cape, of which Upington is the chief centre, were not normal. In particular, suspicion was aroused by the publication of the list of casualties in a border

action which occurred at Sandfontein, south of Warmbad, on September 26th, and which resulted in sixteen men being killed, forty-three wounded, and 192 "captured." No account of the action accompanied these casualties, and when an account was published it did not satisfactorily explain them. A force of South African Mounted Rifles and Transvaal Horse Artillery had pushed forward through a defile to gain a water-hole. The saucer-like depression in which the well lay was discovered to be commanded from every point of the compass by German artillery. The force held out from daybreak till noon under a continuous fire, to which they could make little effective reply, and then, finding their retreat barred and no sign of relief, the survivors surrendered. The officer in command of the force was officially exonerated from all blame for the disaster, and the circumstances that made it possible remained for some days a mystery. On October 14th, however, it was announced that Lieutenant-Colonel S. G.

Maritz, who had been entrusted with the command of the forces in the north-west of the Cape Province, had insolently disregarded an order from headquarters to report himself, had held prisoner Major Ben Bower, who was sent to relieve him of his command, and had then sent him back with an ultimatum to the Union Government that unless he was allowed within three days to meet Generals Hertzog, De Wet, Beyers, Kemp, and Muller, "to receive instructions from them," he would forthwith make an attack on the forces of Major Bower's superior officer, Colonel Conrad Britz. Major Bower reported that Maritz had German guns and a force of Germans under him, as well as his own rebel commando, that he held the rank of General commanding the German troops, and that he had



A typical veldt road.

arrested all of his men who were unwilling to join the Germans and sent them as prisoners to German South-West Africa. Maritz had shown him many helio messages and telegrams from the German commander, dating back to the beginning of September, and an agreement which he had signed with the Governor of German South-West Africa guaranteeing the independence of the Union as a republic, with the Orange River as its boundary; ceding Wal-fish Bay to Germany; and undertaking that Germany would not object to the Union seizing the important Portuguese harbour of Delagoa Bay (which would give the Transvaal an outlet to the sea), and would not invade the Union except at the request of Maritz.

The adventurer who staked everything on this wild stroke of treason came of an old Transvaal stock. He had fought cleverly under General Smuts in the South African war, when he headed a rebellion in the Kenhart district. General Smuts was so impressed by his skill in keeping resistance alive in the north-west of the Cape at that time that he promoted him from corporal to colonel. He had served the Germans in their war against the Herrero natives in Damaraland, had tried cattle dealing in Holland, and finally applied for a commission in the police of South Africa. His unique knowledge of the troublesome north-west country made him valuable, and procured him in time the command which he now so grossly abused. His skill in guerilla warfare was not coupled with foresight or judgment. He had fallen an easy victim to German promises, which a wiser man might have seen were incapable of fulfilment, and he miscalculated the effect his treason would have on the mass of Dutch South Africans, who, though they might have little stomach for what they considered a needless war of aggression, had less for such shameless treachery. His demand to be allowed to consult five of his prominent compatriots must not be taken as

meaning that all or any of these were in league with him. The motives that led some of them to rebel soon afterwards were of a wider and—if distinction in treachery is possible—a less discreditable sort.



General De Wet. [Russell and Sons.]



General Beyers. [Topical War Service.]

When he declared for Germany, early in October, Maritz was in command of a mixed force of rebels and Germans under a thousand strong, and had a considerable store of German rifles, ammunition, and guns, in addition to what he had stolen from the Union. He had his base near Upington, on the Orange River, in the heart of the troublesome and difficult country he knew so well. When his force had increased to well over two thousand he divided it—the one part remaining in the Upington district, while the other moved quickly southwards, up the Great Fish River, hoping to gather recruits as it went, and perhaps to make good, by a march via Kenhart and Calvinia on the Fish River, Maritz's boast to Major Bower that he would "overrun the Cape." Maritz himself remained in the north. From October 16th onwards, Colonel Britz, with the Imperial Light Horse and Enslin's Horse (the latter composed of Dutch burghers from the Transvaal), gave the enemy round Upington no rest. Several parties of rebels were cut off and captured; several others, who had been forcibly detained by Maritz, surrendered voluntarily, and in some cases offered for active service for the Union. At day-break on October 22nd, Maritz, with a force of about 1,000, including a German contingent with machine guns, attacked Keimoes, a day's march south-west of Upington. The garrison of 150 held out pluckily till reinforcements came later in the day, and Maritz moved west again down the Orange River to Kakamas, twenty miles nearer the German frontier. Colonel Britz pursued him hotly, and dislodged him with such violence that he left all his tents standing and abandoned a large quantity of stores and



One of the loyal commandoes "trucking horses" at a South African railway station. [Photopress.]



A baggage convoy on the trek across the veldt.

[Photopress.]

ammunition. In this engagement Maritz himself was wounded, and many of his men deserted. He withdrew to Scruit Drift, on the frontier, where he found German support, but on October 30th was again routed by Colonel Britz. Meanwhile, the force which had moved south had penetrated almost to Calvinia, in the middle west of the Cape Province, a distance of over 200 miles. It was engaged on October 25th by a force under Colonel van der Venter, and lost ninety men and two maxim guns. Three days later, pursued northwards to Onderstepoort, midway between Calvinia and Kenhardt, it was again defeated, losing 124 men. This southern body was now as badly broken as the northern, and the rebellion was virtually ended.

THE RISING IN THE TRANSVAAL AND THE FREE STATE.

Meanwhile, interest had shifted to the north of the Free State and the west of the Transvaal. In the former, General Christian De Wet had great influence; in the latter, the word of General Delarey had been law while he lived, and his friend, General Beyers, had now assumed his mantle. Beyers, in the letter which he addressed to General Smuts resigning his command of the Defence Force, had already made it clear that he thought South African participation in the war needless and vain, since the fate of the German colony must in any case be decided on the battlefields of Europe, and the Union might conquer it at great sacrifice only to see it handed back to Germany if the war went against the Entente Powers. He had, however, declared that he did not wish to stir up civil strife, and could be depended on to "shed his blood to the last drop for his country if she were attacked." Had the Union been asked to do no more than send a volunteer force to Europe and use its Defence Force only for defence, it is more than likely that Beyers would not have rebelled. As it was, his attitude of compromise was an impossible one to maintain, and the only problem was in which way it would harden. The critical weeks of September found him much in the company of De Wet, addressing meetings up and down the country, sometimes from the motor car in which General Delarey was shot. Older, harder, narrower, and more implacable than Beyers, De Wet had proved a disturbing factor in Union politics ever since, fourteen years before, he made a name for himself as one of the greatest guerilla leaders of all time. He was a Boer of the old type, for whom the grant of self-government had not allayed fierce resentment at defeat, and the Peace at Vereeniging was little more than a necessary makeshift, and whose nature was complicated by a strain of religious fanaticism. The spirit of revolt was, moreover, fanned by the exhortations of a religious monomaniac named Van Rensburg, who had a reputation as a prophet among the more primitive of the Transvaal Dutch, and who predicted that Beyers and De Wet would be the instruments of Heaven in bringing about a restoration of the old republics. It became increasingly clear that the menace could not be dealt with by peaceful means, but the Government held its hand till the last possible moment—until, indeed, De Wet had actually raised some commandoes in the Free State, held up a troop train at Reitz on October 27th, and arrested the Government officials at Heilbron, just off the main line from Bloemfontein to Pretoria.

GENERAL BOTHA AS COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF.

The future will rate very highly the services of General Botha to South Africa and to the Empire at this time.

He was now in his fifty-second year, and had been Premier of the Union from its formation in 1909. Those years had not been free from blunders. Among them was the deportation of ten Labour leaders under martial law in the great strike of 1912, and the rescinding of the deportation order shortly after war broke out was a wise and tactful step. But in his five years of leadership he had struck a balance between the aims of South African nationalism and the demands of the imperial tie which rallied round him the majority of South Africans, British and Dutch. The best evidence of his success was the dwindling in those years of the original official Opposition party of mainly British composition. The racial line of division in South African politics had almost disappeared, and in its place was emerging the saner and healthier, though not less sharp, demarcation between the representatives of employment and of the employed. Labour had become a political force, and the problem of the future seemed to be whether a considerable portion of the South African Party which General Botha led would, or would not, develop a Liberalism that would bring it in touch with the aims of Labour. The position was, however, oddly complicated by the fact that the ardent back-veldt Dutch Nationalists, who, temperamentally, had nothing in common with Labour, but who were the bitterest opponents of General Botha for what they considered his betrayal of Dutch interests to the mineowners and "imperialists," saw in the rise of Labour a possible means of undermining the policy of compromise which they so much detested. Of these, General Hertzog was the most enlightened and reasonable spokesman, and General De Wet the most implacable and dangerous. On the outbreak of war the Labour Party, though many of its members shared the regret of its leader, Mr. Cresswell, that South African help had not been confined to an expeditionary force, rallied to the Government. Mr. Cresswell was given a Commission in the Defence Force. The implacables were thus isolated, and the only question was on how much Dutch support, passive or active, they could count.

Three things contributed to reducing that support to its minimum. General Hertzog, though bitterly critical of the Government's policy, refused to aid Beyers and De Wet in their preparations for armed resistance, and even pleaded with them personally to keep the peace. Again, the revolt of Maritz, besides disgusting the mass of the Dutch people, created what was *de facto* a German invasion of the Cape. Lastly, General Botha's decision, announced on September 23rd, to take supreme command of all the forces in the field, coupled with the stimulating speeches he made up and down the country, rallied all save the most extreme sections to him—many of the most enthusiastic promises of support and messages of encouragement coming from Hertzogite supporters and journals.

General Botha placed himself at once at the head of a force, which, besides the regiments of the compulsorily-raised Union Defence Force, included several strong Dutch commandoes organised on the old burgher lines. Many of the Dutch felt the indignity of the rebellion even more than the British, and though now called upon to fight against men of their own race, perhaps of their own family, came forward in a spirit which showed that they considered the stain could best be wiped off the Dutch name by Dutchmen. The call for men was sent from house to house in the old way, much as the fiery cross used to be in the Highlands of Scotland, and commandants, field cornets, and burghers who had fought under General Botha in the Boer war readily came forward to take their places besides the

mixed Dutch and British regiments of the regular Defence Force.

Botha determined to deal first with Beyers, and to crush his force before it could effect a union with the rebels in the Free State. He therefore entrained immediately to Rustenburg, in the Western Transvaal, just north of Beyers's headquarters. He came quickly in contact with the rebel commandoes and put them to flight south of Rustenburg, pursuing them vigorously. Within a week of going to the front he was able to report that Beyers's commandoes had scattered in all directions and were not likely to unite again.

Meanwhile, in the Free State, the Government had been endeavouring to avoid bloodshed, despite open acts of rebellion by De Wet and his followers, who had entered townships and commandeered horses, rifles, ammunition, and stores; smashed the telegraphs, sjamboked hesitating farmers and storekeepers, and in general endeavoured to bring the business operations of the Northern Free State to a standstill. In one of these raids, on Vrede, on October 28th, the petty, bigoted, and bitter spirit that animated the leader was revealed in a vivid flash. He had the magistrate of Vrede dragged before him, and delivered a harangue on the evils of rule by the "pestilential English," and the "ungodly policy" of General Botha. "King Edward," he said, "promised to protect us, but he failed to do so, and allowed a magistrate to be put over us." But his chief point was that this particular magistrate had fined him five shillings for sjamboking a native, a fact of which he now furiously reminded him. To De Wet that seemed the apotheosis of British statesmanship, and cause enough for putting South Africa through the sufferings of civil war. From many of his former comrades, such as General Smuts, his speech provoked the scornful comment that this was a "five-shilling rebellion." Against this spirit peaceful overtures could do little, but the Government, realising that it was not characteristic of many who might be forced or gulled into aiding De Wet, wisely proclaimed that all rebellious burghers who laid down their arms before November 21st should be left in peace. Many took advantage of this, including two of De Wet's sons.

DE WET STILL ELUSIVE.


After his activities at Heilbron and Vrede, De Wet moved southward, keeping to the east of the main line from Bloemfontein to Pretoria. On October 26th part of his force, under Commandant Wessels, looted Harrismith, near the Natal border and on the main line connecting the Free State with Natal. The rebels damaged the railway and pillaged the shops, but did not attempt to hold the town. De Wet then made his headquarters in the triangle of

country enclosed by the railways connecting Kroonstadt, Bloemfontein, and Bethlehem. He defeated a loyal commando near Winburg, which is in the centre of this district, on November 6th, losing one of his sons, Daniel, in the action. On the 8th, rebel forces of some strength, which had been collecting with a view to attacking Kroonstadt, were dispersed by Colonel Manie Botha. On the 13th, General Botha, having sufficiently broken the forces of Beyers to deal with De Wet, came on the latter, after a forced night march, at Marquard, twenty-four miles east of Winburg. The rebels were engaged over a long front and completely routed. It is probable that De Wet himself would have been captured had not the orders that would have brought forces under Colonel Britz and General Lukin into action gone astray. De Wet then gave an exhibition of the elusive tactics of which he was a master. Moving quickly south-west, east, and finally north, he made a bold bid on November 16th to command the main line of railway north of Virginia, fifty miles

south of Kroonstadt. The forces under General Botha were busy in blocking a minor rebel movement further south, but De Wet was engaged by commandoes sent by train from Kroonstadt. With the aid of two armoured trains they were able to prevent a portion of De Wet's force from crossing the railway and making westward to join the remains of Beyers's men, whose flight southwards had brought them into the Hoopstad region of the Free State. This junction was prevented by a smart attack on Beyers's force, now numbering only about a thousand, on November 15th, near Bultfontein. The enemy were defeated over a seven mile front, and headed off in a rapid chase in a north-easterly direction. De Wet, fleeing westward up the Vet River and hotly pursued,

divided his force near Boshof, and himself made for the Transvaal with twenty-five men.

The circumstances of his ultimate capture were symbolic of the change that had come over methods of warfare, even in the veldt, since his peculiar genius found full play fourteen years before. A saddle, a bridle, a rifle, and a horse could no longer complete the equipment even of the most skilful guerilla fighter. There was the motor car to be reckoned with. De Wet slipped across the Vaal River with his handful of men on the night of November 21st. He was pursued by motor, but managed to join a small commando, chiefly composed of rebels who had secretly forming in the district. With this force he started westward again, passing eighteen miles north of Vryburg on November 25th. From Vryburg the chase was taken up by a motor brigade, under Commandant Britz, and continued relentlessly through heavy, sandy, undulating country, thickly covered by thornbush. On the way



A Native Village in German East Africa.

Britz captured fifty-three of De Wet's men without firing a shot. The following of De Wet's spoor through such country was a notable achievement for the motor, and it played out De Wet's horses by forcing him to make one stretch of fifty miles without unsaddling. The actual capture was made by mounted troops at Waterburg, about one hundred miles due west of Mafeking, where De Wet was run to earth in a farm, with fifty-two rebels. Taken by surprise, he made little attempt to escape, and the whole of his men were made prisoners without a shot being fired. Two days later a Johannesburg crowd hooted De Wet as he drove through the streets, under guard, to the fort, and the greatest menace to the internal peace of South Africa was removed.

THE DEATH OF BEYERS.

Meanwhile, General Botha had effected a great "round-up" of the remaining Free State rebels, who had made extensive preparations for a fight at Reitz. As many as 550 were captured on the first few days of December without any casualties in the Government forces. The same policy of extensive surrounding movements accounted a few days later for Beyers. He had crossed the Vaal River into the Free State with a small force, and was pursued by a commando which was guarding the Transvaal bank. Finding himself hard pressed on the Free State side, he attempted to recross. The river was in flood, and in mid-stream he fell from his horse. When his body was got later on, he was found to have been drowned unwounded. Most of the sixty men who accompanied him were shot, drowned, or captured.

The heart was now quite gone from the rebels. Of the five leaders on whom Maritz counted when he lit the fire of revolt on October 9th, Hertzog had kept the peace, Beyers was dead, De Wet was captured, Kemp had joined the Germans with Maritz himself, and Muller, who had been skirmishing and looting north of Pretoria, was wounded and a prisoner. The final collapse came on December 10th, when the only remaining leaders of note, Wessels and the two Serfonteins, surrendered in the Free State with 1,200 men, the only large body of rebels still in being. In six weeks of swift pursuit and masterly enveloping, Botha had secured the surrender of some 7,000 rebels, with a total Union casualty list of 334, including 78 killed. He was now able to give his attention to renewing the attack on German South-West Africa.

THE OPERATIONS IN EAST AFRICA.

In East Africa the vastness of the lands involved, and the smallness of the forces available to either Power, made effective occupation of territory in the European sense impossible. A railway terminus might be seized, a port on one of the great lakes occupied, or a frontier fort stormed, but in its essence this was to be a prolonged "affair of outposts" on a big scale. All of the few hundreds of Europeans scattered about the East African colonies could not be called up, for enough must be left at their posts to safeguard white dominion over the teeming native races, many of incalculable temper. "It is not the Germans whom we have to protect ourselves against," wrote an Englishwoman living near Nairobi, in September. "There is a fear that the natives, who up to the present have always been very quiet and docile, may take it into their heads to rise, and it is against this preparations are being made. We have concentration camps in different parts of the country, which, at the first sign of any trouble from the natives, we shall all

make for." The fighting, therefore, had to be done by native troops officered by whites, and by such small bodies of white volunteers as could be spared. It was fighting, too, with a curious personal quality rare in the battles of masses in Europe. If the rebellion in South Africa set cousin against cousin, and sometimes father against son, here, on the Anglo German frontiers, men accustomed to foregather at the club and gossip over a "peg" after a hard week's farming, confronted each other through the loopholes of many a frontier post. "The only thing I remember of the fight" wrote an English settler of one border foray, "is that one of their men shot W—. He was lying behind a tuft of short grass, and shot W— at a loophole. I was at the next loophole, and he was only 250 yards away. He knew he'd got W—, and he deliberately stood up and waved his hand. . . . I shot him . . . clean through the head. I felt rather sick about it afterwards. . . . He was quite a good sort." When it is remembered that these operations were carried out on frontiers hundreds of miles long, by a few thousand native troops and a few hundred white men, in the wildest and most difficult country, and in equatorial heat, it is possible to get some notion of the distinctive character of East African fighting.

IMPORTANCE OF THE LAKES AND RAILWAYS.

German East Africa has an area of about 384,000 square miles. The sea bounds it entirely on the east, with a 620 mile coast line. To the north lie British East Africa and Uganda; on the west, Lake Tanganyika. On the south Rhodesia runs up to meet it, the extreme north of Nyasaland touches it, and Lake Nyasa and Portuguese East Africa complete the frontier. The chief trade of the colony found an outlet at the port of Dar-es-Salam, on the East coast, whence the railway—designed to cross Africa, in time, from sea to sea—runs inland through the heart of the colony to Tabora, one of the stations on the projected Cape to Cairo railway. Over the island of Zanzibar, which lies off its eastern coast, and from whose Sultans both Britain and Germany had leased the lands that founded their colonies, Britain had established a protectorate. Between the German and British colonies on the north, and shared almost equally by them both, lie the waters of Victoria Nyanza, one of the greatest of the African lakes, and an important source of trade communication, with an active fleet of small British and German steamers, and many prosperous little ports on its shores. The shipping and ports on Victoria Nyanza presented the readiest points of attack for either side; the seaport of Dar-es-Salam was clearly an important British objective; and since the railway in British East Africa—which is usually known as the Uganda Railway, though it does not go so far as Uganda, but which links the chief harbour, Mombasa, with the capital, Nairobi, and with Port Florence on Victoria Nyanza—runs parallel with the German frontier, a little north of it, it was clearly worth while for German forces to push northwards.

At the outbreak of war, Germany had a native force officered by whites estimated by an East African observer at 5,000 men, and was able to enrol another 2,000 whites. She also set about arming and drilling more natives, with a haste and recklessness which British missionaries, who knew the native temper and ideas of warfare, considered dangerous. Britain had a battalion of the King's African Rifles, which are native troops, in British East Africa, another in Uganda, some 3,000 native police between the two colonies, and several small bodies



The Victoria Falls : a view of the Gorge and Falls from the north bank. *[Exclusive News Agency.]*

of white volunteers. These forces, greatly outnumbered on the southern frontier of British East Africa, had a hard time in the early stages of the operations, until the arrival of Indian reinforcements.

Fighting began with an attack, on August 10th, by a British cruiser on the German port, Dar-es-Salam. A German surveying ship and the floating dock there were sunk, and the important wireless station destroyed. The Germans abandoned the port.

NYASALAND ATTACKED.

Two days later, one of the three vessels of the Marine Transport Department of the Nyasaland Protectorate surprised the armed German steamer, Von Wissman, on the eastern shore of Lake Nyasa, and captured and dismantled her. It was September before Germany attempted an effective reprisal in Nyasaland. In the early days of that month, German troops crossed the northern frontier of the colony, and, evading a British force sent to intercept them on September 9th, attacked Karungwa, one of the chief trading ports of the colony on the north of Lake Nyasa. The port was defended only by an officer with fifty African riflemen and native police, and eight civilians. It succeeded, however, in holding out against an enemy numbering some 400 until relieved by a stronger

column, which pursued the Germans northwards towards the frontier. Germany lost more than half of the white officers attached to her force, and the force itself was checked and broken up with a completeness that saved Nyasaland from further attack for some time.

Further to the east of its southern frontier, the German colony pushed a force into the extreme north-east of Rhodesia, and attacked Abercorn, one of the chief settlements in Northern Rhodesia, just south of Lake Tanganyika. A force of the Rhodesian police, natives officered by whites, opposed the enemy, and after silencing a field gun which they possessed by Maxim fire, compelled them to abandon


their position, and, by a forced night march, drove them over the border on September 10th.

The southerly raids from the German colony had, therefore, effected little. Operating northwards, they were able to give us more trouble. A small German force took up in August a strong position near the British post of Taveta, just over the border of British East Africa, at the point where the Uganda Railway and the border are nearest. From this base a force was pushed forward early

in September to try to blow up the railway at Maungu. It was broken up before it could do any damage, and its dynamite and outfit were captured. On September 6th, however, a strong force of the enemy attacked Tsavo, a station on the railway a little further inland than Maungu. It was well equipped with maxim guns, and was opposed by King's African Rifles, assisted by Indian troops. It failed in its object of occupying the railway, but inflicted heavy losses on us, especially on the 29th Punjabi regiment, which had reinforced the Colonial troops, and which made a gallant attempt to rush the maxim guns with a bayonet charge. Thereafter the British force in the Tsavo district remained on the defensive for some weeks, and successfully repelled several attacks on its positions. The officer in command paid high tribute to the conduct of his native

troops at this time, and said that their example had had the important effect of greatly reassuring the Masai natives of the district.

Meanwhile, at the western end of the border, a German force of some 400 occupied Kisii, a settlement which lies just east of Victoria Nyanza. A small British column which met them was compelled to retire, but the enemy did not consider his position tenable, and retreated to Karungu, on the eastern shores of Lake Victoria. Forces from the settlements of Port Florence and Kisumu, further north on the lake, were at once despatched to dislodge him, but on arrival found Karungu abandoned. A German




To illustrate the fighting in East Africa.



[Topical Press.]

Troops of the South African Defence Force marching into the Castle at Capetown after mobilisation.



A Detachment of the King's African Rifles on parade at Mombasa.

attempt on the western coast of Lake Victoria fared no better. Throughout October and November these frontier raids continued, notably at Gazi, on the coast, where an enemy force of 500 made a determined attack, but were driven back to the frontier; and in the Tsavo district, where the attack on the railway was more than once renewed without success.


A DISASTROUS EXPEDITION.

Two attempts to carry the war into the enemy's country were made, one of which cost us dear. On November 4th we had so far obtained mastery in the fighting round Tsavo that we were able to push across the boundary to Longido, where the Germans held a strong post. An action lasting for a whole day was fought, in which the Punjabis again distinguished themselves by taking three of the enemy's positions in succession. Shortage of water compelled our retirement for a time, but in the face of a second advance the enemy evacuated the post, which was occupied by our force. On November 4th the most serious of our reverses occurred. Misled by the information that, as the guarded official account put it, "an important German railway terminus" was weakly held, an expedition was sent to occupy it. The force was described as "landing" and afterwards "re-embarking," and the terminus in question was doubtless the port of Tanga, in the north-eastern corner of the German colony, whence a railway, designed to link Germany's Lake Victoria ports with the sea, runs inland, roughly parallel with the border, for over 200 miles. In this attack a battalion and a half of mixed British and Indian troops was used, including men of the 101st Grenadiers, the North Lancashire Regiment, and the Kashmir Rifles. The strength in which the town was held had been greatly under-estimated, and when the force had survived a heavy fire on its left flank, and pushed forward with great gallantry into the town itself, where it crossed bayonets with the enemy, it was met with so devastating a fire from the houses that it could not complete the attack, and was compelled to return to its base by sea. The casualties in this action were 745, including 141 British officers and men.

The upshot, therefore, of the first few months' fighting in East Africa was that all British possessions abutting on German East Africa had repelled the raids from that colony, and had succeeded in keeping their ports and railways intact, while two raids, one successful and one disastrous, had been made on German soil. Our casualties had been heavy. Lord Crewe, in the House of Lords, on November 18th, put them at about 900, and explained them by the fact that "the initial position of the Germans was a stronger one than ours." This superior strength was mainly in artillery, and many of the brief accounts of East African actions, especially in the Tsavo district, made mention of the number of maxim guns possessed by German forces. The arrival of Indian reinforcements in time redressed this inequality, and by the end of November the position at all points seemed satisfactory.

THE WEST AFRICAN FIGHTING.


In the operations against Germany's other two African colonies, Togoland and Kamerun on the west, British and French naval and land forces co-operated with excellent results. Togoland, lying between the British colony of the Gold Coast and French Dahomey, has a coast line of only about thirty-two miles, on which its chief settlement, Lome, lies. Inland, it widens to three or four times that breadth, and its total area is 33,000 square miles. To push inwards from the sea, subduing the country as they advanced, was




[Exclusive News Agency.]

Railway bridge over the Zambesi at Livingstone, Rhodesia.


clearly the policy for the Allies, and that policy was immediately begun. A British cruiser secured the surrender of Lome in August without opposition. In doing so, it captured one of the largest wireless-telegraphy stations in the world, for it was with Togoland that, after years of costly experiment, the Telefunken Company established connection from near Berlin, a distance of over 3,000 miles. From there, regular communication was to have been made with German East and South-West Africa. A French force operating from Dahomey, in conjunction with the British naval force, made the subjugation of Togoland secure, and by the 11th of November the Board of Trade were able to state that, in the opinion of the Governor of the Gold Coast and of the Commander of the Forces in Togoland, there



The Harbour at Tanga, German East Africa.



The mail boat leaving the landing stage at Port Florence, on Victoria Nyanza.



An engine taking in fuel from a woodstack on the Uganda Railway.

was no reason why British traders should not extend their operations to that colony.


FRANCE AND KAMERUN.

Operations against Kamerun were attended with much more difficulty, though here again the co-operation of British and French forces was of great value. Kamerun, lying between British Nigeria and the French Congo, has an area of nearly 200,000 square miles, a population of about two and a half millions, including some two thousand white men of military age, and over three thousand native troops, officered by whites. The French attack on the colony was given special point by the fact that the south-eastern extremity of it, which almost severs the French Congo from the French Sudan, had been extorted from France by Germany with the Agadir threat of three years before.

Had the policy followed in Togoland of an advance from the sea been adopted solely in Kamerun, it is probable that the allied arms would have been consistently successful. The first attacks on Kamerun were, however, made from Nigeria, and failed. On August 25th, a detachment of the West African Frontier Force, carrying out a reconnaissance from Yola, in Nigeria, pushed forward to Tepe in Kamerun, and, overcoming the resistance offered there, proceeded to Garua, where it captured the fort. On August 30th, it was very heavily counter-attacked, and forced to retreat to British territory, having suffered considerably. No better fortune attended two other columns that crossed the frontier further south, from Ikom and from Calabar; and the policy of attack

from this side was wisely abandoned until a diversion from the coast should make it more practicable.

Meanwhile, H.M.S. *Cumberland* and *Dwarf* had reconnoitred the mouth of the Kamerun River, and the approaches to Duala, the chief port of the colony, and, at the end of September, a concerted attack was made on the coast of the colony by a French force from Libreville, in the French Congo, and the British warships. On September 27th, Duala and Bonaberi, the important settlements close together at the mouth of the river, surrendered unconditionally after a bombardment. Victoria, further north, the other important harbour of the colony, and the outlet for the administrative capital, Buea, which lies just inland from it, was seized by a force of Royal Marines after bombardment by a French cruiser and the Nigerian Government yacht. With the coast from Victoria to Duala as a base, the Anglo-French forces now advanced inland in a fan-like formation in pursuit of an enemy who had been enabled, by two railways and a river valley, to retreat in three different directions. Buea, at the end of the westernmost stay of the fan, was occupied on November 15th; Majuka, some fifty miles north of Bonaberi, on the railway, had already fallen; Jabassi, straight inland from Bonaberi up the Wuri River, was taken by an allied naval and military force on October 8th; and Edea, an important station on the line that runs southward from Duala, fell to a French force on October 26th. The Allies now held the chief ports and railway termini, together with the hinterland within a fifty miles radius of the Kamerun River, and had gained them at small sacrifice. It remained to be seen how far the fan of their advance could be extended.



The scene of the fighting in West Africa.



The part played by motor transports in the retreat from Antwerp: Cars attached to the Belgian Army and the British Naval Brigade drawn up on the outskirts of the city.

[Newspaper Illustrations.]



Another view of the British motor transports halted on the retreat from Antwerp.

[Newspaper Illustrations.]



Watching the bombardment of Antwerp from an armoured car.

[Photopress.]

CHAPTER XXVI.

MOTOR VEHICLES IN THE WAR.

THE FIRST WAR IN WHICH THE MOTOR WAS EXTENSIVELY USED—THE SYSTEM OF SUBVENTIONS AT HOME AND ABROAD—MOTOR SUPPLY COLUMNS—AMBULANCES—THE ARMoured MOTOR.

THE extensive employment of motor vehicles in this war very materially affected its tactics and strategy. Some use was made of motor lorries and tractors in the South African war, and results were sufficiently satisfactory to direct the attention of military authorities throughout Europe towards the rapid development of the motor industry. Mechanical Transport Companies were formed at Aldershot and elsewhere, and it was at first expected that the five-ton steam tractor would prove to be the most serviceable type of machine for military work. The special features in favour of the tractor are its ability to detach itself from its load, and to haul either itself or its trailing vehicles singly out of any difficult position by means of a wire rope gear. The utility of the steam tractor, or, in fact, of any steam-driven vehicle, is circumscribed by its dependence on ample and frequent renewals of fuel and water supplies. In view of this, efforts have been made to encourage the production of reliable internal combustion tractors. The progress of this type of machine has, however, been slow compared with that of the self-contained motor lorry, which can travel with safety at higher speeds, and is a more compact vehicle.

The Governments of the various countries in which motors began to be used extensively for commercial purposes quickly realised that the best way of putting themselves into possession of adequate fleets for mechanical transport

was not any system of direct purchase of tractors or other vehicles in quantity, but rather the adoption of some scheme tending to direct the ordinary civilian demand for heavy motors into suitable channels, and so to make large numbers of lorries available to be requisitioned in emergency. It was clear that ordinary commercial developments might diverge further and further from military requirements, in view of which it became necessary to offer artificial inducements to purchasers of vehicles suitable for army work. Subvention or subsidy schemes were started almost simultaneously in France and Germany. The former decided to encourage principally lorries designed to carry three-ton loads, while the latter preferred to stimulate the demand for larger machines, capable of carrying about four tons, and drawing an additional two tons in a rubber-tyred trailer. Probably the French will have proved to have been the wiser as regards the broad principle, since the difficulty of operating motor vehicles over broken roads and across loose and muddy ground and light temporary bridges is, to some degree, proportionate to their size.

Both in France and in Germany traders proved somewhat reluctant to adopt motor transport, and the inducement offered had to be considerable. The French subsidy scheme provided for a payment in respect of each vehicle of a total sum of about £300, spread over a period of three years. German conditions, both as regards the road



The remains of a German motor convoy which was completely destroyed by the French guns.

[Topical Press.



A collection of damaged motors captured from the Germans in France.

[Topical Press.

system and trade, necessitated even larger payments, amounting in the aggregate to about £450, over a period of five years, for each lorry of the approved type. In Great Britain conditions were very different. Traders were adopting motor vans and lorries very freely, and the country was still, when war broke out, the only one in which the available supply of industrial motors was in excess of the military requirement. Consequently, it was not necessary to pay so high a subsidy, and only about £120, spread over three years, was offered. At the same time, the scheme was far more strict than the others as regards the design of the machines enrolled. It served, in fact, to create new types of three-ton lorries, and, to a limited extent, also of lighter vehicles, suitable for carrying about thirty hundredweights. Traders were not quick to adopt the British subvention models, and at the beginning of the war the number available cannot have been more than a few hundred, including all those owned by the War Department. There were, however, available in ample quantities plenty of excellent machines of about the same carrying capacity, but generally fitted with rather smaller wheels, and differing from the approved types in certain minor respects.

Austria was late in putting a subsidy scheme into force; and in spite of a substantial payment of about £360 per car, it is safe to say that the fleet available at the outbreak of war was still far short of requirements. In Russia, the bad quality of the roads and their comparative infrequency has been sufficient in itself to discourage the commercial use of motors which, in any case, would not yet have been justified by trade conditions. Consequently, the Government had to depend on direct purchase in foreign markets. At least 500 lorries were purchased from Germany between the beginning of 1913 and August, 1914. A fair number were obtained from Great Britain, and since the beginning of the war huge contracts have been placed by the Russian Government with British manufacturers. Probably, large fleets would only have been of very limited use in Russia during the first few months of the operations had they been available, but our Allies have looked ahead. It is said that just before leaving Petrograd, the Austrian military attaché expressed surprise at the number of motors which had even then been requisitioned, or purchased, on the ground that they could not be used on Russian roads. The reply in effect was that that was not the purpose for which they had been brought together, and that the roads of Austria and Germany were of quite satisfactory quality.

During its first five years of operation, ending March, 1913, the German subvention scheme produced 625 army motor trains, while about 400 somewhat similar machines were in use in the country. At the outbreak of war, the number of lorries of approved type available in Germany was probably in the neighbourhood of 1,500 to 1,600, and there were, of course, other industrial vehicles to the number of probably about 5,000.

OMNIBUSES AT THE FRONT.

Among the steps taken in common by all the belligerent powers at the commencement of the war were provisions to prevent the export of motor vehicles or their fuel. In France, Russia, Germany, and Austria, probably almost every fit motor vehicle of ordinary type was commandeered. In Great Britain, such a wholesale proceeding was not necessary. Many thousand cars and lorries were, however, promptly requisitioned. The majority were exported from Avonmouth after undergoing a brief inspection, in the course of which a certain number

were refused as unsuitable. Even so, our transport was at first of mixed quality. It included large numbers of admirable cars, and large numbers also of second-hand vehicles which had seen their best days, or had been subjected to rough handling by inexperienced drivers. These fleets were put under the control of men equally hastily collected, and not by any means in every case competent for the work. Together with the transport lorries and staff cars, a large fleet of motor omnibuses, principally taken from London, was sent out. The majority of these have been used mainly for the rapid carriage of men from point to point, but some were converted into lorries and ambulances, and others have been carrying food and other supplies in their original double-decked bodies.

On the whole, 'bus drivers have proved very satisfactory members of the Mechanical Transport Corps, even though the bulk of them are not possessed of that mechanical knowledge which is requisite to effect emergency repairs upon the road.

After the first demand had been met, steps were taken to increase and renew the fleet of transport lorries by the purchase of adequate numbers of new three-ton vehicles of a limited number of accredited makes. Contracts were placed with these manufacturers for the supply of a pre-arranged number of lorries every week, and the result must undoubtedly be that the efficiency of the British supply and transport columns is steadily increasing. While on active service the vehicles are divided into convoys, and it is evidently very much better, when possible, to arrange that all the units of any one convoy shall be of the same make and type, so that the speed of all the cars shall be about the same, and the convoy shall be able to keep together both on hills and on the level. Another advantage of dividing the fleet up in this way is that it reduces very much the quantity of spare parts which have to be carried in support of each convoy.

In France, every sound industrial motor vehicle of suitable capacity was promptly requisitioned, and various motor works were put under military control, with a view to maintaining a subsequent supply. Within a few hours, Paris was entirely denuded of its fleet of upwards of 1,000 motor omnibuses. These vehicles had been designed partly with an eye to possible military use. They are all of the single-deck variety, and the chassis are very strongly and somewhat heavily built. A very little work suffices to turn the Paris omnibus into a useful lorry for the carriage of meat, or alternatively into a capacious ambulance. It is for the former purpose that most of the cars are, in fact, being used, and in this capacity they are giving excellent service, and have shown themselves peculiarly reliable. The French 'bus driver has in his composition a touch of recklessness, which helped to fit him well for his work. It is equally certain that every suitable heavy motor in Germany and Austria has been commandeered, while Russia, as already stated, has had to depend principally on new fleets ordered from Great Britain, large consignments of which were shipped through to Archangel before winter traffic to that port became impossible.

In the early stages of the war there was a serious shortage of motor ambulances, but hundreds—perhaps thousands—of motorists willingly presented their cars to the Red Cross Societies and Ambulance Associations, by whom funds were collected to equip these vehicles with ambulance bodies. The demand on the British Red Cross Society alone must have been in the neighbourhood of 1,000 vehicles, the majority of which are suited to take four stretchers each, though a certain number of smaller




A convoy of British Red Cross motors drawn up at a French base.

[Newspaper Illustrations.]



Wounded British troops in a London 'bus which had been converted into a motor ambulance.

[Alfieri Picture Service.]



The interior of a motor ambulance.

[Newspaper Illustrations.]

two-stretcher cars have gone out, together with a few waggonettes and other capacious vehicles suitable for carrying men who need not travel in stretchers. In some instances the body design of the ambulances provides for some special means of suspending stretchers through the medium of springs, and so insulating the patients from part of the vibration which passes the car springs. In introducing spring suspension it has been found that great care has to be taken to secure that the stretchers shall not be capable of any rolling or swinging motion relative to the ambulance body while the car is travelling. Difficulties in this respect, and the possibilities of breakages in any unnecessary mechanism, have led to the more usual adoption of a very simple body, in which the stretchers are run in along shelves and securely strapped in position. The bodies themselves consist of sufficiently stout wooden frames covered by waterproof canvas. In very many cases the ambulances are being driven on active service by the motorists who supplied the chassis, and who also gave their own services as volunteers. The work is not without its dangers, for the cars are not infrequently required to run right up to the trenches, and the enemy has not on all occasions shown much respect for the Red Cross.

MOTOR SUPPLY TRANSPORT.

The general system under which the bulk of the ambulances operate will be better understood when a brief description has been given of the system by means of which the motor has revolutionised the transport and supply columns, increased the mobility of huge armies, and, for the first time, enabled large bodies of men in the field to be provided regularly and punctually with fresh meat and bread. The new system has perhaps been worked out to greater perfection in connection with the British army than in the case of any of the other forces engaged. Any description must, of course, refer only to the main scheme, and not to every individual instance, since wide variations are entailed by special circumstances. In general, however, the arrangements which apply not only to the provision of food, but to the bringing forward of ammunition and other warlike stores, are as follows:—

At some safe point along the railways to the rear of the army is the base where supplies are collected, and from which they are forwarded every day up the line to a point known as "railhead"; that is to say, the military terminus for the time being. Railhead is moved in accordance with the movements of the troops, but even when, as in the present instance, fine systems of strategic railways are available, it is not always possible to bring supplies up by rail to the near vicinity of the fighting front. The old scheme for the further transfer of supplies forward from railhead was the provision of a number of *échelons* of horsed waggons. One *échelon* followed a little way behind the troops, and the others completed the chain to railhead at intervals, which would allow of each *échelon* getting into touch once during the day with the one in front of it, and also with the one behind it. In this way, supplies were gradually pushed forward in sections, and if an army was advancing rapidly, or railhead was at a considerable distance from the front, many days elapsed between the time when the supplies left the base and the time when they arrived at the front. A whole series of horsed *échelons* is now replaced by a single column of motor lorries, which, by their speed and carrying capacity, are able to bring the whole of the supplies through direct in one journey to a movable point close behind the troops, called a "refilling point." Here, the goods

are handed over to horsed vehicles for detail distribution, motors not being used systematically further forward, owing to the fact that it cannot safely be assumed that roads will be available on which they can travel. Under this system, animals may perhaps be brought into the slaughter house at the base on Monday evening and the food supplies forwarded the same night by train to railhead. Here they are met in the small hours of Tuesday morning by the motor column, which is then loaded, and goes forward to hand over its supplies to the horsed vehicles at refilling point on Tuesday evening, after which it returns for next day's load. On Tuesday night, the horsed vehicles deliver the food to the travelling kitchens, in which it is cooked during Wednesday's march, providing a hot meal for the men on Wednesday evening. Not only is the delay involved in bringing food forward reduced to a minimum by the use of motors, but the main roads behind the armies are cleared of long and obstructive columns of slow-moving horsed vehicles. The rapidity of a forward movement is not impeded by the necessity of waiting for food supplies, and a retreat is not rendered unnecessarily dangerous by congestion along the main arteries. Without motors the rapid advance of Von Kluck's army in the direction of Paris in the early stages of the war would probably have been impossible, and it is equally probable that without motors the masterly retreat so successfully carried out by the British would have terminated in disaster. Nor, as has been already pointed out, would De Wet have been caught so soon.

The system of dealing with ammunition and warlike supplies is much the same, except that more strict precautions have to be taken to prevent waggons carrying large stores of explosives from coming within range of artillery fire. On occasions, no doubt, any or all of the machines may be required to work right up to the trenches or firing line, but this is certainly no part of the main system.

MOTOR AMBULANCES.

Turning back to the question of ambulance services, it will be seen that the transport motor has made armies more independent of the near support of railways. Consequently, the distances over which wounded men may have to be carried by road are correspondingly increased. In theory, motor ambulances connect the hospitals situated at railhead and along the line in the direction of the base with the dressing stations close behind the scene of action. The pressure on these latter has to be relieved rapidly and regularly to enable them to take in the fresh cases which, according to the main scheme, are brought from the advance dressing stations by military ambulance waggons. The general idea is that wounded men are first carried by regimental stretcher bearers to an aid post, where prompt medical attention can be received, and thence by the bearer sections of the field ambulance to the advance dressing stations. In practice, it is not uncommon for the motor ambulances to work right up to the aid posts, or even to the firing line.

At the beginning of the war, the inevitable effect of the full use of transport motors on the requirement for motor ambulances would seem not to have been fully realised. At any rate, the demand upon the resources of the British Red Cross Society and kindred organisations came somewhat suddenly, and was of unexpected dimensions. Motorists proved very generous in lending or giving their cars and their services, and the public response to an appeal for funds to keep the fleets so formed in being was quick and generous. The difficulties of



Motor cyclist despatch riders attached to the Expeditionary Force awaiting instructions.

[Central News.]



Serving out petrol to the German transport service at a supply depot established at Bruges.

[Newspaper Illustrations.]

providing sufficient motor ambulances for the use of the French army have been greater than those experienced with our own, and there is a strong likelihood of the supply of motors and skilled drivers running short, and of Great Britain being called upon to render the assistance which, fortunately, it is in her power to give. It is equally certain that the motor ambulance services of the hostile armies will prove more and more inadequate as time goes on.

One of the surprises of the war has been the very extensive use of the armoured motor car. In this respect, it must be admitted that Germany showed the most foresight. Considerable attention had been given in advance to the construction of motors designed to carry machine guns, and guns specially designed for meeting aeroplane attacks. Krupp's had also equipped heavy motors for the carriage of field artillery. Heavy artillery must, of course, be drawn, and not carried. For this work the British army have used steam lorries and tractors, and it is reported that Germany has employed British-built traction engines for hauling her huge siege guns. The French have for some time past been experimenting in a special type of motor tractor for the haulage of heavy artillery. In this type, the whole weight of the machine is utilised by providing a positive drive from the engine to all four wheels instead of to the rear wheels only.

Reverting to the armoured car, we find that Germany was certainly in possession of a considerable number of these when hostilities opened. The Belgians very promptly followed suit. Ordinary touring cars were hastily protected by steel plates, and in some cases equipped with light machine guns. Next to nothing had been done in this direction in Great Britain prior to the war, and very little in France, but the armoured car is, fortunately, a machine which can be improvised with fair efficiency. Some of those employed in our own service, as, for example, by the Naval Brigade at Antwerp and in the Ostend district, have been London motor omnibus chassis with light steel plate bodies, and similar protection for the driver and the most vulnerable parts of the mechanism.

For high speed work, as, for example, scouting in advance of cavalry, and for supporting the operations of members of the Aero Corps, touring car chassis on pneumatic tyres have been similarly armoured. As a rule, the improvised armoured car cannot provide such complete protection as the vehicle specially constructed for this work. In the latter case, one or two machine guns are generally mounted on a revolving turret centrally situated a little forward of the rear wheels. In some cases, two turrets are provided side by side, supported, together with the gun mountings, on an aluminium or light steel base. Very complete protection has to be provided for the engines generally, and particularly for the radiators. Usually, every precaution is taken to guard against breakdown. For example, two quite separate systems of

ignition are provided, and two separate systems through which the petrol is supplied to the engine. The petrol tank must, of course, be very thoroughly protected. Provision can usually be conveniently made to the rear of the vehicle for the carriage of ammunition. Pneumatic tyres are, of course, open to objections, and sometimes one or other of the types of tyre which are a compromise between the pneumatic and the solid is preferred. For scouting work, and in conjunction with aeroplanes, the armoured cars have been proving themselves invaluable.

Even the lightest type of motor—the motor cycle—has borne its share in the war. Excellent work has been done by motor-cycling scouts and despatch carriers, while motor cyclists who are skilled mechanics accompany the transport columns to help in the event of breakdown, to keep the column together, and to assist in finding the way. The motor car in its normal form is extensively used by Staff Officers, from the Commander-in-Chief downwards. It has, in fact, become an essential, on account of the enormous length of front of the armies in the field.

Generally speaking, the use of the motor vehicle of one kind or another has had such great effects as to revolutionise the art of warfare. Movements of troops and supplies are daily being carried out which without motor transport would be impossible. Information as to the movements of hostile forces is, by the motor and the aeroplane, gathered with such accuracy as to minimise any risk of surprise on a large scale. It is doubtful how far without motors the long siege battles of the war would have been possible. Probably, one or other of the fighting lines would have been broken after a short time as the result of an unknown concentration of opposing forces. Probably, also, many positions would have proved untenable for a long period, owing to the impossibility of supplying the men who occupied them with food and ammunition. It may be a doubtful question whether, in such respects, the motor is proving itself a blessing or a curse, but as to its enormous utility there can be no two opinions, and the mere fact that we have it in our power to maintain the motor services of our own troops and those of our Allies must, as time goes on, give us an enormous advantage over an enemy less favourably situated. Coupled with this consideration is the fact that, thanks to our navy, our supplies of motor fuel are in no imminent risk of running short, whereas Germany must be experiencing increasing difficulty in maintaining her stock of petrol, especially while the supply from the Austrian oil fields in Galicia is cut off as the result of Russian occupation. This is the only supply of any importance possessed by any of the three hostile countries, and the possibility of bringing in the fuel which is now so necessary for operations, both on land and sea, depends almost entirely on the uncertain results of a skilfully organised system of smuggling through neutral countries.

Appendix to Chapter XXIV.

REPORT BY COMMANDER BERTRAM
W. L. NICHOLSON, R.N., LATE
OF H.M.S. CRESSY.

SIR,—I have the honour to submit the following report in connection with the sinking of H.M.S. *Cressy*, in company with H.M.S. *Aboukir* and *Hogue*, on the morning of the 22nd September, whilst on patrol duty.

The *Aboukir* was struck at about 6-25 a.m. on the starboard beam. The *Hogue* and *Cressy* closed and took up position, the *Hogue* ahead of the *Aboukir* and the *Cressy* about 400 yards on the port beam. As soon as it was seen that the *Aboukir* was in danger of sinking, all boats were sent away from the *Cressy*, and the picket-boat was hoisted out without steam up. When the cutters, full of the *Aboukir's* men, were returning to the *Cressy*, the *Hogue* was struck, apparently under the aft 9-2 magazine, as a very heavy explosion took place immediately after the first explosion.

Almost directly after the *Hogue* was hit we observed a periscope on our port bow, about 300 yards off. Fire was immediately opened and the engines put full speed ahead, with the intention of ramming her down. Our gunner, Mr. Doherty, positively asserts that he hit the periscope, and that the submarine then showed her conning-tower, which he struck, and the submarine sank. An officer standing alongside the gunner thinks that the shell struck only floating timber, of which there was much about, but it was evidently the impression of the men on deck, who cheered and clapped heartily, that the submarine had been hit. This submarine did not fire a torpedo at the *Cressy*.

TORPEDO'S TRACK VISIBLE.

Captain Johnson then manoeuvred the ship so as to render assistance to the crews of the *Hogue* and *Aboukir*. About five minutes later another periscope was seen on our starboard quarter, and fire was opened. The track of the torpedo she fired at a range of five or six hundred yards was plainly visible, and it struck us on the starboard side, just before the after bridge. The ship listed about ten degrees to starboard and remained steady; time, 7-15 a.m. All water-tight doors, dead-lights, and scuttles had been securely closed before the torpedo struck the ship. All mess stools and tables, shores, and all available timber below and on deck had been previously got up and thrown over the side for saving life. A second torpedo, fired by the same submarine, missed, and passed about twenty feet astern. About a quarter of an hour after the first torpedo hit, a third torpedo, fired from a submarine just before the starboard beam, hit us in No. 5 boiler room; time, 7-20. The ship then began to heel rapidly, and finally turned keel up, remaining so for about twenty minutes before she finally sank at 7-55 a.m.

A large number of men were saved by the casting adrift of a pattern 3 target. The steam pinnace floated out of her

crutches, but filled and sank. The second torpedo which struck the *Cressy* passed over the sinking hull of the *Aboukir*, narrowly missing it. It is possible that the same submarine fired all three torpedoes at the *Cressy*.

The conduct of the crew was excellent throughout. I have already reported the splendid service rendered by Captain Philips, master of the trawler *L. T. Coriander*, and his crew, who picked up 156 officers and men.

I have the honour, &c.,

BERTRAM W. L. NICHOLSON,
Commander, late H.M.S. *Cressy*.

REPORT BY COMMANDER REGINALD
A. NORTON, R.N., LATE OF H.M.S.
HOGUE.

SIR,—I have the honour to report as follows concerning the sinking of H.M. ships *Hogue*, *Aboukir*, and *Cressy* :—

Between 6-15 and 6-30 a.m. H.M.S. *Aboukir* was struck by a torpedo. The *Hogue* closed to the *Aboukir*, and I received orders to hoist out the launch, turn out and prepare all boats, and unleash all timber on the upper deck. The two lifeboats were sent to the *Aboukir*, but before the launch could get away the *Hogue* was struck on the starboard side amidships by two torpedoes, at intervals of ten to twenty seconds. The ship at once began to heel to starboard.

After ordering the men to provide themselves with wood, hammocks, &c., and to get into the boats on the booms and take off their clothes, I went by Captain Nicholson's orders to ascertain the damage in the engine rooms. An artificer engineer informed me that the water was over the engine-room gratings. While endeavouring to return to the bridge the water burst open the starboard entry port doors, and the ship heeled rapidly. I told the men in the port battery to jump overboard, as the launch was close alongside, and soon afterwards the ship lurched heavily to starboard. I clung to a ringbolt for some time, but eventually dropped on to the deck, and a huge wave washed me away. I climbed up the ship's side and was again washed off.

Eventually, after swimming about from various overlaid pieces of wreckage, I was picked up by a cutter from the *Hogue*, Coxswain L. S. Marks, which pulled about for some hours picking up men and discharging them to our picket boat and steam pinnace, and to the Dutch steamers *Flora* and *Titan*, and rescued in this way Commander Sells, Engineer-Commander Stokes, with legs broken, Fleet Paymaster Eldred, and about twenty others. Finally, about 10 a.m., when we could find no more men in the water, we were picked up by H.M.S. *Lucifer*, which proceeded to the *Titan* and took off from her all our men except about twenty, who were too ill to be moved.

"DOING WELL."

A Lowestoft trawler and the two Dutch ships *Flora* and *Titan* were extraordinarily kind, clothing and feeding our men. My boat's crew, consisting mainly of R.N.R. men, pulled and behaved remarkably well. I particularly wish to mention Petty Officer (first-class) Halton, who, by encouraging the men in the water near me, undoubtedly saved many lives. Lieutenant-Commander Phillips-Wolley, after hoisting out the launch, asked me if he should try to hoist out another boat, and endeavoured to do so. The last I saw of him was on the after bridge, doing well. Lieutenant Tillard was picked up by the launch, got up a cutter's crew, and saved many lives, as did Midshipman Cazalet in the *Cressy's* gig. Lieutenant Chichester turned out the whaler very quickly.

A Dutch sailing trawler sailed close by, but went off without rendering any assistance, though we signalled to her from the *Hogue* to close after we were struck. The *Aboukir* appeared to me to take about thirty-five minutes to sink, floating bottom up for about five minutes. The *Hogue* turned turtle very quickly in about five minutes, and floated bottom up for some minutes. A dense black smoke was seen in the starboard battery, whether from coal or torpedo cordite I could not say. The upper deck was not blown up, and only one other small explosion occurred as we heeled over. The *Cressy* I watched heel over from the cruiser. She heeled over to starboard very slowly, a dense black smoke issuing from her, when she attained an angle of about ninety degrees, and she took a long time from this angle till she floated bottom up with the starboard screw slightly out of the water. I consider it was thirty-five to forty-five minutes from the time she was struck till she was bottom up.

GALLANT DEEDS.

All the men in the *Hogue* behaved extraordinarily well, obeying orders even when in the water swimming for their lives, and I witnessed many cases of great self-sacrifice and gallantry. Farmstone, able seaman, R.N.R., H.M.S. *Hogue*, jumped overboard from the launch to make room for others, and would not avail himself of assistance until all men near by were picked up. He was in the water about half an hour. There was no panic of any sort, the men taking of their clothes as ordered and falling in with hammock or wood. Captain Nicholson, in our other cutter, as usual, was perfectly cool, and rescued a large number of men. I last saw him alongside the *Flora*. Engineer-Commander Stokes, I believe, was in the engine-room to the last, and Engineer-Lieutenant-Commander Fendick got up steam on the boat and worked it in five minutes.


I have the honour to submit that I may be appointed to another ship as soon as I can get a kit. I have the honour.

REGINALD A. NORTON, Commander,
late H.M.S. *Hogue*.

Ram Chandra Mishra *Ram Chandra Mishra*

The Manchester Guardian HISTORY of the WAR

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
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
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A British Air Fleet drawn up for inspection.

[Record Press.]

CHAPTER XXVII.

THE WAR IN THE AIR.


THE AIR-SERVICES OF BRITAIN, FRANCE, AND GERMANY COMPARED—THE MERITS AND DEFECTS OF THE FRENCH SERVICE—THE LOSSES AT RHEIMS—THE OPERATIONS BY AIR AT DUSSELDORF, FRIEDRICHSHAFEN, AND CUXHAVEN—THE VALUE OF THE "FIFTH ARM."

IF for no other reason, the war of 1914 will always be memorable because in it for the first time the opposing armies and navies gave each other battle, not only on the land and by sea, but in the air. Captive balloons had been used for observation purposes as long ago as the war of 1870, and in the South African war man-lifting kites were also employed for the same purpose. It was not, however, until five years ago, when the aeroplane engine became reasonably perfect, and it was possible to move with certainty and in any direction in the air, that aerial warfare became practicable and demanded the attention of the General Staffs. Clearly, the new inventions had great military possibilities, and they were not long in being put to the test. In the Italian war in Tripoli, in the summer of 1911, aeroplanes and dirigible balloons were employed to act with the Italian forces, but as the campaign presented none of the opportunities for reconnaissance which warfare in an enclosed country and against a civilised enemy gives, the aviators had little opportunity of showing what they could do. The war in Tripoli was immediately followed by the Balkan war, and though in this case the campaign was conducted on a scale and over country which gave great opportunity for reconnaissance by aeroplane, the aeronautical services attached to the opposing sides were less highly developed than that of Italy in the preceding war. The Turks had one or two German aeroplanes, and a few officers trained to fly without being trained to use an aeroplane for military purposes. The Servians and the Bulgarians accepted the services of a number of volunteers, who were either flying instructors or civilian aviators in England or France, but they were able to

provide them with only a very poor and miscellaneous collection of machines not suitable for military work, and none of them had the training necessary to make good use of what they saw on the considerable voyages which they made. From time to time Bulgarian aviators made flights over Adrianople, and dropped bombs, though without apparently doing any damage, and the end of the war came without any evidence having been given of the effectiveness of aerial forces as a support to armies in the field. Misled by the apparent ineffectiveness of military aviation in these two wars, many people were inclined to take them as typical of all that the aeroplane could do as a fighting instrument, and to express the belief that there was no use wasting money and burdening further already overburdened army estimates with provision for the new and so-called fifth arm.


THE MERITS AND DEFECTS OF THE FRENCH SERVICE.

This was not, however, the view taken by the military authorities; and while the Balkan States were indulging in their somewhat amateur experiments, the great armies of Europe were each busily engaged in forming flying corps. The French, owing to their lead, which had been definitely established in the whole art of flight, were first in the field, and in the years following the first great flying meeting of 1909 they acquired large quantities of machines, and trained a large number of officers and men as military aviators. Their practice in flying was constant, and they certainly had attained a mastery of cross-country flight long before the aviators of any other nation. The French aviation service had, however, its defects, as



Two Naval Waterplanes in position on H.M.S. Hibernia.

[Newspaper Illustrations.]



A Zeppelin flying over its shed on Lake Constance.

[Newspaper Illustrations.]

well as its good qualities. The purchase of machines was not always free from a certain amount of favouritism, and even in some cases of corruption, and the knowledge which was present to the mind of every manufacturer that he could always find a market from the Government for whatever machines he built did not tend to encourage improvement in design. Machines of old patterns, and of patterns not suitable for military purposes, were kept on the active list of aeroplanes in large numbers. The desire to spread out contracts over different manufacturers, and the failure to do what was done in England in the way of establishing a Government design, led to the unnecessary accumulation of different types of machines, with all the difficulty which that entailed of providing different kinds of spare parts. The organisation of the service, too, was not particularly efficient, and only a few months before the declaration of war the report of the Committee of the French Senate had vigorously condemned the state of aerial preparation of the Army Service. The French Air Corps had, then, the virtues of courage and a high degree of skill, but it was not so well organised as our own, or as the German. In the first weeks of the war it suffered a further handicap. A raid made upon the different cities of the Rhine proved ineffective, while the scouting service with the army was depleted by the German occupation of Rheims, in which, according to official American reports, which are believed to be accurate, fifty aeroplanes fell into the hands of the enemy. Further, as all the biggest French aeroplane construction works lie in territory which has been occupied since the end of August by the enemy, the air service has naturally been at some difficulty to effect repairs, and to get delivery of new machines.

THE GERMAN AIR SERVICE.


The German army took up aeronautics at a later period than the French, and for long military experts in Germany were inclined to place more reliance on the airship than on the aeroplane, and it was on the airship that their first efforts and expenditure were made. In England we are inclined to associate the German airship service with the Zeppelin and with nothing else, but it is well to remember—especially in the light of what his airships have accomplished in the present war—that Count Zeppelin was for long a hero of the Court and the public rather than of the army, and that it was only on the urgent insistence of the Emperor that the Zeppelins were employed by the military authorities at all. In fact, this reluctance on the part of the military and experts appears to have been justified, at any rate so far as service with the army in the field is concerned. With the main German army in France only two airships, both of them of the older non-rigid type, have been seen by the British Expeditionary Force; and though on many occasions visits of Zeppelins to Antwerp were described in the newspapers, it is now certain that a Zeppelin (it may even have been another kind of airship) appeared there on only one occasion, and that the other attacks were made by aeroplane. Various reports have been published from time to time of the destruction of Zeppelins by the Allied forces; most of them have probably been imaginary, though perhaps five authentic cases exist; but if the casualty list of the Zeppelin were no more in war than it has been in peace, the Allies need have no reason to be dissatisfied. The Zeppelin is ineffective as an adjunct to a field army for any purpose whatever, though it may have advantages of other kinds. That the German Staff themselves take this view is clear from the fact that from the

first moment of the war they made use in the field exclusively of the aeroplane.

High praise must be awarded to the qualities which the German aeroplane service has shown in action. The aeroplanes themselves, though they possess an excellent engine, are inferior in some important flying qualities to our own, and to some of the French. But though they cannot climb as quickly or fly so fast as our own, they have been manned by officers who have completely grasped the fact—forgotten by the French—that the ability to fly an aeroplane is no more in itself a military quality than the ability to ride a horse is, and that to be a military aviator is a highly-skilled and technical thing altogether apart from the main handling of the machine. Without doubt, the German aviators have proved themselves experts in reconnaissance, which has been mainly strategical, and took them in Belgium and France far ahead of the armies to which they were attached, and also in tactical work, particularly in combined action with artillery—a matter in which we ourselves undoubtedly learned a good deal from them in the earlier stages of the war. (The German method of assisting artillery was to fly, very often quite low, along the trench which it was desired to shell, and to drop over it a piece of tinfoil or tinsel paper, which glistened in the sun as it fell, and remained in the air long enough to enable the gunners to get the range.) In other qualities the German aviators have proved inferior; they have almost invariably gone under in any conflict for the mastery of the air in a particular neighbourhood, and in those strange combats in which one aeroplane endeavours to destroy another our own men have been almost invariably the victors. It is becoming apparent also that the German aeroplane service is insufficiently equipped with the means to replace a wastage in material. After the first two months of the war the activity of German aviators slackened, and our own pilots acquired a virtual mastery of the air over the area of the actual fighting.


THE BRITISH AIR SERVICE.

Of the three nations at war in the Western area we in England started latest to set up an air force, and when we did start the Government had to run the gauntlet of a continual and somewhat embittered series of criticisms, which alleged that insufficient encouragement was given to manufacturers; that the design of machine which the Government was making for itself was bad; and that the men—though their bravery and skill were acknowledged—were insufficiently trained, and in insufficient numbers. In fact, the organisation of the Royal Flying Corps, though it was not quite complete at the beginning of the war, has proved itself brilliantly successful. It has proved certainly for its numbers, and for the length of time in its training (and even without these qualifications), the best of all those engaged in the war. Its pilots have flown constantly and in all weathers, and their services in reconnaissance and in other ways have earned them special mention in the despatches of the Commander-in-Chief. Certainly the safety of the British army in the first critical moment is almost entirely due to the reports which the observers were able to bring Sir John French of the enemy's movements. Nothing has been more marked in the efficiency of the Flying Corps at the front than the organisation of their base, with its motor repair shop and assembly of spare parts and spare machines. All the pilots of the squadrons of the Flying Corps now at the front flew from England to their base, and spare




Transporting a new aeroplane by road to the front in France.

[Central News.]



German machine guns mounted for driving off hostile aircraft.

[Photopress.]



[Record Press.

Airmen in position on a military aeroplane, showing a type of hand bomb which is dropped from the side of the machine.

machines have generally been sent to France in this manner. In all these flights no casualties have been reported, and not more than a dozen members of the Royal Flying Corps have appeared in the list of killed, wounded, and prisoners. One of them, Captain Robin Grey, fell into German hands in Frankfurt while he was on a flight to destroy the railway station in the city.

So far we have been dealing with the air service attached to the forces on land, and with that side of their work which has been of the non-combatant character. In fact, however, the most striking achievements in the air during the last five months of war have been those of the British Naval Air Service, and they have been in operations of an offensive character. Alone of all the powers of war we have been fortunate in possessing, owing to the energy and foresight of those at the Admiralty, a Naval Flying Corps, thoroughly organised, equipped, and trained, and possessing the skill and knowledge necessary for the undertaking of serious aerial attacks. Of the side of the Naval Air Service which operates entirely at sea we have still very little information, but on two occasions seaplanes have been picked up far out in the North Sea, where they had come to the surface owing to damage, and these may be taken as indications of the extent to which our system of sea patrols has been indebted to the naval aviators. We have other information of an official character.

"During the course of the war," so runs the official report, "the Royal Naval Air Service (Naval Wing of Royal Flying Corps) has not been idle—airships, aeroplanes, and seaplanes having proved their value in many undertakings.

"While the Expeditionary Force was being moved abroad, a strong patrol to the eastward of the Straits of Dover was undertaken by both seaplanes and airships of the Naval Air Service.

"The airships remained steadily patrolling between the French and English coasts, sometimes for twelve hours on end; while further to the east, with the assistance of the Belgian authorities, a temporary seaplane base was established at Ostend, and a patrol kept up with seaplanes between this place and the English coast opposite.

"By this means it was impossible for the enemy's ships to approach the Straits without being seen for very many miles.

"On one occasion, during one of the airship patrols, it became necessary to change a propeller blade of one of the engines. The Captain feared it would be necessary to descend for this purpose, but two of the crew immediately volunteered to carry out this difficult task in the air, and, climbing out on to the bracket carrying the propeller shafting, they completed the hazardous work of changing the propeller's blade, 2,000 feet above the sea."

THE OPERATIONS BY AIR.

That was remarkable enough, but the Naval Air Service was to distinguish itself later by three achievements more difficult still. On October 9th, the Admiralty reported a successful raid upon the Dusseldorf airship shed, in which at that time one of the latest Zeppelins had just been housed. Three officers were concerned in this feat, and one of them, Lieutenant Marix, who has since been given the D.S.O., succeeded in dropping, from an altitude of no more than five hundred feet, a bomb which went through the roof of the shed and destroyed the airship inside. Flames were observed many hundred feet in the air, and it was clear that the

damage done was complete. Later information showed that Lieutenant Marix's visit threw the town in a state of panic, and that a number of officers who were in the shed at the time were killed. The feat was in every respect remarkable having regard to the distance, over a hundred miles, penetrated into the country held by the enemy, and to the fact that a previous attack put the enemy upon their guard, and enabled them to mount anti-aircraft guns. It was, however, eclipsed six weeks later by a more remarkable achievement still. On the 21st November, a flight of three naval aeroplanes flew from near Belfort to the Zeppelin airship factory at Friederichshafen. The airmen left at ten in the morning,

and made for the Rhine, the course of which they followed. When they reached Lake Constance, the leader—Commander Briggs—was unfortunately shot down through shrapnel bullets striking his petrol tank, but not before he had already dropped some bombs on the Zeppelin station. One of the other aviators, Lieutenant Sippe, succeeded in dropping his upon the gas factory close to the sheds, and, in spite of a heavy fire from all kinds of anti-aircraft guns and from rifles, both succeeded in making their way safely back to France. The amount of damage done was doubtful at the time, but from the official despatch which has since been issued it seems established that an airship was destroyed and the gas factory set

on fire. The German accounts have all concealed the particulars. Finally, on Christmas Day, a squadron of naval seaplanes, escorted by cruisers and submarines, operated over Cuxhaven. All the pilots got away safely; and though it was possible that no particularly serious damage was done, the moral effect of the raid has obviously been serious.

These three exploits, each of which was directed against some point of military importance to the enemy, have been followed by similar feats by French airmen, who have dropped bombs on the railway station at Freiburg and on the station and airship sheds at Metz, but they have not been answered by any carefully thought-out bomb-dropping campaign on the part of the enemy.

German aeroplanes have appeared over Antwerp, Dunkirk, Paris, and most of the towns on the eastern frontier of France, but in all cases bombs have been dropped in what appears to be an entirely haphazard fashion. Many non-combatants have been killed, but no military damage has been done, and the historian of the future will certainly condemn the reckless disregard for the recognised rules of warfare shown in outrages which did nothing to further the success of the army to which those who committed them were attached. In England, though it was widely expected that a raid from German airships and aeroplanes would be one of the earliest episodes in the war, nothing has occurred to disturb our peace.

One German aeroplane did appear for a few minutes over Dover, and another made an unsuccessful attempt to pass over the aerial defences of the Thames towards London. Both, however, were driven off without the slightest difficulty, and in the case of at least one of them the pilot probably never succeeded in regaining his base. None the less, preparations of a very complete character were early made, to defend vulnerable positions on the coast, and particularly to prevent an attack by air on London, with its arsenals and public buildings, and its crowded population. Anti-aircraft guns of a very successful type, which had been exhaustively experimented with before the war began, were mounted on



A high-angle anti-aircraft gun, mounted on one of the armoured trains used by the Allies in Belgium. [Central News.]


all coast defences and on ships of war, and have since the autumn been placed in convenient positions all over London. A series of searchlight stations have also been set up, and these are manned by a specially constituted corps, who are always on duty day and night. The possibility, therefore, of a successful surprise aeroplane attack is remote. It is all the more remote in the case of an airship, which by night presents a large surface for the beam of a searchlight, and either by day or night is a very vulnerable target to a quick-firing gun. To the difficulties presented by these preparations is to be added the further one caused by the presence, in a convenient position, of a large squadron of aeroplanes, which are always ready to go up and fight or pursue the invader in the air.

THE VALUE OF THE AERIAL SERVICE.

A final estimate of the values and limitations of the aerial arm is still impossible. As a weapon of reconnaissance it has already proved its value, and should the war be a long one it seems likely that we must put its length, in part at least, down to the aeroplane, and to the perfection to which scouting by aeroplane has been brought. The difficulty which Wellington used to describe as that of knowing what is going on at the other side of the hill is a difficulty no longer. Efficient air service has informed the Commander-in-Chief of each army of the movements of their opponents, and robbed war of that element of surprise which, in one form or another, has been behind all the most striking victories of the past. Now that no column of men can move by day on either road or railway without being observed, and when the practised eye can estimate—even in a rapid flight and from a great altitude—the number of men and guns over a wide area, those sudden movements and surprises which were the means of the triumphs of Napoleon and Moltke are no longer possible. Movement betrays itself, and so armies tend to dig themselves in, and avoid the observation of the aeroplane by not moving at all. As a weapon of offence the aeroplane is undoubtedly less perfect, and in all probability the amount of damage that can be done


by the dropping of explosives has been much exaggerated. In this respect the aeroplane cannot compare with the high-angle shell thrown by a howitzer. All its successes as a weapon of offence in this war have been in cases where its bombs have been dropped on places containing explosive material easily ignited. You can make havoc with gas works or an airship shed which contains an airship already inflated, but you can do little with houses or fortified works. Further, there is the difficulty of aim, though this has been overcome in a remarkable manner by the naval airmen in the enterprises which have been described.

Finally, there is the aeroplane as a weapon against other aeroplanes. In this respect the British forces have been much more successful than those of their opponents, and a considerable number of German machines have been put out of action in direct aerial combat. Such combats, oddly enough, have not always resulted in the killing of those on board the aeroplane which was destroyed, and in several cases German aeroplanes have been brought down by members of the Royal Flying Corps and their occupants made prisoners. Quick-firing guns have been used with success on British aeroplanes, but for the most part the weapon employed is either a revolver of a larger pattern or a service rifle.



[Alfieri Picture Service.]

French airmen consulting a map before starting out on a reconnaissance.



THE BATTLE-FRONT IN EASTERN FRANCE.



The Bombardment of Antwerp: The small puffs of smoke are German shells bursting over one of the forts, and the heavy smoke is from some of the burning buildings. *[Photopress.]*

CHAPTER XXVIII.

THE FALL OF ANTWERP.

THE GERMAN POSITIONS ON THE AISNE—THE BOMBARDMENT OF RHEIMS CATHEDRAL—THE ATTACK ON THE MEUSE FORTS—CAPTURE OF ST. MIHIEL—THE FAILURE OF THE FRENCH TURNING MOVEMENT BY PERONNE—THE RAPID RECOVERY OF THE GERMANS—THEIR RESOURCEFULNESS—THE GERMAN CAMPAIGN IN BELGIUM—THE SIEGE AND FALL OF ANTWERP.

THE campaign in France was left in arrest (page 155) by the heavily fortified positions which the Germans had occupied on the north bank of the Aisne. The British had forced the passage of the river, and in spite of heavy German gunfire and constant attacks succeeded in maintaining their hold on the north bank of the river. But neither east of Soissons, where the British were, nor west, near the angle of the Aisne and the Oise, where the Sixth French Army was, did there appear the smallest prospect of carrying the German positions in front of them, except at a cost of life from which both the Allied commanders recoiled. It became necessary to find a way round. The three days' battle of the Aisne began on September 12th. Already, on the 17th, the Seventh French Army, under General Manoury, which was to the left of the Sixth Army, began to move up the right bank of the Oise, and at the same time General Castelnau, with the Ninth French Army, was concentrating on Amiens. The turning movement against the German positions on the Aisne had begun, and from this time onwards the main front of battle no longer faces north and south, but east and west—the Germans on the east, the French on the west.

But before the narrative leaves the southern front for the west, it is useful to trace the line from Soissons to the Vosges, which the opposing armies were to hold for so long without appreciable change. The Battle of the Aisne was fought on the reverse of the position which the French knew as that of La-Fère. It covers the angle formed by the meeting of the Oise and the Aisne, and is made by rising ground, thickly wooded, which on its western side overlooks Amiens and the valley of the Somme, and on its eastern side forms the so-called Falaise de Champagne. In the angle of the rivers, where the wood is thickest, is the Forêt d' L'Aigle, and from there the German lines ran along the crest of the plateau, on the north bank of the Aisne, to Berru, on the north-east side of Rheims. From the hill at Berru the Germans later bombarded the cathedral of Rheims, on the plea that the French were using the tower as an observation post. The French stoutly denied the charge, but, even if it had been true—and elsewhere, notably at Malines, in Belgium, undoubtedly cathedral towers were so used—a more scrupulous enemy would have hesitated to damage so beautiful a monument. The defence of the Germans that the lives of their soldiers were more to them than any French cathedral had not even the excuse of a coarse



[Newspaper Illustrations.

The arrival of the British Marines at Antwerp: Carrying ammunition into the trenches.



Belgian troops entrenched on the outskirts of Antwerp: The smoke from buildings set on fire by the bombardment can be seen in the distance. [Photopress.

sincerity, for no commanders have been readier to sacrifice human life for an idea than the German. If life could be sacrificed for the idea of power, why not for that of beauty in stone? From another point of view, also, the destruction of ancient monuments by the Germans was reprehensible, for whereas, by the common teaching of religion, spirit in the human body is indestructible, the soul of a great building perishes with its frame.


East of Berru, the German line descends to the Plain of Champagne, leaves the Aisne, and follows the course of the Suippe, one of its tributaries, to its source in the slopes of the Argonne range. It will be remembered that at the battle of the Marne the effect of the Allies' flank attack was first felt at the western end of the line, and only gradually extended to the east. There was some particularly hard fighting in the marshes of St. Gond, in which the Prussian Guards suffered very heavily. But the eastern end of the French line was never forced back so far as the western end, and the formation of the new Ninth French Army for service in the west, under General Castelnau, seems to have weakened the French attack in the Argonne region. At any rate, whether or not as the result of withdrawals of French troops to the west, in the last week of September the Germans began to gain ground at the eastern end of the line. The details of the fighting in the woods of the Argonne need not detain us here, but one success gained by the Germans on the heights of the Meuse was of great importance, and had a considerable influence on the progress of the campaign. Perhaps the best way of understanding the military events of the last fortnight in September and the first week of October is to think of them as one battle, with two wings and a centre. The centre of the battle lay from Compiègne to Arras, where, as we have seen, General Joffre was just about to begin his attempt to turn the German position at Laon-La Fère. Here the Germans were on the defensive. The right of the battle was on the heights of the Meuse; the left was in the neighbourhood of Antwerp. On these two wings the Germans were the attackers. Between the left wing and the centre there was a great expanse of dead ground, which, though it was later to see some of the heaviest fighting in the war, was at present almost neglected. It was to this ground that Sir John French transferred the British army at the beginning of October, but, except for the British assistance at Antwerp, the battle which began in the third week of September and was waged on three fronts—North Belgium, Mid-France, and the Meuse—

was the first since Mons in which the British had not taken a very prominent part.

THE BATTLE ON THE RIGHT WING.

The Allied advance after the battle of the Marne was oblique, the left being much more forward than the right. Opposite the right—that is on the German left—was the army of the Crown Prince, which, as the French advance gathered momentum, soon began to find itself in serious difficulties. It had to retreat along the slopes of the Argonne, a district with few roads and with a heavy tenacious clay soil, which, with the autumn rains that began soon after the Marne, made travel very difficult. Moreover, its line of retreat north—and at this time no one could foresee that the retreat might not have to be continued—lay past the fortress of Verdun, where a very active field army could have done great mischief to a column in the disorder of a forced retreat. General Joffre had two alternatives, and the choice between them could not have been easy. He might have thrown his main attack against the Crown Prince in the hope of cutting off his retreat through the north of France and Luxembourg, and turning the German fortifications in the Ardennes from the south. Or he might—as in fact he did—make his main effort against the German right in the hope of intercepting the retreat of the main German army on Belgium. Either plan, had it been successful, would have yielded brilliant results, thoroughly in accord with the high hopes that the victory of the Marne had aroused in the mind of the people both here and in France. He chose the second plan of a movement by the west, perhaps because he was already committed to it before the difficulties of the Crown Prince were so great as they afterwards became; perhaps also because he hoped if his turning movement by the west succeeded of driving that wing in on the centre and left, and so increasing the confusion of the retirement. It was one of the few moments of the war when even the most prudent might be forgiven indulgence of sanguine hopes.

What saved the German wing under the Crown Prince, apart from the diversion of strength to the west, was the Army of Metz. Very characteristically of German strategy, the moment of peril was chosen to make a direct frontal attack on the line of French forts running south of Verdun, the fear of which had ostensibly at any rate been the cause of the choice of the line of invasion through Belgium. While the Allies were forcing the passage of the Aisne, the Army of Metz, which consisted of Bavarians, descended into the plain of the Woëvre and began a series






The remains of several uncontrolled locomotives which were sent dashing in the direction of the German lines during the operations against Antwerp. [Central News.



Men of the British Naval Brigade drawn up on the outskirts of Antwerp. [News Illustrations.



The Fortifications and Environs of Antwerp.

of violent attacks on the heights of the Meuse. Their object was to cross the Meuse, to join hands with the retreating German left, now at Varennes, and, if all went well, perhaps to turn the French right and so once more put themselves on the road to Paris; or, failing that, at any rate to create a diversion from which the main German army could not but profit. The Bavarians carried Les Paroches, but failed to maintain themselves there. At Troyon, a fort a little further to the north, both the attack and the defence were desperate. In the course of the second attack all the cannon but four were put out of action. "Orders were accordingly given to the garrison to retreat, but they refused to leave their post of honour, and retired instead into an old cistern of the fort. There were only 450 of them left, with twenty-two more who were cut off from them in the magazine. As there was every chance of its being blown up at any moment, the little detachment tried to join the others in the cistern by a narrow passage joining it to the magazine. Just at that moment the roof of the passage was shattered by a shell, and they were buried under a mass of fallen

stones and earth. A little later the German assault slackened, and the garrison were able to retire at their ease."* (See Map, page 264.)

The Bavarian losses in these attacks were exceedingly heavy, and the forts, when they were won, were worthless to the victors, for they furnished no points at which the Meuse could be crossed. But they won a more solid success at St. Mihiel, a little further to the south. The French, thinking that all danger from the attacks was passed, moved the garrison of St. Mihiel across the Woevre to Nancy, where there was something toward, and the Bavarians, seizing their opportunity, made a rapid march along the south bank of the Rupt de Mad, as far as Thiaucourt, and then crossed the plain to St. Mihiel, which they found unoccupied. The inhabitants fled in panic, and the Germans entrenched themselves in the place. At St. Mihiel the Meuse makes a great loop, in the centre of which is the Camp des Romains. This they

* The Times correspondent at Nancy, without whose interesting despatches the operations on this front would not have been intelligible.



[Wm. Dawson and Sons Ltd.]
 Refugees leaving their homes in Antwerp before the threatened bombardment.



A party of refugees makes ready to depart from Antwerp. *[Wm. Dawson and Sons Ltd.]*

captured early in the last week of September, and its possession gave them the command of a large part of the Woëvre plain. On September 26th, a detachment of Germans crossed the Meuse opposite St. Mihiel, and, beating back a Territorial battalion which was opposing their passage, marched east to join with the Germans in the Argonne district. They were defeated by a column from Toul, and the Germans, in spite of many attempts, never made good their footing on the west bank of the Meuse. The capture of St. Mihiel, however, was a very important success. Not only did it give the Germans control of a large part of the Woëvre plain, but by keeping ajar a narrow door into the central French plain from the east it forced the French to keep much larger forces engaged in purely defensive work at this point than they otherwise need have done. Moreover, the diversion undoubtedly brought great relief to the Crown Prince's army. Not for many months did the French repair the mischief of St. Mihiel.

THE FIGHTING IN THE CENTRE.

On the right wing, then, in spite of the losses of the Bavarians—heavier perhaps in proportion to the numbers engaged, by reason of the extreme recklessness of their attacks, than in any other engagement of the war—the honours rested with the Germans. How in the meantime was it faring in the centre, where a French turning movement against the German positions on the Aisne was already in progress? A great deal had been sacrificed to the success of this movement, for, as has been seen, General Joffre might perhaps, had he put his strength on the other wing, have crushed the army of the Crown Prince. General Joffre attached the greatest importance to secrecy in executing this turning movement, but it is very doubtful whether the Germans were at any time in ignorance of his dispositions. Aeroplanes have made it almost impossible to conceal the movements of large bodies of troops from an active and intelligent enemy, and the German dispositions show that they suspected quite early what the strategy of General Joffre would probably be. On September 13th—the second day of the battle of the Aisne—the Germans evacuated Amiens, in the valley of the Somme. Clearly, they already apprehended a turning movement by the west, as was indeed only to be expected after the great surprise which the French had sprung on the Germans before the battle of the Marne. On September 18th the French Seventh Army was at Noyon, and two days later at Lassigny. About the same time the Ninth Army, under General Castelnau, was at Amiens, and began to move up the valley of the Somme towards Peronne. On the 21st General Castelnau occupied Peronne, but by that time the Germans had made their preparations. A great army had been assembled at St. Quentin and Tergnier, which, on the 23rd, attacked the French as they debouched from Peronne and drove them back. It was a serious check. So far from taking the Germans by surprise, the French were themselves taken aback by the great strength of the Germans and the fury of their sudden attack. The French prolonged their turning movement to the north, but all chance of a surprise was gone. According to a writer in a monthly review*, the French, having taken great precautions to ensure secrecy, were disposed to blame the newspapers for their failure to effect the surprise, and on September 25th all war correspondents were warned not to come within twenty miles of the fighting line, and

"military experts," writing for the newspapers, are said by the same authority to have been forbidden to speculate about the movements of the Allies. It would not, however, appear that General von Kluck, or whoever was responsible for the direction of the German movements, had much to learn from the criticism of the newspapers, and aeroplanes are far more likely to have been the source of his information about the enemies' designs than the telegrams of foreign correspondents. (See Map on page 267.)

A tribute of admiration is due to the energy and skill with which the enemy extricated himself from the exceedingly dangerous position in which the defeat on the Marne placed him. He had, it is true, prepared his position on the Aisne beforehand as a safeguard against defeat, but the interval of time between the first arrival on the Aisne and the retreat to it was, after all, only short, and much must necessarily have been left to the extemporisation of the moment. Up to now it had been doubtful whether the very qualities of method and forethought which notoriously distinguished the Germans in their military as in all their other work might not unfit them for success in a sudden emergency. These doubts, unfortunately, were removed by the German conduct of the retreat, which showed far more genuine military ability than anything that had occurred in the advance. The Germans in military matters were not—as some had thought—mere pedants, who worked by rule and precedent. Not only were their tactical dispositions in the retreat extremely clever, but the higher qualities of generalship came out in the skill with which they divined the most likely strategy of their opponents, and the tremendous energy with which they devised their measures to meet it. The army which the Germans managed to concentrate against the well-conceived turning movement by Peronne was collected in extreme haste, and could only have been got by scraping off every ounce of spare flesh from every other German army in the west. That they felt themselves in great danger is evident from the desperate character of the Bavarian attacks on the Meuse forts. They must also have been labouring under a bitter sense of disappointment, for the retreat from the Marne, skilfully as it was managed, meant the collapse of the hopes on which they had built so much. No responsible German could now delude himself into thinking that Paris could be occupied and French resistance crushed in the time before Russian preparations could be completed. The whole character of the war was henceforward changed for him; all hope of an early victory was gone, and instead there opened before him a long and dreary vista of strain and endurance. It was a serious blow to the conceit which is the national vice of Germany, and it says much for the strength of fibre in the German character that the weeks in which these melancholy truths were brought home to those who had eyes to see them should have been those in which the qualities of courage and resolution should have shone out most brightly.

THE LEFT WING IN BELGIUM.

On the right the Germans had won a distinct success by the capture of St. Mihiel. In the centre they had countered the French attempt to turn their positions on the Aisne. But on the left, in Belgium, they had their greatest success in the capture of Antwerp, a deeply-moving story which must be told in greater detail than the events of the rest of the battle-front, which, important as they were, were mainly strategic in their interest.

On the 25th of September, the German offensive against Antwerp began with a strong reply to a forward

* The *Fortnightly Review* for November, 1914.

movement made by the Belgians some days previously along the three main roads from Malines to Louvain and Brussels. Desultory fighting in this area had been fairly constant for two weeks previously, and at one time the Belgians carried their advance nearly to Vilvorde, within a few miles of Brussels. They were unable, however, to hold this position, and fell back first on the villages of Eppeghem, Elewyt, and Weerde, on the 22nd and 23rd, and on the villages of Sempst and Hoistade later. From these, they were driven back on the afternoon of the 25th, after some severe fighting, to positions defending the railway line from Malines to Termonde, which were covered by the gunfire from the forts of Waelhem and Wavre St. Catherine. While making this attack, the German troops under General von Beseler, who conducted the whole of the operations, made some display of force to the south of Termonde; and in view of the possibility of a renewed attempt on the part of the enemy to force the passage of the Scheldt there, reinforcements were hurriedly sent across to aid in holding the river. These came into action on the 26th, and succeeded in driving the enemy back from the villages of Audeghem and Lebbeke for nearly four miles, while at the same time a small force of Belgian troops attacked the Germans on their left flank, and pressed them back on Alost. This slight success, however, was counteracted by a forward movement of the Germans on the east side, where, on the 26th, they completely cleared the wooded country south of Malines of Belgian troops, and won the first pawn in the game—an emplacement for their guns within striking distance of the forts of Waelhem and Wavre St. Catherine. The strength of the besiegers was about 60,000 men.


During those two days the enemy aeroplane service was specially active. Taubes were constantly seen passing

to and fro over the fortified area, and over Antwerp itself; and though these were repeatedly fired at by the Belgian high-elevation guns, they succeeded in observing without mishap the Belgian positions from Malines to the city pontoon bridge over the Scheldt.



[Wm. Dawson and Sons Ltd.]

Deserted Antwerp: A house burning in the north part of the city.



[Wm. Dawson and Sons Ltd.]

Antwerp: the empty streets in the centre of the city, with the Cathedral in the distance, on Thursday afternoon, October 8th, 1914.

Antwerp, and the town was left in the hands of the Belgian army. No infantry attack was made, however, on the town

THE ATTACK ON THE ANTWERP FORTS BEGINS.

On the 27th the fighting was active on the western side, and the Germans regained much of the ground they had lost to the south of Termonde. Lebbeke and Audeghem were retaken, and the Belgian troops fell back on St. Gilles, the southern suburb of Termonde—which was then in ruins—and on Grembergen, to the north of the river. The attack on this wing was afterwards constant for several days, but the positions remained materially unchanged, the Germans contenting themselves with attempting repeatedly to shell and destroy the bridge over the Scheldt between the advance guard and the Belgian field force. On this day—Sunday, the 27th—it became clear, however, that the main attack on the fortress of Antwerp, apart from any enveloping movement that might follow the crossing of the Scheldt, was to be directed against the south-east side. At about eight o'clock in the morning the Germans began the bombardment of Malines—which had already suffered severely from two bombardments earlier in the campaign—and the first shots were exchanged with the fort of Waelhem. In Malines a number of civilians were killed while returning from church, and buildings in the Place de la Gare, the barracks, and the establishment of the Little Sisters of the Poor were completely wrecked. By shortly after mid-day—following a heavy rain of shells for two hours—the whole of the civil population had fled towards



Refugees from Antwerp arrive in Holland.

[Wm. Dawson and Sons Ltd.]

on that day or on the day following. On Monday, the 28th, heavier guns of 28 and 30 cm. were brought into action against the forts, and it became obvious that the Germans, during their operations a month earlier to the south of Malines, must have secured concrete foundations for their guns below the embankment of the railway between Malines and Louvain, which they had obstinately held throughout the time in the face of repeated attack. On this day an infantry attack was pushed forward to the east of Termonde, but was repulsed with some considerable loss.

Tuesday, September 29th, was in many respects the decisive day. The enemy extended his bombardment to the redoubt of Koningshoycht and the fort and town of Lierre, and till 4-30 in the afternoon maintained a continuous bombardment of the forts of Waelhem and Wavre St. Catherine. His infantry occupied the south and east side of the town of Malines, and made a small attack between the forts of Liezel and Breendonck, which was repulsed. This attack and other similar attacks made during the course of the operations were never of a conclusive nature. Their object appeared to be merely to prevent the defending infantry force from concentrating at any one point, and perhaps—as might have been done—fighting forward to the gun positions. On this occasion the attack, however, cost the enemy dearly in men, as the Belgians allowed it to press well forward before sweeping and decimating the ranks with short range artillery and infantry fire.

During the day it became apparent that the guns in the two southerly forts were outclassed by the Austrian siege guns employed against them, and one of the cupolas of Waelhem fort was damaged beyond repair by the enemy's shells. Further, a severe blow was dealt to the city by the damage done to the reservoir, which lies slightly to the north of the fort. Shells were dropped continuously on the reservoir dyke, which at last gave way in part, and was completely ruined on the following day. The water poured out into the infantry trenches, and from that day till the end of the siege the city, though partly supplied by means of artesian wells, was almost


entirely without water, and its health was in consequence gravely endangered.

On the side of Lierre considerable progress was made by the enemy artillery, and the town especially suffered from the bombardment, which was continued throughout the night. The position of the town behind the fort had made bombardment in this case almost inevitable, and many of the civil population left at the commencement of the operations, but over a hundred civilians of all ages were killed during this and the following day, Wednesday, the 30th of September, when the bombardment of all three forts was resumed with renewed vigour. Several infantry attacks were also delivered at different points on the arc of the fortifications between the Scheldt and the Senne, but these were in every case repulsed with considerable loss to the enemy, mainly owing to the elaborate preparations against infantry attack which had been made by the garrison during the preceding month. The enemy also resumed on this day his offensive movement towards Termonde, and the Belgians were forced to retire across the Scheldt, after blowing up the wooden bridge. At Waelhem fort part of the powder magazine was blown up, but whether as the result of an accident or owing to the enemy's fire has not been definitely determined.

RETIREMENT TO THE NETHES.

On the evening of this day a certain amount of unrest and disquiet became apparent among the civil population of Antwerp. Constant processions of wounded had been pouring into the city, and stories spread by soldiers to the effect that the forts could not hold out were more believed than the official communiqués and the unofficial but censored accounts of the operations which appeared in the Press. The citizens had been schooled to believe the fortifications impregnable, and they did not easily abandon their belief. Once, however, a crowd gathered round two soldiers who were spreading alarmist stories, and only their arrest and the statement in the Press next day that they had been severely dealt with prevented a demonstration by at least a small part of the populace.

On Thursday, October 1st, it became clearly apparent that the attacking force had a superiority in weapons,



Belgian refugees on the harbour at Ostend waiting for a boat to take them to England.

[Pictorial Press.]



Belgian refugees at Scheveningen, near the Hague, being taken to the temporary quarters provided for them by the Dutch.

[Wm. Dawson and Sons Ltd.]

which it was useless to hope could be resisted. New emplacements were taken up by the lighter guns, and the forts and redoubts of the whole sector from Waelhem to Lierre were pounded mercilessly. Waelhem and Wavre St. Catherine were silenced by the end of the day, and during the night the whole of the defending force east of the Senne fell back on the Nethe. The resistance of the outer ring of fortifications had lasted only five days.

The position taken up on the Nethe was a strong one if backed by good artillery, but no sooner had the Belgian force entrenched itself than the enemy changed his plan. The first ring of fortifications had been won by the use of heavy artillery on stationary forts. The second ring was the Belgian field army, strongly entrenched. Against this the whole weight of the lighter artillery—some four hundred guns, according to some estimates—was brought to bear, and the army, already fatigued, was subjected to a rain of shrapnel night and day, which gave no respite and little chance of reply.

On this day, the 2nd, an interesting episode occurred. A Taube, flying very high, passed again and again across the city and dropped copies of a proclamation signed by General von Beseler, commander-in-chief of the besieging army, telling the populace that resistance was useless. Their brave army, it read, had done enough. To persist in resistance was only to imperil their own innocent lives to serve the perfidious purpose of England, which was alone responsible for such a cruel and senseless war.

The proclamation in itself had little effect, but by next day, Saturday, the 3rd, it was apparent that there was little hope for the salvation of the city. The fort of Lierre was occupied by the enemy, and two proclamations, one by the Burgomaster, Mons de Vos, giving permission to leave the city, and another by General de Guise, the military governor, calling on the people to preserve their calmness and *sangfroid*, were issued. At one time in the day the hospitals were ordered to be in readiness to leave, and many of the wounded were actually sent away to the coast, while several members of the Diplomatic Corps and of the Ministry left for Ostend. It was well understood, too, that the whole of the Ministry would leave during the evening or next morning, and that the Government would be transferred to Ostend. When all preparations had been made, however, the Government reversed its decision, in consequence of a message from England that reinforcements were already on their way, and that Mr. Winston Churchill, the First Lord of the Admiralty, had left for Antwerp in order to consult on the situation.

THE ARRIVAL OF THE BRITISH MARINES.

On Sunday, October 4th, in confirmation of this message, the first detachment of the British troops—a brigade of Royal Marines—arrived by train at the Waes station, and marched across the pontoon bridge into the city. They were greeted with extraordinary enthusiasm. The despondency of the previous day gave way to the wildest demonstrations of joy, and everywhere that the troops went they were cheered by enormous crowds. When completed next day, these reinforcements consisted of one Marine Brigade and two Naval Brigades, with some heavy naval guns, manned by A.B.'s—in all, 8,000 men—under the command of General Paris, R.M.A. The first detachment to arrive was hurried at once out to the trenches on the Nethe, where they took up a position on the left of the Belgian army and dug themselves in, making trenches in squares, with a good overhead protection.

In the course of the afternoon Mr. Churchill himself arrived, and within an hour also went out to the front

to inspect the position. On this day, and during the three subsequent days which he spent in Antwerp, he was repeatedly under fire. On the day of his arrival he informed the Burgomaster that it was the intention of the English to hold the city at all costs, but after a short inspection it became plainly obvious that the reinforcements had arrived too late. Their composition, and the action and attitude of Mr. Churchill, were subsequently the subject of considerable criticism in a section of the English Press; but adverse comment did not long survive the statement issued by the Admiralty that the Naval Brigades were chosen for the work "because the need for them was urgent and bitter; because mobile troops could not be spared for fortress duties; because they were the nearest, and could be embarked the quickest; and because their training, although incomplete, was as far advanced as that of a large portion not only of the forces defending Antwerp, but of the enemy forces attacking. The Naval Division," the statement added, "was sent to Antwerp not as an isolated incident, but as part of a large operation for the relief of the city. Other and more powerful considerations prevented this from being carried through." (The nature of these operations and the reason for their failure will be discussed in a later chapter.)

Their numbers and inexperience considered, the British acquitted themselves well. The brigade of Royal Marines—which consisted of about 2,000 men—alone was fully trained, experienced, and equipped, but the lads of the Naval Division stood the fierce shrapnel attack of the enemy well, and repulsed repeated attempts to cross the Nethe opposite their section. Four of the six 4.7 naval guns which were brought with the force were mounted on an armoured train, which had been built under the supervision of Lieutenant-Commander Littlejohn, in the yards of the Antwerp Engineering Company, at Hoboken. This train was in action repeatedly, and though the guns were not equivalent in range or calibre to the Austrian siege guns, by reason of their mobility they inflicted considerable damage, while being themselves almost immune from dangerous attack.

THE SECOND LINE OF DEFENCE FORCED.

The passage of the Nethe was resisted throughout Monday, the 5th, in the face of repeated attacks, but on the morning of the 6th the Belgian defence on the right of the Marines was forced back by a heavy attack covered by powerful artillery. It was remarkable that all attempts to pontoon the river on the two previous days had failed, and this final assault was carried out by a force of about 3,000 Germans, who had waded and swum the stream during the night.

In consequence of this reverse the whole of the defence was withdrawn to the inner line of forts, the intervals between which were very strongly fortified, but it was then obvious that the city was doomed. In the evening, General de Guise informed the Government that the position was fast becoming untenable, and acting on this information the capital was transferred to Ostend on Wednesday morning, when the members of the Government and the Diplomatic Corps left by steamer. On the same day Mr. Winston Churchill also left by motor car for the coast, under escort of one of the armoured cars of the Naval Brigade. The British and Russian Ministers left about noon, and the King of the Belgians, who had been present during the whole of the operations, and had exposed himself frequently to fire, left for St. Nicholas.

Till this morning, Wednesday, the 7th, the civil population—buoyed up by the arrival of the British—

was kept in almost complete ignorance of the actual state of affairs. The two Antwerp newspapers, printed in French, the *Matin* and the *Metropole*, published each day official communiqués which categorically denied that any of the forts had been silenced, and declared in positive terms that the enemy was being held all along the line, while the Flemish newspapers were similarly restricted. Although the sound of the guns came nearer and nearer, the populace was therefore comparatively calm, though plainly anxious, till on this morning, after the departure of the Government, proclamations signed by General de Guise were posted up on the streets announcing that the bombardment of the city was imminent. A proclamation issued by the Burgomaster recommended those who desired to leave the city to do so by the north and north-easterly roads to Holland, and those who intended to remain to take shelter in their cellars, covering any apertures with sand bags. The effect of these proclamations was instantaneous. The calm and *sangfroid* which the citizens had preserved broke down, and thousands left at once by train, by boat, by motor and carriage where possible, and on foot. The majority of these were people of the richer class, and the plight of many was pitiful. Along the western roads, in the Waes region especially, where all means of traffic broke down owing to the congestion of the roads, hundreds of elderly people and children were compelled to spend the night in the open. On this day, too, the lions and other dangerous carnivora in the city's famous Zoo were destroyed, in case any should escape as the result of the bombardment.

Meanwhile, the German artillery was brought into position across the Nethe, and though exposed to a constant fire from the British naval guns and the guns of the inner ring of forts, succeeded in establishing itself. In the evening, several shells were dropped into the suburb of Berchem, and several civilians were killed. For some hours afterwards the fire from the forts was exceedingly active, but towards ten o'clock it ceased.

On the west side, the Germans on this day forced a passage across the Scheldt at Termonde, and also further west at Schoonaerde and Wetteren, in the face of a most determined opposition. Their advance was especially strong at Schoonaerde, where some of the most severe fighting of the whole Belgian campaign took place. The line of the river was, however, too long for the depleted and thoroughly fatigued Belgian troops to hold, and a retirement became necessary towards the line of St. Nicholas, Lokeren, and Ghent. This success of the enemy over the field army completely changed the aspect of affairs for the Antwerp garrison. There appeared the greatest danger of their being completely enveloped, and a retreat was imperative if the garrison was to be saved for further service. It was therefore immediately decided in view of the facts that the city could not be held, and that as the relief operations on the western side had failed, to evacuate Antwerp as soon as could be done. The British General requested that the Marines and Naval Brigades should act as the rearguard, but General de Guise decided to retain this honour for his own troops, who had fought with consistent and admirable pertinacity against very superior odds. Preparations for the retreat were immediately made.

THE BOMBARDMENT OF THE CITY.

During the day the Commander of the attacking force, in accordance with the Hague Convention, sent to the garrison an intimation that it was his intention to bombard the city, to which General de Guise replied that he would take the responsibility for the bombardment. Earlier

than this, General von Beseler had undertaken that, as far as was compatible with the usage of modern weapons of war, the cathedral and other public buildings in the town would be spared.

At midnight precisely the bombardment began, and continued without intermission, but not heavily, till five o'clock in the morning, when it ceased for two hours. Six-inch common shell and incendiary shells were used, and considerable damage was done, especially in the south-east side of the town, and in the suburb of Berchem. In the Rue de Justice, which had already suffered severely from the Zeppelin bomb attack in August, no fewer than six houses were alight at one time, and owing to the scarcity of water no attempt was made to extinguish these or any other fires. Comparatively few civilians were killed during the night, but owing to the enormous exodus of the following day, when hundreds were lost to their friends, it has been difficult to ascertain the exact number.

Throughout the night fierce fighting went on constantly near the inner ring of forts, which were maintained intact till the evening of Thursday, the 8th, when forts 3 and 4 were captured. By this time, however, a large proportion of the Belgian army and the majority of the British force had crossed the Scheldt by the pontoon bridge, and retired towards the coast.

THE FLIGHT OF THE PEOPLE.

The happenings of this day were among the most extraordinary in human history. Alarmed at the stories of German atrocities in other parts of the country, unnerved by the bombardment, and desolated by the suddenness of the defeat which had come upon their strong town, almost the entire population—augmented by refugees from the surrounding villages to nearly half a million people—took to flight. By dawn thousands were collected on the quayside ready to board any and every available craft, and a close procession, which stretched nearly twenty miles to the Dutch frontier, poured out of the town. Every available vehicle was commandeered, and almost every bite of portable food was taken from the city. The streets were absolutely deserted, except for the long train of Belgian artillery and ambulances which stretched along the quay ready to cross the pontoon bridge, which was reserved almost solely for the use of the military and those few civilians—about 900 in all—who remained, and who for the most part secured themselves during the day and the following night, when the bombardment was very heavy, in the cellars of their houses. Early on Thursday morning the Belgian rearguard began to destroy, as far as possible, all military stores and food supplies in the city, and they set fire to the huge petroleum tanks on the west side of the river, in which the whole oil supply of Belgium and the lower Rhine provinces were stored. These burned continuously for nearly thirty-six hours, lighting up the whole city and country during the night, and covering the sky with a great cloud of smoke during the day. Lighters loaded with corn and tinned provisions were sunk in the river; and although it was not possible to complete the work of destruction, only a tithe of the city's huge stores was allowed to fall into the hands of the enemy. The cylinders of thirty-four German steamers detained in the port at the commencement of the war were destroyed.

During the night a stern rearguard action was fought round the inner ring of forts, where some part of the garrison elected to remain. The rest of the army crossed the pontoon bridge before nine o'clock in the morning, and the bridge was then blown up.

One feature of the siege must not be omitted. In Antwerp, whatever may have been the case elsewhere, the enemy was well supplied with information from inside. Spies were known to abound, and though exhaustive search was made and hundreds were arrested they succeeded in sending out information till the last. Two persons wearing the red cross were shot behind the English trenches on the last day, after being detected in signalling to the enemy, and on the retreat two cases of treachery, which almost proved disastrous, were punished with death.

On the day of the evacuation the German enveloping movement to the west of the city was pushed forward rapidly, and continuous fighting occurred on the south of the Belgian line of march. A large part of the retreating army was almost entrapped at Lokeren, where a matter of an hour or two only elapsed between their passing and the entrance of the Germans, while almost the whole force left in the city during the night of Thursday was cut off and forced over the Dutch frontier—among them the greater part of the First Naval Brigade, amounting to nearly 2,000 men. The majority of these crossed the frontier at Hulst, but some were arrested in the Dutch territorial waters of the Scheldt, where they were taken to Bath, disarmed, and interned. Nearly 18,000 Belgian troops crossed the frontier on the same day, and were also interned.

The fall of Antwerp was a terrible blow to Belgium. So long as it was theirs, the Belgians, however grave their sufferings might be, had a noble and historic city to rally their national hopes and to animate their resolution to be free. The difference when Antwerp was lost was between an embodied and disembodied ideal. Its sacredness was not diminished, but all its wealth and circumstance was gone, and nothing remained but the poverty of life eating its bread with tears. Not since


the days of Nebuchadnezzar and the Captivity has a whole nation suffered so much at the hands of another as Belgium. A million people—about a sixth of the entire population of the country—became refugees in the first two months of the war. Of these, about half fled to Holland; a great number, especially from the Ardennes, to France; and more than 100,000 to this country, where those who were not of military age were given shelter and food, and work if it could be found for them. Nor was the plight of the Belgians who remained at home better. Industry and trade, except such as may be stimulated by an army of occupation, was at a standstill, and unemployment was almost general. There was a serious scarcity of food, and had it not been for the Americans, who made arrangements for the distribution of food under a guarantee that it should not be diverted to the use of the army of occupation, famine would have been added to the other tribulations of the country.

The German occupation of Antwerp and of the Belgian coast brought the war nearer to England than anything that had yet happened. There was deep regret that we had been able to do so little to save Antwerp, but, as the next chapter will show, our intentions were much greater than we were able to perform. The attacks on the policy of sending an expedition to the assistance of Antwerp have already been discussed. They were, in fact, made in ignorance of the fine strategic scheme of Sir John French, which was not revealed till later. But, in any case, we could not let Antwerp fall without doing something, whether on the ground of our own interest or of our obligation to Belgium. For the fall of Antwerp, as events were to show, meant the loss of the Belgian coast-line too; and though Antwerp could not—owing to the fact that the entrance to the Scheldt is Dutch territorial waters—be made a naval base, other Belgian ports both could and were.



CC-0. Jangamwadi Math Collection. Digitized by eGangotri
The last act of a tragedy: A photograph taken on the last boat leaving Ostend for England.

[Central News.



A stretch of flooded country near Nieuport.

[Central News.



The ruins of Nieuport Cathedral after the bombardment.

[Newspaper Illustrations.



[Newspaper Illustrations.]

The King of the Belgians at the historic review of French and Belgian troops at Furnes.

CHAPTER XXIX.

FROM THE AISNE TO FLANDERS.

THE NEW BRITISH TURNING MOVEMENT—THE TRANSFERENCE FROM THE AISNE—THE RETREAT FROM ANTWERP—THE GERMAN COAST CAMPAIGN—GERMAN FAILURES ON THE YSER.

IN the three weeks that followed the battle of the Aisne, the war had gone badly for the Allies. In the east, St. Mihiel had been captured; in the centre, the French flanking movement had failed; and in Belgium, Antwerp had fallen. All this time the British army had been entrenched north of the Aisne, successfully resisting the German attacks, but unable to make further progress. At the beginning of October, Sir John French decided that the best chance of success against the Germans lay in bringing the greatest possible force to bear on the northern flank of the French western army, and he proposed to General Joffre that the British army should be withdrawn from the Aisne and begin operations in Flanders. A great flanking movement of this character was naturally dear to the heart of a famous cavalry leader; in spirit it was closely akin to his famous ride round Cronje's positions at Magersfontein to the relief of Kimberley. The strategical idea of placing the whole British army on the German flank in Belgium—where the mythical Russians of English rumours should have been—was finely conceived, and its brilliancy was none the less great because it had already in another form in the earlier stages of the war caught the popular imagination.

The prospects of success would have been much greater if the movement could have been begun a week or ten days earlier, but it is doubtful whether our position on the north bank of the Aisne was sufficiently secure then, and whether there were any troops then available to take their place if they had been withdrawn. Moreover, it was necessary that the French movement to the west should have made progress before it was possible to think of transporting the British army so far north. But even at the beginning of October the prospects of success still seemed good, for though the German movement against Antwerp had begun by then, the number of troops engaged in it was still not large—60,000 is the estimate made in the last chapter in the account of the siege—and at that time the total strength of the German army in Belgium did not in all probability exceed 150,000. It was reasonable, therefore, to hope that the British army of three army corps, with the Indian contingents that were now arriving, and with the prospect of assistance from the Belgian army at Antwerp, which was expected to hold out at any rate for some weeks, would be able to beat back the attack on Antwerp, and to achieve very important results against the main German army.



Soldiers of the Chasseurs d'Afrique advancing over the sand dunes near Nieuport.

[Central News.]

SIR JOHN FRENCH'S PLANS.


At the end of the first week in October the prospects were clouded, for Antwerp was on the point of surrender, and one advantage on which Sir John French had probably counted in his original plans was about to be lost. It was, however, felt to be important that the Belgian army should not be lost with the city, and in addition to the Naval Brigade a division of British troops, under Sir Henry Rawlinson, had been landed to assist in the retirement of the Belgian army. Sir John French, therefore, felt that though Antwerp were lost he might still count on the Belgian army, and on the division under Sir Henry Rawlinson. He, therefore, refused to be discouraged by the German successes at Antwerp, and on October 8th he had an interview with General Foch, who had been placed in command of all the French armies on the west front, and made final arrangements with him. General Foch had two French armies, the Ninth, under General Castelnau, and the Tenth, under General Maudhuy, who were extended on a line reaching from Noyon almost to Lille, and there were besides further north French Territorial troops, who, however, did not prove to be of much assistance. It was arranged at the interview that the road from Bethune to Lille was to be the dividing line between the British and French armies, the French to the south of the line and the British to the north.

The withdrawal of an army in face of an active enemy is always a difficult operation, but it was accomplished successfully. The first to leave was the Second Corps, under General Smith-Dorrien. It left the Aisne on October 3rd, and was due to arrive at Bethune, on the left of the Tenth French Army, on October 11th. After, it left the Third Corps, under General Pulteney, due to arrive at St. Omer on the 12th, and then to take its place on the left of the Second Corps, with cavalry maintaining connection between them. The First Army Corps was not due to leave or arrive for a week later. The movements were all carried out according to scheduled time, and

the places of the British troops were taken as they left the Aisne by French Territorials. The distance between the Aisne and St. Omer is about 100 miles, and the time taken for the transference was roughly about a week. The transport of seven divisions, with all their impedimenta, is a very big operation for a single line of railway, which is all that seems to have been used. The number of trains necessary has been worked out at thirty-eight a day, which is good, but not very good. But the operation was complicated by the fact that it involved a transference of the British lines of communication from St. Nazaire to Boulogne, and that the new lines must have crossed those of the French Western Army under General Foch. When General French calls the operation a "delicate one," the success of which was due in a great measure "to the excellent feeling which exists between the British and French armies," no doubt he was thinking principally of the difficulties that must have been made for the time being by this awkward intersection.


TURNING THE TURNERS.

The diagrams (page 283) illustrate the idea that Sir John French hoped to carry out, and to which he clung in spite of repeated disappointments. He never obtained possession of the two pivots on which he hoped to make his flanking movement turn. The first of these was La Bassée, and the second Menin. As not infrequently happens in war, the army which it was sought to outflank answered by attempting to outflank its enemy. This happened at least twice in the course of the first fortnight of October. As the French army under General Foch extended north, the Germans extended faster, and so ready was the Germans' answer to the Allies when they attempted to turn the enemy's line that there seems room to doubt which was turning which, and whether the Allies were answering the Germans or the Germans the Allies. The German force which attacked Antwerp was the outer circle of a turning movement which had its



BETWEEN THE LYS AND THE SEA.

The Lys - by the end of Paris




Belgian troops on the march along the coast near Ostend. [*Newspaper Illustrations.*]



German artillery advancing over the sand dunes.

[*Topical War Service.*]



(1) How the British corps were transferred.

(2) The projected British turning movement.
(Shown in dotted lines.)

concentric in an inner circle. On October 8th, the French cavalry on the left of the Tenth Army was in contact with the German north-west of Lille, and a few days before German troops had been reported ascending the south bank of the Lys, crossing near Courtrai, and spreading out over Flanders, through Ypres, and across the French border to Hazebrouk, and even St. Omer. Antwerp and the Belgian coast was the outer circle, and on the shorter radius an inner circle would take Ghent, Courtrai, and Bailloul. This inner circling advance, designed primarily to turn the French, was checked by the arrival of the Second British Corps. The strategic plan of General French, as shown on the diagram, was countered by the German coast movement through Antwerp and Ostend on to the line of the Yser. It is more satisfactory to follow the progress of the British operations separately, and therefore we may conveniently describe first the progress of the German operations by the coast, which were the sequel of the fall of Antwerp. It must, however, be understood that the fighting on the Yser was only the left wing of one great Battle of Flanders that extended from the coast to La Bassée.

Antwerp fell on October 9th, and the Germans lost no time in following up their victory. The retreat of the Belgian army, which followed the line of the coast, was covered by Sir Henry Rawlinson's division, the landing of which has already been mentioned, and it suffered very few losses. On October 12th the Belgian Government was transferred to Havre, on the 14th Ostend was evacuated, four days later the Germans were past Ostend, and on October 21st they delivered their first attack on the line of the Yser. These attacks continued with intervals into December, but the heaviest fighting was at the end of October and the beginning of November. This fighting along the Yser was the left wing of a battle which tended as the month wore on to shift more and

more to the Allies' centre and right. The centre of the battle was at Ypres.

SENSATIONAL, BUT UNSOUND, GERMAN STRATEGY.

The strategy of the German coast campaign has been justly criticised, and it is believed that it was in consequence of his objections to it that Von Moltke resigned his position as Chief of the German General Staff. The Germans gave out that their object was to reach Calais, and that Calais was only a stepping-stone to an attack on England. Heavy as their losses were in this attempt, it was popular in Germany, where feeling against this country was now higher than at any time since the war began. The most eminent military writer in the German newspapers, Major Moralt, of the *Berliner Tageblatt*, declared that the greatest battle of the war was in progress, and that success in it was a matter of life and death for Germany. It is not to be supposed that the directors of German military policy had any serious project in their minds for the invasion of England when they committed themselves to this coast campaign. Their objects in wishing to gain possession of Calais were somewhat more subtle. In the first place, they put their main strength against the Belgian wing because they thought that if they could break down its resistance they would turn the British army and cut off its communications with the sea. In the second place, they hoped that the possession of Calais, and of the Belgian coast which would follow, would put them in a position to dispute our command of the Channel, on which depended our communications with France and our ability to transport the new armies which were forming. They were seriously alarmed at the prospect of heavy British reinforcements in the spring, and they thought that the best way of meeting that danger was to make the Channel unsafe, which they could do from the French ports, but not to any purpose from any port east of the British minefield



The Ruins of Pervyse, which was taken and re-taken several times by the Germans and Allies, being heavily bombarded during each attack.

[Central News.]

in the Straits. Lastly, they saw that it was necessary for the security of their position in Belgium to extend their lines to the sea. These were the motives of the Calais campaign, and they were exceedingly strong ones. To say that political not military reasons dictated the

A glance at the map of Flanders will show why of all possible ways of reaching the French coast from Belgium, the route along the coast is the worst. The whole country between Nieuport and Calais is a maze of ditches and canals. An advancing army can hardly advance for a



[Central News.

An incident in the seizure of a Belgian town by the British: Troops scouring the streets and searching houses for German stragglers.

course of the campaign is not just without some qualification, for the Germans had the best of military reasons for wishing to obtain possession of French ports on the Channel. What is true is that German hatred and fear of England distorted their judgment on the best way of reaching Calais.

hundred yards at any part of this region without being stopped by a ditch, a dyke, or canal—not serious obstacles in themselves, but all too wide to jump across, and commanded at point-blank range by entrenchments. It had become axiomatic with French military writers that this coast route would never be used by any considerable



Refugees leaving a town near Nieuport.

[Central News.]



A squad of British wounded walking to hospital after the fighting on the dunes. [Central News.]



Germany infantry halted on the road near Dixmude.

[Central News.]

army, and both the French and the Germans neglected it completely during the invasion in August. It must have been mortifying to the Germans in November to reflect that the French coast, for which they were then vainly sacrificing so many thousands of lives, could have been theirs for the asking in August. They did their best to overcome the difficulties of advance in this enclosed country. Their men were provided with what our men called "table tops," wooden boards, which were intended to be thrown across the ditches which crossed their path and used as bridges. "They rush forward under fire, using these things as shelter, and the front ranks having bridged the obstacle, a rush follows, which usually ends in appalling slaughter. Very often they are mowed down in swathes by machine guns at a range of not more than twenty or thirty yards." In such country, moreover, it was not possible for the Germans to use their superiority in numbers. If a place had to be chosen which would give the individual valour and resource of the Belgian soldier the best possible chance of beating the superior numbers and organisation of the Germans, the country between the Yser and Calais would have been the best choice. The Germans who drew up the early plans of the war knew the difficulties of this region, and therefore left it alone. But later the sensationalism of a campaign for the possession of Calais, and the desire to dispose once for all of the Belgian army, seduced them into a plan for which on military grounds there was nothing to be said. The best way to Calais was not along the coast, but up the valley of the Lys, or past La Bassée.

THE BATTLE ON THE YSER.

The position held by the Belgians was the line of the Yser river. At first the main strength of the attack was directed against the end of the line nearest the sea, but here the British Navy was able to give the defence most effective assistance. Five monitors which were building in this country for Brazil were acquired by the Admiralty, and their shallow draught enabled them to go quite close inshore and to rake the positions of the attackers from the flank. Even more valuable was the assistance given by the French. Sir Henry Rawlinson's division, which had covered the Belgian retreat from Antwerp, had now

taken its place in the British line further to the south, and had it not been for the French reinforcements the Belgian army, shaken by its experiences at Antwerp and by a retreat which if it was not harassed by the Germans must have been exceedingly trying to their *moral*, might have been overwhelmed by the German attack before it had time to reorganise. After the failure of their attack near the sea, the Germans attempted to cross the Yser, half way between Nieuport and Dixmude. The critical days were Friday and Saturday, the 23rd and 24th. On the first day the Germans effected a crossing near Ramskapelle, but the Belgians received early information, and were able to concentrate and to drive the enemy back. Next day, however, it seemed that the line of the Yser had been lost, for the Germans crossed the river not at one but at several points. The losses on both sides were very heavy. But it was after the passage that the difficulties of the country began to tell against the Germans. They could gain and even hold positions on the west side of the river, but to debouch from them was they found to be impossible. On the 30th the Belgians dammed the lower reaches of the Yser, and so caused extensive floods, which further restricted the front on which the Germans could advance. Later, they opened the sluices on a very extensive scale, and as the heavy autumn rains had now set in the German positions at the bridge-heads which they held were islands, from which an attack could only be delivered by wading shoulder deep. The Germans persisted in their attacks, and on November 10th they succeeded in carrying Dixmude itself. But it was already evident that even when they succeeded in crossing the river they could not make any use of the points they won on the far bank, and the weight of the attack shifted further inland.

The German attempt to outflank the Allies by the coast had definitely failed, thanks to the heroism of the Belgian army, which never showed to better advantage than in this fighting along the Yser, to the promptness with which the French brought up reinforcements when affairs were critical, and also to the gunnery of the British Navy.

We must now turn to the fortunes of the battle on the centre and right, where the British were engaged.

APPENDIX.

THE COMPOSITION OF THE EXPEDITIONARY FORCE.

It is now permitted to give the composition of the Expeditionary Force as it was constituted when its landing on French soil was officially announced, on August 17th. Since that landing it has, of course, been very strongly reinforced. Our army on the Continent then contained, for example, no Indian corps or Territorial battalions. Some of the units not mentioned in the subsequent list, but the names of which have appeared in the official casualty lists, are added at the end, but it is not professed that this second list is a complete record of additional regiments mentioned in official announcements.

The original Expeditionary Force consisted of:—

Cavalry Division (1st, 2nd, 3rd, and 4th Brigades and divisional troops) and the 5th Cavalry Brigade with attached troops.

1st, 2nd, and 3rd Divisions (1st-9th Infantry Brigades) and 4th Division (13th-15th Infantry Brigades) with Divisional troops.

Five battalions of infantry as line of communication defence troops.

CAVALRY DIVISION.

1ST CAVALRY BRIGADE.—2nd Dragoon Guards, 5th Dragoon Guards, 11th Hussars, and 1st Signal Troop.

2ND CAVALRY BRIGADE.—4th Dragoon Guards, 9th Lancers, 18th Hussars, and 2nd Signal Troop.

3RD CAVALRY BRIGADE.—4th Hussars, 5th Lancers, 16th Lancers, and 3rd Signal Troop.

4TH CAVALRY BRIGADE.—Composite Regiment (Household Cavalry), 6th Dragoon Guards, 3rd Hussars, and 4th Signal Troop.

Cavalry Divisional Troops.

CAVALRY DIVISIONAL ARTILLERY.—III. and VII. Brigade Royal Horse Artillery.

CAVALRY DIVISIONAL ENGINEERS.—1st Field Squadron.

CAVALRY DIVISIONAL SIGNAL SERVICE.—1st Signal Squadron.

CAVALRY DIVISIONAL ARMY SERVICE CORPS.—Headquarters Cavalry Divisional Army Service Corps.

CAVALRY DIVISIONAL MEDICAL UNITS.—1st, 2nd, 3rd, and 4th Cavalry Field Ambulance.

5TH CAVALRY BRIGADE AND ATTACHED TROOPS.—2nd Dragoons, 12th Lancers, 20th Hussars, J. Battery Royal Horse Artillery and Ammunition Column, 4th Field Transport, 5th Signal Troop, and 5th Cavalry Field Ambulance.

FIRST DIVISION.

1ST INFANTRY BRIGADE.—1st Battalion Coldstream Guards, 1st Battalion Scots Guards, 1st Battalion Royal Highlanders, and 2nd Battalion Royal Munster Fusiliers.

2ND INFANTRY BRIGADE.—2nd Battalion Royal Sussex Regiment, 1st Battalion Northampton Regiment, 1st Battalion North Lancashire Regiment, and 2nd Battalion King's Royal Rifle Corps.

3RD INFANTRY BRIGADE.—1st Battalion Royal West Surrey Regiment, 1st Battalion South Wales Borderers, 1st Battalion Gloucester Regiment, and 2nd Battalion Welsh Regiment.

Divisional Troops.

DIVISIONAL CAVALRY.—1st Squadron 15th Hussars.

DIVISIONAL ARTILLERY.—XXV., XXVI., and XXXIX. Brigade Royal Field Artillery, XLIII. Brigade Royal Field Artillery (Howitzer), 26th (Heavy) Battery Royal Garrison Artillery and Ammunition Column, and 1st Divisional Ammunition Column.

DIVISIONAL ENGINEERS.—23rd and 26th Field Company Royal Engineers.

DIVISIONAL SIGNAL SERVICE.—1st Signal Company.

DIVISIONAL ARMY SERVICE CORPS.—1st Divisional Train.

DIVISIONAL MEDICAL UNITS.—1st, 2nd, and 3rd Field Ambulance.

SECOND DIVISION.

4TH INFANTRY BRIGADE.—2nd Battalion Grenadier Guards, 2nd Battalion Coldstream Guards, 3rd Battalion Coldstream Guards, and 1st Battalion Irish Guards.

5TH INFANTRY BRIGADE.—2nd Battalion Worcester Regiment, 2nd Battalion Oxford and Bucks Light Infantry, 2nd Battalion Highland Light Infantry, and 2nd Battalion Connaught Rangers.

6TH INFANTRY BRIGADE.—1st Battalion Liverpool Regiment, 2nd Battalion South Staffordshire Regiment, 1st Battalion Royal Berkshire Regiment, and 1st Battalion King's Royal Rifle Corps.

Divisional Troops.

DIVISIONAL CAVALRY.—1st Squadron 15th Hussars.

DIVISIONAL ARTILLERY.—XXXIV., XXXVI., and XLII. Brigades Royal Field Artillery, XLIV. Brigade Royal Field Artillery (Howitzer), 35th (Heavy) Battery Royal Garrison Artillery and Ammunition Column, and 2nd Divisional Ammunition Column.

DIVISIONAL ENGINEERS.—5th and 11th Field Company Royal Engineers.

DIVISIONAL SIGNAL SERVICE.—2nd Signal Company.

DIVISIONAL ARMY SERVICE CORPS.—2nd Divisional Train.

DIVISIONAL MEDICAL UNITS.—4th, 5th, and 6th Field Ambulance.

THIRD DIVISION.

7TH INFANTRY BRIGADE.—3rd Battalion Worcester Regiment, 2nd Battalion South Lancashire Regiment, 1st Battalion Wiltshire Regiment, and 2nd Battalion Royal Irish Rifles.

8TH INFANTRY BRIGADE.—2nd Battalion Royal Scots, 2nd Battalion Royal Irish Regiment, 4th Battalion Middlesex Regiment, and 1st Battalion Gordon Highlanders.

9TH INFANTRY BRIGADE.—1st Battalion Northumberland Fusiliers, 4th Battalion Royal Fusiliers, 1st Battalion Lincolnshire Regiment, and 1st Battalion Royal Scots Fusiliers.

Divisional Troops.

DIVISIONAL CAVALRY.—One Squadron 15th Hussars.

DIVISIONAL ARTILLERY.—XXIII., XL., and XLII. Brigades Royal Field Artillery, XXX. Brigade Royal Field Artillery (Howitzer), 48th (Heavy) Battery Royal Garrison Artillery and Ammunition Column, and 3rd Divisional Ammunition Column.

DIVISIONAL ENGINEERS.—56th and 57th Field Company Royal Engineers.

DIVISIONAL ARMY SERVICE CORPS.—3rd Divisional Train.

DIVISIONAL MEDICAL UNITS.—7th, 8th, and 9th Field Ambulance.

FIFTH DIVISION.

13TH INFANTRY BRIGADE.—2nd Battalion King's Own Scottish Borderers, 2nd Battalion West Riding Regiment, 1st Battalion Royal West Kent Regiment, and 2nd Battalion Yorkshire Light Infantry.

14TH INFANTRY BRIGADE.—2nd Battalion Suffolk Regiment, 1st Battalion East Surrey Regiment, 1st Battalion Duke of Cornwall's Light Infantry, and 2nd Battalion Manchester Regiment.

15TH INFANTRY BRIGADE.—1st Battalion Norfolk Regiment, 1st Battalion Bedfordshire Regiment, 1st Battalion Cheshire Regiment, and 1st Battalion Dorset Regiment.

Divisional Troops.

DIVISIONAL CAVALRY.—One Squadron 19th Hussars.

DIVISIONAL ARTILLERY.—XV., XXVII., and XXVIII. Brigades Royal Field Artillery, VIII. Brigade Royal Field Artillery (Howitzer), 108th (Heavy) Battery Royal Garrison Artillery and Ammunition Column, and 5th Divisional Ammunition Column.

DIVISIONAL ENGINEERS.—17th and 59th Field Company Royal Engineers.

DIVISIONAL SIGNAL SERVICE.—5th Signal Company.

DIVISIONAL ARMY SERVICE CORPS.—2th Divisional Train.

DIVISIONAL MEDICAL UNITS.—13th, 14th, and 15th Field Ambulance.

LINE OF COMMUNICATION DEFENCE TROOPS.

INFANTRY UNITS.—1st Battalion Middlesex Regiment, 2nd Battalion Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders, 2nd Battalion Royal Welsh Fusiliers, 1st Battalion Scottish Rifles, and 1st Battalion Devonshire Regiment.

OTHER UNITS.

Other units which have been mentioned in despatches or in the casualty lists are given below. It should be noted that in several instances a regiment has been included on the ground that one of its officers has been named in the casualty lists. Such regiments (except in the case of the Indian Corps) are indicated by an asterisk. It is possible, of course, that the officer in question was on special service or was attached temporarily to some other unit.

TERRITORIALS.

Northumberland Yeomanry, Northants Yeomanry, North Somerset Yeomanry, Leicestershire Yeomanry, Oxford Yeomanry, *Bucks Yeomanry, *Derbyshire Yeomanry, London Scottish, *Liverpool Scottish, Queen's Westminster, Hertfordshire Regiment, Honourable Artillery Company, Essex Royal Horse Artillery.

INDIAN ARMY.

2nd Lancers, 11th Lancers, 14th Lancers, 15th Lancers, 18th Lancers, 19th Lancers, 31st Lancers, 21st Cavalry, 22nd Cavalry, 26th Cavalry, 27th Cavalry, 34th Poona Horse, and 39th C. India Horse.

1st Gurkha Rifles, 2nd Gurkhas, 3rd Gurkhas, 8th Gurkhas, 9th Gurkhas, 3rd Brahmans, 9th Bhopal Infantry, 15th Sikhs, 30th Pathans, 35th Sikhs, 47th Sikhs, 57th Wilde's Rifles, 58th Vaughan's Rifles, 59th Scinde Rifles, 41st Dogras, 39th Garhwal Rifles, 127th Baluchi I.L., and 129th Baluchis.

23rd Sikh Pioneers, 34th Sikh Pioneers, 107th Pioneers, Supply Transport Corps, and 3rd Sappers and Miners.

REGULARS.

Border Regiment, *Cambridge Regiment, Durham Light Infantry, Essex Regiment, Lancashire Fusiliers, 1st Royal Dragoons, 1st Dragoon Guards, *3rd Dragoon Guards, 7th Dragoon Guards, 7th Hussars, 10th Hussars, 13th Hussars, *14th Hussars, Hampshire Regiment, East Kent Regiment, Leicestershire Regiment, 21st Lancers, East Lancashire Regiment, K.O. Royal Lancaster Regiment, Rifle Brigade, Somerset Light Infantry, Shropshire Light Infantry, North Staffordshire Regiment, Warwickshire Regiment, York and Lancaster Regiment, Yorkshire Regiment, West Yorkshire Regiment, East Yorkshire Regiment, and Sherwood Foresters.

Cameron Highlanders and Seaforth Highlanders.

Dublin Fusiliers, Inniskilling Fusiliers, Irish Fusiliers, the Irish Regiment, and *North Irish Horse.

The Manchester Guardian HISTORY of the WAR

A. H. W.
—
NINE ANNAS



ELLIOT AND FRY.

ADMIRAL SIR F. C. D. STURDEE.

Published in
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Off the coast of the Falkland Islands.

[E.N.A.]



CHAPTER IV.

THE NAVAL WAR IN TWO OCEANS.

BRITISH AND GERMAN NAVAL FORCES IN THE FAR EAST—POLITICS AND NAVAL POLICY—THE DEFEAT IN THE PACIFIC
AND LORD FISHER'S COUNTER-STROKE—BATTLE OFF THE FALKLAND ISLANDS.

WHEN war between England and Germany was declared on the 4th of August, it looked as though one of the chief areas of naval conflict must necessarily be in Far Eastern waters. For a number of years the German Government had maintained on the China station a fleet larger than that of any other European Power, composed of some of the newest and best German ships, and commanded by an Admiral who was second to none in the German navy in energy and capacity. Count von Spee, had he lived, would undoubtedly have become in time Commander-in-chief of the German High Seas Fleet. He was a gunnery expert, and his flagship, the *Scharnhorst*, which was, after the *Blücher*, the latest and best of the German pre-Dreadnought armoured cruisers, held the gunnery record for the whole German navy. Besides the *Scharnhorst* and her sister ship the *Gneisenau*, both of them steaming twenty-four knots, and carrying an armament composed of a late and powerful type of the German 8.2-inch gun (both of them, too, with specially-designed armoured protection), he had a number of cruisers of the German town class, very slightly protected and not heavily armed, but, by reason of their great speed and relatively low coal consumption, eminently fitted to act as efficient commerce destroyers. Besides these, he had a number of torpedo-boats of an older type, and a number

of coastal and river gunboats. All these were based on the fortified port of Tsing-Tau. To the north of it, on the southern side of Pechili, lay the British naval base of Wei-Hai-Wei. At this port were collected, under Vice-Admiral Jerram, a miscellaneous body of ships. The Vice-Admiral flew his flag on the *Minotaur*, an armoured cruiser of the most recent pre-Dreadnought type, heavily protected, carrying a powerful mixed armament of 9.2, 7.5, and 6-inch guns, and steaming the same speed, roughly, as the *Scharnhorst* and *Gneisenau*. With it were the *Triumph*, a battleship of light draught, with a light armour belt and medium speed, mounting four 10-inch and a battery of 7.5-inch guns, and the *Hampshire*, an armoured cruiser of the county class with, however, a relatively weak armament of four 7.5's and a number of guns of smaller calibre. Admiral Jerram had, besides two cruisers of the town class, the *Newcastle* and the *Yarmouth*, a number of river gunboats and destroyers, and four submarines of the C class. There was, therefore, no great disparity between the two fleets. The *Minotaur* was perhaps slightly more powerful—but not much more powerful—than the *Scharnhorst* and *Gneisenau*. The *Hampshire* was in every way definitely inferior to the German ships, and, indeed, belonged to that period of British cruiser construction which redounds the least in credit to Admiralty designers. On the other

**H.M.S. Good Hope.***[Topical.]***H.M.S. Monmouth.***[Topical.]*

hand, the British Admiral had the *Triumph*, which would have been a valuable ship in an engagement had the Germans sought or accepted action, but could not have been of much service had it been necessary to force an action by pursuit. In light cruisers the Germans had the *Emden*, the *Nürnberg*, and the *Leipzig*, to our *Newcastle* and *Yarmouth*. They were as fast as our ships, but inferior in armament and protection, and probably could have been sunk, even at odds, if an engagement had taken place. Further, we had the submarines, of which they had none, and our destroyers were superior to their minor craft.

Such was the position on the 4th of August, when the King issued his famous message to the Navy, a message which was publicly acknowledged by only two of the British Commanders-in-chief, Sir John Jellicoe and Admiral Jerram. The fact that the Admiral on the China station should have received the message and sent a reply, and the fact that the reply was published, seemed to point to a belief on the part of the Admiral himself, and of the Admiralty at home, that an action in Chinese waters might speedily be expected, and that the British force there would make it its business to prevent the escape and dispersal on the high seas of the German squadron. In fact, the *Emden*, the *Leipzig*, and the *Nürnberg* departed each their several ways towards the commerce routes absolutely unmolested, and the German Admiral himself, with his two armoured cruisers, succeeded equally in gaining the seas and then disappeared from public knowledge for six weeks. With the exception of one appearance at the French colony of Tahiti, he was never heard of again till October.

THE BRITISH ADMIRALTY'S POLICY.

We do not as yet know anything whatever regarding the Admiralty's policy in Far Eastern waters at the moment when war was declared, and we therefore can only conjecture what were the reasons which induced the British Admiral not to contest the departure of the German ships, or if they departed, as most likely they did, before the actual declaration of war, not to keep in touch with them, and prevent their escape on to the high seas. A conjecture may, however, be made. It seems likely, when the full history of the naval war is written, that the whole campaign in the Pacific will prove to be a capital example of the evil effects of political considerations when they are allowed to weigh in a purely naval problem. It is perhaps worth while for a moment to develop this point. We had ourselves in the Far East no adequate means at our disposal for reducing the strongly fortified German naval base at Tsing-Tau. Even had we had the necessary forces and artillery for this purpose, it is very doubtful whether our alliance with Japan would have permitted us to undertake this work by ourselves. Furthermore, it is clear that by virtue of this alliance the Japanese would have the opportunity, and would feel themselves justified in taking it, of ridding Far Eastern territory of one of the European settlements—a settlement, moreover, occupied by a Power which, twenty years before, had prevented Japan from securing the just fruits of victory, and sixteen years before had begun that process of European encroachment in China which had led to the Russian acquisition of Port Arthur, and, therefore, ultimately to the Russo-Japanese war. It seemed likely that, sooner or later, once war had been declared between ourselves and Germany, the Japanese would come in for the purpose of acquiring Tsing-Tau. It was equally likely that general political considerations

would make it desirable that our own forces should co-operate effectively in this enterprise. Accordingly, when Von Spee put to sea, though the right course from the naval point of view would have been to follow him immediately, never to lose sight of him, and to force an action as soon as possible, the right course from the political point of view was to keep the flagship, the *Triumph*, and the *Hampshire* in North Chinese waters, so as to be ready to co-operate in the land and sea attack on Tsing-Tau.

Von Spee, therefore, got clean away, and one of his ships, the *Emden*, went westwards and did a large amount of commerce destruction, which has been described in detail in an earlier chapter of this history. Another, the *Leipzig*, in its turn, destroyed several vessels in the Pacific. Von Spee himself, with his two armoured cruisers, disappeared from sight. But it is clear that he had his plans well laid. In this connection it is not without interest to observe that the Admiral's brother was, up to the July preceding the war, German Minister in Ecuador, and that there seem undoubtedly to have been concerted preparations for supplying, by means of coal and storeships, the needs of the German squadron when it got out into the Pacific. There was another British squadron in the South Pacific. The Australian Fleet, which had only recently been organised, under command of Rear-Admiral Patey, was placed under control of the Admiralty at the beginning of the war. It consisted of the battle cruiser *Australia*, which was a very powerful ship, built on the model of the *Indefatigable*, but of an improved type, of the *Sydney* and the *Melbourne*, two fast protected cruisers armed with 6-inch guns, and similar to the most recent vessels of our town class. Finally, it possessed two modern ocean-going submarines. This fleet was fast and powerful enough to engage Von Spee successfully, but, so far as we can judge from the published report, no effort was made on its part to bring the German fleet to action. Here, again, we shall not be mistaken if we find traces of the predominance of political over purely naval considerations. The first desire of the Australian Government was undoubtedly to occupy those islands in the South Sea archipelago which were colonised by Germans, particularly the German portion of New Guinea. It is, of course, clear that this object could have been attained just as well after the German fleet had been disposed of, and possibly the action of Australia was dictated by a feeling that it was desirable to occupy these territories rapidly before the Japanese fleet, which, after the ultimatum of August 16th came into play, should have been able to move southwards into waters where its presence might possibly have caused a certain sensitiveness on the part of the Australian population. However that may be, while Admiral Jerram's force was co-operating with the Japanese outside Tsing-Tau, and while the *Australia* was doing work which could have been done just as well by an armed liner, the Germans had the Pacific to themselves. A Japanese squadron did, early in October, visit the Marshall Islands and temporarily occupy them with a force of marines in order to prevent them from being used as a German base, but of an organised Japanese pursuit of the German fleet there is no trace whatever, a fact which is all the more surprising when it is considered that with the two vessels of the *Kongo* class the Japanese had an instrument which, unaided, could have swept Von Spee off the sea. By the end of October the German Admiral had met at a rendezvous the *Leipzig*, the *Nürnberg*, and the *Dresden*, which belonged strictly to the German High Seas Fleet, and which had come round from the Atlantic to join him. He had



The last of the Gneisenau: A photograph taken from the British warship *Inflexible* after the Falkland Islands Battle, showing the survivors from the crew of the sunken Gneisenau in the water. [Universal.]

therefore united a powerful squadron, which was in the technical sense a "fleet in being," and which did at that time command the eastern waters of the Pacific.

GATHERING OF A BRITISH FLEET.

This fleet, which was unchallenged by the British China squadron, the British Australasian squadron, and the Japanese navy, was left to be dealt with by another force. At the beginning of the war, Rear-Admiral Sir Christopher Cradock was in command of a cruiser force in the Western Atlantic. Through a troubled summer he had represented British interests in Mexico with energy and success, and at the declaration of war he commanded the only British squadron of cruisers which was on the high seas outside the Pacific. Shortly after the declaration of war there took place apparently a reorganisation of his force, and he transferred his flag from the *Essex*, which he had occupied during the Mexican crisis, to the *Good Hope*, and at the same time lost a portion of his command. At any rate, in October he moved southwards, with only the *Good Hope* and the *Monmouth*, and off the coast of South America picked up the *Glasgow*, a more modern protected cruiser of the town class which had been for two years on this station representing British interests. At the same time he was joined by the armed liner *Orana*, and with this force, late in October, he went through the Straits of Magellan into the Pacific. Apparently the Admiralty at home were conscious that some further support was necessary, and an old battleship, the *Canopus*, was sent out to support his force. She arrived, as the event proved, too late to be of assistance, but it may be much difference to the action with Von Spee. When the facts were known, the action of the Admiralty, in sending

such a ship to reinforce the Admiral of a cruiser squadron operating against another cruiser squadron faster and more powerful than his own, was seriously criticised. It would not be profitable to go into the question at issue, but it may be said that the subsequent actions of the Admiralty in sending out the two battle cruisers with Admiral Sturdee implied a confession that the policy of using ships of the type of the *Canopus* for this purpose was not the best which could have been pursued.

THE BATTLE OF CORONEL.

On November the 1st, off Coronel, on the coast of Chile south of Valparaiso, the two fleets came into touch. Admiral Cradock had no thought of declining an action. A gallant and courageous man, imbued with the fighting traditions of the British navy, he conceived it to be his duty to engage the enemy as soon as possible. The *Canopus*, which was some two hundred miles away, and made no more than eighteen knots at the very best, could not possibly come in time to support him, and he determined to fight without her. The action took place in the evening, and a heavy sea was running. The *Good Hope* and the *Monmouth* were both old vessels. Moreover, the secondary armament of the former could not be used in a seaway to its full extent, as the lower tier of guns was mounted too close to the water-line. The more modern and powerful wireless apparatus of the Germans enabled Admiral Von Spee to confuse the wireless signals of his opponent, and to make co-operation between the English ships difficult. Moreover, he succeeded in obtaining the tactical advantage of placing his enemy between himself and the sunset, so that the British ships showed up clear and black against the sky-line, and formed a distinct target for the rapid and powerful fire of the


twelve 8·2-inch guns which his two armoured cruisers were able to bring to bear. Against this, the *Good Hope* was able to do no more than serve two 9·2-inch guns, both of them of an old type, while the *Monmouth* broadside was utterly inferior. The action was short and one-sided. A salvo from the *Scharnhorst* struck and exploded the magazine of the *Good Hope*, and she went down with the Admiral and all hands, and without any effort being made by the Germans to pick up survivors. The *Monmouth* lasted but a little time longer, and was finally, after a series of broadsides from the two German cruisers, sunk close in shore. The *Glasgow*, which was considerably damaged, escaped with the *Orana*. Von Spee, with his victorious and nearly undamaged fleet, made northward to Valparaiso, where he was fêted by the German residents, took in coal and stores, and on November 10th again put to sea.

LORD FISHER'S COUNTER-STROKE.

The effect of this reverse, serious though it was in the loss of life which it entailed, was not to perturb or dishearten English opinion. The Admiralty set about quietly, without any public announcement, to make the necessary arrangements for the destruction of the victorious squadron. Lord Fisher had just gone on the Board when the defeat of Admiral Cradock occurred, and it is impossible not to see, in the new dispositions which were made, traces of his masterly and vigorous handling

of ships and fleets. The choice of the Admiral to whom the task of meeting Von Spee in the Atlantic, should he come that way, was entrusted aroused great interest in naval circles. Admiral Sir Doveton Sturdee had been Chief of the War Staff since the beginning of the war, and as such he was responsible, under general instructions from the First Sea Lord, for the dispositions of the ships outside the main North Sea area. So far as the Pacific was concerned, these dispositions had failed to catch Von Spee, and indeed the German Admiral had profited by them, succeeded in eluding the China squadron, succeeded in forming the junction with the *Dresden* and the *Leipzig*, and succeeded finally in destroying the weaker portion of the English fleet before it could receive its supports. All this, of course, reflected great credit on Von Spee, and, though, without the full knowledge of the facts which we do not at present possess, it would be quite unfair to indulge in any strong criticism of the Admiralty, what had happened was, superficially at any rate, not entirely to their credit. It was therefore natural that great interest was excited when it was known that Admiral Sturdee had himself gone to sea.

The squadron with which he was entrusted showed by its composition the instant effect of Lord Fisher's return to the Board. Whereas under the régime of Prince Louis of Battenberg an old and slow battleship, carrying guns of a type which had been for some years superseded, was deemed a suitable reinforcement for a cruiser squadron



to hunt down another cruiser squadron composed of fast ships, Admiral Sturdee was furnished with two vessels which were superior to the enemy in every respect, which could both outsteam and outrange him, and which could not be menaced by any combination which he could bring to bear. There was a further important reason for sending out ships of this kind, in spite of the diminution of strength caused by their absence from the main fighting area. The South Atlantic is not liberally furnished with English dockyards, and a hardly-fought battle, which would entail severe losses or damage to the victors, might have necessitated the laying-up of some of the victorious ships in the Falklands, or, worse still, in neutral harbours, until the end of the war. Von Spee's squadron had to be accounted for, and it had to be accounted for with as little loss as possible, so that the English fleet of cruisers might be released for other duties. Now the battle cruisers were the best means of making sure that this object would be attained. Admiral Sturdee left London very quietly, and, indeed, without the public being aware that he had gone. He joined, at a rendezvous at sea, the *Invincible*, which had already taken part in the Heligoland action over two months before, and the *Inflexible*, which had come from the Mediterranean. With these ships he made a further junction with one of the cruiser forces which had been operating in the Atlantic, and made his way southwards, picking up the *Glasgow*, which had survived the Coronel fight, in the South Atlantic. At 10-30 a.m. on the morning of the 7th December, Admiral Sturdee, flying his flag on the *Invincible*, and accompanied by the *Inflexible*, *Carnarvon*, *Cornwall*, *Kent*, *Glasgow*, *Bristol*, and the armoured liner



Admiral Sir F. C. D. Sturdee.

[Elliott and Fry.]



Admiral Sir Christopher Cradock.

[Elliott and Fry.]

Macedonia, arrived at Port Stanley, in the Falkland Islands.

VON SPEE'S STRATEGY.

When Von Spee left Valparaiso on November 15th with his five ships and the attendant squadron he had two or three courses open. He might, in the first place, have remained in the Pacific and moved westwards with the object of either establishing himself in one of the South Sea Islands or of interfering with Australian shipping, and possibly menacing the transport of troops from Australia to the main area of war. Given adequate supplies and coaling arrangements, a matter in which the Germans have had a very perfect organisation, he might, with luck, have reached the Cape, where he would, of course, have disorganised the whole of the sailings to this country and afforded indirect, though valuable, assistance to the rebel forces in South Africa and the German administration in South-West Africa. It is clear, however, that Von Spee realised that the good luck which had supported him in his action with Admiral Cradock was not likely to be at his service again. In fact, the South Pacific was becoming an unhealthy area for German maritime enterprise, and the forces which ought to have been concentrated against Von Spee at least two months before were now converging on all possible areas of action in the Pacific. To the west of him was the Australian fleet, short of his own in numbers by one armoured ship, but, by the superiority of the battle cruiser *Australia*, not a force which he would care to attempt to engage unless under compulsion. To the north of that again were the various cruiser squadrons of the Japanese fleet, which had been slow in their pursuit, but which now were bearing down upon the


South American coast. The action of the Japanese Admiral was, of course, being concerted with the Admiralty here, and therefore with Admiral Sturdee. The Pacific being impossible, Von Spee turned to the two other courses of action which were open to him. Which of them he intended to adopt had he successfully evaded the British fleet we shall probably never know, unless the surviving officers of the *Gneisenau* were aware of his intentions. There were, as we have said, two things which he could do. One was to make as rapidly as possible for the Central Atlantic, to paralyse English shipping with America, and to form a junction with the *Karlsruhe* and whatever other German ships might still be out or might be able to get out under cover of a friendly fog through the cordon stretched between Scandinavia to the north of Scotland. His other alternative was to give up the sea and take to the shore—that is to say, to attack and occupy the Falkland Islands, a place from which it would have been very difficult to dislodge him, and from which his light cruisers would have been able to control all the shipping which passes from the Atlantic to the Pacific through the Straits. It is said that when he was brought to action the sailors on the *Scharnhorst* and *Gneisenau* were actually dressed in their landing gear, and it seems certain, whether he intended to go or not, he certainly meant to attack and capture Port Stanley, and whatever coal was in it, on the morning of the day on which he met his fate.

THE FALKLANDS BATTLE.

There has seldom been in naval history a coincidence so remarkable as that which occurred on December 8th. The British squadron had arrived only the day before, and it is certain that Admiral Sturdee had no knowledge, and no means of knowing, that the enemy was at that moment approaching, only a day's steam off. It is equally

certain, and indeed self-evident, that Von Spee had no conception that there was a British squadron at the Falklands at all, and of course, until the action commenced, he had no knowledge of the presence of English battle cruisers. At 8 a.m. in the morning two of his ships were sighted steering northwards, about eight miles off, the rest of the squadron following about twelve miles behind. The ships were steering north towards the islands. At that moment the British squadron was coaling. The *Canopus* and *Kent* were lying as guardships in Port William and Port Stanley, the two battle cruisers were in Port William with the two county cruisers, and the *Glasgow* and the *Bristol* were in Port Stanley. At 9-20 a.m. the two leading ships of the enemy, the *Gneisenau* and *Nürnberg*, with their guns trained on the wireless station, came within range of the *Canopus*, which opened fire at them across the low land at a range of about 11,000 yards. Even at this moment, though they must probably have observed that 12-inch shells were being used, it is clear that the Germans had no idea of the presence of the battle cruisers. They knew that the *Canopus* was in South American waters, and that she was too slow for pursuit, and they consequently made off, though not at their full speed, in a north-easterly direction. At first, indeed, it seemed as if they were closing with a view to coming to action with the *Kent*, which had

by then appeared at the harbour entrance, but about that time it seems that the characteristic tripod masts of the battle cruisers were seen over the low land at the entrance to Port William. The whole German squadron, therefore, turned in the attempt to make good its escape. At ten o'clock, as the *Invincible* left the harbour mouth, the Admiral could see the five ships of the enemy clearly to the south-east, hull down. Visibility was at its maximum, the sea was calm, with a bright sun on a clear sky, and there was a light breeze from the



The wanderings of the Dresden.

north-west, which, by driving the smoke from the enemy's funnels away from our ships, made it possible for better practice to be made. At 10-20 Admiral Sturdee made the signal for a general chase.

The action which followed divides itself naturally into two parts. The *Invincible* and the *Inflexible*, supported at first by the *Glasgow* and afterwards by the *Carnarvon*, engaged the armoured cruisers. The *Kent* and *Cornwall*, and afterwards the *Glasgow*, engaged the light cruisers, while the *Bristol* was detached to deal with the colliers and transports which had accompanied Von Spee, and had made off on the approach of the British fleet. The armoured cruiser action did not begin until two hours after the signal for general chase had been given, and it was not until a quarter to one that the signal to open fire and engage the enemy was made. The fire of the battle cruisers, after one or two preliminary salvos directed against the *Leipzig*, was turned on the *Scharnhorst* and *Gneisenau*, and between 1 and 2 p.m. shots were constantly exchanged at a range between 13,000 and 14,000 yards. At 2 p.m. the enemy made another desperate attempt to escape, and it was not until nearly 3 p.m. that action was again joined. From 3 to 4 p.m. the *Scharnhorst* and the *Invincible* conducted their unequal duel. By 3-30 p.m. the third funnel of the German Admiral's ship had been shot away. Some guns were not firing, and the ship was obscured by clouds of smoke and fire and escaping steam. At times a shell would cause a large hole to appear in her side, through which could be seen a dull red glow of flame. At 4-5 p.m. the *Scharnhorst*, with the Admiral's flag still flying, listed heavily to port, gradually settling down till she lay on her beam end, and at 4-17 p.m. she disappeared. With her went the Admiral, his staff, and every one of the officers and men. At 5-30 it became clear the *Gneisenau*, which had been fighting the *Inflexible* meanwhile, was in its turn in a desperate condition. At 6 p.m. she also turned turtle and disappeared. A considerable number of her crew were rescued. An hour and a half later the *Kent* and the *Glasgow* had sunk the *Leipzig* and the *Nürnberg*, and by sundown, of the whole German squadron, only the *Dresden*, which had made off early in the action, remained afloat. The British squadron moved slowly back, its fuel all but exhausted, to Port Stanley, and in the chill southern evening the Admiral made the signal by wireless: "God save the King."

A MIDSHIPMAN'S STORY.

Many accounts of the fight have been published, but the following, taken from a letter written by a midshipman on the *Invincible*, is the most vivid, and deserves to be quoted:—

"The stokers worked like mad down below. We use our precious oil now that we have got the enemy at last. The funnels belched out dense black smoke and flames, and we up-anchored and rushed out. Just before we up-anchored we heard the *Canopus* open fire on the *Scharnhorst*. The *Scharnhorst* fired eight shots. All fell a long way short, and the *Canopus* fired six 12-inch shells, all of which missed also. The Germans then retired a bit.

"In the meantime we were tearing out, ramming anything that got in our way. We cut two small boats in half—happily there was no one in them. Once out of the harbour we formed up as follows:—

"*Bristol* : *Invincible*.

"*Kent* : *Inflexible*.

"*Carnarvon*.

"*Cornwall* : *Glasgow*.

THE CHASE BEGINS.

"On our starboard bow we could see the enemy. They looked quite close. We increased speed slowly. We were

rapidly catching the Germans, and could see them manœuvring and signalling to one another. I have heard from one of their survivors that when Admiral von Spee saw that we were the *Invincible* and *Inflexible*, instead of the inferior force he had hoped to bully, he gave all the men in his squadron one hour for prayers, which was used by a large proportion of them to get drunk.

"At 11-15 I managed to get some bread and cheese to eat, and then ran back to the turret. From the top of my turret (A turret) I watched the Germans trying manœuvre after manœuvre, all to no purpose, as they were countered by our movements, directed by the Admiral. At 12-55 the *Inflexible* fired the first shot. . . . At 12-59 we fired our first shot. We fired at the *Leipzig* and nearly hit her. We went on firing, and finally caused her to drop out of the line. But now we had a more serious quarry in sight, and we engaged the enemy's flagship, the *Scharnhorst*. In the first bout we were about equal. She hit us three times, and we did about the same to her. But we equalled her and, as was shown later, utterly out-manœuvred and out-gunned and out-matched her. After the first bout there was a short lull, and I climbed upon the top of the turret to have a look round. Suddenly we altered course and made for the enemy. I now noticed we were closing, and when their first salvo went off I was still on the top of the turret. I could see all the shells coming at us, and I felt that they were all coming straight at me. However, they all missed except one, which hit the side of the ship near the wardroom, and made a great green flash and sent splinters flying all round. I hopped below armour quickly and started working again. We were nearing the *Scharnhorst*, and began firing for all we were worth. We hit again and again. First, our left gun sent her big crane spinning over the side. Then our right gun blew her funnel to atoms, and then another shot from the left gun sent her bridge and part of the fore-castle sky high.

INVINCIBLE'S TURRET HIT.

"We were not escaping free, however. Shots were hitting us repeatedly, and the spray from the splashes of their shells was hiding the *Scharnhorst* from us. Suddenly a great livid flame rushed through the gun ports, and splinters flew all round, and we felt the 150 or 200 tons of the turret going up in the air. We thought we would go over the side and get drowned like rats in a trap. However, we came down again with a crash that shook the turret dreadfully, and continued firing as hard as ever. Nothing in the turret was out of order at all. The range continued to come down, and the whistles of the shells that flew over us grew into a regular shriek.

"Down came the range—11,000, 10,000, 9,000, 8,800. We were hitting the *Scharnhorst* nearly every time. One beauty from our right gun got one of their turrets fair and square, and sent it whizzing over the side. Suddenly our right gun misfired—we had got a jamb, and one gun was out of action. The breach had caught against one of the cages, and would neither open nor shut. We opened up the trap hatch, and I jumped out and down the ladder with two men to try and find a crowbar. The 12-inch guns were firing all round us, and our left gun was doing work for two, now that the right was jammed. The German shells were whistling unpleasantly close, and there were splinters flying all over the place.

END OF THE SCHARNHORST.

"The *Scharnhorst* was firing heavily, but I could see she was in a bad way. She was down by the bows and badly on fire amidships. I got the crowbar and brought it in, but they wanted a hack saw as well, so I jumped out again, and just as I was coming back I saw the *Scharnhorst's* ensign dip (never knew whether it came down or not, because just then one of our lyddite shells hit her and there was a dense cloud of smoke all over her). When it cleared she was on her side, and her propellers were lashing the water round into foam. Then she capsized altogether and went to the bottom! So the German flagship that had shown so little mercy to the defenceless *Monmouth* a month before sank with Admiral von Spee and 900 German sailors, not a man being saved. To save any was impossible.

"We then turned to the *Gneisenau*, and fought on for nearly two hours. The Germans had fought well and were done. She had a heavy list to port, and was burning furiously. The first funnel was down and she was an absolute shambles. Her turrets in splinters and her guns twisted into corkscrews, she looked as if she had been caught in a vice. It is not certain whether she hauled

down her flag or not. I think she did. She slowly heeled over to port and then capsized just ahead of us.

A DREADFUL SIGHT.

"You could see her side. It looked like a huge whale's back. Then she sank, and you could see wretched men caught one after another and sucked down in the vortex. When we came near we could see that the water was all yellow where she had sunk, and there was a dreadful smell of lyddite in the air. It was absolutely dreadful, and what with all those wretched Germans drowning and sending up pitiful cries for help, which we could not give because most of our boats were in splinters, I hope I shall never have to go through it again. There were a lot of men floating when we saw the ship go down, but when we reached the spot half of them were drowned. It was awful to see them in the water just alongside, trying to hold on to the slippery sides of the ship, and then slipping off and going down, fighting hard for life, but going down and down till they were lost to sight. One grew sick seeing men in their death struggles. Some of them had arms and legs blown off, and it was absolutely sickening seeing them sink, leaving behind a red trail of blood. We got out all the boats we could, and so did the *Inflexible*, and we managed to save some 300 men, including their captain—a tall man with a black beard.

"Some of them had their heads quite turned when they were picked up, and tried to kill their rescuers, or jumped into the sea again and drowned themselves. One officer tried to shoot us with an automatic pistol, but it was wrenched from his hand, and we escaped.

"This is a leaf from a German officer's note-book (just before the *Gneisenau* sank):—

"5-10, hit, hit.

"5-12, hit.

"5-14, hit, hit, hit again.

"5-20, after-turret gone.

"5-40, hit, hit; on fire everywhere.

"5-41, hit, hit; burning everywhere and sinking.

"5-45, hit; men lying everywhere.

"5-46, hit, hit.

"It ends just before the ship sank. The officer is on board here now.

THE KENT BURNS HER BOATS.

"The *Kent*, a twenty-one-knot cruiser, was ordered to chase the *Nürnberg*, a twenty-five knot ship, and also a much more modern one than the *Kent*. She had only a few hundred tons of coal on board to catch the *Nürnberg* with. The old *Kent* set off, and they worked up to twenty-two, more than she had ever done on trials. Then the word was passed up that there

was hardly any coal left. 'Well,' said the captain, 'have a go at the boats.' So they broke up all the boats, smeared them with oil, and put them in the furnaces. Then in went all the armchairs from the wardrooms, and then the chests from the officers' cabins. They next burnt the ladders and all—every bit of wood was sent to the stoke-hold. The result was that the *Kent's* speed became twenty-four knots, and she caught the *Nürnberg*, and after a stiff fight, in which several men were killed, the *Nürnberg* was sunk.


"This ship had a hot time of it, as we were fired on by the *Scharnhorst* and the *Gneisenau*, so that we had only six 12-inch guns to fight twelve 8-3 and six 6-inch guns. We got twenty 8-3-inch shells on board and several 7-inch shells. There is one 8-3-inch which did not explode, and we have got him whole. He weighs 280 lbs. or 300 lbs. without the armour-piercing cap.

"The action was a very hard one—five hours' solid firing. The guns were nearly red-hot to finish with. I escaped all damage except a trivial burn on one of my fingers by a splinter. It is all healed up now.


"It must have been a regular inferno on the German ships, with heaps of dead men and fragments of them all over the decks, and the officers, whose heads had been turned, shooting the men and themselves with their automatic pistols. The prisoners we have look back on it as a kind of nightmare."

EFFECT OF THE VICTORY.


The effect of Admiral Sturdee's action, completed as it was by the sinking of the *Dresden* on March 14th off the Chilian coast, was to remove, with insignificant exceptions, German naval power from the seas of the world outside the area of the Bight of Heligoland. Henceforward the numerous and powerful British cruiser squadrons were to be free for the task of controlling commerce on the high seas, and therefore to make possible the policy of blockade by cruiser cordons which was announced by the Prime Minister as a reply to the German attempts to destroy English commerce by submarine. From the technical point of view the action was interesting, in that it showed the immense superiority of the battle cruiser over the most powerful and best-handled vessels of the earlier armoured cruiser type. Finally, the action, along with that of Coronel, seemed to prove that in modern naval warfare it is the conquered that pays, and that the successful force in a naval action can destroy its opponent utterly with insignificant loss to itself.



A photograph taken from the deck of a British warship patrolling the North Sea.
[Alfieri Picture Service.]



The British Grand Fleet in the North Sea.
[Alfieri Picture Service.]



Admiral Beatty's famous First Battle Cruiser Squadron.

[Cribb, Southsea.]

CHAPTER V.


THE BATTLE OF THE DOGGER BANK.

THE LOSS OF THE "BULWARK" AND THE "FORMIDABLE"—THE CRITICISM OF THE ADMIRALTY—THE THIRD NAVAL RAID—THE FIRST DREADNOUGHT ACTION—THE SINKING OF THE "BLÜCHER"—THE INJURIES TO THE "LION"—COMMENTS ON THE ACTION.

BETWEEN 1898 and 1901 twenty armoured ships were launched, and of the eight armoured ships lost in this war all but one belonged to this period. It is a high rate of mortality, but the rate is higher still if the 1898 ships are excluded, for of what may be called the Boer War ships six out of fifteen have gone to the bottom. The *Aboukir* (1900), the *Cressy* (1899), and the *Hogue* (1900) were torpedoed off Holland. The *Good Hope* and *Monmouth* (1901) were lost at Coronel. The *Bulwark* (1899) was blown up in the Medway at the end of November, and in the first hours of the New Year the *Formidable* (1898) was torpedoed in the Channel. The *Bulwark* and *Formidable* were sister ships of 15,000 tons displacement, 400 feet in length, and 75 beam; both were built in the Government yards, and cost a million apiece. They were, like the other ships of this period, too old to lie in line with more modern ships, but they were powerful and serviceable, mounting four twelve-inch and twelve six-inch guns. The *Venerable*, of the same date, did most useful work against the German trenches near Ostend; the *Ocean*, *Canopus*, *Irresistible*, and *Vengeance*, all of the same period, with the much earlier *Majestic*, were later to take part in the forcing of the Dardanelles, the most difficult operations in which the British Navy has ever been engaged. The sinking of the ships of this period was, therefore, even apart from the drowning of their crews, a very serious loss to the British Navy.


The *Bulwark* was blown up on the morning of November 26th, at a few minutes to eight o'clock. She had been near Sheerness for some days, and other ships were about her in the Medway. Leave had ceased at seven o'clock that morning, and almost the whole crew was on board, most of them at breakfast, some drilling on deck. The ship's band was playing. Suddenly, without any sort of warning, a spurt of flame broke out near the after barbette. "Then a volume of flame seemed to rush towards the after funnel. The whole interior of the ship appeared to be blown into the air, and everything seemed alight." "I saw a sudden flash aft," said one of the very few survivors of a crew of 800. "It moved forward. I turned aft, and at that moment the decks seemed to open, and I fell. I remember coming up in the water with great force. Rising to the surface, I looked round and saw that the ship had gone." Observers on shore heard nothing but the roar of the explosion—people at a distance thought that there had been a Zeppelin raid, and that bombs had been dropped—and saw nothing but immense clouds of smoke, first black, then yellow and white, and, when they had cleared away, nothing of the ship but its masts in the water. None of the other ships was injured, though the ruin of the explosion was flung out on all sides.

The other ships in the neighbourhood put out their torpedo nets after the explosion, but all the evidence goes to show that the explosion was due to an internal cause,



The big guns of H.M.S. New Zealand.

[*Newspaper Illustrations.*]



H.M.S. Bulwark, blown up off Sheerness.

[*Topical Press.*]

and neither to treachery nor to submarine attack. All the causes suggested at the inquest—the dropping of burning cigarette ends on loose cordite and the like—were rejected; nor was anything alongside at the time of the explosion. There was an Admiralty inquiry, which, however, was held privately, and nothing was published of its labours except the finding that the explosion was due to the accidental ignition of ammunition on board, and that there was no evidence to support the suggestion that the explosion was due to treachery on board the ship. Rear-Admiral Gaunt, at the inquest, went beyond this limitation, and said that the Admiralty were satisfied that it was most improbable that there could have been any sort of treachery, or any act of the enemy. But no explanation of the causes of the disaster was ever offered by the Admiralty. The parallels of the loss of the *Bulwark* were the blowing up of the *Doterel* in the Straits of Magellan, in the early 'eighties, the destruction of the *Maine* in Havana Harbour—which was certainly not the work of a Spaniard—just before the war between the United States and Spain, and the loss of the *Liberté* in Toulon harbour, which was proved to have been caused by defective ammunition.

THE LOSS OF THE FORMIDABLE.

The loss of the *Formidable* was less mysterious in its cause, but hardly less obscure in its circumstances. The Admiralty, at first uncertain whether her loss was due to mine or submarine, later came to the conclusion that she was torpedoed by a submarine, and a German official statement said that one of their submarines, whose number, however, was not given, had reported that she had sunk the *Formidable* off Plymouth. Out of a crew of nearly 800, 546 officers and men went down with her. That is all the official information that has been given out about one of the most serious losses in the war, and there is remarkably little agreement between the survivors on some very essential points. For example, while one survivor declared that the night was "the clearest moonlight night he had ever seen, with the sea like a mill-pond," others spoke of "mountainous seas" and a gale of wind. That there should be any conflict

in the evidence on such a point as this is eloquent of the difficulty that there is in fixing even the most elementary facts from a number of unsifted reports.

The *Formidable* was struck on the starboard side about 2-20 on New Year's morning. Immediately the water poured into the boiler rooms, and the electric light and all steam power failed. At the same time the ship began to list heavily, which would have made the task of launching the boats one of great difficulty even in a smooth sea. It was a bitterly cold night, and most of the men, suddenly wakened out of sleep, came up on deck in their shirts. About a quarter of an hour after the first hit there was a second explosion, either through a second torpedo or through fire reaching a magazine,

but this second injury made things better by righting the list. The ship, however, soon began to settle down in the water, and by three o'clock all the men were on the top deck. An hour later the ship's decks were nearly perpendicular.

The men, obeying the orders of the captain, jumped into the sea or slid down the side of the ship into the sea, and at half-past four the ship dived, bow first. Seventy men were rescued by a light cruiser; eighty more drifted about for twelve hours in an open cutter in a sea which by this time, whatever the weather may have been early on the preceding night, was running very high. They were rescued some fifteen miles off Berry Head by the Brixham smack *Providence*.




The British battle cruiser *New Zealand*.

[L.N.A.]

"The *Providence*, bearing north-west, was running before a gale to Brixham for shelter, and, when off the Start, had to heave to owing to the force of the wind. She had just previously been struck by heavy seas, and, when on the starboard tack, Jack Clark, the third hand, noticed an open boat under the lee of the smack. He shouted to his captain and his mate—the latter named S. Carter—to jump up, saying, 'Here's a sight under our lee.'"


"They were amazed to see a small open boat driving through the mountainous seas with one oar hoisted as a staff, from which was flying a sailor's scarf. The little cutter was hidden from view for minutes together in the seething foam.

"Captain Pillar swung the *Providence* clear. The crew, with almost superhuman efforts, took another reef in the mainsail and set the storm jib, for until that had been done



H.M.S. Lion.

[Cribb, Southsea.]



The German cruiser Blücher.

[Central News.]

it would have been disastrous to have attempted a rescue. Meanwhile, the cutter drifted towards them, although at times they lost sight of her in the heavy sea. Clark climbed the rigging, and presently discovered the cutter braving the storm just to leeward of his boat.

"The captain decided to try a perilous manoeuvre in such weather, since the mast was liable to give way. Four times did the gallant steersmen seek to get a rope to the cutter. Each effort was more difficult than the last, but in the end they obtained a good berth on the port tack. A small warp was thrown and caught by the sailors. This they made fast round the stem of the capstan, and with great skill the cutter was hauled to a berth at the stern. The warp was passed round to the lee side, and the cutter brought up to the lee quarter. Then the naval men began to jump on board, but even now there was a danger of losing men, as the seas were rising some thirty feet high at times.

"The rescues from the cutter to the smack took thirty minutes to accomplish. A lad of eighteen, having suffered from exposure, required immediate treatment on board to save his life. The officer in charge of the cutter—Torpedo-Gunner Horrigan—was the last to leave, and he found himself clutching the mizzen rigging to get aboard the *Providence*. This accomplished, the cutter's rope was then cut. She was full of water, having a hole under the hull. This had been stuffed with a pair of pants, of which one of the seamen had divested himself for the purpose. One of the men had his fingers jammed between the cutter and the fishing-smack."

It was one of the finest of the many services that fishermen have rendered to the navy in this war, and Captain Pillar richly deserved his decoration and the congratulations of the King on his seamanship.

THE CRITICISM OF THE ADMIRALTY.

Gossip has been unusually busy with the loss of the *Formidable*. According to one account she left Sheerness on Thursday, December 31st, for Portland, but it is not explained how in that case she was forty miles to the east at the time of the disaster. She is also said to have been the last of a line of eight battleships, and steaming at a speed of not more than twelve knots. Although submarines were known to be about, she is said to have

neglected precautions against attack. To these and other charges—most of them insinuated in interrogatives—the Admiralty has opposed a steady silence, and most of the circumstance of the disaster is for the present unverifiable gossip which may or may not be true, but cannot be utilised as the material for history. That rumour, however, should be so busy lends point to the complaint made against the Admiralty for its discretionary disuse of the old practice of holding a court-martial on naval losses. The public interest could easily have been safeguarded by the suppression of such details of the inquiry as it might be useful to the enemy to know, and a trial would certainly have been more just to the survivors of disaster

who could be held to have been in any way responsible.


A great deal of the work of the Admiralty was brilliantly done—better, perhaps, than in any previous war. But it is undeniable that some mistakes were made, and it is perhaps a pity that they have not been more freely discussed, for nothing is so certain as that they are known and discussed in Germany, and far more victories are won by intellectual and moral courage, which is a rare virtue in a nation, than by physical courage, than which no virtue is more widely diffused. Before the war had been long in progress people were satisfied that our gun-ships, at any rate, were more than the equals of the German. If there was at any time any tendency to criticise the Admiralty, it was




Admiral Sir John Jellicoe going up to the fore bridge of his flagship.

[Alfred Picture Service.]

certainly not due to any lack of faith in the material and design of British ships. The causes were quite different. Perhaps the most widely-felt cause of uneasiness—and it was more thought about than talked of—was a certain tendency to boastfulness on the part of the Admiralty spokesmen. In the middle of September Mr. Churchill made a speech in which he spoke contemptuously of digging the Germans out of their harbours like rats out of their holes, and on the very next day occurred the disaster to the three British cruisers (Vol. I., page 227). There is no lesson in history more certain than that the wrong sort of pride always brings its punishment, for with vaunting always goes a certain carelessness and inattention



The German Cruiser Blücher : On fire and sinking after the running fight in the North Sea.
(By permission of the "London Illustrated News".)



The action off the Dogger Bank.

to details which are dangerous in war. Mr. Churchill was also somewhat unfortunate in his reference to the loss of the *Bulwark*. "It is no exaggeration to say that we could afford to lose a super-Dreadnought every month for twelve months without any loss occurring to the enemy, and yet be in as approximately as good a position of superiority as we were at the declaration of war." Mr Churchill had in mind the additions that had been made to our navy since the outbreak of war, but many felt that there was something wrong in the attitude of mind which applied this particular balm to the wounds made by a great disaster in which hundreds of gallant and highly-trained sailors had met their death. Another unfortunate phrase occurred in the letter to the Mayor of Scarborough after the raid. He described the incident as "one of the most instructive and encouraging that has happened in the war." These things were joyfully seized hold of by his enemies, and his admirers could only regret that he should have given them a handle for personal attacks which have had a much greater effect on public opinion than is commonly supposed. Whether the Admiralty was right in suppressing detailed information about certain disasters—the loss of the *Formidable*, for example—experience only can show, but the critics of the Admiralty were not slow to allege that its real anxiety was not to keep the enemy in ignorance, but to escape a too close enquiry into its own conduct of the war.

THE PROBLEMS OF THE MINE AND SUBMARINE.


A more definite and probably a juster charge against the Admiralty was that it had not adequately thought out the new problems created by the mine and submarine (compare Vol. I., Chapter XXIV.). The best statement of this charge is that of Mr. Gibson Bowles.*

"So long as we have the good fortune to meet our enemy in the old above-board way, we know how to deal with him, and are usually able to dispose of him. But to the new ways we have not yet accustomed ourselves. We have not tackled them. Despite all experience we still fail to estimate their deadly importance. The admiral of seventy cannot attune his mind to that of the lieutenant of thirty who lives among them and knows them, and drowns because of them. He can scarcely do so much violence to himself and his traditions as to attend to them. And to this day he never has duly attended to them, or addressed himself to them with an adequately full sense of their deadly urgency.

"The mine, although no new thing in naval warfare, is altogether new in its present form and present uses. Murder at sea had never before been erected into a fine art. Yet long ago—at least so long ago as the Russo-Japanese War of 1904—the mine had shown its capacities in this way, and the young fighting captains and lieutenants at sea began to be well aware of it, and very anxious about it. But the thinking old admirals ashore could not be moved to sustained attention to this new thing with which they had never been shipmates. Neither they nor any Cabinet, nor any Committee of Defence, ever became really aware of the mine. The fighting lieutenants and captains sighed to see the years go by with nothing invented, nothing done, to help them in that to which they thought the whole of the genius, ingenuity, and constructive power of the Admiralty should years ago have been directed, and kept incessantly directed, until some probable defence for the ship against the mine had been found. They are still, and are still left, at their wits' end, while the sea is still daily strewn with wrecks and corpses, no remedy yet found, and all the remedies suggested still pigeon-holed or half-heartedly and leisurely criticised and examined. No doubt it is hard to find an adequate remedy; but it is no less true that during those ten years of peace, and especially during these last six months of war, a greater, more intense, and more sustained effort should have been made to find one than any of which there are any fruits to be seen to-day.


"The submarine also is not new. And the same criticism applies to it as to the mine—that in all this time no method has been found, or has with persistency been sought, of tackling it with any reasonable prospect of success. Its limited radius of operations, its need of monthly supplies, its inability to

* In the *Candid Review* for February.



What a battleship and her big guns look like in action.

[Record Press.]



H.M.S. Princess Royal.

[Cribb, Southsea.]

remain under water for more than some thirty hours, its slow speed of fourteen knots on the water, and still slower speed of nine under the water, and above all its entire inability to work in the dark—all those limitations are known to all. Such limitations invite ingenuity. Yet, as with the mine, so with the submarine, no adequate or probable plan of meeting it is yet found; and because of that we still look helplessly on while one battleship after another is torpedoed and sunk in our own waters. It is to be supposed that the Admiralty mind has been given to this peril; but if there be any plans for dealing with it they still remain, like prize money, under consideration. Here, too, there has been a fatal want of forethought and of preparation in due time, extending over years, and still apparent."

Adequately to investigate the justice of these criticisms would take us further into current controversy than is consistent with the plan of this work, but the existence of this undercurrent of critical opinion is an important fact which cannot be ignored in a contemporary history.

THE THIRD GERMAN NAVAL RAID.

On Saturday night, January 23rd, the German fleet set out on its third raid towards the British coasts. Since its visit to Scarborough and Hartlepool, on December 16th,* it had done nothing, in spite of the provocation given by a very well-managed air raid on Cuxhaven on Christmas morning. The German official account spoke of the expedition as "an advance in the North Sea," as though nothing more serious were on hand than a reconnaissance. In fact, the squadron was stronger than came on the last raid. In addition to the three "Dreadnought" cruisers—*Derfflinger* (completed 1914), *Seydlitz* (1913), and *Moltke* (1911)—which took part in the Scarborough raid, the squadron included the *Blücher*, several light cruisers, and two destroyer flotillas. Admiral Hipper was in command. There is no apparent reason why the *Blücher* should have been chosen rather than the *Von der Tann*, a battle cruiser of the same type as the *Moltke*, and completed in the same year. The *Blücher* was laid down in 1906, as an answer to the first Dreadnought cruiser, and like Germany's first Dreadnought battleships was a comparative failure. She carried 8.2-inch guns, against the 12-inch guns of the British cruiser of the same period. The German designers held by the intermediate sizes of guns. Whereas the British designers from the first chose 4-inch for their secondary armament and 12-inch for their primary, the Germans preferred 5.9-inch for their secondary armament, and it was only gradually that they were converted to the 12-inch primary armament, by which time our cruisers had worked up to 13.5-inch. Thus, the *Blücher*, completed in 1910, had twelve 8.2-inch guns; the *Moltke* and *Seydlitz*, which followed, ten 11-inch guns, and it was not until the *Derfflinger* that the Germans used 12-inch guns on their battle cruisers. The following table of the armament of the armoured cruisers that were engaged in the Battle of the Dogger Bank shows the gradual conversion of the German designers.

* Some of the details of the casualties in the East Coast Naval Raid given on an earlier page of this work (Vol. I., p. 335) should here be corrected. At Scarborough, since the bombardment, there has been one death from injuries received in it, so that the total death-roll there was not seventeen, as stated, but eighteen. The number of the killed outright at Hartlepool was eighty-two, and thirty-seven have since died, making a total of 119. The times of the bombardment, about which the statements have been contradictory, were as follows: Scarborough, 8.5 a.m. to 8.50; Hartlepool, 8.15 to 8.50; Whitby, 9.0 to 9.15. The Hartlepool bombardment, it will be seen, lasted longer than is stated in Vol. I., p. 355, and synchronised more nearly with the bombardment of Scarborough.

BRITISH.

	Tons.	Completed.	Guns.		Speed (knots).	Men.
			In.	In.		
<i>Indomitable</i>	17,250	1908	8 12	16 4	26	780
<i>New Zealand</i>	18,800	1912	8 12	16 4	25	780
<i>Princess Royal</i> ..	26,350	1912	8 13.5	16 4	28.5	980
<i>Lion</i>	26,350	1912	8 13.5	16 4	28.5	980
<i>Tiger</i>	28,000	1914	8 13.5	16 4	28	—

GERMAN.

	Tons.	Completed.	Guns.		Speed (knots).	Men.
			In.	In.		
<i>Blücher</i>	15,550	1910	12 8.2	8 5.9	25.3	888
<i>Moltke</i>	22,640	1911	10 11	12 5.9	28.4	1,013
<i>Seydlitz</i>	24,640	1913	10 11	12 5.9	29.2	1,150
<i>Derfflinger</i>	28,000	1914	8 12	12 5.9	27	—

The *Blücher* was thus the extreme example of the theories of the German designers before their conversion had begun. A still more serious fault was her comparative slowness. Whether she was employed in the new raiding squadron because the *Von der Tann* had suffered injuries of which no news had been allowed to come out, or because it was intended that she should act as decoy while the three faster cruisers carried out more important work, there is no means of knowing. Certain it is that she was a source of weakness to the raiding squadron.

THE FIRST STAGE—THE SIGHTING AND THE CHASE.

The German squadron was sighted off the tail of the Dogger Bank soon after dawn on January 24th. It is surmised from its position that it may have been intending to attack the Tyne, possibly the Forth. A possible theory of the German intentions is that there was a more ambitious plan contemplated of gaining access to the Northern Atlantic. The Dutch gossips had it that the Germans had troops ready to embark on transports and to take advantage of the confusion that it was hoped might be caused by the appearance of their squadron to effect a landing at some point. As on the occasion of the last raid, there was a British squadron patrolling the coast. This time it was ahead of its beat in December, and it caught the first sight of the German squadron at dawn, some seventy miles from the Yorkshire coast. It is possible that the British had had information from submarines off the German coast that the Germans had left their ports. The British squadron was steaming south. In addition to the five battle-cruisers whose names have been given, the British admiral had four light cruisers, which were on his port beam (that is, between the battle cruisers and the Dogger Bank), and ahead were the destroyer flotillas with three light cruisers, among them the celebrated *Arethusa*, under Commodore Tyrwhitt, the *Aurora* and the *Undaunted*. (See p. 49, Fig. 1.) Admiral Beatty was in command, with his flag on the *Lion*.

The first shots were fired about 7.25, by the *Aurora*, which became engaged with the enemy's destroyers. Under favourable circumstances the ideal tactics might have been to retire, in the hope that the enemy would give chase and so allow the battle cruisers to work their way round between the Germans and home. The Germans, however, were too wary, for almost immediately they turned right about. They had been steering north-west; they now made east, some points south. At 7.30 the battle squadron sighted the enemy fourteen miles away, on the port (east) side. The Germans turned almost at sight, and the scouting cruisers had never any chance of leading them on. The only chance was for them to detain the enemy by engaging him, which they had already begun to do before receiving Admiral Beatty's orders. With his battle cruisers, Admiral Beatty steered south-



The funeral procession, with full military honours, of the captain of the *Blücher*, who was rescued after his vessel had sunk, but who afterwards died in the military hospital at Edinburgh. [Central News.

east in the hope that he might not have been seen, and that his light cruisers might be able to edge the Germans to the south, and so enable him to work round between them and their own ports. The German Admiral, however, made straight for home, and, finding that the enemy was not to be seduced from their course, Admiral Beatty began to run parallel with them. And so, as he said in his first report, the situation developed by degrees into a stern chase. (Fig. 2).

The *New Zealand* and the *Indomitable* were both slower than the other three, and the *Lion* and *Tiger* drew ahead, with the *Princess Royal* third. The leaders were steaming at nearly twenty-nine knots, and the slower ships greatly exceeded their nominal speed, thanks to the exertions of their engineers. Fire was opened at 18,000 yards, and the first hit, soon after nine o'clock, was at 17,000 yards. The German ships were in single line ahead, with the *Moltke* leading and the *Blücher* in the rear. The British ships, after a chase of nearly sixty miles, were now beginning to overhaul the Germans. At 9-20 the *Tiger* was level with the *Blücher*, and five minutes later the *Princess Royal*. Each ship, as it passed her, raked her with fire. Soon after 9-30 the *Lion* was sufficiently advanced to fire with effect on the German leader, which, at 9-45, was observed to be burning. The third in the line, probably the *Derfflinger*, which was engaged by the *Princess Royal*, was also on fire. At this time the prospects

of the annihilation of the German squadron were decidedly good.

THE SMOKE OF THE DESTROYERS.

All this time our light cruisers had been on the port (north) side of the Germans. Between the two parallel lines of battle cruisers were the destroyers, the Germans ahead, the British following close behind. (Fig. 3). The wind was north-east, and the smoke from our destroyers obscured the sight of the gunners. The *Tiger*, for example, could not see the leaders for the smoke, and had to fire on the unfortunate *Blücher*; the apparent immunity of the second in the German line (perhaps the *Seydlitz*)—she is not mentioned in Admiral Beatty's report—may well have been due to the smoke. So serious was the nuisance that our destroyers were ordered to fall behind, so as to give the battle cruisers a better sight.

The German destroyers, relieved of the pressure of the British destroyers' chase, were able to screen the starboard (right) side of their cruisers. At the same time, having noticed perhaps the inconvenience caused to our gunners by the smoke of our destroyers, they began to emit vast volumes of smoke, and under cover of the smoke the German battle cruisers completely changed their direction, and turned nearly due north. Some of the German destroyers threatened to attack, and, as their

came up again between the lines and drove them off. In this division, which Captain Meade handled with conspicuous ability, was the *Melcor*, which was very badly mauled.

THE SECOND STAGE—SINKING OF THE BLÜCHER.

When the German destroyers had been driven off, and the smoke had cleared away, the German battle cruisers—the *Blücher* was well in the rear, and her case was already hopeless—and especially the second and third in the line, were seen to have increased their distance from their pursuers. The manoeuvres of the destroyers must have consumed some considerable time, and it may now have been about 10-30. The chase was now running north. A second attack threatened by the German destroyers, the *Lion* and *Tiger* made short work of, and a quarter of an hour later the *Indomitable* was detached to close with the *Blücher*. But just before eleven a fresh complication appeared. German submarines began to hang on the starboard side of the *Lion*—that is, the side nearest the shore to which the chase must by now have been running parallel. Just after eleven a lucky shot from one of the German cruisers damaged one of the feed tanks of the *Lion*, and reduced her speed very considerably. Admiral Beatty's long report on the engagement does not state the cause of the injury, and mentions it in a way which might connect it with the appearance of the submarines. The statement in the earlier reports, however, that it was caused by a "lucky shot" seems against that theory, and, moreover, the feed tank that was injured was on the opposite side from that on which the submarines were sighted. Whatever the cause, the *Lion* had to retire. She had led the attack since the beginning of the action, and she must often have been hit, though her casualties were small. The Admiral signalled to his squadron to attack the rear of the enemy, and the chase continued.

Admiral Beatty transferred his flag at 11-20 to the destroyer *Attack*, and in a quarter of an hour was hastening to rejoin his squadron, which had gone on ahead. He met the *Princess Royal* returning at 12-20, and then learned that the *Blücher* had been sunk, and that the pursuit of the other three ships had been discontinued. In the final report no reason is assigned for breaking off the action. The reason given in the first Admiralty statement was that the pursuit had been carried up to the enemy's mine-fields, which made its continuance too dangerous. It is, however, difficult to square that explanation with the German statement that the battle ended seventy miles from Heligoland, and the true explanation, no doubt, is that given by Admiral Beatty in his preliminary report, that it had been discontinued owing to the presence of the enemy's submarines.

The sinking of the *Blücher* was a terrible sight, and its incidents at the end—the heeling over of the ship and the sliding of the crew down the sides—have a remarkable resemblance to what happened at the sinking

of the *Formidable*, except that the *Blücher* went down in broad daylight, and many of her crew were rescued by the victors. She stood a great deal of pounding, and it was a torpedo that ended her. A Zeppelin appeared at the end, and, with the stupidity characteristic of all the performances of these craft, began to drop bombs.

COMMENTS ON THE ACTION.

Neither the British nor the German accounts of the engagement have been ingenuous. The first British account did not mention the injuries to the *Lion*, and it was not until the Germans had published accounts of the sinking of a British ship that the Admiralty admitted that she had received any. Only in the later and fuller reports did it appear how important her injuries were in the story of the battle. But the German versions were worse. It was natural that they should make the most of the end of the battle, which was so much more successful for the enemy than the beginning, and no doubt the crews, after seeing destruction before them at ten in the morning, were quite honestly jubilant at getting back to port at all. It is possible, too, that they believed that the *Lion* had been torpedoed—for all we know, she may have been by one of the submarines—and could not possibly get home. But the story of the sinking of a battleship besides—even though battleship is only a bad translation of the German word *Kriegsschiff* (war ship), which is quite possible—was a mere embellishment, for which there was no excuse.

The first battle between Dreadnoughts was a very considerable British victory. One German cruiser was sunk, and at least two of the others were so badly damaged that they will be out of action for months. The British losses, on the other hand, were by comparison very slight, in spite of the temporary disablement of the *Lion*. Two criticisms have been heard on the battle. One, that our chances of cutting off the Germans were spoilt by undue precipitancy in beginning the action, is based—as this narrative may have shown—on a misreading of the facts. The other criticism, which blames Captain Brock for breaking off the action too early, may have more behind it, but cannot be made with fairness on our present very imperfect knowledge of the facts. There is nothing in Admiral Beatty's report to suggest that he would not have made the same decision had he been present at the end.

The battle brilliantly justified the British designs, and exhibited our superiority in gun-fire in the most favourable light. It was a great triumph for the gunners and engineers, and generally for the mechanical side of the fleet. The leading on both sides was extremely competent, and there was some very pretty manoeuvring with the destroyers. Their smoke is like a curtain, which came down between the first act, in which our success was unmarred, and the second act, in which our success was somewhat equivocal. But the end of the battle once more showed the revolutionary importance of the submarine in naval war.



A German general and his staff directing the operations in Poland.

[Central News.]



Austrian troops advancing over marshy ground in Poland.

[Topical.]



The massing of German troops by rail: A troop train halted on the way to Lodz.

[L.N.A.]

CHAPTER VI.

THE GERMAN COUNTER-STROKE AGAINST RUSSIA.

THE GERMAN RETREAT FROM THE NIEMEN—POSITION IN THE MIDDLE OF NOVEMBER, 1914—GERMAN COUNTER-STROKE FROM THORN—ITS FIRST SUCCESS—THE RUSSIAN RALLY—TWO GERMAN CORPS BREAK THROUGH—REMARKABLE SITUATION—THE CLOSE OF THE LODZ FIGHTING.

ABOUT the time when the German armies were preparing for their first advance on Warsaw they were sending forward an army estimated at a quarter of a million men from the frontiers of East Prussia towards the Rivers Niemen and Bobr. They had invaded the Russian province of Suwalki after the heavy defeat which General Samsonoff had sustained in the lake region of East Prussia in August, and it was now their purpose to force the passage of the Niemen and take up a defensive position on its eastern side. There was no alternative between this course and that of standing on the defensive along their own frontier, which would have rendered East Prussia liable to a second invasion if the Russians could have threatened their flanks either from the north or the south. On the other hand, to attack the line of the Niemen was an adventurous policy, because the movement which was about to be directed against Warsaw was much more important than anything which the Germans could accomplish on the East Prussian front, and it is doubtful whether it was worth while to risk defeat. Success alone could justify the experiment, and success was not obtained. The

men and guns which were thrown away on the Niemen might have averted the stroke by which the Russians outflanked the weak German left wing in the great attack on Warsaw. There was, however, one further advantage to be gained by a successful stroke beyond the acquisition of a strong defensive line, and this may have strongly influenced the Germans. Not far from the Niemen, at the points where the Germans attacked it, runs the main railway line from Petrograd to Warsaw. A German army firmly established on the right bank of the river north of Grodno would have broken this line—which would have caused the greatest embarrassment to the Russians defending Warsaw and the Vistula—or would at least have threatened it, which would have compelled the Russians to bring up fresh troops for its defence at the moment when they needed them urgently for use in Poland.

In order that their attack on the Niemen might not be outflanked from the south, the Germans combined with it an advance on the fortress of Ossowiec, which defends the crossing of the Bobr river. The Bobr is one of the three rivers, the Niemen and the Narew being the other


two, which protect Russia from serious invasion north of the Vistula, and at Ossowiec the Bobr is crossed by the important trunk railway which runs from Brest Litowsk, the centre of Russian concentration, in a north-easterly direction through Bielostok (on the Petrograd-Warsaw line), and so into East Prussia. So long as the Germans occupied the attention of Ossowiec and its army they hoped that their operations against the Russians would be able to proceed unmolested from the south. In this they judged correctly. What led to their failure was that they could not bring to bear either the superior numbers or the sudden attack by which they had gained their victory in East Prussia. They found the Russians well prepared, and failed altogether to make any impression on them.

The stretch of country around the towns of Suwalki and Augustowo in which the German advance was taking place is in its natural features a continuation of the lake region in East Prussia. Around Ossowiec, and for a number of miles to the north-east, lies a great area of marshland. Immediately north of the marshes begins the forest of Augustowo, which is about twenty-five miles by thirty-five in extent, and is interspersed with lakes; the lake-country stretches far beyond its northern border. All this country would have been as easy to defend as the Germans, at one time or another during the war, showed their own lake-country to be. But the Russians decided to withdraw almost up to the Niemen river, partly because they feared to be outflanked, but mainly because the farther they could draw the Germans on from the numerous railways of East Prussia, the more they would be able to deal with them on terms of equality, and the better would be their prospects of gaining a complete success if they once succeeded in repulsing the attack.

By September 23rd General Rennenkampf's rearguard had reached the Niemen, and two days later the Germans, who were commanded by General Morgen, opened their attack. The corps which were engaged, in whole or in part, were the First, Second, Fifth, Sixth, Seventh, Eighth,

Seventeenth, and Twentieth. The left wing lay between the Augustowo forest and the railway from Königsberg to Kovno, thrown forward from Mariampol and Simno towards the Niemen, but not intended to attack the river line. In the centre the attack was directed against two points: Drusskeniki and Sopockinie, which lie respectively at the northern and southern extremities of the Augustowo forest on its eastern side. Drusskeniki is actually on the Niemen; Sopockinie is a few miles west of it. From both points, had the Germans crossed the river, they would have been within easy striking distance of the railway between Grodno and Vilna. The strongest force was employed in the movement on Drusskeniki. The extreme right wing of the attack was formed by the column advancing against Ossowiec.

The contest which now took place had taken a long time to mature, but it was decided with remarkable speed. The Germans began their attack on the Niemen on September 25th. At both points it failed completely. The Russians, who met the attack in front of the river, took the offensive at Sopockinie on the next day, and, pushing their way rapidly through the southern outskirts of the forests, re-occupied the town of Augustowo on September 28th. At the same time they drove the Germans who had attacked Sopockinie back in a north-westerly direction through the forest. Their right wing, no less successful, began to repel the German left on Simno and



The map illustrates the first German advance on the Niemen and the attack on Ossowiec.

Mariampol, but at Drusskeniki, where the Germans had massed their largest forces, the fighting was much more obstinate. The advance of the Russians on the flanks, however, made it impossible for the Germans to hold their ground in the centre, and at the end of the month their whole army was in full retreat, but contesting fiercely the outlets from the woods and the difficult passages between the lakes. Pursuit and retreat alike were made difficult by heavy rains, which turned the country into swamps. West of Augustowo the Germans turned and flung back for the time a large Russian force. It was a local success which figured little in the Russian

reports, but was the only incident of the retreat from the Niemen which was allowed to be reported in the German press.

THE ATTACK ON OSSOWIEC.

The operations against Ossowiec fared no better than those on the Niemen, but this was not unexpected, for they were only a demonstration intended to prevent the Russians from advancing on Lyck and threatening the rear of the main German forces. On September 26th a bombardment was opened against Ossowiec, and a day or two later an infantry attack was made. It was easily repulsed; the garrison sallied out and fell on the flanks of the attacking force. With the announcement of the failure on the Niemen, the besiegers retired from Ossowiec, and in a few days' time a Russian detachment, following on their heels, was once more over the East Prussian borders. By October 6th the whole German expedition was back on its own frontiers, and had been heavily reinforced so as to make a stand. This it did, and for the next month the Russians could only advance by slow and painful steps. The campaign became now an affair of trenches, entanglements, and mines, to which the Germans had added lines of blockhouses, made of timber and heavily armed.

By the middle of November the position of the Germans looked critical along their whole eastern front. In East Prussia the Russians were along the frontier. In Poland, south of the Vistula, they had pressed the retreating Germans back beyond the Warta river, and were drawing in on Cracow; in Galicia they were driving the Austrians from the waters of the Upper San towards the Carpathians, and were pushing in towards the space between Cracow and the mountains. Danger seemed to threaten not East Prussia only, but, what was vastly more important, Silesia also. The time had come for the counter-stroke which the German commanders had been preparing ever since they had failed to force the passage of the Vistula, and had drawn their armies off in a south-westerly retreat. The Russians, following them, had also moved in a southerly direction, and so had opened up a region weakly defended between the Vistula and Warta rivers. The Germans now struck at this, the weak spot in the Russian line.

THE ADVANCE FROM THORN.

The centre from which the new German advance set out was the fortress of Thorn, which stands on both banks of the Vistula, a mile or two within the German frontier. Thorn is the junction of a number of important railways. Two run northward into East Prussia—one of them down the Vistula to the fortress of Graudenz, the other north-eastward along the borders of the province. A third railway comes into Thorn from the east, and a fourth from the south; while yet a fifth follows the course of the Vistula as far as Wloclawek, and then runs south-eastwards to Kutno and on to Warsaw. From Thorn the Germans looked out on both banks of the Vistula, and it was from here that they decided to strike at the flanks of both the Russian armies—the one attacking East Prussia, and the other threatening Posen and Silesia. They concentrated at Thorn not only part of the army which had been retreating through Poland, but also a large force drawn from the lake region of East Prussia, where a purely defensive policy was at present being pursued.


The movement which was to take place north of the Vistula was of secondary importance. It was expected

that it would lead to the retreat of the Russian forces which had penetrated up to the East Prussian frontier along the railway from Warsaw to Mlawa, and would prevent the main operations south of the Vistula from being hampered by the necessity of withdrawing troops. But the movement directed southwards from Thorn and from that part of the German frontier between the fortress and the Warta river was of first-rate importance. Its ultimate object was to force the withdrawal of the whole Russian army now before Czenstochowa and Cracow, and further, if possible, to break through the Russian front and penetrate to Warsaw; the withdrawal of the Russians on the whole front extending down to Cracow might even lead, with the co-operation of a fresh Austrian offensive, to a complete evacuation of Galicia. In order to shake the Russian position in the southern half of Poland, the Germans hoped, after dealing a blow at the weak army immediately in front of them to the west of Kutno, to penetrate to the railway between Lodz and Lowicz, and then, still pushing their way south-east, to cut the line leading from Warsaw to Petrokow and Czenstochowa. The successful achievement of this aim would mean either a withdrawal of the Russian armies in Poland towards the Vistula, or that they would be cut into two sections, each in danger of being outflanked.

By November 12th the new German concentration was complete, and on the 13th the Russians discovered the advance of fresh forces both north and south of the Vistula. On the north the advance took place on a front of about forty miles between Rypin and Lipno. Here, the Russians were unprepared for an attack in such comparative strength (neither side was in great force), and were driven back on Plock, about half-way between Thorn and Warsaw, with a loss of 5,000 men and a few machine guns. The Russian forces advancing from Mlawa began to withdraw, and the Germans were freed from embarrassment on the southern flank of their position in East Prussia.

A GERMAN SUCCESS.

South of the Vistula the German advance was first noticed along the railway which follows the course of the Vistula to Wloclawek. It soon appeared, however, that the new front covered almost the whole distance of the German frontier down to the River Warta; and in order to facilitate their task of putting themselves in the rear of the main Russian army, the Germans still continued to fall back slowly south of the Warta. The farther they could draw the Russians towards the German frontier, without allowing them actually to cross it, the greater would be the fruit of their victory if they could once reach the two railways from Warsaw at which they were aiming. Their opening success on the Vistula-Warta front was as rapid and much more substantial than that which they had won to the west of Plock. They were in greatly superior numbers, thanks to the railways which had enabled them to bring up, not only men, but also heavy guns; whereas the Russians had only been able to move forward slowly, because of the complete destruction of all means of communication which had been carried out by the Germans in their retreat. Possibly, indeed, the German victory would have been even more complete than it was had they not destroyed so thoroughly the railways, roads, and bridges. The Russians, being compelled to reconstruct everything as they went along, had the great masses of their army still in mid-Poland; had they been able to move more swiftly they might have made a more stubborn resistance to the first German




Grodno. seen from across the Niemen.

[E.N.A.]




The road into Kovno.

[E.N.A.]



A view of Kovno and the Niemen.

[E.N.A.]



The map illustrates the German advance in Poland in the middle of November, 1914.

attack, but they would have been in any case outnumbered, and they would not have had the same strength in reserve forces behind them. As it was, north of the Warta they were driven hurriedly back on Kutno, with the loss of an army corps.

The first stage of the new movement had therefore gone in favour of the Germans, but as yet they had made no impression on the Russian main armies, against whom their attack was really directed, while in Galicia the Austrians were still falling back towards the Carpathian passes and the country south of Cracow.

THE RUSSIAN FRONT BROKEN.

By November 17th the German front stretched from Plock on the Vistula, in a south-westerly direction through Kutno and Leczyca, to Uniejow on the Warta. (See the map.) The second stage now opened. The Germans directed the full force of their attack from Kutno towards Lowicz, in the hope of breaking through the Russian right wing. (See Fig. 1.) At the same time they took up the offensive farther south, and attacked from Czenstochowa in the hope of preventing the Russians from moving the troops to the north, which were now badly needed there. In this they were only partially successful, but the movement of the Russian reinforcements northward was necessarily slow, and could not be carried through in time to prevent the Germans achieving a great success. On November 18th the German forces south of Kutno forced their way over the Upper

Bzura, and appeared at Piatek, due west of Lowicz and due north of Lodz. This meant a definite and very serious breach in the Russian line, and was followed immediately by the withdrawal of the extreme Russian right wing on to the Lower Bzura. It was not, however, so much the Russian right which was now in danger, as the whole Russian position to the south of Lodz. The Germans proceeded immediately to pour their troops like an avalanche through the breach made at Piatek. Two army corps—a Guards Reserve Corps and the Twentieth Corps—immediately rushed south-eastward across the first of the railways between Lodz and Lowicz, and advanced into the whole of the region east of Lodz from Strykow on the north, through Brzeziny and Koluszki (due east), to Tuszyn on the south. (See Fig. 2.) The Russians were at this moment in extreme danger. A wide gap had been made in their front. The German corps which had broken through were within a few miles of the all-important railway from Warsaw to Petrokow. They were on the flank both of the Russian right, which rested on the Vistula, and of the left on the line of the Warta, and of its reserve forces at Petrokow. Not only so, but they were actually in the rear of a considerable body of Russian troops west and south-west of Lodz. If General von Mackensen were now able to throw in his reserves after the first two corps, to widen the breach which they had made, and to cut the Petrokow railway as he had already cut the less important line north of it, the German plan would have succeeded almost completely; the Russian

front would be broken in two, and the least that would have followed would have been a disastrous retreat to the Vistula.

THE GERMAN CORPS ALMOST TRAPPED.

The German corps had made, as it were, a sack for themselves as they advanced to the south-east. It was the business of Von Mackensen to widen, if he could, the mouth of the sack; but at all events, if he could not do that at once, to keep it open in order that he might pour reinforcements through it, or hold it as a way of escape for the two corps should they be compelled to retreat. The Russians, on the other hand, had to arrest the progress of the invading columns, and, having done so, to cut them off by closing the mouth of the sack. Well aware of the critical state of their fortunes, they now counter-attacked with the utmost vigour. They brought up troops on the east against those German forces which had reached Brzeziny and Koluszki; they hurried up reserves from Petrokow, and barred the southward progress of the Germans who had reached Tuszyn. After fierce fighting the German offensive was stopped. The two corps could penetrate no farther towards either the east or the south, and were compelled to think of retreating in their own track towards Strykow and the gap in the Russian line through which they had come. (Fig. 3.) But it was no longer certain that they would find the gap open. While they had been trying to break their way through the opposing troops on the east and south, the Russians had directed strong columns from the north-east (Lowicz and Skierniewice) towards the line by which the Germans had advanced. This attack seemed likely to close the mouth of the sack completely, for the Russians captured both Brzeziny and Strykow, and it was at this time that reports reached Petrograd that two German army corps had been completely cut off and had surrendered.

GERMAN EFFORTS TO SAVE THE CORPS.

The complete victory, however, to which the Russians had come so near escaped them. As soon as the German corps which had broken through from Piatek had been reduced to the defensive, it became clear to the Germans that only the most supreme efforts could save them from catastrophe. Their endeavours to widen the breach in the Russian line had failed, and it had become a question only of rescuing the endangered corps. They set about it with characteristic vigour. By November 22nd large forces were seen to be advancing from the middle Warta, along the line of the railway which runs in a north-easterly direction to Lodz. This army was directed against the flank of the Russian forces from Petrokow, which were now harrying the retiring Germans back to Strykow. The Russians were thus compelled, while pursuing the enemy to the north, to beat off a formidable flank attack from the east. (Fig. 3.) This they succeeded in doing, but the German flank movement was so far successful that it facilitated the retreat of their two corps from the country east of Lodz. At the same time, the Germans fought desperately to keep open the gap in the Russian line. They hurried up reserves and assailed the Russian positions furiously, both north-west and north-east of Lodz—at either extremity of the mouth of the sack. East of Piatek in particular they attacked the Russian forces which were advancing from Lowicz, and sought to throw them back. (Fig. 3.) Meanwhile, the two army corps were fighting their way slowly northwards again. The Russians were on their rear and

both flanks, and had often to be cleared from their front as well. Some of the points which they had occupied in their dash southwards had now passed into Russian hands. They were attacked and attacking both by night and by day. But they held on, and at last, by dint of their own heroic exertions, and thanks to the diversions which their main armies made both north and south of Lodz, they contrived to win through.

By November 26th they had regained touch with the main body, and both the Russian and the German lines had straightened out again. (Fig. 4.) But it was only remnants of the two corps which succeeded in escaping. They had been fiercely attacked from every side, and their losses were so great that for some time they were withdrawn entirely from the front in order that they might be reorganised. Companies had been reduced from a strength of 260 or more to 70, and the dead along some stretches of the line of retreat lay too thickly to be numbered. Their advance and retreat constitute one of the most remarkable episodes in the war.

THE GERMAN RECOVERY.

So ended a remarkable adventure. The Germans had succeeded admirably in breaking the Russian line, but they had pushed their advance too rashly, and had not allowed sufficiently for the stubbornness of the Russians in resisting all efforts to widen the breach, nor for their rapidity in moving forward from all sides to close the gap. On the other hand, the retreat of the two army corps was conducted with a dogged resolution worthy of the Russian infantry itself, and the German counter-attacks were well devised and boldly handled. The whole movement had, however, entailed very heavy losses on the German armies. Besides the severe handling of the German forces east of Lodz, the Russians had gained a substantial success during the fighting to the north-west of the city, and had defeated the flanking movement from the Warta. The German position had been severely shaken, and the net result of the prolonged fighting which began on November 18th was that the Germans had failed in their plan of breaking through the enemy's front, and that they now stood on a line which ran from the middle Warta to a point not many miles west of Lodz, and on to the north-east of the city. The expectation that the hard blows which they had suffered would lead to their retreat to their own frontiers was not fulfilled. Their withdrawal soon came to an end; the line on which they fell back was strongly entrenched, and they prepared forthwith to renew the advance. They had lost heavily, but in the process they had brought up strong reinforcements. Altogether they had received over six new corps, composed partly of troops which had been on the western front and partly of fresh formations from Germany; Hungarian cavalry also appeared on this front. It was the more necessary that the Germans should pursue their original plan to a successful end, in that they had not yet relieved the danger threatening Silesia and Cracow. The Russians still held their ground in Southern Poland; in Galicia and the Carpathians they were advancing. At the time when the Russian front was being broken at Piatek, the Russians in the Carpathians were capturing the Dukla and Uszok passes, and by the time, a week later, that the broken front had been re-formed Russian columns were well advanced into the Ung and Zemplen districts of Hungary, on the southern slope of the mountains. A few days later Bartfeld, at the head of an important railway running down into Hungary, was captured. Similar successes had fallen to the Russians in their




Fig. 1 shows the positions before the Germans broke the Russian front near Piotrków. In Fig. 2 the Germans have broken through at Piotrków, and are pouring southwards into the country east and south of Łódź. Russian reserves are beginning to move forward against them from Łowicz, Skierniewice, and Piotrków. A German flanking movement is developing from the Warta river. In Fig. 3 the Germans, who have broken through, are fighting their way northwards. They are shut in on the east, west, and south, and the Germans are directing desperate counter-attacks against the Russian forces in the north, who are seeking to close the way out. In Fig. 4 the Germans have succeeded in keeping the exit open for their retreating corps, which have escaped. The Russian front has been re-formed.

advance on Cracow. The Austrians were driven back over the Szreniawa, to the north-east of the fortress, and the Raba, to the south-east, and at Bochnia, about twenty-five miles to the west, 7,000 prisoners and thirty guns were taken. From Bochnia the Russians advanced to Wieliczka, the seat of the famous salt mines, and almost within range of the fortress guns, while their left wing began to swing round into the space between Cracow and the mountain ridges, and to approach the city from the south. It was high time for the Germans both to renew their attack on the Russian right wing from Petrokow to the Vistula, and to spur on their Austrian allies to the defence of Hungary and the recovery of Galicia.


RENEWED ATTACK ON LODZ.

The withdrawal of the Germans to entrenched positions barely delayed operations beyond a single day. The two army corps had reached safety by November 26th, and on November 27th the Germans began a renewed onslaught on the Russian line north, west, and south of Lodz, throwing into it the large masses of new troops whom they had brought up. The Russians made an attempt to counter this almost immediately by advancing from the mouth of the Bzura river along the Vistula, in the hope of threatening the left flank of the new German attack. Their advance, however, could not be pushed sufficiently far, and all their available forces were immediately needed to hold the front near Lodz.

The struggle continued from November 27th up to December 5th. It was most intense to the north-east of the city, between Glowno and Lowicz, and in the neighbourhood of the small manufacturing town of Zgierz, from which the Germans set up a hot attack in a south-

easterly direction towards Lodz itself. The Russians now attempted, as they had done once before, to bring up reinforcements from Petrokow to Lodz. But the Germans, repeating their former tactics, made a fresh flanking movement from Sieradz, on the middle Warta, and Szczercow, which lies farther to the south. On December 2nd and 3rd, while a tremendous attack on this flank held the Russians in their positions, the Germans pressed up to within a few miles due west of Lodz. They did not succeed in carrying the Russian positions, but their attack became more and more dangerous on both sides of the city, and on December 5th the Russians decided to abandon it. It was no doubt true, as their reports explained, that the holding of so large a town was a serious weakness to them, but the abandonment was due to the fighting of the previous days, for the Russians were finding it increasingly difficult to maintain their front.

The capture of Lodz, though it was not an important strategic point, was of great significance at the moment. It is the chief manufacturing centre of Poland, and was regarded as of more importance than any other place except Warsaw itself. Its fall marks the first success of the Germans in the third stage of these operations. The opening stage had comprised the victory at Kutno and the withdrawal of the Russian right wing towards the Bzura river. The second consisted of the breaking of the Russian line, and the complete failure of the Germans to press home their advantage. The third, which began on November 27th, was to end in a general Russian retreat, which, while not great as distance is measured, was of extreme importance, in that it relieved both Germany and Austria from the fear of invasion for an indefinite time.



Czerstochowa, the headquarters of the German Army operating in Poland. The photograph shows the Cathedral and Convent. [Central News.]

Appendix.

THE ACTIONS OFF THE FALKLAND ISLANDS AND IN THE NORTH SEA.

I.

Admiralty, 3rd March, 1915.

The following despatch has been received from Vice-Admiral Sir F. C. Doveton-Sturdee, K.C.B., C.V.O., C.M.G., reporting the action off the Falkland Islands on Tuesday, the 8th of December, 1914:—

Invincible at Sea,
December 19th, 1914.

SIR,—I have the honour to forward a report on the action which took place on 8th December, 1914, against a German Squadron off the Falkland Islands.

I have the honour to be, Sir,
Your obedient Servant,

F. C. D. STURDEE,
Vice-Admiral, Commander-in-Chief.

THE SECRETARY, ADMIRALTY.

(A.)—PRELIMINARY MOVEMENTS.

The squadron, consisting of H.M. ships *Invincible*, flying my flag, Flag-Captain Percy T. H. Beamish; *Inflexible*, Captain Richard F. Phillimore; *Carnarvon*, flying the flag of Rear-Admiral Archibald P. Stoddart, Flag-Captain Harry L. d'E. Skipwith; *Cornwall*, Captain Walter M. Ellerton; *Kent*, Captain John D. Allen; *Glasgow*, Captain John Luce; *Bristol*, Captain Basil H. Fanshawe; and *Macedonia*, Captain Bertram S. Evans; arrived at Port Stanley, Falkland Islands, at 10-30 a.m. on Monday, the 7th December, 1914. Coaling was commenced at once, in order that the ships should be ready to resume the search for the enemy's squadron the next evening, the 8th December.

At 8 a.m. on Tuesday, the 8th December, a signal was received from the signal station on shore:—

"A four-funnel and two-funnel man-of-war in sight from Sapper Hill, steering northwards."

At this time the positions of the various ships of the squadron were as follows:—

Macedonia: At anchor as look-out ship.

Kent (guard ship): At anchor in Port William.

Invincible and *Inflexible*: In Port William.

Carnarvon: In Port William.

Cornwall: In Port William.

Glasgow: In Port Stanley.

Bristol: In Port Stanley.

The *Kent* was at once ordered to weigh, and a general signal was made to raise steam for full speed.

At 8-20 a.m. the signal station reported another column of smoke in sight to the southward, and at 8-45 a.m. the *Kent* passed down the harbour and took up a station at the entrance.

The *Canopus*, Captain Heathcoat S. Grant, reported at 8-47 a.m. that the first two ships were eight miles off, and that the smoke reported at 8-20 a.m. appeared to be the smoke of two ships about twenty miles off.

At 8-50 a.m. the signal station reported a further column of smoke in sight to the southward.

The *Macedonia* was ordered to weigh anchor on the inner side of the other ships, and await orders.

At 9-20 a.m. the two leading ships of the enemy (*Gneisenau* and *Nürnberg*), with guns

trained on the wireless station, came within range of the *Canopus*, who opened fire at them across the low land at a range of 11,000 yards. The enemy at once hoisted their colours and turned away. At this time the masts and smoke of the enemy were visible from the upper bridge of the *Invincible*, at a range of approximately 17,000 yards across the low land to the south of Port William.

A few minutes later the two cruisers altered course to port, as though to close the *Kent* at the entrance to the harbour, but about this time it seems that the *Invincible* and *Inflexible* were seen over the land, as the enemy at once altered course and increased speed to join their consorts.

The *Glasgow* weighed and proceeded at 9-40 a.m., with orders to join the *Kent* and observe the enemy's movements.

At 9-45 a.m. the squadron—less the *Bristol*—weighed, and proceeded out of harbour in the following order:—*Carnarvon*, *Inflexible*, *Invincible*, and *Cornwall*. On passing Cape Pembroke Light, the five ships of the enemy appeared clearly in sight to the south-east, hull down. The visibility was at its maximum, the sea was calm, with a bright sun, a clear sky, and a light breeze from the north-west.

At 10-20 a.m. the signal for a general chase was made. The battle cruisers quickly passed ahead of the *Carnarvon*, and overtook the *Kent*. The *Glasgow* was ordered to keep two miles from the *Invincible*, and the *Inflexible* was stationed on the starboard quarter of the flagship. Speed was eased to twenty knots at 11-15 a.m. to enable the other cruisers to get into station.

At this time the enemy's funnels and bridges showed just above the horizon.

Information was received from the *Bristol* at 11-27 a.m. that three enemy ships had appeared off Port Pleasant, probably colliers or transports. The *Bristol* was therefore directed to take the *Macedonia* under his orders and destroy transports.

The enemy were still maintaining their distance, and I decided, at 12-20 p.m., to attack with the two battle cruisers and the *Glasgow*.

At 12-47 p.m. the signal to "Open fire and engage the enemy" was made.

The *Inflexible* opened fire at 12-55 p.m. from her fore turret at the right-hand ship of the enemy, a light cruiser; a few minutes later the *Invincible* opened fire at the same ship.

The deliberate fire from a range of 16,500 to 15,000 yards at the right-hand light cruiser, who was dropping astern, became too threatening, and when a shell fell close alongside her at 1-20 p.m. she (the *Leipzig*) turned away, with the *Nürnberg* and *Dresden* to the south-west. These light cruisers were at once followed by the *Kent*, *Glasgow*, and *Cornwall*, in accordance with my instructions.

The action finally developed into three separate encounters, besides the subsidiary one dealing with the threatened landing.

(B.)—ACTION WITH THE ARMoured CRUISERS.

The fire of the battle cruisers was directed on the *Scharnhorst* and *Gneisenau*. The effect of this was quickly seen, when at 1-25 p.m., with the *Scharnhorst* leading, they turned about seven points to port

in succession into line ahead, and opened fire at 1-30 p.m. Shortly afterwards speed was eased to twenty-four knots, and the battle cruisers were ordered to turn together, bringing them into line ahead, with the *Invincible* leading.

The range was about 13,500 yards at the final turn, and increased, until, at 2 p.m., it had reached 16,450 yards.

The enemy then (2-10 p.m.) turned away about ten points to starboard, and a second chase ensued, until, at 2-45 p.m., the battle cruisers again opened fire; this caused the enemy, at 2-53 p.m., to turn into line ahead to port, and open fire at 2-55 p.m.

The *Scharnhorst* caught fire forward, but not seriously, and her fire slackened perceptibly; the *Gneisenau* was badly hit by the *Inflexible*.

At 3-30 p.m. the *Scharnhorst* led round about ten points to starboard; just previously her fire had slackened perceptibly, and one shell had shot away her third funnel; some guns were not firing, and it would appear that the turn was dictated by a desire to bring her starboard guns into action. The effect of the fire on the *Scharnhorst* became more and more apparent in consequence of smoke from fires, and also escaping steam; at times a shell would cause a large hole to appear in her side, through which could be seen a dull red glow of flame. At 4-4 p.m. the *Scharnhorst*, whose flag remained flying to the last, suddenly listed heavily to port, and within a minute it became clear that she was a doomed ship; for the list increased very rapidly until she lay on her beam ends, and at 4-17 p.m. she disappeared.

The *Gneisenau* passed on the far side of her late flagship, and continued a determined but ineffectual effort to fight the two battle cruisers.

At 5-8 p.m. the forward funnel was knocked over, and remained resting against the second funnel. She was evidently in serious straits, and her fire slackened very much.

At 5-15 p.m. one of the *Gneisenau*'s shells struck the *Invincible*; this was her last effective effort.

At 5-30 p.m. she turned towards the flagship with a heavy list to starboard, and appeared stopped, with steam pouring from her escape pipes, and smoke from shell and fires rising everywhere. About this time I ordered the signal "Cease fire," but before it was hoisted the *Gneisenau* opened fire again, and continued to fire from time to time with a single gun.

At 5-40 p.m. the three ships closed in on the *Gneisenau*, and, at this time, the flag flying at her fore truck was apparently hauled down, but the flag at the peak continued flying.

At 5-50 p.m. "Cease fire" was made.

At 6 p.m. the *Gneisenau* heeled over very suddenly, showing the men gathered on her decks and then walking on her side as she lay for a minute on her beam ends before sinking.

The prisoners of war from the *Gneisenau* report that, by the time the ammunition was expended, some 600 men had been killed and wounded. The surviving officers and men were all ordered on deck and told to provide themselves with hammocks and any articles that could support them in the water.

When the ship capsized and sank there were probably some 200 unwounded sur-

vivors in the water, but, owing to the shock of the cold water, many of them were drowned within sight of the boats and ship.

Every effort was made to save life as quickly as possible, both by boats and from the ships; life-buoys were thrown and ropes lowered, but only a proportion could be rescued. The *Invincible* alone rescued 108 men, fourteen of whom were found to be dead after being brought on board; these men were buried at sea the following day with full military honours.

C.).—ACTION WITH THE LIGHT CRUISERS.

At about 1 p.m., when the *Scharnhorst* and *Goeben* turned to port to engage the *Invincible* and *Inflexible*, the enemy's light cruisers turned to starboard to escape; the *Dresden* was leading, and the *Nürnberg* and *Leipzig* followed, on each quarter.

In accordance with my instructions, the *Glasgow*, *Kent*, and *Cornwall* at once went in chase of these ships; the *Carnarvon*, whose speed was insufficient to overtake them, closed the battle cruisers.

The *Glasgow* drew well ahead of the *Cornwall* and *Kent*, and at 3 p.m. shots were exchanged with the *Leipzig* at 12,000 yards. The *Glasgow's* object was to endeavour to outrange the *Leipzig* with her 6-inch guns, and thus cause her to alter course and give the *Cornwall* and *Kent* a chance of coming into action.

At 4-17 p.m. the *Cornwall* opened fire, also on the *Leipzig*.

At 7-17 p.m. the *Leipzig* was on fire fore and aft, and the *Cornwall* and *Glasgow* ceased fire.

The *Leipzig* turned over on her port side and disappeared at 9 p.m. Seven officers and eleven men were saved.

At 3-36 p.m. the *Cornwall* ordered the *Kent* to engage the *Nürnberg*, the nearest cruiser to her.

Owing to the excellent and strenuous efforts of the engine-room department, the *Kent* was able to get within range of the *Nürnberg* at 5 p.m. At 6-35 p.m. the *Nürnberg* was on fire forward, and ceased firing. The *Kent* also ceased firing and closed to 3,300 yards; as the colours were still observed to be flying in the *Nürnberg*, the *Kent* opened fire again. Fire was finally stopped five minutes later, on the colours being hauled down, and every preparation was made to save life. The *Nürnberg* sank at 7-27 p.m., and, as she sank, a group of men were waving a German ensign attached to a staff. Twelve men were rescued, but only seven survived.

The *Kent* had four killed and twelve wounded, mostly caused by one shell.

During the time the three cruisers were engaged with the *Nürnberg* and *Leipzig*, the *Dresden*, who was beyond her consorts, effected her escape owing to her superior speed. The *Glasgow* was the only cruiser with sufficient speed to have had any chance of success. However, she was fully employed in engaging the *Leipzig* for over an hour before either the *Cornwall* or *Kent* could come up and get within range. During this time the *Dresden* was able to increase her distance and get out of sight.

The weather changed after 4 p.m., and the visibility was much reduced; further, the sky was overcast and cloudy, thus assisting the *Dresden* to get away unobserved.

(D.).—ACTION WITH THE ENEMY'S TRANSPORTS.

A report was received at 11-27 a.m. from H.M.S. *Bristol* that three ships of the enemy, probably transports or colliers, had appeared off Port Pleasant. The *Bristol* was ordered to take the *Macedonia* under his orders and destroy the transports.

H.M.S. *Macedonia* reports that only two ships, steamships *Baden* and *Santa Isabel*, were present; both ships were sunk after the removal of the crew.

I have pleasure in reporting that the officers and men under my orders carried out their duties with admirable efficiency and coolness, and great credit is due to the engineer officers of all the ships, several of which exceeded their normal full speed.

II.

Admiralty, 3rd March, 1915.

The following despatch has been received from Vice-Admiral Sir David Beatty, K.C.B., M.V.O., D.S.O., commanding the First Battle Cruiser Squadron, reporting the action in the North Sea on Sunday, the 24th of January, 1915:—

H.M.S. *Princess Royal*,

2nd February, 1915.

SIR.—I have the honour to report that at daybreak on 24th January, 1915, the following vessels were patrolling in company.

The battle cruisers *Lion*, Captain Alfred E. M. Chatfield, C.V.O., flying my flag; *Princess Royal*, Captain Osmond de B. Brock, Aide-de-Camp; *Tiger*, Captain Henry B. Pelly, M.V.O.; *New Zealand*, Captain Lionel Halsey, C.M.G., Aide-de-Camp, flying the flag of Rear-Admiral Sir Archibald Moore, K.C.B., C.V.O.; and *Indomitable*, Captain Francis W. Kennedy.

The light cruisers *Southampton*, flying the broad pennant of Commodore William E. Goodenough, M.V.O.; *Nottingham*, Captain Charles B. Miller; *Birmingham*, Captain Arthur A. M. Duff; and *Lowestoft*, Captain Theobald W. B. Kennedy, were disposed on my port beam.

Commodore (T) Reginald V. Tyrwhitt, C.B., in *Arethusa*; *Aurora*, Captain Wilmot S. Nicholson; *Undaunted*, Captain Francis G. St. John, M.V.O.; *Arethusa* and the destroyer flotillas were ahead.

At 7-25 a.m. the flash of guns was observed S.S.E. Shortly afterwards a report reached me from *Aurora* that she was engaged with enemy's ships. I immediately altered course to S.S.E., increased to twenty-two knots, and ordered the light cruisers and flotillas to chase S.S.E. to get in touch and report movements of enemy.

This order was acted upon with great promptitude; indeed my wishes had already been forestalled by the respective senior officers, and reports almost immediately followed from *Southampton*, *Arethusa*, and *Aurora* as to the position and composition of the enemy, which consisted of three battle cruisers and *Blücher*, six light cruisers, and a number of destroyers, steering N.W. The enemy had altered course to S.E. From now onwards the light cruisers maintained touch with the enemy, and kept me fully informed as to their movements.

The battle cruisers worked up to full speed, steering to the southward. The wind at the time was N.E., light, with extreme visibility. At 7-30 a.m. the enemy were sighted on the port bow, steaming fast, steering approximately S.E., distant fourteen miles.

Owing to the prompt reports received we had attained our position on the quarter of the enemy, and so altered course to S.E., parallel to them, and settled down to a long stern chase, gradually increasing our speed until we reached 28½ knots. Great credit is due to the engineer staffs of *New Zealand* and *Indomitable*—these ships greatly exceeded their normal speed.

At 8-52 a.m., as we had closed to within 20,000 yards of the rear ship, the battle cruisers manoeuvred to keep on a line of bearing so that guns would bear, and *Lion* fired a single shot, which fell short. The enemy at this time were in single line ahead, with light cruisers ahead, and a large number of destroyers on their starboard beam.

Single shots were fired at intervals to test the range, and at 9-9 a.m. *Lion* made her first hit on the *Blücher*, No. 4 in the line. The *Tiger* opened fire at 9-20 a.m. on the rear ship, the *Lion* shifted to No. 3 in the line, at 18,000 yards, this ship being hit by several salvoes. The enemy returned our fire at 9-14 a.m. *Princess Royal*, on coming into range, opened fire on *Blücher*, the range of the leading ship being 17,500 yards, at 9-35 a.m. *New Zealand* was within range of *Blücher*, which had dropped somewhat astern, and opened fire on her. *Princess Royal* shifted to the third ship in the line, inflicting considerable damage on her.

Our flotilla cruisers and destroyers had gradually dropped from a position broad

on our beam to our port quarter, so as not to foul our range with their smoke; but the enemy's destroyers threatening attack, the *Meteor* and M Division passed ahead of us, Captain the Hon. H. Meade, D.S.O., handling this division with conspicuous ability.

About 9-45 a.m. the situation was as follows:—*Blücher*, the fourth in their line, already showed signs of having suffered severely from gun-fire; their leading ship and No. 3 were also on fire. *Lion* was engaging No. 1, *Princess Royal* No. 3, *New Zealand* No. 4, while the *Tiger*, who was second in our line, fired first at their No. 1, and when interfered with by smoke, at their No. 4.

The enemy's destroyers emitted vast columns of smoke to screen their battle cruisers, and under cover of this the latter now appeared to have altered course to the northward to increase their distance, and certainly the rear ships hauled out on the port quarter of their leader, thereby increasing their distance from our line. The battle cruisers, therefore, were ordered to form a line of bearing N.N.W., and proceed at their utmost speed.

Their destroyers then showed evident signs of an attempt to attack. *Lion* and *Tiger* opened fire on them, and caused them to retire and resume their original course.

The light cruisers maintained an excellent position on the port quarter of the enemy's line, enabling them to observe and keep touch, or attack any vessel that might fall out of the line.

At 10-48 a.m., the *Blücher*, which had dropped considerably astern of enemy's line, hauled out to port, steering north with a heavy list, on fire, and apparently in a defeated condition. I consequently ordered *Indomitable* to attack enemy breaking northward.

At 10-54 a.m. submarines were reported on the starboard bow, and I personally observed the wash of a periscope two points on our starboard bow. I immediately turned to port.

At 11-3 a.m. an injury to the *Lion* being reported as incapable of immediate repair, I directed *Lion* to shape course N.W. At 11-20 a.m. I called the *Attack* alongside, shifting my flag to her at about 11-35 a.m. I proceeded at utmost speed to rejoin the squadron, and met them at noon retiring N.N.W.

I boarded and hoisted my flag in *Princess Royal* at about 12-20 p.m., when Captain Brock acquainted me of what had occurred since the *Lion* fell out of the line, namely, that *Blücher* had been sunk, and that the enemy battle cruisers had continued their course to the eastward in a considerably damaged condition. He also informed me that a Zeppelin and a seaplane had endeavoured to drop bombs on the vessels which went to the rescue of the survivors of *Blücher*.

The good seamanship of Lieut.-Commander Cyril Callaghan, H.M.S. *Attack*, in placing his vessel alongside the *Lion* and subsequently the *Princess Royal*, enabled the transfer of flag to be made in the shortest possible time.

At 2 p.m. I closed *Lion* and received a report that the starboard engine was giving trouble owing to priming, and at 3-38 p.m. I ordered *Indomitable* to take her in tow, which was accomplished by 5 p.m.

The greatest credit is due to the Captains of *Indomitable* and *Lion* for the seamanship in which the *Lion* was taken in tow under difficult circumstances.

The excellent steaming of the ships engaged in the operation was a conspicuous feature.

I attach an appendix giving the names of various officers and men who specially distinguished themselves.

Where all did well it is difficult to single out officers and men for special mention, and as *Lion* and *Tiger* were the only ships hit by the enemy, the majority of these I mention belong to those ships.

I have the honour to be, Sir,
Your obedient servant,

(Signed) DAVID BEATTY,
Vice-Admiral.

The Manchester Guardian
HISTORY
of the
WAR

A. H. W.
NINE ANNAS



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
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The Archduke Charles Francis, the heir to the Austrian throne, and his Staff.

[Newspaper Illustrations.]

CHAPTER VII.

THE FRONTAL ATTACK ON WARSAW AND THE AUSTRIAN OFFENSIVE.

A COMBINED AUSTRO-GERMAN OFFENSIVE—THE DANGER TO HUNGARY—FRONTAL ATTACK ON THE RUSSIAN LINES BEFORE WARSAW—AUSTRIAN ADVANCE THROUGH THE CARPATHIAN PASSES—RUSSIAN RETREAT AND RECOVERY—GERMAN MASSED ATTACKS ON THE BZURA AND RAWKA—RUSSIAN ADVANCE IN BUKOWINA.

AT the end of the first week in December the Germans were in possession of Lodz, but the Russian centre maintained its ground in Southern Poland. On the left their army was within range of the forts of Cracow and, what was even more important, it stood on the southern side of the Carpathians at several points. Not only had Germany to fear the possibility of an invasion of Silesia, but she had to anticipate an irruption of the Russians on a great scale into the plain of Hungary. Such an occurrence threatened not only the Austrian Empire, but Germany as well. "Hungary for the Hungarians" is a maxim well understood at Buda-Pest, and it was quite certain that if the Russians descended in strength from the Carpathians the Hungarian Government would not merely have been compelled, but would of its own motion have been quick to summon the Hungarian army for the defence of the country. The defection of Hungary would have meant that more than half the value of Austria as Germany's ally would have been lost, and before long the Germans would have had to take on themselves the task of defending their right flank, which they had so far deputed in many desperate battles to the Austrians.

They could not even be sure that Hungary would wait to be overrun by the Russians. The independence movement was always smouldering, and there were ominous murmurs that the interests of Hungary were being sacrificed to those of the Germans. How far the discontent and the talk of an independent peace with Russia were genuine and deep-seated it is impossible to say. Partly at least they may have been a manoeuvre devised to put pressure upon Germany, and compel her

to lend assistance in the Carpathians; at all events, little was heard of them when once the Russian tide had been turned back. But whatever their character, about this time Count Tisza, the Hungarian Prime Minister and a man of great force of character, paid a visit to the German headquarters and discussed with the Emperor and the military staff the nature of the joint action which should now be taken by the Allies for the defence of Hungary. Many versions of this famous interview became current. Some spoke of stormy scenes between the Emperor and Tisza; of threats from Tisza, and of appeals from the Emperor. Probably we may detect a lively imagination in these details; it is certain at least that Germany could not allow Hungary either to be detached from her by a separate peace, or to be overrun by the Russians if she could possibly prevent it by military aid; and the Magyars, the ruling race of Hungary and the prime enemy of its minor nationalities, could have little confidence that they would be able to obtain from Russia conditions of peace which they could tolerate. It is more reasonable to suppose that both the Hungarian and the German Governments desired to arrange the new scheme of defence in their common interests, and that they contrived to construct it amicably in the same spirit in which, to all outward appearance, they afterwards carried it out.

THE PLAN OF ATTACK.

The main idea of the attack on the Russian positions was that while the German centre should hold its ground an attempt should be made to break or force back the Russian wings. The Austro-German line in the Czenstochowa



Russian field artillery in action.

[Record Press.]



Russian transport advancing over the snow-covered country in Poland.

[Central News.]

region having been fortified long before, it would be possible for large numbers of troops to be withdrawn without seriously weakening it, especially as the Russians were likely to be much too hard pressed at other points to have any prospect themselves of breaking through the opposing centre. In Northern Poland there was now no chance of outflanking the Russian right wing. It was firmly planted on the Vistula, and the best that the Germans could hope for was to break through it by sheer force of numbers; and this they were determined to do, both because of the positive advantages which they would hope to gain from a successful advance on Warsaw, and also because of the importance of preventing the Russians from diverting an indefinite number of reinforcements to the southern field. The attack on the Russian left flank was to be left in the main to the Austrian and Hungarian corps, but for the first time a large body of German troops was sent south of Cracow to assist in the movement. The operations on this flank furnished more hope of success than those in front of Warsaw. Russia's best chance to strike at Germany lay past Cracow and through the Carpathian passes into Hungary. In advancing through the mountains and emerging on the Russian flank, the Austrians were carrying out what has long been regarded as the soundest strategy in a war with Russia, for the farther the Russians advanced westward towards Cracow the longer and more vulnerable became their line and the more complete their defeat if the Austrians could descend the northern slope of the Carpathians, relieve the fortress of Przemyśl, and set themselves astride of the line by which the Russian army was supplied. At the beginning of the second week in December the Germans pressed hard on the heels of the Russians, who were withdrawing from their positions at and near Łódź. Large forces were transferred southwards from Cześćchowa. The Twenty-Fourth German Corps was discovered in the mountain-region south of Cracow, forming the right wing of an enveloping movement. A large Austrian army was seen moving up towards the Carpathian passes over a front of about 120 miles. The second Austro-German plan for the defeat of Russia was in full operation.

THE RUSSIANS IN FRONT OF THE BZURA.


The Germans began their attacks on the Warsaw front with characteristic impetuosity immediately after the occupation of Łódź. The Russian line was a few miles in front of the Bzura river, running southward from its junction with the Vistula through undulating country slightly to the west of Łowicz, an important junction of roads, and Głowno, a little to the west of the railway from Warsaw to Petrokow, and on down the line of the railway to Petrokow itself. Beginning with December 8th, the Germans, who had assembled about six corps in this quarter, threw themselves in repeated attacks on the Russian lines north of Łowicz. After four days' fighting they had made but little progress, but on the 14th they were found to have been very strongly reinforced, and their incessant attacks, delivered persistently and in close formation, eventually succeeded in shaking the Russian position. The Russian commanders decided to strengthen their ground by putting in front of them the obstacles presented by the two rivers which they at present had behind them—the Bzura and the Rawka, which, running from the south, joins the Bzura a few miles north of Łowicz. They calculated, and with reason, that the difficulty which the Germans had found in capturing entrenched positions in the open country ought

to be insuperable when to it was added the barrier even of rivers which were as small as these two. The retirement on the Bzura front covered about ten miles—in the region of Skierniewice it was rather more—and it was necessarily accompanied by a retreat of some twenty-five miles to the east of Petrokow. For once the retirement might perhaps be called genuinely strategic, in the sense that the Russians could have held out in their old positions, but found it more practicable and more sparing of life to withdraw behind the rivers.

THE CRACOW FRONT.

While the Germans were preparing their attack on the positions in front of the Bzura, the Russian army was still pressing into the country south of Cracow. It forced the passage of the Upper Dunajec river, and in the valley of the Lososina—a tributary of the Dunajec—defeated the German corps (recently brought from Belgium) which was seeking to envelop its left wing. This was, however, the limit of the advance. Within the next few days the Russian forces which had been south of the Carpathians, in the districts of Bartfeld, Ung, and Zemplen, rapidly withdrew, and by December 12th all the passes in the Western Carpathians were in Austrian hands. To assist in this movement the Austrians had withdrawn troops from their Servian campaign. The Russians in Galicia now began to fall back slightly along the whole line. Even when they were in possession of the more important passes they had not sufficient men to be able to defend the flanks of their positions, and, since the initiative now lay with the Germans and Austrians, they were not able to bring up reinforcements with sufficient rapidity to hold their ground. Throughout the war the announcement of a fresh offensive on the German or Austrian side was followed almost invariably by a temporary retreat of the Russians. The explanation was that the enemy, being able to choose the direction of their attack and to concentrate superior forces, could force the Russians steadily back until they were able to redress the inequality of numbers. The Russians never lacked men, but only the means of planting them rapidly where they were most needed.

The Russian retreat in Galicia, combined with the retirement behind the Bzura and Rawka, meant the definite failure for the time of the great plan of invading both Hungary and Silesia, and it was received in Germany with an outburst of joy which was the measure of the popular feeling of relief. But one of the objects of the Austrian advance was not accomplished—the relief of Przemyśl. The Russian tide rolled back from the Carpathians towards the line of railway between Przemyśl and Cracow, but it did not uncover the fortress. Przemyśl is about fifty miles from the Lupkow Pass, and at one time the Austrians had penetrated almost half the distance. While they were advancing, the garrison, which was informed of their movements—for there was regular communication by aeroplane with the fortress—made repeated sallies against the lines of investment. On one occasion a sortie was made which reached a point to the south-west of the city which was only some fifteen or twenty miles from the advancing Austrian army. But the effort failed: the Russian lines were too strong, and the last chance of joining up with the relieving army passed from the garrison. Nor did the retreat in Galicia long continue. For three or four days the Russians had fallen slowly back towards the north from the Carpathians and towards the north-east from Cracow



The map illustrates the attack made on the Russian front during December, 1914, and the first half of January, 1915—by the Germans west of Warsaw, by the Austrians through the Carpathian passes.

But on this occasion, as on others, reserves were being steadily pushed up, and on December 19th the Austrians found themselves confronted by much larger forces, and their offensive was brought to a standstill. Another stage was now entered on. On the Vistula front the Russians maintained the defensive on a line which ran behind the Rawka and southwards to the Pilica; in Galicia they resumed the offensive and began, but only very slowly and at some points, to push the Austrians back again over the way by which they had come.

A WEEK OF GERMAN FURY.

The Germans, encouraged by the Russian retreat in the north, threw themselves with redoubled energy against the new positions of the enemy, and from December 18th to December 25th fighting followed which for its ferocity and the loss of life involved can be compared only with the attempts to break through the British line in the neighbourhood of Ypres. The Russian entrenchments had been carefully prepared in advance, and at some parts of the rivers the banks were steep and excellent for defence. The Russian soldier has shown in many wars that he has few equals in defensive fighting, and that, in the attack, he excels at close quarters. He had now an admirable opportunity of showing his characteristic qualities, and he took full advantage of it. The German soldiers, on their side, exhibited the same courage and stubborn perseverance which marked their campaign in the west, and their commanders showed a like faith in the power of the direct attack, relentlessly driven home and repeated regardless of all costs.

The chief place on the Bzura between Lowicz and the Vistula is the village of Sochaczew, where the road from Warsaw crosses the river. Against this point and several more to the north and south of it the Germans directed their attacks. On several occasions, especially in the night time, they succeeded in establishing detachments on the eastern bank. On the night of December 19th they delivered five successive attacks, their men

wading across the river, which was here about 50 yards wide and fordable. At the junction of the Bzura and Rawka as many as seven battalions made good their footing, and were counter-attacked by the Siberian rifles and virtually annihilated. About the same time, and a little to the north of this attack, two battalions got across by a footbridge; they, too, did not return. Sometimes the Germans succeeded in getting machine guns across with them. Sometimes they were attacked while actually crossing the river, or were driven back into it by the fury of the counter-attack, so that the stream was filled with bodies floating slowly down towards the Vistula. The number of the losses on either side is unknown, but these sustained attacks with massed troops on prepared

entrenchments must have been paid for at a bitter cost, and at last, when the violence of the assault slackened on December 25th, the Germans were no nearer to their object. A small stretch of ground on the right bank of the Bzura north of Sochaczew remained in their hands, but they shortly abandoned it of their own accord, and withdrew to their old positions on the left bank of the river. Simultaneously with the fighting on the Bzura, they had endeavoured to break the Russian line further south—at Bolimow on the Rawka and near Inowloz on the Pilica. The same methods were followed, and with the same results. Occasionally they gained a foothold, and even carried the front line of Russian trenches, but they were destroyed or driven into the river



Cracow: One of the gates leading into the old city.

[H. J. Shepstone.]

behind them before they could be sufficiently reinforced to hold the ground.

EXPEDIENCY OF GERMAN TACTICS.

The whole of the German operations since they first came up against the main Russian positions in the middle of November constitute an excellent example of their military doctrines and the way in which they are carried out. The result would suggest that they should be regarded with suspicion. The principle underlying the attacks from November 18th to December 25th was simply that of the battering ram, inspired by the faith that it



The Market Square, Cracow, showing the old-st church in the city.

[E.N.A.]



A street scene in Cracow.

[E.N.A.]



The plight of Poland: Peasant refugees clamouring for food at a relief station.

[Newspaper Illustrations.]

would eventually burst its way through any opposition, however terrible, if it was applied without intermission. In a case where no alternative method of attack is open, a commander may have to choose between such tactics and a barren defensive, but in November and December the Germans had another course open to them, which in fact they accepted two months later—a flank advance on Warsaw from the north-east. During the fighting south of the Vistula they made a tentative advance in this direction, and on one occasion they tried to throw a force over the Vistula, on to the northern bank. But these were only demonstrations. They put their whole faith in the frontal attack and the close formations, and in this stage fortune declared decisively against them.

The week of continuous fighting which came to an end about Christmas Day was followed by a slight respite, during which the Germans were resting and reorganising their forces. During this time they strove persistently to find a weak spot in the Russian front farther south, on the upper course of the Rawka, and on the Pilica and beyond it. On the Rawka their fiercest attacks were again directed towards the neighbourhood of Bolimow. To the south and east of Bolimow there lies an extensive stretch of forest. To the north-east is a comparatively open area, and in the last days of December the Germans succeeded in throwing some picked regiments over the river, who turned north-east through the open country and established themselves here at a place called Borzimow. They failed, however,

to hold the positions, and before the end of the year all the troops which had reached the Russian trenches were either destroyed or thrown back across the river. An attempt immediately followed to break the Russian front to the south of Bolimow by penetrating through the woods; while in the region of the Pilica, the German attack, having failed at Inowloz, was also diverted to points both north and south. It is difficult entirely to understand the motives which directed the German attacks at this stage. They had certainly calculated that the shortest road to Warsaw, and that by which their victory would be most complete, lay across the Bzura and the lower Rawka, and having failed for the time at least in that quarter, but being determined at all costs to break through, they were driven desperately to assail first one point and then another in the hope of at last repeating the success which they had won a month before when they shattered the Russian front to the north-west of Lodz. Yet they had by no means abandoned the direct attack on the Bzura. At the close of the year they delivered a sudden and unexpected series of assaults on Sochaczew, fifteen of them being made in one day, and all defeated. For the next week fighting raged incessantly along the eastern bank of the Rawka to the north of Bolimow, where the Germans at last succeeded in establishing themselves so firmly that repeated counter-attacks failed to recover the lost ground. No sooner were they firmly planted in this quarter than they repeated their tactics a few miles to




Austrian troops in the trenches, showing the shelters and communication trenches.

[Topical Press.]



An Austrian field gun in action on the Bukowina front.

[Newspaper Illustrations.]



The main German attacks on the Warsaw front in December were delivered against the Russian positions on the Bzura and Rawka rivers.

the north, and succeeded in capturing part of the Russian trenches at Sucha on a small tributary of the Bzura. The importance of the advantage which they had gained here, and the reason for their persistence in pressing it, was that they had in front of them an open stretch of country from which they could advance against the road and the railway leading direct to Warsaw. But this span of country had to be fought for foot by foot, and they had to face a line of entrenched positions about half-way to Warsaw which the Russians believed to be even stronger than those which the Germans had attacked with so little success for almost two months. While, however, they held their ground here without being able to enlarge it, a new movement developed to the north of the Vistula, where the Russians had begun a wide sweeping movement towards the frontiers of East Prussia. From this time, although the attacks west of Warsaw had not come to an end, this part of the front relapsed into the normal trench-warfare of the winter campaign, and active movement was more and more restricted to the opposing flanks.

THE MISERY OF THE POLES.

The condition of Poland at this time was pitiable in the extreme. Since the beginning of October wave after wave of invasion had swept over it. For the whole of the time the country from the northern to the southern bend of the Vistula had been in the occupation of huge contending armies. Galicia, with its large Polish population, was in no better case. Little information about

all this misery reached the outer world, for there were no avenues of communication comparable with those which revealed the horrors of the German invasion of Belgium, and even Serbia, because of its smallness and its heroic efforts against the Austrians, aroused more interest, and therefore excited more compassion. Poland, however, was reduced to as great depths of distress and misery as even Belgium and Serbia had endured. One of the statements issued by the Polish Committee, of which M. Sinkiewicz, the novelist, was president, declared that in Poland more than 200 towns and 9,000 villages had been submerged by the tide of war, and that 5,000 of the villages had been completely destroyed, either in the course of the actual fighting or during the retreat of one side or the other in order to embarrass the pursuit. Everywhere within the war-zone innumerable farms and houses had been burned; all grain had been seized; almost all the cattle had been taken by the armies or had died for lack of pasture. Seven million people, it was estimated, were destitute. "The most hapless of the villagers, without shelter and in rags, seek a refuge in the town or wander in the forests, living on roots, or the bark of trees, or carrion flesh." It was estimated that in all three million peasants were in a state of utter misery. Manufactories had been destroyed and mines flooded or wrecked by dynamite, so that the output of coal was one hundred wagons a month, instead of the normal 30,000 per week. "In a word," said the Committee, "people are literally dying of hunger, especially the inhabitants of the little towns, who have been forced to



A typical shepherd and his flock on the plains of Hungary.

[E.N.A.]

fly to Warsaw, or further off, in a state of destitution beyond words. Everywhere in the town as well as in the country epidemics are raging, typhus and cholera and dysentery, especially among children, in consequence of the total lack of milk." Galicia suffered as much as Poland; 2,500 villages were destroyed, and some of the towns. Eight hundred thousand horses and one and a half million head of cattle were carried away. Seven hundred churches were damaged or demolished. A million fugitives fled into the interior of Austria. Meanwhile, the Poles whose territories were equally laid waste by the war were fighting against each other in the armies of Austria and Russia.

THE RUSSIAN ADVANCE IN THE SOUTH.

In Western Galicia and in the Carpathians the Russians once more had the advantage. But the character of the fighting on this front had now begun in some measure to resemble that in Flanders or on the lines west of Warsaw. There was apparently little to choose between the opposing armies in point of strength, and the possibility of out-manceuvring the enemy was diminished by the extent to which here too he had recourse to entrenchments. The Austrians had found that they could only drive the Russians back with difficulty mile by mile; and now that the Russians were reinforced and could take the offensive, they on their side found progress no less painful. In the west of Galicia, east and south of Cracow, they succeeded in forcing the Austrians back, after very heavy fighting, over a narrow stretch of country. They pushed forward towards the Dukla Pass—the lowest, and therefore the easiest, of the roads into Hungary. They repelled the army whose main object it was to relieve Przemyśl, but for the present they failed to regain the crests of the Carpathians anywhere west of the Uzsok Pass. From that point eastward their progress was more

rapid. The main hope of the Austrian offensive, and the object of the support which it received from Germany, had been to relieve Cracow and the Silesian frontier, and to drive the Russians from the Hungarian valleys. This had been accomplished for the greater part of the Carpathian range. The Russians, on the other hand, while withdrawing for the time in Western Galicia, had not weakened their forces in the east. They had maintained their hold on the upper reaches of the Latorcza river, which, running southward from the Carpathians, turns due west, and stretches right across the Hungarian plain. At the beginning of January they strengthened their position, and, which alarmed the Austrians much more, they began to press southwards into Bukowina, along the Roumanian frontier.

THE OCCUPATION OF BUKOWINA.

The dispersion of military forces on secondary enterprises is always to be avoided, but the invasion of Bukowina is not open to this criticism. Russia's chief military disadvantage is that her resources of supply are inadequate to the numbers of her men. It is not merely a question of producing the munitions which war on the modern scale demands, but of feeding the armies at the front with supplies of every kind. Precisely the same problem beset Russia in her war with Japan, when the size of her army in Manchuria was severely limited by the capacity of her one channel of supply—the single line of the Trans-Siberian railway. So now, the excellent railway systems of Germany and Austria, largely devised with a strategic purpose, made it possible for them to maintain in the field an army of a given size with much greater ease than could Russia, with few railways and not many good roads at her disposal. In all probability Russia had as many men on the Polish and Galician fronts during this period as she could support,

and she was therefore justified in employing another army elsewhere which would have its independent line of supply, if there was an object of sufficient military value to be gained. This was the case in Bukowina. The railway from Odessa passes through Czernowitz, its capital, while from Czernowitz a line runs south to the Roumanian frontier. It is likely, therefore, that Russia could enter on the Bukowina campaign without prejudice to her prospects of success elsewhere.

Russia's hopes were based on a nice calculation of Austria's political and military fears. Bukowina is a pleasant province of woods and mountains, a holiday and health resort, with a remarkably mixed population of many nationalities, including Roumanians. It was its contiguity to Roumania that now brought the Russians into it. As the winter grew, it had become clear that Roumanian sympathies were leaning towards the side of the Allies. Roumania had had a close connection with Austria, she had been estranged from Russia by the loss of the Roumanian population of Bessarabia after the Turkish war of the late 'seventies, and she had been kept in the straight path by her king, a Hohenzollern. But of late years the ill-treatment of the Roumanians in Transylvania had altered her outlook. King Charles was dead, and, what mattered most, the impression was abroad that Austria was a dying empire, and that the war, sooner or later, would lead to her dissolution. There was still a party in Roumania which was favourable to Austria, and stood firmly for neutrality, but popular feeling was growing in favour of intervention against Austria and the forcible acquisition of Transylvania. The Russian advance, therefore, was well timed. It

would bring home to the Roumanians that the moment might be at hand when they must make their choice or lose their opportunity. If it were successful, and a Russian army descended from the Bukowina passes, then, if the Roumanians threw in their lot with the Allies, Austria would be faced with a gigantic encircling movement of armies stretching from Cracow and the Dukla Pass to the Adriatic—Russian, Roumanian, Servian, and Montenegrin; if the Roumanians hesitated, they would be in danger of seeing the Russian army entering on their inheritance in Transylvania.

Whatever the hopes which the Russians cherished, their new movement had an immediate effect on Austria. The Russian advance followed the line of the railway from Czernowitz to Suczawa, close to the Roumanian border, then turned westwards towards the mountains and reached Kimpolung on January 6th. The Austrians were in weak force, and were pushed backwards until, by the middle of the month, the Russians were on the ridge separating Hungary from Bukowina, and in possession of the Kirlibaba Pass. If the Russians had expected that their advance would bring Roumania into the fray they missed the mark; if, as is probable, they at least counted on drawing off an Austrian army, they succeeded. For Austria, it was imperative that a wedge should be thrust in between the Russian army and Roumania, and that the Roumanian Government should be relieved from the encouragement or the pressure of Russian forces on its borders. Accordingly, about the time when the Russians were attacking the Kirlibaba Pass, the Austrians pushed forward in great strength to dispose of the invasion.



Corn being unloaded at a Government store at Nish, the Servian Government having taken over the control of all food supplies.

[Central News.]



Primitive transport and bad roads: One of the Servian military ox-carts passing along a flooded road.

[Central News.]



Austrian prisoners taken by the Servians resting for their mid-day meal on the banks of the Danube.

[Central News.]

CHAPTER VIII.

THE THIRD INVASION OF SERVIA.

A FRESH AUSTRIAN OFFENSIVE.—NEGLECT OF MILITARY CONSIDERATIONS—SERVIAN RETREAT—EXPECTED COLLAPSE OF SERVIA—THE AUSTRIAN PLAN AND THE SERVIAN ATTACK—DEFEAT OF THE AUSTRIAN RIGHT AND CENTRE—RECAPTURE OF BELGRADE—COMPLETE SERVIAN TRIUMPH.

THE campaign against Serbia hung like a mill-stone round the neck of Austria. The first invasion had been heavily defeated; the second had left the Austrian army with a bare foothold in the hills on the right bank of the Drina; a third had now to be attempted at the very moment when Austria needed to put every available man into the field against Russia. At the end of October, 1914, when Serbia discovered that the Austrian army confronting her along the Danube, Save, and Drina—the rivers which form her northern and western frontiers—had been heavily reinforced, Austria was in the thick of the prolonged battle on the River San, on the result of which depended whether the Russian army would be able to reap the full fruits of its victory over the Germans in Poland. Again, at the beginning of December, just when the engagement was beginning which was to end in the greatest and most humiliating of all the Austrian defeats in Serbia, the Austrian armies in the north were advancing on the Russian positions in Western Galicia and the Carpathians, in the hope of clearing Hungary of the invader, relieving Przemyśl and averting the threatened siege of Cracow. This was clearly the region in which Austria's fortunes would be decided, and nowhere else could she employ her forces so profitably. But though she drew off a number of troops in November from the Servian invasion, she still pursued the enterprise. While reason would have urged her to remain on the defensive, which she could safely have done

with a small army, pride impelled her to renew the attack. There were, it is true, some political grounds on which, had she cared, she might have sought to justify her decision. Had Serbia been overrun, Bulgaria would have been tempted to recover by force the Macedonian territory which she had lost in the second Balkan war, and the Germanic Powers, who were already counting on the aid of Turkey, might have been able to join hands with her through Bulgaria. But this was not Austria's principal motive, for Bulgaria's position—with her late enemies, Roumania and Greece, on her flanks—was too ambiguous to be counted on. Unfortunately for Austria, the military considerations which she now rejected exacted from her a heavy penalty. Maintain the defensive on the Servian front while throwing her whole force against Russia she would not. Divert from the Russian campaign an army so strong as to overwhelm Serbia she dare not. To calculate nicely the forces needed in Serbia and send to the north all those whom she thought herself well able to spare was the plan which she adopted. It was one, as the event showed, which she could not carry to success.

THE AUSTRIAN ADVANCE.

The Austrian advance began on November 4th with an army of seven corps or more—probably about 300,000 men. As in August, it followed the lines which the geographical character of the country mark



Types in the Servian army: Peasant recruits walking into Nish to present themselves for training.

[Central News.]

out for the invader. North-western Serbia thrusts out into Austria in a salient which has the Save and the Drina for its sides, and the aim of the attack is to make one Servian position after another untenable by means of armies marching from these rivers on converging lines. Most exposed of all Servian territory is the plain of Matchva, which lies between the mountain ranges and the Save in the extreme northern corner of the country. Then, in the first range of hills, lies the military centre of Valjevo; at the close of the next stage of the advance, Kragujevatz, the national arsenal, which, having undergone the strain of two Balkan wars and two Austrian invasions, was ill-adapted to meet the needs of yet another and a more exhausting campaign; and finally, still further away in the interior, Nish, the temporary capital.

These were the places at the occupation of which the Austrians now aimed, and to reach them they prepared to penetrate the mountain chains from three sides, throwing forward either one wing or both towards the Servian rear. It was a scheme which promised a successful issue provided that there was a substantial superiority in numbers, so that the Austrian front could be extended without dangerous weakening; but the Servians had the advantage of the interior lines, and if they could extricate themselves and fall back until the appropriate moment for the offensive came, the Austrians would be greatly hampered by the mountainous country in meeting the attack. In such a terrain a great advantage rests with the side which has the initiative, for the army attacked has neither railway nor good roads (nor, indeed, many roads of any kind) by which to modify its dispositions at short notice. There was one avenue of attack which the Austrians would


have been glad to use—the valley of the Morava, a broad path by which one can penetrate from the Danube far into the country past Kragujevatz and on towards Nish. But this gate is not really open. The use of it is forbidden to an invader by the mountain heights which flank it, at certain points coming down close to the river, and also by the distance which would separate an army marching up it from the columns co-operating in Western Servia. There was some fighting at Semendria, near the mouth of the Morava, but it was an Austrian feint, designed to keep a Servian detachment busy.

The Austrians, bombarding the Servian positions from across the rivers and from monitors, made the passage of the Save and Drina in force too strong to be seriously resisted. They cut in at the bases of the Matchva plain and compelled the Servians forthwith to abandon it. At the same time they crossed far up the Drina and thrust in on the Servian left, while another force began to descend upon its right. The Servians fell back on Valjevo and the Kolubara river, which runs north-eastwards from Valjevo and then turns northwards until it falls into the Save not many miles from its junction with the Danube.

The Servian commanders decided, however, that the line of the Kolubara was too long and too exposed to be defended against such superior numbers, and on November 15th they evacuated Valjevo and withdrew into the mountain passes lying between it and Kragujevatz, which was now the object of the Austrian advance.

CRITICAL POSITION OF THE SERVIANS.

The position of the Servians appeared at this time to be critical. Their earlier victories had cost them dear, and they were now greatly outnumbered. The



The map illustrates the advance and defeat of the Austrian army in Serbia in December, 1914.

renewed invasion had caused them to abandon their expedition against Sarajevo, the capital of Bosnia. Their resources of all kinds were scanty. Especially they had to economise in munitions, for their own capacity of production was limited, and, having no direct access to the sea, they could only obtain supplies from their Allies or foreign countries in small quantities. They were embarrassed by the exhaustion of a large part of their civilian population. What few industries there were in the districts occupied by the Austrians had been destroyed, and the farming population, which forms the bulk of the community, had fled or been driven from its villages. The Austrians were well aware of their advantage, and military writers in the Austrian and German Press proclaimed openly at this time that Serbia was on the point of complete collapse. The fierce rearguard fighting which took place during the Servian retreat on the Kolubara and its little tributary, the Ljig, did not lead them to change their opinion. So confident were the Austrians that they had the campaign in their hands that they decided to weaken the army of invasion and to transfer a considerable force—three corps, it is said—to the north, where, towards the end of November, the Russians were appearing on the southern side of the Carpathians and drawing in on Cracow. That these troops did excellent service against the Russians there is no reason to doubt, but in allowing them to be taken from him Marshal Potiorek, the Austrian Commander in Serbia, was either taking an inexcusable risk or he was the victim of an extraordinary error on the part of his intelligence department.

After the Servian army had withdrawn behind the Kolubara in the middle of November, the Austrians made slow progress with their advance. But at the close of the month they won a success which was very soothing to them; they captured Belgrade. The Servian capital had no military importance, was not strongly fortified, and could not be defended against Austrian attack; the Austrian army which was advancing south-east from Shabatz, on the Save, made it untenable, and in any event the Servians were in no condition to spare men for a separate adventure, possibly glorious, but certainly unfruitful, in defence of Belgrade. But the fall of a capital, especially a city with the memories and associations of Belgrade, cannot but make a noise in the world, and in Vienna and Buda-Pest it resounded with all the circumstance of a great triumph. Hitherto, with the exception of some early successes at Lublin in the first weeks of the war, the Austrians had had to find their satisfaction in German victories, and the capture of Belgrade had the rare merit of being their own achievement. And now, at the beginning of December, the Austrian forces were moving forward on the roads to Kragujevatz. They had made but a few miles' progress in a fortnight, although at this stage of the campaign, if ever, time was precious. Whether the transport arrangements had been thrown into some confusion by the withdrawal of part of the army, or the difficulties of movement in the hill-country were being felt increasingly, it is impossible to say, but it is certain that the Servians, having received certain supplies of munitions from their Allies, and encouraged by the personal presence of the King, took fresh heart when they were ordered to begin the attack on December 3rd.

THE SERBIAN OFFENSIVE.

The Austrians proposed to repeat against Kragujevatz the tactics which they had used successfully against Valjevo,

and to converge upon the Servian army defending the position from north, west, and east. To do so they had to make themselves masters of the Maljen and Suvobor ranges, which lay to the south of Valjevo in the centre of their position. These were mountains rising to 3,000 feet and more, with only two or three roads leading across them. The Servians had good reason to dispute the possession of these ridges if they hoped to save Kragujevatz. For once the Austrians were across Maljen and Suvobor, and had reached the road which runs north and south to the Kolubara from the valley of the Western Morava (not to be confused with the Morava already mentioned, which enters the Danube near Semendria), they would be in a much stronger position to drive the Servians out of Kragujevatz. If on other fronts the movement of armies depended largely on the possession of railways, in Serbia it was limited mainly by the control of roads. If the Austrian advance over Maljen, Suvobor, and the heights of Rudnik succeeded, the right wing would march past Cachak, down the valley of the lower Morava, threaten Kragujevatz from the south, and march on it by two roads which strike northwards from the river bank. Simultaneously, the Austrian centre, arriving at Milanovatz, on the road joining the lower Morava and the Kolubara, would march directly forward, while other columns would descend by two roads from the north-east, and a detachment on the left would find another road running east and west from which to work behind the Servian right. All these roads, which it was important for the Austrians to seize, it was indispensable for the Servians to hold, and the possession of them gave the Servian army an advantage in the movement of both troops and transport.

THE AUSTRIAN PLAN.

The plan adopted by the Austrians was to advance slowly against Maljen and Suvobor in the centre while their right wing worked along to the south of the ranges, past Uzice and on to Cachak, so as to get in the rear of the Servian positions. The scheme was sound enough, but it postulated at least that the centre should hold firm while the right wing was doing its work of grasping after the Servian left. It demanded, also, what the Austrians never succeeded in doing, that their various columns from the Drina past the Kolubara to the Save should be in close co-operation so as to put the maximum pressure on the Servians at each point of the line. There was at this time an Austrian column at Belgrade, and another marching southwards on the Austrian left, but the Servians contained them with small forces, and struck with all their might at the centre and right wing.

The Austrians had the Sixteenth Corps on their right wing and the Fifteenth, Thirteenth, and part of the Eighth in the centre. The Servian attack began on December 3rd, and after three days' heavy fighting, the Fifteenth Corps was driven in. Its retreat weakened the position of the Sixteenth, on its right, which also began to retire. The Servians then reinforced their right centre and threw back the Thirteenth Corps. The Austrian left wing proved unable to make a diversion or to send troops in time to stem the main Servian attack, and on December 6th the whole of the Austrian centre and right were in full retreat on Valjevo and the Drina river. Driven steadily north and north-west, they were pushed away from their left flank and could only endeavour to save as much of their forces as was possible by hastily re-crossing the Drina and the Save. Their retreat was as rapid as their advance had been

slow. On December 8th the Servians were again in possession of Uzice, Valjevo, and almost the whole line of the Kolubara. Two days later they were on the banks of the Drina. The Montenegrins came up on their left and hastened the Austrian retreat. By this time, too, the Servians were dealing effectually with the northern Austrian force and driving it back on Belgrade and the river country to the east of it. On December 14th they were in front of the capital, and the Austrian army was retreating across the river over a pontoon bridge. The rearguard, in order to facilitate the retreat, fought stubbornly in positions commanding the city which had been carefully prepared, and it was not until the next morning that the Servians succeeded in forcing an entrance and destroying the bridge by shell-fire. A considerable number of Austrians had failed to make their escape, and laid down their arms. King Peter entered Belgrade on the 15th at the head of his troops, together with the Commander-in-chief (the Crown Prince Alexander) and Prince George, and a service of thanksgiving was held in the Cathedral. Everywhere the Austrian army of invasion had fled to the north of the rivers, and Servia was once more free of the enemy.

A COMPLETE VICTORY.

The victory was complete. From the beginning of the battle to December 15th the Servians captured over 40,000 prisoners, 130 guns, and 70 machine-guns, together with large quantities of transport which the Austrians abandoned in the haste of their retreat. To that must be added heavy losses in killed and wounded. But the moral effects of the Servian triumph were at least as great as the material damage which it inflicted. The invasion had been planned in great strength for the purpose of avenging the unlucky "punitive expedition" of August; it was backed by far greater resources of every kind than Servia could bring to bear; it had been accompanied by confident predictions of the enemy's collapse; and it had begun as a triumphal progress. There was deep humiliation in Vienna and Buda-Pest, and Marshal Potiorek was recalled in disgrace. He had certainly mismanaged the campaign, not only in underestimating the strength and toughness of his opponents, though this was the prime mistake, but in the tactical handling

of his forces. With the Servians constantly slipping from his grip during the retreat, he could not but anticipate the possibility that they would at last make a stand and take up the offensive between Valjevo and Kragujevatz. It was reasonable also for him to suppose that if they did so they would strike either at his right wing, which was grasping at them like the crook of a stick, or at his centre, which was aimed directly towards Milanovatz and Kragujevatz. From this, and from the difficulty of transferring troops rapidly in such country from one part of the field to another, it followed that the different parts of his forces should have been as closely linked up as was possible, whereas the Servians had little difficulty in dealing first with the Austrian right and centre and, later, with the northern force. Correct timing is of the essence of the converging attack, but neither in August nor in December was the Austrian column which marched on the left flank from the direction of the Save river able to give useful help to the main advance.

Before the echoes of this hapless enterprise had died away there were rumours that it would be speedily renewed, and on this occasion with the help of German troops. But an attack on Servia would have had no attraction for the Germans except that, if carried through successfully, it might have drawn Bulgaria from her neutrality and made the German front continuous through the Balkans into Turkey. Germany was too busy in Poland and the Carpathians to indulge in such insecure investments, and probably would have restrained Austria had she shown any stomach for another venture. But Austria did not, and Servia, for the time at least, was allowed a breathing space. She had other enemies to contend with. The greater the strain on her resources, the heavier became the burden which she had to bear. Austrian prisoners and sick and wounded were left on her hands, although she could scarcely support her own poverty-stricken refugees, nor find hospital room and medical aid for her own people. To add to her misfortunes, early in 1915 an epidemic of typhus broke out, which she had neither the means nor the knowledge to subdue. The Servians, as the Crown Prince Alexander said, had raised on their mountains and rivers "great and everlasting monuments of heroism." But disease was a more deadly enemy than the Austrians, and one not to be killed by the heroism of a primitive people.



Peasants from what was once part of Albania drilling for the first time.

[Central News.]



A scene in the Caucasus.

[E.N.A.]



A pass in the Caucasus, showing the military road.

[E.N.A.]



Turkish artillery leaving Constantinople on active service.

[Central News.]

CHAPTER IX.

THE CAMPAIGN IN THE CAUCASUS.

RUSSIAN AND TURKISH ARMENIA—THE CHARACTER OF THE COUNTRY—THE TURKISH PLANS OF ATTACK—THE TURKISH DEFEAT AT SARIKAMISH—THE RAID ON PERSIA.

TURKEY nowhere marched with the frontiers of the belligerent Powers except in the desert of Sinai and in the Armenian Highlands. Of the two obstacles, desert and mountain, the desert was much the more serious, and the first frontier to feel the effect of Turkish intervention in the war was that of Russian Armenia. The name ordinarily and loosely given to this Russian frontier province is the Caucasus, but in fact it lies far to the south of the Caucasus range which makes a natural boundary between Europe and Asia Minor. Russia had overstepped this boundary into Asia more than a century ago. Georgia became hers in 1802, and every war between Russia and Turkey in the nineteenth century saw some extension further south of the Russian frontier. These extensions had never been easily won, for the character of the country is very favourable to the defence. In the last war, in 1877-8, the Russian victory had been particularly expensive, and a too venturesome advance had been punished by a severe defeat, which was not redeemed until five months later by the storming of Kars. The military power of Turkey had always shown at its best in the campaigns in these highlands. The frontier as fixed after the war

of 1878 ran from the Black Sea, just south of Batoum, to Ararat, some three hundred miles to the east. The crest of the range along this front is in Turkish territory, in the latitude of Erzeroum, so that Russia, after crossing the Caucasus, was still after a century's fighting climbing the northerly slopes of the Armenian plateau. Nowhere has the conflict between the Christian and the Mohammedan races been more severe than on these Caucasian slopes. Less fortunate than the Georgians, whose deliverance from the Ottoman yoke came early, the bulk of the Armenians remained subject to Turkey. The Turkish system was to use the Mohammedan Kurds against the Armenians, much as in Europe she used the Albanians against the Serbs and Bulgars; and the Armenians, partly because their proximity to the Russian frontiers made them the objects of suspicion, were the victims of the worst of the Turkish atrocities. The Armenians, to their credit, had cherished the hope of national independence, and well it would have been if the Powers—and especially England—had encouraged an aspiration which their long and distinguished history had fully entitled them to indulge. Unfortunately, in the late 'seventies British policy was violently anti-Russian, and

the continued subjection of the Armenians to Turkey was morally perhaps the most disgraceful of its manifestations. It was also, from the standpoint of selfish interest, singularly unwise. A rational policy of obstruction to Russia's advance in Asia would have sought rather to encourage the making of a free Armenia, which could in time have grown into a strong buffer State between the Russian and Turkish Empires. But at the outbreak of the war their continuous sufferings at the hands of the Turks had almost killed the Armenian hopes of independence. Their hopes were now fixed on Russia as the only Power who could secure them tolerable conditions of existence, and some 8,000 Armenian volunteers enlisted in the Russian armies when Turkey's intervention brought the prospect of final liberation from her misrule.

THE WAR OF 1877.

The geography of Trans-Caucasia is difficult, and for that very reason—because communication is so difficult and the mountain system so complicated—the military operations have of necessity been restricted to certain well-marked routes. In the war of 1877, the Russians, not then in possession of Kars, invaded the Turkish territory in Trans-Caucasia in four columns. One advanced by Batoum, a second on Ardahan, a third on Bayazed, and a fourth, the strongest, on Kars. The Turkish General, Moukhtar Pasha, whose army was much weaker than the Russian invaders, lost Ardahan and Bayazed, and, abandoning Kars to its own defence, fell back on the line of the Soghanli Dag, north of Erzeroum. Here the Russians were badly beaten, and forced to retire. At the same time a force of Kurds broke through and menaced the communications of the column operating against Bayazed, and the Batoum column had no better success. The whole Russian army was compelled to fall back, and not until October, four months later, was it able to return to the attack, this time with complete success. Kars was carried by assault in November, and in the following February Erzeroum capitulated. The Treaty of Berlin drew the southern frontier along the line of the Soghanli Dag, where the Russians had been defeated in June, and gave the Russians Kars, Batoum, and Ardahan, leaving Erzeroum and Bayazed to the Turks.

THE TURKISH PLANS.


When Turkey joined in the war, Russia had hopes that by taking the offensive without delay she might be able to rush Erzeroum, or at any rate secure advanced positions for an early spring campaign. Her main advance, accordingly, was made, as in 1877, along the road from Kars to Erzeroum. Two other columns crossed the frontier

further east, without, however, gaining any other success than the occupation of Bayazed. The column from Kars began very well, and pushed on towards Erzeroum as far as Kopri Koi. That was the limit of the southern advance, for, much to the Russian surprise, the Turks in December began a counter-attack, which, though it ended in disaster, met in its earlier stages with very considerable success.


The Turkish plans were well laid, and both in their faults and in their vigour and comprehensiveness bore characteristic traces of their German authorship. They proposed with one of their corps—the Eleventh, reinforced by a division from the Baghdad Corps—to hold the Russians in front of Erzeroum, and with the two other corps—the Ninth and the Tenth—to envelop their right flank and cut off their main army from its base at Kars. In order to cover and complete this flanking movement the First Army Corps was brought up from Constantinople, landed at Trebizond, and moved up towards Ardahan.

There, if all went well in the south, it was in a good position to take advantage of the confusion caused by the expected annihilation of the Russian army near Erzeroum and to cut the railway between Kars and Tiflis. Had this bold scheme succeeded, the Russians might well have suffered a disaster of the first magnitude. The Mohammedans of Trans-Caucasia have always been somewhat unmanageable subjects of Russia, and at the beginning of the war there were very persistent rumours in the German press that they were preparing to rise against their conquerors. Whatever truth there may have been in these rumours, there is no doubt that a great Russian defeat would have made them true; and with Trans-Caucasia in rebellion, Russia would have had a serious business on hand, which would have compelled her to

withdraw corps from Poland, and might even have cost her Warsaw. These operations in the Caucasus were not a campaign detached from the rest of the war. Had it not been for the German hopes of influencing the war in Europe in their favour by some striking success in the Caucasus, the Turks might well have deferred their attack until the spring. Campaigning in the Caucasus hills in the winter is extraordinarily difficult. There are few roads; the passes are not only very high but steep, and the winter, which in Europe had been exceptionally mild, had set in on the frontier hills early and with unusual severity; moreover, the Turks were ill-equipped for the hardships of winter campaign in these wild, barren hills. There is probably not another army in the world, equipped as the Turks were, that would have attempted so ambitious a scheme of operations in such country at such a season.



Where three frontiers meet.



The Russo-Turkish frontiers.

DIFFICULT POSITION OF THE RUSSIANS.

But the Turkish army not only attempted but came near to success. The Russian army which had advanced along the Erzeroum road as far as Koprikoi was compelled by the steady pressure of the Turkish Eleventh Corps to fall back on Khorasan. Meanwhile, the movements of the Turkish First Corps away to the north were developing well. Advancing down the valley of the Chorok, this corps crossed the frontier and defeated the Russian forces in the Yalanuz Pass, and Mohammedan rebels joined the army in such numbers that the garrison at Ardahan thought it prudent to evacuate the town. At this time the gravity of the turning movement by the Ninth and Tenth Corps was quite unsuspected by the Russians. On Christmas Day the Ninth Corps attacked Sarikamish, the head of the railway running south from Kars, while the Tenth Corps, which had marched through

Id towards Olti, threatened the railway further north. Both Sarikamish and Olti were weakly held.

THE BATTLE OF SARIKAMISH.

The position of the Russians was now one of great anxiety. Their right at Ardahan and their left at Kharasan had been driven in, and their centre at Sarikamish was in serious danger. Had they known how serious, it is probable that they would have left the Turks at Ardahan to do their worst, and rushed every available man to extricate the army at Khorasan from its difficulties. But it was not until they had attacked and defeated the Turks in Ardahan that they learned that the main Turkish concentration was against Sarikamish. The Turks were driven back from Ardahan on January 3rd, and the fighting at Sarikamish had begun on Christmas Day. From the 25th to the 28th the weak garrison



The raw material for Turkey's army: Recruits from Anatolia.

[Topical Press.]



Turkey's army: The finished product on parade in the streets of Constantinople.

[Record Press.]

held its own against a whole Turkish division, which, realising that there was no time to be lost, attacked with the utmost fury. Sarikamish had to be abandoned, but the Russian force was finely handled, and it was still within three miles of the place when reinforcements arrived and turned a defence which, even in the obscure accounts that have reached this country, is still recognisable as one of the finest feats in the war into a brilliant victory. The Ninth Corps had suffered very severely in its march through the snows, over passes 10,000 feet high, to the attack on Sarikamish. Great numbers fell in the attack, and what remained surrendered. The Turkish army was in a terrible state of exhaustion. It had had to march light to reach Sarikamish at the appointed time. It had no supply convoys, and counted on the assistance of Mohammedan rebels. It arrived in time, but it had not been able to bring artillery over the almost impassable roads, and the attack on the garrison was made by exhausted and starving men without artillery preparation. In any other conditions of roads and weather the strategic scheme, which showed very real ability, might have succeeded. The great difficulty in carrying out plans of this kind is the proper timing of attacks made at different points by columns which, though not distant from each other as the crow flies, could not keep in touch owing to the absence of cross roads. The timing of the attacks in this case seems to have been excellent, though what it might have cost in human agony has not, and never will be, adequately described. The great fault of the plan was that it asked too much of human flesh and blood, and the Russians, outnumbered and outmanœuvred as they were, were able to win a brilliant victory because by the time the Turks reached the point of attack the heart had been taken out of them by the struggle with the difficulties of the march.

The official Russian accounts, ordinarily clear and good, break down somewhat in the description of the battles in these Caucasian campaigns. Some of the confusion caused by a comprehensive and bold plan of attack of which the Russians evidently never thought the enemy capable is reflected in the reports of this fighting. "Having repulsed the frenzied attacks of the

Turks on the front, and at Sarikamish they" (that is, "our gallant troops of the Caucasus") "enveloped and annihilated almost the whole of two Turkish army corps, taking the remainder of one of these corps prisoners, together with its commander-in-chief, three divisional generals, the staff, numerous officers, thousands of prisoners, artillery, machine guns, and baggage animals." When it is remembered that the First Turkish Corps was also defeated at Ardahan, the wonder is that the Turks were able to keep up the struggle at all. It would appear, however, that only one Turkish Corps was annihilated, and not two, as was at first officially reported.

The Tenth Corps escaped the destruction which overtook the Ninth, thanks mainly to a diversion made by the Eleventh Corps in the direction of Kara Urgan. Here the Eleventh Corps held the Pass until January 17th, until the Tenth Corps had effected its retirement, and then, although repeatedly defeated, succeeded in outdistancing its pursuers, and in withdrawing to Erzeroum. Throughout this fighting in the Caucasus, it is impossible not to be struck with the great competence of the Turkish leading, and with the quite remarkable quality of the Turkish troops.

Here the campaign in the Caucasus rested until it could be renewed in the spring. Both the Russian and the Turkish attempts to take the offensive had been defeated by the snow and the high passes, but the victories of the Russians, though tactical, had made their prospects of decisive success when they should take up the campaign in the spring exceedingly bright.

THE RAID ON PERSIA.

The raid on Persia in January had no military interest, and its chief importance was in the extreme cruelty with which the irregular Turkish troops treated the inhabitants. The violation of the neutrality of Persia was quite without just excuse, and her sufferings gave Persia a just claim to the consideration of Russia and England which has not always been shown to her in the past. Tabriz was reoccupied without difficulty by a small Russian detachment at the end of January.



Turkish Infantry training at Constantinople.


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
"Manchester Guardian"]

The making of khaki: (1)—Wool blending.

[Copyright.



(2)—Making the warp. (These photographs and the remaining ones in the series illustrating the manufacture of khaki were taken at the Huddersfield Mills of Messrs. Martin, Sons & Company Ltd., where about 50,000 yards of khaki for the army is being turned out every week.)



Naval guns arriving at a dockyard.

[Newspaper Illustrations.]


CHAPTER X.

TRADE AND COMMERCE.

TRADE AND EMPLOYMENT DURING THE WAR—THE TEXTILE TRADES—IRON AND STEEL—THE DYE SCHEME—SHIPPING AND WAR LOSSES.

IN times of peace we can measure changes in trade conditions by examining railway traffic, banking, unemployment, poor-law, and foreign trade returns, but when a great war is in progress these tests are apt to be fallacious. Railway traffic returns are not in fact being issued, for that very reason; unemployment figures are unsatisfactory, because they ignore short time; poor-law statistics are misleading, because vast sums are being paid by the Government, employers, and the charitable organisations to prevent distress among the dependants of our soldiers; and foreign trade returns need critical examination, because they take no account of the enormous amount of work that is being done for our armies on the Continent and elsewhere. We might imagine from these figures that one community, which is known to depend upon exports, must be in a parlous condition, whereas we know that in fact it is so busy that it cannot possibly do more. There are some industries, engaged in the production of munitions of war, which are so pressed that they have actually been allowed to recall men from the trenches. Yet they are exporting little, and make quite a poor show in the returns.

The first effect of the war, no doubt, was to give a great shock to all our industries, and particularly to the cotton trade, the greatest manufacturing industry in the world. The raising of the New Army, however, and the strengthening of the navy soon transformed the situation. Birmingham was called upon to produce rifles and other weapons to its full capacity. Sheffield had immense orders for armour-plate and cutlery; the shipbuilding centres were spurred on to activity in making warships; engineers who had been engaged in the ordinary work of civil life were asked to turn to munitions of war; the West Riding was replete with orders for khaki, and also for materials for uniforms for France; and even the cotton trade began to get War Office orders. By Christmas, therefore, an immense transformation in industrial organisation had been effected, and this became even more pronounced when the new army was about to take the field, and Parliament went to the length of commandeering workshops. People ceased entirely to speak of unemployment. It was shortage of labour, congestion of the railways and docks, and scarcity of coal, through sheer inability to get it conveyed to users, that were uppermost in men's minds as far as industrial matters were concerned.



The making of khaki: (3)—In the weaving shed.



(4)—Washing the grease out of the cloth.

OUR OVERSEAS TRADE.

Subject to the reservations mentioned, the Board of Trade figures of foreign trade are not without interest :—

	IMPORTS.		EXPORTS.	
	£	Decline from previous year	£	Decline from previous year
August	42,362,034	13,613,670	24,211,271	19,899,158
September..	45,051,937	16,303,788	26,674,101	15,750,763
October ...	51,559,289	20,170,887	28,601,815	18,020,884
November .	55,987,058	12,480,017	24,601,619	20,154,569
December...	67,554,960	3,559,914	26,278,928	17,047,992
January....	67,401,006	604,003	28,247,592	19,558,573
February ..	65,268,814	*3,215,163	26,176,937	15,084,860

* Increase.

In considering these figures, regard will, of course, be had to the fact that we have necessarily cut off the large trade we have been doing for years with the enemy countries, and that, in the interests of national defence, the exportation of many valuable articles to other countries was prohibited. Nothing in the nature of war materials was allowed to leave the country, and it is surprising what a long list these things make. There was also a very long list of articles which could only be sent to British possessions and protectorates, so that the marvel is, not that the declines in our exports were so large but that they were not considerably larger.

The railway companies had an arrangement with the Government by which, in return for the conveyance of troops and stores and the first call on the use of the lines, their net receipts were to be made up to the totals for 1913, subject, however, to deductions which experience before the war indicated might have been expected to occur if there had been no war. All but two of those in the front rank had to reduce their dividends because of the falling off in traffic in the first seven months of the year, but the loss was not heavy. The companies which were able to pay the same dividends for 1914 as for 1913 were the Great Eastern and the Lancashire and Yorkshire. In March it was understood, though it was not reported officially, that the Government and the railway companies had made a fresh agreement, more favourable to the

latter, in consideration of the fact that the Government were then using the lines to a much larger extent than was at first contemplated.

The banks all showed very good profits for the second half of the year, though not as much as they would have expected in a time of peace. Several of them maintained their dividends, but six of the leading institutions paid a little less. They had an agreement, which was pretty generally observed, that their investments should be written down to the prices on July 27th. The investments were not realisable at those prices, but as there was a hope that the war would turn more decidedly in our favour before many months were over, and as this would be

certain to raise the prices of securities, it was felt that the banks could very well wait a while before fixing the value of their investments in a way which would affect the distribution of profits materially. The directors had regard, no doubt, to the heavy sums which had been applied to investment depreciation in the last two years.


COTTON TRADE.

The cotton trade received a blow on the outbreak of the war which can only be described as staggering. It was already suffering from depression which necessitated putting the operatives on short time, in order that foreign markets might have time to absorb the goods in stock. The collapse on the outbreak of war was the greater

because the American cotton crop turned out to be the largest in history. It was evident that a crop of such dimensions could not be used up this season, and prices fell so low that it became a question with some of the growers whether it was worth while picking all the cotton. The decline put many of the merchants and brokers, both in America and in Liverpool, in a perilous position, and it became necessary to close all the exchanges hastily. Prices were then fixed arbitrarily by the governing bodies of the exchanges, and such business as must be done was at those prices. They were still low, however, and their fall brought about a drastic reduction in the value of all stocks of manufactured goods. Indian and Egyptian cotton, of course, fell simultaneously with



The finished product of the armament works: Hoisting shells on to a British battleship. [Newspaper Illustrations.]



The making of khaki: (5)—Examining the finished cloth.



(6)—Packing the bales of khaki for despatch to the Government.

American, and the purchasing power of those countries was reduced to a corresponding extent. Exchange was difficult everywhere, and America's heavy indebtedness was particularly embarrassing, as it interfered very seriously with trade. It will be remembered in this connection that London, as the great clearing-house for the business of the world, held many foreign as well as English trade bills. America was naturally reluctant to ship gold, which might be seized at sea, and was anxious to wait until its great crops of cotton and wheat could be marketed. The collapse of the Lancashire cotton trade made this wait rather a long one, but eventually matters were righted again, though only for a short time, as the purchases of the Allies in America were so large that we became the debtor nation, and exchange gave trouble again.

Meanwhile, merchants found it useless to take in new supplies of goods—their warehouses were crammed already—and manufacturers had either to stop their mills entirely or restrict their running to a small number of hours per week. In its acutest form, this state of things continued for about six weeks. The Government's general financial measures then began to tell, and by October spinners began to buy cheap cotton in America. The mills gradually increased their working hours, and early in November the Liverpool cotton market was partially reopened, and the American markets followed suit. By this time many of the men in the factories had enlisted, and, although there was no great amount of work to be done, inconvenience was felt because certain sections were undermanned.

The Government had not contemplated in the first instance that they would be able to provide work for the cotton operatives, but eventually they placed a number of contracts for army purposes, and this helped the trade materially. The home market also became fairly good when other industries had recovered from the first shock of the war, but foreign trade contributed nothing like its usual quota. German, Austrian, and Turkish trade, of course, was lost entirely, except so far as it percolated through neutral channels, but India and China, which are usually two of the greatest outlets for Lancashire goods, remained very poor customers for a long time, and no market of much consequence fully recovered. The value of the exports of cotton goods, as shown month by month in the Board of Trade Returns, were as under. We add the yardage of piece goods as a further measure of the decline, this being necessary because of prices being lower than in the period with which comparison is made:—

	Yarns and Fabrics: Total Values.	Decline from previous year.	Piece Goods. Yards.	Decline from previous year.
	£	£	Yards.	Yards.
August	5,839,981	4,629,939	313,074,600	266,471,900
September....	6,220,501	3,664,502	374,358,500	174,614,000
October	6,109,580	5,264,533	370,711,500	260,225,600
November ...	5,492,762	4,902,190	306,666,600	257,183,500
December ...	5,131,873	4,874,065	276,015,100	254,677,200
January	6,370,476	6,210,704	349,441,800	338,663,300
February	5,941,563	4,582,370	309,982,300	273,469,300

It should be explained that in the cotton trade the figures for any particular month are not an accurate reflex of the manufacturing done in that month, as it takes some time to finish and ship a large portion of the goods.

The decline in the business done and the heavy depreciation in stocks told heavily against some concerns; for example, one concern, which often has a profit of about £180,000 in the second half of the year, said to report a

net loss of £276,560. Manchester warehouse companies all suffered to some extent, though not so badly as at one time seemed probable. Many of the spinning companies went on merrily paying 10 per cent dividends, but these were taken from the reserves which the directors, with commendable prudence, had built up during the recent prosperous times.

The experience of the operatives in the first four months of the war is reflected in the report of the Amalgamated Association of Operative Cotton Spinners. This shows that the total unemployment benefit for the year amounted to the large sum of £107,623, which compared with only £17,718 in the previous year. Fortunately, the Board of Trade came to the assistance of those operatives' associations which showed willingness to help themselves by imposing levies upon the members still employed. The Spinners Amalgamation received £10,711 from that source, and was thus enabled to give all the benefits promised by its rules.

Board of Trade reports showed that the wages paid to the cotton operative, as a body were 40·7 per cent less in September than in the corresponding month of 1913. In November 36 per cent of the looms were idle, and 33 per cent more were on short time. In December things were a little better—37 per cent of the looms were idle, but only 27 per cent were on short time. In January the corresponding figures were 24 and 26 per cent, and the trade as a whole worked forty-seven hours a week. In February there was a further improvement, forty-nine hours per week being worked. By that time the decrease in the number employed, as compared with 1914, was only 6·3 per cent, and the wages bill was only 9 per cent less. Considering the enlistments, that meant a near approach to normal conditions.

SHORTAGE OF DYES.

The war had not been going on long before the textile industries of this country began to experience a shortage of aniline dyes. It is estimated that we use £2,000,000 worth of dyes every year, of which nearly nine-tenths come from Germany. With that supply cut off, prices rose enormously, and it became necessary to see if anything could be done. The question was by no means an easy one. The fact that many of the dyes have been patented by Germans was the smallest of the difficulties. We can require a patent to be worked in this country, and, as the Germans were not doing this, a special court which was set up granted licences to applicants. We had few works, however, which were capable of producing the choicer dyes, and our organisation was inadequate at all points. The Germans, of course, have works of great magnitude and considerable staffs of highly-trained chemists, and everybody has realised that when peace is restored these men will make a stiff fight for the retention of the industry in which they have so long been masters. We have also had to face the fact that we cannot possibly supply all our own wants during the war, and that we shall still be dependent on the Germans to some extent when peace is restored. There was at first a widespread disposition to take a gloomy view of the prospect of any works we might set up, and nothing whatever was done.

In November the Board of Trade took the matter up. A committee of users was formed, and the whole question was threshed out in the country, or at all events in Lancashire and Yorkshire. The upshot was the issue of a prospectus by a company named British

Dyes, Ltd. This appeared first on the 6th March. The authorised share capital was £2,000,000, in £1 shares, but only half that amount was offered at first, and the million was not all payable at once. The Government had resisted many proposals that they should impose a tariff for the protection of the company after the war, but offered to take up debentures equal in amount to the share capital subscribed up to £1,000,000, and after that £1 for every £4 of further share capital up to a maximum of £500,000. An ultimate share capital of £3,000,000 was contemplated as possible, and in that case the Government would advance £1,500,000, secured by debentures. The interest on these debentures was fixed at 4 per cent, but for the first five years this interest was to be non-cumulative and contingent on the net profits of each separate year being sufficient to provide it. An option to purchase the works of Read Holliday and Sons, Ltd., at Huddersfield, had been acquired, and the acquisition of other works by the company was spoken of as being probable. More important still, negotiations were in progress with the object of securing a considerable supply of dyes from Switzerland, where they were already being produced with considerable success. The response to the prospectus, however, proved disappointing to the directors. Instead of £1,000,000, only £571,000 was offered in subscriptions for shares, and £83,000 of this was subject to conditions. The directors did not feel justified in going to allotment upon this, and a meeting of the applicants for shares was called to see if they could be induced to enlarge their applications. At that meeting the directors modified the scheme to some extent, and at the close they were assured that more money would be supplied.

Directly after the company's prospectus had been submitted to the public the Government announced that they had acquired the greater part of the crop of natural indigo that was coming forward, in the interests of the dye-users of the United Kingdom. They did this, as they said, to mitigate the effects of the shortage of the synthetic product and to avert the

danger, which was doubtless a very real one, of speculators holding-up the available supply. Our imports of natural indigo had already been going up, and it was expected that the Government's action would give them a further impetus, although it was impossible that the natural product could be found in sufficient quantities to dispense with the need of synthetic indigo.

Some surprise was created by an announcement that the Board of Trade were granting licences for the indirect importation of dyes from Germany. It was understood that this was only to be done on a limited scale, but when the Germans heard of it they announced, in a wireless message, that they would shortly prohibit all exports of dye-stuffs from their country.

WOOLLEN AND OTHER TEXTILE TRADES.

The woollen trade became very bad in the early days of the war, buyers cancelling orders on a very large scale in August. Then the demand for khaki arose, and it soon became so enormous that it could not be met by ordinary methods. France also wanted cloth for uniforms, and we were asked to do our best to supply her needs. The making of coarse goods like khaki is not exactly a delight to firms who have been accustomed to fine goods, but it was khaki or nothing in many cases, and that clinched the matter. Yorkshire had been sending a large quantity of valuable dress

goods to Germany, and even if the makers were able to turn to the production of army cloths this would not be a full compensation. Exports of woollen goods fell off about 50 per cent in September, October, and November, but they were not quite as bad as this in subsequent months. Worsted yarns lost a great part of their foreign market—the fall in February being nearly four-fifths—but worsted tissues only declined to the extent of about one-third. By January, 30 per cent of the operatives in the woollen and worsted trades were working overtime, and in February they were earning 12 per cent more in wages than in the second month of 1914. On the 12th of March a royal proclamation made raw wool, wool tops and noils, and



Receiving shells for the naval guns on the deck of a battleship.
[Newspaper Illustrations.]

woollen and worsted yarns absolute contraband of war. This, of course, had no direct effect upon our trade, but it may have had an indirect effect upon markets in other countries than those of the enemy. All markets, however, have been kept very bare since the war began, and are likely to remain so. We shall be glad to remember that when we are at peace again.

The linen trade had all the difficulties of manufacturers generally and some special ones of its own, for it has depended very largely upon flax from Russia, which was unable to ship the usual amount. Belgium has also been a source of supply, and this, too, was cut off early in the war. Ireland had a pretty good crop of its own, and this went to very high prices, to the great gratification of the growers, no doubt, but not of the manufacturers who required it. The United States of America are by far the largest market abroad for British linen goods, and for the first four months of the war they kept up their demand very well. There were slight increases in their takings in August and November, and a very large one in September. October showed a decline, but not an important one. Since then, however, there have been very substantial declines—about 5,000,000 yards in December, 6,000,000 yards in January, and 4,000,000 yards in February.

The silk trade also suffered a diminution in its exports, but Mr. Frank Warner, President of the Silk Association, stated in March that some firms, making a certain class of goods, had as many orders on hand as they could cope with. The greatest loss had fallen upon the importers of raw, thrown, and spun silks and of manufactured goods, upon the makers-up, and upon the wholesale and retail distributors. The spinners were doing badly, owing to the export restrictions, and so were the makers of the richer kinds of goods, but still the condition of the industry generally was not pathetic.

IRON, STEEL, AND ALLIED TRADES.

The iron, steel, and other metal trades were already experiencing a period of comparative depression when the war broke out. The Board of Trade showed that in the first seven months of the year there were declines of £3,499,524 in the exports of iron and steel and manufactured goods, £1,003,617 in other metals, and £1,133,260 in electrical goods. The outbreak of war made the comparison much worse; but on the other hand, Germany ceased to compete in our markets at once and Belgium ceased soon afterwards. This made a considerable difference to the trade, and prices were further improved by the great demand which set in from the shipyards and the armament works. The following table compares the imports and exports of iron and steel in the war period with those for the corresponding months of the previous year:—

	IMPORTS.		EXPORTS.	
		Decline.		Decline.
	£	£	£	£
August	400,383	733,804	2,295,351	1,822,615
September	267,898	923,640	2,456,636	1,663,924
October	334,954	1,031,372	2,810,817	1,861,771
November	450,196	756,384	2,586,111	1,987,589
December	497,488	968,287	2,346,265	1,773,447
January	580,302	637,738	2,670,903	2,192,756
February	419,152	747,162	2,236,472	1,600,005

There were also heavy declines in the imports and exports of other manufactured, or partly manufactured,

metals, but the table given will suffice to illustrate the general dislocation which occurred. Unfortunately it was accompanied, as in other leading industries, by an increase in the cost of production, all requisites being dear and the workshops being incapable of yielding their full output through the shortage of labour caused by the numerous enlistments.

Shipbuilders set aside a great deal of private work in order to cope with the requirements of the Admiralty. Overtime, night-shifts, and Sunday work were common in the departments which did not require daylight, but even then the output was not as large as was desired. A body of men on the Clyde, not realising the gravity of the position, struck work for a larger advance of wages than was offered them, but on the urgent plea of the Government went back after a few days, on the understanding that their claims would be investigated and justice done to them.

GOVERNMENT CONTROL OF ARMAMENT WORKS.

Engineers who were able to produce munitions of war were asked to do so, and they responded with great readiness, although the work was unfamiliar to many of them. Sheffield and Birmingham firms, as we have indicated, were particularly busy from the first, and after the lapse of a few months there were so many engaged on war supplies that Lord Kitchener told a member of the House of Lords the country's output of these articles had been multiplied three-hundred-fold. Even Railway Companies had by that time placed their locomotive works at the disposal of the Government, and in many places not only were overtime and night shifts worked but Sunday labour was resorted to. Still, Lord Kitchener—in view, no doubt, of the requirements of our Allies, as well as our own—was far from being satisfied, and in March a very remarkable Act of Parliament was hurriedly passed, giving the Government power to take full control of all the armament works—regular as well as casual. They proceeded at once to set up a species of Socialism, as a means of extending the existing powers of production. It was announced that a limit would be put upon profits, and an agreement was made with the leaders of the trade unions connected with engineering by which the ordinary safeguards against the intrusion of unskilled labour upon the sphere which skilled labour regarded as its own were suspended for the period of the war. This meant that, in order to increase the output, men who were called unskilled would be allowed to attend to certain machines, provided the rate of pay was "the usual rate of the district for that class of work," and also that when normal conditions were restored the men recognised as skilled would have preference in the selection of those required. Another very important provision, for the immediate purpose of the Government, was that there should be no strikes of men engaged in the manufacture of munitions of war, arrangements being made for the settlement of disputes by arbitration or other means.

COAL MINING.

Virtually all the colliery companies reduced their output after the war began. The main cause of this was the high percentage of enlistments among the miners, but the railway congestion was also an important cause. Prices went up smartly, but coalowners with heavy contracts did not get much out of that, and in virtually all cases their working expenses per ton

produced were heavier. The Powell Duffryn Steam Coal Company increased its profit in 1914 from £347,800 to £395,100, and the United National Collieries Company advanced from £117,600 to £160,000, but these were quite exceptional cases, due to special circumstances. The typical experience was that of the Consolidated Cambrian, which dropped from £134,900 to £97,100; the Great Western Colliery Company, which dropped from £158,419 to £111,820; North's Navigation Collieries Company, which dropped from £100,145 to £65,578, and the Fife Coal Company, which had to reduce its ordinary dividend from 27½ to 10 per cent.

The extent to which foreign trade was dislocated will be seen by the following table, showing the values of the exports of coal, coke, and manufactured fuel this year:—

	Total.	Decline from 1914.
	£	£
January.....	2,580,262	1,715,431
February.....	2,686,845	1,506,963

It is also significant that 1,140 pits only reported 551,260 workpeople as being in their employment in February, this being 81,718, or 12.9 per cent, less than in the second month of 1914.

SHIPPING AND WAR LOSSES.

It is a remarkable fact that, despite the activities of the *Emden* and a few other enemy cruisers and the preference which shipbuilders gave to naval work, the British mercantile marine was stronger at the end than at the beginning of 1914, the net addition being 119 vessels, with a total tonnage of 404,630. This made the aggregate 21,057 vessels, of 20,009,530 tons. Another fact in connection with the shipping industry, which has perhaps not been generally recognised, is that at one time the Admiralty had no less than one-fifth of the British mercantile tonnage under charter, and has not had much less than that at any period for several months. The ships, it may be as well to state, were not bargained for—they were commandeered, the question of remuneration being left for subsequent settlement. Some of the great lines had their fleets substantially

reduced in this way, but they quite understood, when freights went up to fancy rates, that they would not be paid on that scale. It must be acknowledged, however, that they did not clamour for them—that, in fact, they showed a perfect disposition to be reasonable in their demands.

The shortage of shipping for commercial purposes was slightly relieved by the employment of such of the interned steamers belonging to the enemy as were capable of carrying coal from the North to London, and freight rates fell a little in consequence of that being done, but there were not enough of such ships to make any great impression, although March saw a rather sharp reduction from other causes. It was rather curious that this decline coincided with the new activity of the enemy submarines, which succeeded in sinking a number of ships, mostly small and slow, but still valuable.

On the question of the value of the ships sunk and the losses sustained by the insurance organisation, Mr. Bruce Ismay, Chairman of the Liverpool and London War Risks Association, had some interesting things to say at the meeting on the 23rd February. The policies they had issued covering King's enemy risks amounted, he said, to over £107,000,000. They had received in premiums £1,540,000, but the losses to date left them £691,000 to the good. The State, having accepted 80 per cent of the risks, took £552,800 of that, and the Association got the balance of £138,200. Put in another way, the premiums amounted to 28s. per cent, but the losses were less than 16s. per cent.

The Association's report gave some additional details. The insurance rates that had been in operation were as under:—

	Single Voyage. Per cent.	Round Voyage. Per cent.	Time (91 days) Per cent.
Aug. 4 to Aug. 31..	25/-	50/-	50/-
Sept. 1 to Dec. 16..	20/-	40/-	40/-
Dec. 17 to Feb. 3...	15/-	30/-	30/-

The total value of the British vessels entered in this and other War Risks Associations was over £150,000,000.

The Manchester Guardian
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A. H. W.
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
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
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
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
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


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A British cruiser taking a German prize in tow.

[Central News.]

CHAPTER XI.

SEA-POWER AND SEA-LAW.

THE HISTORY OF THE LAW OF MARITIME CAPTURE—THE DECLARATIONS OF PARIS AND OF LONDON—THE DOCTRINE OF CONTINUOUS VOYAGE—THE POSITION OF HOLLAND AND THE UNITED STATES—PRESIDENT WILSON'S CRITICISMS—THE CASE OF THE "DACIA" AND OF THE "WILHELMINA."


OF all the questions raised by the war none has touched the interests and the sentiment of this country so closely as those which have turned on the law and the use of sea-power. As the carrying-nation of the world, the greatest naval power, and the only country absolutely dependent on the sea for its life-breath, Great Britain has the strongest interest in making the most effectual use of naval offence that does not injure her defence—an antithesis which, though many would maintain it to be quite unreal in warlike operations on the ground that whatever increases our means of offence must also strengthen our means of defence, may well be valid in the realm of law. Hardly less important in the eyes of this country are the morals of the use of sea-power. For the ground of the average Englishman's attachment to the navy, and of his determination that it shall be supreme, is not solely material, but is also moral and political. He is genuinely convinced that the British navy is an instrument of human liberty, and this conviction became doubly precious in a war which exhibited the German army as the instrument of tyranny. The tests of whether a great piece of mechanism is being used on behalf of freedom or tyranny are largely political, but they are also legal. The conduct of the German army in Belgium was condemned in this country on grounds not only of humanity but of law, which with the Englishman lies much nearer to the springs of action than with most people. This war, to the English mind, is being fought to justify and establish the rule of law against force. It was therefore a necessary part of our case to prove that our "navalism" is not German

militarism on another element. The war, again, is being waged largely in defence of neutrals, and therefore it became doubly necessary that our naval power should be used with the utmost respect for neutral rights. Such are the moral and political issues beneath the questions of law which are the subject of this chapter.

The law of war at sea is not an easy branch of international law, and a brief sketch of its modern history, though it may seem to begin by taking us away from its applications in this war, will probably be the shortest way to an understanding of the issues.

THE OLD RULES OF CAPTURE.

The rules of capture on which this country acted in its wars with France were those of the *Consolato del Mare*, a code dating back to the days of the Italian Republics. Under this code the property of a belligerent, whether publicly or privately owned, was always liable to capture at sea; on the other hand, neutral property was not so liable. For example, if the nationality of the ship was hostile, and of the cargo neutral, the ship could be seized, and, if condemned by a Prize Court, confiscated; but the cargo was restored to its neutral owners. Similarly, if the ship was neutral and the cargo the property of the enemy, the cargo was good prize, but not the ship. These were clear and logical rules; but the objection to them was that by giving a belligerent the right to examine a neutral ship for belligerent property, they in effect, and for no offence such as the carriage of contraband, violated neutral territory, the neutral ship being considered as a portion of the territory of the State



Firing with rifles from the deck of a mine-sweeper in order to explode a floating mine.

[Topical Press.]



The crew of a mine-sweeper wearing the safety collar and lifebelts, which are part of their working attire.

[Topical Press.]

to which it belonged and whose flag it was flying. Accordingly, an alternative set of rules was propounded, first by the King of Prussia, and later supported by others. Under these rules the flag covered the cargo. A neutral flag redeemed enemy property carried under it from its hostile character, while an enemy flag infected neutral cargo with its hostile character and made it liable to seizure and confiscation. The object of this rival set of rules was not only to prevent the infringement of the territory of the neutral ship, but also to secure and to retain for neutrals the carrying trade. These rules were adopted by the so-called Armed Neutrality of 1780, of which the Baltic Powers, with Holland, France, Spain, and the United States, were members. Pitt was fierce in his denunciation of these rules. "Shall we give up our maritime consequence," he asked, "and expose ourselves to scorn, derision, and contempt? . . . Four nations have conspired to produce a new code of maritime laws which they endeavour arbitrarily to force on Europe. What is this but the same Jacobin principle which proclaimed the rights of man, which produced the French Revolution, which generated the wildest anarchy, and spread horror and devastation through that unfortunate country? Whatever shape it assumes it is a violation of the rights of England, and imperiously calls upon Englishmen to resist it even to the last shilling and the last drop of blood rather than tamely submit to degrading invasion or meanly yield the rights of the country to shameful usurpation." These, then, were the issues at law in Napoleonic times, Great Britain, as the strongest naval Power, asserting the right to capture all enemy property at sea under whatever flag it might be, the weaker Powers and neutrals maintaining that the neutral flag ought to cover the enemy's property. England had her way.

THE DECLARATION OF PARIS.

But fifty years later, by the Declaration of Paris, England agreed to a compromise between these two sets of rules. She took from either set the part which was most favourable to neutrals. While the Armed Neutrality had held that the enemy's flag ought to infect even a neutral cargo with its hostile character, the Declaration of Paris enacted that it should not, but that the British rule which refused to touch neutral property under the enemy's flag should be the law. On the other hand, it accepted that part of the Armed Neutrality's code which held that a neutral flag should exempt enemy's property carried under it from capture. The same Declaration abolished privateering, and declared that a blockade to be legal must be effective—a somewhat cryptic rule the meaning of which will appear later. Every important Power signed the Declaration except Spain and the United States, which objected to the abolition of privateering on the ground that it was unfair to the Powers with weak navies and large mercantile marines.

The signature of the Declaration of Paris was a very remarkable sacrifice of belligerent power to neutral right which produced a cleavage of opinion running clean across the lines of party division. Some argued that it went much too far, weakened our power to injure the enemy when we were at war, and by giving immunity to neutral shipping would lead to a great transfer of British shipping in time of war to the protection of a neutral flag. Others, again,—among them Cobden and Bright—following a line of thought that had been popular in the United States since Benjamin Franklin's day, held that the whole system which permitted the capture

of private property at sea was indefensible, that the right of capture should be restricted to public property and to contraband, and that all non-contraband trade should be free, whether under the enemy's or a neutral flag, except to ports which were blockaded. The controversy on this question went on for more than half a century. Liberals like Cobden, and Conservatives like Mr. F. E. Smith, have argued for the complete exemption of private property from capture; philosophic Radicals like Mill have opposed the change; and independent Conservatives like Mr. Gibson Bowles have advocated the denunciation of the Declaration of Paris and the return to the law of capture as it was practised in the Napoleonic Wars. The line of division cut very deep. It was drawn in the first place by different estimates of the results which the law, as modified by the Declaration of Paris, would have on our position when we were at war. But it was deepened by a radical conflict of opinion as to what ought to be the position of neutrals and non-combatants in war-time, the one side holding that war was a relation between States and not between their subjects, and that subjects and—*a fortiori*—all neutrals ought to be protected as far as possible against loss; the other side arguing that the State was not a separate entity but merely the sum of all the individuals composing it, who could therefore not expect to continue their affairs as though nothing was happening, and that, as the world was now "all one," even neutrals must be content to suffer some inconvenience. The critics of the Declaration of Paris were therefore divided amongst themselves. But, except officials, there were few whole-hearted supporters of the Declaration.

THE DECLARATION OF LONDON.

In 1909 the Powers met to draft a code of maritime law in war which should be administered by an International Prize Court, thus freeing the law from any risk of control by the belligerent Executive. The result of their deliberations was the Declaration of London, which was violently criticised from the outset in this country and was never approved by Parliament, whose consent was necessary to establish the jurisdiction of an International Court. The key to the understanding of the contentious clauses in the Declaration, and also of the legal argumentation that arose in the course of the war, is the distinction between contraband, conditional contraband, and the free list. On the free list were put articles amounting in value to about one-third of our annual trade, and including cotton and the raw materials of textile industries. In these the trade under a neutral flag, except to a blockaded port, was to be free from interference by the belligerents. On the list of absolute contraband were placed articles entirely or mainly used for the prosecution of the war if destined for a belligerent country. These could be seized and confiscated under whatever flag they were being carried. The difficulties began with the third list of conditional contraband, made up of articles capable of warlike and peaceful use. Foodstuffs, which could be used both for feeding an army and for feeding non-combatants, were the first on this list. The Declaration proceeded to draw up a number of rules for determining when articles of this character were to be considered as contraband and liable to confiscation, and when the trade in them was to be free. These rules are set forth in Articles 33 to 36 of the Declaration, which must be textually quoted, for most of the controversies on maritime law in this war have turned upon them.

"ARTICLE 33.—Conditional contraband is liable to capture if it is shown to be destined for the use of the armed forces or of a Government department of the enemy State, unless in this latter case the circumstances show that the goods cannot in fact be used for the purposes of the war in progress. This latter exception does not apply to a consignment coming under Article 24 (4).

ARTICLE 34.—The destination referred to in Article 33 is presumed to exist if the goods are consigned to enemy authorities, or to a contractor established in the enemy country who, as a matter of common knowledge, supplies articles of this kind to the enemy. A similar presumption arises if the goods are consigned to a fortified place belonging to the enemy, or other place serving as a base for the armed forces of the enemy. No such presumption, however, arises in the case of a merchant vessel bound for one of these places if it is shown to prove that she herself is contraband.

"In cases where the above presumptions do not arise, the destination is presumed to be innocent.

"The presumptions set up by this Article may be rebutted.

"ARTICLE 35.—Conditional contraband is not liable to capture except when found on board a vessel bound for territory belonging to or occupied by the enemy, or for the armed forces of the enemy, and when it is not to be discharged in an intervening neutral port.

"The ship's papers are conclusive proof both as to the voyage on which the vessel is engaged and as to the port of discharge of the goods, unless she is found clearly out of the course indicated by her papers, and unable to give adequate reasons to justify such deviation.

"Article 36.—Notwithstanding the provisions of Article 35, conditional contraband, if shown to have the destination referred to in Article 33, is liable to capture in cases where the enemy country has no seaboard."

These articles have probably been more written and talked about than any articles of similar length in any other international treaty. Their broad effect, however, is clear; and had they been followed as they stand, the general situation as regards imports into Germany would have been as follows:—

(1) Germany under a neutral flag would have been free to import through her own ports all foodstuffs, clothing, and the raw materials of most manufactures, unless it could be shown that these

were meant for her armed forces or for the use of one of her Government departments.

(2) She would have been able to import all these articles under a neutral flag through neutral ports, e.g., Rotterdam, irrespectively of their ultimate destination (Article 35), or of the use to which they were to be put.

It will be seen at once that these articles put an island country—which must get all that it requires from abroad through its own ports or go without—at a great disadvantage as compared with a Continental country, which can obtain all that it wants, in the way of foodstuffs and the raw materials of manufactures, by railway from a neutral port without any possibility of its supplies being touched by an enemy, however complete that

enemy's command of the sea may be. "Does any one say," asked the Leader of the Opposition when this Declaration was being debated in Parliament, "that the fact that an American ship, having tinned meats which were going straight to the German army, could pass through our Channel Fleet and we not touch it does not mean a prejudicing of our position?" If by "going straight" is meant through Dutch ports or up the Rhine, the sentence is an exact description of what might have happened under the Declaration.

THE AMENDED DECLARATION.

The Declaration of London had fortunately not been ratified by Parliament, and the Declaration of Paris

was still the statement of the law that was legally binding on this country. The Government must have felt profoundly thankful that Parliament had resisted its attempts to get the London Declaration through. Under the Declaration of London, as it stood, practically the sole injury that we could have done to Germany by our naval strength was to hold up German shipping and stop the dividends of their great shipping companies. That degree of injury was not worth the losses of our own shipping through the depredations of the German commerce destroyers. It is impossible to read the Declaration of London, or even of Paris, without feeling that the British signatories



The German Admiralty Building, Berlin.

[Central News.]

had either ceased to contemplate our intervention in a European War as a possibility—which was likely enough in the 'fifties, after the Crimean war, when the Manchester doctrines of foreign policy were in the ascendant in both the political parties—or else were completely out of touch with the conditions of modern naval war. The drafting of the Declaration of London certainly put the Government in serious difficulties when war broke out. True, it was not the law; still, by signing it, the representatives of the Powers had set out a greatest common measure of agreement by which their actions were sure to be judged in a great European war.

THE BRITISH PRACTICE.

At the outbreak of war an Order in Council was issued declaring, on behalf of this country and France, that they meant to observe the provisions of the Declaration of Paris, subject to certain modifications and additions. These were of so great importance as almost to change the character of the Declaration. The principal modification was the virtual cancellation of Article 35 of the Declaration, by which importations of conditional contraband into Germany in neutral ships through neutral ports were exempted from capture by belligerent shipping. Instead, precisely the same tests were applied to all importations into Germany, whether through German or neutral ports. That was to remove one of the principal objections to the Declaration, but it was the beginning of difficulties with neutrals. For the cancellation of Article 35 meant that all imports of articles not on the free list into neutral countries were liable to retention and search, and if it should be found that they were intended for the use of the enemy's armed forces, or to come within the provisions of Article 33, to confiscation.

It has not been generally understood in England how much that meant for Holland. Some 75 per cent of the imports of Rotterdam normally find their way into Germany, and of that percentage probably more than a half comes under the head of conditional contraband. Moreover, the whole of the British shipping ordinarily engaged in this trade ceased to visit Dutch ports, and not a single German merchantman was able outside the Baltic to keep the seas. It has been calculated that not more than a fifth of the ordinary number of ships was arriving at Rotterdam in October, and in Rotterdam and Amsterdam alone some 50,000 men were thrown out of work. But for the modification of Article 35 of the Declaration, Rotterdam would probably have

done the bulk of the import trade of Germany. Yet if the Dutch Government was ever under temptation to protest against the change in the Declaration they resisted it. Not only did the Dutch Government not protest, but it made arrangements at very great loss and inconvenience to second our efforts to keep anything from passing through her ports into Germany that might assist the enemy in his prosecution of the war. By the Rhine Convention the Dutch Government must keep open the Rhine for transit into Germany. Consignments for Germany are loaded into lighters in the Rhine at Rotterdam, and then proceed to their destination. These do not count as importations into Holland, and the Dutch Government could not without violating its treaty interfere with their carriage. But over all its imports destined for re-exportation to Germany it exercised a strict control. It agreed to purchase all cargoes consigned to Holland which came within our list of conditional contraband, placed them in bond, and only issued them to the consignees in return for a deposit and a guarantee that they were not for war consumption or for use of the German Government. Scrupulous regard for the obligations of neutrality could not have been carried further.

THE RIGHT OF SEARCH AND THE AMERICAN PROTEST.

Less fortunate were our first experiences with the United States in this war. Between Britain and the United States there is an old tradition of quarrel over the laws of naval war. Our last war with the United States in 1812 arose out of the exercise by the British navy of their right of search for British subjects on American vessels. By British law at that time a British subject could not divest himself of his nationality, and America was full of English and Irish emigrants,

whom the United States had received as her subjects, but who were still by English law British subjects. These our navy made a practice of apprehending whenever they could find them on American ships, and this harsh violation of American asylum was bitterly resented, and to this day has made the American Government extremely critical towards any suspicion of arbitrariness in the exercise of the right of search. It was a curious coincidence that the centenary of the Treaty of Ghent, which made peace at the end of this foolish and unnecessary war, should have seen another dispute arise over British search of American vessels. Between Christmas and New Year's Day the United States Government sent a long despatch to Great Britain protesting against the wrongful treatment of American ships. The protests



Admiral von Tirpitz. [Central News.]

fell under three general heads. In the first place, President Wilson complained of delays and losses caused to American shipping by detention and search. Reimbursement for wrongful detention would not, he said, remedy the evil, because the chief difficulty was the moral effect of British practice on American exporters, who were refusing to take risks. The British naval practice was directly responsible for the depression existing in many American industries. Secondly, the American Note complained that we were detaining American steamers on mere suspicion. It quoted, with approval, the old British doctrine that foodstuffs were only contraband when they were meant for the armed forces of the enemy, pointed out that the burden of proof in such cases was on the captor, and argued that there was no right of detention and search merely in the hope of making up a case that cargoes of foodstuffs were so intended, but that there must be solid ground for suspicion before the loss of detention and search in port was put on the neutral shipowner. Lastly, the Note protested against the cancellation of Article 25 of the Declaration of London, the effect of which was that cargoes of foodstuffs and other conditional contraband consigned to Holland, which should under any circumstances have been free, were made subject to precisely the same regulations as if they had been consigned to German ports. The Note was very friendly in its phrasing, but many people in England felt it to be unfortunate in view of the grave breaches of international law committed by the Germans in Belgium: that these should have been passed without protest from the United States, and that their first appeal to law should have been made in defence not of humanity but of purely commercial and, it was thought, somewhat trivial grievances of the American trading community. But the motives of President Wilson's policy, and the extreme difficulties of his position, have already been discussed in this History (Vol. II., Chapter II., page 15).

Sir Edward Grey's reply is an extremely important public document, for after a statistical argument to show that the trade losses of the United States were not so great as had been alleged, he then proceeded to justify his policy in modifying the provisions of the code agreed upon by the London Naval Conference. The reason, in a word, was railways, which made the Continent of Europe "all one."

"No one in these days will dispute the general proposition that a belligerent is entitled to capture contraband goods on their way to the enemy. That right has now become consecrated by long usage and general acquiescence. Though the right is ancient the means of exercising it alter and develop with the changes in the methods and machinery of commerce. A century ago the difficulties of land transport rendered it impracticable for the belligerent to obtain supplies of seaborne goods through a neighbouring country. Consequently the belligerent actions of his opponents neither required nor justified any interference with shipments on their way to neutral ports. The principle was recognised and acted on in the decisions in which Lord Stowell laid down the lines on which captures of such goods should be dealt with. The advent of steam power has rendered it as easy for a belligerent to supply himself through the ports of a neutral contiguous country as through his own, and has therefore rendered it impossible for his opponent to refrain from interfering with commerce intended for the enemy merely because it is on its way to a neutral port.

"No better instance of the necessity of countering new devices for despatching contraband goods to an enemy by new methods of applying the fundamental principle of the right to capture such contraband can be given than the steps which the Government of the United States found it necessary to take during the American Civil War. It was at that time that the doctrine of continuous voyage was first applied to

the capture of contraband; that is to say, it was then for the first time that a belligerent found himself obliged to capture contraband goods on their way to the enemy even though at the time of capture they were *en route* for a neutral port from which they were intended subsequently to continue their journey.

"The policy then followed by the United States Government was not inconsistent with the general principles already sanctioned by international law, and met with no protest from His Majesty's Government, though it was upon British cargoes and upon British ships that the losses and the inconvenience due to this new development of the application of the old rule of international law principally fell. The criticisms which have been directed against the steps then taken by the United States came and come from those who saw in the methods employed in Napoleonic times for the prevention of contraband a limitation upon the right itself, and failed to see that in Napoleonic times goods on their way to a neutral port were immune from capture not because the immediate destination conferred a privilege, but because capture under such circumstances was unnecessary. The facilities which the introduction of steamers and railways have given to a belligerent to introduce contraband goods through neutral ports have imposed upon his opponent the additional difficulty, when endeavouring to intercept such trade, of distinguishing between goods which are really destined for the commerce of that neutral country and the goods which are on their way to the enemy."

Later in the despatch, Sir E. Grey pointed out how increasingly difficult it had become, with the growth in the size of modern armies, to maintain the old distinction between the civilian population and the army, between the individual and the State. "The reason for drawing a distinction between foodstuffs intended for the civil population and those for the armed forces or enemy Government disappears when the distinction between the civil population and the armed force itself disappears. In any country in which there exists such a tremendous organisation for war as now obtains in Germany there is no clear division between those whom the Government is responsible for feeding and those whom it is not." The whole despatch is a remarkable piece of reasoning, and Sir E. Grey undoubtedly had the better of the argument. But the conclusion undoubtedly has its tragic side, for if conscription has made it all but impossible to distinguish between soldier and non-combatant, between public and private interests, it is obvious that the ground on which the legislation for humanising war has been built up is rapidly subsiding, and the Germans, in refusing to be bound by distinctions between neutrals and belligerents, combatants and non-combatants, may be only expressing the wicked logic of conscription. One cannot, on the other hand, refrain from wondering why if railways and conscription have made so much difference to the law of war, the Government's advisers should not have realised the fact until after the war had begun, when their tardy enlightenment exposed us to a charge of inconsistency and vacillation in policy.

THE CASE OF THE DACIA.

The two most famous cases in maritime law during this war were those of the *Dacia* and the *Wilhelmina*. The *Dacia* was a Hamburg-America liner, which was in New York when the war broke out, and stayed there, fearing capture if she left. There were very many other German ships in the same plight, and the sight of so many must have strengthened the desire of many good Americans to restore the old glories of their mercantile marine. Before the Civil War America possessed the second largest merchant navy in the world, but after the war it declined, and now bears no sort of proportion to her commercial greatness. Among the causes of the

decline were the substitution of iron for wood as the material of ships, and the high Protectionist policy of the United States, which made ships more expensive to build in America and prohibited ships not built in America from being placed on the American Registry. But the extensive transfers of ships to a neutral flag during the war began the decline, and many Americans hoped that what war had taken from them war might help to restore. The Democratic party, with its Free Trade sympathies, was, and had been for some time, identified with these hopes of reviving the American merchant navy, and in his message to Congress at the opening of the session in the autumn the President had announced a project of legislation for the State purchase of foreign-built shipping to the American flag. An Emergency Registration Law had previously been passed which allowed ships not built in the United States to be placed on the American Registry. The movement for acquiring some of the German ships was a genuine American movement in its origin, and it was not against our interests.


The *Dacia* was bought from the Hamburg-America Company by a Mr. Edward Breitung, an American subject, and when first heard of in this country was at Galveston loading cotton for Bremen. Cotton had been put on the free list by the Declaration of London, and kept there by our own Proclamations, so that there was no question of the cargo being contraband. Equally, there was no more doubt about the right of an American ship to go to a German port with a non-contraband cargo than there was of its right to go to Liverpool—so long as there was no blockade. The sole question was whether the *Dacia* was in fact an American ship, placed on the Registry under such conditions. If she were, we had no right to stop her; if she were not, she would be good prize, not, of course, as an American ship, but as a German ship whose transfer to the American flag we could not recognise as valid. By English law, the decision would have been a ticklish one; but the problem was evaded by arranging for the French to capture her. The French rules recognise no transfers of shipping made after war has begun.

This may be a convenient opportunity to deal with a question which was often asked in the early months, namely, why no blockade was declared of the German ports. A blockade would undoubtedly have avoided some difficulties, notably this one of the nationality of the *Dacia*, and of the *Wilhelmina*, an American ship bound for Hamburg with foodstuffs and detained for trial before a Prize Court on the ground that the German seizure of the foodstuffs made (Vol. I., page 380) imports of food into Germany imports for the use of the Government, and therefore contraband. If there had been a blockade of German ports there could be no question of our stopping anything and everything that tried to get through. Unfortunately, there were greater difficulties in a blockade. Submarines, as has been observed in a previous chapter (Vol. I., page 226), had made anything like a close blockade impossible, and the validity of a blockade distant from the coast would probably have been questioned as also barring access to neutral coasts within Article 18 of the Declaration of London, or as not being "effective," that is, constituting a continuous risk to all ships seeking access to the blockaded coast. A still graver objection was that

a blockade of German ports was quite useless so long as the Dutch ports were open. These could not be blockaded, and to blockade German ports would have made our action in preventing the importation of conditional contraband into Holland still more invidious. Sir E. Grey had argued against the proposal to exempt private property at sea from capture by saying that it would logically involve the abolition of a commercial blockade. In fact, commercial blockade of Germany, or of any Continental country, with a neutral neighbour was impossible in any real sense under the rules either of the Declaration of London or of Paris. Only an island which has no neutral neighbours to import by sea and re-export by rail can be blockaded without infraction of neutral rights. These, then, were the reasons which led the Government to modify the Declaration of London, and to avoid the proclamation of a blockade of Germany which was generally expected.

So far as our survey has gone, the policy of the British navy towards commerce during the war seems to have been wisely and humanely directed. The war brought the country face to face with problems that had not been adequately thought out. Some legal ideals had to be jettisoned, and it was fortunate for the country that the Declaration of London had not the binding force of law, not having been approved by Parliament. Had it been in force, except for the local injury done to German shipping interests, our fleet would not have been able to exercise any real economic pressure on Germany, and this country might have had to begin the war with a repudiation of the Treaty or have resigned itself to complete confession of failure to stop the importation into Germany of what she needed other than absolute contraband, for everything else could have gone through Holland. When accounts are cast up at the end of the war, it may be found that the injury that we were able to do Germany by restricting her commerce no more than counterbalanced the injury that we suffered ourselves, and that we may decide that a commercial blockade is not worth while in the future. That remains to be seen. But having decided to bring economic pressure to bear, the modifications in the law of war as it was most generally accepted were confined within the strictest limits. Until the German Proclamation about foodstuffs in January, no attempt was made to hurt Germany by starving the civil population. Neutral ships were free to enter German ports with cargoes for other than military and Governmental use without hindrance from our fleet. If the ships did not bring everything that a peaceful civilian population might want, the reason was in the cessation of British traffic to Germany and the disappearance of the German merchant marine from the seas.

It was indeed necessary to restrict to some extent the rights of neutral trade, but we were able to come to an amicable arrangement with Holland, and every possible concession was made to the United States of America. It was the blunders and vices of German policy that made it possible for this country to exercise real economic pressure on Germany, not only without offending neutral sentiment, but even with a considerable measure of approval from neutrals. These blunders are the subject of the next chapter.



War time lifebelt drill on board an ocean liner.

[Central News.




Inflating one of the safety collars supplied to the sailors of the British Fleet." [Central News.



The safety collar in position.

[Central News.



A German artist's idea of the sinking of a British merchantman by a German submarine.

[Central News.]

CHAPTER XII.


THE SUBMARINE "BLOCKADE" AND THE LAW.

THE PROCLAMATION OF A "WAR ZONE"—GERMANY'S EXCUSES EXAMINED—THE "LUSITANIA" AND HER FLAG—THE BRITISH REPLY—THE PROTESTS OF THE UNITED STATES—INCIDENTS OF THE "BLOCKADE."


IN the first week of February the German Government issued a Proclamation which will be as famous in history as the Milan Decree of Napoleon. It was in three clauses. By the first, the waters round Great Britain and Ireland, including the English Channel, were declared a military area. "From February 18th every hostile merchant ship in these waters will be destroyed, even though the lives of crews and passengers should thereby be endangered." The second clause warned neutrals that their ships, too, would incur danger in this military area. A third clause left a free passage into the North Sea round by the Shetlands, along the east part of the North Sea, and a belt thirty miles wide along the coast of Holland." Shortly after the issue of this Proclamation an official Memorandum was published explaining the reasons which had driven Germany to these courses. The reasons given for the measures against British merchantmen were (1) the inclusion on the British list of contraband of articles which were not, or at most indirectly, useful for military purposes; (2) the "abolition of the distinction between absolute and conditional contraband, inasmuch as Great Britain has subjected to capture all articles of conditional

contraband intended for Germany without reference to the harbour in which they are to be unloaded or to the hostile or peaceful use to which they are to be put;" (3) the removal from neutral ships of German reservists of military age; (4) the British Proclamation declaring the entire North Sea to be a military area.

Of these reasons, the second, which is much the most important, has been discussed at length in the last chapter. Again, what is loosely described as the closing of the North Sea was forced upon us by the improper sowing of mines away from the main area of operations, off the north coast of Ireland, which nearly destroyed a great American liner crowded with passengers. This was a necessary measure of protection not only of our own but also of neutral interests (Vol. I., page 231). The other two reasons turn on the legal interpretation of some clauses in the Declaration of London, which, though valuable as a guide to the law, was not legally binding, and could therefore legitimately be modified by the Government in these as in other of its provisions. Both on the supposed rights of German reservists to sail in neutral ships and under the nose of the British navy to rejoin the colours and in compiling the lists of contraband



A type of hospital ship for submarines constructed for the German Navy. The ship has a tank in the middle into which the submarine enters as into a floating dock. [Record Press.]



A submarine entering the repair ship.

[Record Press.]

the policy of the British Government had been somewhat hesitating. It was only in consequence of popular agitation that the British Government decided to stop the reservists from joining. As for the lists of contraband, it is undoubtedly true that the British Government in its revised list, published on October 29th, modified the list of the Declaration. Rubber and certain metallic ores which had been put on the free list in the Declaration were put on the list of absolute contraband, and so also were copper and certain mineral oils not specifically mentioned in the Declaration. But the Declaration was an illustration of what would probably be held to be good law, not a contract binding on the Government. Even if the German reasons had all substance, they would be quite inadequate to support the measures of retaliation now announced.

NEUTRALS AND THE BLOCKADE.

The reasons for including neutrals in the dangers of the new blockade were not so succinctly stated, but the principal reason would seem to be that they had acquiesced in the illegal acts of the British Government at sea.

"Especially they had not succeeded in inducing the British Government to restore the German individuals and property seized in violation of international law. In certain directions they had also copied the British measures, which are irreconcilable with the freedom of the sea, in that they have, obviously under the pressure of England, hindered by export and transit embargoes the transit of wares for peaceful purposes to Germany. The German Government has in vain called the attention of neutral Powers to the fact that it must face the question of whether it can any longer persevere in its hitherto strict observance of the rules of the London Declaration if Great Britain were to continue its course and the neutral Powers to acquiesce in these violations of neutrality to the detriment of Germany. For her violations of international law Great Britain pleads the vital interests which the British Empire has at stake, and the neutral Powers seem to satisfy themselves with theoretical protests. Therefore, in fact, they accept the vital interests of belligerents as sufficient excuse for every method of warfare. Germany must now appeal to those same vital interests."

Germany, in fact, made much the same grievance against Holland and the United States for not making their protests effective against what she regarded as England's violations of international law at sea that some Englishmen made against the American President for not protesting at all against German violation of international law in Belgium and elsewhere. As the neutrals had not considered Germany, Germany's position now was that she could not let consideration for neutrals stand in her way. Without actually threatening neutral ships in the military area with the same destruction as British merchantmen, the Memorandum said that it was "advisable" for their ships to avoid entering the military area.


Germany did not decide hastily upon this policy. As early as December 2nd, Admiral von Tirpitz, the German Minister of Marine, outlined the whole policy to an American interviewer. "America," he said, "has not raised her voice in protest, and has taken little or no action against England's closing the North Sea to neutral shipping. What will America say if Germany declares submarine war on all enemy merchant ships? . . . Why not? England wants to starve us! We can play the same game. We can bottle her up and torpedo any British or Allies' ship which uses any harbour in Great Britain, thereby cutting off large food supplier." Nor was Germany the first to think about the possibility of using the

torpedo as a weapon of blockade and commerce destruction. But no one had yet carried thoughts into action, and for reasons which are not far to seek. In the first place, until the improved ocean-going submarine came into existence, there was no reason or opportunity of doing by torpedo what could be done so much more advantageously by gunfire. Secondly, the torpedo is cruel and indiscriminating. It cannot disable like gun-fire; it destroys or misses. It is like a policeman armed with nothing but a rifle, who cannot arrest and take for trial, but can only shoot dead on suspicion. Those who use the torpedo, again, cannot, except under exceptional circumstances, search a vessel and take off non-combatants, but must overwhelm all alike in a common destruction. The use of such a weapon against merchant shipping must, of necessity, be a complete negation of all the laws of war. For the whole theory of the law of capture is that it is a process of execution by an order of a court of justice in accordance with rules and regulations laid down beforehand. The law knows nothing of summary executions except under conditions parallel to those which would justify a policeman in killing a man caught in the act of felony who resisted arrest. Against all non-combatants the law is that the warship can only take such steps in preserving the rules of the sea as a policeman can take in maintaining civil order. The warship may search; if suspicions are confirmed, it can arrest and take for trial; and only after sentence, which carefully distinguishes the various interests, can punishment be inflicted or judgment executed. The submarine can normally do none of these things.


It is true that practice has made certain inroads in the rule of the law of naval capture at sea. The sound old British rule that a captor who could not take his prize for legal adjudication must let her go had been so far relaxed that in the Declaration of London a captor was allowed to sink a captured ship if to take her into port would endanger his safety or the success of the operations on which he was engaged, and Captain von Müller of the *Emden*, and others less humane, had availed themselves of this permission. But there was never any difficulty, for a cruiser, even if it sank the ship, to take the crew and passengers off first; Captain von Müller's practice was to spare every fourth or fifth capture, and send his captives ashore with it. But the submarine had no room aboard for non-combatants. It must be inhumane to do its business at all against merchantmen.

THE LUSITANIA INCIDENT.

Long before the Germans formally announced their intention to torpedo merchantmen, and declared the coasts round these islands to be a military area dangerous to all shipping, their submarines had sunk ships in the Channel, off Havre, and just before their Proclamation there were German submarines in the North Sea which had done damage to shipping, and temporarily interrupted the cross-Channel service to Ireland. The Admiralty seems to have circulated by wireless general instructions or advice to merchantmen to sail under a neutral flag if they were in any danger from submarines; at any rate, the *Lusitania*, which was then due to arrive from New York, was so instructed, and, in fact, she came into Liverpool under the American flag. The instruction was a grave error of judgment. The Germans seemed to have picked up the message, and they clutched at what they called the misuse of the neutral flag as an excuse for warning neutrals away from the proclaimed area. It is not we, they said in effect to neutrals, who are inconveniencing



The famous German submarine U23, photographed by the captain of the British steamer *Headlands* from his vessel just before it was torpedoed off the Scilly Islands. [Central News.]



The wake left by a torpedo as it passes through the water. [Newspaper Illustrations.]

you, but the British, by making an improper use of your flag. The use of false colours is a legitimate strategem of war, and one that the Germans themselves had employed. But there is all the difference in the world between a strategem, the use of which is infrequent, and making a practice of sailing under neutral flags, and the issuing of the order was a singularly unhappy inspiration, and in fact did much to damp down the indignation which the new German policy excited in neutral countries, and especially in the United States. The Admiralty saw quite clearly that the submarine could not make a formal search, at any rate of the large liners, and its idea clearly was to kill the new German policy at the very outset by using the neutral flag to produce such a state of confusion between ships of belligerent and neutral nationality that their character could not be told with certainty without search, which the submarine could not make, or at any rate without an inspection, which would betray its presence. But such a policy, however intelligible, was unfair to neutrals, because it diminished the security of their shipping. The United States protested under such circumstances against the use of their flag, which, it said, would afford no protection to British vessels, while it would be a serious and constant menace to the lives and property of American citizens. It trusted, therefore, that the British Government would do all in its power to discourage the deceptive use of the United States flag. Even more serious than the protests of neutrals, however, was the British dislike of the whole idea, which struck most people as undignified and unworthy of the greatest Naval Power. Much to the general relief the strategem was abandoned, and British ships henceforth sailed under their own flag. That the order was ever issued at all still rankles in many minds.

The protest of the United States Government against the German submarine "blockade" was extremely sharp, and for the first time in the war there was visible a marked difference in the tone of the official communications of the United States as between the two sides in the war. The American Note was indeed regarded in some quarters

as opening up for the first time the prospect of American intervention in the war; and though that was to misunderstand the whole tendency of President Wilson's policy, there is no doubt that in spite of the incident of the *Lusitania's* flag the whole controversy greatly strengthened the position of the Allies' cause amongst neutral nations. The American protest gave an excellent summary of the law, and went on to convey a distinct threat to Germany if her policy should cause loss of American lives or property.

"It is, of course, not necessary to remind the German Government that the sole right of a belligerent dealing with neutral vessels on the high seas is limited to visit and search, unless a blockade is proclaimed and effectively

maintained, which this Government does not understand to be proposed in this case. To declare or exercise the right to attack or destroy any vessel entering the prescribed area of the high seas without first certainly determining its belligerent nationality and the contraband character of its cargo would be an act so unprecedented in naval warfare that this Government is reluctant to believe that the Imperial Government of Germany in this place contemplates it as possible.

"The suspicion that enemy ships were using a neutral flag improperly can create no just presumption that all ships traversing the prescribed area are subject to the same suspicion. It is to determine exactly these questions that this Government understood the right to visit and search to have been recognised.

"If the commanders of German vessels of war should act upon the presumption that the flag of the United States


is not being used in good faith, and should destroy on the high seas American vessels or the lives of American citizens, it would be difficult for the Government of the United States to view the act in any other light than an indefensible violation of neutral rights which it would be very hard indeed to reconcile with the friendly relations now so happily subsisting between the two Governments. If such a deplorable situation should arise, the Imperial German Government can readily appreciate that the Government of the United States would be constrained to hold the Imperial Government to a strict accountability for such acts of their naval authorities, to take any steps which might be necessary to safeguard American lives and property, and to secure to American citizens the full enjoyment of their acknowledged rights on the high seas."



The crew of the *Headlands* being landed at the *Soilly Isles* after their vessel had been sunk by U29. [Topical Press.]



The precautions taken by neutral vessels against the German submarine menace: Painting in large letters the name and nationality of a Danish merchantman on the vessel's hull. [W. Watson, Hull.]



The first British merchantman to establish her claim to having sunk a German submarine: The Thordis in harbour at Saltash after having satisfied the Admiralty inspectors that she had rammed and sunk a submarine off Beachy Head.

[Newspaper Illustrations.]

THE BRITISH REPLY.

The British Government debated long and anxiously what reply should be made to the new German policy. The best reply of all would have been one addressed not by the Government to the world at large, but by the British navy to the submarine. Unfortunately, the Admiralty was not prepared with an effective answer to a danger which it had never considered seriously. And there was some excuse, if not for its general under-estimate of the gravity of the submarine problem, at any rate for its failure to foresee that Germany would carry its disregard of law to such lengths as to start sinking merchantmen at sight. The British Government seemed to be driven to retaliation, but it was not easy to decide what form it should best take. It was unfortunate that we could not retaliate on Germany without trespassing still further on neutral rights. Already we had had one controversy with the United States, friendly in tone, it is true, and one that had been adjusted by mutual consideration, the United States recognising the peculiar difficulties in which we were placed, and we on our side agreeing to accept the formal certificate of the United States Government as conclusive of the character and destination of the cargoes carried in her ships; but it was not possible to foresee how far she would submit to further restrictions on her trade. There was the additional difficulty that whatever we did along these lines would carry us further away from that rule of law at sea to which our Government rightly attached great importance, and might even compromise our character as the natural defender of neutral rights. Already after the German Proclamation nationalising the sale of breadstuffs in Germany, there had been circulated an official hint that it might affect our contraband policy very seriously, but it was necessary to move very cautiously so as not to prejudice our position with neutrals.

While the Cabinet was considering what reply it should make, America had proposed (amongst other things) that in consideration for our agreeing not to place restrictions on the importation of foodstuffs for the civil population of Germany, submarine attacks on merchantmen and the laying of drifting mines should be discontinued. Count Bernstorff, the German Ambassador in America, again, had suggested that Germany would abandon the submarine "blockade" if we would consent to allow food to pass freely through German ports under a guarantee that it should only be used by the civil population. Except in the case of the *Wilhelmina* we had not yet stopped neutral ships carrying foodstuffs for the civil population of Germany, and it was, so far as our belligerent interests were concerned, a very nice calculation whether the prospective risks of the submarine campaign were more or less than the prospective advantage of a further restriction of Germany's supplies, which would, at the least, not increase our popularity with neutrals. A number of people in England, who had no sort of sympathy with Germany, believed on a cool calculation of the gains and losses that an arrangement of some sort—if it could be made without loss of dignity—would on the whole be advantageous to us. If the Cabinet considered this suggestion seriously, the idea must clearly have broken down on the objection to making any sort of bargain with threats of a policy so illegal and inhumane as that of sinking merchantmen at sight. When the Government's decision was announced by Mr. Asquith, on March 1st, it was sufficiently uncompromising. He recited the German violations of international law, and announced that in retaliation for her excesses our policy,

and that of France, henceforth was to prevent commodities of any kind from reaching or leaving Germany. The Government did not propose to proclaim a blockade, because they did not intend their efforts to be strangled in a network of judicial niceties. In other words, what they did they proposed to do by Executive prerogative, and not in execution of the judgment of a Prize Court.

THE ORDER IN COUNCIL.

The Order in Council, however, embodying this policy, issued a fortnight later, showed that in certain important respects the hard outlines of Mr. Asquith's pronouncement had been softened. It began with a recital of Germany's violations of the law of nations in the form of a Preamble, clearly implying that if Germany wished to modify our policy her best chance was to abandon the practices of which it was the consequence. The opening words of the first three clauses of the Order, which give the effect of the Order, are as follows:—

"1. No merchant vessel which sailed from her port of departure after the 1st March, 1915, shall be allowed to proceed on her voyage to any German port.

"2. No merchant vessel which sailed from any German port after the 1st March, 1915, shall be allowed to proceed on her voyage with any goods on board laden at such port.


"3. Every merchant vessel which sailed from her port of departure after the 1st March, 1915, on her way to a port other than a German port, carrying goods with an enemy destination, or which are enemy property, may be required to discharge such goods in a British or Allied port."

A distinction now makes its appearance, which was not in the original statement by Mr. Asquith, between German trade through German ports and through neutral ports. The first "shall" not be allowed to continue; but German trade through neutral ports "may" be diverted to British ports. That distinction at once opens the way to such concessions in practice to neutrals as the occasion may suggest to be prudent or desirable.

In effect, what the Order in Council did was to establish a blockade of German coasts without proclaiming one. The effect of not proclaiming a blockade was to prevent doubtful cases coming before a Prize Court, and to keep the direction of policy in the unfettered discretion of the Executive; on the other hand, the penalties for breach of this *de facto* blockade were much lighter than they normally are of a legally-proclaimed blockade. The usual penalty for a breach of blockade is confiscation of the ship and her cargo. Under the Order one of three things might happen to a ship apprehended on her way to or from a German port. She may be told to discharge her cargo in a British port, where it may be requisitioned for our own use or else restored to the owner by direction of the Prize Court. Or, secondly, the ship may be given a pass to some neutral or Allied port, in which case the cargo is dealt with according to the ordinary uses of trade. Only, thirdly, if the ship after receiving a pass to a neutral port attempts to reach an enemy port is the ship liable to confiscation. The same rule applies to ships intercepted with cargoes for Germany on their way to a neutral port, except that in this case the powers of the Executive are discretionary only. On the whole, the Government solved the difficulty of combining the maximum injury to the enemy with the minimum of injury to neutral trade and neutral rights. The wording of the Order in Council showed signs that the British policy as announced by Mr. Asquith had been pruned to meet the objections of neutrals.



A remarkable photograph taken by one of the survivors from the Falaba. It shows the passengers on deck with their lifebelts. The taker of the photograph was picked up after more than an hour in the sea, and the edges of the photograph have been damaged by salt water. *[Daily Mirror.]*



The submarine which sank the Falaba photographed from the deck of the sinking boat. *[Daily Mirror.]*

THE AMERICAN PROTEST.

The heart had been taken out of neutral objections by the ingenuity of the Government's proposals, by the badness of the German case, and by our obvious intention to relax the strictness of the embargo whenever that could safely be done. None the less, the United States Government sent a protest, somewhat stiffly worded in parts, though friendly in its spirit. The blockade of German ports was accepted; the main objection taken was to the prohibition of German trade by way of neutral ports.

"The novel and quite unprecedented feature of that blockade, if we are to assume it to be properly so defined, is that it embraces many neutral ports and coasts, bars access to them, and subjects all neutral ships seeking to approach them to the same suspicion that would attach to them were they bound for the ports of the enemies of Great Britain and to unusual risks and penalties.

"It is manifest that such limitations, risks, and liabilities placed upon the ships of a neutral Power on the high seas—beyond the right of visit and search and the right to prevent the shipment of contraband already referred to—are a distinct invasion of the sovereign rights of the nation whose ships, trade, or commerce is interfered with."

To this criticism there was no answer possible, except that our measures were in the nature of reprisals for the grave offences of Germany, and that the powers which we were taking were discretionary only, and would not be exercised in a harsh or unreasonable spirit. American opinion, which at first had been markedly hostile, now rapidly quietened down.

INCIDENTS OF THE "BLOCKADE."

A full narrative of the "blockade" must be deferred until later, but notice of some of its earlier incidents may be taken at once before the subject of this chapter is left.

The submarine blockade of British ports, which according to the German press was to be a "milestone in the world's history," began on February 18th. That date found the shipping community in London.

London, little perturbed, and conditions at the great ports unaltered. Scarcely any sailings were cancelled, and even the cross-channel services were not suspended. At the same time, the shipping paper *Syren and Shipping* offered £500 to the first British merchantman that should ram and sink a German submarine, and this was the first of several offers of the kind. The feeling was general that no appreciable damage could be done to a shipping trade averaging some 1,500 sailings a week by submarines operating in a sea area of some 400,000 square miles, and it was soon seen that this feeling was on the whole justified. In the week succeeding February 18th seven British ships were torpedoed by submarines, while 708 ships arrived at British ports and 673 sailed. In the second week Germany not only achieved nothing, but lost a


submarine to the attack of a merchantman. The little steamer *Thordis*, of 501 tons, was attacked off Beachy Head, on February 28th. The torpedo aimed at her passed underneath her, and before a second could be fired her captain put her head for the submarine and rammed and sank it. In his account of the adventure the captain of the *Thordis* said:—

"The submarine crossed the bows and took up a position about thirty or forty yards on the port beam. A few minutes after that I saw the wake of a torpedo on the starboard. All the crew saw it as well. It was like a long, feathery arrow. It was clear that the submarine had fired at us and missed us through the lifting of the boat, and I said to myself, 'As she's sure to have another shot I'd better try and ram her. It's about the only chance. So I called


out to the man at the wheel, 'Hard a' starboard!'

"A minute later—or it may have been two or three minutes, for you don't think much about time when you see a thing is trying to sink you—we closed on the submarine. The bows of my ship and the periscope—which was all we could see—came nearer and nearer together, and I could have touched the periscope with my hand as we went over if I had been on the deck. There were two distinct noises. One was like a slight crash, and then a scraping noise followed. We didn't see the periscope at all again, and some time after there was a quantity of oil on the water in the neighbourhood we had left behind.

"I think we must have sunk the submarine, but I don't believe we got any damage. I can only attribute our escape



Passengers from the *Falaba* clinging to an upturned lifeboat which capsized in launching. [Daily Mirror.]



Lieut. Bell, R.N.R., captain of the *Thordis*, being presented by the Lord Mayor of London with the reward offered to the captain and crew of the first British merchantman to sink a German submarine.

[Topical Press.]

to the fact that owing to the heavy seas we lifted at the moment the torpedo was discharged, so that it passed under us, and also that the submarine treated us with contempt, as it were, and never thought we would be likely to turn and run her down. This ship pitches pretty heavily in a rough sea, and that might easily account for the torpedo missing us when it might strike a big vessel."

In the following weeks the submarines succeeded in doing more damage, but nothing commensurate with German expectations. The first six months of the blockade resulted in thirty-one British vessels being sunk or captured by submarines or cruisers, out of a total of 8,960 ships of all nationalities sailing and arriving.

The progress of the blockade made it amply clear that the German warning to neutral ships was no idle one. Norwegian, Dutch, and Danish vessels bound for British ports suffered the same fate as British merchantmen, though as a rule more care was taken in their case to allow sufficient time for the crews to take to the boats. The conduct of the submarine commanders in this respect differed widely, ranging from observance, in some cases, of all possible courtesies of war to the most shameless inhumanity in others. One outrage in particular which greatly damaged German prestige in neutral eyes was the sinking of s.s. *Falaba*, on March 28th. The *Falaba*, a 4,806-ton liner of the Elder Dempster Line, carrying 160 passengers, was hailed by a submarine, which after a chase closed with her, and gave her crew five minutes to take to the boats. The respite was impossibly short, and was rendered quite valueless by an accident to one

of the boats. Before the passengers could be got off, a torpedo was fired, and the vessel sank with many still on board. The conduct of the submarine was the more barbarous since there was in the offing a trawler, which, had it been allowed to come alongside, could easily have taken off the *Falaba's* crew and passengers. The savagery which characterised the crew of this particular submarine was further shown by the fact, for which there are many witnesses, that appeals for help from those in the water were greeted by them with laughter and taunts.

The Yeoward line steamer *Aguila*, again, was pursued by the *U28* on March 27th, off the Pembrokeshire coast, and her determined attempt to escape seems to have infuriated her pursuers. Her crew were given four minutes to get into her boats, and before they could do so the submarine opened fire, killing several members of the crew.

A much better spirit was shown in many cases. The crew of the *U29*, for instance, which was active off the Scillies for some days, treated their victims with consideration. The case of the *Adenwen*, torpedoed by the *U29*, twenty-five miles N.N.W. of the Casquets, was typical.

"The captain asked the commander of the submarine to spare his ship, but the commander replied that as war was war he was unable to accede to the request, adding, 'I am very, very sorry to have to sink your ship.' The captain was allowed ten minutes to launch lifeboats, as the commander of the submarine said: 'We wish that no lives should be lost.' Two lifeboats were lowered. One sailor either fell or jumped overboard, and the commander of the submarine,

noticing this, sent a suit of dry clothes for him. Four German sailors boarded the *Adenwen* and took the ensign and other flags as souvenirs. The submarine took the two lifeboats in tow, but subsequently fell in with the Norwegian steamer *Bognia*. The Germans gave the British a box of cigars, and made enquiries as to their supplies of food."

Although the *Thordis* was the only ship whose claim to have rammed a submarine was considered proven, the enemy's tactics were frequently baulked by manœuvring on the part of merchant captains, and several ships showed their pursuers a clean pair of heels, or steered

so cleverly erratic a course as to make torpedoing impossible. Meanwhile cruisers and destroyers were accounting for a certain number of the blockaders. The *U8* was sunk off Dover on March 5th, H.M.S. *Ariel* accounted for the *U12* on March 10th, and the *U29*, one of the largest of her class, with a speed of over eighteen knots on the surface and twelve submerged, was sunk on March 25th. Proportionate to the total size of her submarine fleet these were considerable losses, and they were in no way compensated for by the measure of success that attended the attempted blockade

EU




The explosion of a submarine mine.

[Universal Photo Exchange.]




Cairo : The citadel and mosque of Mohammed Ali, seen from the Arab village.

[E.N.A.]



Cairo : Allée de Ghoubrah.

[E.N.A.]



General Sir John Maxwell (at the back of the car and second from the right of the photograph), in command of the troops in Egypt, motoring through one of the camps.

[L.N.I.]

CHAPTER XIII.


THE ATTACK ON THE SUEZ CANAL

THE PROBLEM OF DEFENCE IN EGYPT—THE BRITISH FORCES—THE PLAN ADOPTED—THE TASK BEFORE THE TURKS—THE SCHEME OF ATTACK—ATTEMPT TO CROSS THE CANAL—REPULSE OF THE ATTACK—THE TURKS ALLOWED TO RETREAT—REASONS FOR BRITISH POLICY.

THE Turkish attack on Egypt, and the possibility of its renewal, were something of an embarrassment to England. One of the objects of Germany in drawing Turkey into the war had been to threaten Egypt and the Suez Canal—the main highway of communication with the British Empire in the East. Probably the Germans were not hopeful that Turkey would be able to reconquer Egypt, although they may have counted on the possibility of assistance from the natives both in Egypt and in the Sudan. But at any rate it was certain that England would take no risks in Egypt, and that she would assemble and maintain there a force which would be capable of dealing with any attack which the Turks could make. So much the better, they calculated, for their cause in Europe. For England, on the other hand, the problem was how to make Egypt safe without weakening her position in France and Belgium more than could be helped. Ill-organised as the British Empire was for a great Continental war, it was able not only to meet the demands made on it in Egypt, but also to turn the means adopted to profit in the main ends of the war.

England had, at the beginning of the campaign, a considerable number of troops who were excellent military material, but they were at this time deficient in training

and wholly lacking, individuals apart, in experience in actual warfare. Among these were the East Lancashire Territorial Division, under General Douglas, which had volunteered as a unit for foreign service, and the Australian and New Zealand contingents, which were disembarked and kept in Egypt while on their voyage to England. The Lancashire men were admirable citizen soldiers, and required only a few months of hard work and combined training; and this they obtained in active preparations to meet the Turkish attack and in performing all the varied duties of the regular Army of Occupation whose place they had taken. The Australian and New Zealand forces were characteristic products of their countries; men of fine physique, full of vigour and individuality; a little averse at first, so far as a minority were concerned, from the fetters of discipline; full of the exuberance of a young people, and affluent with a prosperity which gladdened the entertainment vendors of Cairo. There were Indian and native troops, too, among the defence forces, and Egypt, perhaps, among the many strange sights that she has seen, has known little stranger than this mingled army of Sikhs and Punjaubis, Australians and New Zealanders, Lancashire business men, miners and cotton operatives, who were now to defend the Suez Canal against an army




Allied warships at the entrance to the Suez Canal.

[Newspaper Illustrations.]



A British camp on the Turkish side of the Suez canal, showing the soldiers bathing from a barge.

[Alfredi Picture Service.]



Egypt and its Eastern Frontiers.

of Turks and Arabs tutored by German officers in a Holy War against the infidel. These Lancashire Territorials were responsible for a curious canard which sprang up in Egypt in the autumn, and was reproduced in the German press. Whether it was a spontaneous rumour among the population of Cairo, or whether it was set on foot by German agents, is not known: but when the Territorials in their khaki paraded through Cairo, the report ran that the "citizen soldiers" were civilians dressed up in uniforms in order to impress the people with the power of Great Britain.

CHARACTER OF THE CANAL.

Towards the end of the year it became known that the Turks were collecting a large army in Palestine to the south of Jerusalem. Between sixty and seventy thousand men, it was said, were gathered under Djemal Pasha. There was never any doubt that the Turks could accumulate a large army to attack Egypt; the question was how many men and guns they could transport across 120 miles of desert and carry back again in safety if the invasion were defeated. There was only a comparatively small part of the Canal where they could hope to force a passage, and there were only three routes by which they could get there. The northern road, running along the coast by way of El Arish, was at certain points exposed to attack from the sea; it crossed the Canal at El Kantara, and the greater part of the country on the east bank of the Canal between Port Said and Kantara had been inundated as a defensive measure. South of Kantara lies Lake Ballah and then the principal cutting of the Canal, at the southern end of which stands Ismailia—the headquarters of the Canal

Company, and the point at which the central road over the Sinai Desert touches the Canal. This is the road that runs to the ancient Beersheba, Hebron, and Jerusalem. Beyond Ismailia lie Lake Timsah and the Bitter Lakes, with a narrow stretch of ground between them; and there is a last section between the southern extremity of the Bitter Lakes and Suez which is crossed by the third road—150 miles long—leading to Akaba. Of these three roads the central is worst supplied with water, although, as it happened, there had been during the winter months a greater rainfall than for several years past.

The Turks had to choose by which of the roads they would make their advance. Towards the end of January their advance parties were discovered to be approaching the Canal, and there were some skirmishes both near Suez and at El Kantara—preliminary movements which were directed against these two points in the hope of persuading the defence that the main attack was to be delivered there. In point of fact, Djemal intended to make his main effort along the central road, and to cross the Canal between Lake Timsah and the Bitter Lakes. No attempt was made by the defending forces, of which Sir John Maxwell was in chief command, to oppose the Turks on the eastern side of the Canal. The plan adopted, which arose from the character of the British forces at our disposal in Egypt, and the necessity of husbanding our military resources with a view to keeping the army in France at its maximum strength, was to take the fullest advantage of the natural obstacle of the desert and the artificial barrier of the Canal, and to run no risks. Prudence was the watchword. The extent and the waterless character of the desert were relied on—and, as it



A scene on the Suez Canal.

[E.N.A.]



Alexandria: The Mahmoudieh Canal.

[E.N.A.]

proved, justly—to prevent the Turks from coming in really dangerous strength; and the Canal was to be called in aid as a defensive line in order to drive the attacking army back into the desert, where it would be left to withdraw to the country whence it came, unless it chose rashly to renew its enterprise.

REASONS FOR DJEMAL'S CHOICE.

There were good reasons why Djemal should make his general attack south of Lake Timsah. The railway which joins Port Said, Cairo, and Suez runs to Ismailia from the east, and then turns and runs north and south beside the Canal. An enemy crossing the Canal south of Lake Timsah would find himself within a few miles of the railway, and, turning north, he would be within striking distance of Nefishe—the railway junction from which the lines spring north and south to Port Said and Suez. There were, too, from the Turkish standpoint, some slight natural advantages about the Canal at this point. About eight miles south of Ismailia lies the Canal "Station" of Tussum, and three miles beyond that is Serapeum, both on the western bank. On the eastern side of the Canal, between Tussum and Serapeum, the ground is uneven and covered with scrub for a distance of about seven miles, when there begins a low line of hills—the kind of country in which an attacking force might find useful cover. Besides this, for a short distance the Canal bank is comparatively low and sloping, which was likely to help the Turks in launching their pontoons and rafts, while on the opposite side of the Canal, also, there were points at which the bank was less steep and formidable than elsewhere. All these reasons have been mentioned by people on the spot as likely to have influenced Djemal in choosing this area for his attack, and it is therefore scarcely possible for anyone to say that his selection was not anticipated by those in charge of the defence. It was, of course, impossible, if a considerable army was spread over the course of the Canal by night from the Bitter Lakes right up to El Kantara, that the precise objective of the main advance should be discerned beforehand with certainty, but equally it cannot be supposed that the attack on the section between Tussum and Serapeum came in any sense as a surprise to the defence.

By February 1st, Djemal and his army, whose strength was variously estimated at from 15,000 to 25,000 men, had arrived within about ten miles of the Canal, and an entrenched camp had been formed due east of Tussum. His troops belonged in the main to the Damascus Division


of the Eighth Army Corps; there were with them some from the Adrianople Corps. Djemal's general plan was to attack on the night of February 2-3, and, in his own words, "seize the Canal." That he really hoped, with the comparatively small army at his disposal, to establish himself west of the Canal, defeat the British forces, and regain Egypt for the Sultan of Turkey it is difficult to believe. If he had any such idea it can only have been because he had no conception of the strength of the defending troops, a supposition which is incredible in view of the time that they had been there and the possibility of communication between Egypt and Turkey. He may, of course, have thought that he would get assistance from the native population of Egypt, but that again was necessarily a matter of conjecture on which no prudent leader would have placed the slightest dependence. His action would have been intelligible

had he been supported by a larger army coming up behind, which would have used the foothold across the Canal gained by him to undertake a serious attack on the British forces. There was, however, no such army in reserve. But if it was not a serious attempt to capture the Canal and regain Egypt, then it was only a reconnaissance in force, and this was what Djemal and his Turkish colleagues always declared it to be after their defeat. It is, however, a remarkable reconnaissance which goes out with ten or twenty thousand men to attack and to break through a strong position heavily defended, and it is scarcely to be supposed that the Turks intended to take positions on the western bank of the Canal with the intention forthwith of abandoning them and withdrawing their armies. It seems likely that the Turks came with as large a force as the difficulties of the desert permitted them to transport, and with the intention


of doing what damage they could and extricating themselves as best they might. In any case it was a reckless and even desperate adventure, and only the peculiar military situation of Great Britain saved it from utter disaster.

THE TURKISH PLAN.

Djemal's plan was to attack with the main body—the Seventy-fourth and Seventy-fifth Regiments—between Tussum and Serapeum, while threatening the Canal at other points both north and south. On his right wing one detachment was to attack El Kantara; another—the Sixty-eighth Regiment—was to move against El Ferdan, just to the north of Ismailia, and Ismailia itself. On the left flank an attack was to be made on Suez and



The latest and official portrait, taken after his accession, of Sultan Hussein of Egypt.
[Anglo-Swiss Studio, Cairo.]




The Australian troops encamped near the Pyramids build a suspension bridge over an irrigation canal.

[Topical Press.]



New Zealand field artillery returning to camp from the desert.

[Topical Press.]



Unloading food supplies at the New Zealanders' camp.

[Topical Press.]

the Canal to the north of it. By these means Djemal hoped to keep the defenders in uncertainty as to the point at which danger really threatened, so that they would be unable to reinforce their troops near Tussum; his movement on Ismailia was intended also to prevent the British from moving out to deliver a counter-attack against his flank. Among the troops detailed for the crossing of the Canal were the Champions of Islam, the chosen warriors from Tripoli. Djemal made his preparations also to deal with the warships, both British and French, whose guns he knew to be an important part of the defences of the Canal. He therefore sent his heavy artillery (two 6-in. guns) to stations lying east and south-east of Lake Timsah, with instructions to destroy the warships on the lake, and, if possible, to sink a ship at the southern entrance to the lake, so as to prevent any interference with the bridging operations. Having cleared Lake Timsah, the guns were to move south at once and perform a similar service at the Great Bitter Lake.


There can be no doubt, from the terms of the orders which Djemal issued to his army on February 1st, that he had hopes of crossing the canal by stealth and unopposed. "All the detachments of the enemy," he said, "have been pushed back to the western bank of the Canal. A part of the eastern bank of the Canal, between Ismailia and the large Bitter Lake, is occupied by a few sentries of the enemy." Accordingly, he gave elaborate instructions to his troops that during the advance of the last two days—February 1st and 2nd—nothing should be done which could possibly attract the attention of the British. Commands were not to be issued in a loud voice. Coughing was forbidden. There must be no cigarette smoking. Entrenching tools and water flasks were to be carefully tied so that they would not rattle. The parties sent forward to the Canal must carry their rifles unloaded so long as they were on the eastern bank, and examination was to be made and repeated to make sure that the order had not been evaded. When the crossing had been made, rifles were only to be loaded on officers' orders. Soldiers were to be told off specially to man the pontoons and rafts which were carried with

the expedition, and they were strictly warned that they must embark and disembark with speed and noiselessness. All the officers and men engaged in the night attack were to wear a white band on the upper part of their arms as a distinguishing mark. The password was to be the "Sacred Standard," and "if the detachments which cross the Canal meet the enemy in the vicinity of the Canal they are to attack and disperse him." So little, apparently, did Djemal expect to find the canal held strongly in this section. The advance troops carried with them a number of rafts (kerosene tins joined together in threes, with a wooden framework) and twenty-four pontoons, which had been dragged across the desert on trucks, or sometimes hauled with ropes along the sand.

Each of them was now carried, during the last stage of the advance, by eighteen men. The pontoons were made of galvanised iron, about six metres long by one and a half broad, and could accommodate between thirty and forty men. And so, at six p.m. on February 2nd, the attacking force moved down towards the Canal—the bridging parties first, with a brigade in support. The main body waited in the camp. To the north the flanking parties were working towards the Ismailia Ferry and El Kantara.


THE NIGHT ATTACK.

The bank of the Canal between Tussum and Serapeum was held by the Twenty-second Indian Brigade. The main positions were behind the western bank, where




The Section of the Canal attacked by the Turks.

the defence was for some distance made easier by a belt of fir trees; on the opposite bank, however, there were the Tussum and Serapeum advanced posts, which threatened danger to the advancing enemy. About three o'clock in the morning of February 3rd the Turks came down to the edge of the water and began to launch their pontoons. Prisoners stated afterwards that they heard no sound on the Egyptian side except the barking of an occasional dog; but the Turks did not themselves carry out Djemal's orders for complete silence, and their presence was first betrayed by the voices of officers giving orders and by the exhortations to each other of the Champions of Islam. Fire was immediately opened from machine guns and rifles on the bridging parties. Five



Seven hundred Turkish prisoners, taken at the attack on the Suez Canal, in the barracks square at Kasr-el-Nil under a guard of Lancashire Fusiliers. [Topical Press.]



One of the Turkish pontoons left behind in their flight from the Suez Canal.

[Sport and General.]

pontoons had been launched, and of these three were immediately sunk. Two succeeded in getting across the Canal, and the soldiers in them endeavoured to climb the western bank. The whole of one boatload were shot down and thrown back into the water; of the other, a few men succeeded in getting to land, where they hastily dug a shallow trench, partly with their bare hands, in order to obtain shelter. Only four men were left by the morning, and they were quickly seized. Active assistance was given in repelling the attack by a torpedo boat, which, having discovered the presence of the Turks south of Tussum, dashed in between the opposing fires and shelled their trenches.

By half-past three a hot engagement had developed. One Turkish detachment moved towards the advanced Serapeum post, while another attacked that at Tussum, and the troops in the centre quickly entrenched themselves, while more pontoons and rafts were brought up, and the bridging parties continued their efforts to span the Canal. Mr. W. T. Massey, who visited the scene of the fighting a few days later, thus describes the final repulse of the attack:—

"Only a few of the boats were launched. These were recovered, with many bodies in them, while beneath the pontoons on the bank were dead men, crushed to death when some of the carriers had been mown down by fire, causing the boats to fall. During the hours of darkness rifle and machine gun fire prevented any progress being made with the bridge. Indeed, the first minutes of the engagement

must have made it clear that there was not the remotest chance of communication being effected with the other side, and the concentrated fire on the Anatolian engineers and their supports would have convinced most troops that they must retire. However, they came again and again to their task, and it was not till the first shafts of light in the sky behind them made them good targets that they gave up.

"From almost the whole of the enemy's brigade heavy firing continued, but more than 10,000 Turks massed in a deep depression near the Canal did not come into action. Four field guns—18-pounders—were in action in this hollow, and other field guns and two 15-centimetre guns were in rapidly-made emplacements two miles north-east of Tussum. The Turks adopted the German method of

artillery practice, and subjected the ground between Tussum and Serapeum to a searching fire, but although the direction was good the ranging was indifferent, and the majority of the shells fell well over the camps. Shell fire did small damage, though the marks of shrapnel bullets were plentiful.

"As soon as the enemy's positions could be made out we poured in a hot cross-fire from two batteries cleverly concealed two miles apart, their shells continually raking the trenches and giving infinite trouble, not merely to the Turks dug in on the bank, but to the infantry supporting. The effect of the fire was signalled from an observation post fixed in the topmost branches of a slender tree, which bent under an officer's weight. The gunners have been warmly commended by the officers who watched their work. Under the gun fire most of the enemy's infantry were driven to retire to the shelter given by the uneven, sandy ground behind the scrub.

"Meanwhile, some of the troops occupying the Tussum post moved to a position where they could pour a heavy enfilading fire into some of the Turkish trenches, and they killed and wounded scores before the remainder surrendered. By this time it was obvious the attack had failed completely, and that the enemy must retire.


"The enemy had to try to do something to extricate the remainder of the bridging party and supports, and accordingly made a pretence of attacking the Serapeum post to cover the retirement. The defenders of this post were ready, too, and the Turks, who could not get within three-quarters of a mile of the advance line, never pressed home their attack. During this part of the operations the artillery again gave valuable support by a well-directed fire.

"The British made a counter-attack, going out to a ridge commanding the ground on which most of the enemy were massed, and compelling them to retire hurriedly across the rolling, stony plain to the hills. They were afterwards seen to move off in a south-easterly direction, but some came back

during the night and carried off many of their dead."

DEMONSTRATIONS ON THE TURKISH RIGHT.

The Turkish attack at the other points of the front did not develop until somewhat later in the morning. At Kantara it was about six a.m. before the Turkish flanking party—some 3,000 strong—was discovered approaching the British advanced positions, which here also were held by Indian troops. The attack had scarcely even the value of a serious demonstration. The Turks discovered that the position at Kantara was strongly entrenched and amply provided with a formidable



Australian cavalry riding through the streets of Cairo.

[Central News.]



Lancashire Territorials marching the Turkish prisoners taken during the fighting on the Suez Canal to a detention camp on the outskirts of Cairo. *[Newspaper Illustrations.]*



Lancashire Territorials digging trenches in the desert.



The trenches almost completed.

system of wire entanglements, and after what amounted to little more than an outpost action they withdrew. In front of the Ismailia Ferry, where they moved up a force estimated at 4,000 men, they did not approach within closer range than about one thousand yards of the British outposts. At Lake Timsah their 6-in. guns produced a greater liveliness. Near the southern entrance to the lake a gunboat was hit, and the Indian transport *Hardinge* was struck by two shells. One of them, hitting the fore funnel, completely shattered the leg and broke one arm of Temporary-Lieutenant Carew, of the Naval Reserve, who was acting as pilot; and it was afterwards recorded as one of the most gallant actions of the day that "he continued to advise on the piloting of the ship with coolness and equanimity," for which he received the Distinguished Service Cross.


By mid-day it had become clear that the attack on the Canal had failed. Most of the bridging material which the Turks had with them had been destroyed. Their entrenched positions between Tussum and Serapeum were becoming untenable. Their guns had been well served, but they had too few of them. By three o'clock in the afternoon they were in retreat towards their entrenched camp. It remained to be seen whether they would make a renewed attempt on the following day, or whether the British would be able to push home their success and prevent the enemy's escape.

THE LAST STAND.

During the late afternoon and the night of the 3rd some scattered firing took place from the trenches which had been held by the Turkish advanced parties, and the next morning it was discovered that some hundreds of Turks had not joined in the general retirement. A British warship was brought to shell them out, and Indian infantry was moved up to the attack. Some confusion took place among the Turks, part of whom were apparently anxious to surrender, while others continued their resistance, but eventually the whole body was dis-

posed of. It was here that the body of Major von den Hagen was discovered, and among his equipment was a white flag, the purpose of which has been much discussed. Unless it was intended merely for signalling purposes it must have been designed for use in case of surrender—surely the last refinement of warlike preparation—or as a means of treachery. But it seems never to have been put to actual use of any kind, and the dead may therefore have the benefit of such a doubt.

With the destruction of this last party of Turks the fighting came to an end. The British losses, all told, were only 110 killed and wounded. On the Turkish side 600 prisoners were taken, and in all the Turks probably lost more than 3,000 men. The greater part of their army, however, they succeeded in withdrawing unhampered to Palestine, and many reasons were afterwards offered why no serious effort was made to pursue and destroy them. It was said that until the Turkish detachment near Tussum had been ejected from its entrenchments on the 4th, it was impossible for the British force to move either from Ismailia or from Serapeum and attack the Turkish camp. On the other hand, it is not disputed that the British were in greatly superior strength, so that there was no lack of men for the pursuit, and aeroplane reconnaissance must have made it known that no serious attack was impending at this time at any other section of the Canal. For the same reason it is scarcely possible to suppose that comparative weakness in mounted men deterred the British from the pursuit, nor, as has already been said, is it conceivable that the Turkish attack near Tussum had not been anticipated long before. The fact seems to have been that the British had from the first determined on their settled policy for the defence of the Canal, and that they intended, while repulsing all attacks, to resist every temptation themselves to take the offensive and carry the war into the desert. The history of desert warfare, of which the British have had many and sometimes bitter experiences, shows that it makes heavy demands on even the most experienced troops, and it may have been



What the Turks had to cross in order to attack the Suez Canal: Typical desert land on the eastern side of the Canal.

[Topical Press.]

thought desirable not to allow forces who had had so little experience of any kind of warfare to become entangled in desert operations with an enemy who, whatever his defects, had come across one hundred miles of desert with a considerable force, was armed with more guns than had been expected, and was very formidable for his military qualities.

A SETTLED POLICY OF CAUTION.

The view that a settled policy of caution accounts almost wholly for the unhampered withdrawal of the Turks is borne out by all the other incidents which took place on the Canal during the winter months. In no instance does there seem to have been any serious design to pursue and cut off the enemy. Thus, towards the end of March a party of about a thousand Turks approached the southern end of the Canal, opposite Suez. They were driven off by British artillery fire on March 22nd, and encamped about eight miles east of the Canal. On the following day Sir George Younghusband marched from Suez, attacked and routed them; but afterwards they made good their retreat. This decision to allow the Turks to break themselves against the defences of the Canal, but not to run the hazard of manœuvres in the desert, may have been inconsistent with the rule which enjoins that the enemy should be relentlessly pursued when his attack has been broken; but it was justified by the special circumstances of the time and place, and it was eminently characteristic of a nation which was feeling its way through a great war, improvising new armies, and not only fitting them for their tasks but, in Egypt at least, fitting their tasks to them.


The repulse of the Turks was largely the work of the Indian troops. There were also in the action two companies of the Canterbury battalion of the New Zealand force, the 19th Battery of the East Lancashire Territorial Artillery—Bolton men, who had four or five wounded among them—and the Fifth Battery of Egyptian Artillery; the captain of the Egyptian battery afterwards received the Military Cross for his services, and the same honour was awarded to a member of the native Medical Corps attached to the battery. The vigour and decision with which the attack was driven back were as creditable to the troops engaged as were the measures taken for the defence of the Canal to the staff who settled them. Criticism of the handling of the situation after the retirement began falls to the ground, of course, if the explanation is that which has been suggested. The precise objects of the Turkish enterprise must remain a mystery. It was certainly a mad adventure, which escaped with much less punishment than it deserved, and it was foredoomed to failure. But it would be unfair not to admit that the Turks did much better than was expected of them: that they transported guns, pontoons and water supply for a large force over the desert without difficulty, laid their plans with some skill, fought a stubborn action under most difficult conditions, and carried their guns, their wounded, and the bulk of their army back to Palestine and safety. If, as Djemal Pasha said, he had conducted a reconnaissance, it should certainly have been an instructive one. He must have learnt not a little about the difficulties of the desert and how to overcome them, and certainly he had discovered much about the strength of the defences of the Suez Canal.

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
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


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A view of the Alsace.

[E.N.A.]

CHAPTER XIV.

THE GREAT FRENCH RECOVERY.

THE CAMPAIGN ON THE EAST FRONT AND ITS IMPORTANCE—THE OPERATIONS ROUND NANCY—A GREAT RECOVERY—GENERAL JOFFRE AS ARMY REFORMER—SWEEPING CHANGES—THE PROBLEM OF MUNITIONS IN FRANCE—THE CHARACTER OF GENERAL JOFFRE.

THE popular view in England of the Western operations tended, at any rate in the first few months of the war, to do much less than justice to the French. Over the greater part of the front a close veil was dropped, which was not lifted until after Christmas, and the only part of the campaign about which there was a regular, if somewhat scanty, supply of information was the extreme west wing, in which the British army was conspicuous. Seeing in this section of the front the British army acting decisively at each of the turning points of the war, it was natural perhaps that the uninstructed in this country should mistake the part for the whole, and even speak as though the British army was carrying on its shoulders the main burden of defending France. This false and, to the French, most unfair view was encouraged by the prevailing ignorance about the size of the British army. The popular guesses at its numbers were all widely in excess of the truth. At Mons there were not more than 50,000 British in the fighting line, and at no time before the spring did our effectives much exceed 150,000 men. In numbers, therefore, our army was never more than a very small fraction of the total forces engaged, and it says much for its quality that the fraction should have had so considerable an influence in the opening months of the war. The British Expeditionary Force was undoubtedly the highest-trained and in some ways the best-equipped of all the armies engaged in France and Belgium; but it was after all only a section of one wing, and that, numerically, not the strongest wing. It did not save France. The French, helped by the British, saved France.

Attention has been drawn from time to time (Vol. I., p. 117 and p. 384) to the importance of the operations

on the eastern front. The early operations in Alsace, designed to hamper the German turning movement through Belgium, not only failed in that object, but were so incompetently conducted that the general was relieved of his command. A fresh beginning was made on August 14th, under General Pau, but in the meantime the French had suffered their severe defeat at Morhange, in Lorraine, and on August 28th the Alsace army was broken up and reduced to a mere garrison holding the region of Thann and the Vosges. The defeat in Lorraine was the first indication that there was something seriously wrong with the French army. It took place on August 22nd, two days before the defeat at Charleroi, which led to the retreat from Mons; and while the Anglo-French army was falling back in Northern France before the Germans advancing from Belgium, the Eastern French Armies were in difficulties that at one time were even more serious. The Northern Army, broken at Charleroi, could still retire south provided the Germans did not get round its left wing, where the British were stationed. But had these eastern defences broken down nothing could have saved it. The Germans would have been round on its line of retreat, Paris must have fallen, and the main French army would have been surrounded. The Germans, in fact, planned a double encircling movement, one by the north and west, the other by the south-east. That the first movement failed was due to the stubbornness of the British army, and to the skilful application in the strategy of General Joffre of the doctrine of "detached reserves." (Vol. I., p. 145.) That the easterly envelopment failed was due to the army of Nancy, and to the ability of General Castelnau. And the achievement on this eastern front was the more remarkable because the army which



A postal waggon delivering the mails at a French artillery camp.

[Central News.



A French artillery camp in the Woevre.

[Central News.

accomplished it began with a bad defeat—probably the worst suffered by France in the war. The merits of the French recovery on the west have been generally recognised, and our national vanity has not been slow to assign even more than its due share of the credit to the presence there of the British army. But the recovery in the east was quite as remarkable, and these operations, whose merits have been very imperfectly understood as yet in England, are the subject of the first part of this chapter.

THE INVASION OF FRENCH LORRAINE.

The retreat from the defeat in Lorraine was covered by the Twentieth French Army Corps, which did the same service as the British army did in the west after the defeat of Charleroi, and at enormous cost to itself. It is not the German way ever to remain content with the repulse of an attack, and after the retirement of the French from Lorraine the victors invaded France in four columns. One column advanced southwards from Metz, along the valleys of the Moselle and the Seille; a second and stronger column came from Saverne—better known in England as Zabern (name of evil reputation)—through Chateau Salins. Both these columns were directed against Nancy. The two other columns started from Strassburg; one crossed the frontier near Blamont, and moved on Lunéville, and the other crossed the Vosges and penetrated into France through St. Dié, and besieged or rather blockaded Epinal. At no time was Epinal in any danger, though in the early spring of 1915 it was still, like Belfort, in a "technical" state of siege. The danger came from the operations of the first three columns against Nancy and Lunéville.

THE GREAT CROWN OF NANCY.

After the war of 1870, France was forbidden to build fortifications within a certain distance of the frontier for a period of forty years, and Nancy came within this prohibition. Two or three years ago, this period having then expired, the French began to fortify the heights round the town, and the outbreak of war found these works just approaching completion. They made a great semi-circle round the east side of the city of an average radius from its centre of some twelve miles. On the north side the arc began near Mont Sainte Geneviève, sixteen miles from the city; it curved through the Forest of Champenoux across the Plateau d'Amance, overlooking at a height of 1,200 feet the plain over which the French armies came back after their defeat at Morhange, and thence continued to Dombasle, about ten miles south-east of Nancy. This semi-circle of hills was known as the Grand Couronne of Nancy, on which it is the boast of the French Army of the East that no German ever set foot in this war.

The German invaders advanced with great rapidity. Lunéville was occupied on August 22nd. A detachment crossed the Meurthe and pushed towards Mirecourt, but the main body turned north and attacked the Grand Couronne at the height of Le Rembêtant, near Dombasle. The other columns attacked the Couronne from the north side. Le Rembêtant suffered badly from the German artillery fire, but at no point did the attack make any impression. The defence of the Plateau d'Amance was particularly skillful, and the heavy guns were so well concealed on the summit that they were never located in the course of a long and terrific bombardment by big guns brought up from Metz, and their fire was never subdued. The losses of the infantry in the attacks were extremely heavy, and have been put as high as 20,000 in the Amance

district alone, and most of them fell on the Bavarian regiments. After the repulse of the infantry attacks, General Castelnau made a counter-attack from the plateau, and drove back the eastern columns through the Forest of Champenoux, across the Seille. The southern column had to fall back on Lunéville.

The attacks were renewed in the beginning of September, but with no better success, in spite of an attempt on September 6th by the White Cuirassiers of the Imperial Guard to storm Amance. On September 11th, the French advanced and took the village of Champenoux, which lies on the far side of the forest of that name, and on the following day Lunéville, which had been held by the Germans for nearly a month, was evacuated. Nancy was safe; and not only Nancy, but Paris, for the battle of the Marne had now been fought and won. Yet even the Marne would not have relieved Paris of all danger had Nancy fallen. For there would still have been nothing to prevent the Germans from pushing through the Gap of Mirecourt and attacking Paris from the south-east. Moreover, had the Germans appeared on this side, the whole strategy of the French would have been hopelessly compromised. No wonder that General Joffre's instructions to General Castelnau were to hold the Grand Couronne at all costs. Yet in the first few days of the war there had been talk of evacuating Nancy, and a semi-official statement was put out that a German occupation of the town need cause no alarm, as it would have no importance. It is hardly conceivable that such a statement should have been put out on military authority, and it almost looks as though its inspiration were the desire on the part of commercial interests to save themselves against prospective loss should the city be the centre of military operations.

Nancy had been an "open town" for a generation, and there may have been those who desired that it should remain so even if the Grand Couronne had to be sacrificed. But whatever backing such a policy may have had elsewhere, it had none in Nancy itself. The city authorities and the people of the town were most anxious that it should be defended to the last. In this respect, Nancy contrasts most favourably with Lille. At Lille "the Mayor and other civil authorities strongly opposed General Percin's efforts to defend the town, telegraphed to Paris demanding that he should be ordered to stop the measures of defence, and finally succeeded in getting him withdrawn, and Lille declared an open town."* The circumstances, however, it is but fair to remember, were not quite the same in the two cases. Lille lends itself very well to defence, but its old fortifications had been dismantled, whereas Nancy had just been equipped before the war with an excellent system of defence works. Still, an obstinate defence of Lille, though it might not have arrested the German advance on Paris, would certainly have increased its difficulties, and the town would not have suffered much more than it actually did under the German occupation.

GERBÉVILLER.

Few details of the fighting round Lunéville and across the Meurthe have reached this country, but it is known to have been very severe. Near Gerbéviller an exceedingly promising French attack was most tragically ruined by the fire of its own artillery—unhappily not the only instance in this war. The Germans were strongly entrenched on high ground, near the Mortagne river, on the road to Lunéville. There were three lines of trenches—

* The Paris Correspondent of the *Manchester Guardian*, March 22, 1915.



German soldiers in the woods on the banks of the Aisne.

[Central News.]



German prisoners being marched through a ruined French village.

[Topical Press.]

the first one hundred yards in advance of the road, the second on the road, and the third at the edge of a wood which backs the road. The wood itself was full of trenches and dug-outs.

"The 222d Reserve Regiment attacked this terrible position in a dense fog, having crossed the river by the footbridge during the night. It was arranged that the heavy French guns on the other side of the Mortagne should support the assault by bombarding the wood. The regiment, leaving two companies in reserve, crept up, covered by the fog, and carried the first German trench with a rush, bayoneting every man therein. They then without stopping carried the second line on the road, the defenders sharing a like fate. Then with another irresistible rush they hurled themselves on the wood, swept over the first trenches, and penetrated a long way in attacking the dug-outs and bayoneting every man they met.

"Success seemed assured, when one of those tragedies which are sometimes unavoidable in war overwhelmed the 222d Regiment. The heavy artillery, which had been ordered to support the attack by bombarding the wood as soon as the first line of trenches had been carried, suddenly opened a terrible and destructive bombardment. No one believed that the attack would be carried through with such irresistible élan that all three lines

of trenches would be carried at one wave of the advance. The high explosive shells, charged with melinite, fell with awful effect amongst the French who had won the Bois de la Paxe. Terrible cries arose through the fog. The Germans, strongly reinforced, reoccupied the first two trenches. For some time it looked as if the French would be driven right into the Mortagne. However, the Germans, badly knocked about and exposed likewise to a heavy artillery fire, did not follow up their success.


The two French reserve companies retired slowly and dug shelter trenches 200 yards down the slope from the first German trench, which remained unoccupied. The ground on the far side of the Mortagne was held until the final German retirement."

But this was not the only tragedy associated with the name of Gerbéviller. The conduct of the German column south of Lunéville was as bad as anything that happened in Belgium, and the desolation of the countryside by the war in this part of French Lorraine probably surpassed anything to be seen west of Poland. Every yard seems to have been shot to pieces. The ground is pock-marked by shell fire, and it was possible for months afterwards to trace the course of a battle by the deformities of the landscape. The Germans, there is reason to believe, lost much more heavily here than in any battles of the war until Ypres. But no fury of battle could excuse the cruelties of the Bavarian Highlanders, who did most of the fighting on this section of the front. At Gerbéviller they were seen at their worst. It is (or was) a small

town of about 1,500 inhabitants, with a fine chateau situated, not like the chateaux in other parts of France, outside, but right in the centre of the town. The River Mortagne divides the town in two. On August 24th it was in French hands. The chateau had been converted into a hospital, where Soeur Julie, afterwards decorated by the French President with the Cross of the Legion of Honour, nursed both French and German wounded with equal care, and the two bridges over the river were held by seventy Chasseurs. They had barricaded the bridges, and in order to make the enemy think that they were in great numbers they moved about on bicycles, and kept firing from different parts of the town. The stratagem succeeded. The enemy, who was in considerable force, delayed the attack with his infantry and began to bombard the town. It was two in the morning when they arrived, and seven in the evening before they ventured to cross the bridges, by which time the Chasseurs, who had suffered only slight losses, made good their retreat, having gained a day for the

retreat of their main body. Whether mortified at having been held up for so long by so few men, and desiring to conceal from their commander what had really happened, or disbelieving that so few could have accomplished the feat of holding up a whole German regiment for a whole day, the Germans on entering the town immediately began to arrest and shoot the inhabitants, accusing them of being *franc-tireurs*. The houses that the bombardment had spared were sprayed with petroleum and fired. The soldiers

began to loot indiscriminately. "This is what we do" said two German officers, "to civilians who fire on our soldiers." That the civil population of the town sat with folded arms while the Chasseurs were conducting their defence is not to be supposed; but there is not a scrap of evidence that any civilians actually fired on the enemy, and even if some did, there was no justification for collective punishment of the whole town for acts of a few unauthorised individuals. Nor could anything justify the dragging of frightened old men out of the cellars of their houses and murdering them in cold blood. In addition, some forty-seven "hostages," so-called, seized when the Germans entered the village, were shot. Only the courage of Sister Julie saved such few buildings as escaped the fire. A German officer went the round of the hospital, turning down the bedclothes to see that the men were really wounded. "I could not," said Sister Julie afterwards, "allow them to kill my wounded, and told them that they had no business to act as they had done.



The country round Nancy.



French artillery advancing into position.

[Graphic Photo Union.]



French Chasseurs get a lift on their way to the trenches.

[Graphic Photo Union.]

They insisted on coming in and going all over my hospital, and then they agreed to let it alone. But I had to protest with them again, as they wanted to set fire to the rest of the street, and that would probably have meant the destruction of the hospital as well. Eventually I and the three sisters with me had their wounded to look after, as well as our own. It was a hard trial to Christian charity, but we did it."

SUCCESS NOT FOLLOWED UP.

By the defence of Nancy the Army of the East had brilliantly redeemed its early failures. But some of the benefits of these successes were lost later in September by the German occupation of St. Mihiel and of the Camp des Romains, on the Heights of the Meuse, which has already been described (Vol. I., p. 267), and it is greatly to be regretted that General Joffre had not sufficient men at his command to follow up the repulse of the German attacks on Nancy. Not that it would have been wise to attempt again the invasion of German Lorraine. France had already paid a sufficiently heavy penalty for her slavish imitation—with inferior resources in men, material, and organisation—of the German policy of attack. But it would seem that much could have been done at this time by a bold counterstroke on the Woëvre Plain. Holding the Germans on the front—and that required no elaborate defensive works of bricks and mortar, but only entrenchments—the French might have swept north of the Woëvre, broken up the investment of Verdun on its north side, and perhaps have attacked the Crown Prince's army in the Argonne Forest. That would have been a movement exactly parallel to the transference of the British army from the Aisne to Flanders. It would have exposed the



General Foch.



General de Castelnau.

German main armies in France to a simultaneous attack on both its flanks, and had it made any sort of progress it might have defeated the German plan of entrenching themselves in Champagne. For this plan depended for its chances of success on two conditions—first, the security of the right flank of the armies in Belgium and Picardy, and, secondly, the maintenance of its position in the valley of the Meuse; and combined movements into Flanders and down the Meuse would have threatened the German strategy at its two weakest points. It may have been that but for the losses incurred during the ill-considered advance into Lorraine this plan would have been possible. As it was, the French army was much too weak to begin an aggressive movement on both flanks at once. It needed a period of rest for reorganisation. The experience of the first two or three months of war had revealed grave faults; and before any ambitious strategic scheme of attack could be thought of, some very thorough-going reforms were necessary. General Joffre was probably not altogether sorry at the approach of winter, which made it possible for his army to entrench itself securely and prepare for the resumption of the offensive in the spring.

THE REJUVENATION OF THE FRENCH ARMY.

It was now that General Joffre's greatness began to show itself. Hitherto he had appeared as a cool and patient commander, who had shown himself capable of building up a new strategy out of the ruins of the old. He was now to appear in the new and even more difficult part of army reformer. It has been given to few commanders to be great alike in the broad, clear thinking which makes the strategist and in the mastery of detail



The new French armies: Conscripts and volunteers waiting to enrol for service. [Photopress.




German troops in the trenches along the Aisne.

[Newspaper Illustrations.

and singleness of purpose which are necessary to anyone who attempts to reform an army in the face of the enemy. But General Joffre is one of these few. His reforming work in the winter of 1914-15 will probably be recognised when the full story of it can be told as the best proof of his military capacity and of his strength of character. At present his work as a reformer is known only in outline. At the time no hint of it ever reached this country. People here had no conception of the gravity of the problems which he had to solve; and they saw in the long winter months of trench warfare, in which neither side advanced or retired, except here and there a mile, either a stalemate, only to be relieved by the arrival of British reinforcements in the spring, or evidence of a planless hesitation and indecision. In reality it was the period of a great military recovery, more remarkable because so much more rarer in war than victories in the field.

The gravest faults had shown themselves in the higher commands of the French army. An official retrospect, published in the spring, in its enumeration of the causes of the great French defeat at Morhange, mentioned among them "the default of certain units." The phrase hides perhaps the most serious fact in the early history of the war. The units which "defaulted" belonged to the Fifteenth Army Corps, who at a critical moment in the battle either failed to stand their ground or refused to obey the order to advance—it is not clear which. What does seem to be clear is that these units had been ordered to advance without being properly protected by artillery, and therefore with the certainty of being cut to pieces. "The officers were stupefied at the order, and refused to send their men



General Maunoury.

[Record Press.]



General D'Amado.

[Central News.]

to certain death to no purpose.* Coming after the fiasco of the first French invasion of Alsace, for which the general was relieved of his command, this incident raised the gravest doubts about the capacity of the higher ranks in the French army. Nor were these two examples the only ones. The leading in the battle of Charleroi was bad. "There were in this affair," said the French Retrospect in the spring, "individual and collective failures, imprudences committed under the fire of the enemy, divisions ill-engaged, rash deployments and precipitate retreats, a premature waste of men, and finally the inadequacy of certain of our corps and of their leaders in the use of both infantry and artillery. In consequence of these lapses, the enemy, turning to account the difficult terrain, was able to secure the maximum of profit from the advantages which the superiority of his subaltern cadres gave him." Censure could hardly be stronger; and it is clear that in the early months of the war there must have been a serious breakdown in the higher ranks of the French army. "Long before war broke out," General Joffre is reported as saying, in an interview suppressed at the time but afterwards republished in the most famous of French provincial newspapers, "I had realised that a great number of our generals were worn out and tired. Some I found absolutely unfit, absolutely unequal to their task, and about others I had grave doubts. I had made it clear that I intended to replace these worn-out and unsuitable members of our General Staff by younger officers; and in spite of all the obstacles that were then laid across my way to frustrate

* Paris Correspondent of the *Manchester Guardian*, March 22, 1915. Later this corp, under better leadership, undoubtedly distinguished itself.



The war on German territory : Alpine Chasseurs removing a German frontier post in Alsace.

[Newspaper Illustrations.]

such a plan, I should have seen it through. But the war came too soon. . . . I admit that in this war a few of our generals in whom I had confidence did not come up to my expectations, for the real leader of men mostly reveals himself during actual war only, and not on parade during peace. The keenest intelligence and the widest knowledge are of no use unless they are combined with the gift of resolute action. . . . Responsibility in war is often such as to leave men of otherwise great merit and inherent qualities and power quite helpless."

Such were the first difficulties that faced General Joffre. A kindly man, and with the Southern Frenchman's warmth of personal friendship, he can have found no task more painful than this weeding of the incompetent or worn-out men from the higher commands. He allowed no friendship, no personal feeling to stand between him and what he believed to be his duty to France. As a result of his purge, the average age of general officers in the French army was lowered by ten years. At the end of the winter more than three-fourths of the officers commanding armies and army corps were less than sixty years of age. His task was simplified by the fact that for three years, as a result of his reforms, some of the higher regimental commands had been duplicated. Every French cavalry and infantry regiment had two colonels, and there was thus a reservoir of officers used to command from which to draw upon to fill vacancies in the higher ranks. The difficulty of filling the lower commissioned ranks was not so great as in the German and the British army. In both there is a caste division between the commissioned and non-commissioned ranks. Not so in the French army, which is the most genuinely democratic

in spirit in Europe. Promotion from the ranks was frequent, and indeed there was no reason why it should not be, seeing that the commissioned ranks in the French army were not separated from the rank and file by any differences of education, of wealth, or of social status.

REPAIRING THE WASTAGE OF WAR.

The next problem before General Joffre was to repair, so far as was possible, the wastage of war. First, all men of the contingents between 1889 and 1909, that is, men between twenty-five and forty-seven, who had hitherto been exempted from service, were called up. Secondly, local committees were appointed to hold musters of the men of military age exempted from field service, and engaged in some auxiliary service of the army, in order to detect the shirkers and draft them into the fighting force. Lastly, all the reservists between the ages of twenty-six and forty who had hitherto escaped active service were called to the colours; and in addition the 1915 contingent, which ordinarily would not have been called up till the autumn of that year, were already in training in December of 1914. By these means a new army was created, ready for the spring, of nearly a million men; and with the prospect of a British army rising to a million or more, spring had fewer anxieties so far as the supply of men was concerned.

But it was not enough to raise the men; a more serious difficulty was to equip them. A correspondent of the *Neue Zürcher Zeitung*, writing on January 3rd, says that already on that date appeals had been issued to every industry capable of supplying equipment to the army. At the same time, immense preparations were made for

increasing the manufacture of guns and ammunition. The following passage from the correspondent of the Zurich paper is interesting as showing that the French at the beginning of the year were hard at work on the problem of munitions, which in England did not obtain public notoriety until three or four months later.

"The arms of the new units are being manufactured at full speed by all the branches of the armament industry. A veritable trial of strength is being carried out by the great metallurgical works which supply the material for the artillery. Only last June attention was drawn by General Maitrot and then Senator Hombert to the lack of heavy artillery in the French army. At that time only a few batteries of the 150 mm. (6-inch) gun of the Rimmailho type were in existence. Immediately the French set to work to create within a few months a completely new heavy artillery—something between the Rimmailho and the 75 mm. field gun—and this artillery has already taken part in the fighting and given excellent results. Week after week new batteries are being sent to the front. It is especially in the matter of artillery ammunition that almost fabulous results have been achieved. All factories and works in any way connected with the steel and iron industry have been turned into manufactories of shells and grenades. . . . The chief aim is to be in a position, when the decisive moment comes, to pour out a rain of shells "as from a watercan" on the enemy's position without need for economy."

In no direction did the energies of the French manufacturers yield better results than in the equipment of the great fortresses. It is believed—naturally the details are not made public—that the fortifications of Verdun and their armament have been largely remodelled since the beginning of the war. The fate of the Belgian fortresses, and in particular the fate of Namur, which had such serious effects on the plans of defence in Northern France, naturally made the French extremely anxious for the safety of their great line of fortresses along the Heights of the Meuse, on which, even more than on the successful defence of the northern frontier, the safety of France depended. The French Staff was not slow to grasp the lessons of the Belgian failures. They saw, in the first instance, that no strength of defence could make up for the lack of guns of long range, and they re-armed such of the French forts as were deficient in this respect. Secondly, they saw that the best protection for fortress guns was not masonry and steel cupolas, but concealment, frequent change of position, and mobility. Lastly, they saw that the right use of forts was as bases for the operations of a field army, and not as shelters against the fury of a storm of fire which had been allowed to come near and break over them. Nowhere are these

principles more clearly recognised than at Verdun, whose defence in this war will probably go down to history as a classic example of the right use of forts in a system of national defence.

All through the winter faith in General Joffre steadily grew. "Besides his military qualities," said a shrewd Swiss observer at the beginning of 1915, "it is his strength of character, his doggedness, and the moral authority which he inspires that deserve our admiration."

"It was only he who was in a position to prevent a disaster after the battle of Charleroi by inspiring the entire army with the conviction that the retreat was an intentional move and pursued with the object of placing the storming Germans between the two blades of a pair of scissors. The army believed him, and not only was a fight avoided, but the strategical manœuvre was crowned with complete success. Thanks to this moral authority, which has become still more profound since then, he has succeeded in making the French soldiers adapt themselves to the war of positions, which has ever been a speciality of General Joffre in his capacity of engineer. It is still owing to his personal influence if in the present phase, when the strategical operations are paralysed and the armies are condemned to inactivity, the officers and men do not give vent to their native temperament, but are waiting patiently for the moment when Joffre considers it at last opportune to act.

"His firm character is also revealed in his attitude towards incapable leaders. Since Joffre has been in supreme command he has dismissed or replaced no fewer than seventy-seven generals—a number which has since then probably increased. Of all the political generals and corps commanders—that is, those who owed their places to the good offices of politicians—only one has remained, General Sarrail, who has exhibited high strategical abilities. The slightest error in the leading of the troops is severely punished, and the number of high officers treated in this way amount to 150.

"This hecatomb of political generals has not been effected without some resistance. But Joffre remained obstinate, and when a high personage one day asked him to cancel a certain order he categorically declared that should these efforts continue he would put his sword on the table. This was carefully noted for future guidance. To-day Joffre is the most popular man in France, and had he really tendered his resignation for reasons which could not long remain a secret there would have arisen a storm in the land which the Government would not have been able to resist."

As a strategist, his principal characteristic was his patience and his firm belief that the surest way to defeat an able and resolute enemy is not to try to imitate him, but to develop an opposing system of strategy and tactics which would feed his weakness and at the same time bring out all that is best in one's own national character.



British troops drawn up outside their billets before returning to the trenches.

[Newspaper Illustrations.]



French troops returning to their trenches in the Soissons district.

[Topical Press.]



Serving out winter coats to the English soldiers in France.

[Central News.]

CHAPTER XV.

THE WINTER CAMPAIGN IN FRANCE.

THE DIVISIONS OF THE BATTLE FRONT—THE OPERATIONS OF THE BRITISH FLEET OFF THE COAST OF BELGIUM—THE BRITISH LINES—THE FIGHTING ROUND LA BASSÉE—LA BOISSELLE—SOISSONS—RHEIMS AND CHAMPAGNE—THE ARGONNE—VERDUN AND THE WOEVRE—THE ALSACE FRONT.


UP to the middle of November the campaigns in Belgium and France made a continuous and rapidly moving story, big with great events. But with the approach of winter the movement is arrested, and the flow of the war in the west no longer moves in a single broad channel, but breaks up in a delta of seemingly disconnected streams, like those rivers of Siberia that flow north and lose themselves in the frozen tundras on the shores of the Arctic Sea. In the trench warfare of the winter the excitement and passion of the summer is frozen stiff in an iron mould, like molten metal poured out of the furnace into a frosty air.

The chief interest of this winter campaign is not strategical or tactical, but moral; and its significance is to be found not in records of military movements—such movement as there was was never more than could be covered in half-an-hour's walk—but in the life of the soldiers in the trenches, and in the hard philosophy which sustained them in a reversal to the existence—short, brutish, and nasty—of primeval cave-man. Some description has already been given of this strange life, and in the next chapter a further account is given of the appearance of typical trenches on the west front. The object of this chapter is to give a general view of the opposing lines, and to take note of such operations as were of importance in the long winter that set in soon after the failure of the German attempts to force their way to Calais past Ypres. The result of all these operations was almost of necessity inconclusive, but some idea of their character, and of the condition in which they left the opposing lines, is necessary to an understanding of the military problems which presented themselves in the spring.

The length of the firing lines was more than 450 miles, and extended from the sea near Ostend—a few hours from Dover—to the Vosges mountains and the Swiss Alps.

A front so long cannot be envisaged as a whole, and it is necessary for the sake of clearness to divide it into its several sections, each of which has fairly well-marked distinguishing characteristics. The battle front divides naturally into three parts, a Western, a Southern, and an Eastern; and each front in its turn is divisible in three sections—a left and a right wing and a centre. The divisions may be set out thus:—

- (A) THE WESTERN FRONT, extending from Nieuport, near Ostend, to the junction of the Oise and the Aisne.
 - (i.) *The Left Wing*, from the sea to Ypres. Held by French and Belgian troops, flanked by the British fleet. Flat, sandy, intersected with canals.
 - (ii.) *The Centre*, from Ypres to La Bassée. Held exclusively by the British. Damp clayey soil, enclosed country, flat, with isolated hills.
 - (iii.) *The Right Wing*, from the neighbourhood of La Bassée to Compiègne. Dry, well wooded, warmer soil.
- (B) THE SOUTHERN FRONT, extending from Compiègne to the Argonne. Held entirely by French.
 - (i.) *The Left Wing*, along the valley of the Aisne, through Soissons to Rheims. Rolling country, chalky soil.
 - (ii.) *The Centre*, from Rheims across the Champagne and up the valley of the Suippe to the Forest of Argonne. Flat plateau, light, chalky soil.
 - (iii.) *The Right Wing*. The Forest of Argonne. Heavy clayey soil, rolling hills. Thickly wooded, roads and communications few.



The Battle-front in the West.

(C) THE EASTERN FRONT. Again held in its entirety by the French. From Verdun to Belfort.

- (i) *The Left Wing.* The great bastion round the fortress of Verdun, curving like the top loop of a note of interrogation, with a hollow made by the German lines round St. Mihiel.
- (ii) *The Centre.* The plain of the Southern Woevre, south of St. Mihiel to Pont-a-Mousson to Nancy and Lunéville. The Woevre is an undulating plain of woods and meres, intersected by deep cloughs, known locally as rupts, e.g., the Rupt de Mad. Round Nancy the country is hilly.
- (iii) *The Right Wing.* The crests of the Vosges mountains overlooking Alsace, crossing the German frontier opposite Munster to the lower spurs of the Vosges, and re-crossing to Belfort, near Thann.

Something more must be said of most of these parts, for each of them has an interest of its own, and each presents problems that are distinctive.

THE OPERATIONS ON THE BELGIAN SEABOARD.

The strength of the Belgian army after its reorganization was about 150,000 men, which, with some assistance from the French, held the line of the Yser from its sea coast to near Ypres. No serious attempt was made by the Germans during the winter to cross the Yser by the coast road. There was, however, a very general popular expectation in this country at the beginning of the winter that the Allies might make a forward movement along the coast in conjunction with the British fleet. It was even thought possible that a force might be landed under cover of its guns, and that in this way the German flank might be turned. At one time the Germans took this danger very seriously, and began a series of very elaborate fortifications along the sand dunes from Ostend to the

Dutch frontier. It is conceivable that important results might have been achieved by a landing near the Dutch frontier, but the operation would have been a very hazardous one, with the Germans holding Antwerp, Ghent, and Bruges; and the Allies, even if they had men available at that time—which is doubtful—were wise not to take risks, unless the Belgians had been in a position to take the offensive along the coast, which they certainly were not. The operations of the fleet were much less ambitious in their object.

"The flotilla was organised" says Admiral Hood, in his report on the naval operations in October and November, "to prevent the movement of large bodies of German troops along the coast roads from Ostend to Nieuport, to support the left flank of the Belgian army, and to prevent any movement by sea of the enemy's troops." In these objects the flotilla succeeded for a time, though not without suffering loss; but as the enemy succeeded in mounting heavy guns on the coast, the older battleships, like the *Venerable*, took part in the work. The fleet did not, however, succeed in preventing the Germans from forming a submarine base at Zeebrugge, and the net result of the operation was to confirm the generally accepted view that battleships can accomplish nothing very serious against shore batteries unless there is an army ready to co-operate with their work.

THE BRITISH LINES.

Ypres, the scene of the terrible fighting at the end of October and the beginning of November, was taken over by the French on November 17th, and a few days later was subjected by the Germans to a bombardment which destroyed most of what the previous fighting had spared. The assistance of the French at Ypres considerably shortened the British lines, which were now divided into two equal portions by the River Lys. The northern section of the British lines ran through broken and rolling country, in which the Germans, generally speaking, occupied the higher and the British the lower ground. That disadvantage was the legacy of the fighting round Ypres in October, when the Germans, it will be remembered, though they failed to break down the defences on the east, succeeded in driving a wedge into the British lines and occupying the wooded ridges which overlook the town from the south-east. Wytschaete and Messines are the principal positions on this ridge, the possession of which by the Germans was a constant annoyance to us all through the winter. An attack made on December 14th against one of the spurs of the Wytschaete position broke down with over 400 casualties, mainly in two Scotch regiments, and was not renewed.

South of Messines, which marks the western limit of this German indentation, our lines ran almost due south to the Lys, which they crossed at Houplines, just east of Armentières, which, like Ypres, suffered heavily from the German bombardment, and had a celebrated organ destroyed in the old church of St. Vaast. The floods, which were two or three miles broad east of Houplines, were as complete a protection to the German lines near the Lys as were the floods on the Yser to the Belgian army. About three miles north of Armentières the British trenches run through to Ploegsteert Wood, corrupted by the army to Plug Street, which, at first a treacherous bog, became later one of the few pleasant spots in the British lines. This was the British equivalent of the Argonne, and the only place in which our troops had any experience so far in the war of forest fighting.

But it was south of the Lys that the hard fighting took place. This district is a flat, water-logged plain, in which trench life was at its worst. Here, too, the Germans held the higher ground, running from La Bassée, where there are two considerable hills surrounded with mounds of slag, through Neuve Chapelle and Aubers, in a direction parallel to the Lys. Almost the only dry spot in the British lines on this section is at Givenchy, standing on rising ground, just opposite La Bassée. Between La Bassée and Givenchy is the famous "railway triangle" formed by the looplines running east from La Bassée and by the Bethune Canal. It is described as one of the most desolate and forbidding spots on the whole front.

"The familiar poplar trees and the placid surface of the canal contrast with the trench-tormented ground, which is full of huge circular fortified holes, plots of barbed wire. The place is a warren of trenches, old and new. There are trenches built by the French, the Germans, and the British, abandoned and subsequently reoccupied, blown to pieces by mine and by shell fire, captured and recaptured in this amazing war in which armies appear to attach more importance to sentiment than to comfort. It is dotted with strange defensive works, such as keeps, which suggest the sixteenth rather than the twentieth century. It is pitted with shell-fire as the face of a person is pitted with small-pox. Water stands stagnant and foetid in every shell-hole, every hollow. The gauntness of telegraph poles, here and there snapped in two by shell-fire and lying in a coil of telegraph line, the sinister mazes of wire entanglements, complete the panorama of desolation."*

Even "Eye-witness," incorrigible optimist as he is, can find nothing pleasant to say of this region. He compares the confused mass of trenches, crossing and re-crossing, to a huge gridiron. "A trench runs straight for some distance, then it suddenly forks in three or four directions. One branch merely leads to a ditch full of water, used in drier weather as a means of communication; another ends abruptly in a *cul-de-sac*, probably an abandoned sap-head; the third winds on, leading into galleries and passages further forward." When new ground is broken the spade turns up the dead. The life of the soldier is a "strange, cramped existence, with death always near . . . a life which has one dull, monotonous background of mud and water."

THE TWO BATTLES OF GIVENCHY.

There were two battles fought at Givenchy in the course of the winter. On December 18th, in the early morning, two Indian Divisions began an attack on the German positions opposite Givenchy. The Meerut Division, which was on the left, after capturing the enemy's advanced trenches, was heavily counter-attacked and forced to retire. In the meantime, the Lahore Division on the right had captured the position opposite, and not knowing, apparently, what had happened on its left had crammed as many men into the captured trenches as they would hold. When morning came they found themselves unsupported, with both flanks in the air. The ground behind them was swept with fire. Attempts to reach them broke down, and it was equally impossible for the Division to withdraw. There was nothing to be done but to hold on till nightfall, which was done, and the trenches were then evacuated. The next day, Sunday, the 20th, the Germans began a violent bombardment on the whole front occupied by the Indian Corps, and then followed it up with an attack on Givenchy. Part of the line on the left gave way, and the enemy even

* A *Times* Correspondent's description.

entered Givenchy. It was a very critical moment, for Givenchy was one of the most important points in the British line. The chief honour for the recovery of Givenchy belongs to the First Manchesters, who late in the evening advanced through the village and re-occupied the old support trenches. Again the same situation arose as had confronted the Lahore Division on the 18th. The Manchesters in the trenches were unable to go forward, and none of their reserves could move to them. They not only hung on all night, but at dawn they moved out to attack the enemy's trenches in front. The attack did not succeed, and the regiment was presently back in the support trenches, its left flank still exposed and its right unable to get into touch with its supports. The situation was serious, and in the afternoon the Manchesters fell back, having been in action continuously for twenty hours. Had they known that reinforcements were on their way, they might have held still longer to their positions. For on the day before Sir John French had ordered up first a brigade of the First Army Corps, then in general reserve, and later the whole corps up to the support of the Indian Corps. The position was recovered before dusk, but it was not until the night of the following day that the line was restored, and the regiments who had stood their ground when part of the line gave way early on Sunday were all relieved. The defaulting regiments seem to have been Gurkhas and Baluchis, and it is not to be wondered at that they broke down temporarily under conditions of war and climate so different from those to which they were accustomed. But as a whole the Indian troops, as Sir John French is careful to say without any qualifica-

tion in his account of this unfortunate affair, fought with the utmost steadiness and gallantry.

A month later, on January 25th, the enemy were again in Givenchy, but our artillery fire had the effect of

deflecting their line of advance, and they all crowded into the village on its north-eastern corner. Thence they penetrated into the centre of the town, where there was a stronghold known as a keep. (This trench war sometimes skipped more than the two centuries to the wars of Marlborough's days, and became mediæval.) On this occasion it went back further still. There was desperate hand-to-hand and house-to-house fighting. Some men fought with bayonets in their hands, others with bare fists, while "Eye-witness" tells a story of a man

who entered a house occupied by eight Germans, bayoneted four, and captured the rest, all the time sucking at a short clay pipe. Before noon the village was again clear. More successful, however, was the German attack south of the canal, where the enemy drove in a part of our line, and though he was repulsed later, we

had to be content with a position slightly in rear of our old trenches. In the following month there was some successful hand-to-hand fighting in the brickfields between the canal and railway.

Throughout the whole of this winter fighting at La Bassée the British army suffered severely from the low-lying and swampy positions which it occupied. Its conditions were much worse than those of the

enemy occupying the higher ground on the ridge overlooking the valley. Sir John French, in his despatch of February 2nd, allows himself the luxury, in which he rarely indulges, of general reflection, and points out the great difficulties of warfare under such conditions.




British soldiers in the trenches in Flanders during the winter campaign.

[Photopress.]



A mouth organ provides a little music for the men in the trenches.

[Photopress.]



Givenchy and La Bassée.

"To cause anything more than a waste of ammunition long-range artillery fire requires constant and accurate observation; but this most necessary condition is rendered impossible of attainment in the midst of continual fog and mist.

"Again, armies have now grown accustomed to rely largely on aircraft reconnaissance for accurate information of the enemy, but the effective performance of this service is materially influenced by wind and weather.

"The deadly accuracy, range, and quick-firing capabilities of the modern rifle and machine gun require that a fire-swept zone be crossed in the shortest possible space of time by attacking troops. But if men are detained under the enemy's fire by the difficulty of emerging from a water-logged trench, and by the necessity of passing over ground knee-deep in holding mud and slush, such attacks become practically prohibitive owing to the losses they entail."


There were few moments of excitement, and still fewer brilliant passages, in the winter months on the front opposite La Bassée; what little movement there was was movement backwards. Yet the quality of the British army showed in no less favourable a light than amid the excitement of the opening months of the war. Nearly all armies will rise to great feats of endurance when nerves are strung up; but an even greater test for an army is its power to resist the depression of uneventful suffering, and perhaps no army in the world would have stood this test so well as the British. It emerged from a winter in the wet and the mud high-spirited still, and with no change of temper other than an added touch of impatience. There had been surprisingly little sickness—for which the country has to thank the sanitary and the medical services, whose work usually never finds a chronicler until

the war is over, when people have grown so weary of its incidents that they forget to express their thanks.

On the west front, between La Bassée and Compiègne—the French right to our centre—there were some useful gains in the winter, of which perhaps the most important were the capture of Vermelles, south-west of La Bassée, and the pushing of the Germans back from Albert. This last success led to one of the most horrible passages in the whole history of war. Behind Albert, and hidden away in a fold of the ground, is the small village of La Boisselle. It was impossible for the French gunners to reach the place with their fire, and the only way of approach was by trench and sap. The French infantry sapped up the hill side (the ground all along this west front rises gradually towards the east), and then, early in January, reached the edge of the village. Contact was established with the enemy's trenches in the village churchyard, and there, through the rest of the winter into the spring, fighting went on amongst and in the tombs, sapping from grave to grave. (See page 157.)


THE BATTLE OF HILL 132.

Some of the most serious fighting of the winter took place along the stretch of the Aisne river held by the British in the last fortnight of September. Early in January the French attack opposite Soissons began to make very considerable progress. They worked their way up from the river along two valleys flanking one of the spurs with which the gentle slope of the hills running down to the river is ribbed. They captured Cuffies and Crouy, and the hill between them, marked on the official maps with the number 132, and they also gained a footing



The bombarded church at Albert.

[Newspaper Illustrations.]



Rheims Cathedral with sandbags piled round the lower portions of the front in order to protect the carvings from shell splinters.

[Central News.]

on the plateau at Vregny, which, when the British fought on this section of the front, had been the centre of the German position. Immediately behind is Anizy, an important railway junction, the loss of which would probably have forced the Germans to retire from their positions in the angle of the Aisne and the Oise, and to fall back on the Laon-La Fère line. General von Kluck was alarmed, and brought up heavy reinforcements from other points of the front—the excellent railway system within the German lines made their prompt concentration easy. He had hopes not only of checking the French advance, which was not in very great strength—perhaps three brigades or about 12,000 men—and had been pushed forward rather too rapidly, but also of effecting a capture and perhaps of breaking across the Aisne. With two army corps at command, it did not need much of Von Kluck's great ability as a tactician to force the French back from the plateau down to the river. Fortune favoured his projects. The weather was wet and stormy, and the Aisne rose very rapidly. First the bridge at Venizel and then the bridge at Missy was carried away. Night fortunately came down, and the engineers on the south laboured all night to construct a bridge at Missy. What followed was told in an article in the *Matin*, which seems to have had authentic information.

"The morning of the 13th saw the Missy bridge up, the engineers who had been working upon it having had their

feet frozen whilst engaged upon their task. Immediately reinforcements and munitions began to pass across. But at twenty minutes past eight the bridge was again swept away. Thus the French forces were again separated from their main body. They had but fifty cartridges left, and they charged the Germans, fighting furiously with their bayonets and rifle butts. Practically the whole of the First German Army was engaged in a counter-attack, and the French were forced to a retirement, which they carried out in perfect order.

"German reinforcements continued to arrive from Laon, Verins, and Mézières. A hundred times the French charged; a hundred times they were forced back upon the ruined villages. Their orders then were to hold on. New bridges were being built, and on the other side of the river reserves impatiently awaited for the opportunity to cross.

"On the morning of the 14th the retreat began. The bridge had again been repaired, and would probably hold for an hour or two. Rapid action was necessary. The battery of artillery covering the retreat was reduced to its last four shells, with only six men to work the guns, the rest having been killed. As the last company crossed the river a young officer in charge of the battery, whose arm had been broken, gave the order to fire, and then rendered his guns useless as the French troops safely recrossed the Aisne."


The German account pays high testimony to the work of the French gunners in the advance to the plateau, but is curiously silent about the swollen river. It must be supposed that the bridges up stream stood, for they crossed the river apparently without difficulty and penetrated to the suburbs of Soissons, where, however,

they never established themselves. Another version of the story current in France was that the bridges across the Aisne were destroyed not by the floods but by the German artillery. The net result of these operations which began so well for the French was that the whole of the ground won by the British at the Battle of the Aisne, and held by them for the last fortnight in September, was lost to the enemy.

THE OPERATIONS IN CHAMPAGNE.

East of Soissons is Rheims, persistently bombarded for eighty days in succession in the winter; on the edge, the plain of Champagne, to which the Germans attached such great importance. The remarkable operations which the French began in Champagne on February 15th,

like the operations in the Woevre, belong rather to the spring than to the winter campaign, and they are best treated later in connection with the events which followed them. But their earlier stages round Perthes-les-Hurlus and Beausejour Farm have been described by the official British Observer with the French forces in a letter which gives the only good description of the day-to-day progress of active trench warfare that has yet appeared in this war. The whole value of the letter is in its detail, which does not lend itself easily to summary. But some idea of the character of trench war is conveyed by his map, which we give. These operations, it must be remembered, were amongst the most successful conducted



French dragoons advancing past an English outpost.

[Photopress.]



A battery of British field guns in action.

[Newspaper Illustrations.]



French soldiers sharpening their bayonets in a village behind the firing lines.

Wyndham, Paris (C.N.)




Diagram to illustrate the Trench Fighting in Champagne.

by the French during the winter. The figures in the map are the dates of the month on which the lines to which they belong were won; the letters mark the points at which the fighting was particularly obstinate or interesting. "A," for example, is a little redoubt holding 500 men. It was first attacked by the French in January and retaken, except for the southern corner, where they held on for a fortnight. On February 16th and 17th it was taken and lost, retaken and lost again. On the 23rd the French were again in the fort, successfully repulsed five counter-attacks, and were turned out by the sixth. On the 27th they took the whole of the fort except a piece of trench on the far side, and on the 29th they captured that too.

A similar history attaches to each of the letters. "Observer" will perhaps bear quoting on the history of "D."


"At 'D' there are two woods; the southern we will call No. 3, the northern No. 4. On the 16th our Allies got a trench just south of No. 3; they got into the wood on the 18th, and fought backwards and forwards in the wood that day and all the 19th and 20th; by the evening

of the 20th they had almost reached the northern edge. On the 21st a stronger counter-attack than usual was repulsed, and in pursuing the retiring enemy they secured the northern edge. On the 22nd there was more fighting in No. 3, but in the end the French managed to make their way into No. 4, as far as a trench which runs along a crest midway through the wood. The next six days saw continuous fighting in No. 4, sometimes near the northern end, sometimes at the crest in the middle, and occasionally back near the southern end. The French now hold the northern edge, and have pushed troops into the 'Square' wood just north of the line of the 25th."

The progress in this three weeks' fighting varied from 200 to 1,400 yards, and the total casualties on both sides in the same period cannot have been less than 50,000 or 60,000.

SOME OFFICIAL CALCULATIONS.

The winter campaign was a period of disillusionment for many in this country who had hoped for an early issue from the war. There were those who, when the retreat from the Marne began, had visions of a German



The horse lines in a British camp in the North of France.

[Central News.]




A Gurkha regiment returning to the trenches at La Bassée. [Newspaper Illustrations.]



Indian troops baking native bread.

[Newspaper Illustrations.]



From Compiègne to Rheims (page 147).

Sedan, in which the war would be dramatically ended by the interception of the main army in France by a converging movement on both flanks, or of a disastrous retreat through Belgium. When the retreating army dug itself in on the Aisne, and then with fresh reinforcements attempted on this firm pivot a new great turning movement through Belgium, taking Antwerp on its way, the earlier over-confidence gave way to depression which refused all the comforts of official optimism. Some measured up the cost of a mile gained here and there, and figured by a sum in simple proportion that the total cost even of driving the enemy back to his own country would be prohibitive, even in a war that has been more spendthrift of human life than any in history. They failed to see any signs of a definite strategic plan emerging through the operations of the winter. Between the official optimism and the hard facts of the situation they saw no correspondence, and the severity of the censorship spread scepticism of the accuracy and value of the official reports. Criticism was driven underground, and the people became the prey of rumour, extravagant alike in their gloom and again in their confidence of early victory, and swung uncertainly from depression to elation and back again.

Much the most valuable of all the official statements of the grounds of hope was the French Retrospect on the first six months of the war, published in March. The argument of this writer was that the Germans had wasted their resources in order to win the quick victory which was their only chance, and at the end of six months had entirely failed, and that the French, on the other hand, had conserved their resources by a defensive which was more economical of men, and had gradually all through the winter been accumulating power in men, supplies, and organisation, which, when the spring

came, would carry them to victory. By the middle of January, Germany's losses on the two fronts were 1,800,000 men, excluding sick. The French critic assumed that of these 500,000 would be able to rejoin after being cured, and he therefore estimated the net losses at 1,300,000 men, or 260,000 per month. The entire resources of Germany in men amounted to nine millions, from which some half a million should be deducted for men employed on railways, in police, and in armament works, leaving a net total of 8,500,000. Of these, half were at the front at the end of the winter, and 1,300,000 had been lost. Deducting from the remainder inefficient and men of over 39 years of age, the writer arrived at the conclusion that Germany's untouched resources in 1915 would not amount to more than two millions, of which 800,000 might be immediately available, 500,000 in April, and another 700,000 (anticipating the 1916 and 1917 classes) before the end of the year. These resources would not enable Germany, at an average rate of loss of 260,000 a month, to do more than fill the gaps for eight months. He thus arrived at the conclusion that Germany had reached her maximum, would not be able to do more than maintain her standard of numbers for eight months, and then would begin to weaken. France, at the period at which he was writing, had more than 2,500,000 men at the front, with 1,250,000 in the depôts. In addition, there were the British and the Belgian armies, and the enormous untouched reserves of Russia. The time must come when the Allies would be in a decided numerical superiority. He further detected signs of growing inferiority in the German munitions, and with the whole world open to the Allies to draw upon and closed to Germany, thanks to British sea-power, he was confident that the German weakness in this respect would become more marked as time went on.

"We have before us two systems. The one, the German system, demanded a rapid success at the opening of the campaign—a success against France before the Russians could come upon the field, before the British reserves could intervene, before the economic trouble could make itself felt. Hence the creation in all haste of new corps. Whether or not they could be kept up for a long time, by predetermination the victory was to be immediate. Now this necessary victory the Germans did not have.

"The other system, the French system, consists, with the advantage of the freedom of the seas, in maintaining in good and complete form a number of sufficient formations, and in creating new ones only in the measure in which they can with certainty be kept up and suitably and durably equipped with regimental organisation. This system is established with a view to a prolonged war.

"Of these two systems which, after six months of trial, shall triumph? To put the question is to answer it. The Germans can no longer oppose us with forces superior to ours. They will therefore not be able to do in the future what they could not do in the past when they were one-third more numerous than ourselves."

"NIBBLING."

But would a superiority of, say, thirty per cent be sufficient to carry the German positions in Belgium and Northern France, which she had been fortifying assiduously for six months? The first answer to that question was the conviction, held very strongly both in the French and the British army, that a "moral superiority" had been established over the Germans, and in particular that the French regimental organisation was much superior to the German especially in its officers. The French regiment, according to the author of the Retrospect, had no fewer than forty-eight officers against the twelve to which the Germans had been reduced. The second answer was that enormous as the problem was of turning the Germans out of Belgium and France, it might not in reality be so insuperable as it was in appearance. The real depth of the German position in Flanders and Belgium was not the hundred miles which separated their existing lines from their own frontier, but something very much less. It was that of a number of belts representing the possible lines of defence that an enemy might take up in succession. The depth of the first line in Flanders was the distance between the German front and Menin, that being the railway junction on which the communications between the German army in the west depended, or about fifteen miles. Menin lost, the whole of the west front was gone, and the next line of defence would run from Antwerp along the Scheldt, through Le Cateau to La Fère. Behind that was the Antwerp-Brussels-Mons line, and behind that again the line of the Meuse. To force

the enemy back from one line to the one behind it was sufficient to pierce it to a sufficient depth at any one point. That fact governed the strategy and tactics of General Joffre during the winter. He called it "nibbling," but there was no timidity or lack of decision in the policy. His aims were these:—

(1) By "nibbling" he meant an attack which, while it was not pressed to the ultimate issue of decisive success or failure, should make sufficient impression on the enemy's lines to encourage him to counter-attack in the hope of recovering what he had lost. These counter-attacks are always expensive of men, and General Joffre wished to feed the military faults of the enemy—his wastefulness of men and of material.

(2) The effect of this policy would be not indeed to break the enemy's lines, but to provide the Allies with a number of *points d'appui*, jumping-off places, from which a serious attempt to break his lines could be made in the

spring at the right time and at the right place. Such *points d'appui* might be found in Flanders, French or Belgian, in Champagne, in the Woëvre, or in Alsace, and by keeping the enemy in doubt at which of these places the serious attempts to break his line were most likely to be made, General Joffre hoped to encourage him to resist at all points, and so fail to retain decisive superiority at any; to keep him in a general state of apprehension all along the line, so that the task of the attack in effecting a concentration at the chosen spot and breaking through might be rendered much more likely of accomplishment. The great advantage of attack is that it can choose its objective. General Joffre's strategy was designed to put the Allies in a position to utilise that advantage when the time came, and his tactics to encourage the enemy to weaken his strength in counter-attacks for the recovery of lost points that might or might not be of importance.



General Joffre and King Albert at the headquarters of the Belgian army in Flanders.

[Newspaper Illustrations.]

Such were the ideas that governed General Joffre's conduct of the operations in the winter. There was nothing heroic about them; they were frankly Fabian, and looked to the power of delay, wisely used, as one of the great military assets of France. Yet no one knew better the importance of striking hard than General Joffre, the most patient and the least typically French, according to conventional ideas of the Frenchman, of all the generals in the west. And all the time he gives the impression of being in full revolt against the domination of German ideas in the profession of arms, and of seeking to defeat the alien occupation of Northern France not by borrowing and adapting German military principles

and methods, but by developing a distinctively national and French military system. It was the copyists of German ideas of strategy that made the disaster in Lorraine early in the war, but the Marne was won through military tactics which are anathema to German military theorists.

THE MAKING OF A NATIONAL FRENCH STRATEGY.

History seems to teach that every nation must have its own national strategy if it is to achieve the greatest success in war of which it is capable. For years French military thought had been purely imitative of Germany; its preoccupation had been how best to adapt German ideas to French needs and conditions. Joffre broke with that tendency. Instead of offering a French copy to the German original, he was revealed developing a genuinely national system of strategy. In an earlier chapter of this work (Vol. I., page III) passages were quoted from "*L'Armée Nouvelle*" of M. Jaurès, in which he pleaded for a modification of the prevailing

German ideas for a scheme of defence more distinctively French in their inspiration, and prophesied failure if the plans of a bold offensive into Lorraine after the German model, which so filled the imagination of French military writers, were persisted in. His prophecy was mournfully fulfilled in the defeat of Morhange; but as the winter wore on it became clear that in Joffre had arisen a man whose military ideas were at any rate not borrowed from Germany, but had the smack of France, with her incomparable fecundity in idea. The long, dreary months of winter, uneventful as they seemed, may perhaps have been the gestation of new ideas which were destined to overthrow the military system of Germany as completely as Napoleon overthrew that of Frederick. The spring would show. But certain it is that after six months, which to many in France, as here, after the extravagant hopes aroused by the victory of the Marne must have seemed a military anti-climax, the faith in General Joffre was greater than at the beginning.



Arras : A view of the Cathedral.

[E.N.A.]



The entrance to a French trench on the line Ypres—La Bassée. [Newspaper Illustrations.]



A party of French soldiers in one of the Flanders trenches. [Newspaper Illustrations.]



French soldiers returning from the trenches make a halt for refreshment.

[Central News.]

CHAPTER XVI.

IN THE FRENCH TRENCHES.

A TYPICAL FRENCH VILLAGE ON THE WESTERN FRONT—THE HORRORS OF LA BOISSELLE—THE JOYS OF NOYON—TRENCH DECORATIONS—THE SOIXANTE-QUINZE—THE SPIRIT OF THE FRENCH ARMY.

THE terrific nature of modern explosives and the astonishing accuracy which artillery has reached has driven modern armies under ground, and in many cases tends to bring them closer and closer together, so that we arrive at the paradox that safety from the deadliest form of attack can only be found at the closest quarters, when the lines are almost touching each other, and the artillery of either side dare not fire without great risk to its own men. Trench warfare, as we now understand it, at first was new to both the Germans and French, but the experience of the South African war had given the English some insight into its possibilities, and some practice in its operations. The English were probably first to make hasty use of trenches, the Germans were the first to be equipped with periscopes to facilitate this kind of warfare, but the modern trench fortification as it now exists was only developed after the German retreat to the Aisne, when the great deadlock of the war began. The whole of the four hundred and fifty miles, from Switzerland to the sea, is not defended by trenches, but the gaps between the entrenchments have been gradually narrowed down to points which afford naturally strong defensive positions.

The entrenchments on the French western front from Arras to Compiègne are fairly typical of a large part of the country, covering, as they do, cultivated land, with many villages, wooded valleys, and open downs, quarries, river-courses, and well-kept estates with chateaux; and on this front Lihons may be taken as typical of the rest.

THE TRENCH MOUTH.

Lihons, a village some twenty miles from Amiens, has been bombarded into ruins, reminding one rather of the shanties at the pitmouths through which men descend into an under world quite different from the happy, work-a-day world of the upper earth. This village was held by the Germans after their retreat from Amiens before the French army of the west, and it was captured by the French after a "siege." Soldiers live in the cellars of the ruins and in dug-outs in the yards, protected by girders and stones from demolished bridges. Some of the houses are skeletons on one side, but whole on the other. In one of these, evidently a book and curio shop, the stock, fallen and tossed about, and white with mortar, is lying about in heaps, and dropping at intervals through a rent in the shutter on the ground outside

whenever a new explosion shakes its neighbourhood. The village green in the centre has tiers of barbed wire set up, and an undamaged crucifix remains in the middle. There is only one inhabitant left in the village with the soldiers. He is the village undertaker.

You enter the trenches quite suddenly. There is one in the main street which looks like a sewer being opened up. That is a communication trench, which is not now used. You go further along the village to the end where the ground slopes, and the incessant noise of firing rises and falls. You turn into a small yard, and then into the ruins of an outbuilding, and go down as into a cellar. It deepens, and everything else is shut out, and you trudge down through mud towards the firing-lines. These trenches have been in use for more than two months, and have been carefully improved for defence and comfort. The chief communication trench in the village is paved with bricks, with a slope leaving a gutter on one side. The other trenches are corduroyed with sticks from one to two inches thick, and in the firing trenches bushes, branches, and matting from the village houses have been trodden down into the soil. The village pump is used to pump the water out twice a day, and doors, window frames, cupboards, carpets, and all sorts of household things have been brought down from the village to make the life of the defenders a little more decent. The height of the parapet varies at different points. For the most part it is well overhead, and the men have to climb up a step or two to fire through the loophole. At some points, however, where the ground cannot be worked, the trench is so shallow that you have to stoop double, and as it winds along the side of a mound there has been much ingenious planning to prevent it being commanded or enfiladed. That danger, however, is less now since the Germans were driven from the mound and beyond the outskirts of the village. The extraordinary thing is that by planning of the lines the enemy is sometimes on one side and sometimes on the other. It is impossible from the inside to conceive the real disposition of the entrenchment, and it is difficult enough to understand the ramifications of the warren, so many are the communications by which the reserves can be poured into any trench which is attacked, and so necessary is it to find accommodation for large bodies of men and stores. The observation posts, where the sentinels sit and watch, usually are on points jutting out on the highest ground available, and you discover the salient angles best by looking for them when you come upon a machine gun. Bomb-proof shelters, in which from twenty to forty men can be gathered, are placed at intervals. They are usually a widening of the trench, with logs placed over it and sand-bags piled above. These shelters have two or three openings, so that if one side is blown down men can get out round the other. The loopholes are made by wooden cases, broad enough at the inside for the head and shoulders of a rifleman, but narrowing to a slot at the outside, the sandbags and earth protecting the rest and keeping it rigid. The Germans often have an iron shield, with a large loophole, forming a strengthening and protection to the whole trench front, and giving these trenches an armoured appearance. The French have captured many of these, and are glad to have them for themselves.

IN THE FIRING TRENCHES.

In the firing-trenches close to the enemy there is usually a little dark curtain of cloth, sometimes torn from

the coat of a soldier, hung over the loophole, so that the snipers cannot see anyone passing, and these curtains are always raised at the risk of a bullet. It has been discovered recently that the Germans have vices at some of the loopholes on which rifles are fixed trained on the opposite loopholes, and so set that while they will not move up or down, they can be swung to either side, so that without movement of more than an inch or two they can be fired instantly into any loophole on the other side. The sniper can thus watch by a periscope until he sees a movement of the loophole, and then, without showing himself, fire his whole magazine into it. In some cases anyone passing a loophole with his head up makes a darkening against the sky through the ground dropping at the back of the trench. Men speak at a whisper in these trenches. There is a steady percentage of loss day by day despite all precautions, and there are always "suicide corners" where, owing to the turn of the ground, you cannot help an instant's exposure. At first you are surprised to see so few men in the firing-trenches, but at a word they swarm out from dug-outs under your feet, or from the feeding trenches. These dug-outs provide rest-rooms, telephone-rooms, kitchens of sorts, and sleeping-rooms. The men at the observation posts sit on barrels or tubs, or piles of fodder. At this point the trenches approach one another as close as forty yards, and the barbed wire coils thrown out from both sides touch one another. One way of dealing with the enemy's entanglement is to throw out a grappling iron and pull down from the trench the whole erection. At certain places the earth is cut in steps, by which attacking parties can go out above. How the attacking parties get through their own barbed wire entanglements before crossing the zone to attack the German entanglements it is not permitted to say, but it is probably the same on both sides. At night the patrol goes out to guard against sudden attack, and to find out, if possible, what the Germans are doing, and especially to test and strengthen the barbed wire. There are usually half-a-dozen intrepid spirits from each company who voluntarily go out every favourable night working at the wire and sniping the enemy. It is perhaps the strangest of all the paradoxes of modern war that this simple agricultural protection of barbed wire to keep cows from straying should have become one of the most deadly of all defences in warfare, and that so far no effective way has been found to deal with it apart from continued and violent gun-fire. The wire-cutters have proved less and less useful as the quantity of wire was increased to meet them. Shutters, doors, logs, blankets, all sorts of objects are now carried in assaults to beat down and cover these hooks of death.

THE TRENCH GRAVES.

A strange circumstance of trench warfare is that the ground behind the trenches is for some distance quite as unsafe as the ground in front. There are instances where village cattle killed on the higher ground a few yards behind the firing-trenches have been lying for weeks poisoning the air, and it has been found too dangerous to remove them. There are even cases where bodies of soldiers who went out at night to do this work can be seen lying near the dead cattle. The dead are everywhere about the trenches. Often the French soldiers working in captured German trenches come on bodies or limbs of men buried in the floors and sides. The rain, working away sandy corners, discloses bodies, and even moves them into the trench. In a few cases the French dead are

buried beside the trench, and the men eat, fight, and work, with a little wooden cross almost at their elbow, and the cap and woollen gloves of a dead comrade fraying away in the weather. But usually the dead are buried in a cemetery behind the village, and you can tell how long and how hard the fighting has been at each spot by the size of the cemetery. In the open ground and in the forest the dead are usually buried in the shell holes that pit the soil everywhere. The name of the hero is generally inscribed on a cross, but sometimes you come upon little stone tablets telling of some particular deed that deserves commemoration. It is noticeable that if the dead soldier is an Alsatian that is always recorded. Sometimes the floods have filled the shell-holes where the grave is, and all you see is the top of the cross above the water. Often a little fence is made around the grave with empty German shell cases, in which spring flowers are kept—sometimes in the husk of the very shell that killed the soldier. In a few of the long-inhabited trenches an attempt has been made to cut a roll of honour on a stone, but this can be seen perfectly done in the great quarries that are used as rest rooms and stores.

It is strange to see how, when great fortresses have tumbled down and cities are deserted as impossible for defence, men's hopes for safety and persistence have turned again to the prehistoric strongholds of burrows and stone caves. Even the graveyards have been made into strongholds, and lines have been sapped from tomb to tomb. The village of La Boisselle, two miles from Albert, has a terrible fame through the conditions of warfare there. When the Germans retreated from Albert in January, they hung on tenaciously to this village, which lay hidden over a bend of the ground from the observation posts of Albert. The French are now entrenched in a half circle, with lines thrown out, breaking through a great road and falling down to the cemetery, where contact is almost established among the tombs. It is an ordinary village cemetery of a good class, with many heavily-built stone vaults and little temples. In this place trench warfare has reached the ultimate point of horror, and the bodies of the newly-killed soldiers and the dust of the quiet villagers, dead long ago, the fighting and the wounded living, are all mixed together in the semi-darkness of these stone catacombs. These trenches can only be reached at night, and only men of the very strongest nerve are selected to work there.

THE ENTRENCHMENTS IN THE WOODS.

Some of the pleasantest trenches are in the woods that lie between Noyon and Compiègne. The soil is mainly a sandy loam. The young trees and branches furnish material for corduroy paths through all the soft places, and the natural irregularities of the ground give opportunities for ingenious lines and shelters. The dug-outs with which all the young woods are thronged are hardly discernible, even when you are on the top of them. Drains have been sunk, and the underground rooms are wonderfully dry and full of comforts. There are bunks, shelves, mirrors, pictures, even little bookcases and wine cellars, all very shipshape and Bristol fashion, as seafaring folks say. In the shelter of the wood, fires could be lit with some impunity, and the appearance of the whole place in the spring is amazingly curious, with the soldiers coming and going like magic in and out of the earth, felling trees, preparing food, wrestling and playing cards, building all kinds of queer little devices—little arched shelters of foliage for the watch-dogs to lie on through the night down the valley to give warning of


any movement in the German camp, and to smell out scouts; contrivances made from old tin-cans for explosives, or for signalling, stuffing dummy soldiers to be placed up trees to delude the Germans, and the like.

There are many Algerian and Tunisian soldiers in this part, who are clearly having the pick of their lives. The odour of good coffee is constantly arising from strange places. Sometimes you kick a piece of bark standing in a mossy bank, and an indignant black head will shoot out of the earth a few yards away, and curse you in the name of Allah for spoiling his kitchen chimney. It is like war as Sir James Barrie might have conceived it. In the trenches there logs have been largely used, and there are strong block-houses at corners, heavily protected by sand-bags, that are real fortresses. Runnels and ditches have been used, with the water diverted and drained off elsewhere. Ruined farmhouses, whose huge stone structures have been tossed everywhere, are centres of armed forces who live in their tiers of cellars, and have tunnelled passages leading in many directions. The use of tunnels slightly below the surface, in most cases covered over with weeds and bushes, is extensively made to connect artillery with ruined houses where their billets are. The batteries themselves are masked with extraordinary ingenuity, and are constantly moved. As an instance of the elaborate character of the disguises, it may be mentioned that roofs are constructed partly over the guns, hiding them from the angle at which they could be seen by aeroplanes, earth is placed on top, and actually ploughed over, so that it is impossible from above to notice any difference in the ploughed field.

The comfort of a trench depends on the soil and the slope of the land. The happiest conditions are on sandy soil, which dries quickly, and provides the right material for the bags that are the chief protection of parapets and shelters. Clay soil—such as the British trenches were in opposite La Bassée—is, of course, hard for digging, at one place tough as india-rubber, at another mobile as porridge, requiring constant attention, always leaking, and providing the worst sort of material for bags, especially when it is dry and hard. In that condition even three bags will hardly stop a bullet. Sandy soil makes sanitary conditions much simpler. In the new conditions which established entrenchments with billets in reach have made possible, the conditions at the front are now in most cases very different from those at the beginning, when there were no sanitary corps and disinfectant supplies, and it was sufficient for the day if the soldier kept himself alive anyhow. In the Picardy sectors the trenches are noticeably free from smells and vermin, and the general health is very good.


DECORATIONS IN THE DUG-OUTS.

In the three or four months of trench warfare, extraordinary changes have taken place in the habits and even nature of the men, who have had to re-adjust their lives to meet the curious half-mole, half-monk existence into which the great war has driven them. But the French soldiers do not look nerve-shattered, or dulled, or hopeless, although they are men taken from every department of the complex French civilisation and riddled down—ploughman, painter, lawyer, vanman, musician, miner, seminarist, labourer, mechanic, sculptor, joiner, scavenger, boatman—to do the same work, eat the same food, lead the same life. The national gift for giving a domestic, bright look to the dreariest places comes out strongly here. The men in the trenches are always busy with oil and rags, working away with



A communication trench near Soissons cut through a church yard.

[Newspaper Illustrations.]



In the French trenches near Ypres.

[Newspaper Illustrations.]

bayonet and rifles, or cooking things in dark corners over little charcoal stoves, or decorating their cells in ingenious ways, such as neatly framing a portrait of an old woman, probably the soldier's mother, in a border of German bullets stuck in the soil round it. Every dug-out has its proper name, like a village in the suburbs. Most of them have a portrait presiding over the cell, sometimes of a popular actress. One large dug-out had the name the "*Salle des Pas Perdus*," and someone had altered it to "*Salle des Repas Perdus*." The dug-outs in the rear are always called "*village nègre*," as they are supposed to look like Kafir huts. The Frenchmen do not seem to have as many smokes as the English soldiers, and smoker's heart is a very uncommon complaint there. They talk endlessly about the English soldier's comforts, his bully beef and jam, and endless cigarettes, and pipes for every pocket, and sleeping helmets. Yet their food is good and plentiful, mainly soups, with meat and bread in it, and stews, and wine mixed with water is to be had everywhere. Their bread is good French bread, of which they are very proud. Sometimes they toss a piece of it to the Germans just to remind them what bread is. In normal conditions they have coffee, and in cases where the trenches are near great towns, such as Amiens, the food is varied, and the men are in constant touch with the town. A few of the soldiers at Lihons have relatives who have come down to Amiens to be near them, and they are often permitted to cycle down to the town.

But any intercourse like this is enjoyed by very few of the French soldiers. It was only in February that any system was arranged by which married men could get leave to visit their homes. In France the Territorials have been fighting since the beginning of the war. The vast majority of them are married men with families, and at first a very serious problem faced the staff. The separation from his family is to a French father as severe a trial as any of the physical hardships of the war. The men soon yearned for home, and pleaded in thousands for leave, which was, of course, refused. The spirits of the troops fell, and melancholia became common, particularly in the army of the Vosges. General Castelnau there showed his genius well in dealing with this problem. He set himself to create a family feeling in the army itself, and by many ingenious ways and great tact he encouraged the comradeship of all ranks that gives the French army so distinct a character of its own. Anyone who has gone through the French trenches and seen the exchanges between officers and men—the touch on the shoulder from the superior, the half-affectionate *mon colonel* or *mon capitain* from the man, the mixture of intimacy of eye and gesture and polite formality of phrase—beholds a community with a thousand tacit understandings and adjustments that make it so different from other great armies.

The Frenchmen in the trenches show their individuality in countless ways, especially in the attempts to hold fast to their old personality, which is fast being overlaid by the terrific immediacy of the war. Thus, in covered parts of the trenches you come on busts and reliefs of General Joffre, Castelnau, Foch, or other French heroes modelled in clay, often very well done, obviously by practised sculptors, carvers, and confectioners. There are many pungent reliefs of the Kaiser and his generals wreathed in little devils. In the great limestone quarries near Ribecourt the men in their rest time have had orgies of carving and scrawling cartoons with makeshift paint. One soldier has carved a beautiful altar out of the solid rock in an inner chamber of the Pyrenesian region, and

adorned it with a regimental inscription. The place is used as a chapel. Books are to be found in most of the dug-outs, but a strange fact is the absence of newspapers. Musical instruments of the humbler kind are rarely seen at or near the front, and there is no singing.

THE MEN AND THE SOIXANTE-QUINZE.

The false glamour and emotionalism of war, of which one reads so much in the war correspondence of the Franco-Prussian war, have gone with its bright buttons and gold braid. In the terrible pressure of the first month of the war the old soldier came through the fire and became hard and tempered to the ultimate point of endurance, and the new soldiers have come under their influence and accepted their tradition. The silence of the trenches is noticeable. Even in the great stone farms behind the lines where transport work is always going on, and where the little cafés are open, there is not much talk. But a look at the faces of the men in trenches or villages reveals no signs of depression, although often you see in high-strung faces an expression of boredom, as one may expect where so many ingenious minds and hands have been torn away from their proper work to be soldiers and fight in warrens. War is a very earnest thing to the modern Frenchman. He sees that a noble tract of his country has been conquered and defiled by his enemy, and there can be no happiness until all France is free and the evil powers of Germany are broken. His attitude to *les Boches* is that of a man with memories and strong feelings, which in the last war he was not equipped to put into effective action. To-day he finds himself equipped, determined, hard trained, and well fed, and he believes himself to be, man for man, the master of the German.

They seem for the most part like men who have a disagreeable job to do and who are going through with it to the end, but who think much about the old life and look forward to its renewal. They do not seem to have the same simple absorption in the present as the English soldier, or to be able to imprison their minds and hearts in the custody of authority like the Germans. Their jests are more subtle, and the smile, not the laugh, is common. The ordinary soldier is much delighted with responsibility. The most important and joyful man in a French masked battery is always the trumpeter, who is on the look-out for aeroplanes, at the sight of which he blows his trumpet, and the whole force "*plays rabbit*," and nothing can be seen but stunted trees, bushes, or haystacks. But in all sections, from generals to buglers, the high feeling of confidence is the same. At one part, where the French and German trenches had been in almost the same position for three months, and the French, knowing how they have strengthened their own fortifications, must have guessed that the Germans were quite as formidable, it was remarkable to find that man after man showed the same serene confidence that they would toss the Germans out of their position whenever the time came. Two of them were asked by a journalist visiting the trenches how they expected to get over the difficulties. They only smiled, and said "*You shall see*. Whenever the order comes—out go the *Boches*! We can do it." This was not only the case with those magnificent picked troops, the Chasseurs Alpins, but with the territorials too—*les pères de famille*—who have lost many illusions, but in the strain of the eight months of war have found a new half-mocking faith in themselves and in France. Strongest of all is their faith in the French "*Soixante-quinze*," the wonderful 3.03-inch gun, which is held as the new Joan of Arc of France. With

this gun French artillery will fire on the enemies' trenches even when they are so close as fifty yards from their own. The Germans, it is believed, cannot risk a shell within, at least, a hundred yards of their own men. In cases where the front trenches are in telephonic communication with the artillery, and the men can be warned to take to their bomb-proof shelters, the French will sometimes fire within twenty-five yards of their own front. A good deal of the interest in the trenches during quiet spells is to identify the batteries firing three or four miles behind them, or the great guns in the rear, and in being first to spot the sound of new German batteries. Their ears become curiously expert while so many of their faculties are not required; living there week after week in their tunnels, they acquire a sort of sharpened sense, like an engineer in a modern turbine liner.

THE TRENCH APPROACHES.

Except when heavy fighting is taking place the losses among troops on their way to the trenches are as great as those in the trenches. In the present fighting in France and Flanders, where the Allies are occupying ground and in many cases actual trenches formerly possessed by the Germans, the actual conditions are well known and cannot be disguised from the calculations of the German artillery, who know the slopes and state of the ground and roads, and can guess the hours and method of the parties relieving and leaving the trenches. The roads, of course, are known, and are searched at intervals day and night by shell fire on the chance of catching troops, and especially ammunition. Consequently, new tracks are built and roundabout ways taken to communicate with the trench mouths. The main roads are little used within two or three miles of the enemy, and men moving within this zone do so in very open order. Yet it is curious to see how familiarity with danger becomes part of ordinary life, and it is found difficult to keep the men in long communication trenches when they are being relieved. Many men prefer to take the chances and get above ground to hurry to their billets or dug-outs. Going and coming from the trenches, you are always passing graves with little crosses, sometimes single, sometimes in groups, and men wounded in the approaches are always keeping the ambulance busy. But the soldiers plod on, or work on the side tracks, hardly looking up at the shrapnel bursting on the other side of the great road, even when it is only a hundred yards away. In the appalling conditions of modern war, men now accept

murder falling upon them everywhere from the sky as a sort of wartime bad weather. You will see parties working together break into a sharp, dry laugh at something one of them has said about the shell fire that is demolishing a showman's caravan, left standing long ago in happier times. Three French soldiers, who had known intimately the horrors of La Boisselle graveyard fighting, have been seen talking agitatedly and sorrowfully together while one held in his hand a starling killed by the concussion of a shell.

A CHIVALRIC SCENE.

Amiens is about twenty-three miles from the firing line, and when the wind blows from the east the citizens can hear the big guns firing, but as you motor out towards the trenches there is little sign of war, apart from the constant challenging of the sentries and the villages brimming with soldiers, until you suddenly seem in the middle of it. The ground is pitted with shell holes ranging from those of about a yard and a half diameter, made by the German seventy-seven shell, to enormous excavations, that would hold a horse and cart, made by the "Jack Johnsons." Then you probably pass a wood with the trees blasted and scorched and smashed, as if it were at the mouth of hell. Soon you see the large shelter huts in which fifty men can sleep. They are built with logs and mud, and matted over with heather or mosses and dead leaves, so that it is impossible to see them from above. In countrysides where there are few villages there are always towns of these huts. Then you pass old trenches, whose only inhabitants are under the little white crosses. Four or five miles back from the firing trenches you may come on a little review, where a general is decorating officers and men for some brave deed done probably that very morning at dawn. To receive the Cross of the Legion of Honour thus on the very field of glory, with the applause of cannon rolling in your ears, and only your comrades who know what you've done to witness your reward, must be the greatest honour a soldier can have. It would seem a dangerous thing to have such an assembly so near the front, but the moral effect on the soldiers of the colours, the band, the high officers on their horses, and the splendid confidence of the event is considered worth the risk. It is characteristic of the brave and chivalric French nation that even in modern warfare, with its grey horrors and squalors, and awful secresies, that they should, even if only for an instant, make it sparkle with martial beauty.

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HISTORY
of the
WAR



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
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
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
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Lieutenant Leach, V.C., addressing a recruiting meeting in Manchester.

CHAPTER XVII.

SOME STORIES OF THE WAR.

ON THE BATTLEFIELD—V.C. STORIES—THE RED CROSS WORKERS—EXPLOITS AT SEA—AIRMEN'S FEATS.

"**W**HAT a pretty thing man is when he goes in his doublet and hose and leaves off his wit!" was Don Pedro's reflection when he saw Benedick lay his banter aside and make ready, at the bidding of Beatrice, to slay Claudio. And the finest thing about war, which is the complete denial of wit and the bankruptcy of mankind's political intelligence, is that it strips thousands of brave men to the doublet and hose of their native resolution and character, laying before them a directly simple task to which all the old manly virtues can be bent without reserve or qualification. It exhibits individual man, in Shakespeare's phrase, as a very pretty thing indeed, taking courage, fellowship, and determination into the very shadow of death, and redeeming a task dreadful in itself by the devotion with which it is accepted and fulfilled. This we can admit without any danger of falling into the German error of regarding war as the only school of such virtues. Peace, we know, can call them forth in ways that are in themselves wiser and more hopeful. But whatever the ends, the qualities that serve them are high and splendid ones, and the world may very well be humbly grateful that war, a hideous and unprofitable business in itself, turns them out as magnificent by-products on an unparalleled scale.

ON THE BATTLEFIELD.

And, as far as it can, war keeps the eyes of the world fixed on the instances of daring and resource and devotion that it has called forth. But it demands and receives them in such wonderful profusion that no man can know the title of what the battlefield alone, which is only one theatre for them, has produced. Even leaving out instances which are represented by the official list of decorations, the others that are gathered from soldiers' letters and tales are overwhelming. Now it is from the statement of a German prisoner that one learns of a Lancashire Fusilier cut off from his detachment, but declining to surrender to 200 of the enemy. He lay on the ground

firing until his last cartridge was spent; and then rose from his scanty cover to face, with folded arms, the end and a sweeping deluge of bullets. Again from a German source, if it is ever to be forthcoming at all, will have to be received the account of the last moments of Captain McCuaig, of the Royal Highlanders of Montreal. He was severely wounded during the crisis of the fighting round Ypres at the end of April, and at a moment when it would still have been possible for him to have been removed to the rear without further harm. At his own command he was not removed; and when orders were given that his section of the line must withdraw at once, he still refused to hamper his men in the task which lay before them with a burden of a maimed man. In the account of "Eye-witness":—

"He asked of them one thing only—that there should be given to him as he lay alone in the trenches two loaded Colt revolvers to add to his own, which was in his right hand as he made his last request. And so, with three revolvers ready to his hand for use, a very brave officer waited to sell his life, wounded and racked with pain, in an abandoned trench."

From an English surgeon comes the story of a private in the East Lancashire Regiment who, after his battalion had been desperately hard pressed all day, was borne into a field hospital with one side of his jaw blown away. Being unable to speak, he signed to the doctor for writing materials, and would not be treated until he had received them. But it was not for himself or for his friends at home that the message was intended. All that this terribly wounded man wrote upon the pad which was brought to him was, "My captain is a brave man and deserves the V.C."—an unofficial recommendation which was a decoration in itself, and which one trusts that the captain was spared to receive. Or if, in addition to the highest degree of fortitude, one would have—expressed in the queerest of fashions—that gay modesty which seems to be a characteristic of man in his doublet and hose, there is the story of "the worst slanging match I ever

heard," according to the wounded sergeant who described the incident. Three men of the Manchester Regiment were on patrol duty, when one was hit and wounded to the point of death. The second ran to his help, and was promptly wounded by the same sniper. By the time the third man had reached the pair the first was dead. The newcomer bore the wounded man back to safety, cursing him the while with the most appalling proficiency for the "folly" of the very endeavour which he himself was engaged on—the attempt to save another man's life at the risk of his own. And if one would have recorded an instance of the same brave and generous spirit in a foe, there is "Eye-witness's" account of the German officer who, during the engagement at Givenchy, paused to dig out a British officer who was partly buried below a trench parapet which had been blown in upon him, and to give the wounded man brandy from his flask. The German was in the firing line from the British troops while he did this, and a chance bullet from it killed him—a pitiable accident which, from the ease with which it might be misrepresented, should serve to warn English readers against a too easy credulity in stories of British rescuers of German wounded being fired upon by the men whose comrades they were endeavouring to save.

V.C. WINNERS AND THE NAMELESS OTHERS.

Stories like these could be multiplied endlessly without ever touching on the official records of V.C.'s and Military

Crosses. And beyond them is a vast host of instances of individual heroism which will never be known to any but those who saw or played their part in them, instances the details of which in all too many cases have perished with the men who made them. It was to these that Mr. Balfour paid a fine tribute in April, when he spoke of the necessity for trying to realise "the individual courage and heroism of the man who doesn't know at the moment whether his side is winning or losing; who only knows that he has a job before him which he has to do at all risks, and does it." The modern army, which from one point of view looks like a great, unconscious machine, whose use for living flesh and spirit is in direct ratio to

the success with which it can turn them into reliable parts of that machine, from another makes more demand upon individual courage and confidence than any army of the past did. It cannot fling itself into the field, as Napoleon flung his last, hasty levies, relying upon packed formation and pressure of numbers to carry it forward, whatever the mood of its component parts. With the modern army the machine is most in danger of disintegrating when it comes to its severest test; the parts are proved to be greater than the whole, and personal courage, determination, and skill shown to be still the decisive factors of the day when the battle comes at last to be joined over a league-long front, along which men, and companies of men, fight and die

resolutely with no certain knowledge of whether their sacrifice means victory or defeat in the general fortunes of that day. The bravery of each man is then put to its own individual test. The splendid results of that test, even where the dust of a nameless grave has not closed over them for ever, will remain in the vast majority of cases untold and unrecognised in any individual reward.

Of the deeds which have been recognised and rewarded by the highest decoration which the British army has to offer, it is not possible to select more than one or two typical instances. In some cases the details of the heroism which won it are not generally known; for the brief particulars given in the official list of V.C.'s are better calcu-

lated to stimulate curiosity than to satisfy it, and need to be supplemented by the tale of the man who won the Cross or of those who saw him win it. For instance, the Victoria Cross was awarded to Sergeant Harlock, of the 113th Battery R.F.A., according to the official announcement, "For conspicuous gallantry when his battery was in action under a heavy shell fire, in that, although twice wounded, he persisted on each occasion in returning to lay his gun after his wounds had been dressed." Behind this lies a story of extraordinary spirit and determination. His gun was in action in an open field under heavy fire from the enemy's artillery. A shrapnel shell burst right underneath it, killed one of



In the British trenches.

[Photopress.]


the team and wounded Harlock in the right thigh, "just enough to keep him in hospital for two or three weeks, perhaps," in the words of the soldier who described the affair. He walked to the dressing station, had his wound dressed, and received instructions to get into the ambulance and go to the hospital. Instead of doing this he walked back to the battery and took his place at the gun. He had not been there ten minutes when he was wounded again, this time in the back. He returned to the dressing station, explaining to the doctor that he had been unable to find the ambulance, and had thought that he might just as well go back to his gun as down to the hospital. His fresh wound was dressed, and the doctor, holding that if he could walk to his battery he could walk to the hospital without the aid of the ambulance, handed him over to an orderly with instructions that he was to be marched down to the hospital without delay. Once away from the dressing station, Harlock persuaded the orderly that there was much more important work waiting for him than conducting to the hospital a man who could find his own way there perfectly well; and, having got rid of his guardian, he returned to the battery for the second time. Here, according to the artilleryman who told the story, he was slightly wounded again, and, "as he was afraid to go back to the doctor again, he just stayed there till we went out of action in the evening." The appropriate end of the story is that Harlock was first reprimanded for disobeying the doctor's orders and then promoted to sergeant and recommended for the V.C.

Another fine instance of a man grievously wounded and yet continuing to serve his gun was that for which Lieutenant Dimmer, of the King's Royal Rifles, received his V.C. Dimmer was in charge of four maxims during the attack made by the Prussian Guard on the British lines on November 12th. Three out of the four guns were put out of action by the German shell fire, and at the same time Lieutenant Dimmer received his first wound, which was from shrapnel bullets and in the face. In all, he was wounded three times by shrapnel and twice by rifle bullets, and by the time that the Prussian attack was fully launched all of his three men had been killed, and he was alone with the single maxim which it was still possible to keep in action. He succeeded in emptying three belts of 300 cartridges before collapsing unconscious; and when the proudest troops of the German army were ultimately swept back, this very brave officer was picked up by the English soldiers from the side of his gun and despatched to the hospital at Boulogne, where, as a convalescent, he afterwards learnt of the decoration which had been awarded him.

THE TWO WHO RECAPTURED A TRENCH.

But of daring successfully partnered by resourcefulness the records of the war have given no more impressive example than that which earned the V.C. for Lieutenant Leach and Sergeant Hogan, of the Manchester Regiment. Between them these two soldiers succeeded in retaking an advanced British trench which had been captured and was being held by the Germans. It sounds an almost impossible feat, but a glance at the sketch plan given in next column will assist in the explanation of it. The sharply-angled trench A B had been taken by the Germans in the morning of October 29th. About three o'clock in the afternoon Lieutenant Leach and Sergeant Hogan, taking with them ten men, left the British firing line, and crawling along the communicating trench C, established themselves at A. Here they left the ten men who had

accompanied them. Leach and Hogan themselves then began to advance along the narrow trench, their plan being to drive the Germans back to the *cul-de-sac* B at the opposite end of it. Here the ten men left behind at A were to prove their use, for the organisers of the scheme believed that the Germans, if they were driven back into the blind end of the trench, would climb out and make a dash across exposed ground for their own main trenches, thereby giving the men at A an opportunity to account for them. But Leach and Hogan had underestimated the effect of their own exploit; by the time that they had reached the last angle of the trench the Germans were in no mood for dashes across the open, and surrendered without more ado. The story of how the two men gradually worked their way from one end of the trench to the other has been reconstructed from details supplied by Lieutenant Leach himself. They began at the corner D. Leach, who was armed with a revolver, could reach his hand round the corner and shoot along the section D E without exposing his body, but the German soldiers, who were armed only with rifles, could not return his fire without exposing part of their bodies. Whilst Leach was shooting along D E, Hogan was guarding the parapet F G to ward off surprise attacks, lest the Germans should crawl over from the section H I and take their two assailants in the rear, or shoot them down from above. When the Germans had been driven out of the section D E, the two men took up their stand at the corner G and repeated their manoeuvre along the section G H. The risks of the adventure were not lessened by Leach's now having to fire with his left hand in order not to expose his body. As the two men advanced section by section, Hogan, raising his hat on the end of his rifle above the parapet of the trench, signalled the progress that had been made to the main English trench in order that the fire from it might not sweep those portions of the captured position which had now been retaken. Corner after corner was successfully negotiated in this way, and when the two men were approaching the blind end of the trench they heard one of their own men—who had been taken prisoner in the morning—call out, "Don't shoot, the



Germans wish to surrender." Sixteen surrendered, seven had been killed by Leach in his progress along the trench, and in addition to these there were twenty wounded Germans in the trench who were also made prisoners.

It was a very brilliantly-conceived and unusual exploit. And many others, displaying equal daring and determination, might be extracted from the official lists of V.C. awards—in all too many instances of men whose decoration has been bought at the price of their lives.

Before leaving these records it may be noted that what seems, after some newspaper correspondence on the subject, to be definitely established as a quite unprecedented honour has fallen to the Royal Army Medical Corps, on some of whose members, serving under fire, is laid the noblest and most beautiful task that war can offer. The honour in this case was a clasp to a V.C. already awarded to Lieutenant Arthur Martin Leake. Lieutenant Leake won the Victoria Cross in the South African War, and the clasp to it was granted him "for most conspicuous bravery and devotion to duty throughout the campaign, especially during the period 29th October to 8th November, 1914, near Zonnebeke, in rescuing while exposed to constant fire a large number of the wounded who were lying close to the enemy's trenches."

AN HEROIC FRENCH DOCTOR.

For another example of things in the highest degree lovely and of good report which stand to the credit of this branch of the service—this time in an Ally's army—one may take the story of the French medical officer who was in charge of fifty-four German wounded in the Civil Hospital at Ypres when the first bombardment of that unhappy town was at its height. He had only volunteer assistants, and on November 9th reported that the hospital had been struck by six shells, one of them an incendiary shell. Bread was then failing, and his assistants were sharing their own with the wounded Germans. A more desperate situation, in which a man could only be supported by the highest ideals of duty, cannot be imagined. The position of the hospital, and the fact that it sheltered some of their own comrades, were known to the Germans; the doctor and his staff, regardless of their own peril, were trying to save men whose lives were being endangered by their own friends. To the inevitable suggestion that, as the Germans regarded these lives so lightly, there was no great call for the French to be concerned about them, the brave doctor returned the resolute reply that to abandon them would be to sink to the level of "the race of vandals" whose shells were striking the hospital. "So long as I remain here," he wrote in his report, "by your leave, I will continue to look after the wounded Germans, showing them that a French doctor laughs at their shells, and only knows his duty." His spirit infected his staff. Two nursing sisters who had abandoned their posts returned to the hospital weeping, driven back to their tasks by remorse and the force of example. In the last report that the gallant Frenchman ever wrote is included the following


brief picture of that stricken hospital, with its material misery and desolation side by side with the greatest spiritual grandeur:—

"I am continuing to dress the wounded. There are now only fifty-two. Two have just died. The others are in a very grave condition; their wounds are suppurating. All the men but one are in bed; one is suffering from tetanus."

Within the next three days the man who wrote it had been killed by a shell; faithful to the end, he had proved wonderfully that a French doctor "knows only his duty." And his sacrifice was not in vain. On the evening of November 14th it was possible to remove the surviving wounded from the care of the few nuns who were now their only guardians and take them to a place of greater safety.

A FEAT FROM THE MERCANTILE MARINE.

Naturally, not all the memorable stories of the war are supplied by the armed forces on land or sea. The German submarine menace put the courage and seamanship of our mercantile marine to a severe test; and the stories of submarines rammed, or of attempts to ram them, by unarmed vessels, and of brave and successful attempts to elude these insidious raiders, show how promptly that test was accepted. But even before the advent of the submarine "blockade," there were some stirring instances of daring, resourcefulness, and skill from the captains of British merchantmen. Captain Kinneir, of the steamship *Ortega*, who brought his vessel down an uncharted channel without "even a scratch on her plates," was the author of a fine feat, and one which was recognised by the Admiralty. It was in the days when there were still German cruisers abroad in the Pacific, and the *Ortega*, which had sailed from Valparaiso with three



The Military Cross, the new British decoration awarded for distinguished and meritorious service.

[Sport and General.

hundred French reservists on board, fell in with one near the western entrance to the Straits of Magellan. The German cruiser gave chase. The *Ortega*, which is a vessel of 8,000 tons, had a normal speed of fourteen knots; the cruiser of at least twenty-one. Captain Kinneir was faced with the alternatives of surrendering straight away, or of getting the last ounce out of his engines for just long enough to let him reach the entrance to Nelson Strait, into which he was pretty confident that the German cruiser would fear to follow him. He chose to attempt the escape, and with firemen, engineers, and volunteers stoking the vessel as she had never been stoked before, her speed was got up from fourteen to eighteen knots. She reached the entrance to the Strait, hotly pursued by the cruiser, who was firing on her, luckily without effect, with two



The result of a single German shell on a dwelling-house at Ypres.


[Newspaper Illustrations.]

heavy bow guns. Sure enough, the cruiser declined to follow, and then, with the pursuit at an end, began the passage of an entirely uncharted channel—in the words of the British Consul at Rio de Janeiro, “a narrow, tortuous passage, constituting a very nightmare for navigators, bristling, as it does, with reefs and pinnacle rocks, swept by fierce currents and tide rips, and with cliffs on either side sheer to the water without any anchorage.” With a navigating officer ahead of the ship in a boat, taking soundings and semaphoring the results to the liner, and with the whole crew on duty in engine room or on deck, the *Ortega* ventured into these perilous waters, and by a miracle of skilful seamanship, pluck, and good fortune, worked her way safely into Smith’s Channel and on to Punta Arenas, the most southerly town in the world. Either because the wish was father to the thought, or because they really felt confident that Nelson Strait would do to a vessel of the *Ortega*’s size what they had been unable to do, the German cruiser sent out a wireless message that the *Ortega* had “sunk with all hands.” And when he was safely in the Straits of Magellan Captain Kinneir met a Chilean warship which had been sent out to rescue “the survivors of the *Ortega*.”


THE SEQUEL TO THE EMDEN’S CAREER.

Another interesting story of the sea is that provided by the remnant of the *Emden*’s crew. There are large gaps in our knowledge of what did happen, but the points that are known are amply sufficient to indicate a very remarkable exploit. As most readers will remember, the full story of the famous German commerce raider did not end with the destruction of the vessel and the surrender of the greater part of her crew off Cocos Island

in November, 1914. When the *Sydney* arrived off Cocos Island the *Emden* had still ashore a landing party of forty




men and three officers, who had been despatched to wreck the cable station, and the German ship put out to meet

**H.M.S. Formidable.***[Topical Press.]*

An armed British aeroplane landing at a base on the Continent after a flight over the German lines.

[Topical War Service]

the *Sydney* without ever taking on board again her landing party. Though she had very little chance against the *Sydney's* fire, the *Emden's* formal surrender was curiously delayed; disabled by about eleven o'clock in the morning, it was not until late in the afternoon that she hauled down her flag. Rescue work occupied more of the *Sydney's* time until night was falling, and it was too late to get in touch with the cable station. All this time was not lost by the *Emden's* landing party, and when the *Sydney* did hear from the cable station on the following morning it was to learn the forty-three men had seized and provisioned the *Ayesha*, a seventy-ton schooner, and set sail in her the previous evening. It was the beginning of what was certainly a long and, in all probability, a hazardous voyage. According to the cable staff, the *Ayesha* was leaking when she was seized, and the pumps would have to be kept constantly at work—indeed, it was doubtful whether the remnant of the *Emden's* crew would get anywhere except to the bottom in her. The prophecy was not justified; in three weeks the *Ayesha* was laying in stores at Padang, a straight 830 miles away on the coast of Sumatra. This was probably in anticipation of the attempt which was afterwards carried to a successful conclusion, as far as the seafaring portion of it went—the plan to make right across the Indian Ocean for Arabia, and the nearest centre of Germany's



Turkish allies. The voyage took four months. The *Ayesha* left Sumatra on November 28th and landed on the Red Sea coast below Hodeida on March 27th, a distance of at least 4,100 miles. The risk of capture or attack at sea over, the perils of the land began. On their march inland the little party was attacked by Arabs, who harassed them for three days, and were only driven off at the expense of several casualties. The story ends with the wounded in hospital at Jeddah, and a Berlin wireless message accusing the English of having incited the Arabs to attack the party—a singularly futile charge, for the Arabs of the Yemen need little enough inciting against the Turks, and cannot be expected to have any greater love for Turkey's German allies.

THE END OF THE FORMIDABLE.

Stories of heroism or self-sacrifice in the navy could be multiplied as endlessly as in the army. The story of the sinking of the *Formidable*, with a loss of 546 officers and men, has already been told in this volume (page 45), but some of the details not mentioned in that account may well be given as examples of the traditional discipline and bravery of the British navy. In the long wait of over two hours in the darkness of a bitterly cold winter morning there was no panic. All the men were

assembled quietly on the upper deck, many of them in the slightest of clothing. All portable woodwork was brought above, and part of one of the decks pulled up to provide more floatable material. It was generally thought that the ship would float until dawn, and while the rest of the crew were waiting on the upper deck, each with some woodwork at his side, the turret crews endeavoured in vain to correct, by shifting the position of the guns, the terrible list which the ship had developed. At the end of another three-quarters of an hour it was evident that she would not float much longer—in addition to the list she was sinking by the head. Still there was no departure from discipline. With the vessel nearly flat on her side in the last ten minutes, some hundreds of men had climbed over the rails on to the side which was out of the water, and stood there in two ranks waiting for the order to move. It came at last in the captain's "Into the water with you, she's going!" and not until then did the men commit themselves to the darkness and the sea. One typical instance of individual heroism may be mentioned. Bugler S. C. Reed, of the Royal Marine Light Infantry, when he was advised to use his drum to keep himself afloat, replied that he had given it to one of the blue-jacket boys who seemed to have no very reliable support for the final plunge. This quiet little act of self-sacrifice—the bugler was not among the rescued—did not pass unnoticed. A war medal was sent to the boy's parents, as well as a letter from the Admiralty expressing their deep appreciation of the act.

ESCAPED PRISONERS.

Escaped prisoners have not provided many notable war stories. Barbed wire fencing is a more effective, if less picturesque, barrier than the dungeons of Bitche or Givet, and there are no stories of long tunnelling below rampart and palisade such as are provided by the record of Napoleon's prisoners. The two German officers who escaped at the beginning of April from the detention camp near Abergele, and wandered about the Welsh hills for a week before being recaptured, provide one instance of an escape; but beyond securing for themselves a short term of hard labour, and giving Easter holiday makers in North Wales a little additional excitement by opportunities to assist in numerous wild-goose chases, there are few notable details about the exploit. Very much more extraordinary—and very nearly successful—was the attempt made by a German officer to escape from the internment camp at Dorchester. By some means, which never very clearly emerged, he equipped himself with a large wooden box, a blanket, a rubber pillow filled with oxygen, two champagne bottles full of water, a bottle of meat extract, and a dozen or so bananas. The box was about three feet six inches square, and in this, doubled up with the belongings mentioned, the German was locked in by some accomplice. The opportunity to get the box out of the country arose out of the release of a number of aliens, all over military age, from the Dorchester concentration camp. They were being sent back to Germany, and were taken down to Tilbury under military escort for shipment to Rotterdam. A quantity of baggage accompanied them, and amongst it was included the box containing the German officer. It was a pretty plan, and one that was only discovered by an accident to the box as it was being transferred from the ferry boat to the steamer leaving for Holland. On account of the weight of the box, it was being turned over and over along the ferry boat deck to the gangway of the liner. Under this rough treatment the side gave way, and to the

astonishment of the men handling it, a man's head and arm appeared. The plot had failed, and perhaps the designer of it was not sorry at the moment, for he had been cramped up within his hiding place for fifteen hours, and was weak and dazed by the villainous knocking about that he had received. He had prepared himself for his journey with some thoroughness, as the pillow of oxygen showed. In the two corners of the box, straps had been fixed for the occupant's arms in order to hold him as steady as possible; and he claimed that he could have released himself from the box without outside aid at any time that he desired.

AIR FEATS AND THEIR PERFORMERS.

This was the first war to see the aeroplane established as a fighting arm, and the records of its services are full of instances of daring backed up by the highest degree of skill. The raid on Friedrichshafen, involving as it did a winter flight over the high hills separating German and French territory, was a particularly brilliant performance, quite apart from the military value of the damage done to the airship sheds. In reconnaissance work over the enemy's lines and artillery the superiority established at an early period of the war by English and French airmen over those of the Germans was proved in numerous daring feats. The French airman, Lieutenant Garros, had many to his credit. His resourcefulness was well illustrated in November, when he had an accident to his motor while pursuing a German aeroplane behind the German lines. Realising that he was bound to descend, he deliberately drove his machine to earth as violently as he dare, and after the crash lay as though dead. The German brought his Taube to earth, and ran up to what he took to be the dead or helpless pilot of the French machine. Thereupon Garros rose to his feet, shot the German with his revolver, climbed into the Taube, and in it got safely back to the French lines. On another similar occasion he was less fortunate, and, being forced to descend within the German lines near Roulers, he was taken prisoner on April 18th. He was the hero of many successful air duels, and only two days before his capture had brought down a German aeroplane near Dunkirk, shooting both pilot and observer in mid-air.

With too many of the airmen's exploits it is impossible to give the names of those who performed them, owing to official reticence over such particulars. The story of a French lieutenant observer and sergeant pilot who had been ordered to locate a German battery is one of these cases. They carried out their task and turned to fly for their base under a deadly shell fire. The pilot was blinded and the observer mortally wounded, yet, guided by the dying lieutenant, the blind pilot brought his machine safely back to the French lines. A very magnificent piece of fortitude on the part of an English airman would also have remained anonymous if it had been left in the form in which it was described by "Eye-witness." (It formed a starting point for some shrewd newspaper criticism of the curious attitude adopted by the British authorities, an attitude whereby feats of great gallantry on the part of men and regiments were frequently given out without any disclosure of the performer's identity.) Towards the end of April, Lieutenant Rhodes-Moorhouse, in one of a series of air raids on rail-heads behind the German lines, set out for the station at Courtrai in a biplane and alone. From a height of three hundred feet he dropped a large bomb on the railway junction, and, being the target for a great concentration of anti-aircraft weapons, was wounded. It was not a very serious wound, and he might have descended and so saved his life, even at the

expense of his liberty. Instead, he turned for the British lines in order to deliver his report and save his machine from capture. Flying now at a height of only a hundred feet, in order to get up a greater speed, he was wounded again. He flew on back to his own base, landed without damage to his machine, and delivered his report before being taken to the hospital. There he died shortly afterwards, leaving as his memorial what the official chronicler of his deed—who yet withheld the name of its author—described as "one of the most heroic episodes of the war."

A lighter but by no means insignificant air exploit was that of the British airman who flew over the Lille aerodrome, where a number of German troops were quartered, on April 1st. From a great height he dropped down upon the Germans a football. Seeing it descending, the men below scattered in all directions, taking it for a large bomb. It hit the earth, bounced up again for a considerable distance—and still the Germans remained under cover, thinking that it was exploded by a time fuse. When they did venture forth to examine, with great caution the bomb that had failed, they found on it the inscription:—"April fool. Gott strafe England!" The incident is a very consoling example of the difference between the German and English tempers—it is not easy to think of a German risking his life in this way—for the airman was risking his life, and might just as easily have dropped a genuine bomb—for no more important end than to taunt his enemies. It was man in his doublet and hose without having put off any of his wit, and one cannot imagine a more stinging and satisfactory reply to the dull folly of the German "campaign of hate" against this country.

THE MOST MOVING TALES OF ALL.

Heroism, gaiety, and devotion to duty will never lack recognition in war, wherever the instances of them can be ascertained. But some of the most deeply-moving stories of all have had little to do with these qualities—they have been played out when these typical virtues of the soldier have served their end and left behind only some grievously wounded man waiting release. It is just as well to remember that this is a war in which, side by side with all the high spirits and gay determination, all the "Hymns of Hate," and all the just anger at the most ghastly excesses of "frightfulness," more generous and humane men than in any previous war have gone out to a task essentially abhorrent to them, supported in it only by the loftiest conception of duty. And having served that conception almost to the end, it is not very surprising to hear of the older faiths and charities asserting themselves in the little interval before the end arrived. Such instances have been gathered now and then from soldiers' letters. From one is gleaned the story of "one of our lads who was at the point of death" noticing a wounded German, and saying to the stretcher bearer, "Look in my haversack and you will find some grub. Give it to that German chap—he's half starved." The gift was taken by the German with gratitude, and the next day he begged to be allowed to have a last look at his benefactor before he was buried. Another strange, sad story—sadder, perhaps, than any other story of the war because of the realised hopelessness of the dying man's sacrifice—was told in the letter of an English sergeant:—

"I stopped for a few seconds by the side of a German who was dying. He was in great pain, and when I asked what I could do for him he said, in a pathetic tone that went to my heart, 'Nothing, unless you would be so good as to hold my hand till all is over.' I gave him my hand and stayed to the end. It seemed to comfort that poor

chap a lot. He was able to speak good English, and we had quite a pleasant chat, considering the circumstances. He thought the war would last another year at least, but had no doubt that his own country would be beaten in the end."

In another case it was three mortally-wounded men of three nations who were thrown together by the hazard of battle. The facts were given in a letter written from hospital by a dying French officer to his betrothed. When on the field he first roused himself to consciousness after being wounded in a cavalry charge, he found two other wounded men endeavouring to bind up his wounds—an officer in a Scottish regiment and a German private. His letter continued :—

"The Highlander had one of his legs shattered, and the German had several pieces of shrapnel buried in his side. In spite of their own sufferings they were trying to help me, and when I was fully conscious again the German gave us a morphia injection and took one himself. His medical corps had provided him with the injection and the needle, together with printed instructions for its use.

"After the injection, feeling wonderfully at ease, we

spoke of the lives we had lived before the war. We all spoke English, and we talked of the women we had left at home. Both the German and the Britisher had only been married a year. . . .

"I wondered, and I suppose the others did, why we had fought each other at all. I looked at the Highlander, who was falling asleep exhausted, and in spite of his drawn face and mudstained uniform he looked the embodiment of freedom. Then I thought of the Tricolour of France and all that France had done for liberty. Then I watched the German, who had ceased to speak. He had taken a Prayer-book from his knapsack and was trying to read a service for soldiers wounded in battle."

The French soldier answered his own question in the only way which could bring anything but irremediable sadness into this strange chance meeting :—


". . . while I watched him I realised what we were fighting for. . . . He was dying in vain, while the Britisher and myself, by our deaths, would probably contribute something toward the cause of civilisation and peace."

It is the only thought which can atone for such sacrifices as these.



French troops who have distinguished themselves receiving their decorations.

[Wyndham, Paris (C.N.).



The Guards in London in war time : Grenadier Guards leaving Buckingham Palace, with the Prince of Wales bearing the colours. [Central News.



The Guards on parade in peace time.

[Topical Press.



The 1st Life Guards at mounted sword drill in Hyde Park.

[Sport and General.

CHAPTER XVIII.

SOME REGIMENTAL RECORDS IN THE WAR.

A SOLDIERS' WAR—THE REGIMENT AS THE SOUL OF THE ARMY—THE SECOND MANCHESTERS IN THE RETREAT FROM MONS—THE FIRST MANCHESTERS AT GIVENCHY—THE WORCESTERS AND WILTSHIRES AT YPRES.

A CONNECTED record of the fighting done by individual regiments has been made extremely difficult from two separate causes. The refusal of the military authorities to allow accredited war correspondents to accompany the army in the field has deprived us of a detailed account of what the several regiments have done, and the exercise of a strict censorship has completed the dearth of news from the field of operations. The despatches of General Sir John French have told us of the coolness, courage, intrepidity, and determination of our troops as a whole, but what this or that regiment has done has to be gleaned from the letters of officers and the special army and divisional orders which have from time to time been issued. All that can be done here is to select one or two typical regiments, and as far as possible to recount their services. The regiments so treated are not to be taken as having done better than their fellows, for all branches of the service—combatant and non-combatant (Regulars and Territorials, and Colonials)—have displayed the greatest gallantry, and earned the highest praise from the officers placed over them.

"This war is essentially what is known as a soldier's war," Sir John French has said. That is to say, it is a regimental war. The higher formations of Divisions and Army Corps are necessary both for tactical and strategical reasons. But the men in the trenches, though they do not as a rule know to what corps or division they belong, never forget that they belong to a regiment famous in history and possessed of noble traditions. The regiment is one and indivisible; it is indestructible. It lives even though officers and men fall and are buried within sound of the guns. Its colours and appointments speak eloquently of the deeds of those who were of the regiment in the past, and the glory and honour which are

won to-day will be shared by those to whom these great and noble achievements will be an encouragement and inspiration in the future. In war the personnel of a regiment changes rapidly. The regiments that faced the enemy in the early part of the fighting have already been completely transformed, and at the end of the war, when the regiments return bringing their honours with them, the majority of officers and men who have so heroically fought to maintain the honour and reputation of their regiment, and have thereby added further honours to the list, will not return to share in the triumphant welcome of a grateful country. But they will still have their place in the life of the regiment, and will be honoured, as they deserve to be honoured, in the regimental records.

In the following pages the Manchesters are selected as a typical regiment of the industrial North, and the Worcesters as typical of the regiments recruited from country districts.

THE MANCHESTERS IN THE RETREAT FROM MONS.

The Gallant Manchesters were among the first of our troops to meet the German attack. The Second Battalion, commanded by Colonel H. L. James, was at Curragh Camp when war broke out, and the First Battalion, commanded by Colonel Strickland, C.M.G., D.S.O., was in India. The Second Battalion left Ireland on August 13th, and reached Havre three days later. Le Cateau was the battalion's destination, and on August 18th Colonel James and his men had got within striking distance of the enemy's lines. The battalion at war strength totals 1,015 men, which for fighting purposes may be called 900. At the end of two months' desperately hard fighting thirty-five officers (the full complement is twenty-seven) had been lost in killed, wounded, or prisoners, and there were 800 casualties among the men.




The 2nd Battalion Manchester Regiment photographed on parade at the Curragh at the beginning of August, 1914, just before leaving for the front.

After the battle of Mons, where the Manchesters held the ground to the south of the canal between Pommereul and Thun, they retired at nightfall in the direction of Dour, about four miles away. Most of the fighting in this initial action fell to two companies. When they reached Dour they bivouacked on some rough ground. For several hours they had been marching under the most trying conditions. Officers and men were tired and hungry, wanting rest and finding none. At dawn on August 24th shells were again dropping among them, and again they were driven from the trenches by the enemy's activity on their flank. His enfilading fire was very destructive, and eventually the battalion was allotted a position which offered better facilities for resistance. The Manchesters were at this time fighting what was to all intents and purposes a rearguard action—one of the most difficult and responsible operations in war—and for five hours they held back the pursuing army, two hours longer than they were expected to do, because the order to retire had miscarried. When the order to fall back did reach them they were in a most perilous position. They had held their ground at all costs, and at last a hurried flight was the one alternative to certain annihilation. This brave show of resistance heartened the men considerably. They had now begun to feel that the enemy would not be allowed to have his own way, and that, whilst they might be driven back a few miles, they were prepared seriously to contest the ground and thereby maintain the reputation they had gained in other fields. No troops had harder work to do than the Manchesters at this time, and none came out of it with a greater reputation. The next day the Manchesters and other troops fell back on Bavai, the rearguard being composed of two companies of the Second Manchesters (A and C) and a detachment of the East Surreys. The German advance was now pressed forward, and a constant shower of bullets from bursting shrapnel failed to break up their ranks.

AT LE CATEAU.

At nine o'clock at night the men were in bivouac at Le Cateau, and were supplied with rations—one of the two things they were most in need of. The other was sleep. They had just six hours in which to refresh themselves and to prepare for another desperate encounter, for Colonel James had received orders that the British rearguard must make a stand when next they got into touch with the enemy, and they knew he was close upon them. Notwithstanding the terribly anxious time through which they had passed, and the critical time which was to come, the men off duty slept soundly. They had a covering of straw to sleep upon—a great luxury, and although embarrassed by their heavy marching kit, they made themselves tolerably comfortable until three a.m. (August 26th), when the retirement was continued to Reanmont, the enemy pressing hard all the time. But a stand had to be made in order to allow the main body to get away and prepare a position for desperate defence. The Second Suffolks were appointed to hold a line from the Reanmont Road, facing north-east towards Le Cateau, and the Manchesters prepared for themselves a defensive position just in rear of the Suffolks, B Company acting as an advanced post on the left of the Suffolks, between their line and the road, and a platoon drawn from C Company, with a machine gun, supported the Suffolk's right flank. About seven o'clock these positions were swept by a heavy concentrated fire. The enemy had located this defensive

position, and from the heavy bombardment which took place it would appear that they anticipated a stand. The Suffolks were in desperate straits. They could not reply to the enemy's fire because it was concealed, and their ranks were thinning rapidly. Colonel James grasped the situation, and accompanied by Captain Nisbet, the Adjutant of the Manchesters, he rushed forward with a detachment of his men to their support. But before the trenches were gained A Company had lost many men. Meanwhile, B Company drove from a hill an advance force of the enemy which threatened a flanking movement, and the casualties included Captain Nisbet, who was killed by a shot through the head while encouraging his men in the rush against the enemy's position. About one hundred men of C Company were struggling against a searching enfilade fire from machine guns. Captain Knox was with them, and he and many others fell. There was no cover for them, artificial or other; and the shower of bullets pumped from the machine gun, at the rate of four hundred rounds a minute, proved very deadly. Another company of the Manchesters covered the right flank, where some Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders had already done some brilliant work. There were, therefore, something in the nature of three detached—although one and the same—fights. The ground was scattered with wounded officers and men, some of whom shouted words of encouragement to their comrades who were still able actively to engage the enemy. It was a series of despairing rallies and desperate assaults. But the position had to be held at all costs, and the Manchesters, of Cæsar's Camp fame, were the men to do it without flinching. They were practically offered as a sacrifice in order that the main army might extricate itself from a perilous position. The cost was not a trifling one. The battalion was broken and scattered. The field was strewn with brave men, some killed outright; others were dying; many suffering great pain; and those who were fortunate enough to escape with minor injuries tried, in vain, to raise their rifle to the shoulder in a last effort to save their comrades who were falling around them. But the fierce German attack defied anything to live above ground, and even the trenches were not immune. Colonel James had lost half his battalion, including many officers, in this fine fight. The time limit had been reached; the position had been held; the main army was for the moment out of danger; and now it remained for the Battalion Commander to gather up the fragments of his brave battalion. This he proceeded to do with great coolness, whilst the stretcher bearers performed their allotted task. It was a sad and yet glorious end to a day's fighting, for the German advance was checked so effectively by the magnificent stand of the rearguard that time was given for the preparation of a camp at Estrées, where the roll was called, scattered units re-formed, the loss of each estimated, arrangements made for much-needed reinforcements, food and rest obtained, and fresh orders issued for the continuance of the fight. What remained of the Second Manchesters continued bravely to assist the rearguard in its retirement. The battalion had lost by now 350 of all ranks. Captains Wymer and Morley, and Lieutenants Butler, Miller, Burrows, and Whyte were wounded and prisoners, and Captains Theobald and Knox and Lieutenants Thomas and Albrecht were severely wounded and sent to England. One of the officers, wounded in a later action, said: "Everybody did well. The position was held for about five hours. The German machine guns and artillery did the damage. The latter outnumbered ours by about four



The Guards marching past at Aldershot in peace time.

[Topical Press.



War recruits to the Coldstream Guards at rifle drill.

[Central News.

to one, and their aeroplanes ("Dirty Dickies," the men called them) did great work. Harper did splendidly with his machine guns, and although he lost them and most of his men, he managed to smash the vital parts before they fell into the enemy's hands."

FROM THE MARNE TO FLANDERS.

From August 27th to September 3rd the troops were marching and bivouacking, and marching again, the monotony of these duties being varied by acting as a rearguard. Thus they reached the Marne, where a detachment of 93 men made good to that extent the earlier losses. On September 9th the Manchesters had been in the field twelve days. In that short time they had marched 200 miles, and had taken part in some of the fiercest fighting of any troops since the war began. On September 9th the battalion began the advance from Tournay, and perhaps by way of a compliment to their fighting spirit the Manchesters were the advanced guard. The Marne was crossed at Saareg without opposition, but just beyond the river the battalion were subjected to a heavy fire from the German batteries. The shells were bursting in front of the line and behind it. Fragments of shell mutilated and shattered limbs, and the bullets placed many more out of action. The time of this action was about four o'clock in the afternoon, and as little headway could be made in the face of the fire, the

wounded could not be got to cover. Consequently, the fighting men were greatly handicapped in their movements. An officer, who was one of the victims, said the wounded spent a dreadful night. "It was about 4 p.m., and some of us weren't found till about 8-30 a.m. the next day. It was beastly cold during the night, and it came on to rain at daylight—a nice, wetting rain. The men had no overcoats, and my Burberry was on my saddle, unfortunately. The Germans let us have it if we moved at all, and I had to growl at the wounded men near me to lie still. We were between our own firing line, or part of it, and that of the Germans, and it was 'dirty work,' as we got the short ones (bullets) all round us for a bit;

luckily none of us were touched again. They (the wounded men) were awfully plucky, and although badly injured, hardly uttered a groan." In an attack on a force holding a wood, Lieutenants Chittenden and Smith were killed, Captain Foord was severely wounded, and 105 non-commissioned officers and men were killed or wounded.

The Manchesters crossed the Aisne on a pontoon raft on September 13th, and on the following day Lieutenant Moore was wounded, and in an attempt to take Chivres village, under a heavy enfilade fire, the list of killed and wounded was added to. Night attacks, too, were frequent, and further losses in an already greatly depleted battalion were recorded. Chivres Wood, six miles east of Soissons, was occupied by the Manchesters on September 16th.

The Germans had been turned out of this wood three days before, and the Manchesters were holding the trenches against them. The wood was a swamp, and the trenches were several inches deep in water. An officer who joined the battalion on the Aisne (since wounded), describing the conditions in this part of the battlefield, said:—"The men sat on bully-beef tins, or anything else they could get, to keep them out of the water. The Germans were never more than 200 yards away in their trenches, and sniping went on all the time. Our men were relieved every three days. The men got reckless, and put up their heads to see what was going on, and every now and then a man got caught. Most of the men who got hit in the trenches were shot




The Guards leaving the Tower of London.

[Topical War Service.]

in the head, and usually they were killed. Food and relief could only be got at night, and it was under the cover of darkness that the wounded were removed and the dead were buried. We used to have a burial party nearly every night. I had a Prayer Book, and I used to read the Burial Service by the light of an electric torch."

The trenches near Soissons were held by the Manchesters for a week. Then Sir John French moved his army into Flanders. The position assigned to the Second Manchesters was in the neighbourhood of La Bassée, but the Germans would not allow them to take it. From October 11th to the end of the month the Manchesters were engaged constantly. During this trying time Colonel



Recruits to the Grenadier Guards at physical drill at Caterham, where the Brigade of Foot Guards depot is established,

[Central News.]



Scots Guards in training at Caterham.

[Central News.]

James fell sick and was invalided home. Late in October the Manchesters reached Lorgies, where they found that the Germans had billeted in the church there, for the nave was covered with straw and very dirty. Their horses were stabled in the houses of the villagers, the inhabitants being turned out to make room for them. For a day or two in this district the usual sniping proceeded without intermission. On October 20th there was a clash of steel. Less than 100 of the Manchesters dashed at the enemy. By sheer steel and sheer courage the Manchesters won their desperate way through the enemy's lines. These hundred men charged a German regiment, but in the heat of the battle they went too far, and suffered heavily from machine guns. This charge was led by Captain Tillard, and was a particularly gallant affair. Another fierce fight which showed the mettle of the Manchesters took place on October 29th. From early morning the Germans shelled their trenches, and they had to take refuge in the supporting trenches about fifty yards behind. The Germans tried to rush the supporting trench, but they were all shot down. Lieutenant Bentley was killed in the first rush, and Lieutenant Reade, who was acting as Adjutant since the death of Captain Nisbet, was killed in the second attack. "Learning this," writes a wounded officer, "I hurried to the trench, seized a rifle, and made more bull's-eyes than ever I made in my life. We stopped the rush. One man fired at me point-blank from a few yards' distance. Instead of hitting me, he hit the bank, and drove the dirt into my eye with such force as to blind me. Second-Lieutenant Leach and Sergeant Hogan made a gallant and successful effort to recapture the trench, which they did after hard fighting." (Both have since received the Victoria Cross, p. 163.) Leach had a marvellous escape, and both he and Hogan returned unwounded. The same night our line of trenches was taken over by the Second Battalion of the Eighth Gurkhas. They were busily adjusting the trenches to suit their size when they were attacked by the Germans. There was a desperate fight, in which the Gurkhas lost nine out of eleven officers and 320 men. The Gurkhas were driven out, but, with the assistance of a Sikh regiment, they gallantly attacked again, and before the morning the Indians had recaptured the trenches. The total Manchester losses up to the end of October were estimated at about 1,000 officers and men.

THE TWO BATTALIONS MEET.


The First Manchesters went to France with the Indian Expeditionary Army, and joined the Second Battalion in the trenches. This was the first time the two battalions of the regiment had met since they were in Egypt in 1882. The arrival of the foreign service battalion was heartily welcomed. The men could hardly bear the privation of a cheer; to have to stifle their emotions on such an occasion seemed to them to be one of the greatest hardships that could be suffered. But there are ways and means of welcoming comrades on the battlefield, and a reunion after a separation extending over thirty-two years was not allowed to take place without some outward and visible sign of rejoicing. The First Manchesters got into touch with the enemy on October 23rd (five days after their landing in France), near Laventie. The battalion had not at this time been brought from a peace to a war footing. It had only eight hundred officers and men, which is the normal peace footing. The armies had "gone to earth" when Colonel Strickland's men entered the war area, and under cover of darkness they crept stealthily to the trenches to share the hardships

and endure the discomforts common to all soldiers engaged in siege warfare. They had to wait until December before they could distinguish themselves.

THE FIGHT AT GIVENCHY.


The Baluchis and the Gurkhas, as already has been related (p. 144), had been repulsed in the neighbourhood of Givenchy, and the trenches which they had held were now in the hands of the enemy. The village of Givenchy, it was reported, was still unoccupied, and Colonel Strickland ordered two companies to go forward and hold it, with Major Hitchins in command of the attacking line. No. 1 Company, commanded by Captain Tillard, was to be on the left of the line; No. 2 Company, commanded by Lieutenant Mair, on the right. As soon as the village was secure these two companies had orders to advance steadily towards the enemy's trenches beyond, and No. 3 Company (Captain Creagh) was to take up a position on the right of No. 2. The advance was begun at three o'clock in the afternoon, and it was immediately opposed by a heavy rifle fire. Lieutenant Lynch and about twelve men fell. But the line steadily advanced. The enemy had found effective cover, from which they rained lead on our men; but they showed no sign of wavering. Men fell, but the line just steadily advanced with that grim determination to accomplish the work in hand. Presently the village was reached, but it was not clear of the enemy, as had been reported. The opposition was overcome, and when night came on Captain Tillard's men had made good the ground through the left of the village, and had taken possession of some of our trenches in an orchard. Meanwhile, Lieutenant Mair's Company advanced up the right centre of the village, and No. 3 Company came up on the right, and then the whole line advanced to our old support trenches. No. 1 Company was well to the left of the other companies, and in advance of them. The Germans were in our old fire trenches, from which they poured a heavy fire on the movements of the Manchesters. Unfortunately, Captain Tillard's Company was the only one of the three able to give an effective reply. The other two companies were not able to define the enemy's trenches, and as the Germans concentrated their fire on No. 1 there was a fear that they would be annihilated, and the remaining companies left in a position from which it would be difficult to retire without heavy loss. The officers decided at once that Captain Tillard must be supported, and Nos. 2 and 3 made an attempt to crawl over the open ground to the trenches of No. 1. It was now dark, and as the Germans had set on fire two haystacks this movement to support Captain Tillard's men was clearly seen. The crawling men were for the time defenceless, and their comparatively slow movement across the open ground presented a good target for the German snipers. This supporting movement had failed. The men who essayed the task were left on the ground wounded, and Lieutenant Norman was killed. The position now was that No. 1 Company was unsupported from the trenches on the left which had been vacated by the Gurkhas, and Nos. 2 and 3 Companies could not get in touch with the Rifles, who maintained their original position on the right, between the village and the canal.

The extreme British right was held by the Connaught Rangers, south of the canal. Late at night an order was received that another attempt must be made to recapture the trenches still in the hands of the enemy. Accordingly, Nos. 2 and 3 Companies moved to the attack early on the Monday morning, but it did not develop, because No. 1 Company, being in such desperate straits, could not




Men of the North Midland Division of the Territorial Army cheering the King, who inspected them just before they left for the front.

[Central News.]



British Columbia Infantry marching past the King and Lord Kitchener at the inspection on Salisbury Plain before the Canadians left for Franco.

[Topical Press.]



The honours list of the Northumberland Fusiliers worked out in stone and flowers as part of the St. George's Day celebrations at Boldon Camp, Northumberland.

[Central News.]

advance, and the other companies re-established themselves in the old trenches that had just been vacated. In this attack Captain Creagh was killed, and Major Hitchins (since promoted) and Captain Rose were wounded. About eight o'clock Lieutenant Parminter brought up the last half company and joined Companies 2 and 3. The whole battalion, together with a company of the Fourth Suffolks (Territorials), was again in the old support trenches, and both their left and right flanks were still open. Since the fighting in the village only No. 1 Company had had the opportunity of firing a shot. At midday the enemy made a desperate attempt to turn the Manchesters out of their position. For one hour they continuously shelled their trenches, and then the left of the position was strongly attacked,

and the occupants of the trenches here were forced to retire. This was the beginning of a general retirement, which was covered by No. 2 Company. This company fought on against odds, and suffered many losses. In the course of time the enemy advanced on the left, and were heavily enfiladed by Lieutenant Mair's Company, and compelled to retire. But this company could not hold out much longer. Numerically it had been greatly weakened, and individual exhaustion was telling its tale. The Battalion Commander was informed by messenger of the state of affairs, and he and Captain Heelis (Adjutant) rallied the battalion and established the line in the supporting trenches. No. 2 Company was reinforced, but the

fierce onslaught of the Germans compelled a general retirement through the village to Le Pont Fixe. During the whole of this retirement the men were shelled by the enemy.

The First Manchesters were continuously in action at Givenchy for above thirty hours. The casualties were heavy—five officers and 300 men—but the men had succeeded in holding an important position. The Commander of the Division, in a message to the Commander of the Brigade, said "Givenchy was the most important point in the whole line held by the division," and we had held it "against overwhelming odds and successive attacks by the enemy." The regiment was afterwards addressed

on parade by the Commander of the Brigade, who thanked the officers and men for their "splendid behaviour at Givenchy," and for saving "what was becoming a very serious situation." The Commander of the Division also addressed the regiment, and referred to their "magnificent piece of work," about which, "in my report to higher authorities, I could only use the term 'Gallant Manchesters.'" He said that "at that period the village of Givenchy was the most important point in the whole British line," and told the regiment that they were "a very brave set of men." Subsequently the regiment was addressed by the Commander of the Indian Army. He said: "Colonel Strickland, officers, and men of the First Manchester Regiment, I want to thank you for

your very fine bit of work in the last fight. You are a very gallant battalion. You were holding the most important point on the right of the British line, and by your gallant conduct in holding on to it you rendered greater service than you probably realised. I want to tell Colonel Strickland in front of you all what I think of him. He is a first-class soldier, and you are a brave lot of men. I shall not fail in my report to the Commander-in-Chief to bring to notice your conduct and that of those recommended for reward, and shall do my best to obtain some suitable reward for them."

THE IRISH GUARDS.

Not far from the Manchesters in the battle of Mons was the Brigade of Guards, with Brigadier General Scott-

Kerr as its commander. This officer was wounded in the early stages of the retreat from Mons, and the Brigade command, since that time, has been held by Lord Cavan. The Grenadiers, the Coldstreams, and the Scots Guards date their existence from 1660. These regiments have won fame on many a hard-fought field, and in the present war each have suffered heavy loss, both in the commissioned and the non-commissioned ranks. The Irish Guards is the youngest of the King's Foot Guards. It was formed in 1902 as a mark of Queen Victoria's appreciation of the services rendered by the various Irish Regiments of the Line in the South African war, and in this their first campaign they have shown that, like their comrades



Canadian Field Artillery colours deposited in Westminster Abbey while the batteries are at the front. [Record Press.]

in the Brigade, they are soldiers possessing the highest fighting qualities and worthy to be associated with regiments that have already gained a reputation in the field. Although the Irish Guards cannot claim a long and glorious history, during the last eight months they have made regimental history which will inspire to great and heroic deeds those that come after them.

In the retreat from Mons the Irishmen fought bravely and tenaciously, and held their ground until compelled by a furious cannonade to evacuate it. As soon as a position became untenable they returned to another, and fought again until driven back by largely superior numbers.

It speaks well for the men that in the face of repulse they went into the battle as steadily as ever, using their bullets and their bayonets with deadly effect in the face of shrapnel and the devastation wrought by machine gun and rifle fire. In these earlier engagements the Irish Guards behaved splendidly, and although their comrades were falling thickly around them they never wavered. Brigadier-General Scott-Kerr was one of the first officers to fall wounded, and Lieutenant-Colonel Morris and his second-in-command were killed. Major H. Herbert-Stepney succeeded to the command, and has since been killed, and Lieutenant-Colonel Lord Ardee, who was attached to the Irish Guards from the Grenadiers, held the command of the battalion for a short time only before he was added to the casualty list.

The following statement appeared in Regimental Orders later:—"On October 31st, November 1st and 6th, the Irish Guards lost sixteen officers and 597 other ranks in disputing 200 yards of ground with superior forces. On November 1st one platoon, under Lieutenant Woodroffe (since killed), remained all day at their posts, and only withdrew at nightfall. The battalion was splendidly reorganised by Captain Orr-Ewing and Captain Trefusis, and was very soon a fighting unit once more. While the battalion as a whole have thus done so well, individual members of it, both officers and men, have won for themselves distinguished honour. The President of the French Republic has conferred the Croix de Chevalier of the Legion of Honour on Lieutenant the Hon. H. R. L. G. Alexander (now Captain Alexander), and the Medaille Militaire of the Legion of Honour on Company-Sergeant-Major J. Rodgers. The Distinguished Conduct Medal has been awarded by the King to Company-Sergeant-Major A. Munns, Lance-Sergeant P. McGoldrick, Lance-Corporal M. Riordan, Private W. G. Russell, and Private M. Glynn."

THE HEROES OF YPRES.

The "Vein-openers" is the nickname of the Worcesters. It was given to them by the inhabitants of Boston, America, because they are said to have been the first to draw blood at the beginning of the American War in 1770. "The Old and Bold" and "The Star of the Line" are other nicknames by which the Worcesters are known in the service. The regiment gained the former in the Peninsular war, and the latter is derived from the fact that the men wear an eight-pointed star on their pouches, a distinction which is peculiar to the Worcesters. The Twenty-ninth (or First Battalion) were permitted to retain the star, it is

said, through the influence of Queen Charlotte. The regimental motto is "Firm." In the present war they have maintained their right to that motto, and their past records in all parts of the world, and the valour they have displayed in the last eight months on the Belgian frontier and in France, completely justifies their retention of the unofficial designation "Old and Bold."

The Worcesters and the Wiltshires, two typical rural regiments, are the heroes of Ypres. They behaved with coolness and consummate bravery in checking the German attack at Mons, and at Ypres their gallant conduct saved a critical situation. Although compelled to retreat by a numerically superior enemy, they were not defeated. Addressing the First Battalion on their great work at Ypres, Sir John French, on November 26th, 1914, said:—"Worcestershires, I am very glad to have this opportunity of addressing you. On October 31st we were in a very critical position. At Headquarters we received the report that the village of Gheluvelt, an extremely important strategic point, had been taken by the enemy. Matters looked most critical. Shortly after, I was informed that the village of Gheluvelt had been recaptured by a counter-attack. Since then I have made repeated enquiries as to what officer was responsible for the conduct of this counter-stroke, and have invariably received the reply that it was the Worcestershire Regiment who carried out this attack. I have, therefore, in my despatch to the Secretary of State so mentioned it, and said it was the Worcestershire Regiment who took the action in relieving this critical state. You bear on your colours the names of many famous victories, and in this war you have added lustre to your former reputation. No man can say what the future has in store for us, but I have every confidence that in the future you will conduct yourself with the same soldierly bearing as in the past."

The Wiltshires and the Royal Scots Fusiliers also fought gallantly, and lost heavily in saving the position at Ypres. Each unit when it reached Belgium was at full war strength, and at the end of four days' fighting had not more than two hundred men left. General Sir John Hart Dunne, Colonel of the Wiltshire Regiment, records that the Second Wiltshires took up an entrenched position five miles east of Ypres, and for six days the Division to which the Wiltshires and the Worcesters belonged (about 20,000 strong) held its ground against at least two army corps of 80,000 men. The Second Wiltshires were placed in what was regarded as the key of the position held by the brigade, with orders that under no circumstances were the men to retire from the trenches. After some days of continued firing, the Germans got the exact range of the trenches occupied by the Wiltshires and broke them completely. The enemy then made a general attack along the whole line, sending forward an enormous column against the Second Wiltshires, who in charging them became mixed up with the enemy, and practically the whole battalion were killed, wounded, or captured. The German object of turning the position was not attained, for within two hours a British Army Corps arrived and routed them. The remainder of the brigade suffered greatly, but it is agreed that if the Second Wiltshires had not held the position for four days the brigade would have been driven back into Ypres.



Belgians waiting to draw an allowance of soup.

[Photopress.]

CHAPTER XIX.

THE CONDITION OF BELGIUM.

THE PROBLEM—GERMAN REQUISITIONS—THE FORMING OF THE AMERICAN COMMISSION—THE SCHEME IN BEING—SCENES AT THE CANTEENS—HOLLAND AND THE REFUGEES.


WHEN the German tide of conquest had rolled to its limit over Belgium in the early autumn, there remained in the country a population of some seven millions. Five hundred thousand had fled to throw themselves on the hospitality of Holland, France, and Britain, and the wastage of war accounted for some 200,000, but the great mass of the people clung to their homes, even when these were in ruins. After the first panic of invasion sixty to eighty per cent of the inhabitants returned to the chief towns, and, living often in cellars or behind charred, broken, and roofless walls, awaited the regeneration of their country. An American who visited the country districts of Belgium in the autumn reported that in many the peasantry had "no home in which to sleep, no seed to sow with, no implements to work with, no transport with which to reach a market, and no heart to struggle against the impossible." It soon became clear that to these horrors would be added that of actual starvation, not of the poorest, or in certain districts, but of the nation as a whole. Belgium was ringed with steel. She had no exports and no imports. Her industries were paralysed, for even the threat of shooting had not compelled the workers to give their labour for the benefit of their conquerors. In any case, the revival of an economic life was made impossible by the fact that the army of occupation monopolised the means of transport and supply. There was no postal service. Movement by the inhabitants was forbidden, and metallic currency had almost ceased. In normal times Belgium imported two-thirds of her foodstuffs. She consumed more wheat per head of her population

than any European nation, and grew only twenty-two per cent of what she consumed. In peace she was essentially an industrial country, with five-sixths of her population dependent on mining, manufacturing, and allied industries. Her food supply was based on imports paid for by the exports of this labour. By the middle of August the levies of the Germans, the consumption of the population, and the stoppage of exports brought her face to face with a bread famine. There was enough meat and potatoes in the country to last, if carefully used, for several weeks, but without 80,000 tons of cereals per month the population could not face the winter.

Neutral opinion was not slow to point Germany's obligations in the matter. "Morally," said the *New York World*, "the Belgian people are as much a charge on the Imperial Government at Berlin as any of its prisoners of war." "The nation which is most liable" said the *New York Sun*, "should see to it that no man, woman, or child starves or freezes this winter because of the 'military necessity' that made desolation of a million homes." This warmth of feeling in America was soon to take shape in the most amazing charitable enterprise the world has ever known. Meanwhile, the German reply was that if the Belgians cared to work under German rule, and if the British navy ceased to bar trade with Antwerp, Belgium need not starve; but that Germany's resources would not be more than sufficient to feed her own people till the end of the war, and that she was not going to take on the burden of another seven million mouths. This was a monstrous enough violation of the canons of humanity and of international law, but it was



S.S. Industry at Antwerp discharging a cargo of foodstuffs provided by the Philadelphia Relief Committee.



In the hold of another American relief ship discharging at Antwerp.

coupled with a wholesale requisitioning both of money and of foodstuffs from the stricken nation that had no parallel in history. Belgium, as a whole, was condemned to pay a war "levy" of £14,000,000, and £1,600,000 a month till the end of the war, and from several towns sums were extorted varying from the £1,800,000 with which Brussels, after long bargaining, finally escaped, to the £10,000 taken from Ghent. These "levies" were made "to provide for the upkeep of the army of occupation," "to compensate the widows of German soldiers shot by Belgians," as the price of being spared bombardment, or as expiation for alleged acts of violence by the civil population. They contributed materially to the impoverishment of the Belgian people, and they were accompanied by food requisitions which definitely hastened the approach of famine. While grain was still obtainable in the country Germany bought up what supplies she could lay hands on, and resold them at three times their value. At the outbreak of war there had been established in Berlin a department of the Ministry of War with power to requisition any raw material that might be even indirectly useful for military purposes, irrespective of whether it was produced in Germany or imported. The materials were then divided among the factories, which were obliged to put the products at the disposal of the Minister of War. In addition to requisitions for the army of occupation allowed by the laws of war, Germany seized in Belgium large quantities of grain, maize, oats, malt and yeast for the Raw Material Department of the German War Ministry, fixing the prices at forty to ninety per cent below their real value, and paying by credit notes on German banks redeemable three months after peace. The Dutch Government very properly refused to allow goods so requisitioned to pass through its territory, and Germany found it necessary to give some colour of legality to her actions by arranging that the goods should be consigned to definite firms in German towns, so that the requisitions should have the appearance of free sales. In this way she exacted from Antwerp alone 40,000 tons of cheese, 18,000 tons of maize, and 40,000 tons of barley, worth in all £720,000. Her total exaction in food and other supplies from Antwerp in the early months of war were worth not less than £3,400,000, and for this she paid £800,000. The raw material taken out of Belgium in this way by February was estimated as worth £15,000,000.

This monstrous toll on Belgium made the position of the British Government as regards relief a very difficult one. Popular feeling would have welcomed any step Britain could have taken to assist as vigorously in the feeding of Belgium's civil population as she was already doing by her arms in the avenging of Belgium's honour. But as long as Germany batten on the food and money of the Belgians, any help the Allies gave them was a not indirect aid to the enemy, and Britain had to be reluctantly content with housing refugees and denying official aid to the Belgians in Belgium. As the winter approached their plight grew increasingly hopeless. Belgium lay under a pall of misery and bitterness, her fields ploughed by the enemy's shells, many of her finest buildings in ruins, thousands of her homes razed, her roads empty except for soldiers, her factories silent, and her people faced by famine. Here and there resorts to violence by people desperate with hunger showed what terrible results might follow famine.


Belgian Committees formed in August to help the victims of the war had done what they could. Belgian bankers, manufacturers, and men of business had dipped

to the bottom of their pockets in the effort to save their country from a fate worse even than overrunning by Germany. The administrative machinery of the various communes into which the country is divided, and which survived the invasion, had been promptly directed to relief work. But the 20,000 francs a week which the wealthiest commune could afford was pitifully inadequate, and by the beginning of October whole districts were without supplies or the hope of securing them, and even Brussels was feeling the pinch.

AMERICA ACTS.

In the face of these circumstances the United States worked a miracle by creating in a week or two, from nothing, one of the biggest and most amazingly efficient business concerns the world has seen, and applying it to the feeding of the Belgian people. In September Mr. Walter Page, American Ambassador to Britain, was instructed by his Government to use his diplomatic efforts to secure from belligerents permission for the United States to aid Belgium with food. A prime condition of official British sanction of the proposal was that Germany should undertake that none of the food so imported was used for the German army, or to release native resources for their use. It was clearly to Germany's interest to agree, and she readily did so. This undertaking, though broken at first, was later scrupulously kept, even to the point of abandoning all requisitions of foodstuffs. In these circumstances the British Government felt able to guarantee immunity for any cargoes of food shipped by the Commission, and to contribute £100,000 in aid of the scheme. Mr. Brand Whitlock and the Marquis de Vilalobar, the American and Spanish Ministers at Brussels, in collaboration with eminent Belgians, laid in September the foundations of the Commission for Relief in Belgium. A chairman of extraordinary energy and organising capacity was found in Mr. Herbert Hoover, an American mining engineer. He picked his executive committee mostly from men of his own profession, who agreed to give up the whole of their energies to the work. They were men, for the most part, without previous experience of charitable or relief work. They regarded the feeding of Belgium, not only as a work calling for the highest personal sacrifice, but as the biggest business venture on which they had ever engaged; and despite the appalling magnitude of their task, and the speed with which they had to organise, they applied to all the details of it a precision that is a model for all time. A weekly balance sheet detailed the work of the Commission, and when its organisation was complete it is no over-statement to say that a record was kept of the distribution of every penny received, and of the destination of every pound of provisions that entered Belgium.

It was at once decided to make the utmost possible use of the Belgian communal system for the purposes of relief, and for this purpose there was formed the Comité National de Secours et d'Alimentation, with its headquarters in Brussels, as well as the Commission proper, with its headquarters in London. To the Commission was to fall the work of negotiating for the passage of food, of soliciting from the world contributions in money and kind, and, since all movement of Belgian subjects from place to place in Belgium was prohibited, of superintending the passage of the supplies to the various centres. To the Comité fell the work of getting the food to the people, and for this purpose it enrolled over 50,000 voluntary workers. The problem of relief was twofold—to provide bread for those who could



The Messagerie Van Gand, where soup for 50,000 people is made every day.



Some of the cooks preparing the soup at the Messagerie Van Gand.

afford to pay for it, and to provide all means of subsistence for those who were destitute. Of the latter there were at Christmas some 1,500,000, and it was clear that another million would be added before the next harvest.

Belgium was accustomed to import 230,000 tons of cereals a month. Investigations by the Commission established the fact that if a supply of 80,000 tons a month could be secured, with proportionate quantities of bacon, rice, tinned milk, and other staples, famine could be warded off. The distress was too urgent to await full organisation before starting work. In a fortnight the Commission were enabled by their energy and credit to raise £250,000, and to despatch the first relief ship to Rotterdam with 33,500 tons of flour—enough to provide the population of Belgium with one and a half days' food. She was berthed at Rotterdam on a Saturday night. By Monday morning five hundred labourers, working over Sunday for the first time in the history of the port, had transhipped her precious cargo into barges for Belgium. From that time onwards the supply of food was constant.

THE SCHEME IN BEING.

The vast and complex organisation that made this possible was quickly established and singularly complete. The financial mainstay of the enterprise was the generosity of towns, trusts, and individuals in the United States, but splendid support was also given by the British Dominions and the Allied peoples. The necessary supplies were assembled in neutral countries and shipped on the Commission's own fleet of steamers, which grew in time to number over 120 vessels. These vessels displayed on a large white flag the name of the Commission, and were exempt from search by all belligerent Governments. Their destination was Rotterdam, where the palace of a Dutch merchant prince housed a cosmopolitan staff of American, Dutch, British, and Belgians, intent on expediting distribution. The railways were for the most part unavailable, but the Commission made a careful survey of the canal system of Belgium and acquired a large fleet of barges. The progress of these barges from point to point on their routes was checked with the regularity of a train service, and delays or obstacles were quickly dealt with by the Commission's agents, many of them Rhodes scholars, who had offered their services to the Commission on its formation.

The work of provisioning included, as we have seen, the entire population, but from the point of view of organisation the people could be divided into the middle and upper classes who were able to pay for their food, the workpeople of small means, and the destitute. For the feeding of those entirely without means communal canteens were established. A card index record was formed of the people whose circumstances entitled them to canteen rations, and free non-transferable tickets were issued to them, securing them a definite ration twice daily. The actual cost of the rations for which the tickets provided was about nine francs a month, and the ration consisted usually of 300 grammes of bread, a portion of potatoes, a little coffee, a litre of soup containing vegetables and meat, and salt. The fact that the Belgian communal system provides in normal times a relieving officer and a doctor for each commune was of great help. The doctors were especially useful in directing the supplementary canteens which were established for children. In accordance with their judgment, one of five different


kinds of children's tickets was issued to each child, securing for it such variety of diet as was possible to meet its case.

The workpeople of small means received the same rations as the destitute, but had to pay cost price for their tickets. The supply of bread to those with means involved a more complex system. The Commission's imported foodstuffs were shipped to the various warehouses throughout the country under the control of the Commission. Thence they were delivered to the communal officers, and each commune was debited at prices determined by the Commission and the Comité upon a basis which allowed a small profit over the import value of the foods. The communes in turn sold the flour to accredited tradesmen. These were required to submit lists of customers to the communal officers, who then issued supplies at a fixed amount per head, the price being fixed. In the case of flour, for instance, the bakers were supplied with 250 grammes for each adult customer. From this amount the baker would produce 325 grammes of bread. The price of bread and of flour being about equal, the difference in weight allowed the baker to pay his working expenses. The prices so established were kept lower than the London prices, despite the difficulties of production.

By March the Commission was shipping monthly into Belgium 60,000 tons of wheat, 10,000 tons of rice, 5,000 tons of peas and beans, 1,200 tons of bacon and lard, and 300 tons of condensed milk, at a total cost of about £1,500,000 a month. That the miracle was worked none too soon was made terribly clear by the accounts which the American emissaries sent of what they found when they went about their work. On October 30th the Commission's representative at Rotterdam telegraphed to Mr. Hoover:—"The conditions at Charleroi, Liège, Brussels, Namur, and Dinant are desperate. They are feeding from Brussels in these districts over three million people. The rations for the last three weeks have consisted of three ounces of flour per day for each inhabitant and, for each marriage certificate presented, ten grammes of salt. These are the only supplies available. The flour now on hand is sufficient only for four days. . . . It is feared that in their desperation the hungry people may attack the authorities." As late as December, Mr. Edward B. Robbinette, a Philadelphia banker, who made a tour in Belgium, wrote:—

"Before long, unless supplies of relief food keep pouring into the country, healthy Belgian men and women will die from actual starvation. Before that happens the pangs of hunger will probably drive them to measures futile but desperate, which will bring upon them the terrible retribution of an army of occupation.

"As I watched the poor being fed in Brussels, and as I saw them standing in groups in the thickly-populated cities of Namur, Charleroi, and Mons, with hunger and despair haunting them, I pictured to myself what might happen if the flour and wheat and salt which the people of my own and other countries are supplying should give out. The appreciation of the Belgian people for what is being done for them is evident everywhere. But the problem confronting the Commission is staggering. It must be remembered that it is not only the poor and destitute who must be provided for—it is all Belgium. No one is working in Belgium to-day. Her wheels of industry are stopped, her trade has disappeared, her credit is smashed. Her Government has been broken up, her ports are closed, and there are no exports and no imports except such foodstuffs as the Commission get in through Rotterdam. Supposing we allow 2½d. a day for each Belgian for food, it will be readily seen that with 7,000,000 people still in the country the cost in supplying food will come close to £2,000,000 per month."



S.S. Harpalyce discharging a relief cargo given by New England.



A bread line in the Rue Blaes, Brussels, outside one of the twenty-one canteens to which 50,000 people come daily for their rations.

By the beginning of December Brussels had fourteen communal kitchens and 147 canteens for adults, and sixteen kitchens and thirty-four canteens for children under three. In the first week of December, out of a population of 650,000, 218,000 were dependent on the canteens, including 31,000 babies—a total of more than a third of the population. In the industrial districts, where the people naturally had less stores in hand than at the capital, the canteens supplied a much greater percentage of the population, amounting in some places to over 600 per cent.

We have already seen that Germany promised every help to the Commission in their work. The promise was observed. "The German occupying army," wrote Mr. Hoover, in January, "is giving us a great deal more actual assistance than could normally be expected from an army in time of war." Belgium was, he pointed out, occupied mainly by Landsturm men, and these, having been called up from private life, showed a more considerate disposition than was commonly found in the regular German soldier. Many of the officers helped strenuously in the moving of food supplies, the re-opening of canals, and similar work. The guarantee that no duties or taxes of any sort should be laid on the Commission's supplies was kept, and in November German Headquarters issued a general order throughout Belgium that no provisions of any kind which would in the ordinary course have to be replaced by the Relief Commission should be requisitioned. This was a notable change from the attitude in August and September; but at the same time she made no relaxation in her money levies.

A SCENE AT DISTRIBUTION.

The Belgian cities at the hour of food distribution presented a scene that no observer could forget. His attention would be drawn from the havoc caused by bombardment by a steady stream of people, mostly women, children, and old men, heading in one direction, with the little net bags with which in peace they were wont to go marketing in their hands. The stream would join other streams, till thousands of people converged in orderly fashion on the communal canteens. In a town of moderate size like Liège they would pass two-deep through the canteen courtyard from eleven a.m. till two, scarcely checking their pace to present their cards and receive their rations. On all sides of the courtyard were piled heaps, ten to fifteen feet high, of crisp, crusty bread, with about three slices to the loaf, ranged in bins according to the size of the loaves, and vast kettles of soup holding a hundred gallons each. This soup was made with extreme care by the best cooks available, and was extraordinarily nourishing and palatable for its cost, one cent a portion. The recipe for a ration at Verviers to feed about 50,000 people is typical. It consisted of

- 5,000 kilogrammes of potatoes,
- 900 kilogrammes of meat,
- 1,200 kilogrammes of carrots and celery,
- 500 kilogrammes of onions,
- 500 kilogrammes of rice,
- 500 kilogrammes of crusts,
- 70 kilogrammes of extra fat.

The delivery of these vast quantities of hot soup was no easy matter. It was carried, still boiling, from the communal kitchens to the canteens on steam wagons, and its distribution was helped by the tireless work of Belgian women and girls of good family, whose labour and sacrifice brought the warmest tributes from the

American workers. They were struck, too, with the entire absence of any air of patronage or charity about the distribution, despite the care that had to be taken to obtain the fullest particulars of each individual case. At the end of a distribution the record would show at a glance who among the regular recipients had not come, and within an hour someone would visit the house to see what fresh trouble had befallen. "No race, not even the French," wrote one observer, "could have kept the air of charity so completely out of it. If they were at all conscious of our presence, they did not show it. I was sure they knew where the wheat came from to make the bread, but only a few said anything. They felt it would embarrass us. One old woman, holding up her loaf so that she could get the fragrance of it, remarked, 'You have good grain where you come from.' To which Mrs. Whitlock, wife of the American Minister, replied, 'You have good bakers.'" And so carefully was the supply and demand calculated that after a distribution to several thousands, not more than a few portions of soup and bread would be left.

The task of ensuring that none of the supplies should benefit German troops was a difficult one. There were on the average a quarter of a million men in the army of occupation, many of them of course billeted on houses whose occupants were in receipt of relief. The communes made a careful record of the number and allocation of the troops, and of the amount they consumed. The figures were submitted by Mr. Whitlock to German Headquarters, and Germany supplied foodstuffs to that amount. But the finest evidence of the wonderful efficiency of the combined Commission and Comité was in their care of the infants. An association composed in the main of young Belgian women, and calling itself the Little Bees, was formed expressly for this work. A writer in the *World's Work* gave a picture of their activities:—

"The Little Bees do all their own cooking on the spot, and on the stoves were big kettles of chocolate and soup. On a counter were the accessories which go to make up a baby's diet, and close at hand were the cans of milk. As a mother or sister came in, usually carrying the child, she held a card in her hand, issued by the doctor who had examined and prescribed for the child. The cards were in six different colours, and frequently the applicant had more than one. I carried away a set of these cards. The yellow is for milk, green for half milk and half phosphatine, red for phosphatine, pink for half milk, orange for cocoa, and blue for soup and bread.

"If the child thrives, it is examined only once in five months and its diet advanced. But the sickly are under constant attention. The girls at the counter never let a sickly child pass without enquiring into the circumstances, and frequently sending the mother directly off to the doctor."

Thus through the winter the Commission pursued its work, continually accepting and discharging greater responsibilities than it had dreamed of when it embarked on its great enterprise. It was as though the fury of the war had given birth to a new state—a state ruled by business men, who met kings and ambassadors on terms of equality, to whose requests belligerents deferred in the passion of their quarrel, whose fleet enjoyed a safety that even neutrals could not command, and whose members were free to come and go where no others might. It had no territory except in the appreciation of the world, but it stood very definitely between Belgium and ruin.

As the burden of Belgium grew heavier it became clear that this work could not be done without much greater help than was yet forthcoming. The price of foodstuffs had increased, and the number of the destitute



German soldiers distributing food.

[Photopress.]



German soldiers doling out bread at the Antwerp barracks.

[Newspaper Illustrations.]

in Belgium had increased with it. It was calculated that before the next harvest over two and a half millions would have no means. At no time had the Commission more than a week or two's supplies in hand, more often they had stores only for a few days, and sometimes the failure of a cargo would confront an outlying district with the old horror of famine.

A regular subvention from the British Government was applied for. Sir Edward Grey replied that though satisfied that none of the food was consumed by Germany, and that since December no requisitions of food had been made for the German army, the fact that the enemy continued to exact enormous money levies, culminating in the demand for forty million francs a month from Belgium as a whole, compelled the British Government to withhold official aid from the Commission. If Germany were willing to confine her taxation of Belgium to the amount allowed her by international law for the maintenance of her army of occupation, Britain would grant a monthly subvention to the Committee. Germany refused, and the Commission was forced still to rely on private effort. The formation, however, in April of one of the most influential committees ever formed in this country, to help in securing a steady flow of provisions to Belgium, gave a national colour to British support and a hope for the future.


THE FLIGHT TO HOLLAND.

If Belgium has the United States to thank for warding off famine from the great bulk of the population who did not quit the country, her debt to Holland is not less great. Even before the fall of Antwerp, on October 8th, the little Dutch nation of 5,000,000 people had given hospitality to as many refugees as it could well accommodate. When Antwerp fell its resources were at once hopelessly overtaxed. We have already seen (Vol. I., Chap. XXVII.) how the fury of the bombardment and the fear of German violence sent almost the whole population of the city and surrounding country in flight to the coast and to the Dutch frontier. By the middle of October not less

than a million Belgians had taken refuge in Holland. In many parts they outnumbered the Dutch. The Province of Zeeland, with 300,000 inhabitants, had 400,000 refugees; Flushing, with a population of 20,000, had 30,000, and Sluis, with 1,500, had 8000. Every available shed, school, barge, and warehouse was filled with refugees, and still the terrible tide of the weary, destitute, and panic-stricken people flowed on from the frontier.

The burden rapidly became insupportable for Holland. Food ran short, the congestion was so great that sanitation was impossible, and the medical staff

available could not hope to deal adequately with the disease that would almost certainly result from such conditions. Agencies for relief gave what help they could—notably the International Women's Relief Committee. The British Government offered financial help to Holland, but the Dutch Government felt compelled to refuse it lest Germany should regard it as a breach of neutrality; and throughout October Holland continued to bear her impossible load as best she could. Meanwhile, the Germans were giving band concerts in the dead city of Antwerp. "Nothing," wrote a lady who remained for some time after its fall, "could give one a more profound impression of



The Germans in Belgium: Guns placed on the terrace of the Palace of Justice, Brussels, in order to overawe the city.

[J. A. Wolf.]

the desolation of the place than the sinister gaiety of the Station Square and before the Athenée, which are but the centres of streets that are deserted, strewn with what the fugitives have abandoned, and filled with the barking and moaning of abandoned dogs." Back to Antwerp and its environs, however, as many of the refugees as possible had to be sent, and in November the stream began to ebb again as trainload after trainload returned to take up what life they could under German domination. But even when all who could, or would, go had left, Holland still housed nearly half a million Belgians, of whom 200,000 were destitute. Trade was bad, and to find employment for any considerable number of them was impossible. Holland patiently accepted the task of feeding and



Waiting for relief rations at Bruges.

[Newspaper Illustrations.]



All that remains of a peasant's home.

[Central News]

housing them, and, as far as possible, schooling the children, and won the gratitude of all Europe by her sacrifice. Some measure of the urgency of the problem can be got from the fact that it was found necessary to establish at Bergen op Zoom a special camp for young children. In it were three hundred babies born after the fall of Antwerp, eighty of them on the road to the frontier.

BRITAIN AND THE REFUGEES.

Beside the part Holland played, the little that Britain could do for the refugees seemed insignificant; but those who felt it a cause for shame that with all our resources we gave shelter only to some 200,000 should have remembered that when the great exodus occurred it was possible for thousands of Belgians to walk to Holland who could not take ship for England; that every available ship was crammed to the limit of her capacity; and that we did, in fact, relieve Holland of many of her refugees as soon as was practicable. More just is the criticism that the problem of dealing with the relatively small number that came under our care was approached with more enthusiasm than method. In the days after the fall of Antwerp, transports, channel steamers, fishing smacks, and pleasure boats landed thousands of refugees a day at Dover and Folkestone.


"The Ostend boats are so crowded," wrote an observer at Folkestone, "that you look from the pier on a mass of heads. Bedridden old men and women are carried down, then there may come a forlorn young woman with a shawl over her head quite destitute, a bevy of nuns stealing along with expressionless faces, a workman and his distraught family who immediately camp out among their bundles on the quay side. You would put many of them down as ordinary middle-class folk coming over for a holiday, but these are often the worst cases of destitution. From comfort they have come down to perhaps a hundred francs in the pocket and no prospect of more.

"A well-drilled army of helpers from the War Refugees Committee is ready to smooth the way. The interpreters—one is a Belgian Count—are endlessly resourceful and patient. Folkestone ladies carry round sandwiches and

coffee before the train starts. Ambulances are ready for the sick and wounded."

London served as a clearing house for the refugees on arrival, and there they were dealt with by the War Refugees Committee which had been formed in August, acting with the Local Government Board. Huge buildings such as the Earl's Court Exhibition Hall and the Aldwych Skating Rink were commandeered for their reception in the first instance, and throughout the country over 1,400 committees were formed to provide homes and maintenance for them. Though the relationship between these committees was extremely loose, and the methods they employed widely different,

they managed to keep pace with the demand for accommodation. At the end of January the War Refugees Committee reported that the Clothing Department had issued over 500,000 articles of clothing; at the Aldwych Skating Rink arrangements had been made for allocation, registration, and tracing missing relatives; left and lost luggage offices, a crèche, a shop for supplying cheap necessities, labour and recruiting bureaux, and food and clothing departments had also been organised. As many refugees could pay the whole or part of their expenses if quarters were found, the committee organised a scheme at an extremely low cost for leasing and furnishing some



The Germans in Belgium: Troops quartered in the Palace of Justice, Brussels.

[J. A. Wolf.]

hundreds of small flats for the accommodation of this class. The cost of this scheme was materially reduced by an arrangement with the officials of the National Food Fund to supply food daily without charge in cases recommended by the Committee. The Committee's Education Department also provided higher and primary education for the great majority of the children.

In the disposal of the refugees certain districts, notably on the east coast, were proscribed by military order, but the Belgians were distributed widely over both town and country, and there were few districts that had not this very real reminder of the war in their midst. Many a small village remote from the stream of news and events had its tea-parties and concerts for the

Belgians, and the sympathy and intercourse between the refugees and their hosts formed a link between the countries which will not soon be broken. In Scotland, which accounted for more than its share of refugees in proportion to population, a slight, but appreciable, community even of language was discovered by the Flemish and the Scottish peasantry, greatly to the satisfaction of both.

EMPLOYMENT SCHEMES.

The problem of finding employment for the visitors was less satisfactorily settled. Mr. Seeborn Rowntree had remarked on the demoralisation which threatened the refugees in Holland through the entire idleness in which they spent their days, and it was recognised that no effort be spared to find work for those in Britain. A Special Committee which was appointed, with Sir Ernest Hatch as chairman, estimated that some 21,000 might be absorbed in the industries of this country, and though the distrust which the trade unions felt for a step that offered such obvious temptations to the abuse of their rules handicapped progress on this line,

and resulted in some friction, a certain number of Belgian workmen, skilled and unskilled, found their way into British factories. The Committee also recommended the establishment of special workshops where the Belgians could make goods for their own use, and several interesting experiments of this kind were made. In Bradford, a technical institute, manned as far as possible by Belgian teachers, formed a centre for the social life of the refugees of the district, and a place where they could learn certain trades which they could put in operation on the premises. In Hyde, a small cabinet-making factory was started, and the furniture stored till it could be taken back to Belgium; while in Leeds three or four industries were organised in one workshop on similar lines.

But in the main the care and maintenance of the refugees continued to be a matter of private generosity, which gave of money, houses, clothes, and even motor cars to the refugees. The help given by all classes, from the workers who set aside a bedroom to municipalities who housed hundreds, showed how readily the British people welcomed a chance of repaying some of their debt to Belgium.



Holland's share in the relief of Belgium: Belgian refugees over the Dutch frontier.

[Newspaper Illustrations.]

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
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


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
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In the Russian reserve trenches, showing the wire entanglements.

[Topical Press.

CHAPTER XX.

THE GERMAN ADVANCE FROM EAST PRUSSIA.

THE POSITION NORTH OF THE VISTULA—EAST PRUSSIA AND THE LINE OF THE RIVERS—NEW GERMAN CONCENTRATION—RUSSIANS OUTFLANKED—THEIR ARMY BROKEN UP—A SEVERE DEFEAT—THE ATTACK ON THE RIVER LINE—BATTLE AT PRZASNYSZ.

IN January, 1915, the Russians held a position which was on the whole favourable. They had descended through Bukowina to the frontier of Roumania and the passes leading into Hungary; in the Carpathians they had thrown back the Austrian attack and were making their preparations to advance towards the mountain crests; in Poland, south of the Vistula, they had brought the German advance on Warsaw to a standstill, and their line, after innumerable attacks made upon it, seemed now to be as unshakable as that of the Allies in the west. North of the Vistula they had pushed forward by a number of roads well up towards the southern borders of East Prussia; in the eastern section of that province they had advanced into the lake region and up to the line of the Angerapp river, so that a considerable strip of German territory was in their possession, although the Germans had utilised the lakes and marshes to form a line of defence which the Russians found they could not penetrate. In the far north of the province a Russian column was threatening Tilsit.

The German commanders, having made every effort to force the Russian front before Warsaw and having failed, after the heaviest losses which they had ever suffered on the eastern front, looked round for a better opportunity of dealing the Russians an effectual blow. From the Vistula southward the war had become an affair of trenches, but the long extended line north of the river might still give them the opportunity of either practising a successful flank movement or finding a weak point between the different Russian corps and breaking through the front. A special reason for attacking in the northern area lay in the Russian occupation of East Prussian territory—"Our beloved East Prussia," as the

German Emperor called it in a telegram sent after the blow was struck. They determined, therefore, following the methods which had been so successful at the battle of Tannenberg in August and the later movement from Thorn, to concentrate great forces in East Prussia and to fall upon the invader and overwhelm him before he could secure his retreat across the region of marsh and lake between East Prussia and the Niemen river. This was only one-half of their plan. They decided also to advance from a number of points on the southern frontier of East Prussia, and to attack the line of the two rivers which, beside the Niemen, form the barrier to an invasion of Russia in this quarter, namely, the Narew and the Bobr.

THE GERMAN PLANS.

It has been much debated what the precise object of the Germans was in this campaign, which, it will be seen, falls into two parts—that directed against the invasion of East Prussia and the line of the Niemen, and that which threatened the Russian positions on the Narew and Bobr. There is no doubt at all about the object of the former movement. It was primarily to free East Prussia, and only incidentally to force the passage of the Niemen and by the same stroke to cut the trunk railway line from Warsaw to Petrograd, which crosses the Niemen at Grodno and for some distance northwards runs dangerously near the river. But whether the Germans in the southern half of this campaign intended, as is often said, to cross the Narew and the Bobr, to outflank Warsaw on the north-east, and thereby to bring about, as such a stroke certainly would have done, a withdrawal of the whole Russian line down to the borders of Galicia, must be held to be doubtful. A short consideration of



Russian infantry on the march through a frontier town.

[Photopress.]



German troops passing through a destroyed village on the East Prussian frontier.

[Sport and General.]

the character of the river line and the railway system behind it shows this to be so.

The Narew and Bobr, linked up with the Niemen by the Augusta Canal, form an unbroken screen to Warsaw on the north and north-east. At the junction of the Narew and the Vistula stands the powerful fortress of Nowo Georgiewsk, and before the junction with the Bobr is reached there are other fortified places, such as Pultusk, Ostrolenka, and Lomza: The Bobr, and in a slight degree also the Narew, are defended by a broad belt of marshes on either bank; the road and railway which cross the Bobr on their way into East Prussia are protected by the fortress of Ossowiec, on which the Germans had already, on a former occasion, failed to make any impression. The roads available for the use of an invading army seeking to cross these two rivers are few and far between, and the defence is correspondingly easy. Moreover, it is precisely in this area that the Russians have what they possess scarcely anywhere else—a good railway system. At the back of the rivers runs the Warsaw-Petrograd line, fed by a number of other railways from the interior. From this main avenue there spring six or seven railways built right up to the rivers, and able, therefore, to assist a rapid concentration of troops—the one thing which at the critical moments of this war the Russians have been unable to effect and

which has been responsible for all their serious defeats. One line joins that from Warsaw to Nowo Georgiewsk, and runs northward to Mława, so that it strengthens the Russian advanced position in front of the Narew. Three lines springing from the Warsaw railway converge near Ostrolenka, and would quickly reinforce and supply the Russian army along almost the whole length of the Narew up to its junction with the Bobr. Not far beyond the northernmost of these three is the railway to Ossowiec. Three railways cross the Niemen at Grodno, Olita, and Kovno—all fortified places. It is clear, therefore, that the Germans, if their intention was to force the line of the three rivers, were attacking the Russians on ground


which the defence could for once use to the best advantage, and where it was least likely to be taken by surprise. This does not, of course, apply to an attack on the Russian army engaged in invading East Prussia, but the defeat of that force was an operation quite distinct from an attempt to gain the line of the Niemen. It would seem likely, since the Germans put the bulk of their available forces into the East Prussian movement rather than into the advance on the Narew and the Bobr, that they did not hope to be so fortunate as to outflank the Warsaw position. They were to some extent compelled to advance from the southern borders of East Prussia by the very fact that the Russians were so far forward

there as to be on the flank of a German army marching to the Niemen, and the probability is that they did not hope to do more than drive the Russians back on the rivers, and possibly divide and defeat some sections of their army while carrying out undisturbed the main stroke on the East Prussian and Niemen front. Towards the end of January they began to assemble large forces for the enterprise.


RUSSIAN DISADVANTAGES.

The decisive factor in dealing with the Russian forces in East Prussia was that they were far removed from their bases, and, if surprised by a largely superior army, had no alternative but to beat a hasty retreat; there was no prospect of reinforcements reaching them in time

to enable them to make an early stand. This was the first and, as it proved, the decisive advantage which the Germans held. The second was that the Russians, if compelled to retreat, would have to do so over most unfavourable country, which at this time was deep in snow, and was liable at any moment to be made even worse for the passage of an army by a sudden thaw. The most that can be said for the Russians was that the farther the Germans followed them towards the Niemen, the greater their difficulties would become, since they would be leaving the sources of their supply just as the Russians were drawing nearer to theirs, and the pursuit would therefore become more and more arduous. But



The map illustrates the methods of attack by which the Germans broke up and defeated the Tenth Russian Army.



The remains of a railway station on the East Prussian frontier.

this disadvantage did not affect the ease and success with which the Germans dealt their first blow. They drew the army with which they now delivered the attack from four sources. Part of it was that which had been holding the lake region for many weeks against the Russian invasion. One corps, the Twenty-first, was drawn from the western front, which it left on January 27th, with the exception of one regiment belonging to it that remained behind in order to conceal from the enemy that the remainder of the corps had gone. (This did not, however, imply any weakening of the German army in the west, as an equivalent force was at once brought up from the interior of Germany.) The third portion of Marshal von Hindenburg's army consisted of two corps, the Thirty-eighth and the Fortieth, which had been trained during the autumn and winter, and were now put into the field for the first time. The fourth section was composed of troops withdrawn from the German army south of the Vistula. So long as Von Hindenburg had been attempting to break through to Warsaw he had no troops to spare for other purposes, but he had more than enough to maintain a pure defensive, and he now withdrew to the north of the Vistula the Twentieth Active Corps, a reserve corps of the Guard, one active brigade of the Guard, and one brigade of the Silesian Landwehr. He had thus at his disposal six new army corps, and was practising again the manoeuvre by which he had already inflicted two severe reverses on the Russians. Whatever the faults of the Russian commandership may or may not have been, it was almost impossible that the handicap which they suffered in respect of railways should not on occasion be decisive against them. The railway system of East Prussia is unsurpassed for strategic purposes, and Von Hindenburg once more succeeded in collecting a largely superior force and throwing it against an enemy who was too weak to resist the attack with any hope of success, and could not avoid a serious defeat unless he obtained intelligence of the concentration against him in time to retreat before the blow was dealt.

THE TENTH RUSSIAN ARMY.

The invasion of East Prussia had been entrusted to the Tenth Russian Army, under General Baron Sievers. It consisted of four corps. One of these, forming the right wing of the army, lay to the north of the railway line which runs east and west across the province from Königsberg to Gumbinnen and on to Kovno; it held the ground between Gumbinnen and Tilsit on the Niemen, in extent about forty miles. The other three corps were south of the railway—one along the line of the Angerapp river, about Darkehmen and Goldapp; the others in the region of the Masurian Lakes on either side of Lyck. Half a dozen or more railways led towards the positions held by these corps from the line which runs through the centre of East Prussia, but the Russians had on this occasion advanced more carefully than in August of last year, and their corps were spread out so as to be in touch with each other, and prevent any repetition of the double envelopment to which General Samsonoff had fallen victim.

During the last days of January the German forces were gathering, and on February 4th the Russians first became aware that a great concentration against them was in progress. On February 7th the German offensive opened with a movement east of Tilsit against the extreme right wing of the Russian army. This flanking advance may be compared in its object and execution with the attack on the Franco-British army at the end of August, and with the Russian movement from Warsaw

and Nowo Georgiewsk against the flank of the German army in its first advance on Warsaw. But in its result it was much more successful. Both the Western Allies and the Germans had succeeded in drawing off their armies as a whole, saving their wings from being surrounded and at the same time keeping all the corps in touch with one another. The Russians between Tilsit and Gumbinnen were not so fortunate. The German flanking force was thrown forward with great energy, and the Russians found themselves in serious danger of envelopment on their right wing. The situation might probably have been saved by a retreat of the whole Tenth Army, not due east as it had come, but in a pronounced south-easterly direction, so that the right wing was continually being withdrawn from the outflanking force. But its commander did not choose this course. The Gumbinnen Corps endeavoured continually to head off the outflanking Germans, stretching itself out farther and farther towards the north-east. In the haste of this manoeuvre, seeking always to keep pace with each effort of the enemy, it drew away from the corps which lay immediately to the south of it, and soon lost touch with it altogether. A gap was opened up in the neighbourhood of the railway, of which the Germans at once availed themselves. They had, indeed, succeeded beyond what they might have hoped, for they had not only brought about a general Russian retreat, but they had broken through between the right wing and the centre.

THE 20th CORPS ENVELOPED.

The Germans have always shown themselves quick to seize an advantage and relentlessly pursue it. They came down in a torrent across the railway, pouring in a south-easterly direction into the country immediately behind the Russian corps which had been on the Angerapp river, and was now—too late—in full retreat. This was the Twentieth Corps, under Lieutenant-General Bulgakoff, composed of the Twenty-ninth Division and three reserve regiments of the active army. With the Germans already in its rear it could do nothing but seek a way of escape towards the south-east, in the direction of Suwalki, and the forest region of Augustowo. It was not, however, assailed only on the front, right flank and rear. Simultaneously with the German onslaught from the line of the railway, fierce attacks had been made on the left wing of the Twentieth Corps and on both flanks of the two corps to the south. The attack at these points was only less successful than that in the north. The Twentieth Corps, which had long ago been cut off from the right wing of the Tenth Army, now (February 13th) lost touch completely with the two southern corps, and retired fighting desperately on all four fronts. So long as its ammunition lasted it continued the struggle, and in the Augustowo forest some sections of it were fighting until February 22nd. It was believed at first that only a few individuals out of the whole corps had escaped, but eventually part of two regiments appeared at Sopockinie, in the south-eastern section of the Augustowo forest, having traversed sixty miles in twelve days, most of the time fighting. For all practical purposes the Twentieth Corps had been annihilated.

The two corps which formed the left wing of the Tenth Army were attacked both in front and at the southern point of their line, where large German forces advanced along the frontier railway and pressed forward into Russian territory to the south of Augustowo. At the same time they found themselves completely cut off from the unfortunate Twentieth Corps, and were themselves hard pressed on their right. They succeeded—




German transport waggon captured by the Russians.

[Photopress.]



A Polish road on which the mud lies so deeply that motors have to be hauled by horses.

[Universal.]



Map to illustrate the German attack on the line of the Narew and Bobr.

and to this they partly owe their safety—in maintaining their connection with each other, and, with the Germans pursuing and harassing them on both flanks, they beat a retreat towards Augustowo and the forest and marshes lying between it and the Niemen. It was a hurried but not a rapid retirement. The ground was deep in snow, to which the Germans attribute the escape of the two corps from complete destruction, while the Russians declared that the same cause was alone responsible for the heaviness of their losses. Nine days were taken in a retreat over ground which would normally have been covered in four; motor transport had become impossible, and the supply service sometimes failed completely. It was not until February 20th that the left wing reached the safety of the far side of the Niemen.

THE GERMAN SUCCESS.

The German claim that the whole of Baron Sievers's army had been annihilated was exaggerated, as no doubt were the reports which declared that a hundred thousand prisoners and 150 guns had been taken. But the Russians had undoubtedly suffered a disaster which, if only local in its consequences, was still of the first magnitude. The northern corps had saved itself by a hasty flight, in which it had suffered seriously; the Twenty-eighth had been annihilated; the remaining two had only extricated themselves after nine days' continuous fighting. The German victory was as creditable to the planning of the General Staff as anything which they had done in the collection. The original movement from the direction of Tilsit had all

the qualities of surprise and swiftness of execution which are essential to the success of any flanking scheme, and the Russians never recovered from it. The hope that the Northern Russian Corps would either fall back on and obstruct the communications of the rest of the army, or in avoiding this disaster would produce one even greater by losing touch with its neighbours and opening up a gap in the line, must have been present in the mind of the German leaders, and when it was fulfilled they took the greatest possible advantage of their opportunity. This was not the full extent of their success, for the three corps south of the Gumbinnen railway might still have succeeded in drawing off together; but the German blow at the point of junction between the Twentieth Corps and that adjoining it on the south was so shrewd and well-timed that it split up the Russian army still further and exposed the Twentieth Corps to complete encirclement. The Russian army, on the other hand, was badly handled, and it was perhaps the general admission of this which led to the story that the Grand Duke Nicholas afterwards summoned Baron Sievers to his headquarters and openly denounced him for incompetency. The cause of the great defeat in the Masurian Lakes in August had been that a large force ventured too far into a most difficult country, where it could obtain no trustworthy intelligence of the new forces that were forming against it, and was surrounded almost before it knew its danger. But in the present instance the Tenth Army covered a much greater extent of ground, and for many weeks it and the enemy had been facing one another in strongly-entrenched positions.



A heap of battle wreckage—equipment, ammunition, etc.—swept together after a fight on the Russian frontier.

[Newspaper Illustrations.]



Russian prisoners taken by the Germans.

[Topical Press.]

The initial error which led to the defeat, and which seems to have been due purely to bad generalship, was the movement of the right wing away from its centre; the second cause is only to be found in the strength and momentum of the attack which the Germans launched on the entrenched positions of the Russians at the point where the two central corps were in touch with each other. It was a plain case of success in breaking through the centre of a line which should have been almost unbreakable, and as the Russians elsewhere—as, for instance, in front of Warsaw—had defeated the most desperate efforts of the Germans to obtain success by similar methods, it must be supposed that the Russian forces on the Angerapp river were either unduly weak at critically important points, or that the Germans chose their points of attack with very great skill and concentrated exceptionally

they had to give attention to the strong Russian forces which had advanced north-westwards from the Narew towards the southern corner of East Prussia, and which might now, if left to themselves, have created a very disagreeable diversion. Accordingly, at the same time as General von Eichhorn began to attack the Tenth Army, German columns were set in motion on half-a-dozen roads leading to the points of strategic importance on the rivers. One column advanced to Ossowiec on the Bohr and brought up heavy artillery, which engaged in an ineffectual duel with the fortress guns. Ossowiec is not a first-class fortress, but on this, as on a former occasion, it had no difficulty in repelling the attack, which, indeed, was not pressed with any vigour. Other columns moved towards Lomza and Ostrolenka, the fortified places which guard the crossings on the upper Narew; but the Russians met



The remains of a bombarded town in East Prussia.

[Universal.

strong forces against them. At all events, the result was a notable victory for the generalship displayed both in planning and executing the attack; although the Russian soldier exhibited here, as he did throughout the war, qualities of courage and endurance which were not surpassed by any of the armies in the field. The operations had been carried out on the German side by General von Eichhorn, under the direction of Von Hindenburg, and the Kaiser was present in the field.

THE NAREW AND THE BOHR.

In order that the Germans might be uninterrupted while they dealt with the Tenth Army it was necessary that they should occupy the attention of the Russians all along the line of the Narew and Old Prussia.

them well in front of the river, and fighting took place for days in which neither side engaged large forces. On the right bank of the Vistula the Germans drove the Russians back to within about two days' march of the fortress of Nowo Georgiewsk, but there their advance stopped, as it was no doubt expected it would. All these operations were in the nature of demonstrations, designed to keep the Russians on the defensive, but no actual attempt to get across any one of the rivers was made except to the north-west of Grodno, where, after heavy and continuous fighting, some weak detachments succeeded in crossing the Niemen. They were quickly thrown back, and no further attempt was made. Only on one section of the river front, that which lay between Mława (close to the Russian frontier) and Ostrolenka, was there



A German Red Cross motor ambulance corps drawn up in the snow on the Eastern front.

[Photopress.]

fighting on a great scale. Here the Russians were in strength, and it was proportionately necessary for the Germans to push them back. They employed two army corps for the purpose.

THE BATTLE OF PRZASNYSZ.

By February 18th the German army was concentrated along the East Prussian frontier on a line stretching about thirty miles north-east from Mława towards Chorzele. From each of these places a road runs to the village of Przasnysz, and from Chorzele, in a direction almost due north and south, runs the river Orzic, which is a tributary of the Narew, and passes a few miles east of Przasnysz. The Russian line lay along a ridge just south of the Mława-Przasnysz road, with its extreme right wing resting on Przasnysz. The Germans were well aware that there were no great Russian forces lying to the east of Przasnysz or beyond the Orzic, and connecting with the army of Mława, and that, if they advanced with sufficient speed along the valley of the Orzic, they might brush aside what small resistance they were likely to encounter and appear on the flank and rear of the Russian wing at Przasnysz. The manoeuvre was about to be repeated which had already served them so well against the Tenth Army. If the Russians learned in time of the concentration on the frontier they might extend their right wing to the Orzic and present the enemy with a frontal battle, but if all went well with the German rush they would be driven into retreat, and perhaps cut off. At first all went excellently well. On February 20th the Germans, while making a demonstration in force against the Russian left flank near Mława, poured down beside the Orzic and flung their left flank right round Przasnysz until it reached a point about eight miles to the south of the village. The enveloping force then turned west and pressed on until Przasnysz was surrounded on all sides but one, and the Russian right wing, resting on Przasnysz, was attacked from both the north and south.

The Germans, while detaching forces to assail Przasnysz from the east and south, secured them from interruption

in the attack by throwing out a strong screen of troops along the line of the Orzic, of which they seized the crossings so as to hold off the counter-attack which they expected would be delivered from the direction of the Narew. The counter-attack was duly delivered, but before it came Przasnysz was taken by assault. Simultaneously with its envelopment the Germans delivered a general attack on the Russian front, seven miles in extent, which lay between Przasnysz and the Mława railway; and as their frontal assault was supported by the advance of the wing which had come round the southern side of Przasnysz, the Russians were in imminent danger of destruction. The Germans claimed 10,000 prisoners and twenty guns as the fruit of this success. But the tables were soon to be turned. Early in the morning of February 24th—the day on which the Germans entered Przasnysz—the Russians began their counter-attack. The line from which they advanced faced the crossings of the Orzic, now held by the Germans, and, passing over the river, stretched across country so as to threaten the wing of the Germans which now lay to the south of Przasnysz. The crossings of the Orzic were held by the Thirty-sixth German Reserve Division, which was compelled to abandon them by the evening of the 24th. Throughout the whole of the 25th the battle continued to the south of Przasnysz, and in the evening of that day the Germans were at last driven back on Przasnysz itself. The Russians, swinging their right flank round to the north-east of the village, drove the Germans from it and re-took it in the evening of the 26th, only to be driven out of it again during the night, and it was not until the 27th that they gained final possession. With the loss of Przasnysz and the advance of the Russian right wing, the Germans fell back along the whole line up to the Mława railway, and throughout the 28th were retreating towards the frontier between Mława and Chorzele. When they regained their own territory about ten thousand prisoners remained in the hands of the Russians.

In the battle of Przasnysz the Russians had brilliantly retrieved a desperate situation. They had been taken once more unawares. They had occupied a position which

was in itself insecure, since there was between their right wing and the river Orzic a gap which an enemy might, and in fact did, utilise to very good effect. They had found the Germans turning their flank, appearing on their rear and threatening them with complete envelopment. But no amount of surprise avails to shake the stubbornness of the Russian soldier, and the resistance of the garrison of Przasnysz and of the main army beyond it was sufficiently prolonged to give time for the counter-attack to develop from the flank. This was one of the few opportunities which the Russians had had of delivering a counter-attack on a large scale, and they made good use of it.


The net effect of the German operations in February was that the Russians had suffered very heavy losses

and had been cleared out of East Prussia for the second time, but that their strategic position had not been seriously damaged. Against Russia, Germany fights always with two hopes. The first is that she may divide and drive back the Russian armies along the whole front, herself taking up an impregnable position in front of the San, the Vistula, and the northern rivers. But if this is too much to achieve, then her hope is that she may deal Russia blow after blow, now on one part of the front, now on another, until at last Russia becomes exhausted and weary of the fruitless struggle. This East Prussian campaign carried her no further towards the achievement of the greater purpose, but it was another severe blow in the series of which the battle of Tannenberg was the first.



In the trenches on the Eastern Front,

[Topical Press.




Warsaw: A view in Lazienki Park, showing the Summer Palace of the Polish Kings in the background. [E.N.A.]



The front of the Summer Palace.

[E.N.A.]



Warsaw: The Palace of the Polish Kings..

[E.N.A.]

CHAPTER XXI.


THE TRAGEDY OF POLAND.

THE EARLY GRANDEUR OF POLAND—CAUSES OF THE DECLINE—THE PARTITIONS—POLISH NATIONALISM—THE WAR A CIVIL WAR FOR POLAND—RUSSIAN, GERMAN, AND AUSTRIAN POLICY TOWARDS THE POLES—THE BELGIUM OF THE EAST.

THE first glimpse of Poland reaches us in the pages of some German chronicles of the late tenth century. The Poles were then a pagan Slavonic tribe, driven apparently from the Danube and settled on the Warta, in what is now Posen. The Slavonic world in those days stretched much further to the west, and its frontier was the Elbe. At the moment when the Poles first loom out of the mist of time the Germans, under the Saxon emperors, were pressing eastward at the expense of the chaos of Slav tribes, and it is as a conquering State pressing westward from the Warta under a line of able kings, the Piasts, that Poland appears on the stage. Mieszko I. (962-992) adopted Greek Orthodox Christianity, and imposed it on Poland. His successor, Boleslaus I. (992-1025), carried his people over to the Roman Church.

The entrance of Poland into the Roman Church is a crucial point in the history of the country. It was effected as a political expedient—to obtain the protection of the Papacy and admission into the community of European nations as an aid in the struggle with the advancing Germans. But no people became in process of time more loyal and devoted sons of the Church, and it is one of the boasts of the Poles that they thereby assumed the high and difficult mission of bearing the message of Western Civilisation to Eastern Europe. Yet if we are to consider the measure as a strictly political one, in the long run Boleslaus I.'s calculation proved to be of doubtful wisdom. In 988 Vladimir, Prince of Kiev and ruler of the land of Rus, married the daughter of the Greek Emperor and entered the Greek Church. By

this stroke Russia gained a kind of legendary succession to the Empire (a political fact of great value), and in the event all the remaining Slavs, except the Croats and the Slovenes, received their Christianity from the Greek Church. Poland, by adopting Roman Catholicism, lost her chance of acquiring the headship of the Slav world. That passed to Russia, and the wars of Russian expansion at the expense of Poland assumed the air of crusades. As it happened, the western neighbour of Poland, Prussia, whose destiny drove her against Poland, adopted a religion which was neither Catholic nor Orthodox. While Poland, after the coming of Luther, constituted herself the leader of the counter-Reformation and the sword and buckler of Catholicism, Russia turned Protestant. Protestant, too, were the Scandinavian States of the Baltic, who completed the chain of Poland's enemies. Politically, therefore, Poland's identification with Catholicism involved renunciation of Slav leadership and isolation. But all this lay in the future. Immediately, Boleslaus I.'s judgment was approved by events, and a Polish Empire was built up which stretched from the Elbe to the Bug, from the Baltic to the Carpathians. Then in the twelfth century came a king who divided his lands among his children, and the period of partition (1138 to 1305) was a time of weakness and disaster. The order of the Teutonic knights, with Brandenburg, the ancestor of the Prussian kingdom, lodged itself in the north (1230) and imperilled Poland's hold on the Baltic. The Tartars (1224-1242) ravaged far and wide, and the towns of Poland had to be repopled from German burghers and Jews. On the north-east, a powerful pagan Lithuanian monarchy



Peasants mending their nets on the banks of a Polish stream.

[E.N.A.]



Poland in war time: A Polish village over which the war has passed.

[Topical Press.]

came into being, with territory stretching from Courland to Kiev and Chernigov. Poland was saved from utter disintegration by Wladislaus I. (1309-1339), who reunited the principalities, and by his son, Casimir the Great (1333-1370), the last of the Piasts and the most distinguished of all Polish sovereigns. Casimir rebuilt the towns, reorganised justice, founded Cracow University, and constituted Poland, now that the Levantine Seas were threatened by the Turks, one of the highways of commerce between Northern and Southern Europe. Under him, too, Galicia was recovered, and Volhynia was conquered from Lithuania, but the western provinces lost during the troubled years had to be abandoned.

THE POLISH CONSTITUTION.

For two centuries Poland was to be a great power as a result of the labours of Casimir; but to him there date back the seeds of decay. He left no son, and the consent of the nobles to the succession of his nephew, Louis of Hungary, was only obtained at the expense of concessions which transferred authority from the Crown to the nobles. The nobles had grown during the period of partition as the State decayed, and Casimir the Great organised the military class, the landowners, as a privileged order, the *Szlachta*, into whose hands subsequently all political power fell. The half century following the death of Casimir saw rooted in Poland those characteristic features of its polity to which historians are agreed in attributing its ruin. When Louis of Hungary died the Polish nobles elected Jadwiga, niece of Casimir, Queen of the Poles. They married her (1386) to Jagiello, Grand Duke of Lithuania, conveniently baptised for the occasion. By this device Lithuania and Poland were united, and when Jadwiga died childless a Jagiello prince, with no drop of Piast blood in his veins, was elected to the throne. The Jagiello dynasty kept the throne for two centuries, but had to pay a heavy price for the privilege. The principle of election to the throne was definitely established and every Jagiello king on his accession had to sign a contract with the nobility, *pacta conventa*, confirming its rights and privileges. These rights and privileges were extended with every new king, who had to buy his election with this currency.

In its full form the Constitution of the Polish Republic had the following characteristics. The king was chosen by the whole body of the gentry. He could neither legislate nor impose new taxes without the authority of the Diet. The Diet consisted of representatives of the gentry, bound by strict injunctions given to them by the local Diets, composed of the whole body of local gentry, a mob. The Diet was further crippled by the necessity that every decision should be unanimous, so that the Diet could be dissolved by a single negative vote (*Liberum Veto*). Even rebellion was legalised by the Constitution. In the words of a high authority: "There was no Treasury, no standing army, and, properly speaking, no central Government at all. The Polish Republic became in its essence a federation in which every landed property was a separate State, and every gentleman a sovereign at home."


THE CAUSES OF DECAY.

If we turn from the political machinery to the social reality of which it was the framework the picture is equally depressing. The gentry was a relatively numerous body, but its very numbers and its privileges made it the tool of the magnates, and later of foreign kings. Corrupt,

ignorant, self-centred, without the sense of the State or of civic sacrifice, they were the prey of intrigue, demagoguery, bribery, and flattery, and the great nobles who managed them and accroached all authority in the State came to pursue no higher interests than those of themselves or their families. The middle class, so far as it existed, was largely composed of Jews, but the expansion of Europe towards America and the discovery of the sea route to the Indies had hit the Polish towns very hard. The rural population was sunk in hopeless serfdom. Serfdom was fully established in Poland in the sixteenth century, when Poland became the granary from which the industrial cities of Northern Europe were fed, for the serf was convenient on large corn-growing estates.


The Diet of 1496 expressed the spirit of the *Szlachta*. It ruined the burghers by exempting the imports and exports of the nobles from all tolls and depriving the burghers of the right to hold land outside the cities; it enslaved the peasantry; and it monopolised the Church by enacting that henceforth all prelatures and canonries should be held only by descendants on both sides of noble families. Thus, precisely at the time when Western Europe was beginning to break with feudalism and to acquire strong centralised monarchies, Poland consecrated anarchy and slavery as the pillars of the State; and when Ziska, the Hussite leader, had revolutionised tactics, Poland pinned her military hopes to the tactically bankrupt feudal chivalry.

There were other grave elements of weakness in the Polish state. The union with Lithuania, fortified at Horodlo (1413) and completed at Lublin in 1569, tied Poland up with a State much larger than itself, only very partially catholic, different in race, on a lower stage of civilisation, and, if anything, more anarchic. It told heavily against the strengthening of the State. Again, the extension of Polish rule south and west over little Russian lands brought into the State people of a different race and faith, and in those march lands submission was alien to the Cossack temper. Poland in the sixteenth century had reached the height of apparent glory, but it was deeply infected with the germs of dissolution. Yet no State had greater need of strong government and patriotic administration. It was a border land beset on all sides by enemies. It had no naturally defined frontiers, and great rivers, traversing its territory from end to end, exposed its very heart to penetration by hostile armies. If, nevertheless, Poland was able for some time to hold its own, and even extend its authority, that was due to the series of happy chances which had weakened its neighbours. The Teutonic Order was exhausted, and when Prussia was formed the ruin of the 'Thirty Years' War held the new military monarchy in check. Russia was shattered politically and ravaged economically by the Tartar invasions, and, before the effects of Ivan the Terrible's work of restoration (1534-1584) could make themselves felt, there came that prolonged anarchy which Russia knows as the troublous years (1584-1613). The crisis arrived for Poland in the latter half of the seventeenth century, when strong despotisms, Prussia and Russia, were in being on either flank. The signal was given by the revolt of the Cossacks (1648), one of the most horrible outbursts of brute savagery in European history. Six years later, by the treaty of Pereyslav, the Cossacks accepted the lordship of the Muscovite Tsar. That was the loss to Poland of Ukraine and the opening of war with Russia. Sweden joined in, and Poland, beaten to the knees, was only saved by a national uprising.



St. John's Cathedral, Warsaw.

[E.N..I.]



Warsaw: The Kerlski Palace.

[E.N.A.]



The Market Square, Warsaw.

[E.N.A.]

It was the briefest gleam of light. John Casimir, the king, tried to drive the lessons of disaster home by persuading the *Szlachta* to reform the Constitution, but, as always, the nobles proved Poland's worst enemies. Not only did they refuse to strengthen the Crown, but they would not pay a farthing in taxation, and they crushed the poorest citizens under the burden of taxation. Even John Sobieski (1669-1696), who was to give Poland its last spasm of strength and, by driving back the Turks from Vienna, was to perform the last great service of the Polish State to Christian Europe, had many of the faults of his class. It would have been better if he had concentrated on the reform of his own country rather than headed a crusade. At the last Diet which he attended he was driven to cry:—

"Posterity will be stupefied to learn that the only result of so many victories and triumphs, shedding an eternal glory on the Polish name throughout the world, was—God help us! irreparable ruin and damnation. Yet forty days and Nineveh shall be destroyed."

On his deathbed he announced the end of his country.

The nobles were utterly beyond redemption. The Constitution had reached the culminating point of futility when the *Liberum Veto's* principal use, to quote a historian, "was to shelter high-placed felons from the pursuit of justice." Meanwhile, the two-handed engine at the door was ready to strike.

THE PARTITION OF POLAND.

Prussia under the Great Elector, and Russia under


Peter the Great, had acquired a definite policy and an organisation adapted to it. Their policy was to grow, and both looked upon Poland as providential prey. From the close of the seventeenth century the partition of Poland is practical politics. The nibbling is begun, and the grand banquet is prepared by the systematic cultivation of anarchy within the Polish State. That is facilitated by the Polish Constitution and by the boundless corruptibility of the Polish nobility. From the death of John Sobieski until the election of Stanislaus Poniatowski (1697-1763) two Saxon Electors were kings of Poland. The State had practically ceased to exist. The king did not visit the country; there was no administration anywhere of

the fifteen Diets under Augustus III. was exploded by the *Liberum Veto* before anything was done; the army was abolished because the gentry would not pay for it; for the same reason the diplomatic service had been swept away. Poland was treated as a no man's land by its neighbours, who marched their armies through at pleasure. In the words of one eminent Pole: "The Republic died long ago, only it has forgotten to tumble down." That the great nobles had accumulated princely estates and immense fortunes at the expense of their country was dubious compensation.

Stanislaus Poniatowski was the Russian candidate, and Russian policy at this time was to keep Poland alive as a client of Russia. It was Frederick II. who first proposed partition, and by diplomatic finesse induced

Catherine II. to fall in with it. Austria required little persuasion, and, although Maria Theresa wept crocodile tears, it was chiefly because her pious soul was disturbed by the thought of uniting with two heretical States to despoil a Catholic State. The first partition (1772) deprived Poland of 214,000 square kilometres out of 751,000. Austria got 70,480, Prussia 34,741, and Russia 108,750. The conscience of Europe was not shocked. The transaction accorded with the two contemporary political principles—reason of state and the balance of power. In Poland it did awake among better men their dormant patriotism. The famous Four Years' Diet (1788-92) evolved the Constitution of 3rd May, 1791, which

set up an hereditary monarchy, abolished the *Liberum Veto*, swept away class distinctions, established religious toleration, and extended the franchise. But the reform was the signal for foreign intervention, and, as always, the Polish magnates betrayed their country. Russian troops poured into Poland, and Prussians followed them. By the second partition treaty (4th January, 1793) Russia took 250,700 and Prussia 58,370 square kilometres. The rising of Kosciuszko was a gallant affair, and only the masses took part in it, but it ended with the blotting out of Poland from the map. In the third partition (3rd January, 1795) Prussia took 54,898 square kilometres, Austria a population of 1,000,000, and Russia 111,780



A view in Danzig.

[E.N.A.]

square kilometres. Rectifications made in 1815 gave Russia as her final share something like nine-tenths of the whole of the Republic's territory. Her part of the booty was much the largest, but the initiative in partition came from Prussia.

No impartial student can doubt that Poland fell more by the vices of the nobles, who should have been her rulers, than through any other single cause, and this curse of political ineptitude and of class prejudice on the part of her leaders she has not even now managed to shake off entirely. The history of Poland since the partitions has been the history of attempts, which have uniformly failed, to revive the Polish State, and of attempts, far more successful, to recreate, or rather to create, the Polish nation—for in the days of the Polish Republic there was no Polish nation. Meanwhile, the Poles have taken their revenge on conservative Europe for its cynical indifference to the destruction of their country by engaging prominently in every revolutionary movement since 1815. As Mr. H. A. L. Fisher puts it:—"The annihilation of the Polish nationality has probably done more to endanger the monarchies of Europe than any one political act since the monarchies of Europe were first founded. In all the Republican movements of the Continent the Poles have taken a leading part. They are to be found in the Saxon riots of '48; in the Berlin barricades; in the struggle for the Republic of Baden; in the Italian and Hungarian Wars of Liberation; in the Chartist movement; and in the French Commune. Homeless and fearless, schooled in war and made reckless by calamity, they have been the nerve of revolution wherever they have been scattered by the winds of misfortune." Certainly, there have been few more curious political changes than this transformation of a people the most feudal in Europe into one striding to the van of every democratic movement.

THE POLISH REVIVAL.

Until the Revolution of 1863 the political energies of the Poles were concentrated not upon the recreation of the

Polish nation, but upon the revival of the Polish State. They identified themselves with Napoleon, and he rewarded them by calling into being the Grand Duchy of Warsaw, which, for a few brief years constituted a political centre for the Polish nation. It fell with the fall of Napoleon, but the Treaty of Vienna contained some food for Polish hopes. It set up the Congressional Kingdom of Poland, Poland without Lithuania or the Ukraine under the Tsar, and it founded the little Republic of Cracow, under the tutelage of its great neighbours. And the first article of the Treaty of Vienna laid it down that "The Poles, who are respective subjects of Russia, Austria, and Prussia, shall obtain a representation and national institutions regulated according to the degree of political consideration

that each of the Governments to which they belong shall judge expedient and proper to grant to them." It was a promise which looked like something and amounted to nothing. At various times Russia, Austria, and Prussia had made concessions to Polish national sentiment, but always independently of the Treaty of Vienna, and in the light of the political interests of the moment.

The kingdom of Poland after 1815 revealed notable efforts at solid creative work, but the rulers of the State were hampered by the distrust of the Tsar and by two political errors of their own. They did not appreciate that a Polish State must be built upon a united nation, which implied that justice should be done to the peasants

and to the non-Polish elements, Ruthenian and Jewish, in the State; and they had fixed their hopes upon the speedy adding to the Congressional Kingdom of Lithuania and the Ukraine those parts of old Poland in which the Poles were a minority. They were thinking too much in terms of political machinery and too little in terms of spirit; too much of extension and too little of intension. Again, the magnates had not lost their habit of seeing Poland through their own eyes, while the very abnormality of Poland's fortunes gave to romantic exiles and explosive young students an excessive and a fatal influence in her affairs. It was under such conditions that the Revolution of 1831 and the Revolution of 1863 happened. Both were



The Marienkirche. Danzig.

[E.N.A.]



The ruins of a Polish village after the German bombardment.

[Universal.



Polish peasants road repairing in the war area under German supervision.

[Topical Press.

sectional movements, in the sense that the peasantry, and even the townsmen for the most part, stood aside, and the nobility themselves were divided. They were gallant affairs, but hopeless, and they were grave misfortunes to Poland.

After the rising of 1831 the Tsar, Nicholas I., suppressed the Polish Constitution, while the Republic of Cracow was unostentatiously pocketed by Austria. The only States in which Poles could determine the political fortunes of Poles disappeared, and Poland was ruled as a Russian province. The Universities of Vilna, Krzemieriec, and Warsaw were suppressed, and the Russification of the Polish schools was taken in hand. The accession of Alexander II. raised hopes, and also was the signal for the revival of the revolutionary movement. In 1861 the Marquis Wielopolski, by far the broadest mind and most statesmanlike head in Poland, was appointed practically to rule the country. He had the misfortune to possess too dictatorial a temper, and to stand almost alone even against the hostility of the magnates and the revolutionaries. His idea was to work in harmony with Russia, to reduce political demands to the minimum, and to concentrate on the realities of national life. His programme was (1) administrative reforms leading up slowly to autonomy for the Congressional Kingdom; (2) judicial reforms; (3) agrarian reforms to convert the Polish serfs into peasant proprietors and a bulwark of Polish nationality; (4) the emancipation of the Jews and their assimilation as a middle class; (5) religious toleration and the subordination of the Church to the State; (6) a complete system of national education—university, secondary, and elementary. His programme found little support among the Polish leaders, who were megalomaniac, and insisted upon the return to Poland of Lithuania and Ukraine; anti-Semitic and against the emancipation of the Jews; aristocratic and indifferent to the welfare of the peasants; Messianic and impatient of slow and steady evolution. The Revolution of 1863 shattered everything. It was followed by a policy of Russification steadily pursued for half a century, and only varied in the last few months. Every Polish institution was suppressed, and Russian replaced Polish as the language of administration and the schools. Yet these fifty years have done more to create a real Polish nation than all the centuries which had gone before. There could be no more convincing evidence of the innate strength of the Polish nation.

THE AIMS OF POLISH NATIONALISTS.

Three problems faced the builders of the Polish nation: (1) The building of a Polish culture common to all sections of the nation, whatever their political subjection; (2) the uniting of the various elements within the borders of Poland—upper classes, middle classes, peasants, Jews, Ruthenians, and Lithuanians; (3) the maintenance of the union between the Poles of Russia, Austria, and Prussia, with a view where practicable to common action. These problems have been tackled with varying understanding, skill, and success. The building of a common Polish culture, in some ways the most important of all the tasks of Polish nationalism, has met with most good fortune. By a happy chance the Polish nation has since 1815 not been for any prolonged term without an organised centre of the higher intellectual life, though the centre has repeatedly shifted. From 1815 to 1831 it was in the Congressional Kingdom at Warsaw and Vilna. When Russian and Austrian Poland was given up to repression after 1831, it was transferred to the Grand Duchy of Posen, a most curious episode in the chronicles of Poland.

policy towards the Poles. From 1867 Galicia, with the universities of Cracow and Lemberg, has been the home of Polish culture, which, partly as the result of the work of these universities and partly as a result of the work of the exiles, has assumed a worthy place in national culture. More difficult has been the task of carrying this message to all strata of society. In the days of the Congressional Kingdom there was much school activity, but it aimed chiefly at creating strategic positions in the "western provinces"—Lithuania and the Ukraine. Still, in spite of Russian and Prussian repression, the Polish language and the Polish spirit have been kept alive, and have struck roots even in Silesia, where they had long been forgotten.

The Poles never seriously grappled with the peasant question. The peasants, given personal freedom in 1807 by the Code Napoléon, still retained all the economic disabilities of serfdom, and this fact made them hostile to the nobles and indifferent to the national cause. It was the Russian Government which in 1863 emancipated the Polish serfs. This stroke was intended to break the back of the rebellion, in which it succeeded; and it was hoped that it would permanently attach the peasants to the Russian Government and alienate them from the nobles. It so happened that it had precisely the opposite effect, for it bridged the gap between peasants and gentry. When in recent years propaganda was started to win the peasants to the national cause, it found them thoroughly accessible, and to-day they are identified with it to a degree quite unknown in any previous age. A more partial success has met the efforts at winning the adhesion of the middle classes and the proletariat to the national cause. The middle classes in Poland were for many centuries constituted by the Jews. In the last twenty or thirty years the industrialisation of Poland, notably round Lodz, has brought the Poles into industry, and the movement has been accompanied by the deliberate adoption of anti-Semitism as a principle of the strongest Polish party, the National Democratic Party. There has long been an anti-Semitic tendency in Polish politics, but the most statesmanlike minds, Wielopolski and Swienotoehowski for example, fought against it. The National Democrats, however, whose programme was issued in Russia in 1896, have taken as their principle "the gradual acquisition by intellectual, cultural, and economic work, and by political effort and agitation, of the greatest possible national distinctiveness and independence." This formula is much more negative than positive, and it has more edge than haft, an edge directed against every element in Polish territory not Polish by blood or race.

The Jews have suffered, and along with them the Lithuanians and the Ukrainians. Neither the Polish character nor the Polish society has gained, for among Jews, Lithuanians and Ukrainians national movements have taken firm hold. These are perfectly compatible with the welfare of a tolerant Polish State which understands, with Lord Acton, that "the combination of different nations in one State is as necessary a condition of civilised life as the combination of men in society"; and, indeed, the indispensable condition of the health of a Polish State is that the leaders of Polish nationalism should be purged of this latest variant of their traditional exclusiveness, narrowness, and intolerance.

The modern Polish nationalist movement has aimed at maintaining the union of all these parts of Poland. The cultural union has, on the whole, been sustained, but common political action has been extremely difficult. The immediate problems of the Poles in Russia, Austria,



A group of beggars in Warsaw.

[E.N.A.]



A typical cab, with its moujik driver, on the Polish plains

[E.N.A.]



The Governor-General's Palace, Warsaw.

[E.N.A.]

and Prussia have been very different. Economic influences make for disintegration. On the one hand, there are tariff barriers between Russia, Prussia, and Austria; and on the other, the abolition in 1850 of the tariff between the Congressional Kingdom and Russia identified the economic interests of the largest fraction of Poland with Russia. The political problem has been equally stubborn. Polish leaders have been slow to characterise the political settlement which they desire. They would probably be content with autonomy because they doubt the practicability of independence, but they would like the reunion of Poland. Autonomy implies a suzerain. Under which State is Poland to be united? The Russian Poles, for all their grievances against the Russian Government, incline to favour autonomy and reunion under the Tsar. The Austrian Poles, on the other hand, being far the most liberally treated of all sections of the Polish race, favour Austria; and while few Poles, save the inevitable handful of magnates, have any affection for Prussia, the close relations between Austria and Germany, and the extremely hazardous question which State would have the power to unite Poland, render it impossible for many Poles to exclude Prussia from their calculations. The net result, when war broke out, was that the Poles were not politically at one.

CIVIL WAR IN POLAND.

The war has been to Poles as to Jews a colossal tragedy, setting father against son and brother against brother. It is estimated that on a war footing there would be serving under the Russian flag 400,000 Poles, under the Austrian flag 82,000, and under the German flag 111,000. It was calculated that by the middle of March 400,000 Polish soldiers of the various armies had been killed, wounded, or taken prisoners. In the three sections of Poland there are some 20,000,000 of Poles, and the support of this great population was a thing of moment to all three belligerents in the Eastern theatre of war. A revolution in Russian Poland, or in Galicia or Posen, would have disorganised the campaign for Russia, Austria, and Germany respectively. All three States endeavoured to confirm the loyalty of their own Polish subjects, and to shake the loyalty of the Polish subjects of the enemy. Early in August the Commander-in-Chief of the Austro-Hungarian forces which had entered Russian Poland issued a proclamation to the Poles, in which he said:—

"We are bringing the Poles emancipation from the Muscovite yoke. Greet our banners with confidence. They are bringing you justice. They are not unknown to you and your brothers. . . . From the time of King Sobieski, who once effectively assisted the threatened house of the Hapsburgs, the glorious traditions of Poland have been intimately connected with those of the two Western States."

The Germans followed this up with proclamations in which they invited the Poles to rise against the hated Russians and join hands with the Germanic Powers, who bring freedom and culture and religious toleration with their victorious armies.

"Away with Oriental barbarism. Victory for Western culture common to you and to us. Trust us, and with us let the united forces of culture fling back these Asiatic hordes from the frontiers of Poland."

The Austrian Poles, constituting a "National Council" at Kielce, backed up the appeal of the Austrian Government. They raised vast sums for the Austrian cause (Cracow alone gave £40,000), and 10,000 volunteers joined a Polish legion for the redemption of their brethren in Russia.

On 14th August, evidently in answer to the Austrian proclamation, the Grand Duke Nicholas, the Russian Commander-in-Chief, issued in Polish the following proclamation:—


"Poles! The hour has struck in which the sacred dream of your fathers and forefathers may find fulfilment. A century and a half ago the living flesh of Poland was torn asunder; but her soul did not die. She lived in hope that there would come an hour for the resurrection of the Polish nation and for a brotherly reconciliation with Russia. The Russian army now brings you the joyful tidings of this reconciliation. May the boundaries be annihilated which cut the Polish nation into parts! May that nation reunite into one body under the sceptre of the Russian Emperor. Under this sceptre Poland shall be reborn, free in faith, in language, in self-government."

"One thing only Russia expects of you, equal consideration for the rights of those nationalities to which history has linked you. With open heart, with hand fraternally outstretched, Russia steps forward to meet you. She believes that the sword has not rusted which, at Grünwald, struck down the enemy. From the shores of the Pacific to the North Sea the Russian forces are on the march. The dawn of a new life is breaking for you. May there shine, resplendent above that dawn, the sign of the Cross, symbol of the Passion and resurrection of all nations."

This was followed on 16th August, 1914, by a declaration of the leaders of the middle-class Polish parties in Russia (National Democrats, Polish Progressives, Realists, Polish Progressive Union) in the following terms:—


"The representatives of the undersigned political parties, assembled in Warsaw on the 16th August, 1914, welcome the Proclamation issued to the Poles by His Imperial Highness the Commander-in-Chief of the Russian forces as an act of the foremost historical importance, and implicitly believe that upon the termination of the war the promises uttered in the Proclamation will be formally fulfilled, that the dreams of their fathers will be realised, that Poland's flesh, torn asunder a century and a half ago, will once again be made whole, that the frontiers severing the Polish nation will vanish. The blood of Poland's sons, shed in united combat against the Germans, will serve equally as a sacrifice offered upon the altar of her resurrection."

As might be expected, the effect of all these conflicting appeals was chiefly negative. They sufficed to confirm the loyalty of the Poles in each State, but they failed to provoke a revolutionary movement in the enemy State. Nor can it be said that the various Governments have been over anxious to translate their promises into deeds. The Austrian Poles have for fifty years had no grievances. In the Prussian Budget the anti-Polish estimates have maintained their place, while Count Bobrinski, the Russian Governor of occupied Eastern Galicia, has informed the Poles that "the organisation of Galicia must be based on Russian principles," and that "he would introduce here the Russian tongue, Russian law, and Russian institutions." Accordingly, Eastern Galicia is being Russianised with equal indifference to the views of Poles, Ruthenians, and Jews. Against this must be set the enactment by Imperial decree of the law (rejected by the Imperial Council) establishing municipal government in Poland, and authorising the use of the Polish tongue by the new municipal bodies. It is also believed that the Duma in the approaching session will have before it a project extending self-government in Poland. For the Poles, however, there have been laid bare and accentuated their political disintegration and the impossibility of political action, under present conditions, common to the whole nation. Their leaders



In German Poland: A view of Posen, showing the old town.

[E.N.A.]



The Kaiser's Castle at Posen.

[E.N.A.]

have aggravated their weakness and their difficulties by utilising the war for a particularly violent campaign against the Jews, upon whom they have endeavoured to fasten the odium of being spies and traitors to Russia. That has made the sufferings of the Jews in the war area even more bitter than those of the Poles, for while many have been hanged on false charges, whole communities have been expelled by order of the Grand Duke Nicholas and other Russian commanders.

THE BELGIUM OF THE EAST.

It is impossible to give even a faint idea of the ruin and devastation which the war has brought upon Poland. The eastern theatre of war is Poland, and German, Russian, and Austrian armies have repeatedly swept across it. Each movement of the tide has laid whole districts waste, and when Hindenburg retired from before Warsaw he destroyed all the means of communication and all supplies which could possibly help the Russians. It is estimated that 200 towns and 7,500 villages have been wrecked, and that the material damage amounts to £120,000,000. Mr. Sienkiewicz, in an appeal to the civilised nations, thus describes the condition of his unhappy people:—

"An area seven times as vast as that of the realm of King Albert has been crushed and devastated by the iron heel of war. From the banks of the Niemen to the summits of the Carpathians fire has destroyed the towns and villages, and

over the whole of this huge country the spectre of famine has spread out its wings. All labour and industry have been swept away. The ploughshare is rusted; the peasant has neither grain nor cattle. The artisan is idle; all works and factories have been destroyed. The tradesman cannot sell his wares; there is no one to buy. The hearth is extinguished, and disease and misery prevail. The aged and infirm have no shelter from the cold and hardships of the winter weather. Little children, stretching out their arms to their mothers for bread, receive in answer but tears."

Lest the colours in this picture may be thought too gloomy, there may be quoted from the *Berner Tagwacht* (13th April, 1915) the testimony of a German Social Democrat:—

"Since German troops have occupied a large part of Poland, the land is being systematically plundered. Not only does the army requisition for its needs, but vast supplies of raw material and foodstuffs have been taken from the owners and sent to Germany—minerals, wool, cotton, sugar, flour, wheat, potatoes, beet, vegetables. It is direct, shameless robbery. This systematic robbery threatens the population with the terrible catastrophe of starvation."

This writer goes on to describe the brutality of the soldiers, and says:—

"When the troops leave their quarters they often destroy everything out of pure joy in destruction."

So the war has proved to Poland the latest, and not the least, terrible act in her tragedy.



Polish peasants on a wayside railway station.

[E.N.A.]



French troops passing over the sand dunes into the firing line.

[Alfieri Picture Service.]

CHAPTER XXII.

A SYNOPSIS.

ONE of the difficulties in following the war is to keep in mind the correspondence of events as they happened in the several campaigns.

A war so vast in its area of necessity falls into a number of campaigns, which, as they never touch, it is natural to regard severally as though each were unconnected with the rest. Yet to read the war so is to obtain a very incomplete and misleading idea of its progress. The aim of this chapter is to present a synoptical view of the war, to correlate the happenings on the various fronts, and to exhibit the connection of events in the various campaigns so far as this exists or is discoverable.

In the following pages the events of the war are taken month by month, and shown for the sake of clearness in parallel columns. These tables are not, of course, to be taken as in any sense a complete diary of the war, for many happenings of very great importance are excluded. The sole object is to bring out the points of connection between the various campaigns, and to enable us to obtain a general view of the war as a whole, so far as the narrative of events in this History has yet progressed.

THE FIRST MONTH.

It will be seen that the Battle of Gumbinnen, in which the Russian General, Rennenkampf, defeated three German

army corps in East Prussia, coincided in time with the German occupation of Brussels, the fall of Namur, and the heavy French defeats in Lorraine and at Charleroi; that the great Russian disaster in the Masurian Lakes came on the most critical day in the retreat from Mons, and coincided with the beginning of the Russian victories over the Austrians on the Lublin-Lemberg line; and, further, that the burning of Louvain came between the Battles of Gumbinnen and of the Masurian Lakes. All these facts have significance. At the beginning of the war the German plan was to put the whole strength of their offence against France, and, leaving the attack on Russia to Austria, to hold her eastern frontier with as few corps as possible. This plan was foiled by the unexpected rapidity of the Russian mobilisation and by the invasion of East Prussia by Rennenkampf. This movement, and the arrival at Berlin of crowds of refugees from East Prussia, had an immediate effect on German plans. A great number of troops, perhaps 250,000 in all, were rushed across to the east frontier, some of them arriving in time to take part in the battle of the Masurian Lakes. These corps seem to have been drawn not from the army invading France, but from the troops garrisoning Belgium. For a week or a fortnight, until they were replaced by Landwehr troops, Belgium was in consequence very weakly held, and this was the fortnight of the worst

German atrocities. The battle of the Masurian Lakes removed the danger in East Prussia, but the great Austrian defeats in Galicia made it unsafe to return the corps borrowed from the west. In spite, therefore, of the Masurian defeat, Russia's services to the Western Allies in this critical first month were very great indeed, if hardly so great as some Russian writers have maintained. The defeat of the Masurian Lakes was the penalty of Russian loyalty to her Western Allies. She deliberately ran risks as part of her duty to them.

commerce. Of direct connection between the campaigns there is no clear sign, but new plans for the conduct of the war begin to emerge. It is perhaps not fanciful to suspect that the sinking of the *Cressy* may have suggested to the Germans the desirability of gaining possession of the coast of Belgium and the Straits of Dover. The Germans had other motives too—the increasing boldness of the Belgian attacks from Antwerp, the necessity of covering their right flank and of prolonging their lines to the sea, whether as a protection against French attacks

FIRST MONTH.

DATE.	ALLIES v. GERMANY.		AUSTRIA v.		TURKEY AND THE EAST.	NAVAL.	COLONIAL.
	WEST.	EAST.	RUSSIA.	SERVIA.			
Aug. 2...	Invasion of Belgium and Luxembourg.						
" 12...						<i>Goeben and Breslau</i> take refuge in the Dardanelles (Vol. I., 95).	
" 17...	British Expeditionary Force landed.						
" 18...				Battle of Shabatz (Vol. I., 335).			
" 20...		The Battle of Cumbinnen (Vol. I., 187)					
" 21...	Germans enter Brussels.						
" 22...	Battle in Lorraine						
" 23...	Fall of Namur. Battles of Mons and Charleroi.				Japan declares war on Germany.		
" 25...	Sack of Louvain.		Battle of Lemberg begins (Vol. I., 200).				
" 26...	British army nearly surrounded makes good its retreat (Vol. I., 135).	Battle of Masurian Lakes begins.					
" 28...		Battle of Masurian Lakes ends in great Russian disaster (Vol. I., 189-191).				British victory in Heligoland Bight (Vol. I., 213-222).	
" 29...							Samoa captured.

THE SECOND MONTH.

On the whole, September was the worst month that the Germans had in the first six. They were defeated on the Marne and thrown back across the Aisne. They began an offensive movement in the Suwalki province of Russia. But it made slow progress. For the Austrians it was a month of heavy defeats. Against these reverses the Germans had to set the capture of St. Mihiel on the Heights of the Meuse, a notable success by one of their submarines, and the depredations of the *Emmer* on

or as a means of turning the flank of the Allied armies. It is remarkable that the move on Antwerp should have begun about the same time as the breach was made in the defences of the Meuse Heights at the opposite end of the French line, as though the Germans were making ready when the time came for a double flanking movement against the Allied armies. But the sinking of the *Cressy* may well have suggested to them the important naval as well as the military advantage that the possession of the Straits would confer. These ideas are the first link

in the chain of events that led later to the submarine blockade.

THE THIRD MONTH.

This is the month of the great German recovery. They—or the heads of the army and navy who alone in Germany knew all the facts—must have begun the month with a feeling of depression. They ended it with Antwerp and the Belgian coast as far as the Yser river in their hands, and with what seemed to them good prospects of capturing Ypres and gaining possession of the Straits. They had gained in Turkey a new and exceedingly powerful ally, capable of menacing England in Egypt, and also

Silesia, is threatened by the Russians, whose troops begin to raid over the Carpathian Passes. The fortunes of the Austrians are almost at their lowest in this month, and their weakness begins to be a danger to the security of the German frontiers. At the same time the enemy begins an attempt once for all to dispose of Serbia. The third and greatest invasion of Serbia begins immediately after Turkey has been dragged into the war, and there is an obvious connection between the two events. The natural answer to the success of the Germans in bringing Turkey into the war was for the Allies to bring in Bulgaria, and Austria hoped, by disposing of Serbia, to deter Bulgaria from

SECOND MONTH.

DATE.	ALLIES v. GERMANY.		AUSTRIA v.		TURKEY AND THE EAST.	NAVAL.	COLONIAL.
	WEST.	EAST.	RUSSIA.	SERBIA.			
Sept. 1...			Great Austrian defeat at Lemberg (Vol. I., 200).				
" 2...	Furthest south reached of Allies' retreat.						
" 6-10	Battle of the Marne (Vol. I., 149).	German advance from East Prussia towards Niemen begins (Vol. I., 313).		Second invasion of Serbia begins (Vol. I., 339).			
" 13...	The Battle of the Aisne begins (Vol. I., 153).						
" 16...			Przemysl invested from the east.				
" 22...			Fall of Jaroslav (Vol. I., 203).				
" 25...	Capture of St. Mihiel (Vol. I., 269).					Hogue, Cressy, and Aboukir sunk by submarine (Vol. I., 227). Madras bombarded (Vol. I., 207). Career of Emden begins.	
" 26...	Germans move towards Antwerp (Vol. I. 272).	Ossowiec bombarded (Vol. II., 57).					Maritz rebels (Vol. I., 233).
" 27...							
" 30...		Silesia threatened	Russians approach Cracow (Vol. I., 203).				Tsing-Tau invested (Vol. II., 29).

it was hoped of drawing off Russian corps from Austria. They had approached Warsaw, and the Austrians had driven the enemy back towards the San. The German faith in mines and submarines had received striking confirmation. In spite of the weakening of the Austrians on the San, the Germans were probably more confident this month than at any time since the war began. Both in England and Germany, but especially in Germany, the month brought a great acerbation of feeling.

THE FOURTH MONTH.

November marks the transference of military interest from the west to the east front. Cracow, the gate of

committing herself to war with Turkey. The military policy of Germany is now to remain on the defensive in the west and to win some decisive victory against Russia, in the hope of being able, in the spring, to withdraw troops from the east and resume her offensive campaign against France on the same lines as those of the autumn preceding. The most signal success against Russia would have been the capture of Warsaw, which, if it could have been accomplished, would have put the Germans, despite the defeats of Austria, in a position to take up the plans for crushing France, which had perforce to be abandoned for the time being after the Battle of the Marne. While her land

attacks are directed against Russia, Germany consolidates her position on the Belgian coast, and extends the activity of her submarines. Lord Fisher, the new First Sea Lord, closes the North Sea, except for a

Although the Germans have suspended their offensive in the west and begun an ambitious move against Warsaw, there is no evidence of any transfer of troops from the west to the east.

THIRD MONTH.

DATE.	ALLIES v. GERMANY.		AUSTRIA v.		TURKEY AND THE EAST.	NAVAL.	COLONIAL.
	WEST.	EAST.	RUSSIA.	SERVIA.			
Oct. 1...		Advance from Thorn on Warsaw (Vol. I., 315).					Bombardment of Tsing-Tau (Vol. II., 29).
" 3...	Transference of British army from the Aisne to Flanders begins (Vol. I., 280).	German advance towards Niemen checked.					
" 7...	Bombardment of Antwerp.						
" 8...	Fall of Antwerp (Vol. I., 276).						
" 11...	The fighting in Flanders begins.						
" 13...		Russians fall back to Vistula (Vol. I., 317).					
" 19...						British flotilla arrives off Belgian coast (Vol. II., 142).	
" 20...			Russians retire to San river (Vol. I., 317).				
" 23-24	Heavy fighting on the Yser (Vol. I., 287).						
" 25...		Germans retreat from the line of the Vistula (Vol. I., 323).					
" 26...			Austrian attacks on the San river lines definitely fail (Vol. I., 328).			German submarine sinks the Admiral Gan-tesaume.	Beyers and De Wet head a rebellion in South Africa (Vol. I., 239).
" 28...						German minefield discovered off the North of Ireland (Vol. I., 231).	
" 29...	Heavy fighting begins at Ypres (Vol. I., 289).				Turks begin hostilities against Russia in the Black Sea.	Prince Louis of Battenberg resigns.	
" 30...					Italy occupies Saseno opposite Valona.	Lord Fisher appointed First Sea Lord (Vol. I., 231).	
" 31...						Hermes sunk in the Straits (Vol. I., 229).	

THE FIFTH MONTH.

narrow passage off Dover. This is the naval answer to the violent German attempts to find a way to the Straits through Ypres. The naval bombardment of Zeebrugge is another answer. But the British are not conspicuously successful at sea. Against the destruction of the *Emden* is to be set the bad defeat of Admiral Cradock off the coast of Chili, which was due mainly to faulty dispositions on the part of the Admiralty.

Notwithstanding very obstinate German attacks in Poland, the Russians, on the whole, hold their own on the eastern front. They lose Lodz, and are driven back from Cracow, but the Austrians, in spite of temporary successes, fail to dislodge them from the Carpathians. There is evidence in this month of withdrawals from one campaign to another. The

Austrian defeat in Serbia, for example, was due, in part at any rate, to the withdrawal from Serbia of troops to take part in the movement against the Russian progress in Galicia. The attack on the head of the Russian columns threatening Cracow was conducted by German troops, some of whom may have been withdrawn from the western front; and henceforth the distinction between German and Austrian conduct of the war becomes difficult to keep. The Austrian left in Poland and the right wing of the German east front had for some time been under

a part of the German plans that the Russians should be kept busy in the Caucasus, so that they could not withdraw troops thence to Europe, but might rather be compelled to send reinforcements to meet attacks which, if they had been successful, would have caused widespread disturbance among the Mohammedan subjects of Russia in Asia.

It is to be observed that Germany's plan, carried into execution two months later, for a submarine war on shipping to the British Isles is already completely formed in the mind of Admiral von Tirpitz.

FOURTH MONTH.

DATE.	ALLIES v. GERMANY.		AUSTRIA v.		TURKEY AND THE EAST.	NAVAL.	COLONIAL.
	WEST.	EAST.	RUSSIA.	SERVIA.			
Nov. 1...						<i>Monmouth</i> and <i>Good Hope</i> sunk off Chili (Vol. II., 36).	
" 2...						North Sea closed (Vol. I., 231).	
" 3...						Bombardment of Akaba.	
" 4...			Russians cross the San (Vol. II., 57).	Third Austrian invasion of Servia (Vol. II., 77).			
" 5...					England declares war on Turkey.		
" 6...							Kiao-Chau surrenders (Vol. II., 30).
" 8...					Fao occupied in Persian Gulf (Vol. I., 349).		
" 9...						<i>Emden</i> sunk (Vol. I., 211).	
" 11...	Prussian Guard defeated at Ypres (Vol. I., 301).						
" 13...		German advance on Warsaw from Thorn begins (Vol. II., 57).					
" 18...		Russian line pierced near Lodz (Vol. II., 59).					
" 21...							
" 23...					Basra occupied (Vol. I., 351).		
" 26...			Austrians defeated east of Cracow.			Zeebrugge bombarded. <i>Bulwark</i> blown up (Vol. II., 43).	

SIXTH MONTH.

The revival of French activity, with General Joffre's proclamation of December 14th, is to be read in connection with the reports of withdrawal of German troops from the west to the east front. The small measure of success obtained by the French is proof that the withdrawals from the west were not considerable and had not weakened the strength of the German defensive positions. The chief interest of

German command; but henceforth the German troops begin to operate regularly on Austrian soil, Germany regarding Austria as a bastion for the defence of Silesia, as Belgium was for the defence of Westphalia.

The Turkish attack, again, on the Russians in the Caucasus has an obvious connection with the German campaigns in Poland. In their own interests, the Turks were ill-advised in beginning an ambitious offensive in the Caucasus in mid-winter; but it was

FIFTH MONTH.

DATE.	ALLIES v. GERMANY.		AUSTRIA v.		TURKEY AND THE EAST.	NAVAL.	COLONIAL.
	WEST.	EAST.	RUSSIA.	SERVIA.			
Dec. 1...			Russians occupy Wiatyczka, near Cracow.				Capture of De Wet.
" 2...						Admiral von Tirpitz threatens a "submarine blockade" in an interview with an American journalist.	
" 3...			Russians at Bartfeld in the Carpathians.	Servians attack Austrians.			
" 7...	French capture Vermelles (Vol. II., 145).	Russians evacuate Lodz (Vol. II., 62).					
" 8...				Servian victory over Austrians (Vol. II., 81).			
" 12...			Russian pressure on Cracow relieved. Austrians attack Russian communications through Galicia (Vol. II., 67).			British naval victory off the Falkland Islands (Vol. II., 39).	
" 14...				Servians recapture Belgrade.			
" 16...						Bombardment of Scarborough (Vol. I., 355).	
" 17...	General Joffre issues order announcing that the time has come to clear France of the enemy.						
" 18...	Indecisive fighting at Givenchy (Vol. II., 144).						
" 22...			Russian success in the Carpathians (Vol. II., 74).				
" 23...			Austrian attacks checked.		Roumania announces that she will not see Servia crushed.		
" 25...					Turks attack Sarikamish in the Caucasus (Vol. II., 85).	British air raid on Cuxhaven (Vol. I., 262).	
" 27...			Austrians retire towards Dukla Pass.				
" 29...			Russians cross the Nida.			American protest against British treatment of neutral shipping (Vol. II., 102).	

the month, however, is in the German preparations for the submarine campaign against shipping. The military position from this month remains virtually unaltered until the opening of the spring campaign.

THE ARITHMETIC OF THE WAR.

Much has been written about the numbers on the two frontiers, but the calculations, in spite of specious detail, have all been more or less guess-work, and

1,000,000 on the east. Drafts and new corps—seven new army corps made their appearance on the west in October—would raise the total number to over 3,000,000 on the west and perhaps 1,500,000 on the east, though this last figure may be an over-estimate. From these totals must be subtracted the casualties, which, by the middle of January, had reached nearly 2,000,000 men. Making an allowance for recoveries and excluding losses from sickness, the figures on the

SIXTH MONTH.

DATE.	ALLIES v. GERMANY.		AUSTRIA v.		TURKEY AND THE EAST.	NAVAL.	COLONIAL.
	WEST.	EAST.	RUSSIA.	SERVIA.			
Jan. ...						The <i>Formidable</i> torpedoed (Vol. II., 45).	
" 4...	French activity in the Vosges.		Russians occupy Bukowina (Vol. II., 74).		Russian victory in the Caucasus (Vol. II., 85).		
" 8...	French advance opposite Soissons (Vol. II., 147).						
" 13...	Defeat of the French near Soissons.		The Austrian Foreign Minister resigns.		Turks occupy Tabriz (Vol. II., 87).		
" 16...		Russian advance on Lower Vistula.					
" 17...	French attacks at Pont-à-Mousson.						
" 24...						Battle of the Dogger Bank. The <i>Blücher</i> sunk (Vol. II., 53).	
" 25...	Fighting at Givenchy (Vol. II., 143).						
" 26...					Turkish force near El Kantara on the Suez Canal (Vol. II., 119).		
" 28...						German Federal Council decides to nationalise supplies of corn and flour.	
" 30...						Two British steamers torpedoed off Fleetwood (Vol. II., 107).	

it is safest and quite as instructive, to keep to very round numbers. The probabilities would seem to be these. At the beginning of the war the proportion of German troops in the west and east was nearer four to one than three to one—say, 2,750,000 men in the west to 750,000 in the east. At the beginning of September the preponderance of the west was diminished by the transference of perhaps 250,000 men to the east. The figures would then be 2,500,000 on the west and

two fronts at the end of the winter would be perhaps 2,600,000 on the west and 1,200,000 on the east. When all allowance is made for the troops that Austria had to keep in Bosnia and Herzegovina in the Tyrol and watching the Italian frontiers, and against Servia, it may be doubted whether the combined Austro-German forces arrayed against Russia on the east front at any time exceeded, if they ever equalled, the strength of the German armies on the west.

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
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
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
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
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A photograph of the Czar, taken among the workmen at the great Putloff Munition and Engineering Works at Petrograd, on the occasion of a visit of inspection to the works. [Central News.

CHAPTER XXIII.

RUSSIA IN WAR TIME.


RUSSIAN UNITY IN FACE OF THE WAR—THE PROHIBITION OF VODKA—RUSSIA'S VIEW OF ENGLAND—RUSSIA'S ECONOMIC POSITION—THE SPIRIT OF THE ARMY.

AT the beginning of the war Russia was in a somewhat different position from England and France. From the first moment of the Austrian ultimatum the Russian people, although confident that a peaceful settlement would be found, realised at once the danger and the possibility of war. In 1908 the Teuton had been able to ride rough-shod over the Slav. This time it was felt that neither morally nor in her own interests could Russia allow Serbia to be treated in the same way as Bosnia and Herzegovina, and therefore, contrary to all German expectations, the historic sitting of the Duma on the 8th August found all parties united to make common front in what was felt to be the cause of justice and their country.

If, then, the war came as less of a surprise to the Russian people than to the English and French, it must not be thought that Russia had in any way premeditated a war for which she neither wished nor was prepared. A glance at the railway-map of the Austro-Russian and Russo-German frontiers shows plainly

were the most ready for war. Nor was it merely in insufficiency of railways that Russia was handicapped. Like her Allies in this struggle she, too, was to suffer severely because her disbelief in Germany's warlike intentions had not provided for a Krupp and for the vast reserves of material necessary for modern warfare.

During the days following on the declaration of war the whole country was in a fever of excitement. It would be idle to pretend that during those first hours there was the same confidence in victory that now prevails throughout the country. Even although it was generally believed that the army had improved beyond all knowledge, people could not forget the Japanese war of 1904, or the vaunted invincibility of the foe they had to face. And so for some time there was a very natural anxiety to see how the Russian arms would fare. One thing alone was certain. The war was a popular war, in every sense of the word a national war. The wonderfully demonstrative send-off given to the Servian reservists at Petrograd and Moscow, where Servian



Petrograd : The Nicholas Bridge seen from the English Quay.

[E.N.A.]

officers were passed down to the train shoulder-high through the cheering crowd, proved this beyond all doubt. Uncertainty, too, as to England's intentions kept the excitement at fever heat, and the one question on the lips of the manifestants who thronged the streets was "Will England join?" In Moscow a hundred brazen-lunged orators, haranguing vast crowds from the Skobelev monument at every hour of the day, advanced a hundred reasons why she must do so. It is not too much to say that had England remained neutral the position of Englishmen in Russia would have been extremely uncomfortable. When finally the British declaration was made public, it was hailed by the whole of Russia with a great sigh of contented relief, and the *Russkiya Vedomosti*, perhaps the most dignified of the Russian newspapers, undoubtedly echoed the feelings of the empire when it said in the first lines of a memorable leader: "England has declared war on Germany. This is a fact of the most tremendous importance—a fact which may well be the decisive factor in the final issue of the war." In view of a tendency, which was assiduously developed later by German influences, to criticise the British for the small part they were playing in the war, it is only fair to give to this point the prominence it deserves.

RUSSIA BECOME A NATION.

England's declaration of war marked the high-tide in the sea of excitement. The first days of the war had been marked by wild scenes of patriotism, by endless manifestations, and even by some senseless hooliganism, such as the sacking of the German Embassy in Petrograd. When it was known that England was to take her stand with France and Russia, high feeling subsided, and the whole nation settled down to prepare for victory with calmness and determination. The traditional phlegm of the Russian character, after a fierce explosion of passion—with which it is by no means incompatible—had reasserted itself. In a week Russia, which the world had believed to be deeply divided, had become a united nation.

Much has already been said of the inability of the German mind to understand the psychology of other nations. And yet, as far as Russia was concerned, on paper everything seemed to justify the predictions of the German diplomats. Only a few days before the war there had been serious strikes in Petrograd, which seemed to promise an outbreak of discontent throughout the whole country. Numerous Russian subjects living abroad spoke openly of their dislike of the Russian Government, and hinted that another war would be of great advantage to the Radicals and the Socialists. It was only natural for the German, confident in his own power and in the superiority of his own institutions, to think that Russia, disrupted and discontented, would be an easy prey. And indeed it would have required a more far-seeing mind than the German to foresee that within a few hours the same workmen who had been singing the Marseillaise as a strikers' threat would be singing it with the deep-throated enthusiasm of patriotism before the doors of the French Embassy in Petrograd, or that the students of Moscow University would throw away their books on Socialism in order to drag officers from their cabs and toss them in the air outside the railway stations. War with Germany was a different thing from war in the unknown province of Manchuria. Had the war been with any other nation but Germany it is just possible that things might have been different.

And the German calculations failed, because of Germany herself, because no one outside Germany could appreciate the benefits of German civilisation and German *Kultur*.

GERMAN MISCALCULATIONS.

The Germans had counted greatly on the sympathy of the Poles in Poland, in much the same way as they had counted on the sympathy of the Irish or the Boers. If the Russian Poles had perhaps little sympathy for Russia, there was nothing in the treatment of their brothers in Posen to tempt them to transfer their allegiance. Similarly, Liberal Russia, however great its aspirations for reform, saw nothing Liberal in the rule of Wilhelm II. In his memorable letter to the *Times*, Professor Vinogradoff, himself a Liberal who had suffered for his political opinions, was echoing the feelings of intellectual Russia when he wrote:—

"It is a blessing in this decisive crisis that Russians should have a firmly-knit organisation and a traditional centre of authority in the power of the Tsar. The present Emperor stands as the national leader . . . and his subjects will follow him to a man. We are sure he will remember in the hour of victory the unstinted devotion and sacrifices of all the nationalities and parties of his vast empire."

In the heart of every Russian there is at the bottom a wonderful love of country, which differs somewhat from the patriotism of other countries. It is partly a religious sentiment, due to the force which binds 120,000,000 souls in one faith, but it is also a love of the land itself, of the soil on which he lives. It is a sentiment which rises above all party dissensions and politics. One finds it in the works of all Russian writers, in Shevtchenko, for instance, the Little Russian poet, who wrote: "I asked such little things of God—a hut by the Dnieper, a plot of land to cultivate, two poplar trees of my own, and at the end to die by my dear river." It only needed some great occasion to reawaken this sentiment which circumstances had too long kept dormant. German arrogance, German world-dominion, German interference, and, above all, the sacrilege of a German invasion of Russian soil roused in a night all that was deepest in Russian patriotism.

That Russia realised the magnitude of the task that had been forced upon her may be seen from the stringent measures that were taken to prevent any repetition of the mistakes of 1904. The most important of these was the suppression of the sale of vodka, and this suppression was extended later to the sale of all alcoholic liquor, including beer and wine. There is nothing finer in the whole of Russian history, nothing more convincing as a proof of her determination, than this sudden sobering in the space of a single day of the Russian people. It would be difficult, too, to exaggerate the importance of this measure, but those who remember the mobilisation during the war with Japan will understand the difference between a mobilisation with vodka and a mobilisation without it. And the rapidity of the Russian mobilisation in 1914 has an importance which it would be hard to over-estimate. As a peasant wrote in one of the Russian papers:

"If vodka had not been forbidden, our village would have suffered a dreadful loss. Every man called out by the mobilisation order would have spent at least ten roubles on this useless drink. In our village thirty-two men were called out. In this way they would have spent on drink not less than 320 roubles. Besides this, their relations would have spent from two to three roubles 'to drown the grief of parting.' And so our village would have spent not less than 800 roubles. This is an enormous sum for one village."



A general view of Petrograd.

[E.N.A.]



The Nevsky Prospect, Petrograd.

[E.N.A.]

Since the beginning of 1915 the regulations regarding the sale of red and white wines have been very slightly relaxed. There has been, too, a certain amount of illicit drinking and cases of poisoning from such obnoxious substitutes as "khanja" (spirits of wine rendered unfit for drinking), furniture polish, and children's balsam. This was almost inevitable in a country where drink has for generations had an abnormal hold on the masses. One may say, however, without exaggeration that from the first day of the war the vast majority of the Russian people have been leading a sober life, with excellent results both for those at the front and for those who remain behind, while the night-life for which the large cities were notorious has practically disappeared.

THE PEOPLE AND THE WAR.

An interesting feature of the commencement of the war was the intense desire of the people to live themselves into the spirit of the war. The theatres and the picture-palaces gave themselves up wholly to the patriotic play. Everyone who was not required for military service hastened to enrol himself or herself as a stretcher-bearer, hospital orderly, or Red Cross nurse. Lectures on the war succeeded one another with bewildering rapidity, and a whole series of new newspapers made a glorious but generally very ephemeral appearance. People spoke glibly of the war finishing in three months, and devoured the telegrams, true or untrue, with an appetite that could not be sated. Later, there came the inevitable reaction. People, realising that calmness and self-discipline were as necessary in the streets of Petrograd and Moscow as at the front, discovered that they were helping no one by crying over such neurotic fare as Leonid Andreeff's Belgian play "For King, For Law, and Liberty." The theatres went back to their old régime, and, in the big cities at any rate, by September life was more or less normal. Naturally, there was much that was changed. In almost every street the Red Cross Flag was flying over some hospital or improvised lazaretto. The number of wounded increased daily, and all Russia united to alleviate their suffering. This work has been admirably done. In Moscow, which has had to deal with about one-third of the total wounded, the whole town has worked splendidly together; and in spite of Russia's bad reputation as a practical organiser, the arrangements, which of necessity are on a very large scale, have been excellently carried out. In Russia there are no paupers such as one sees in London. The Russian people gives to its beggars, as no nation

in the world gives. Every week since the war there has been some new collection for such excellent purposes as 'Orphans' Day,' 'Polish Day,' 'Belgian Day,' 'Cossack Day,' until one marvels at the generosity and giving-power of this great-hearted people. And here it is well to point out that in Russia it is not only the rich who give, but all classes, and even the poorest sempstress contributes ten per cent of her wages to the upkeep of some lazaretto. But apart from the wounded, who in winter were rarely to be seen in the streets, everything was normal and quiet. Russia had settled down, had gained her first wind in what she now realised was to be a long struggle. And the result was that when victory came it was not over-estimated, and there was no

hysteria over reverses. If the first seven weeks' fighting in Galicia did much to inspire the Russians with a quiet confidence, it did not make them over-optimistic. It is certain that the Russians themselves never entertained the wild hopes of a rapid advance on Berlin which were so common in England at the beginning of the war. In this respect the Russian press has been of great service. From the very commencement of the campaign it has maintained a tone of firm dignity and determination, and in this it has done much to steady the character of the intellectual classes, who are somewhat inclined by nature to extremes of joy and despair. With a censorship which is apparently less severe than the censorship in France and England, the great Russian newspapers have given their public a clear and accurate picture of the fighting on all fronts, and, as far as the war is concerned, such papers as the *Novoe Vremya*, the *Russkoe Slovo*, and the *Russkiya Vedomosti* will stand comparison with



In agricultural Russia: A priest takes a hand in the sowing. [E.N.A.]

the best papers of any country. They have received, too, an excellent lead from the Russian official communiqués, which, both in claiming victory and in acknowledging defeat, have shown a dignity and sincerity that have not always been found in the statements issued by the German General Staff.

RUSSIA AND ENGLAND.

As regards England, the position has been somewhat curious. The two nations, which a somewhat unnatural antagonism, due largely to ignorance, had so long kept apart, have been drawn together as never before in history. Although Englishmen and Russians are still unfortunately ignorant of each other, there has been a very evident desire on the part of the English people to make friends



German and Austrian prisoners being marched, through the streets of Petrograd.

[Record_Press.

with the nation that has played so large and so determining a part in this war. This movement, which had already started some two or three years before the war, is a most welcome one to Russians, and they are more than prepared to meet us half-way. It would be idle to deny, however, that at one stage of the war the Russian "man in the street" was a little disappointed at what he considered the small part that England was playing in the war, and was ever ready to lend an ear to the slanderers who maintained that England was letting Russia pull the chestnuts out of the fire for her. This was due to more than one reason. First, Russian merchants were inclined to blame England for the high rate of exchange which severely hampered the country's foreign trade. Secondly, owing to the strictness of the censor during the first four or five months of the war, people in Russia had really very little idea of the great work that England was doing, and were therefore the more inclined to accept the misleading suggestions of the German agents. The chief reason, however, was a simple one. If Russia was not over-confident as regards her own strength, she had a very exaggerated idea of the power of the English Fleet. Not a maritime nation herself, with a population ninety per cent of whom have never even seen the sea, there was nothing she thought the English fleet could not accomplish. So great were the hopes of the "man in the street" during those first days of the war that had the British navy come steaming up the Neva, or even the Moscow river, it would scarcely have exceeded his expectations. When during the first four months of the war our fleet scored no great theatrical success, and itself suffered some loss, hope gave way to disappointment, and even, as for instance after the loss of the *Good Hope* and the *Monmouth*, to lack of confidence. In the neutral press the Germans, too, had made the most of their successes, whilst the silent pressure of the English fleet had not yet fixed itself on the public imagination. Since Christmas, however, this feeling has vanished. The victories at the Falkland Islands and at the Dogger Bank, the bombardment of the Dardanelles, the driving of every German ship from the high seas, the good reports of Kitchener's army, and, above all, perhaps, the picture of the German fleet lying idle in its harbours, has completely restored Russian confidence.

It should be pointed out that educated opinion, as expressed by the leading newspapers, never wavered in ascribing an all-supreme importance to the work of the fleet—a work which everyone now realises is one of the chief guarantees of ultimate victory. The British army, too, which before the war the Russians had looked upon as a negligible quantity, has made a great reputation for itself, as may be seen from the following flattering estimate by a well-known Russian correspondent:—


"The English excel in battle by their endurance and by their extraordinary coolness in the hour of danger. They

are never flurried, never in too great a hurry. In the face of the most hellish fire they act coldly, methodically, but with tremendous energy. Wilhelm's army has no more dangerous opponent than this 'contemptible rabble of traitors'—not because it is splendidly armed, but because the personal element in it is magnificent."

After this panegyric it is a matter for regret that so far the soldiers of the two countries have not had an opportunity of fighting side by side and learning to know each other better.

THE RUSSIAN SOLDIER.


It has been stated not infrequently that for the Russian this war is a Holy War. This statement must not be misunderstood. The Russian is not a fanatic like the Turk or the Arab. He has no lust to kill, none of the frenzy of religious hate and excess. In this sense the Russian is certainly not waging a "Holy War." But if to believe in the justice of your cause, to believe that God will help to repel the invader from the soil that is holy to you, to believe that the law of right is stronger than the law of might, to feel that faith will guide your arms, and that death in such a cause is not death but life—if these are the elements that constitute a Holy War, then Russia is indeed waging such a war: "For Faith, for Tsar, and Country," and of these Faith comes first. If, then, in one sense the spirit of the Crusades seems still to be present in Russia, it must not be thought that Russian religion is a Christianity of the Sword. Far rather is it a Christianity of Compassion and Infinite Pity. The Russian is not fighting because he is inflamed with the spirit of conquest. His patriotism is quite a



A Russian peasant and his cart. [E.N.A.]

different thing from the patriotism of the Englishman, the Frenchman, or the German. To the English mind it is almost lethargic, as though the Russian were indifferent to everything. It is indeed a kind of fatalism. The Russian soldier fights without asking questions, without any understanding of the fine points of politics, without reflecting how long the war will last or what will happen to him if he is defeated. Some knowledge he has certainly of the broad outlines of the war. He knows what Belgium and Servia have suffered, and, as is his nature, his sympathies are touched. But for him the one important fact is that his God and his Tsar have called him to defend his country, and so he goes without complaint to do his duty, ready for any sacrifice, even the greatest of all sacrifices when a man shall lay down his life for his country.

It is not unnatural that a people such as this should treat their prisoners with a kindness and consideration that are rare in any war—rarest of all in a war like this. At Kieff, where thousands and thousands of Austrian prisoners have been marched through the streets, the population has had many opportunities of seeing the men who have been perhaps the slayers of their nearest and



A general view of Moscow, showing the Kremlin.

[L.N.A.]

dearest. Yet not once has there been a jeer or a sound of indecent rejoicing. Russians do not hit a man when he is down, and countless acts of kindness, such as the giving of fruit and cigarettes to their captives, bear witness to the good heart of the Russian people and to their immeasurable sympathy for the sufferings of others. Indeed, the whole Russian attitude to victory is one of deep, fervent, religious feeling, in which the sentiment of thanksgiving is far stronger than the sentiment of exultation. In view of the repeated charges of savagery made against the Russians by the Germans, it is only fair that this should be set on record.

THE GRAND DUKE NICHOLAS.

As befits an intensely religious race, the Russians attribute success to personalities and not to scientific causes. That is why in the imagination of the Russian people the Grand Duke Nicholas has become an almost superhuman figure, to whom nothing can come amiss. Every great cause produces its great man, and one has only to hear with what affection the average Russian lingers over his name to realise the popularity in which the Russian people hold their great generalissimo. It is interesting to find how people of the most widely-opposed views worship the Grand Duke and look upon him as the champion of their own particular policy and theories. The man who can create such a state of feeling in Russia is no mere figure-head. If the war finishes with a great Russian victory, and no one in Russia doubts that it will finish in this way, the Grand Duke will take a place in Russian history second only to Peter the Great.

In this war the question of financial and economic resources must inevitably play a very important part in the final issue. In this respect Russia's position is a little difficult to judge. It has been represented as analogous with that of England, and to a certain extent this is true. If Poland be excluded, Russian territory has not suffered in the same way as Belgium, Servia, and North France have suffered. A casual visitor to Moscow or Petrograd would notice, perhaps, no great change in the life in the streets. Even at Kien, which, after Warsaw,

is the nearest of the large Russian towns to the seat of war, everything is quiet and business proceeds outwardly much as usual. There seems to be no lack of young men in the streets, and the cinemas and theatres are full.

This, however, would give a very unfair position of the real state of affairs. In the country districts and in the villages it is easy to see the thinning in the ranks of the men, and the shortage of labour is already making itself felt. More serious is the virtual cessation of foreign trade. At the beginning of the war the fate of Russian credit abroad and the sharp rise in the exchange upset the whole machinery of Russian payments abroad; and the

closing of all communications with the rest of the world, except by the congested and unpractical routes via Sweden, Archangel, and Vladivostock, left Russia in the undesirable position of being unable to export or to import. In consequence, the prices of most manufactured articles have risen considerably. The cost of living will be further increased by the recent revision of the Customs Tariff, and by the new taxes which have been introduced to meet the loss on the vodka revenue. Russia is a country which is naturally able to feed its people from its own resources. Unfortunately, there has been a rise in food prices in some of the large towns which might perhaps have been avoided. The trouble is that



Moscow: The Spassk Gate.

[E.N.A.]

although the supplies are in the country there is no rolling stock available for their transport. While the Russian railways have performed marvels in the transport of troops and of everything connected with the army, the organisation of the goods traffic in Russia itself leaves much to be desired. The question is an important one, and energetic steps have already been taken to deal with it. One can imagine nothing more harmful to the popularity of the war in Russia than a continued rise in the price of the first necessities of life.

THE DARDANELLES.

In these circumstances it is not difficult to understand the feverish desire of the Russian people to have the Dardanelles opened. The question is as much an economic




Moscow: The Place Rouge and Cathedral of St. Basil.

[E.N.A.]



Moscow: A general view of the Kremlin.

[E.N.A.]



A general view of Kieff.

[E.N.A.]

as a political one, and while a long-fostered national sentiment demands that Constantinople shall belong to Russia, common sense dictates that it is intolerable for a great power like Russia to be in the ignominious position of having one of her life-arteries closed at the will of a second-rate power like Turkey. While the opening of the Dardanelles will be of enormous service to the Russian Government, it is most unlikely that the benefit to private individuals will be as great as Russian business men seem to expect. The rolling-stock, already insufficient for present purposes, will be required for Government stores, and, just as at Archangel, private traders will have to wait until their needs are satisfied.

It is not meant to suggest that there is anything serious in the economic position of Russia. As far as trade is concerned, the general opinion is that she has suffered less than had been expected. There is no unemployment, and Government orders have kept most of the factories busy. At the same time, there is nothing in the present state of affairs which would induce the Russian merchants to support a long and protracted war with the same equanimity as, say, their English Allies. A feature of the economic campaign has been the desire to replace German goods by those of British manufacture. Owing partly to the difficulties of inter-communication, partly to the breakdown of the exchange between the two countries, and partly to the fact that English manufacturers have already more than they can do at home, this desire still remains to a great extent unfulfilled. Russians are inclined to blame the English manufacturer for this state of affairs, and point out that very little has been done with a view to capturing the German market after the war. Even when due allowance is made for all the difficulties enumerated above, it certainly seems as though English manufacturers and merchants have shown very little enterprise in their attempts to enter the Russian market, and it is greatly to be feared that after the war the great business that Germany formerly did with Russia will either revert to Germany herself or go

to the less conservative Swedish, American, and Japanese firms, all of whom are already showing considerable activity.

The war has already lasted over ten months, and there were many people before the war who predicted that Russia would never endure the burden of a long war. Financial ruin, internal troubles, even revolution, were prophesied, and yet none of these things have come to pass. In a country like Russia it is at all times difficult to gauge public opinion, because in the English sense of the word public opinion scarcely exists. In war time the difficulty is doubly increased. The Russian character is a strange mixture of infinite patience and violent passion, which may often be ignited by a chance spark. It inclines easily to extremes either of joy or of despair, but on the whole it has come out of a long and trying ordeal with the greatest credit. Russia has borne great sacrifices. To-day, there is no reason to doubt that the war is still popular with the vast majority of the Russian people, and that, while no one looks forward with relish to a long war, there will be no talk of peace until these sacrifices have been atoned for and the enemy decisively crushed. If there is little feeling of hate against Austria, the resentment against Germany, whom Russia blames for the whole war, is very strong, and has not been diminished by the treatment of Russian prisoners in Germany, or by such stories as the torture of soldiers—like Porfiri Panasiuk—who refuse to betray their country. The speaking of German in the streets and in public places is forbidden, and German names and signboards have been changed or removed. The fate, too, of Belgium and Serbia has excited the pity and sympathy of every class of Russian, and King Albert is as popular a figure in the moujik's cottage as he is in England or in France. Much has been done by the publication of popular pamphlets to make the war known to the masses, and in the large cities, at any rate, the "man in the street" is surprisingly well-informed about all phases of the war. The question of Constantinople appeals to all



Moscow: The Temple of the Saviour.

[E.N.A.]




The People's Theatre, Moscow.

[E.N.A.]


classes of Russians in a way that is perhaps hardly realised in England; and while there are a few croakers who profess grave mistrust of England's intentions, the general belief is that Constantinople will be Russia's just reward for the sacrifices she has borne, and that this time England will not stand in the way.

The spirit of the army itself is magnificent. Foreign military critics, who had seen the work of the Russian army during the last decade, had borne witness to the great improvement that had been effected since the Japanese war. From the first mobilisation onward the Russian organisation, which has always been a weakness of the Russian army, has astonished everyone by the speed with which it has overcome all the difficulties caused by long lines of communication and lack of railways. While this testifies to excellent work on the part of the Russian Headquarters, even greater credit is due to the wonderful powers of endurance of the Russian soldier. Never, perhaps, in the history of the world have soldiers been called upon to face such hardships as the Russian soldiers have undergone in Poland, in East Prussia, and, above all, in Galicia and the Carpathians. Even when one admits that the Russian soldier, who comes from the peasant classes and is therefore unaccustomed to the luxuries of modern life, is better fitted than any other to stand the strain of modern warfare, his achievements are no less matter for admiration. Before the war it was the common opinion—not only of Germany and Austria but

of the rest of Europe, and even of many Russians—that the Russian army was little better than a vast horde of ill-clad, stupid barbarians. To-day this view has been profoundly altered. No one has ever denied courage to the Russian troops, and history has shown more than once that no soldiers are better able to stand punishment. But the world looked on this as the courage of the brute—a courage that went hand in hand with plunder and excess. Not the least gratifying feature of the Russian campaign has been the exemplary manner in which the Russian soldier has waged his war. Even the Germans have been forced to admit grudgingly what the Austrians acknowledge with due respect. Historians will doubtless seek to find a reason for the good behaviour of troops that had hitherto been looked upon as full of ferocity. They will tell us that Russia is on her best behaviour, that she considers she is on trial before the world, and that she is anxious to prove that Russian barbarism is a finer thing than German *Kultur*. To some extent this may be true. Russian soldiers, like other well-disciplined troops, will do whatever they are ordered. But no orders can so influence a man that after the heat of the battle he is prepared to share his bread and his tea with his captives. It is due, perhaps, as much to this natural good-heartedness as to anything else that the Russians can look back with pride on one of the fiercest campaigns history has ever known, and say that "We, the barbarians, have waged war like gentlemen, and you, the *Kulturists*, like evil beasts."



The Tsarina (holding the thermometer with which the patient's temperature has just been taken) and (directly behind her) the Grand Duchess Olga and the Grand Duchess Tatiana, in a Russian Red Cross Hospital. [Central News.]



The Carpathians : The Austrian railway which crosses the mountains through the Lupkow Pass.

[E.N.A.]



A view of the road at the entrance to the Uzsok Pass.

[E.N.A.]



In the Austrian trenches in the Carpathians.

[Topical Press.

CHAPTER XXIV.

HUNGARY AND THE CARPATHIAN CAMPAIGN.

THE RUSSIAN ADVANCE ON HUNGARY—RESIGNATION OF COUNT BERCHTOLD—HIS SUCCESSOR—FALL OF PRZEMYSL—STORY OF THE SIEGE—THE CARPATHIAN FIGHTING.


WITH the beginning of 1915 Hungary began to be the centre alike of military and of political interest on the eastern front. In August the chief event had been the Russian invasion of East Prussia and its repulse; in September interest had turned to the occupation of Galicia and the Austrian retreat; in October had come the German march through Poland and the attempt to confine the Russian armies behind the Vistula and the San; in November and December the Germans had devoted their most persistent efforts to the attack on Warsaw, and the Austrian attempt to drive the Russians out of Galicia had failed. At the beginning of January the Russian southern armies were once more moving slowly towards the crests of the Carpathian mountains, and the threat to Hungary, already twice removed, was renewed again.

This front now became of pre-eminent importance. The East Prussian campaign which ended in the destruction of the Tenth Russian Army was not more than an episode in the course of the war; and although the Germans in Poland persisted for some time in their furious attacks on the Russian lines before Warsaw, the Russian rôle here was defensive, and it was to Hungary that Russia now looked for really decisive results. From the Baltic down to the Vistula, and through Poland to the neighbourhood of Cracow and the Dukla Pass, the Russians were satisfied with maintaining their positions; while the whole of their left wing, stretching from the Dukla to the Roumanian border, moved forward upon Hungary. From the purely military point of view there was perhaps something to be said for the alternative

plan, by which the Russians, merely holding the passes of the Carpathians against all attacks, would have pushed forward in the gap lying between Cracow and the mountains and advanced upon both Vienna and German Silesia. The advantage of such a plan would have been that the Carpathian passes were not difficult to hold, and the Russian army advancing through the gap would have been comparatively secure from an attack on its lines of communication in Galicia. On the other hand, the Germans were so far forward in Poland that they would have been on the right flank of the Russian advance, and it would have been impossible for the Russians to have marched on Silesia by way of Cracow unless they had first driven the Germans back in Poland. But what determined the Russians to direct all their energies on Hungary at this stage was the political situation, which had in it the possibilities of a great military advantage.

RUSSIAN HOPES OF ROUMANIA.

The Russian advance was therefore directed through Bukowina and towards all the Carpathian passes. Its general object was the occupation of Hungary—an achievement which would have deprived the Germanic powers of an indispensable source of supply, and would almost certainly have had the effect of bringing certain neutral powers into the field and breaking up the Austrian empire. In particular, the object of the Russian advance through Bukowina was to put an end to the hesitations of Roumania. Throughout the winter, expectation had been growing that with the spring Roumania would throw in her lot with the Allies. She was much



MAP TO ILLUSTRATE THE CARPATHIAN CAMPAIGN OF JANUARY-APRIL, 1915.

more likely to do so if she knew that in invading Transylvania she would have the support of a Russian army on her right flank. Without this support she was exposed to a sudden and separate attack by an overwhelming force, such as the Germans had from time to time assembled against the Russians whenever German territory was in danger. There was the further possibility that a Russian advance into Transylvania would arouse its Roumanian population to revolt. Rumours of such a movement had already sprung up from time to time, but disaffection, if there was any, had not taken an active form. Lastly, a Russian invasion of Hungary would put to the test the loyalty of the Magyars, the dominant Hungarian race, who would certainly either insist on Germany making every effort to prevent the occupation and disruption of their country or would take the business into their own hands, at whatever cost to the Austrian and German empires. There was no reason to doubt the loyalty of the Magyar leaders to the Germanic connection, but it was always understood that the price was the support of Magyar supremacy and territory to the uttermost limit. It was about this time that Count Tisza, the Hungarian Premier, was reported to have said that either Germany and Austria would secure the safety and integrity of Hungary or Hungary would discover a way to recall her sons, of whom nearly a million were believed to be fighting in the Austro-Hungarian army, to the defence of their own country.

RUSSIA'S DISADVANTAGE.

In the forthcoming offensive against Hungary, Russia was exposed to one great disadvantage. While, on the one hand, whenever she approached close to the



Count Stephan Tisza, the Hungarian Premier. [E.N.A.]



Baron Stephan de Burian. [E.N.A.]

territory of her enemies, she was exposed to the possibility of a sudden concentration of superior numbers, she was unable to use a similar method of attack for her own advantage. Had she now been able to mass very large forces in Bukowina at the extreme left of her line she might have penetrated the passes and wheeled round into Transylvania, and so, perhaps, secured Roumania's support. She was prevented from doing so by difficulties of supply. The number of troops whom the Russians had in the fighting line was greatly exaggerated in the popular imagination during the early stages of the war. Her reserves, indeed, were almost inexhaustible; her difficulty lay in equipping them with the appliances of modern warfare, especially artillery, and in supplying them with all the necessities of a campaign—not merely munitions, but food and clothing also—when they were at the front. This was the real reason why the Russians, after having advanced to the Hungarian borders of Bukowina, were compelled forthwith to retreat when the Austrians marched against them. The railway organisation of Hungary, like that of Germany, enabled the German Staff (now in supreme control of the war) to pour into Bukowina and to maintain there a larger force than it was possible for the Russians on their side to handle and supply. This difficulty not only made the Russian reserves comparatively useless at the time, but was likely to last until, by a prolonged process of slaughtering down, the German and Austrian armies had become so greatly weakened that the balance of numbers began definitely to turn against them.

There was, however, not the slightest possibility that Count Tisza would have to carry out his threat. The aid of Austria was indispensable to Germany as a defence



After the fall of Przemyśl: A Russian column passing through one of the main streets.

[Universal.]



Bringing up a shell for one of the great Austrian guns.

[Topical.]

to her right flank and a cover for Silesia, and Hungary was indispensable to Austria. The separatist influences which existed in Hungary, and which gave its name to the Independence Party, were no doubt still alive. They did not, however, carry much weight among the political leaders, although they could be used as a hint to Austria and Germany that Hungary, if neglected, was capable both of defending herself and of asserting her right to do so.

THE RESIGNATION OF COUNT BERCHTOLD.

About the same time as Hungary became the centre of strategical interest, she also took the front place in the political management of the empire. Count Berchtold, the Imperial Foreign Minister, resigned on January 13th, and was succeeded by Baron Burian, a Magyar and a friend and supporter of Count Tisza. The causes of Count Berchtold's fall were many, but they might be summed up in the complete failure of the schemes for which he had plunged Austria into war. The immediate cause and the climax of his misfortunes was the extreme humiliation which Austria had undergone in the second great defeat of her armies by Serbia in the middle of December. Even if Count Tisza was the person ultimately responsible, as was said at the time, for the ultimatum to Serbia of July, 1914, Count Berchtold was in supreme control of the policy of the empire. It was he, therefore, who had now to bear the shame of the disgrace attaching to defeat from the small and despised neighbour, a disgrace which was all the greater since it was clear that at present there was no way of punishing Serbia; every effort was required now for the preservation of Austrian and Hungarian soil from the invader. It was said in Hungary that in the Council which was held after the Servian defeat the question was debated whether a fresh campaign should forthwith be undertaken, and that Count Berchtold pronounced against the proposal, and, being over-ruled, resigned. The story is of very doubtful origin, for the fact was that, however much Austria might have liked to send yet another expedition into Serbia, she was no longer in a position to do so, and this in itself was sufficient to account for the fall of the statesman who was responsible for Austria's Servian policy.

COUNT BERCHTOLD'S BALKAN POLICY.

The Servian defeat, however, was only the culminating point of Count Berchtold's long failure with regard to the Balkans. He had failed to prevent the formation of the Balkan League, which was so great a diplomatic success for Russia. As a natural consequence he had been unable to prevent the outbreak of war between the Balkan League and Turkey, the expulsion of the Turkish power from Macedonia, and the creation of a greater Serbia. Then, the danger of an enlarged Serbia being clear, Austria had encouraged Bulgaria to plunge into the second Balkan war which had resulted in her defeat;

and when the Treaty of Bukharest formally recognised Serbia's acquisition, Austria had allowed her dissatisfaction with it to be openly seen, and had thereby taken the first step towards alienating Roumania. Count Berchtold decided to make the supreme effort to retrieve his earlier failures by a direct attack on Serbia, and now his policy had ended in a great triumph of Serbia and her patron. To add to his other misfortunes, the Italian Government had already, in December, given him to understand that an attack on Serbia, whether successful or not, entitled Italy to compensation from Austria, and that she proposed to obtain it. Count Berchtold's measure was full, and his resignation followed.

Baron Burian, the new Austrian Chancellor, had had a considerable diplomatic experience in the Balkans, and had also gained a reputation as an administrator in Bosnia and Herzegovina. The importance of his appointment was that it seemed to mark the complete success of Count Tisza's policy of making Hungary the dominant political power in the Austrian empire. Whereas the ideal of the Independence Party was a Hungary cut off from

all political and military connection with Austria, Count Tisza held the view that Hungarian interests were best served by the Dualist system of government, but that Hungary should protect her own interests by exercising, if possible, the direction not only of her own affairs, which she already had, but also of the Imperial policy. In the middle of January, therefore, the defence of Hungary opened under somewhat improved prospects. In the field the Hungarian troops had the support both of the Austrians and of several German corps, while their protection on the political side was in the powerful hands of Tisza and Burian.



Lieut.-General von Kusmanek, in command of the Austrian forces at Przemysl. [E.N.A.]

PRZEMYSL.

The campaign in the Carpathians, which was waged for the most part not far from the ridge of the mountains, had the general purpose of driving the Russians back down the northern slopes and the particular object of clearing them out of Bukowina and of relieving the besieged fortress of Przemysl. At the beginning of the third week in January the Austrians were found to have gathered large forces on the borders of Bukowina, and they had little difficulty in recapturing the positions on the frontier, especially the Kirlibaba Pass, which were in the hands of the Russians, and in driving them back on Czernowitz. At the same time their attack developed in a northerly direction, and by the end of the month heavy fighting was in progress over more than a hundred miles from Dukla to the Wyszkw Pass. For the next two months the struggle was carried on with the utmost intensity, but without any great progress on either side. Often the general conditions were such, owing to the storms and frost and snow, that according to all ordinary conceptions of warfare campaigning would have been thought impossible; it was said by the wounded when they returned home that in some attacks the troops had had to advance waist-deep in snow, and when killed had

remained standing erect at the spot where they were shot. In this mountainous country it was not possible for either side easily to deploy large numbers of men. On the whole, the efforts of the Austrians and Germans to penetrate into the valley of the Upper San, to advance on Przemyśl and to reach Sambor and Stryj in order to cross the Dniester and reach Lemberg and the great strategic railway running through it, were unsuccessful, and at several points the Russians succeeded gradually in pushing them back and in crossing the crests of the mountains. At the beginning of February the western section of the Russian army reached Mezo Laborec at the extreme point of one of the Hungarian valleys, while towards the other end of the line a series of desperate battles was fought for the possession of the heights of Koziowa, lying about fifteen miles north-east of the mountain ridge. Here the attack was in the hands of German troops, and a succession of hand-to-hand combats took place which, although the character of the country was very different, were in their sustained fury as desperate as those which had marked the earlier fighting in Poland or the great German attack in Flanders. By the end of February the Russians were making slow but steady progress in the centre of their line, and were attempting again to advance against the Austrians in Bukowina.

At the beginning of March the Austrians redoubled their efforts, especially in the neighbourhood of the Lupkow Pass, through which they hoped to penetrate to Przemyśl. Their extreme activity at this time was due to the knowledge that the garrison of the fortress could not hold out many weeks; they were in no doubt as to its condition from day to day, for there was throughout the siege regular communication by aeroplane between the commander of the garrison and the Austrian headquarters. By the middle of March the siege was nearing its close. Nothing had been heard for many weeks of the siege operations, although it was known that there had been no attempt to storm the fortifications, and that the Russians—who were probably well informed of what was happening in the fortress—were content to proceed


by the slow, but in this case certain, methods of investment. It was suddenly announced that they had captured an important position near the fortress, and had driven the enemy back to the inner ring of forts. On March 18th the forts began suddenly—and throughout the following night maintained—a tremendous bombardment which had, and, as it proved, was expected to have, no military effect. Its purpose was simply to consume all the remaining ammunition in order that it might not fall into the hands of the enemy when the now imminent surrender took place. On the 19th a portion of the garrison (it was said, but never confirmed,

that the rest refused to obey orders) made a vigorous sortie to the east of the fortress. The Twenty-Third Honvéd Division was engaged in this attempt, and lost several thousand men. The sortie could have served no useful military purpose, and even the Austrian reports offered no better reason for it than that it was designed to discover the nature of the Russian entrenchments round the fortress in case the knowledge should be useful at some later date.

FALL OF THE FORTRESS.

On the 20th and 21st the bombardment continued, and on the latter day there was another sortie no less futile than the first. But throughout the 21st the Russians were given indications that surrender was at hand. Early

on the morning of the 22nd the fortress was surrendered, but before the Russians entered tremendous explosions were heard from every quarter of the city; the Staff were blowing up the forts, the magazines, and bridges, in order that little of military value might fall to the Russians. According to the figures published by the Russians, 120,000 prisoners fell into their hands. The normal garrison would have been between fifty and sixty thousand, but it appeared that a certain portion of the army which was driven back in Galicia at the beginning of November, 1914, was left in Przemyśl. If this were so, it was a masterpiece of bad management, for the surrender of the fortress was not due to the Russian attack, which for the most part was in the hands of five divisions of reservists, nor to lack of guns or ammunition—of



A view of the Uzsok Pass.

[E.N.A.]

which there was plenty—but solely to the lack of food. In four and a half months the huge garrison had exhausted its food supplies; on March 22nd there was, according to one report, only “three days’ maintenance” left in the place, and, according to another, none at all. There was, therefore, nothing to do but either to surrender or to march out the whole able-bodied garrison in a desperate effort to break through to the Austrian army in the Carpathians. This would have been the heroic course, but it would have ended in disaster. The Austrians preferred the path of greater safety and less glory, and surrendered.

A DIARY OF THE LAST DAYS.

A vivid account of the last days of the siege appears in a diary kept by a wounded Russian soldier, who was carefully tended in the fortress.* He says:—

“MARCH 15th. Severe frosts have set in. The cold is terrible. Food is getting scarcer and scarcer. The dinner ration is getting very small. The soldiers’ dinner consists of a little white beet-root (cattle food) with a mixture of some sort of acid stuff.

“MARCH 17th. Four days ago they requisitioned the cows of all the inhabitants, in spite of the beseeching and crying of the women and children. The servants and orderlies have been warned that bread will be issued to-morrow for the last time. The day after to-morrow one ration for every four. Our wretched orderly imagines that by washing his stomach with hot water now and then during the day he loses the wish to eat.

“The Sisters of Mercy tell us that in the city they openly talk of the speedy surrender of the fortress. The Austrian administration have told us that we must have money to hand over on deposit. This, if you please, on the eve of surrender! Absurd! We have all agreed not to hand over a penny. All day yesterday the artillery crashed from the forts. They say that in two directions from the fortress a force of 70,000 men this morning advanced to try and break through towards the Carpathians. To-day all forts and bridges are to be blown up. There remain in the fortress 40,000 soldiers incapable of fighting. Medicines also have run out. For a long time there has been no soap or vaseline. Iodine for a couple of days only is left. The wounded even are not getting bread now;

they are giving them the last of the biscuits. The Austrian officers are already arranging and packing for the journey into Russia.

“During the whole of to-night uninterrupted heavy artillery fire has been going on; all night long rockets have been lighting everything up from the forts. The Russians this morning began the bombardment of the town. Two shells burst close to the hospital; the windows were blown to bits. To-day we had no bread.

“MARCH 20th.—They say that the garrison has failed to break through! In the hospital, in spite of the tragedy being enacted, the men amuse themselves in drawing caricatures.

“MARCH 21st.—To-day is the third day we have had no bread. Our Mother Superior sold a cow for £140 and a three-day-old calf for £12 10s. A dog costs £2 10s. The recent gloomy weather has changed to sunny. The snow has thawed already. The River San is free of ice. They say the Austrians have burned twenty-one millions worth of paper money, four aeroplanes, and have destroyed as far as possible all stores and carriages. They have thrown the guns into the San river. Just before turning in they warned us that the forts and bridges in the town would be blown up at four in the morning.

“MARCH 22nd.—The fortress is surrendering. The artillery fired up to 5 a.m. At 5.30 a.m. explosions were heard, at first separately, but later a regular hell was let loose. We opened the windows so that they should not be broken. The sun had already risen, and the plumes of smoke, lit up by the sun, presented a beautiful scene. The thunder and crash of the explosions went on uninterruptedly. It was impossible to get near a window; one was flung backwards. The panic

had become terrible. At every explosion the doors were blown open. Bridges, powder magazines, stores, everything was blown up in two hours. The Ruthenes were overjoyed at the Russian victory. We could no longer remain in the hospital, and for the first time we went out into the streets. Our soldiers were embracing the Austrian soldiers. In one place a ring had been formed, and our cavalymen were dancing with the Ruthene women. All the footpaths were thronged with people.”

The surrender of so large a body of men naturally aroused criticism; we may compare the criticism of General Stössel for surrendering Port Arthur, whose garrison was much smaller. The Austrian General Staff therefore issued a long narrative of the siege and



A view towards the summit of the Dukla Pass. [E.N.A.]



Russian soldiers after a successful engagement with the Germans.

[Record Press.]

the reasons for surrender.* In the course of this they said :—

"The garrison of the fortress held Przemyśl to the very last hour that human force could do so in the military sense of the word. General Kusmanek only surrendered when such a course was dictated by feelings of humanity and military consideration. On the day of the surrender there was not one morsel of food in the fortress, and no breakfast could be supplied to the men.

"Events have developed around Przemyśl more quickly than was expected. The last sortie officially reported was directed towards the east, and was undertaken not with the view of effecting the relief of the fortress, but to find out if the surrounding Russian force was as strong towards Grodek and Lemberg as in the other directions, and whether the Russians had fortified their positions in the Grodek direction, as well as to the south and west of the fortress. It was ascertained during the sorties that this was the case. The Russians, in fact, built counter-fortifications all around the fortress, even in the direction of their own territory, preparing for all eventualities. In fact, the last reports coming from the fortress all confirmed the report that the Russians built a new fortress all around the besieged territory. The fortifications were so constructed as to constitute an impenetrable obstacle to inward attacks, just the counter-form of the fortifications and defensive works of the fortress itself. The Russian ring was constructed exclusively against Przemyśl with unparalleled skill and rapidity, and with all available means of modern technique.

"On the west a well-fortified defending line and on the south a large Russian army stood in the way of any attempt to relieve Przemyśl. In addition, the roads leading towards Russia were well fortified, as the last sortie proved. This was the military situation of the fortress during the last weeks.

"With regard to provisions the fortress was well supplied at the outset, but the stores were consumed at the time of the first investment, which lasted until October 11th. On that date the fortress was relieved, and General Borjevich entered the fortress with his army. The railway lines had been blown up by the retreating Russians. On the Galician roads it was impossible to transport anything at that time, and this fact obliged us to provision the army fighting to the east of Przemyśl from the stores of the fortress, the army being cut off from all other points of supply.

"It was thus necessary to draw provisions from the ample stores of Przemyśl in the hope that as soon as the railway line was reconstructed the stores could be replaced. The railway line was reconstructed, and on October 23rd the first trains began to move towards the fortress.

"At the end of ten days, however, and before the deficiencies could be made good, Przemyśl was invested anew."

"At this period the situation in North Poland made it

necessary for us to withdraw our flank in Galicia. During the ten days at our disposal the transport of ammunition took first place. The question of provisioning the fortress appearing at that time to be a secondary matter, when eventually food supplies were despatched to Przemyśl it was too late.

"During the first days of the investment, in November, General Kusmanek took stock of the available quantity of foodstuffs, and drew up a scale of rations. He took great care that neither officers nor men should get more than the minimum of everything. For breakfast they had only tea, for their mid-day meal a small piece of meat and half a pound of bread, and in the evening tea again, with some bread. To add to the meat supply thousands of horses were slaughtered, which was all the more necessary on account of the shortage in fodder. Later on this minimum was further reduced, so that the men of the garrison were on almost starvation diet for the last two months of the siege.

"It has been said in some quarters that flying machines and dirigibles might have been used in bringing in supplies, but this idea was excluded from the beginning. Such flour or meat as could have been thus brought in would only have sufficed a few hundred men for a few days, and to have made any appreciable difference all the aeroplanes and dirigibles of the world would have had to have been employed daily. The commander of the fortress vetoed the idea that certain members of the garrison should receive food by this means whilst the rest put up with the rations available in the fortress. Even the game shot by some of the officers was not allowed to be brought in, but was cooked and eaten in the hunting field. The aeroplanes only brought in letters, medicines, and material for the wireless telegraphy.

"The food supply grew daily more and more scanty, until on the morning of the 22nd there was not a particle of bread in the stores, not a pound of meat or flour available, so that the commander of the fortress decided to surrender.

"The sortie above referred to had no effect whatever, but soon after this the Russian besieging army began a violent attack from the north and east with the object of ascertaining what powers of resistance the famished and exhausted garrison still possessed. How our poor soldiers could bear the brunt of these attacks is a mystery, but General Tamass's Honvéds succeeded in repulsing them. These weak and famished soldiers had courage and enthusiasm enough to face the onslaught of the healthy well-fed Russians, and succeeded in repulsing them from beneath the fortress. True, this was their last effort.

"After this battle, which lasted seven hours, General Kusmanek and his staff saw that another sortie was impossible, the investing ring being too strong for even a well-fed army to break through."

AFTER THE FALL OF PRZEMYSL.

The fall of Przemyśl had, as it proved, little or no effect on the campaign. Expectation had probably been

* Published in the *Morning Post*, March 30th, 1915.

misled by the recollection of what happened after the fall of Port Arthur, when General Nogi's army was rapidly transferred to the north of Manchuria and played a decisive part in the defeat of the Russians at the Battle of Mukden. The conditions of the Carpathian campaign were wholly different. At Mukden there was room for armies to manœuvre; in the Carpathians there was none. In their attempt to force a passage into Hungary the Russians had probably as many men engaged already as they could usefully employ, and in addition the troops of the besieging army were not of the best quality if they could have been used. The appearance of some of them was reported in the fighting of the next few weeks, but the rate of the Russian progress scarcely quickened.

At the end of March the Russians were south and south-west of the Dukla Pass, and their line then stretched eastwards over the crest and continued along the northern slopes. Their object was gradually to broaden out their front, and in a movement from west to east to seize the heads of the Hungarian valleys—they were already established in the valleys of the Ondawa and Laborcz—and so move down into the plains below. In the last week of March they captured a strong Austrian position on the mountain crest near the Lupkow Pass, and a fortnight later they seized the Rostok Pass, to the east of Lupkow. By the end of the first week in April the ridge was in their hands for a distance of 75 miles. But all their efforts, continued for many weeks, failed to capture the next most important pass to the east—the Uzsok—and they were still fighting fiercely, but unsuccessfully, for its possession at the end of April. The fighting on the whole of this front had, in the difficulties of the ground and the severities of nature, become similar to that which had taken place in the Caucasus. One of the reports

published about this time described the attacking side as "wading through snow up to the loins, climbing almost perpendicular precipices, and stubbornly fighting their way through forests fortified with wire entanglements."

PROSPECT OF A GERMAN COUNTER-STROKE.

Still, towards the end of April the Russians had made a certain amount of progress; and although the Austrians were well equipped with a new series of positions along the southern slope of the mountains, it seemed likely that the Russians, if they could finally capture the Uzsok Pass, would be able to deploy their forces more successfully. At about this time, therefore, there were signs on the Russian side of an expectation that the German Staff, which had for many weeks rested content with the operations in the Carpathians, would deal a counter-blow either in Poland or in Western Galicia, which, if successful, would be likely to relieve Hungary from the threatened invasion. Rumour began to spread that Germany was re-grouping her forces, and that troops were being withdrawn from East Prussia and from Poland for an unknown quarter. The Russian Staff certainly must have had some knowledge that these movements were going on, and must have been prepared for the new movement of which they were a sign. Up to May 1st, however, there was not the slightest indication of the extent of the blow which the Germans were preparing, nor of the point at which it was to be delivered, nor yet of the precise means with which they intended to deliver it. On Sunday, May 2nd, they struck the Russian front between Cracow and the Carpathians, broke it at many points, and inflicted a defeat which was to prove much the worst that Russia had suffered since the war began.



German cavalry in the snow-clad Carpathians.

[Topical Press.]



Greek Infantry on the march.

[Central News.

CHAPTER XXV.

BALKAN POLITICS AND THE DARDANELLES.

THE DISSOLUTION OF THE BALKAN LEAGUE—BULGARIA'S GRIEVANCES—FAILURE OF ATTEMPTS TO WIN HER OVER—THE POSITION OF ROUMANIA AND OF GREECE—THE STRATEGY OF THE ALLIES IN SOUTH-EASTERN EUROPE—MR. CHURCHILL'S POLICY—BOMBARDMENT OF THE DARDANELLES FORTS—FALL OF M. VENIZELOS.

THE entry of Turkey into the war might, under favourable circumstances, have done the Allies more good than harm, for Turkey had many enemies and no true friends. Unfortunately, the circumstances were not favourable. The war between Turkey and the Balkan League of Bulgaria, Serbia, and Greece had done very great service to the Allies in cutting off direct communication between Turkey and Austria; for had Turkey, when the war began, still been in possession of the province of Novi Bazar, it would have been out of the question for Serbia to resist the combined attacks of Austria on the north and Turkey on the south. As it was, Bulgaria and Greece completely screened Serbia from attack from the side of Turkey. But this gain was offset by the dissolution of the Balkan League, and by the immunity which it brought to Turkey from attack by her natural enemies, the Balkan States. But for Bulgaria's neutrality, Turkey could not have attacked Russia on the Caucasus or England in Egypt, and the only service that she could have rendered to Germany would have been to close the Dardanelles and to prevent the importation of arms and munitions into Russia through the Black Sea ports. That would have been a great service, but Turkey would never have risked it if she had not felt herself secure against attack from the side of

Bulgaria. In a word, the entry of Turkey into the war, with all the embarrassments that it caused to the Allies, was due to the break-up of the Balkan League after the defeat of Turkey in the last war.

It followed that the reconstitution of the League should from the beginning of the war have become one of the principal objects of the Allies. But their diplomacy seems to have been somewhat slow to realise the urgency of the need. Between Russia and Turkey there was no possibility of reconciliation, but Great Britain, as the old friend and protector of Turkey, was in a much stronger position, and a more skilful diplomacy might have prevented Turkey from committing herself irretrievably to the side of Germany. The most effectual means to that end would undoubtedly have been the reconciliation of the Balkan Allies, and in this work Russia, as the old liberator of Bulgaria and the champion of the new Serbia, might, had she chosen, have taken a decisive part. But the diplomacy of the Allies, neither then nor later, was equal to the emergency. It was indeed a difficult task that was required of it, and one not to be accomplished without a comprehensive policy in regard to future eventualities as well as to present conditions. The war found the Allies with no other equipment in their Balkan policy than that of mutual goodwill. Whereas the plans

of Germany and Austria in regard to the future had been thought out in advance, England and Russia had to begin reconstructing their policy out of the ruins of their rivalries, and this work of reconstruction presented so many delicate problems that it was natural that both parties should wish to postpone the beginning of it until the necessity was clearly demonstrated. The Allies, therefore, for some time after Germany declared war on Russia, not only had no common Balkan policy, but were still at the stage of hoping that Turkey would not put them under the necessity of having one. Valuable time was lost by improvidence and procrastination, for which the blame must be equally divided between them. If our diplomacy at Constantinople failed to make good use of our past history holding back Turkey, Russian diplomacy, too, failed no less signally to recover the affections of Bulgaria. Nor, so far as is known, did France show any greater prescience. When Turkey joined in, the problem of reconstructing the Balkan League was as far from solution as it was at the beginning of the war. Indeed, had any considerable progress been made it is safe to say that Turkey would never have joined in.


BULGARIA'S POSITION.

The key of the situation was in the hands of Bulgaria. Alone of the members of the Balkan League she had a land frontier with Turkey, and was therefore in a position to check immediately any attempts to make trouble for England and Russia outside Europe. Alone of the Balkan Powers she had definite grievances which war might set right. They were grievances against all her neighbours, Serbia and Greece, Roumania and Turkey. Her principal grievance was against Serbia, whom she regarded as the author of her misfortunes.

In February, 1912, Bulgaria and Serbia had concluded a treaty of Alliance,


to which there was a secret annexe defining the boundaries in Macedonia beyond which neither Power was to claim territory at the expense of the other. Serbia, after the victories over Turkey, refused to abide by this understanding, on the ground apparently that the agreement had reference only to territories won by the joint efforts of the Serbian and Bulgarian armies; whereas in fact not only had the district in question been won by Serbia without Bulgarian assistance, but Serbia had also assisted Bulgaria in her Thracian campaign. While Bulgaria appealed to the text of the Treaty and to the fact that the disputed territory was inhabited mainly by Bulgars, Serbia relied on the logic of the stricken field. In an evil hour for herself Bulgaria attacked Serbia. It was one of the worst blunders that any nation has ever committed. She was completely defeated, and lost not only the territory in dispute but a great deal besides, both to Greece and to Serbia. Roumania, who intervened to stop what was to all intents and purposes a civil war, took the opportunity of extending her frontiers at Bulgaria's expense, and Turkey quietly re-occupied Adrianople. But of all these humiliations, the loss of Monastir to Serbia was the one that rankled most. It put Serbia in the position, so long occupied by Turkey, of oppressor of the Bulgars.

There is some reason to think that in attacking Serbia Bulgaria was acting on the advice of Austria, who had most to gain by the enfeeblement of Serbia. If that is so, then the refusal of the Entente Powers to do anything to save Bulgaria from the consequences of her folly was the less excusable. Serbia could hardly be on terms of close friendship with Austria, by reason of her geographical position; but Bulgaria might. To leave Bulgaria with a grievance so bitter was to give Austrian intrigue an opportunity of making mischief, of which it would not be slow to take advantage.




The King of Greece.

[Russell and Sons.]



Nikola Pavlovitch.

[L. N. 1.]



Map showing the increases of territory gained in the Balkan Wars.

Moreover, the Treaty of London, which the Treaty of Bukharest set aside, was made with the sanction and assistance of the Powers. It is a sound principle that what the Powers had made only the Powers should unmake. The Entente Powers, therefore, had a double reason for restraining the aggrandisement of the other Balkan States at the expense of Bulgaria. Not only would such restraint have been just in itself, and in accordance with the principle of nationality, but it would have been in the permanent interest of the Entente Powers themselves. It is even conceivable that the great plague of this war might never have descended on Europe if the Concert had vindicated its regard for principle by insisting that, however criminal Bulgaria's attack on Serbia had been, the Concert could not consent to have its authority flouted by a settlement which, leaving as it did many thousands of Bulgarians under the rule of alien governments, threatened to keep open the Balkan question as a focus of political disease and infection. For their neglect to revise the Treaty of Bukharest in the light of justice, the Entente Powers were to pay a terrible penalty.

PRESSURE ON SERBIA.

When Turkey joined in the war the Allies essayed a task which would have been best done before the Treaty of Bukharest was forced on Bulgaria. But even then, they did not immediately grasp the truth that of all the Balkan Powers Bulgaria was in much the strongest position to be of service to the Allies. Bulgarian diplomacy has the reputation of being excessively grasping, and it was obvious from the first that a very high price would have

to be paid for her assistance in the war. The first condition, and the one to which she attached most importance, was the cession of the districts of Macedonia inhabited by Bulgars and under the rule of Serbia, in defiance, as Bulgaria believed, of treaty and of justice. That meant that a great deal of pressure must be brought to bear on Serbia, but this Russia was certainly in a position to apply. The war, it is true, was not on account of Serbia, but she had applied the torch that set Europe ablaze, and without the help of Russia her case would have been quite hopeless from the first. Moreover, she stood to gain a great deal from the victory of the Allies. Bosnia and Herzegovina would certainly be hers, perhaps Croatia too, with a port on the Adriatic. Within ten years Serbia might expect to rise from the bottom almost to the top of the second scale of European Powers. It would have been reasonable to ask her to make some sacrifice of territory for advancement so rapid and so great. Some pressure was brought to bear upon her, but it was not nearly enough to accomplish the desired end. The negotiations were through the Russian Minister at Sofia, but some failure left them in the main in the hands of Bulgaria and Serbia themselves—an arrangement which contrasts with the action of Germany later in the Italian negotiations. Bulgaria asked for Macedonia up to and including the Monastir and Ochrida districts. Serbia refused to yield more than the Radovisto and Ishtip districts, and even these not till the end of the war. That was the position in the middle of November, and further negotiations brought no better results. It soon became plain that, left to themselves, there was no chance of an agreement between Bulgaria and Serbia.


ROUMANIA.

Both Roumania and Greece were more reasonable. To Roumania the great bribe could be offered of Transylvania, a portion of Hungary, in which there were 3,000,000 Roumanians. Roumania achieved her national independence in the Russo-Turkish War of 1877, in which she gave Russia most valuable assistance. After the war, however, Russia insisted on annexing Bessarabia, in which there were 2,000,000 Roumanians, and, in consequence, Roumania began to lean on Austria. In 1898 Austria concluded with Roumania a military convention, by which Austria, in case of any alteration in the *status quo* in the Balkans, was to march on Salonica and annex a part of Macedonia, while Roumania was to seize the so-called Bulgarian quadrilateral, Silistria-Shumla, Rustchuk-Varna. This convention expired in 1910, but presently the Balkan War and the breakdown of Bulgaria gave Roumania her opportunity of aggrandisement, which she took. To everyone's surprise, Russia not only did not protest, but supported her; and it seemed at the beginning of the war as though Roumania was now in the orbit of Russian diplomacy, and was only waiting a suitable opportunity to throw in her lot with the Allies. In December and January the rumours that Roumania meant to join the Allies were very frequent and circumstantial. As early as the beginning of December, Dr. Take Jonescu, the Roumanian ex-Minister, declared his conviction that Roumanian interests were bound up with the victory of the Allies. "Neutrality no longer suffices. We must act, and act I am convinced we will." It was said that Roumania had settled her differences with Bulgaria, and was satisfied that if she went to war in Transylvania she would not be attacked by her. Just before Christmas Roumania issued a statement that if Austria again made a serious attack on Serbia she would

be compelled to take the field against her. Throughout January the rumours of intervention gathered body. Roumania obtained a loan of £5,000,000 from the Bank of England; she was known to be buying munitions of all kinds from the United States and elsewhere; she was negotiating with Bulgaria; and it looked as though the Russian advance into Bukovina was expressly planned to fit in with a joint attack on Hungary by Russian, Roumanian, and Servian armies. The probable date of the Roumanian intervention was bandied about. Roumanian ex-Ministers wrote articles and gave interviews which seemed to leave not a shadow of doubt of her intentions. Wrote one of them:—


"The Roumanian race is widely spread beyond the kingdom. In Austro-Hungary, upon the territories which border Roumania, nearly four million of its members live in the country which was its birthplace when Trajan established there his Roman colonies. Among these Roumanians less than a million and a half strangers—Saxons, Hungarians, and others—live in scattered groups. The best soldiers in the Austro-Hungarian army, active and industrious, the Roumanians of Transylvania have been so oppressed by the Magyars that they look impatiently for union with their blood-brothers, towards whom their alert race conscience directs their hopes. Both for them and for us national union is a vital necessity. Then only will we be able to make our full contribution to the world's progress. The war whereon Roumania is about to embark is one of right and restitution against the abuses of force and conquest.

"Such being the circumstances, and the necessary aims of Roumanian policy being so determined, it is obvious that the country, to obtain the desired satisfaction, must join in the war on the side of the Triple Entente. No one is foolish enough to think a nation numbering fewer than eight million persons able to annex without a great sacrifice of life new territories supporting five million and a half inhabitants. Roumanian blood must be spilt in floods to force national union from the world's most terrible crisis. Yet one may rest assured of Roumania's intention."




The 12-inch guns on a French battleship supporting the British Fleet in the Dardanelles.

[Cribb, Southsea.



MAP TO ILLUSTRATE THE ATTACK ON THE DARDANELLES.



The Dardanelles bombardment: Waiting on board a British man-of-war while the mine-sweepers clear a fresh part of the channel. [Sport and General.

Suddenly, early in February, the tune changed. "The Irredentist agitation," telegraphed *The Times* correspondent at Bukharest on February 3rd, "has subsided for the present. It appears that the Government entertain no intention of breaking neutrality at an early date, though military preparations continue. The British Military Attaché has gone to Sofia, and the Secretary of the British Legation has left on two months' leave." Perhaps the change of front was not so sudden as it appeared. A Liberal Government was in power in Roumania, and the ex-Ministers who were so confident that Roumania was about to intervene were not the best qualified to speak of the Government's policy. The whole truth about Roumanian politics in the winter and spring has not come out, but three causes would seem to have contributed to Roumania's decision not to intervene as soon as was expected. One was the slight set-back to the Russian arms in Galicia and in Bukowina, which made it clear that the acquisition of Transylvania would not be so easy an achievement as was thought. Another cause was the suspicion that arose in Roumania of Russia's intentions with regard to Constantinople. M. Viratela-Bratiano expressed the misgivings of the Government and of Parliament on this question with extreme candour:—

"The time has come to reawaken the conscience of this interest, unhappily failing in the west. For some time the Western States have seemed not to concern themselves directly with the control established at Constantinople, and, instead, to consider it in the light of a compensation for changes elsewhere. The Straits are no longer the key to the Eastern question."

commerce of seven States finds its ports, but a territory whose fate is discussed just as are the national claims advanced to any other territories. We have no ambition to possess the Bosphorus or the Dardanelles, but demand, in the interests of all the nations which trade in the Black Sea, freedom of passage.

"Joined with Italy, we are given by the strategic situation a great influence on the war, while together with the same country, bound to us by her territorial claims and by her policy in the East and in the Mediterranean, we have national and economic rights which call us to a defensive part of the first importance. We cannot act in the first capacity while permitting the second to be endangered. We cannot join in the settlement of the conflict as simple champions of peace, but must also assist in deciding, for the benefit of Europe, questions which concern us and all the other States of Eastern Europe."

Nor should it be forgotten that though the larger part of unredeemed Roumania was under Hungary, there was a considerable part in Bessarabia of which she believed herself to have been unjustly deprived by Russia.

Yet a third cause was the uncertainty with regard to Bulgaria's intentions. Roumania was prepared to retrocede the territory which she acquired at Bulgaria's expense by the Treaty of Bukharest, but she would hardly be disposed to part with the territory of which she was in occupation before she had occupied the territory in Transylvania which was to compensate her, and she may well have thought that the only security for Bulgaria's action was the satisfaction which Serbia refused of her demands in Macedonia. To these causes may be added the powerful commercial interest in Roumania, which was

strongly pro-German and carried great weight with the Liberal Government. But the most important of all the causes was undoubtedly the fear of Bulgaria. Once again, Bulgaria was the stumbling-block.

GREECE AND INTERVENTION.

Near as Roumania came to intervention on the side of the Allies in the winter, Greece came nearer still. Greece had the good fortune of having for Premier probably the ablest and most forceful man that her modern political life has produced. Born in Crete, M. Venizelos left the island in 1910, because he realised that he could best serve from Athens the cause of its union with Greece. Having accomplished the union which had been the great passion of his life, as Prime Minister of Greece, he began a period of vigorous reform alike in the civil and in the naval and military services, and the results of his energy were seen in the war of 1912, when the Greek army, which the war of 1897 had made a byword of inefficiency, carried itself with distinction. To M. Venizelos it was, more than to anyone else, due that the seeming miracle of bringing about a union of Balkan Powers against Turkey was accomplished. He had the statesman's gift of seeing another point of view than his own, and he was able, temporarily at any rate, to reconcile the racial jealousies of the Balkan peoples and to unite them in pursuit of a common object. He knew, as so few of the leaders of men in the Balkans had ever known, that to insist on all rights may be to jeopardise them, that in business affairs no great advantage is to be had without some sacrifice, and that the whole art of politics is to distinguish the essential from the non-essential, and to achieve what matters most by rejecting what matters less. The diplomacy of M. Venizelos was supple without being crooked. He had historical imagination, and with it an intensely practical genius for getting things done.

In the middle of August, Germany relying on its connection with the Greek Royal House—the Queen of Greece was the sister of the Kaiser—sought the co-operation of Greece, desiring not so much to have the assistance of her army and navy as to prevent her from heading a combination of Balkan Powers against Turkey and so neutralising the effects of Turkey's intervention, which Germany had already determined to bring about. Greece rejected these overtures. Her first anxiety was to secure her position in Epirus, where her claims had been rejected by the Powers in favour of the new State of Albania which they wished to see established. In the third week of October she notified the Powers of her intention to re-occupy Epirus, in order to re-establish order. Germany might have objected, for it would have been very convenient to Austria to have a rebellion in Epirus and Albania directed against the Serbs, and there were rumours of Turkish plots to fit out an expedition in the hope of re-establishing their rule there. But she was too anxious for Greece's goodwill to thwart her in ambitions which she knew to be dear, and Greece accordingly obtained the consent of all the Powers in what was in effect a reversal of their Albanian policy. About the same time, an Italian squadron landed a large "sanitary mission" at Valona, and patrolled the coast of Albania to intercept cargoes of contraband. Greece and Italy were both determined to resist any attempts by Turkey to take advantage of the dissolution of the Concert to re-establish her rule in Albania, or to foment disorder among the Albanian clans. The moment for intervention was wisely chosen, and it was an achievement to secure the consent of Germany and Austria.

M. VENIZELOS AND THE KING.

In December and January the Allies were very busy in framing their case for Greek intervention. With Greece, as with Roumania, Bulgaria was the stumbling block. She was afraid that if the invasion of Serbia made progress, Austria might incite Bulgaria to re-occupy the Macedonian provinces. In that case she would be bound to join in the war if only to protect Salonica. The threat of Roumania to intervene if Austria's attacks on Serbia became serious relieved some of Greece's anxieties, but it was not till January 11th that M. Venizelos felt himself strong enough to commit Greece to the Allies. Up to then, he had even objected to the comparatively small concessions that Serbia was willing to make to Bulgaria in Macedonia, because he was anxious that Bulgarian territory should not intervene between Serbia and Greece's possessions in Macedonia. But on January 11th, the British Minister at Athens assured M. Venizelos that if Greece rendered assistance to Serbia the Entente Powers would willingly agree to important territorial concessions to Greece in Asia Minor. On the same day, M. Venizelos wrote to the King urging intervention on the side of the Allies. "Greece," he wrote, "is to-day invited to participate in the war, not only in order to accomplish moral obligations but in exchange for compensations which, if realised, would create a great and powerful Greece." He was even willing to cede Kavalla in order that Bulgaria, by acquiring a good port on the Ægean, might have no motive to attack Greece. This proposal to cede Kavalla gave very great offence to the Greeks when news of it came out later, and M. Venizelos' own account of what he had in mind should be quoted.

"In this letter (to the King) I said that if there was no other way of shielding ourselves against danger from the Bulgarian side, I should not hesitate to recommend the cession in Western Macedonia of an area of 2,000 square kilometres on the following conditions:—

"1. That, in return for this cession in Macedonia, Greece should be ceded an area of 1,000 square kilometres in the Doiran-Ghevgheli district, which would close the gap existing to-day on our Northern Macedonian frontiers, to which we agreed when it was a question of an allied nation like the Servians, but could not tolerate if the Servians were replaced by the Bulgarians.

"2. That Bulgaria should abandon her neutrality at the same time as Greece, as her ally and the ally of the Servians.

"3. That the cession take place only after the end of the war, and if as a consequence of the war the sovereignty of Greece was assured in the western part of Asia Minor, in the manner detailed in my letter, over an area of about 140,000 square kilometres.

"4. That Greece and Bulgaria should mutually agree to purchase the possessions of their nationals in the respective territories on a valuation made by an international commission."

In fact, no negotiations seem to have been opened with Bulgaria for the cession of Kavalla on these conditions. The reason given by M. Venizelos was that the news of a loan placed by Bulgaria with German banks convinced him that all effort towards common action would be vain, but that can hardly have been the true reason, for the loan contract was in fact made in July before the war, and it had previously been offered to English and French bankers, but declined. The true reason, no doubt, was that M. Venizelos saw that public opinion in Greece would not support him in the cession of Kavalla. But though he abandoned, temporarily at all events, his project for bringing in Bulgaria, he was prepared to enter the war even

without guarantees on her side. "Bulgaria," he said afterwards, "would not have dared to attack Greece had Greece decided to move, because in the event of the victory of the Triple Entente she would have risked losing even what she now possesses."

THE DARDANELLES.

It is necessary now to return to England to take note of a decision which was to have tremendous consequences. The motive of the Allies in their earlier attempts to induce the Balkan Powers to make common cause with them was defence rather than offence. They were anxious to make so much trouble for Turkey in Europe that she would have no energy or resources to spare for attacks in the Caucasus or on Egypt; they—or at any rate the Western Allies—had no thought of themselves taking aggressive operations in Turkey. Gradually, however, this view changed, and for several reasons. The closing of Archangel by ice, of the Baltic by Germany, and of the Black Sea by Turkey left Russia without a single port of her own through which she could obtain the supplies of munitions of war or export her own agricultural produce. She was absolutely dependent on the favour of Japan for what she could import through Port Arthur, and from Port Arthur to European Russia there was but a single line of railway. In the Japanese war, it had been regarded as a wonderful feat that she was able to supply an army of 500,000 men by a single line of railway; and now she had an army of five or six times that size in the field. The closing of the Dardanelles was a serious embarrassment to Russian provinces, and also to her power to equip and maintain in the field her millions. Further, these arguments for the opening of the Black Sea ports were reinforced by those of strategy. There seemed little hope of Russia's being able to force her way into East Prussia or through Posen, but against Austria the outlook was much more hopeful. A campaign against Hungary not only promised to cut off from Austria and Germany a very important source of food supply, but it would open up new lines of attack against Germany from the south. Germany was already embarrassed by having to fight on two fronts. Could not a third front be created? Did not the whole shape of the frontiers suggest a combined movement against Hungary between Russian troops pouring over the Carpathians from Galicia, Roumanian troops entering Transylvania, with the Servian armies on their left? These ideas governed the strategy of the Allies from the beginning of the New Year. Germany had bastions at her vulnerable points, Belgium in front of Westphalia, Cracow and Austria in front of Silesia, and Turkey in front of Hungary. Might not the Allies find the means of turning these defences by mobilising the old hatred of Turkey among the Balkan States?

Amongst others who were fascinated by this prospect of making war against Germany on a third front was Mr. Churchill, the First Lord of the Admiralty. The forcing of the Dardanelles and the occupation of Constantinople appealed with a particular attraction to a statesman of his temperament. It would be the most dramatic thing that the British navy had done since the Battle of the Nile, a splendidly eloquent vindication of the reality of our sea power that would echo down history for generations. The slow methods of diplomacy wearied him as they wearied others. There was no persuasiveness like that of accomplished diplomat, especially

of such a fact as the forcing of the Dardanelles, or even a successful beginning of the operation. Would not all the Balkan Powers, now hesitating because they were not sure which was the winning side, come tumbling over each other in their eagerness to join the side which could force the Dardanelles?

The arguments on the other side were strong but colder. It was urged (by Lord Fisher, the First Sea Lord, amongst others) that the forcing of the Dardanelles was not a naval operation, that ships were not to be trusted alone against land fortifications in waters infested with mines, and that against fortresses of such tremendous natural strength as those of the Dardanelles the co-operation of an army was necessary. But could we spare the men for two such enterprises as the defence of Flanders and the forcing of the Dardanelles? Was not Flanders, after all, the main field of military operations? And even if the men could be found for the Dardanelles, would not the operations there, if prolonged—and who could fix a term?—weaken us in Flanders when the time came for us to strike there? Was it not playing the game of Germany to engage in a struggle with the famous army of Turkey, which if only we did not attack could do us no hurt? To which the advocates of action in the Dardanelles may be supposed to have replied as follows: Is it so certain that modern ships are powerless against land fortifications? Would not the experience of Antwerp and Namur seem to show that the strength of these fixed fortifications has been exaggerated? Further, if operations on land should turn out to be necessary, might not Greece supply the army? And was it to be supposed that any Balkan Power would stand idly by while the Dardanelles were forced and Constantinople occupied? Even if the fleet alone could not force the Narrows, it was sufficient for it to win some startling success at the entrance to bring the Balkan armies into the field. We might never persuade them by words; deeds would be more eloquent. Finally, if we did not succeed in bringing them in and had, after all, to use our own troops, was there any real rivalry between land operations in Flanders and in the Gallipoli Peninsula? The direct frontal attack on the German positions in Flanders seemed unpromising enough; might not a way round be found through Constantinople, a way easier than through La Bassée and Lille, and one which would gather up new sources of strength as it advanced?

THE ATTACK ORDERED.

These arguments prevailed with the British Cabinet, and an attack on the Dardanelles forts was ordered. The first attack was delivered on February 18th. The narrative of the operations must be deferred to a later chapter, when it can be given with its sequel; here it is sufficient to quote the Admiralty's account of the opening of the attack:—

"Yesterday morning at eight o'clock a British fleet of battleships and battle-cruisers, accompanied by flotillas and aided by a strong French squadron, the whole under the command of Vice-Admiral Sackville H. Carden, began an attack upon the forts at the entrance to the Dardanelles.

"The forts at Cape Helles and Kum Kale were bombarded with deliberate long-range fire. Considerable effect was produced on two of the forts. Two others were frequently hit, but being open earthworks it was difficult to estimate the damage. The forts, being outranged, were not able to reply to the fire.

"At 2.45 p.m. a portion of the battleship force was ordered to attack and engage the forts at closer range with secondary

armament. The forts on both sides of the entrance then opened fire, and were engaged at moderate ranges by the *Vengeance*, *Cornwallis*, *Triumph*, *Suffren*, *Gaulois*, and *Bouvet*, supported by the *Inflexible* and *Agamemnon* at long range.

"The forts on the European side were apparently silenced. One fort on the Asiatic side was still firing when the operation was suspended owing to failing light.

"No ships of the Allied fleet were hit.

"The action has been renewed this morning after aerial reconnaissance.

"His Majesty's aeroplane ship *Ark Royal* is in attendance, with a number of seaplanes and aeroplanes of the naval wing."

If it was expected that the beginning of the attack on the Dardanelles forts would resolve all the doubts of the Balkan States, the hope was bitterly disappointed. When the operations began, the Allies "semi-officially" inquired whether Greece was disposed to intervene. The Crown Council was then summoned, and M. Venizelos proposed that 50,000 men should be sent to aid the Allies against Turkey, and that Greece should receive the vilayet of Smyrna in exchange. The General Staff objected, that to use so many would endanger the safety of Salonica, and M. Venizelos then reduced his proposal to the despatch of a small division of 15,000 men.

"The Council then asked whether M. Venizelos would guarantee the safety of the territory received in compensation in Asia Minor, and M. Venizelos in reply pointed to the fact that in recent times he had twice unconditionally engaged

the whole forces of the kingdom and had obtained more than he had expected by them. The Council pointed to the impossibility of defending Smyrna against the Turks. But the ex-Premier showed that if the Allies were victorious Greece would be the neighbour of Russia and Italy in Asia Minor, and that these three Powers could assist each other against the Turks. M. Venizelos further affirmed that Germany would not wrest the mastery of the seas from Great Britain.*

"The Council rejected these reasons on the ground of the possibility of an invasion of Greece."

The decisive argument against M. Venizelos was that Bulgaria might attack Greece when she was engaged, and that Greece was in any case bound to go to the help of Serbia should the Austrians threaten to break through her defences. Other things told against him—the influence of the Court, and (as in the case of Roumania also) suspicion of what Russia might do. Indeed, according to *Nea Hmera*, an Athens newspaper, which seems to have been in touch with the views of the Court, the Greek preparations for war brought from Petrograd "a categorical pronouncement that the entry of Greek troops into Constantinople would not be tolerated"—a statement, however, for which no confirmation has yet appeared.

On March 6th, M. Venizelos announced in the Chamber that as the King did not approve the policy of the Government the Cabinet had resigned.


* M. Venizelos in the *Corriere della Sera*, March 16.



The attack on the Dardanelles: Marines going ashore to take up guard duty.

[Central News.

The Manchester Guardian
HISTORY
of the
WAR



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
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
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


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A financial conference of the Allies: Left, M. Bark; centre, M. Ribot; and right, Mr. Lloyd George, Ministers of Finance in Russia, France, and Britain respectively, in conference in Paris. [Central News.

CHAPTER XXVI.

THE FINANCE OF THE WAR.

FOREIGN COUNTRIES AND THE FINANCIAL CRISIS OF AUGUST LAST—THE COST OF THE WAR IN THE VARIOUS COUNTRIES IN THE FIRST YEAR—HOW THE COST IS BEING DEFRAYED—ESTIMATES OF THE COST SHOULD THE WAR BE PROLONGED INTO A THIRD YEAR—STATE FINANCE IN GERMANY.

THE outbreak of the war was accompanied by a financial crisis of the first magnitude in all the belligerent countries and in many countries in intimate relation with them. The provisional measures of the British Government at the beginning of the war have already been explained (Vol. I., Chapter VI.), but the policy in other countries was in many respects different, and it is interesting to take note of what they did.

In Germany there was no financial moratorium, but the Courts were given powers similar to those given to the British Courts (by the Courts Emergency Powers Act) to relieve in proper cases, and the Chambers of Commerce and other business corporations qualified the rigour of the law. The Germans had carefully thought out and prepared in advance the financial measures which would be necessitated by the outbreak of war. Ever since the Agadir crisis the gold reserve of the Reichsbank had been expanded. The average in 1911 was less than 41½ millions; in 1912 it had risen to 44 millions; in January,


1913, to 45 millions; in January, 1914, to 60 millions; on the eve of war it was 68 millions. After the Austrian declaration of war on Servia there was a run, but when Germany went to war it was quickly checked by a suspension of cash payments. The Government determined to accumulate all the gold in the country in the Reichsbank by substituting paper for gold coin, and by encouraging private citizens to bring to the Reichsbank gold of all kinds. These measures, coupled with the transfer of the war treasure at Spandau, were highly successful. In January, 1915, the Reichsbank held 106 millions in gold; in March, rather under 115 millions. As the total amount of gold in Germany was estimated in 1913 at £150,000,000, this was a very considerable achievement.

On this basis of gold a vastly increased note issue was made by the Reichsbank. To this must be added the notes put into circulation by the Treasury, and through the war loan banks, which were authorised to lend up to 75 millions on the security of stocks and commodities.



The Bank of France, Paris.

[E.N.A.]



The Bourse, Paris.

[E.N.A.]

These banks by the end of December had given loans to the amount of £65,350,000, but six weeks later this amount had fallen by one-half. The flood of paper money far exceeded the currency needs of Germany, and, as it was inconvertible, the paper mark depreciated some 12 per cent.

In Austria-Hungary very similar devices were adopted for the extension of paper currency and for the relief of the banks to those adopted in Germany. The gold reserve of the Austro-Hungarian Bank stood at some 50 millions on the outbreak of war, but it does not appear that it was increased. The position of the financial institutions here had been weakened by a prolonged commercial depression.

The Bank of France, with a gold reserve of over 165 millions (as well as a silver reserve of 25 millions), was in a strong position, but other French banks were unfortunately placed. They had tied up a good part of their deposits in unliquid investments of not too sound a character, and immediately before the war they and their clients had been indulging in a speculation in State funds. On the 7th of July a loan of 32 millions had been issued by the Government to meet the deficit on the year's Budget, and as the terms were very favourable, and the first instalments asked small, it was over-subscribed forty times for speculative purposes. As it happened, one of the instalments was due on 31st July, in the height of the war crisis.

All these circumstances made for panic. As early as the 25th of July a run on the banks began. On the 1st of August a moratorium was proclaimed, which lasted till March 1st, 1915. The banks exercised their rights in the most rigorous fashion, and this was the subject of bitter complaint. On August 29th, a decree compelled the banks to pay out of their deposits up to £10, and 5 per cent of sums above. Successive decrees raised these figures to £40 and 50 per cent and 75 per cent. From 1st January, 1915, the banks waived entirely their rights under the moratorium. The Bank of France behaved as well as the Joint Stock Banks behaved ill. It issued notes to the enormous amount of 450 millions for the relief of the market and the State, and yet maintained them at par. But as a result of these transactions the proportion of gold reserve to liabilities fell from 61·9 per cent to 36 per cent, and in order to finance foreign war purchases the gold reserve was somewhat lowered.

On the outbreak of war the Russian State Bank had in Russia gold reserves amounting to 160 millions, and gold credits abroad amounting to another 12 millions. Its notes were made inconvertible, and its power to issue such notes was greatly increased. These measures enabled it to retain its gold and finance the Government's war expenditure for some months, but they have also heavily depreciated the paper rouble. From the beginning of the war until March 21st, the Bank issued 163 millions in notes, and it can now issue up to a maximum of 444 millions.

THE FOREIGN EXCHANGES.

England is the greatest of all creditor nations, and when the apprehension of war became very strong the English banks called in very sharply the money due from abroad. At this time the only important country whose exchange with England was favourable to it was France. There was thus, therefore, an increased demand for bills in London to meet the demands of the English banks. Gold at the same time could not be shipped owing to fear as to its safety. Meanwhile the banks refused to re-

discount bills or issue new bills. As a result, the foreign exchanges went to pieces. But so long as the exchanges were in chaos and the bill-discounting business was crippled, foreign trade came almost to a standstill. The Government therefore intervened, as has already been stated (Vol. I., page 57). It guaranteed the Bank of England against loss in discounting approved pre-moratorium bills, the amount of which in existence was some 350 millions sterling. This immobilised existing bills, but the banks were still refusing to finance new bills. On September 5th the Bank of England undertook to advance the money to the acceptors of pre-moratorium bills, so as to enable them to meet them.


In France the exchanges were favourable until well on into the war, when the vast war purchases in the United States converted them. In Russia the impossibility of exporting the harvest, coupled with the need of making considerable imports and the excess of inconvertible paper currency, lowered the value of the rouble in exchange by nearly one-third. The efforts of France and England to assist her Ally have not appreciably relieved this situation. The rate of exchange was against Germany at the opening of the war, and the evidence is all against the suggestion that just previous to the war, and in preparation for it, the Germans were drawing in gold heavily. The excess of inconvertible paper currency, coupled with an unfavourable trade balance, kept the exchange against Germany; but the very strictness of the naval blockade, by forcing Germany back on her own resources, prevented the depreciation becoming as high as it otherwise would have been.

THE STOCK EXCHANGES.

Stock Exchange transactions are largely financed by short-term loans from the banks. The stockbroker deposits collateral security with the bank, and he is bound to increase the amount of this security as the market price falls. It is estimated that at the end of July the banks had advanced 80 millions in this fashion to stockbrokers, and some 250 millions to private customers. Prices were falling rapidly, and to make the position still more difficult the Stock Exchange could not hope to get payment from many of its foreign and domestic clients. If the Stock Exchange had been kept open and the banks had enforced their rights there would have been a cataclysmic decline in values, accompanied by innumerable bankruptcies. The Stock Exchange was therefore closed on July 31st, and the moratorium gave temporary relief; but it was necessary to enable the Stock Exchange to re-open, and also to ease the position of the banks. The Stock Exchange was opened on January 4th, under strict currency control, with minimum prices and regulations to prevent the sale of securities held in enemy countries; and the Bank of England (under Government guarantee) undertook to advance to lenders 60 per cent of the value of securities held against Stock Exchange loans at 1 per cent above Bank rate, with a minimum of 5 per cent, and the Bank undertook not to press for payment until twelve months after peace.

The Bourse at Paris was closed under circumstances similar to those in London, but the amount involved in commitments was estimated at only 22 millions, and the constitution of the Bourse made it easier to handle. The Bank of France advanced 40 per cent of the value of the shares, and the Bourse was opened under restrictions on December 7th.

It is not known precisely how the crisis on the Stock Exchange was dealt with in Austria and Germany, but



The Bourse, Petrograd.

[E.N.A.]



The Imperial Bank, Moscow.

[E.N.A.]

in both cases there was in effect a moratorium and the fixing of minimum prices, and the Loan Banks lent freely on securities. The general moratorium was not to come to an end in Austria before August, 1915.

COMMERCE AND EMPLOYMENT.

Commerce was affected by the mobilisation, the difficulty of securing payment from abroad, the restriction of bank credit, and the collapse of the exchanges. As a result, unemployment in England rose in August to 7.1 per cent. The Government formed a committee representing the Treasury, the Bank of England, the Joint Stock Banks, and the Association of Chambers of Commerce, which was empowered to assist exporters. As a matter of fact the claims made upon it turned out to be small, and by February less than £900,000 had been advanced. The vast recruiting and the enormous war orders conspired to give speedy relief to the industrial market, and by September unemployment had fallen to 5.9 per cent, by November to 2.9 per cent, by February, 1915, to 1.9 per cent, and by April to 1.2 per cent.

In France the mobilisation was so extensive that most of the industry of the country was temporarily crippled. The occupation by the enemy of some of the chief industrial districts of France added to the economic distress, but in France, too, there has been a notable recovery.

In Russia the closing of the western frontier, the occupation by the enemy of the Polish provinces, and the restriction of transport crippled Russian export and domestic trade, and deranged considerably the industrial life. The moratorium, in one form or other, was extended to the end of March, 1915, and the State Bank lent much assistance to industry; but economic life in Russia has not yet returned to the normal.

In Germany the commercial crisis, owing to the more extensive mobilisation and the blockade, was much more intense than in England. In August unemployment reached 22.7 per cent. From that point, however, it steadily declined, and by November had fallen to 8.2 per cent, and by April to 2.9 per cent. Conditions there are to-day similar to what they are in England—a factitious individual prosperity, side by side with an unprecedented outpouring of the resources of the State.

The damage done by a war to the material resources of a nation may be classified under the following heads:—

- (1) Reduction of its liquid assets—stores, material, live stock, coin, bullion, &c.—consumed and not replaced.
- (2) Sale of foreign investments and other assets realised abroad, the proceeds of which have been spent.
- (3) Foreign indebtedness increased.
- (4) Depreciation of the national plant and equipment through insufficient maintenance.
- (5) Damage to property by warlike operations.
- (6) Loss of labour force as a result of the war.

Much of this loss does not appear in the Budget of the Government, and it cannot be estimated except very roughly. In what follows, only that part of the cost which appears in the Budget of the Government will be discussed, but it should never be forgotten that in addition to this there is a margin of loss which varies from country to country, but is in all considerable.

THE MEETING OF FINANCE MINISTERS IN PARIS.

Early in the war it was realised by the Allies that there must be financial co-operation as well as military

co-operation between them. All the Allies were compelled to make vast purchases abroad of war munitions, and, in addition to this, some of them could not finance the war from their own resources. This was clearly the case with Belgium and Serbia. Russia has always been a borrowing country, and she was further hampered by the crippling of her export trade. France, though a very rich country, found her chief industrial areas in enemy occupation. It was inevitable that the chief financial burden should rest on this country. A conference was held in Paris in February between the Finance Ministers of Great Britain, France, and Russia. Russia seems to have proposed a joint war loan of the three Powers. This was whittled down to a joint loan for assisting Serbia and Belgium; but even in this form the scheme has been abandoned because of the grave financial objections to it. Great Britain, however, undertook to finance the foreign purchases of all the Allies. Great Britain, by February, had advanced £40,000,000 to Russia for foreign purchases in return for the transfer of £8,000,000 in gold from Petrograd to London. France and Great Britain also undertook to put on the French and British markets loans of £50,000,000, and to increase that sum when necessary. France and Russia also undertook to replenish the gold reserve of the Bank of England should it fall below a certain amount, while the British money market was opened to French Treasury notes. It is understood that when Mr. McKenna conferred with the Italian Finance Minister at Nice in June, similar arrangements were made with that country. Very little is known of the real nature of these financial arrangements between the Allies—Mr. Lloyd George's account leaves many dark places unilluminated—but they have set this country a serious problem. It was expected that the Dardanelles expedition would quickly open the markets of the world to Russia, but that expectation was disappointed. The financing of the foreign purchases of the Allies, too, was heavily complicated, because, side by side with these importations, the normal means for paying them had contracted. These normal means are exports, services (freights, insurance, &c.), and the transfer of securities. Mr. Lloyd George, on May 4th, estimated the excess of imports into this country over exports during 1915-16 (exclusive of the purchases of our own and the Allied Governments abroad) at £448,000,000, and the total balance against us, inclusive of such purchases, at between £700,000,000 and £800,000,000. He put investments, freights, insurances, and other services which we render foreign countries, at the peace figure of £350,000,000, which is thought to be too favourable. That left a sum of £400,000,000 still to be found. It is highly improbable that the American market can absorb British or Allied owned securities to that full amount in a year. It is also clear that the difference cannot be met by exporting gold, for—apart from the fact that the exports of gold from this country during the war has been very small—there can be no question of draining so immense a quantity of gold away. The only course which remains is to obtain credits in foreign countries, chiefly the United States.

BRITISH WAR FINANCE.

In the eight war months (August to March 31st) of the financial year 1914-15 the Government obtained three votes of credit—August 6th, £100,000,000; November 15th, £225,000,000; March, £37,000,000—amounting to £362,000,000. To this must be added £60,000,000—two-thirds the normal peace expenditure on the Army and Navy. All this was exhausted except £5,000,000, so that



The Russian Minister of Finance in England: M. Bark on his way to the House of Commons, accompanied by Mr. Lloyd George and Mr. Winston Churchill. [L.N.A.]

in the 240 war days of the 1914-15 financial year the total war expenditure was £417,000,000. This is an average of 1·7 millions a day. For the financial year 1915-16 no attempt was made to distinguish between normal expenditure on Army and Navy and abnormal war expenditure. On March 1st Parliament voted a credit for the financial year 1915-16 of £250,000,000, which was estimated to last 100 days. On June 15th Mr. Asquith, in asking for another vote of £250,000,000, explained that this estimate was rather too optimistic. In the 73 days from April 1st to June 12th the total war expenditure was £194,000,000, constituted as follows:—

Army.....	£121,000,000
Navy	36,000,000
Loans to Foreign and Colonial Governments	26,000,000
Foodstuffs	10,000,000
Other Services.....	1,000,000

This is an average of £2,660,000 a day. There was still in hand on June 12th £56,000,000, enough to last till the end of June. From July Mr. Asquith estimated the rate of expenditure at not less than £3,000,000 a day, and possibly more, of which £2,250,000 would be taken by the Army. The June vote of credit, therefore, could hardly carry the country on beyond the middle of September. From that date onward the rate of expenditure might rise to £3,500,000 a day during the third quarter of the financial year 1915-16, and possibly to £4,000,000 a day during the fourth quarter. On these

assumptions the war expenditure during 1915-16 threatened in the spring of 1915 to be as follows:—

April 1st to June 30th	£250,000,000
July 1st to September 15th ..	250,000,000
September 15th to December 31st (say).....	320,000,000
January 1st to March 31st (say)	360,000,000

Total £1,180,000,000

To this (to obtain the total Government expenditure during the year) must be added the non-war expenditure, £158,000,000. Grand total, £1,338,000,000.

IF THE WAR LASTS INTO THE THIRD YEAR.

Mr. Lloyd George's estimate in May, based upon a lower rate of expenditure than experience has borne out, was £1,136,000,000; actually it seemed more likely to be £1,300,000,000. We may, therefore, estimate the war expenditure of this country, should the war last till March 31st, 1916, thus:—

August, 1914—March 31st, 1915 ..	£417,000,000
Financial Year, 1915-16	1,180,000,000

Should it last another year after that—and some have talked of a three years' war—a further sum of £1,460,000,000 would have to be added; and in addition there is the peace expenditure, amounting for this period to, say, £400,000,000. That would make, in round numbers, a grand total of national expenditure during the war of £3,450,000,000.

It should be added that part of this expenditure is loans and payment for foodstuffs, and may be expected ultimately to return; but against this must be set the fact that after the war, in the words of Mr. Lloyd George, "There will be months of expenditure almost as heavy as the expenditure of the war whilst affairs are being wound up. The three or four months after the war may very well be more expensive to the Exchequer than the three or four months before the end of the war." The estimate here made—which, be it remembered, is an estimate only of *Government expenditure*, not of *total national loss*—must be considered as an under-estimate rather than an over-estimate. Nor has account been taken of the capitalised value of pensions and allowances, nor of the liability thrown upon the Government by its guarantees to commerce and finance. (Mr. Lloyd George estimates this last item at less than a week's cost of the war.) These two items together can hardly be less than £330,000,000, and they bring the cost of a war—apart from peace expenditure—lasting till April 1st, 1917, to over £3,400,000,000.

TAXATION AND LOAN.

If the national revenue were to remain in the condition at the time when Mr. Lloyd George made his Budget speech (May 4th, 1914), then there would be raised by taxation, &c.:—

August, 1914, to April 1st, 1915.. £160,000,000
April 1st, 1915 to April 1st, 1917.. 554,000,000

Total.....£714,000,000

This would leave £2,966,000,000 added to the National Debt, which, at 5 per cent for interest and sinking fund, would mean an annual charge of £148,000,000—a sum equal to the total State revenue of the country several years ago.

That, of course, is assuming that no extra war taxation were imposed. The practice in previous British wars has been to raise two-sevenths of the cost by taxation and the remaining five-sevenths by means of loans. This would mean an addition to the National Debt of £2,450,000,000, at an annual charge of £122,500,000. At the beginning of the war the National Debt stood at £708,000,000, and was an annual charge of £29,250,000. At the end of the war it would stand at £3,158,000,000, and be an annual charge of nearly £152,000,000. Up to June, 1915, the only additional war taxation which has been imposed was put on in November, 1914, by Mr. Lloyd George. The war taxes were a doubled super-tax and income tax, charged on only one-third the income in 1914-15, making a tax of 1s. 8d. for the year 1914-15, and 2s. 6d. for 1915-16 on unearned incomes, and 1s. and 1s. 6d. on earned incomes; 17s. 3d. on the barrel of beer and 3d. per lb. on tea. Mr. Lloyd George estimated the increased yield for 1914-15 and 1915-16 thus:—

	1914-15.	1915-16.
Income Tax	£11,000,000	£38,750,000
Super Tax	1,500,000	6,000,000
Beer Duty	2,500,000	17,600,000
Tea	950,000	3,200,000
	<hr/>	<hr/>
	15,950,000	65,550,000
Less License Duty Concession	450,000	650,000
	<hr/>	<hr/>
Total	£15,500,000	£65,000,000

The actual yield in 1914-15 of income tax and super-tax exceeded the estimate by £8,000,000, and the excess from other sources was also considerable.

It was estimated previously that the expenditure of the Government for 1915-16 would be some £1,300,000,000, and in 1916, if the war should last so long, some £1,600,000,000. From what sources can this sum be drawn? It can be drawn either from the national income or from the national capital, or by raising loans abroad. The national income of Great Britain consists of its current production of wealth in the form of usable or saleable articles; its earnings from other nations for services rendered; its revenue from foreign investments. The total is estimated at £2,400,000,000. Whether that total can be maintained when millions of workers are withdrawn from production may be doubted. The national capital consists of the whole mass of accumulated wealth, and includes fixed assets, such as land, buildings, machinery, railways, roads; live stock and stocks of raw material and manufactured goods, together with articles of art and luxury; gold and silver, coin and bullion; debts owed by foreign nations. The total capital of Great Britain is estimated at from £13,000,000,000 to £17,000,000,000. It is obvious that whereas a part of this capital could be consumed, the major part could be rendered liquid only by selling it to foreigners. Inasmuch as the United States is the only wealthy nation not at war, there is only a small margin which can thus be realised. The same difficulty arises with regard to foreign loans. The only country in which foreign loans could be placed is the United States, and that is not a big market. Of the £1,300,000,000 which the country must raise in 1915-16, perhaps £250,000,000 could be obtained by the sale of securities abroad. The remainder, amounting to over £1,000,000,000, will have to be taken out of its own resources, either the national income, or such part of the national capital as can be consumed. From the point of view of the Government the problem is to raise in the year over £1,000,000,000 over and above the £270,000,000 it estimates to raise from ordinary sources of revenue. For practical purposes the possibility of raising any appreciable part of this by means of a foreign loan may be neglected, although the Government will doubtless survey the ground.

If we set the ordinary tax revenue of the Government (£270,000,000) off against those capital resources which can be liquidated in the course of the year by selling securities abroad and the like, then the Government deficit of over £1,000,000,000 will have to be made good out of the national income, which cannot be more than £2,400,000,000, and may be no more than £2,000,000,000. In other words, the deficit can be met only by taking on the average something well over one-third and near to one-half of the income of every person in this country. Whether it be taken in the form of loan or in the form of tax makes no difference. The only source from which it can come must be the national income.

It has been calculated that at its severest the war taxation during the Napoleonic wars rose to two-sevenths of the national income. To raise the whole £1,300,000,000 needed during the year 1915-16 out of income by means of taxation would be to take from 13/24ths to 13/20ths of the national income, and in the year 1916-17 it would be 16/24ths to 16/20ths. Taxation on such a scale is impossible. On the other hand, to put £1,000,000,000 of war loan on the market in one year, with the prospect of an even larger amount in the following year, would be a loan operation beyond all precedent. Doubtless part of

the money needed will be raised by new taxation and part by loan. If the traditional proportion of two-sevenths taxation and five-sevenths loan were observed, the amount to be raised in 1915-16 would still be about £900,000,000. Some part of last year's loan of £325,000,000 is available to meet this, but the amount still to be raised would be so great that it would make a severe demand on the patriotism and self-sacrifice of the nation. In any case, whether the Government resorts to loan or tax, or a combination of loan or tax, the money needed can be obtained only by a drastic reduction of the amount of the nation's income devoted to private purposes. Money will not be available for repairs and replacements, so that there will be a heavy depreciation of the national plant; private expenditure will have to be cut down to bare necessities; every possible new labour force for increasing the national income must be called up. While the Government is faced with the gravest financial problem in the history of this country, there is, owing to war orders, among the people a factitious appearance of prosperity which makes for extravagance instead of thrift.

Having stated the nature of the financial problem, we may now consider what steps were taken by the British Government up to the beginning of June to deal with it. The measures adopted have been taxation, the issue of a loan, the issue of paper money (in the form of Treasury notes), the issue of Treasury bonds, advances from the Bank of England, and Exchequer bonds. The new taxation has already been described. In November a War Loan of a nominal value of £350,000,000 was issued and oversubscribed. It was a $3\frac{1}{2}$ per cent security, redeemable in March 1928, and issued at 95. The Government reserved the right to redeem after March 1st, 1925. The Bank of England undertook to lead in the War Loan at the issue price at 1 per cent under Bank rate for three years. It is the Government's intention to keep gold for every Treasury note issued, but the amount of notes in circulation still exceeds by over £10,000,000 the amount of gold in reserve. The difference is really a loan free of interest. As these notes are convertible on demand into gold, and as there is no evidence of a superfluity of currency, there is no reason to suppose that this transaction has had the disadvantage of sending prices up. The amount of the advances from the Bank of England to the Government—advances which in June the Government took power to pay off—has not been published. The amount of Exchequer bonds issued was £50,000,000 at $3\frac{1}{2}$ per cent. Treasury bills to the amount of £72,500,000 were sold by public tender at rates varying from $3\frac{1}{2}$ per cent to $1\frac{1}{2}$ per cent. The Treasury also adopted, in April, the new practice of selling Treasury Bills for three, six, nine, and twelve months at rates fixed each morning by the Bank, and by the middle of May £80,000,000 were disposed of in this way.

THE FRENCH WAR BUDGET.

On June 3rd M. Ribot, the French Finance Minister, estimated the ordinary expenditure on the war for the first fourteen months at nearly £884,000,000, but he explained that a large supplementary estimate would be necessary. On that basis the expenditure for a war of 32 months would be about £2,600,000,000. The difficulty of financing was accentuated by the fact that the £32,000,000 loan of July, 1914, was still under liquidation. On September 11th arrangements were made through the Bank of France to assist the subscribers to meet their liabilities. For war purposes it was felt impracticable at that stage to raise a public loan, and

the burden of providing the sinews of war was assumed by the Bank of France. Under an agreement made in 1911 the Bank had undertaken to assist the Government in loan to the extent of £144,000,000. By an agreement made on September 21st, 1914, this was increased to £240,000,000. A later agreement increased the maximum to £360,000,000. In the middle of June the Bank's advances to the Government amounted to £236,000,000. M. Ribot also began to issue National Defence Bonds for three, six, or twelve months at 5 per cent, in sums of 100, 500 and 1,000 francs. The three-months bonds are exchangeable for bank notes, and on the others the Bank will lend readily. In December the interest was reduced to 4 per cent on the three-months bonds. In May M. Ribot was authorised to raise £240,000,000 in this way. These issues have been readily taken up, and have eased the strain on the bank. Great Britain also advanced £60,000,000 on French Treasury notes, redeemable a year after peace, in return for the transfer to London of £20,000,000 in gold. Relatively small amounts of French Treasury notes have also been placed in the United States.

In April, 1915, the cost of the war was £60,000,000, and was rapidly increasing. Mr. Lloyd George estimated French war expenditure at from 100 to 150 millions a year less than our own. To this must be added the peace expenditure, which in 1914 was £140,000,000. The total sum which France would have to provide in a war lasting till April 1st, 1917, would be at least £3,000,000,000. This takes no account of the great sums which are provided by the Communes. In the financial year 1915-16 the expenditure would probably be not less than between 900 and 1,000 millions, and might rise much higher. For some years the French Budget has had to be balanced by loans.

The capital value of France's wealth was estimated in 1913 at £11,400,000,000, and the wealth per head (£290) was greater than for any other people. We may plausibly guess the annual income at one-seventh the capital value, or £1,600,000,000. How far these figures have been affected by the occupation of much territory by the enemy, and by the mobilisation of so large a portion of the labouring population, it is difficult to say. Clearly, however, France will have to rely for the financing of the war much more on her capital accumulations and much less on her income than we. There is no people so thrifty as the French, and among no people is wealth so evenly distributed. It follows that the margin for saving for war purposes is very large.

THE RUSSIAN BUDGET.

Russia's war expenditure is probably about as high as that of France. The restriction of exports and the prohibition of the sale of vodka have complicated the financial problem. It is estimated that the ordinary revenue of 1915 will be some 400 million roubles less than for 1914, after allowing for the new taxation. The new taxation includes something like a 30 per cent all-round increase on the tariff, an additional tax on real estate (6 per cent to 8 per cent), inhabited house duty (50 per cent), merchant certificates, commercial undertakings, tobacco, beer, spirits, sugar, petroleum, matches, and practically every article of consumption, as well as on transportation, insurance, &c. These new taxes should produce between 60 and 70 millions sterling. The Russian Government has also issued two internal loans, one for £50,000,000 and one for £100,000,000; obtained credits in England and France to the amount of £50,000,000,

put £10,000,000 of Treasury notes on the English and £5,000,000 on the American markets, and issued bank notes to the amount of £170,000,000.

GERMANY.

The German Government, unlike the British and French Governments, has thrown very little light on the cost of the war, and we are left to speculation. As Germany has to finance Austria to some extent, and Turkey very largely; as she is conducting a war on both fronts, and has a very large army with the colours and a large fleet fully mobilised, it is improbable that the war is costing her less than Great Britain, and she is doubtless spending not less than three millions a day, and perhaps much more. Her total expenditure, war and peace, for 1915-16 is hardly likely to be less than £1,400,000,000, and her total expenditure, war and peace, in a war of 32 months is not likely to be less than £4,000,000,000. She is able to requisition on occupied territory, and this may help her to keep her war expenditure down to the British level and give her a large taxable area.

The capital wealth of the German nation may be estimated at £15,000,000,000, and the national income at £2,000,000,000. It will be noticed that the national income of Germany is £400,000,000 less than that of England, although the population of Germany is some 22 or 23 millions greater. It is also probable that the war has reduced the German national income much more than the British. The shipping trade is cut off; the profits from foreign trade are heavily reduced; and there is a huge diversion of labour. It may be that the employment of women has helped to correct the reduction in production, but in April unemployment among trade unionists was still rather worse than with us last December. One may guess that Germany's national income during the current year is likely to be nearer £1,750,000,000 than £2,000,000,000, and the Government expenditure may well swallow up more than one-half of this. Inasmuch as the German Government will be taking at least as much out of a smaller national income, which is divided among a larger population, it follows that the financial pressure upon Germany will be far severer than upon us, and the depreciation of the national equipment much greater. On the other hand, the German Government and the German people have been much quicker to realise what is demanded of them, and to practise economy.

In one respect the problem before the German Government is simpler than with us. The crippling of Germany's foreign trade relieves it of the difficult obligation to finance foreign purchases and foreign imports on a large scale, and so renders it easier to maintain the gold reserve. On the other hand, this advantage should not be

exaggerated. Germany is still importing and exporting, and her depreciated paper currency compels her to pay heavily. Still it should be remembered that she is requisitioning very heavily on the occupied territories.

The German Government has so far imposed no war taxation, except upon the occupied territory. Perhaps some £30,000,000 have been raised by the sale of securities in the United States, and that country has taken some £2,000,000 in Treasury notes. For the rest, Germany has been forced back on her own resources. She financed the early stages of the war by issuing through the Reichsbank and the War Loan Banks and other institutions an inconvertible paper currency, in the form of Imperial Bank notes, Treasury notes, and War Bank notes. The exact amount of these in circulation is not easy to estimate, but the issue of Imperial Bank notes alone rose to some £250,000,000. This excess of paper currency is equivalent to a forced loan without interest, and its effect has been to depreciate currency and send up prices. In September a war loan of 97½ and 5 per cent was issued, and £50,000,000 in Treasury bonds and £173,000,000 in Stock were subscribed. In February, 1915, a second war loan of 5 per cent at 98½ was issued, and £450,000,000 was subscribed. People were enabled by the War Loan Banks to subscribe by pledging stocks and goods, and for the second war loan the stock of the first war loan, but the extent to which this was done must not be exaggerated. According to an official report for the first payment on the second war loan, £26,000,000 was borrowed from the War Loan Banks as against £35,500,000 for the first payment of the first war loan. On April 15th the total advanced by these institutions on war stock was a little over 43 millions out of a total of 77 millions. It cannot be doubted that by far the greatest part of the German war loans is being met out of the resources of the people, and not out of paper manipulations.

AUSTRIA-HUNGARY AND TURKEY.


Austria-Hungary's war expenditure is probably at least two millions a day, but it is even more difficult to gather confirmation as to how she is financing it than in the case of Germany. She has sold Treasury notes in Germany to the amount of at least £40,000,000. In November a domestic loan of £130,000,000 was successfully floated, and another loan in May. There has also been a heavy launching of paper money, but it is not known how much. The financial pressure of the war on Austria-Hungary, already very hard hit before the war, is now extremely severe, and will become much greater.

Turkey was bankrupt before the war, and nothing reliable is known of the financial devices to which she has resorted for financing the war.



German troops on their way to the trenches.

[Photopress.]



French soldiers in the trenches taken from the Germans at Les Eparges.

[Central News.]



A photograph, taken under fire, showing French troops advancing in rushes against a German position.

[Newspaper Illustrations.]

CHAPTER XXVII.

THE SPRING CAMPAIGN IN FRANCE—ALSACE AND CHAMPAGNE.

THE FRENCH PLANS AND THEIR EXECUTION—IN ALSACE—THE FIGHTING IN THE WOEVRE AND IN CHAMPAGNE—
A WAR FOR RAILWAYS—JOFFRE'S SUBTLE STRATEGY.

IN a former chapter on the Winter Campaign in France (page 141), the battle front was divided into three main sections, each in three wings, and this division may usefully be kept up in noting the chief events of the French Spring Campaign. The west front in this division covered the line from the sea to Compiègne; the southern front from the junction of the Aisne and Oise to the Argonne; and the eastern front from Verdun to Belfort. At the end of the winter it was uncertain on which of these sections the great forward movement would be made, but few doubted that with the advent of spring General Joffre would concentrate on one and force his way through. Actually what happened was something very different, and though there were very strong local concentrations at several points along the frontier from time to time, spring came and gave place to summer, and it was still doubtful at which point the great thrust, the expectation of which had sustained hopes all through the winter, was to be made. But the weight of the fighting tended, as spring wore on, to shift to the west, and certainly it was here that the issues at the end of the spring had shaped themselves most clearly. It will be convenient therefore to begin the survey of the French front with the east, where events, though important in themselves, had no immediate consequence, and so come to the fighting on the west,

which had immediate sequel, important alike in the history of the war and of our politics at home.

THE CAMPAIGN IN THE VOSGES.

Alsace, which figured so prominently in the earliest news of the war, afterwards dropped out of sight almost completely, and about no considerable area of the war has so little information reached this country. The place had a very great and natural sentimental value for the French, but it ceased to have much strategic importance when the Germans succeeded in throwing the weight of their invasion on the west, and what little importance remained to it as a base of offensive operations was greatly diminished by the German occupation of the Woevre. Nevertheless, the French continued to exercise a steady pressure on the Germans all through the winter, for, though it was not a promising district in the military sense, it was important to detain as many German troops there as possible, and so relieve other parts of the front. The failure of the first invasion of Alsace had taught the French that no invasion of the Alsatian plains from the south had any chance of success unless they had first established themselves securely on the eastern slopes of the Vosges. Accordingly, while they retained the southern tip of Alsace (up to but not including Altkirch, south of Mulhouse), they made no attempt to advance north from

that point. Nor were winter and spring favourable seasons for operations on the slopes of the Vosges. The hills are of a considerable height, and covered with snow until well on in the spring. The country in appearance is not unlike Switzerland and the Austrian Tyrol, with steep hill sides and deep, very narrow valleys. The French had the greatest difficulty in victualling their troops in the Vosges during the winter and in providing adequate artillery support to the firing line. While there were few changes during the winter, such as there were, notably near Munster, were in favour of the Germans. The French thought it wise to withdraw some of their advance posts, which, isolated as they were, and far from villages, were cut off by any winter snowstorms from supplies and from the support of their main body. In spring, however, the French began a forward movement along the hills flanking the Fecht and the Lauch, two tributaries which feed the Ill from the Vosges, the Fecht flowing past Munster, the Lauch past Gebweiler to Colmar. The fighting in the Lauch district centred round Hartmannsweilerkopf, a conical hill about 3,000 feet high, in the Gebweiler group. This hill was held by the French through the winter until January 19th, when an advance guard posted in a redoubt on the top was surrounded by the Germans and starved into surrender, in spite of very persistent and costly attempts made by the main body to relieve it. The French then began a systematic siege of the hill, digging trenches and establishing positions for artillery. That took a month, up to February 26th, but when the attack was launched it only succeeded in driving back the Germans for a hundred yards. The French artillery fire had overlooked many of the German secondary defences, so skilfully were they concealed. Fog, too, which is common in the Vosges Hills in the winter, added to the difficulties of

artillery preparation for the attack. The attack, however, was renewed on March 5th, and the line of the enemy's trenches, with the strongest of his blockhouses, was carried by the Chasseurs. Violent counter-attacks in the next two days broke down. For another fortnight the French were unable to advance further, but in the last week in March they were reinforced. On March 23rd a general attack was delivered, which, on the 26th, was crowned with complete success.


THE CAPTURE OF HARTMANNS- WEILERKOPF.

The opening bombardment on March 23rd lasted four hours; and in order to secure perfect direction of fire, the French operators had honeycombed the hill with more than thirty miles of telephone wire.

"Observation officers were in the first line directing the fire. All the while could be seen hurtling among the trees fragments of dead Germans, arms, and sandbags from their defence works. When the infantry leapt forward from the trenches, preceded at a short distance by this wall of fire, the enemy was thrown into complete consternation. He fought, however, with courage. But our men pressed furiously forward. The infantry carried two lines of trenches and a redoubt, and captured over 200 prisoners. The Chasseurs debouched on their flank with equal dash. We were getting near the summit, but new lines appeared to view, and these had to be carried also. We repelled two counter-attacks

and organised the ground we had won. On the following day at dawn our look-outs saw dark points stirring in the trenches which the enemy still held. Helmets and bayonets next appeared, and it was obvious that a big counter-attack was being prepared. Our artillery with appalling rapidity found the trenches with its fire, and, as on the day before, we saw hurtling in the air men and their equipments. The German losses must have been enormous, for there were no more counter-attacks and his artillery remained silent."

"The night of the 25th passed without incident, and when the day of the 26th broke it was noted with joy



Alsace and the Vosges.

that the fog, which so often during the last two months had come to the help of the Germans, had fallen to the first rays of the sun. All was ready, and from this point onwards the drama was to proceed with an automatic regularity, which was the fruit of long weeks of work. It was a supreme effort which should make us masters of the summit. Between us and our objective there were at least three lines of trenches, strengthened by blockhouses, containing machine-guns, and the trees still masked the defence of the enemy. Our artillery had yet a great deal to do. At 10-30 it came into action, and until half-past two without intermission it deluged the enemy's lines with its fire. Artillery of every description was employed. Huge pines fell with a crash, having been severed about the height of a man from the ground and toppled over into the craters formed by the explosion of the shells. The whole ground was a chaos of holes, branches, and trenches. Cries of agony were heard from the shelters of the Germans, whose resistance had now been broken. Ammunition stores exploded, and the work of destruction continued remorselessly until a quarter to three. The bombardment had lasted four hours and a quarter.

"At this moment our infantry in a magnificent rush dashed forward, and ten minutes later was on the summit; and on the crest, now cleared of trees, one of our men, scorning the German bullets, waved a large flag to our artillerymen, who were now sweeping the eastern slopes with their fire. At three o'clock an infantry regiment organised its position on the summit of the Hartmannsweiler-kopf. Companies belonging to the second battalion of the Chasseurs carried by means of hand grenades the trenches on the right, while two companies of another battalion made progress on the left. The whole body, joining forces, swept down the eastern slope in pursuit of the Germans, who were now completely demoralised. More than four hundred prisoners in our hands and the whole of the Hartmannsweilerkopf conquered—such is the statement of account for the two attacks of March 24th and 26th. Many brave men fell in those attacks, leaving to their comrades a splendid example. Among the survivors, whether wounded or not, how many might be mentioned! One case may be cited. A chasseur named Dumoulin, alone in a German trench, from which a machine-gun was sweeping down our attack, felled the gunner to the ground and stopped the fire."

Even then the French were not secure in their possession. A month later—on April 26th—they were driven out by a surprise attack from three sides at once, in which the Prussian Guards took part and poison gas was used. But in less than twenty-four hours the Guards were again driven off the summit. They fought, however, with great determination, and after losing the summit clung to trenches on the slopes. The Germans turned their lower position to profit both here and at other points in the Vosges by posting themselves in trees, from which they overlooked the trenches further up the hillside.

The advantage gained at this hill was not pressed, for the lesson of the early defeats was well learned.

Later, it was hoped, Alsace might play an important part in the development of the French strategy of attack. There had at the beginning of the war been an idea that a bold attack here and in Lorraine might prevent the German concentration through Belgium. For the present, however, it was sufficient for the purpose of General Joffre to clear the hills and to put himself in a position from which he could occupy the plains whenever it was convenient for him to spare the men.




French troops in one of the captured trenches on the Hartmannsweilerkopf.

[Universal.]


BETWEEN THE MEUSE AND MOSELLE.

Strategically the district between the Meuse and Moselle was perhaps the most important on the whole front, next to the section opposite La Bassée. It has

already been suggested (Vol. II., p. 135) that had General Joffre had more numbers at his command he could have followed up the repulse of the German attack on Nancy, and so made an eastern counterpart of Sir John French's movement into Flanders. As it was, the German occupation of St. Mihiel was a standing threat to the French defence—a door ajar to the rear of the French armies in the Argonne and Champagne. The Germans early made it clear that having secured this advantage they had no intention of letting it slip. A railway ran from Metz across the plain of the Woevre as far as Thiaucourt at the beginning of the war, and the Germans were not slow to construct a field railway between the old terminus and their new




One of the famous French 75-millimetre field guns with its ammunition wagon. [Photopress.



Behind the French lines: Field kitchens attached to the French army.

[Newspaper Illustrations.



The Woëvre.

acquisition on the Heights of the Meuse. The existence of this railway made the southern German front in the plain of the Woëvre, to which it ran parallel, extraordinarily strong, for it provided the Germans with lateral communications, and enabled them to concentrate an overwhelming force to meet an attack at any given point. The country through which the front ran was studded with forests, which assisted the defence. Near St. Mihiel is the Ailly Wood, and then (from west to east) the Forest of Apremont, Burntwood Forest (Bois Brulé), the Mortmare Wood, and Priest's Wood (Bois le Prêtre). North of St. Mihiel the front followed the crest of the Meuse Heights for some distance, and then bent east to the Heights of Combres on the east, and curled round Verdun in a generously wide circle. Early in April the French began a serious attack on these German positions in the Woëvre. All through the month they attacked from south and west, and so made the famous pincers of which so much was heard, one prong pressing on the Combres Heights, the other against the German entrenchments protecting the railway to St. Mihiel. The pincers obstinately refused to pinch, but the two prongs were brought very much closer together.

On the southern front the French, after hard fighting, occupied Flirey and Regniéville, but it was June before the Ailly Wood at the western end of the plain, and Priest's Wood at the eastern end, were wholly in French occupation. The fighting on the hills facing the Meuse Heights was shorter and sharper. In the first week of April the French attacked the whole line of German positions north of St. Mihiel, and on April 9th they carried and held against all counter-attacks the plateau of Eparges. It was an important victory, for more reasons than one. The plateau of Eparges, and Combres at the eastern edge of it,

projecting as they do into the Woëvre plain, make an excellent post of observation from which to direct the fire of artillery concealed in the woods behind, and are, therefore, a good jumping-off place for attacks on the St. Mihiel railway from the north-west. From the prong of the pincers at Eparges to the other prong south of the St. Mihiel railway is no more than sixteen miles. Another reason that gave importance to these operations in the Woëvre was that the Prussian Crown Prince was in command at this point. His ill-luck in the field still pursued him. When Eparges fell he had just returned to the field from a long holiday, after his by no means brilliant campaign in the Argonne (Vol. I., p. 267).

In April, too, the French considerably enlarged the radius of the German positions round Verdun. Invested, but never besieged in a military sense, the garrison of Verdun in April threw back the German investing lines almost to Etain, on the railway from Metz. The possession of the Woëvre and of the country between Verdun and the Luxembourg frontier was of incalculable service to the Germans. It gave the army in France two additional lines of railway communication, besides those through Belgium, namely, the lines from Metz and through Luxembourg, and the loss of the Woëvre would have menaced both these lines, and thrown on the Belgian lines a strain to which they were quite unequal. Moreover, a drive north from the Woëvre would have exposed the flank of the armies in Champagne to a dangerous attack, which, if it had been timed with a strong attack in Flanders, might have driven the two German wings in on their centre. That would have meant not defeat, but annihilation. The issues of the fighting in the Woëvre were therefore vital to the Germans. There was no place in the whole of their lines to which they attached more importance




A French soldier hurling a hand bomb into the German trenches.

[Topical Press.]



Men of the famous Chasseurs Alpins of the French army in billet after a spell in the trenches.

[Photopress.]




From Rheims to Varennes in Argonne.

than the Woevre and St. Mihiel, and the fact that they claimed the April campaign in this district as a success for themselves, in spite of the French victories at Eparges and in the woods from the Bois Ailly to Priest's Wood and Pont-à-Mousson, shows how genuinely alarmed they had been by this spring campaign.

IN CHAMPAGNE AND THE ARGONNE.

The general character of the fighting in Champagne has been described already (Vol. II., p. 149) in the chapter on the winter campaign. It continued well into spring without materially changing the situation. The advance was painfully slow and the losses on both sides extremely heavy, but such progress as was made was in favour of the French. Here, as in the Woevre, the object of the French

attacks was the railway communications of the enemy. The lateral communications in this north-eastern corner of France are exceedingly bad, a fact which was one of the many causes that made Germany prefer Belgium as the main route of invasion. The routes from the east into France are crossed by a succession of natural obstacles, of which the Heights of the Meuse and the Argonne Hills are the chief. There are still few good roads and no railways across the Argonne Range, and the main railway from Metz to the west is blocked by the great fortress of Verdun. A glance at the inset in the map of Champagne above will show that (apart from lateral field railways like that from Thiaucourt to St. Mihiel, which the Germans may have constructed during their occupation) the Northern Argonne district



CC-0. Jangamwadi Math Collection. Digitized by eGangotri.
French gunners in training! A lecture on heavy artillery.

[Wyndham, Paris (C.N.).

is served by only two railway systems. One running through Verdun was, of course, closed to the Germans. The other system runs north from Metz, parallel to the Luxembourg frontier, almost to Sedan, and there breaks into two branches, one ascending the Meuse to Verdun, the other describing a large arc through Champagne to Apremont, which it reaches from the west, and there stops. The course of the railways determined the whole plan of the French operations in the central section of their line. Direct advance through the wooded Argonne was hopeless; the rate of progress, elsewhere measured in yards, was here measured in feet. The most hopeful plan was to turn the right of the Germans in the Argonne by an advance in Champagne. The French objective in the terribly heavy fighting north of Perthes and Beauséjour was to cut the railway to Apremont, and so isolate the Germans in the Argonne and force them to retreat north. Such a retreat would not only relieve Verdun from investment, but it would give the French an opportunity of beginning a campaign in the valley of the Meuse against the German communications through Luxembourg. (Compare the observations already made (Vol. I., p. 107) on the French railway system between Verdun and Luxembourg. It is there described as the strategical idea of Napoleon III. before Sedan put on wheels.)


HOW THE SPRING CAMPAIGN DISAPPOINTED EXPECTATION.

The course of the French spring campaign surprised the general expectation. The system of railway communications behind the German lines was very much superior to that behind the French, and therefore it was not reasonable to hope for any imitation of the strategy followed so successfully by Von Hindenberg of a sudden concentration in great force now at this, now at another point of the enemy's lines. What people had imagined General Joffre would do was to concentrate an overwhelming force at some one point of the German lines which was to be left secret to the last possible moment, and so force his way through, in the assurance that the strength of

the whole line could be no more than that of its weakest link. The constant shifting of the point of attack from one section of the frontier to another, and the long periods of rest in each section which followed the gaining of a success in it, tended to puzzle onlookers. Would it not have been possible, people asked, to break the German line at some one point at a less cost than the sum of all the casualties in the attacks in half-a-dozen sections, which, though they might be successful, always stopped short of piercing the enemy's main defences? That this was not the plan of General Joffre was in itself a sufficient answer to such criticisms, for General Joffre, by his victory on the Marne, had shown himself one of the great strategists

in the world's military history, and he neither did nor left undone anything without good reason. But they were natural, and it may be helpful to try to divine the ideas which governed General Joffre's policy in this somewhat discursive and perplexing spring campaign.

There were many local or sectional concentrations of the French troops against the German lines during the spring campaign, but there was no general concentration at any one point. Among General Joffre's reasons were probably these. First, on the greater part of the front the Germans had the better railway communications, and could concentrate the faster. Before a general French concentration could force its way through, it



Chasseurs Alpins on the snow-covered slopes of the Vosges.

[Central News.]

was more likely that the Germans would themselves concentrate against some point of the French lines that had been weakened and break down the defence first. The breakers of lines such as these always stood a chance of being themselves broken first. Further, as Von Mackensen's experience in breaking the Russian lines near Lodz showed, the force which breaks through may be itself in danger of being cut off. (See diagrams, Vol. II., p. 61.) For tactics of this kind to be successful, a greater superiority in numbers and equipment is necessary than General Joffre believed his army to possess over the enemy. Lastly, even if this plan had been tried and succeeded, it would only have forced the Germans back from their first lines of defence to shorter lines behind,

when the same work would have to be done over again.

JOFFRE'S SUBTLE STRATEGY.

General Joffre's strategy was much subtler and incalculable than that of the Germans, who recognised him as a dangerous man, precisely because he possessed military gifts different in kind as well as in degree from that of their own generals, and because his plans were individual, and not cast in the dominant mould of military thought. General Joffre attached very great importance to persistent but discursive attacks, partly because he saw in them the best security against a resumption of the German offensive, but also because he seems to have believed that it was on the whole better under the circumstances to make as many vulnerable points as possible than to break through at one with the vigour of the defence unshaken at all the other points. His notion was not to break at one point, but to wear the defence thin at many points. That done to his satisfaction, he might concentrate at one point and break through; and the breakage at one point might then be expected to lead to a breakage at the other weakened points too. A breakage at one point might be relieved by retreat; a breakage at several

simultaneously would be disaster, perhaps irretrievable. The Battle of the Marne showed General Joffre employing with brilliant success a distinctively French, or at any rate non-German, scheme of defence. The very discursiveness and apparent discontinuity of the French attacks in the spring encouraged the hope that General Joffre was working out for himself an equally original scheme of attack.

In the meantime, his immediate objects were unmistakably clear. In Alsace, they were to master the Vosges Heights and dominate the plain, so that if and when the French were again in a position to attack from Lorraine they might have the support of a powerful French army on the right flank. Between the Meuse and Moselle they were to recover St. Mihiel and the Southern Woevre, and by thrusting back the German lines north of Verdun to menace the railway communications with Metz. In Champagne they were to interrupt the railway communications with Germans in the Argonne, and so make the German invading armies in France entirely dependent on their communications through Belgium.

The campaign on the west front cannot be dismissed at the end of a chapter, but must have several chapters to itself.



Ruins of dwelling-houses in one of the principal streets in Arras leading to the railway station.

[Photo Service of the French Armies.]



Life behind the firing line: British reserve troops entering their billet in the loft of a French farm.

[Photopress.]



A sergeants' mess in a ruined farmhouse near the trenches. The walls are strengthened with sandbags.

[Photopress.]

The attack which we are about to undertake is of the first importance to the Allied Cause. The Army and the Nation are watching the result, and Sir John French is confident that every individual in the IV. Corps will do his duty and inflict a crushing defeat on the German VII. Corps which is opposed to us.

Headquarters, IV. Corps,
9-8-15.

H. RAWLINSON, Lieut.-General,
Commanding IV. Corps.

The official message to the men of the 4th Army Corps before the Battle of Neuve Chapelle. The slip from which the photograph was taken was carried all through the battle, and brought to England by its wounded owner. The slip from which the photograph was taken was carried all through the battle, and brought to England by its wounded owner. [Central News.]

CHAPTER XXVIII.

THE BATTLE OF NEUVE CHAPELLE.

THE PLANS OF ATTACK AND THE COMPOSITION OF THE FORCES—THE OPENING BOMBARDMENT—CAPTURE OF THE VILLAGE—THE DISASTER TO THE CAMERONIANS—DELAYS IN RESUMPTION OF THE ADVANCE—THE FAILURE TO CARRY PIETRE—THE REPULSE OF THE GERMAN COUNTER-ATTACK—THE END OF THE BATTLE—OBSERVATIONS AND CRITICISMS.

ALL through the winter our troops in the neighbourhood of La Bassée had occupied the low fen country south of the River Lys, while the Germans had enjoyed dry quarters on the higher ground which protected the industrial districts of Lille, Tourcoing, and Roubaix from attack on the west. The advent of March, with its drying winds and spells of sunshine, brought hope of deliverance from conditions which would have broken the spirit of any other army. Sir John French himself had at times been anxious about the effect which the inactivity of a long and depressing winter might have had on the spirit of the troops. It is not good for an army to remain too long in the same place; and even had there been no other reason for movement, the need of the tonic of action would have been sufficient in itself. But there were many other reasons. In February the German attacks on the Russian positions in Poland (Chapter XX.) were at their height, and it was necessary to give to our Allies what assistance was possible. There were many who at this time saw in Eastern Europe the best prospect of a solution of the military problem, and in this hope, encouraged by Russian successes over Austria in the Carpathians, an attack had been begun on the fortifications in the Dardanelles. These hopes, however, depended on the maintenance of a steady pressure on the German forces in the west. The French, as the last chapter has shown, were doing their part; and the time had now arrived for the British army to emulate their energy. Sir John French, therefore, determined to strike. There had been little fighting for a month, but such as there was had gone in our favour. On February 25th, near St. Eloi (south of Ypres), the Germans had carried a portion of our trenches, but our counter-attacks had recovered the lost ground, and in the fighting the Canadian contingent, which had begun to arrive five days before, showed itself equal to the best regular troops. We had been particularly successful in the night reconnaissance work of our patrolling, in fact,

in every enterprise which required individual skill and resource, our men had always come off best. They felt themselves, man for man, superior to the enemy. "A moral superiority," in Sir John French's phrase, had been established. It remained to be seen whether this greater individual virtue would give the victory over an enemy whose superiority on the mechanical side of war was suspected, but not as yet generally admitted.

The choice of the point of attack was dictated by the activity of the French on his right flank. There were broadly two directions in which the British army might seek to break through the German defence. So long as Antwerp was in the hands of the Belgians, the extreme left flank was the more attractive; and even when Antwerp had fallen, it was still a conceivable strategic scheme to roll up the German right by an encircling movement pivoting on Ypres and following the line of the coast. The heavy fortification of the coast line by the Germans and the capture by the Germans east of Ypres of the Zandvoorde ridge, which would have been the natural pivot of such a movement, in the fighting of October and November, robbed this plan of its attractions, but there were still some who favoured it until quite late in the spring. Had such a movement been attempted, it would have aimed first at the capture of Menin, the most important of the positions in the railway communications between the German armies in Belgium and in France, and the outer rim of the wheel would have moved under the protection of the guns of the fleet, with the possible assistance of a fresh British army landed at some point on the Belgian coast, such as Zeebrugge. This plan was—on good ground surely—rejected, and thereafter the district south of the Lys, where the right wing of the British army was stationed, became the more important. The policy of both German and British armies was to attack with the right and parry with the left. The Germans wanted Ypres in order to obtain command of the Scheldt and cut the sea communications of




Off to the trenches: General French (marked with an x over his head) and members of his staff watching a fresh draft of British troops march past on their way to the firing line. [Universal.

the British army. The British wanted Lille in order to cut direct communications between the German armies of France and Belgium, and to force them to retreat from their outer lines to their inner lines, which would have kept Northern France and a great deal of Belgium free of the invader. It was not the first time that Sir John French had cast longing eyes at Lille. In the previous October General Smith-Dorrien's Corps had had most desperate fighting between Laventie and Lille; and in the middle of the month both Aubers and Illies, on the ridge of low hills that overlook Lille from the south-west, had been in their possession. (Vol. I., p. 290, and map on the same page). They had not, however, been able to hold their positions on the ridge.

THE BRITISH FRONT.

The general direction of the British front from Festubert (nearly opposite La Bassée) to the Lys was now north-east. The line would have been straight but for a westerly indentation made by the German occupation of the village of Neuve Chapelle. Opposite Neuve Chapelle, as Givenchy is opposite La Bassée, is Richebourg-St. Vaast, and between them is the main road from Estaires to La Bassée. The possession of this road had been much disputed, but at the beginning of March the Estaires end and the stretch between Richebourg-St. Vaast was in ours. From Petit Logy on this road, just past the bend made by the Neuve Chapelle position, the British front ran due north-east along the main road to

Armentières, through Fauquissart and Tilleloy. The general direction of the roads may be carried in the mind by figuring them as a capital X, with Estaires, Armentières, Givenchy, and La Bassée at the ends of the strokes, Petit Logy at the point of intersection, and Richebourg and Neuve Chapelle at each side; thus:—



The further east we could establish ourselves beyond the point of intersection of the two main roads the better our chance of turning the German position of La Bassée, which now, as in October last, was the object of the British army. Two miles south-west of Lille is a ridge which runs to Fournes and then divides, one spur going to Aubers, the other to Illies. Between these ridges the land slopes down through Neuve Chapelle to the main roads. The possession of Neuve Chapelle was thus a

step to the occupation of the ridge overlooking Lille. The object of the attack which was now to be delivered was the capture of the village of Neuve Chapelle and "the establishment of our line as far forward as possible to the east of that place."

The plans of the attack had been carefully prepared. Sir John French knew how strong the German positions had been found last autumn, and that the enemy had been working at their improvement all through the winter. He saw that there were two conditions of success. First, there must be an overwhelming superiority of artillery fire, which should literally blast a way through the enemy's lines, and secondly, it was desirable that there should be some element of surprise. Without that it was doubtful whether we should be able to obtain artillery supremacy at the point of attack. The Allies had started the war greatly inferior to the Germans in the numbers of heavy guns and machine guns, and as future developments were to show, whatever France had done, we had not made up that inferiority in the number of guns, and still less in high explosive shells. The superiority in artillery fire which we had in the Neuve Chapelle engagement was the result of preparations which were carefully concealed. The massing of our artillery on the Neuve Chapelle front must have been the work of a fortnight or more. Yet the enemy seems to have remained in ignorance of what was preparing. By what means Sir John French kept the secret has not been told, but some part of the credit must have been due to our air service, in preventing the enemy's aeroplanes from making a too curious inspection of what was going on behind our lines.

THE CONCENTRATION.

On the evening of March 9th the troops for the attack were concentrated near Ixventie and Richebourg-St. Vaast. At least six brigades (or twenty-four battalions) of British troops took part in the attack, besides the Indian troops, and it is possible in this engagement to give the names of many of the regiments which took part in the attack.* On the extreme right of the attacking line was the Indian Corps, whose direction of advance on Neuve Chapelle was almost due north, crossing the Estaires road near Port Arthur. To their left was the Twenty-fifth Brigade, and to the left again the Twenty-third Brigade, then the Twenty-fourth, Twenty-first, and Twenty-second Brigades. There were other troops in reserve, some of which came into action quite early, but these are the only brigades that have been mentioned by name. A comparison of the official and the chief unofficial accounts of the battle gives the following list of the regiments composing some of the brigades:—

Twenty-fifth Brigade—

Lincolns.
Berkshires.
Royal Irish Rifles.
The Rifle Brigade.

Twenty-third Brigade—

Scottish Rifles (Second Cameronians).
Middlesex.
Devons.
West Yorks.

Twenty-fourth Brigade—

Worcesters.
East Lancashires.
Sherwood Foresters.
Northants.

Twenty-first Brigade—

Second Scots Guards
First Grenadiers.
South Wales Borderers.
Second Gordon Highlanders.



The Twenty-third Brigade was opposite Petit Logy, and the other brigades were along the Armentières road, as far as the junction of the Pietre road. Most of the British troops belonged to the Fourth Army Corps, under General Rawlinson. The Germans opposing were Westphalians, of the Seventh Corps, which was the first to invade Belgium.

THE BOMBARDMENT AND THE CAPTURE OF NEUVE CHAPELLE.

At 7-30 in the morning of March 10th there suddenly began the greatest bombardment that had been heard in the war up to that time. The infantry lay in the trenches, crouched for the spring. They had had hot coffee, but no breakfast. Not until the bombardment began did the Germans suspect that anything unusual was afoot. According to a story told by a prisoner, an officer in the German advanced line did report that the British trenches were full of men, and requested a battery commander to open fire, but received the reply that he had instructions—issued, no doubt, in consequence of the waste of ammunition earlier in the war—only to fire under express orders of the Corps Commander. Certain it is that the British concentration was absolutely unmolested by enemy fire. When the bombardment began no effective reply was possible. The report of the guns was, in the words of an officer of the Manchesters who was in the reserve line, and therefore nearer the artillery, "a repeated banging which shook the earth." Another officer, who put his ear to the ground, said that it was "as though the earth was being smitten great blows with a Titan's hammer." For thirty-five minutes the bombardment lasted. To the infantry, waiting in its trenches, it seemed as though the time would never end.

The whistles blew for the infantry attack at five minutes past eight. The bombardment still continued, but as our men passed over the 250 yards that separated their trenches from the German it was "lifted" from the trenches on to the village of Neuve Chapelle. The attack by the Twenty-fifth Brigade in the centre was immediately successful. The Berkshires on the left of this brigade's advance, and the Lincolns on the right, rushed the trenches and then opened out to allow the other regiments of the brigade to pass through them to the attack on the village. The resistance of the Germans was not obstinate. Here and there a group held out obstinately: in particular, the Berkshires had trouble with a couple of German officers, who remained alone working a machine gun after the other occupants of the trenches had been killed or captured. But for the most part the Germans in the first line of the trenches were demoralised by the violence of the bombardment, as was natural enough. "When we reached the trenches the Germans were nearly hysterical. As soon as they saw us they put up their hands and cried for mercy. We were amazed at the condition of the trenches: there were scores of dead, lying with only

* Thanks to a very spirited narrative which appeared in most of the morning papers on April 19th, and by an unusual indulgence of the censor, the press was allowed to mention the names of many individual regiments.



PHASES IN THE BATTLE OF NEUVE CHAPELLE.

heads or feet sticking out of the heaps of earth which had buried them." While the Berkshires and Lincolns were making prisoners, the Irish Rifles and the Rifle Brigade passed between them on towards the village, on which the bombardment had now been turned. The Rifle Brigade, which was the first to enter the village, found it a heap of ruins.

"It looked as if an earthquake had struck it. Into this scene of desolation the Rifle Brigade—the first regiment to enter the village, I believe—raced headlong. Of the church, only the bare shell remained. The little churchyard was devastated, the very dead plucked from their graves, broken coffins and ancient bones scattered about amid the fresher dead—grey-green forms athwart the tombs. Of all that once fair village but two things remained intact—the great crucifixes reared aloft, one in the churchyard, the other over against the chateau.

"The din and confusion were indescribable. Through the thick pall of shell smoke Germans were seen on all sides, some emerging half-dazed from cellars and dug-outs, their hands above their heads, others dodging round the shattered houses, others firing from the windows, from behind carts, even from behind the overturned tombstones. Machine guns were firing from the houses on the outskirts, rapping out their nerve-racking note above the noise of the rifles.

"Many strange incidents were observed. In one cellar a portly German was found dancing about in an agony of fear, screaming in a high-pitched voice in English, 'Mercy, mercy! I am married!' 'Your missus won't thank us for sending you home,' retorted one of the men who took him prisoner, and his life was spared. A Rifle Brigade subaltern, falling over a sandbag into a German trench, came upon two officers, hardly more than boys, their hands above their heads. Their faces were ashen grey; they were trembling. One said gravely in good English: 'Don't shoot! I am from London also!' They, too, were mercifully used."

The Rifle Brigade entered the village from the west side. Very shortly afterwards arrived one of the regiments of the Garwhal Brigade from the south. They, too, had had easy work with the enemy's trenches. They found the wire entanglements destroyed by the artillery bombardment, and the Germans too shattered to offer a stout resistance. At 8-30 the Rifle Brigade and the Indian Corps

met outside the village and shouted themselves hoarse with cheers for the victory.

HEAVY LOSSES OF SCOTTISH AND LONDON REGIMENTS.

Meanwhile, other regiments had had a very different experience. One of the regiments in the Garwhal Brigade on the right found the wire entanglements in its line of advance untouched by the bombardment for a distance of 200 yards, came under a heavy German fire, and had to retire to their own trenches. They were relieved by the Leicesters, who carried the German trench from which the trouble came. But they lost twenty officers and 350 men. Even worse was the experience of the Twenty-third Brigade, to the left of the now triumphant Twenty-fifth.

The Cameronians lost every one of their officers but one, and 750 men. Again the cause was the same. Opposite their right-hand company the entanglements had been destroyed, but they had been "unaccountably missed" opposite the left-hand company. The men had no wire cutters. They tore at the wire with their hands, stamped on it, jabbed it with their rifles—all the time under a heavy fire. The Middlesex Regiment was in like case. In spite of fire from machine guns, they got as far as the wire. "They hacked at it, tore at it, till their hands were raw and bleeding and their uniforms in tatters. From their starting point right up to the wire they left a deep lane of their dead and dying,

120 yards long, a

sight so poignant that men, coming suddenly on that bloody trail, broke down and wept at the sheer pity, at the undying glory, of it."* Had it been possible to communicate with the batteries, they could soon have destroyed the entanglements, but unfortunately at this point of the line the telephone wires had been destroyed. A hundred times repaired, the wires were broken before the repairer had time to reach his operating machine. One message, however, reached the batteries, and the Middlesex soon



Rifle inspection before leaving billets for the trenches.

[Photopress.]

* From the account, obviously semi-official, published in the papers on April 19—the only intelligible account of the battle, and much the best description of any battle in this war that has been printed in English.



Bringing up one of the great British guns which demolished the German trenches at Neuve Chapelle.

[Newspaper Illustrations.]



Getting British heavy artillery into position.

[Newspaper Illustrations.]

had a path made for them. The Cameroonians, though they were nearly annihilated, managed to deliver themselves by working their way round the Germans through the place where the entanglements had been destroyed.

SIR JOHN FRENCH ON THE DELAYS.

Time was now getting on. The Rifle Brigade had entered Neuve Chapelle at 8-30; and it was now 11-30. The holding up of the advance of part of the line by the wire entanglements had cost us three hours and more than 2,000 casualties. It had prevented the Twenty-fifth Brigade from pressing its advantage after the early capture of Neuve Chapelle when the Germans were demoralised, and had involved it in fighting on the flank of its direct advance. It had further delayed the development of the attack by our extreme left, which was the most important part of the plan, for the capture of Neuve Chapelle was useful mainly as a step to the capture of the Aubers ridge. Soon after 11-30, however, to the left of the Twenty-third, the Twenty-fourth Brigade was able to move forward, and it joined with the Middlesex and two regiments of the Twenty-third Brigade, the Devons and the West Yorks., which had not suffered, in clearing the large demesne north of Neuve Chapelle, covered with orchards, gardens, and large houses, from which the German fire had been very destructive. By the time the orchard was clear it was 1-30; five hours had passed, and even then our troops were still not ready for the further advance. It took two more hours before the alignment of the attack broken by the wire entanglements was restored.

"The infantry was greatly disorganised by the violent nature of the attack, and by its passage through the enemy's trenches and the buildings of the village. It was necessary to get units to some extent together before pushing on. The telephonic communication being cut by the enemy's fire rendered communication between front and rear most difficult. The fact of the left of the Twenty-third Brigade having been held up had kept back the Eighth Division, and had involved a portion of the Twenty-fifth Brigade in fighting to the north out of its proper direction of advance. All this required adjustment. An orchard held by the enemy north of Neuve Chapelle also threatened the flank of an advance towards the Aubers ridge.

"I am of opinion that this delay would not have occurred had the clearly expressed order of the General Officer Commanding First Army been more carefully observed.

"The difficulties above enumerated might have been overcome at an earlier period of the day if the General Officer Commanding Fourth Corps had been able to bring his reserve brigades more speedily into action."

The disorganisation of the Germans, in spite of the very obstinate resistance at a few points, had been complete; and when the Twenty-first Brigade came into action, as it did soon after mid-day, it was able to form up in the open without a shot being fired at it. Later in the afternoon, however, they began to rally. Between the ground now won and the rising ground of the Aubers ridge to the east there runs a small stream, the des Layes, flowing round its base. Upstream, and on the eastern bank, there is a wood, the Bois du Biez, which clothes the hillside almost to the top of the ridge at Haut Pommereau. Between Haut Pommereau and Aubers the ridge dips, and in this saddle is the little village of Pietre. A road leads across the low land from the Rue Tilleloy to Pietre, and crosses the des Layes near a mill known as Pietre Mill. The object of the fresh attack, which began late in the afternoon, was to establish a footing on the ridge which commands Lille. The possession of Pietre would probably have given us Aubers.

THE FIRST ATTACK ON PIETRE.

The attack began well, but was presently in difficulties. The Germans were posted very strongly on the Pietre road and in the Biez Wood, and the bridge over the River des Layes was held by a most determined detachment with machine guns. The Twenty-fourth Brigade was held up by the fire of the Germans from houses at cross-roads 600 yards north-west of Pietre, and on its right the Twenty-fifth Brigade was in similar difficulties from the machine-guns on the bridge. Nor had the Indian Corps any better fortune. It attacked the Bois du Biez, and some companies of Gurkhas penetrated it, but were unable to debouch from it owing to the cross-fire from the bridge. Night came on soon, and no appreciable advance had been made. The troops could do no more that day than entrench themselves where they were, and make their positions secure for the night.



The German reinforcements were slow in arriving, and for that thanks were due to our airmen, who attacked the railway junctions at Menin and Courtrai, and also Dcn and Douai. Much damage was done, for the airmen dropped their bombs from as low as 100 and even 50 feet. As the day wore on the brightness of the early morning was succeeded by local mists, and unless the airmen had taken great risks in flying low they could not have seen what to attack. Very useful assistance, moreover, was given by attacks further along the line near Armentières by the Third Corps. Very little progress was made on the 10th at this point, but the fighting prevented the enemy from detaching men to the assistance of the defeated corps at Neuve Chapelle.

THE SECOND DAY.

Towards the morning of the next day the Germans delivered their first counter-attack, but it was not made in very great force, and was driven off with heavy loss. But our own attacks towards Pietre had no better fortune than on the preceding day. The weather conditions were very unfavourable. There was a thick mist, and aerial reconnaissance was impossible. Moreover, the telephone wires were cut, and it was impossible to communicate properly from the fighting line to the batteries. The enemy were still holding the same buildings as on the previous day, and only a well-directed artillery fire gave any chance of turning them out, and artillery support was impossible under the circumstances. "Even," writes Sir John French, "when our troops which were pressing forward occupied a house here and there, it was not possible to stop our artillery fire, and our troops had to be withdrawn"—a sentence which certainly illustrates the dangers of artillery fire under such conditions, and perhaps implies that those dangers were not wholly avoided. Our artillery fire on the Biez Wood, however, seems to have been very effective, and inflicted heavy losses on the Germans who occupied it. The German field artillery, which had done little on the day previous began to be very troublesome on the 11th, especially towards the evening. In the night the Germans received heavy reinforcements, and just before dawn on the following day—the 12th—the first really serious counter-attack was delivered. The new troops were Bavarians and Saxons, who had been resting at Tourcoing.

THE THIRD DAY.

The German attack was mismanaged. The gravity of the defeat on the 10th had been concealed not only from the men but also from their officers. At any rate, opposite the Worcesters the enemy advanced in column



The result of the British concentration of artillery: Photographs of the ruined village of Neuvo Chapello taken after the battle.

[Central News.

of route, a mounted officer in their midst. Or, perhaps, the explanation was that the mist which had done us so much injury on the previous day, had also done us a service in preventing the Germans from determining our precise positions. Their staff work may have been at fault. Whatever the cause, it is clear that they did not suspect that we were as far forward as we in fact were. The results were like Magersfontein over again, but on a larger scale.

"The slaughter was sickening. In front of one of the brigades the Bavarians, coming along at the ambling trot adopted by the German infantry at the assault, and bawling 'Hourra!' in the approved fashion, blundered into the fire of no less than twenty-one machine guns. The files of men did not recede or stagger. They were just swept away. One moment one had the shouting, ambling crowd before one's eyes; the next moment where it had been lay a writhing, convulsed pile of bodies heaped up on the brown earth. When day broke, amid the rattle of machine gun and rifle fire, the German corpses were seen to make ramparts behind which the wounded took cover. In one case at least the Germans, feverishly digging themselves in, were actually seen to use the corpse of one of their comrades to finish off the parapet of their trench."

Encouraged by the breakdown of the German attack, our troops made a further attempt to carry the positions on the Pietre road and the bridge over the river. The attack was made with a gallantry conspicuous even in this war, for again adequate artillery support was impossible owing to the mist and the closeness of the fighting. But it was unavailing. The mill was reached, thanks to work with grenades and bayonets. In this fighting the Territorial Battalion of the Second Gordons greatly distinguished itself. Its colonel fell mortally wounded. He was in great pain, and a subaltern brought him morphia, which relieved him. "Thank you," he said, "and now, my boy, your place is not here. Go about your duty." And a few minutes later he died. The Rifle Brigade, which had done so well on the first day of the battle, again distinguished itself, and shortly after midday almost carried the German trench. It could get no further.

and all attempts later in the afternoon to get as far failed. At nightfall the troops fell back to their positions of the morning, and the three days' battle of Neuve Chapelle was over.

THE LOSSES.

The enthusiasm in the army at being again on the move after the dreary inaction of the winter knew no bounds. The soldiers went into battle like children rushing out of school; even the wounded on the way to the hospital were gay, and made a jest of their sufferings. No army was ever so wearied of sitting still, or more overjoyed at the idea of attacking the enemy. Something of the same feeling took possession of this country when the first news came of the capture of Neuve Chapelle. It

was thought that at last the great advance to which people had been looking forward all the winter had begun, and speculation was rife as to the exact nature of the strategy that would be adopted. These early expectations were disappointed by the pause which followed the battle, and later there came into circulation alarming rumours about our losses, and versions of what happened in the battle, which dashed the first enthusiasm over the victory. Sir John French's full despatch was published a month after the battle. There was much in it to reassure after the rumours which had been in circulation. But it confirmed the report of the heaviness of our losses. One hundred and ninety officers and 2,337 other ranks were



The remains of one of the houses outside Neuve Chapelle in which German machine guns had been mounted.

[Central News.]

killed, 359 officers and 8,174 men wounded, and twenty-three officers and 1,728 men were returned as missing—a total casualty list of 572 officers and 12,239 men. Our casualties at Waterloo were under 6,000. The German losses were very much heavier. "Several thousand," which should mean at least three thousand, were left dead by the enemy on the field and there counted; more than 12,000 wounded were removed by train, and in addition thirty officers and 1,657 other ranks were taken prisoners. It was a quite unequivocal victory, yet it raised more doubts than it satisfied, and criticism—wholesome for the most part and helpful in its spirit—began after the battle to make itself heard.



Some of the cheerful wounded from the Neuve Chapelle fighting, wearing captured German helmets.
[L.N.A.]



A batch of Neuve Chapelle wounded on a French railway station.

[Newspaper Illustrations.]

OBSERVATIONS AND CRITICISMS.

The general impression left by the early telegraphic despatches of a brilliant opening, followed by an anticlimax, was confirmed in the detailed report of Sir John French. Neuve Chapelle was in our hands by 8-30, but it was not until 3-30 that the army was in a position to move forward again. This delay did irreparable injury to our hopes of achieving a decisive victory. The plan of the battle was well-conceived, and it had been worked out with exceeding care. Everything depended on our being able to follow up the initial success promptly. We had achieved a surprise at the outset which most people had come to believe was impossible in modern war. Until well on in the afternoon the enemy, except for small parties here and there, was demoralised, and the Germans were unable to bring very heavy reinforcements into action until the third day. On the 10th, certainly, and except for the weather on the 11th, too, all the conditions were in our favour for achieving a decisive victory. Magnificent as Neuve Chapelle was in many respects, it also brought with it disappointments which Sir John French did not attempt to conceal. It was a great victory, but a greater victory missed.

Sir John French lays the blame for the failure to achieve decisive results on the delay in the resumption of the attack after the capture of Neuve Chapelle. The sentence of censure in his despatch has already been quoted. His view is natural in a commander-in-chief, whose concern is with strategy and the higher tactics of a battle. Yet it is clear that an attack made under such circumstances against defences which the enemy had been elaborating for months must raise many problems of minor tactics which are both novel and difficult, and can only be satisfactorily solved by experience. All the difficulties in the earlier part of the day arose at points where the bombardment had missed—the evidently semi-official account, from which several quotations have already been made, says “unaccountably missed”—destroying the wire entanglements; and the cutting of the telephone wires prevented the omission from being made good promptly. Evidently the artillery was at fault in some sections; or, if it is inevitable that such failures should take place, the arrangements for avoiding such misfortunes as befel the Cameronians and the Middlesex Regiment obviously need to be much more accident-proof than they seem to have been. It seems doubtful whether before this battle the power of a few resolute men with machine guns to hold up a whole attack was fully appreciated. Sir John French thinks that there was undue delay in bringing the reserves into action, meaning, presumably, that if the Twenty-fourth Brigade had been brought up sooner to the assistance of the Cameronians and the Middlesex Regiment the heavy losses of men and the delay would have been reduced, and the diversion of the Twenty-fifth Brigade from its direct line of advance, which resulted in a great deal of confusion, that took time to straighten out, would thereby have been avoided. The Twenty-fourth Brigade does not seem to have come into action till 11-30, by which time the Twenty-third Brigade must have been in difficulties for two and a half hours, or perhaps longer. Sir John French's judgments on such a matter are conclusive. Yet much the same difficulty seems to have arisen later in the day when the advance was resumed. The Germans had rallied when this attack was delivered, but at this time the numbers defending the Pietre road and the bridge over the river cannot have been very great, and the main work of holding up the

attack must have fallen on machine guns worked by comparatively few men. The course of the engagement on the first day suggests that the supremacy of the rifle in defence may be passing to the machine gun. The ability of the Germans to deliver strong counter-attacks on points where they had lost ground seems to depend on their practice of holding the first line with a comparatively few men liberally supplied with machine guns, and concentrating their infantry in the second and third lines. We may have to revise the conceptions that were current after the Boer war about the enormous defensive power of the rifle, and substitute the machine gun for what was then said about the rifle.

There are many difficulties about this battle which are still unsolved, and will probably remain so until the end of the war. The battle opened with the heaviest bombardment of the war up to that time, and in spite of its failure at some points in the line it decided the battle in our favour. By 8-30—an hour after the bombardment began—we had won on the south and west side, at any rate, of Neuve Chapelle as much ground as we had at the end of three days' hard fighting. How comes it that so little is heard of the artillery after the first thirty-five minutes artillery fury with which the battle opened? Why did not the plan which was so successful against Neuve Chapelle and the entrenchments in front of the village work later in the battle against Pietre? It is very remarkable how little we know of the second stage of the battle which began on the afternoon of the 10th and lasted until nightfall of the 12th. On the second day there was mist, and artillery fire might have been dangerous with the armies so close and no aeroplane reconnaissance possible—Sir John French indeed seems to hint, what rumour asserted with great circumstantiality, that some of our casualties were due to our own artillery fire. But that does not explain why our artillery on the first day so suddenly lost the supremacy which it asserted so triumphantly at the beginning of the battle. What sufficed to destroy Neuve Chapelle and its trenches should have destroyed the buildings round Pietre. Yet, so far as the published accounts go, our artillery would seem to have lapsed into a silence almost as loud as its opening bombardment. Clearly, there is still much to explain. Either our supplies of shells ran out, or something happened in the afternoon of the first day or on the second day about which all the published accounts of the battle are silent. Another feature of the battle on which the accounts throw no light is the large number of missing. Some of these may have been dead, left on the field in the closing stages of the battle, whose bodies it was impossible to recover. But it would seem with 1,750 men missing as though many of them must have been taken prisoners, wounded or unwounded. There is no stage of the battle as we know it to which so large a number of enemy captures can be related with certainty, unless possibly sections of the Cameronians and Middlesex were cut off and made prisoners.

LESSONS OF THE BATTLE.

Neuve Chapelle is one of the great British battles, and its details are extraordinarily interesting. For about no other modern British battle do we know at once so much and so little. Great as its perplexities are, and disappointing as were some of its results, it was still the first great battle of the war in which a British attack had broken down an elaborately prepared German defence. We were attacking on the Marne, but it was in the open,

and the strategic scheme was not ours, but General Joffre's. In the Battle of the Aisne the Germans had not established themselves firmly when we carried the passage of the river. Our other battles had been victories of the defence. All through the winter the thought of how we should hew our way through the elaborate field fortifications in Belgium had haunted people's minds. Neuve Chapelle showed that the problem was not nearly so simple as the unreflecting had imagined it would be, nor so insoluble as many feared. It showed that there would be many complications to straighten out before the great advance could be undertaken with reasonable certainty of success; it also showed that success could be made reasonably certain, and also, at any rate on broad lines, how. Above all, it showed that the British army had not suffered by its terrible winter in the trenches, and that, wisely directed, it could be as potent in attack as it was unconquerable in defence.

Sir John French, in a section of his despatch on Neuve Chapelle, drew the practical moral in very simple and direct words.

"I can well understand how deeply these casualties are felt by the nation at large, but each daily report shows clearly that they are being endured on at least

an equal scale by all the combatants engaged throughout Europe, friends and foes alike.

"In war as it is to-day between civilised nations, armed to the teeth with the present deadly rifle and machine-gun, heavy casualties are absolutely unavoidable. For the slightest undue exposure the heaviest toll is exacted.

"The power of defence conferred by modern weapons is the main cause of the long duration of the battles of the present day, and it is this fact which mainly accounts for such loss and waste of life.

"Both one and the other can, however, be shortened and lessened if attacks can be supported by the most efficient and powerful force of artillery available; but an almost unlimited supply of ammunition is necessary, and a most liberal discretionary power as to its use must be given to the artillery commanders.

"I am confident that this is the only means by which great results can be obtained with a minimum of loss."


The events of the next three months, both at home and in Flanders, were to be an insistent underlining of these words.



German prisoners taken by the British being marched down to the base.

[Photopress.]

The Manchester Guardian
HISTORY
of the
WAR



CENTRAL NEWS

MR. LLOYD GEORGE, Minister of Munitions.

Published in
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
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
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
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British wounded on a French railway station during a halt on the way to a base hospital. [L.N.A.]

CHAPTER XXIX.

THE SECOND ATTACK ON YPRES.


THE LINES IN FRONT OF YPRES AFTER THE FIRST ATTACK—THE CAPTURE OF HILL 60—THE GERMAN CONCENTRATION IN THE SPRING—THE ATTACK BY POISONOUS GAS—THE VALOUR OF THE CANADIANS—THE FIGHTING FOR ST. JULIEN AND FOR THE YSER CANAL—THE NEW LINES

THE first attack on Ypres in October and November, 1914 (Vol. I., 295-301), cost the Germans more lives than any other single operation in the war.

Of all the passions aroused in the Germans by the war, none was so strong as their desire to reach Calais. Calais was a symbol of the Anglo-French alliance which had defeated their early scheme of a short, sharp campaign in France, followed by a concentration against Russia. But its possession would have had real as well as sentimental value for Germany. It would have been followed, as a matter of course, by the seizure of the southern shores of the Channel; for if the Allies were not able to defend the much shorter line through Flanders, they certainly could not defend a longer line through Normandy. That would have been a grave embarrassment to the transport of reinforcements and supplies to the British army in Flanders. But there is reason to believe that the German Admiralty had already in last autumn conceived its plan of the submarine blockade, and it was reasonably hoped that the Straits and the French coasts would make ideal

bases for submarine operations against the British fleet. Calais became an obsession of the Germans; but there was method in their madness, and it was not to be expected that they would acknowledge the defeat of the autumn of 1914 as final. This country, of all the Western Allies, was the most directly interested in defeating the German projects on the Straits, and to Sir John French belongs the credit of first seeing the strategic importance of Flanders and urging the transference of the British army from the Aisne to the north. But for this transference, the French right would undoubtedly have been turned. But it is just to add that but for the assistance of the Belgians and of the French Ypres could not have been held. Some of the heaviest losses of the Germans were in front of the line of the Yser which was held by the Belgians; and the French reinforcements secured our left flank at Ypres and saved us from almost certain defeat.

The autumn campaign in Flanders, which began with the siege of Antwerp and came to a standstill before Ypres, was no part of the original German plan. It



THE SUCCESSIVE BATTLE-FRONTS ROUND YPRES.

was an afterthought, suggested by the unexpected vigour of the British military policy, and, as it turned out, an exceedingly expensive one. The Germans must have spent a quarter of a million men in the autumn to fail in getting what they might have had for the asking in the summer. The prompt intervention of the British army on the Continent upset the plans of the General Staff, and the readjustment of plans to meet the new circumstances was not made with sufficient promptitude, and led to the worst rebuffs of the war. The dissatisfaction caused by these failures led in the New Year to the resignation of Von Moltke, the son of the great Moltke, as the Chief of Staff. General von Falkenhayn took his place.

THE YPRES BASTION.

Badly as the German attacks on Ypres had failed to achieve their main object, they made a sensible impression on its defences. In the middle of October, General Rawlinson, with the Seventh Division, was in front of Roulers (Vol. I., p. 293, and Map on p. 290). A week later Passchendaele, half way between Ypres and Roulers, was the centre of the battlefield in Flanders. When the great attack began at the end of the month our troops were holding the line from Zonnebeke, on the Roulers road, through Gheluvelt, on the Menin road, and thence along the Zandvoorde ridge to Messines. At the end of the three days' attack Messines and Zandvoorde ridge had been lost, and a great indentation had been made in our lines on the south-east side of Ypres. The loss of ground was serious, for the Zandvoorde ridge dominated the plain. In our possession it enabled us to overlook the low land towards the Lys, and gave a basis of attack against the German lines north-west of Lille; in German possession these hills not only screened the movements of troops through Menin, but greatly weakened the defence of Ypres, and forced us to keep a larger number of men on the south-eastern section of the bastion than we otherwise need have done. This line was maintained without further loss all through the winter, and at St. Eloi there was even a slight gain.

It has already been noted that the idea of a turning movement through Flanders had occurred almost simultaneously to Sir John French and the German command in the autumn, and that at any given moment in October it was difficult to say which army was turning which (Vol. I., p. 280). In the spring, too, both armies began their forward movement simultaneously. The Battle of Neuve Chapelle in March, which was the first stirring of the spring in Flanders, was followed by another month of immobility. But in the middle of April the spring campaign of both sides began in earnest. The Allies' plan, in its broad outlines at any rate, had evidently been concerted. The British reinforcements had now begun to arrive, and it was possible for us to extend our lines. It was arranged that we should take over the northern segment of the Ypres defences which all through the winter had been held by the French. We were further to extend the advantage which had been gained at Neuve Chapelle, and to win our way through towards Lille. To cover this movement an attempt was to be made to capture the Zandvoorde ridge. The French on their side having gained ground on the hill of Notre Dame de Lorette, near Arras, were to drive in the direction of Lens, and, having established themselves there, to connect with the British in an attack on Lille. Such were the plans which, though they may not have worked out in all their details, and were necessarily provisional, governed the Allies' spring campaign in Flanders.

THE FIGHTING ON HILL 60.

The first movement on the British side was on the south-east side of Ypres, along the road and railway to Comines. Some six miles out of Ypres the railway meets the foothills of the Zandvoorde ridge, and crosses them in a deep cutting. The highest of these foothills, and nearest the railway cutting, is known as Hill 60, which is an undulation in the ground rather than a hill. It had changed hands several times in the winter when the French held this portion of the Ypres lines, but in February, when we took over the French trenches, it was in the possession of the Germans. All through March there was mining and counter-mining by both armies on the hillside, and in the evening of April 17th some mines were fired simultaneously under the German trenches. The hillside was shattered by the explosion, and in place of the trenches which had faced our men thirty or forty yards away there were now large craters and mounds of debris. The Germans in the first trench were imprisoned in the ruin of their own mines, and were never seen again. As our infantry rushed to the attack of the trenches beyond they saw through the clouds of dust men in their shirt sleeves—they had been mining—rushing about wildly and fighting with each other to escape into the communication trenches. They charged them with the bayonet, and poured down the communication trenches, but were stopped at the end by barricades. The enemy quickly recovered from his surprise, and when night fell the hill was being bombarded from three sides, for it made a salient in the enemy's lines. For the next four days the enemy attacked incessantly, and the only relief that the men on the hill had came from the fact that the fighting was at such close quarters that when the infantry attacked the bombardment had perforce to cease. The infantry attacks were directed along the communication trenches, and the fighting resolved itself into dozens of isolated encounters in the maze of half-obliterated old trenches and the new trenches that our men had built under artillery fire. The whole area of the fighting was less than 250 yards square, and at no point was it possible to see the ground more than a few yards distant, so numerous and deep were the great holes torn in the ground by the mine explosion and the bombardment which followed. The worst day was the second—a Sunday—when the enemy delivered two massed attacks which were beaten off, thanks mainly to the fire of our machine-guns rushed into action on side-cars. Towards nightfall on Sunday our men were driven back from the southern edge of the hill until the arrival of reinforcements enabled them to counter-attack and recover the lost ground. Another terrible time was the sixteen hours that began at nine o'clock on Tuesday night and continued until early afternoon of Wednesday. There were moments in the attack when it seemed as though Hill 60 was to be another—and a worse—Spion Kop; but our men held their ground through all, and by Wednesday evening their hold on the hill was firmly established.

The soldiers' letters on this engagement agree that it was perhaps the worst fighting that the war had seen up to that time. The psychology of soldiers in action is often difficult; and it will be noted as a curious fact that our army found the violent bombardments of the German artillery less demoralising, though more destructive, than the dropping inconstant fire of the few Boer guns on Spion Kop; and the violence of the massed attacks of the Germans, with their hand-to-hand group fighting, like nothing so much in our military history as Inkerman, easier to resist than the stealthy stalking of the Boer



A ruined village on the outskirts of Ypres.

[Photopress.]



British troops taking shelter behind a barricaded house in the Ypres neighbourhood.

[Photopress.]

attacks. The explanation may be that the passion of hand-to-hand fighting is after all, for all its carnage, the easier strain to endure, or perhaps our army was by now so seasoned that no horrors could shake its resolution. Our losses, though heavy, were less than the German, and the fury of their attempts to recover the hill shows how much importance they attached to the possession of even the foothills to the ridge south-east of Ypres which they had won in the autumn. Among the regiments which won distinction on Hill 60, the King's Own Scottish Borderers was conspicuous.

Hill 60 would doubtless have been put to good use, but on the day after the repulse of the last of these attacks on the hill the Germans opened an attack on the north-east of Ypres, a section which had almost entirely escaped in the attacks of the autumn.

There had been fighting on the Yser early in the month, in which the Germans, after an initial success in crossing the river near Driegrachten, were afterwards driven back by the Belgians with heavy loss, but nothing had happened to indicate that the Germans were massing for attack on the north side of Ypres. We had been for some time past gradually taking over trenches on the left from the French, and on Thursday, April 22nd, the Canadian Division occupied the section from Langhemarck to Gheluvelt, with the French immediately to their left. During the fighting for Hill 60 the enemy had not confined his attention to the lost hill, but had bombarded the whole of our front. No particular importance was attached to the bombardment, which was thought to be for the purpose of preventing us from sending reinforcements there. Suddenly, at five o'clock in the evening, the Canadians on the north-east side of the city found their left flank exposed. The French had fallen back in great confusion for some two miles to the bank of the Yser, and there was a wide gap in the Ypres defences between the river and the beginning of the Canadian trenches.

THE GAS APPARATUS.

The Germans had begun an attack for which they had long been making elaborate preparations. At the Hague Convention of 1907, Germany (with other powers) agreed to abstain from the use of projectiles the sole object of which is the diffusion of asphyxiating or deleterious gases. The clause does not prohibit projectiles which, on exploding, emit poisonous gas as a bye-product, so to speak, of their energy; almost all shells do that, and lyddite not less than others. A shell that suffocated by its fumes as well as shattered by its explosion would not come within the prohibition; but if it only suffocated it would. The logic of such a rule, as of many of the prohibitions in the Hague Conventions, is certainly not clear, and both France and the United States refused to sign. Admiral Mahan said that, in his opinion, asphyxiating shells might be less inhuman and cruel than the employment of submarines. Our delegates signed, but on the condition that the practice of the Powers was unanimous. Germany signed apparently without reserve, so that she was certainly bound by the provision for what it was worth. She seems, however, to have decided quite early that it was worth nothing at all, and in 1909 the German army began to experiment in apparatus for the diffusion of poisonous or asphyxiating gas. A machine was invented consisting of a gas cylinder and a drum attached by a tube.

the substance required for generation of the poisonous gas. A cock mounted on the drum's upper cover at the end of the tube connecting the cylinder controls the supply of the liquid or gas under pressure which is used to expel with force the poison mixture. Near the bottom of the drum there is another cock joined to a long pipe or bore which may be carried underground by means of a tunnel or over the ground surface as near as possible to the trenches. The mixture liberated by the opening of the cock is forced from the drum through the pipe at a pressure capable of carrying it, under favourable circumstances, a considerable distance in the form of poison gas, ignition having taken place by means of an inflammable liquid contained in a small receptacle near the nozzle at the end of the tube. Various ignition drums are employed, according to the length of the tube and whether it is underground or otherwise.*

This apparatus seems to have been the type which was varied according to the nature of the poison gas which it was meant to use. Its use in any form was a violation of Germany's undertaking at the Hague Conference. Whether it was also a violation of the laws of humanity would depend on the nature of the gas used. At Ypres the gas used was chlorine, and its effects were harrowing in their cruelty. They will be described later in the History. This chapter is concerned with its effects on the fortunes of the campaign, and with the purely military motives for its use at this time.

The Germans had not up to this stage of the war used this apparatus, though both sides had charged each other with using projectiles which generated poisonous gas. The British who were engaged on Hill 60 complained particularly about the gases given off by the German shells in the bombardment. There were, however, particular reasons for the use of the gas apparatus by the Germans at this particular juncture. True to their policy of getting in the first blow, they early decided that their attack on the Allied lines in France should be delivered before the British were in full strength. The 1915, 1916, and 1917 classes of conscripts had already been called up for training in 1914, and it was known that by April the Germans would have another half million men sufficiently trained to be fit for service. But the progress of the Russian campaign against them must, long before spring, have decided the Germans to make their main offensive movement in the East, thus reversing their policy of the previous summer. There was, therefore, no hope of breaking through on the French front by weight of numbers; nor did it seem obvious, unless entirely new methods were employed, how they were to anticipate the expected offensive of the Western Allies in the spring. They had lost in the autumn fighting between Ypres and the sea perhaps 250,000 men; the British army had proved its remarkable quality in the defence of entrenched positions, and Neuve Chapelle, though not the great success that had been hoped for, had given the Germans qualms for the security of Lille. All these facts decided the Germans, or confirmed them, in their intention to resort to exceptional measures. They had made up their minds, and rightly, that the British attack would be delivered on Lille by way of the Aubers ridge, and they could not feel certain of their power to resist a concentrated movement by the British, now presumably in greatly increased strength. Nor was it in their military nature to employ the tactics of purely passive defence. They determined to meet the British attack south of the Lys by an attack on Ypres. They had had some reinforcements from the winter-trained

* There is a closable orifice in the drum or reservoir through which liquid fuel is inserted. To the liquid fuel is added

* *The Poison-War* (Messrs. Heinemann.) By A. A. Roberts, pp. 26-27.



The use by the Germans of poisonous gas added "respirator parade" to the routine of the British soldier. The photograph shows an officer inspecting his men's respirators, and their method of wearing them. [Universal.]



Wounded British soldiers wearing the respirators by the aid of which they were able to withstand the German gas attacks. [L.N.A.]

men; but they were used largely to replace regiments drawn away for the projected campaign in Galicia, and the Germans were on the whole French front in a numerical inferiority. If any attack on Ypres was to have any chance of success, it must have the elements of novelty and surprise. All these things had been carefully thought out during the winter, and it was early decided that the use of asphyxiating gas on a large scale offered the best prospects of success. Throughout the winter the apparatus for producing and distributing the gas was made in great quantities, and no doubt the troops were exercised in its use.

These calculations, though they were a violation of their promises at the Hague, need not have been so barbarously cruel if another gas had been used. But the Germans decided in favour of chlorine for several reasons. Their chemists had discovered a method for producing liquid chlorine in large quantities; but, a more important reason still, chlorine was heavier than air, and therefore would not rise much higher from the ground than a man's height. Further, it was less easily dissipated by wind. Mere pressure alone might not have driven gas as far as the enemy's trenches. A favourable wind was necessary, and they wanted the north-east wind which prevails in the spring to carry it to the enemy trenches. And, as luck would have it, rarely has the wind blown with such persistency from the north and east as in the spring and early summer of 1915. The Germans were very successful in keeping their intentions secret. Yet there had not been wanting warnings. "It has been reported," wrote "Eye-witness," on April 6th, "that in the Argonne, where the trenches are very close, the Germans have on several occasions pumped blazing oil and pitch on to the French; but, according to our prisoners, they are preparing a more novel reception for us in front of parts of our lines. They propose to asphyxiate our men, if they advance, by means of poisonous gas. The gas is contained under pressure in steel cylinders, and being of heavy nature will spread along the ground without being dissipated quickly." It is strange that in spite of this warning, of which note had duly been taken in official quarters, no preparations had been made on our side to counter the danger; nor is this the only instance of lack of responsiveness between brain and hand, between our Intelligence and Munitions Departments.

THE ATTACK ON THE CANADIANS.


The device was at first shamefully successful, for, as has already been noted, the French were taken completely by surprise and retired in the utmost confusion to the Yser. Our men in the trenches saw the French retiring away to the west, followed by a cloud of greenish vapour rolling along the ground behind them.

The Canadians were in three brigades, the Third on the left, joining up with the trenches that the French had just evacuated, the Second to its right, and the First in reserve. At five o'clock in the afternoon of April 22nd, the position was as shown in the diagram in the next column.

After the discharge of the gas, the dotted line became a gap, through which the Germans poured, following close behind the wall of green vapour. They wore pads over their mouths and noses soaked in a solution of bicarbonate of soda. Their advance was exceedingly rapid, and as they made for the gap, their formation all broken by the obstacles encountered in their path, they looked more like a mob pouring out of a football ground after a match than an army. Near Ypres, which being on low ground did not command a wide view, our

reserves were conscious only that something unusual had happened. They were questioning some bodies of excited Turcos who had made their appearance, when suddenly a Staff officer rode up and shouted "Stand to your arms," and in three minutes the troops had fallen in and were marching north to the gap, meeting as they went swarms of panic-stricken fugitives.

The gas reached the Canadian trenches, though not in very great quantities, but their position was immediately one of great peril. By seven o'clock the Germans had reached the wood behind the old French trenches, and there captured four naval guns. The Canadians' Third Brigade had very skilfully extended to the left, in the hope of stopping the gap left by the French, but were unable to occupy the wood in time to save the guns. In the evening the Canadian Scottish and two other battalions attacked the wood and captured it, after a fierce struggle,



by the light of a misty moon, and reached the captured guns, which, however, had been blown up. The recapture of the wood, in which the Third Brigade had the assistance of two fresh battalions from the First Brigade, was one of the fine exploits of the war.

"Some 2,500 of us had to attack the wood, where there were, I suppose, some 7,000 Germans, and the place was full of Maxim guns, though before our attack some shells had been thrown into the wood, but not many.

"We drove them from the trenches in front of the wood, and went right through, about 500 yards, to the other side. Then we got surrounded, and had to retire to the trenches which we had taken, and here we dug ourselves in, remaining till next (Friday) morning, the enemy shelling us all the time with shrapnel. Then we had to file out on the Saturday morning to make room for reinforcements. I might say here that in our advance we were enfiladed by heavy fire on both sides, but in spite of this we moved them before us, and recovered three howitzers which the French had left behind in the wood. These we blew up, and then we succeeded in recapturing our own four 4.7 guns which the enemy had taken. At this point we surrounded sixty Germans and bayoneted forty-five of them. One officer just in front of me blew out his brains. We could not estimate the number of Germans slain, but we saw their searchlights at work the whole night through looking for the dead."

In the early morning of the 23rd (Friday), the position of the Canadian troops was roughly as shown in diagram, page 297.*

They had been heavily attacked all through the night by artillery bombardment, and their position in the morning, with the Germans still trying to work through

* The diagrams are from a capital account of the fighting by the Canadian Record Officer.



British engineers with the Expeditionary Force making hand grenades out of tobacco tins.

[L.N.A.]




British soldiers practicing throwing hand grenades.

[Photopress.]

the gap was perilous. By this time they were more than two miles south of the old French trenches. It was decided to make a counter-attack, and this was brilliantly carried out by the First Brigade, with the assistance of an English brigade, in which were the Worcesters, once more the saviours of Ypres.

"It is safe to say that the youngest private in the rank, as he set his teeth for the advance, knew the task in front of him, and the youngest subaltern knew all that rested upon its success. It did not seem that any human being could live in the shower of shot and shell which began to play upon the advancing troops. They suffered terrible casualties. For a short time every other man seemed to fall, but the attack was pressed ever closer and closer.

"The Fourth Canadian Battalion at one moment came under a particularly withering fire. For a moment—not more—it wavered. Its most gallant commanding officer, Lieut.-Col. Burchill, carrying, after an old fashion, a light cane, coolly and cheerfully rallied his men and, at the very moment when his example had infected them, fell dead at the head of his battalion. With a hoarse cry of anger they sprang forward (for, indeed, they loved him), as if to avenge his death. The astonishing attack which followed—pushed home in the face of direct frontal fire made in broad daylight by battalions whose names should live for ever in the memories of soldiers—was carried to the first line of German trenches. After a hand-to-hand struggle the last German who resisted was bayoneted, and the trench was won."



The result of this success was to force back the wedge which the Germans had thrust through the gap on the Canadian left; and though the gap was not completely stopped, the enemy were never able to work through in force.

THE RETIREMENT FROM ST. JULIEN.

Meanwhile, the Third Brigade in the wood was in serious difficulties. A gas attack was made upon it at four in the morning, which was withstood with great fortitude, though it caused heavy losses. The wood could not be held, and the attack developed such fierceness that, in spite of the arrival of several British battalions on its left, the brigade was ordered to fall back on St. Julien. This it did with sullen obstinacy, disputing every yard of the ground. Later St. Julien, too, had to be abandoned, for the line was fast being drawn in on both right and left flanks, and to have stayed would have been to run the risk of being cut off entirely. As it was, it was impossible to extricate two Montreal regiments, which had to be abandoned in the village, fighting a rear-guard action. The Brigade left these only with heavy hearts. "The German tide rolled indeed over the deserted

village, but for several hours after the enemy had become masters of the village the sullen and persistent rifle fire which survived showed that they were not yet masters of the Canadian rearguard. If they died, they died worthy of Canada." The losses of the Canadians in the Ypres fighting was over 5,000.

The evacuation of St. Julien by the Third Brigade had exposed the First Brigade on its right to the same dangers as the withdrawal of the French had exposed the Third Brigade. Fortunately, however, the pressure of the German infantry attacks was not so great on this section of the line as it was to the left, and they succeeded in not only withdrawing their left south so as to keep in touch with their other brigade, but also in holding their original trenches against a tremendous bombardment and many gas attacks. Only for an hour—on the morning of Friday—was there any yielding; a bayonet-charge recovered the lost ground, and the Second Brigade maintained their original positions until Sunday.

THE FIGHTING ON THE YSER.

Meanwhile, there had been heavy fighting on the extreme left. The Germans, after crossing the old French trenches, had opened fanwise, some going south, where, as the narrative has told, they encountered the reserves from Ypres and the Canadians, the others pursuing the French to the Yser. These occupied Steenstraete, and crossed the river at Het Sas and several other points to the south. It was an exceedingly dangerous movement, for it threatened to separate the Franco-British from the Belgian lines and to open a passage to the coast. In the night of Thursday the Germans pushed on and rushed the village of Lizerne. The Belgians, although they were themselves occupied with strong German demonstrations on the Yser front, rendered very valuable assistance in this crisis, and early next morning Lizerne was stormed by the French and the Germans forced back to the river. In this work the French received much assistance from the counter-attack of the Worcesters and the Canadians, which, as has already been described, broke the end of the German wedge. But neither the French nor the British were able to press their advance very far. Pilkem was reached by the British, but not carried; and the Germans obstinately held the bridge head opposite Lizerne. Towards evening they again stormed Lizerne, and, though they lost it again, all the efforts of the Allies failed to dislodge them completely from the west bank of the Yser. On Monday, the German front north of Ypres ran between Lizerne and the Yser, crossed the Yser north of Het Sas, which the French had retaken, ran parallel to the river to a point opposite Boesinghe, and thence in front of Pilkem and St. Julien to a point half-way between Passchendaele and Zonnebeke. The ground gained was in shape a triangle, with a base two or three miles broad towards the Yser, and its apex was Broodseinde. Fortunately, the apex was immovable, in spite of very heavy artillery attacks. Nor had the enemy made any advance on the south-east side of Ypres, where he seems to have been content to keep up the furious bombardment which had begun on the day after the capture of Hill 60 and never stopped since. Ypres was ablaze in many places, and was now little better than a heap of ruins.

THE STATE OF YPRES.

A motor ambulance driver, writing home, has given a terrible description of Ypres at this time:—

"The sights going through the town were awful. To me now it all seems like a horrid nightmare. I cannot

realise yet that I witnessed such horrible sights. Everywhere are great holes in the ground caused by shells. Here you see the front of a house blown away, on the ground-floor tables and chairs standing, coffee pot on the stove, glasses and cups on the table; upstairs you can see a bed standing with the clothes thrown back—everything just as the people left it when they fled for safety. There you try to drive your car over what was once a house, but now a mass of ruins scattered over the street.

"Getting into the Square, where the Cathedral and Cloth Hall stand (or rather what is left of them), you see a hole 50 or 60 feet wide, exposing to view one of the main sewers; that was caused by a 'Jack Johnson.' Close by it stands an ambulance car, one wheel off and the body of the car riddled with pieces of shell. I heard afterwards that all they found of the driver was his legs. On the other side of the street is the churchyard. Scattered about are broken pieces of coffins and human bones blown up by the bursting shells. Of the Cathedral itself little was left, only the spire standing; the same with the Cloth Hall.

"Lying about everywhere are dead horses and men in various stages of decomposition. They cannot get them moved, as the place is under a continual shell fire. It is terrible to see our poor fellows lying there stretched out in death. Further on lies a motor-cycle, the driver (I expect he had been a despatch rider—one of the most dangerous jobs in this war), with his head blown clean off, lying close by.

"A little further on you come to the bridge leading over the Canal. This part is the worst in the whole town, as they keep on sending in shells, trying to blow up the bridge. We never let the grass grow under our wheels going over that bridge, but this morning we were just about to get on the bridge when a battery of artillery came galloping down the road and reached the bridge first. We had to wait nearly five minutes until they had passed. I think that was the worst five minutes I spent in my life; how we got through it without being smashed up I don't know."

The German attacks on Ypres did not cease with the closing of the gap along the Ypres, but the enemy's position was never so favourable afterwards, nor ours so critical. The closing of the gap converted what in the terrible days following the breaking of the line was a flank attack into a frontal attack. Moreover, the Germans were in constant difficulties in maintaining their position at the bridge head over the Yser against the French pressure, which was steadily increasing in the last days of April. Yet the bombardment and the gas discharges were kept up until the third week in May.

THE ATTACKS IN MAY.

On May 1st, England and France were astonished by the announcement that Dunkirk had been bombarded by the Germans. It was thought here at first that the bombardment must have come from some German cruiser that had sallied out of its harbours, but it presently appeared that the Germans had stationed a great gun near Dixmude, where desultory fighting had been going on throughout the month, and had bombarded Dunkirk from there. The distance from Dunkirk to Dixmude is twenty-three miles. Some twenty-three shells were thrown into the town, and fifty people killed and injured. This exploit had no military significance except as a somewhat childish advertisement of what the Germans could do if and when they reached Calais. It merely repeated in mangled human bodies the German boast that they could bombard Dover from Calais.

When May came in, the attacks showed a tendency to shift from the north to the east and the south-east side of Ypres. The reason was the German dislike of fighting on parallel fronts. They preferred best of all the enveloping

tactics, such as the gap left by the French retirement gave them an opportunity of indulging in; and next to the exposed flank they preferred the attack on a salient, which gave them an opportunity of approach from two directions. After the withdrawal from St. Julien there was neither gap nor salient on this north side of the town. There was, however, a fairly-pronounced salient on the east side, where the line from St. Julien curves round through Zonnebeke and Gheluvelt. The German attacks at this section were very strongly pressed, and it was decided that the salient was too dangerous to hold. The new line to which the British retired early in May curved round north of Wieltje and Eksternest, to the east of Hooge. This involved a sacrifice of ground which had a great sentimental value to the British army, because it had been the scene of its hard-won victories in the previous autumn. Headquarters were then at Hooge; and at Gheluvelt, which had to be abandoned, the Worcesters had won undying fame. The French, moreover, had pleaded hard that we should hold on. On the 23rd, before the withdrawal to St. Julien, and again on the 29th, General Foch had urged Sir John French not to retire until his attacks had matured, and it was therefore doubly hard for the British Commander-in-Chief to have to issue the order for the concentration of the British line. But needs must, and the retirement was very skilfully carried out by General Sir Herbert Plumer, who was now in charge of the Ypres defences on this front.

A very fierce attack was made on May 5th in the direction followed by the enemy's attacks of the autumn, namely, on the south-east side. On that day he broke through our line near Hill 60 and reached as far as our support trenches, but was afterwards dislodged. On the following day he succeeded in establishing himself on the top of the hill. From the 8th to the 10th there was desperate fighting on the curve through Frezenberg and Verlorenhoek. "The enemy's bombardment," writes Sir John French, "completely obliterated the trenches, and caused enormous losses in the Fifth Corps, which was holding this section. It was followed by an infantry attack which temporarily broke our line." The following passage from General Plumer's report covers these most critical passages in the defence of Ypres:—

"The right of one brigade was broken about 10-15 a.m.; then its centre, and then part of the left of the brigade in the next section to the south. The Princess Patricia's Canadian Light Infantry, however, although suffering very heavily, stuck to their fire or support trenches throughout the day. At this time two battalions were moved to General Headquarters second line astride the Menin road to support and cover the left of their division.

"At 12-25 p.m. the centre of a brigade further to the left also broke; its right battalion, however, the 1st Suffolks, which had been refused to cover a gap, still held on and were apparently surrounded and overwhelmed. Meanwhile three more battalions had been moved up to reinforce, two other battalions were moved up in support to General Headquarters line, and an infantry brigade came up to the grounds of Vlamartinghe Château in corps reserve.

"At 11-30 a.m. a small party of Germans attempted to advance against the left of the British line, but were destroyed by the Second Essex Regiment.

"A counter-attack was launched at 3-30 p.m. by the First York and Lancaster Regiment, Third Middlesex Regiment, Second East Surrey Regiment, Second Royal Dublin Fusiliers, and the First Royal Warwickshire Regiment. The counter-attack reached Frezenberg, but was eventually driven back and held up on a line running about north and south through Verlorenhoek, despite repeated efforts to advance.

The Twelfth London Regiment on the left succeeded at great cost in reaching the original trench line, and did considerable execution with their machine gun.

"The Seventh Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders and the First East Lancashire Regiment attacked in a north-easterly direction towards Wieltje, and connected the old trench line with the ground gained by the counter-attack, the line being consolidated during the night.

"During the night orders were received that two cavalry divisions would be moved up and placed at the disposal of the Fifth Corps, and a Territorial division would be moved up to be used if required.

"On the 9th the Germans again repeated their bombardment. Very heavy shell fire was concentrated for two hours on the trenches of the Second Gloucestershire Regiment and Second Cameron Highlanders, followed by an infantry attack, which was successfully repulsed. The Germans again bombarded the salient, and a further attack in the afternoon succeeded in occupying 150 yards of trench. The Gloucesters counter-attacked, but suffered heavily, and the attack failed. The salient being very exposed to shell fire from both flanks, as well as in front, it was deemed advisable not to attempt to retake the trench at night, and a retrenchment was therefore dug across it.

"At 3 p.m. the enemy started to shell the whole front of the centre division, and it was reported that the right brigade of this division was being heavily punished, but continued to maintain its line.

"The trenches of the brigades on the left centre were also heavily shelled during the day and attacked by infantry. Both attacks were repulsed."


On May 16th, the French forced the Germans to evacuate the bridge head near Steenstraete, and developed a strong attack on Steenstraete itself, where there was house-to-house fighting. By the third week of May the attacks on Ypres seemed to have ceased, but they broke out afresh on May 24th, when there was an unusually copious discharge of gas against the section between Wieltje and Hooge. The advance was stopped, but as a result of the fighting there was a slight contraction of our line near Wieltje. At the end of May and the beginning of June there was very heavy fighting round Hooge, in which the Third Dragoon Guards distinguished themselves.

The accounts of the second Battle of Ypres are still very incomplete, but the old policy of suppressing the names of the regiments engaged has been to some extent relaxed, and opportunity was allowed to unofficial reporters of mentioning the names of some of the regiments that distinguished themselves. At the beginning of the battle the Canadians bore the brunt, and no praise of their achievements could be too high. But other regiments contributed to the repulse of the German attacks, and

there would seem to have been no failures. Among the regiments mentioned in an unofficial despatch of March 25th are the Rifle Brigade, the Welsh Regiment, the Durham 'Territorials', the Lancashire Fusiliers, and the Essex Regiment. A message sent by the Colonel of the Welsh Regiment will, no doubt, become classical. "My right flank is enfiladed, but I am quite comfortable; machine-guns are operating on our left, but we can carry on all right." A grinly humorous story, the type of many, is that of the men who had been subject to a shelling for several hours, and when they saw the enemy's infantry attack beginning were so overjoyed that they mounted the parapets of their trenches and shouted, "Come on, you blighters, fight it out." The Germans were allowed to come within fifty yards, and were then annihilated by machine-gun and rifle fire. Magnificent and yet terrible was the valour of Private Lynn, of the Lancashire Fusiliers.

"Private Lynn, of the Lancashire Fusiliers, particularly distinguished himself during the gas attack. As soon as he saw the greenish cloud rolling towards the British trenches he put on his respirator and turned his machine-gun on the advancing gas, and also on to the German trenches beyond it. Even when the gas reached him he would not stop, but kept up a fierce fire. When the Germans began to leave their trenches to attack the half-unconscious but still determined British line, Lynn with a superhuman effort—for he was coughing badly by this time—lifted his gun right on to the parapet in the trench, and from there continued to play upon the advancing enemy, who, unable to stand up against such withering fire, finally turned and sought cover behind their own line. Even then Lynn was not satisfied, and he had to be literally dragged away from his gun. He was removed on an ambulance and died the same day."

A collection of the regimental records in this second Battle of Ypres would make as fine a monument of soldierly conduct as is to be found in our military history. But the higher the praise that is given to the men the greater become the doubts about other matters no less important in war than individual courage and regimental efficiency. This second Battle of Ypres was fought after seven months of comparative rest, in which there had been ample time to organise everything and ample opportunity to provide for every emergency. It came at the beginning of what was expected to be a great offensive movement. It should have been a victory, and the beginning of decisive success. It was in fact—and all the valour of the troops cannot alter the fact—a defeat, happily not decisive, but still grave.



Two photographs of French heavy guns in action.

[Photographic Service of the French Armies.]



French troops in the trenches.

[Newspaper Illustrations.]

CHAPTER XXX.

THE MOVEMENT ON LILLE.

THE MILITARY IMPORTANCE OF LILLE—THE BRITISH ATTACKS ON THE AUBERS RIDGE—REASONS FOR THE FAILURE—THE FIGHTING NEAR FESTUBERT—THE FRENCH FORWARD MOVEMENT FROM ARRAS—CAPTURE OF CARENCY—BREAKDOWN OF THE BRITISH OFFENSIVE—COMMENTS.

THE second Battle of Ypres (if battle it can be called that contained much more fighting than most campaigns) was part of a still larger battle which extended from the sea to beyond Arras. This battle began with fighting at Driegrachten, on the Yser; it entered on a sharper phase with the capture by the British of Hill 60; its centre of gravity was shifted further north by the gas attacks on Ypres, only to be brought south of the Lys again by the operations which are the subject of this chapter. It is misleading to think of the fighting on the Yser, the defence of Ypres, the attacks on the Aubers ridge, and the great French advance from Arras as separate military operations. They are all part of one great battle, lasting for two months and more, which fluctuated from one end to the other, not by accident but by design. Both sides were anxious to put their weight on their right, the Germans by way of Ypres, in pursuit of their plan of winning through to Calais and the French coasts, the Allies by way of Lille. The gas attack on Ypres was an interruption of the Allies' plans of attack on Lille, which had probably been formed at the time of the attack on Hill

60. After the April attacks on Ypres had been checked—though at a heavy sacrifice of life and land—the Allies were free to resume their designs on Lille.

Some degree of confidence, however, had been lost. It is a great shock to the command of an army which has prepared plans of attack to be faced with the necessity, as Sir John French was, of meeting an enemy attack at the opposite end of the line just when they were about to be put into execution. Even if the enemy's attack under such circumstances is entirely unsuccessful, it can hardly fail to disconcert. But the German attack on Ypres, though it failed in its main object, materially weakened the defence and brought the attackers' trenches, which were virtually siege lines, to within two miles at some points from the centre of the city. If the enemy could make so formidable an attack before the British attack began, might not his attacks from the vantage-ground gained be more dangerous later, if delivered when we were committed to an offensive movement for which immediate success could certainly not be predicted with confidence? The importance of the enemy's gas attacks on Ypres tended to be under-estimated in this country,

which regarded them more as atrocities than as part of a military plan, and was satisfied that they had not succeeded in depriving us of Ypres. We lost, however, very heavily in their repulse, and, what is more, they left us with a certain amount of anxiety for the security of our left wing. Sir John French did not feel himself justified in beginning his forward movement towards Lille until the second week of May, when the German attacks, though still continuing, were less dangerous. Had all gone well at the outset of the movement, Ypres would have ceased to trouble him. As it was, he began his movement with many backward glances towards Ypres, and with the fear that if he involved himself very deeply in prolonged and doubtful operations the penalty of failure might be not only a reverse in front of Lille but the jeopardy of Ypres and of all those vital British interests for which it stood. His task in making his decisions was not by any means an enviable one. Had the Ypres attacks not taken place, he would have been comparatively light-hearted.

THE IMPORTANCE OF LILLE.

But the fascination of Lille was not to be resisted.

The British army had sat down for six months in the next valley to that in which Lille stood, separated at Bois Grenier, the nearest point in the British lines, by not more than ten miles, and even at Festubert by not more than fifteen miles, from the greatest victory that the war had to promise in the west. Lille was the greatest railway centre in France after Paris. A glance at the map of the railway system of Northern France (page 310) will show that the line through Lille is the most westerly of all the railway communications between Germany, Belgium, and France. The railway connections behind the Allied lines on the western front are singularly poor; the Germans, on the other hand, have the command of a number of railway systems connecting with the various points on their front. It was a great advantage to the Germans to hold the line through Lille, because its possession by the Allies would have redressed one of the disadvantages under which they laboured. It would, moreover, have forced the

Germans to fall back to the next railway system, that through Valenciennes, which would have meant the abandonment of a not inconsiderable area of Artois and Picardy. That, however, was not all. On the maintenance of Lille depended the possession of all Flanders, for the main railway communications between Flanders and France pass through it. Its loss would have separated the German armies in Flanders from their armies in France, and have forced them to fall back from before Ypres and to abandon their project for the possession of the Straits. It was, lastly, a great manufacturing centre. In a word, it was, after Antwerp and Liège, strategically the most important town in the whole western campaign. This was the town on which the Allied

commanders were now determined to move. In front of Lille there is the great bastion of La Bassée, which is impregnable by direct attack. It was necessary to go round, the British by the north, the French by the south. The French on the right wing had already opened their attacks. The British attack was delivered on Sunday, May 9th.

THE ATTACK ON THE AUBERS RIDGE.

It was one of the most important battles of the war, but our whole official knowledge of it is contained in a few sentences in Sir John French's despatches. The first, published in the newspapers on the following morning, ran as follows:—

"This morning our First Army attacked the enemy's line

between Bois Grenier and Festubert, and gained ground south-east towards Fromelles. The fighting in this area still continues.

"Our airmen made successful attacks on St. André railway junction north of Lille, and on the canal bridge at Don. Pournes, Herlies, Marquillies, and La Bassée were also bombarded."

The long mailed despatch from Sir John French published two months later added very little, except that the enemy's position was stronger than was expected and that a more extensive artillery preparation was necessary to crush the resistance of the enemy's numerous fortified posts. This was an echo of the need on which



French soldiers in action with a mitrailleuse.

[Photographic Service of the French Armies.]

he had already insisted in his Neuve Chapelle despatch for unlimited supplies of ammunition. Nor was any reference made to it in the French or the German official bulletins as published in this country. Nor have any full unofficial accounts appeared of the battle except from the special correspondent of *The Times*, who is understood to have been Colonel Repington. In a telegram dated May 12th, he gave the following account of the action:—

"Sufficient details of the action have now filtered through to give an idea in broad outline of the course of the battle. Our attack began on Saturday with a terrific bombardment of the German trenches on the hills. Then our whole line advanced, from Festubert and Neuve Chapelle to the Bois Grenier, with its centre on Laventie.

"The right and the centre stormed the Aubers ridge; the left made a direct advance on Haubourdin, the south-western suburb of Lille. The right and the centre carried the first line of the enemy's trenches without serious opposition. They had been pounded to a shapeless mass by our artillery fire and practically abandoned by the enemy.

"The villages of Fromelles and Aubers fell into our hands.

Our troops, among whom were the Indians, pressed on to the second line. They came under a withering fire from rifles and machine-guns.

"The enemy's infantry was massed in great force on their second line, and had suffered little from our shells. These trenches were deep and reinforced with concrete, with underground galleries, giving almost complete immunity from shell fire. When our bombardment ceased and our infantry began the advance, the enemy issued from these subterranean shelters, manned their battered surface trenches, and turned upon our advancing troops the concentrated fire of massed machine guns.

"Our men fought like heroes in face of tremendous odds.


"On the left our troops were successful. They almost reached Haubourdin. Then the enemy's counter-attack was launched upon them. A fresh force in great numbers debouched from Lille and stayed their progress. Slowly, and fighting hard, we were driven back.

"But we retained a footing on the Aubers ridge and hold it still. Yesterday there was nothing but artillery fire.

THE REASONS FOR THE FAILURE.

Obviously, this attack was of the very highest importance, and equally obviously it ended in a defeat, though one that reflected more distinction on the troops engaged than some victories. In the wide area of the advance, covering almost the whole of our front south of the Lys, it was quite the most ambitious effort that our army had yet made. Moreover, it began by gaining a very remarkable initial success. Aubers we had tried to reach in the fighting at Neuve Chapelle, but had failed, in spite of efforts lasting into the third day. In this attack it fell into our hands in a few hours, and the advance from Bois Grenier on our left wing made such

rapid progress that it almost reached Haubourdin, a suburb of Lille on its southern side.* From Bois Grenier to Haubourdin must be from seven to eight miles, and this distance must have been covered by soon after noon, for by evening the men were back almost in their original positions, and the retirement had been sullen and slow. The rate of advance on this left wing must have been rapid almost without precedent in this war since the field war had ceased and the trench war began. What, then, was the explanation of this rapid advance, followed by retirement? Something of the same kind had happened at Neuve Chapelle, for there almost all the ground, at any rate at the south end of our line, had been won in the first half hour of the battle,



A French soldier in a dug-out in one of the trenches in Flanders.
[Photographic Service of the French Armies.]

and the remaining seventy hours failed to make any appreciable advance. No detailed explanation has ever been given, but general statements have been made of the cause which undoubtedly reflected the opinion of Headquarters. Compare, for example, the sentences from Sir John French's despatch on Neuve Chapelle, already quoted (page 288), with the following passages from a telegram of the same special correspondent of *The Times*, who has told us practically all that is known of this second attack on the hills outside Lille.


"The results of our attacks on Sunday last in the districts of Fromelles and Richebourg were disappointing.

* It is strange that Sir John French's despatch does not mention Haubourdin, but its details are too meagre to justify the positive statement that we have quoted.



A barricade taken from the Germans at Neuville St. Vaast.

[Photographic Service of the French Armies.]



A French heavy gun being fired from its concealed position in a wood.

[Photographic Service of the French Armies.]

We found the enemy much more strongly posted than we expected. We had not sufficient high-explosive to level his parapets to the ground after the French practice, and when our infantry gallantly stormed the trenches, as they did in both attacks, they found a garrison undismayed, many entanglements still intact, and maxims on all sides ready to pour in streams of bullets. We could not maintain ourselves in the trenches won, and our reserves were not thrown in because the conditions for success in an assault were not present.

"The attacks were well planned and valiantly conducted. The infantry did splendidly, but the conditions were too hard. The want of an unlimited supply of high-explosive was a fatal bar to our success."

This explanation is itself in need of some further explanation. The lack of high-explosive shells had not prevented our left wing from making an amazingly rapid advance, which carried it to the suburbs of Lille. Many lines of trenches must have been carried to advance this distance, and, in fact, the advance was beaten back on this wing not by the failure to carry trenches, but by the failure to keep them against a powerful counter-attack, which, one would think, would have been more effectually stopped by shrapnel than by high-explosives. Against troops advancing in the open there can be no doubt that shrapnel—and British shrapnel fire is the best in the world—is more effective than high-explosive shells. The advantage of high-explosives is against troops in trenches.

The high-explosive shell breaks up trenches, whereas shrapnel is a man-killer, not a work-destroyer. The lack of high-explosive shells would therefore at first sight seem to be adequate as an explanation of the failure of the troops to make progress against the enemy's trenches—which was not the trouble on our left wing, at any rate—but not of the failure to hold our ground against counter-attack. What, however, seems to have happened is this. The left wing was able to make a rapid advance because its advance was in the nature of a surprise, and the enemy (who, as will be seen presently, had an attack of the French to deal with at the same time) was numerically very weak on this section of his front. When

he saw, however, how serious his position at the northern end of his line was becoming, he was able to mass his troops for a counter-attack on this wing. That he would not have been able to do if the British right wing had been able to develop its attack. But it never made any real progress. The Germans, behind their elaborate entrenchments, were able to hold it back, while concentrating their main strength against our left flank, which, when it had crossed the Aubers ridge, found itself in air without supports, owing to the failure of the right to break down the defences opposite to it and come into alignment. It was this failure on the right that was


due to the lack of the explosive shells necessary to break up the opposing entrenchments. The story of this battle is thus one of a brilliant tactical success on our left which was entirely thrown away and turned into defeat by the failure of its right wing to come into line. And that failure was due to lack of a sufficient number of high-explosive shells.

How, in the meantime, had the attack fared at the other end of the line?

THE CAPTURE OF CARENCEY.

The fighting on the Aubers ridge was the left wing of the attack on Lille. To the right of the British were the French under General Foch—the ablest of General Joffre's lieutenants. Between La Bassée and Arras, the German front bulged to the west in front of Lens, and even crossed the

road from Béthune to take in Ablain and Carency. The citadel of this bastion is the hill Notre Dame de Lorette, near Ablain, which was to the French lines what La Bassée was to ours. On the same day as our attack on the Aubers ridge the French attacked north of Arras, and carried three lines of trenches near Carency. Pursuing their advantage, they crossed the road from Souchez, and stormed half the village of Neuville St. Vaast. The width of the front captured was more than four miles, and its depth in some places as much as two miles and a half. More than 3,000 prisoners and some fifty machine-guns were taken. The British attack on the Aubers ridge, though it did not establish itself, must have been



The approaches to Lille.

a very great embarrassment to the Germans in resisting the French, and an excellent prospect now seemed to open up of skilful co-operation between the Allies. Unfortunately, the British were unable to do anything more for a week. The French, however, steadily pressed their gains. On Tuesday, May 11th, the French, attacking with great skill and dash, captured the chapel on Notre Dame de Lorette which had been stubbornly defended by the Germans for months. On the north of Notre Dame de Lorette they carried the whole system of trenches between Loos and Vernelles. The effect of the operations since Sunday had been to bring the French columns well round the flanks, both north and south of Carency, and on the following day Carency surrendered. The number of the prisoners taken by the French was now well over 5,000. These successes had been secured by the same methods of massed artillery fire as had won for the British their early successes at Neuve Chapelle, but the bombardment was more prolonged. More than 20,000 projectiles of all calibres were thrown on Carency. Even then, although the garrison had been reduced to perhaps a couple of thousand, it was not an easy task to take possession. For the final attack, which was directed from the east and the west sides of the town, the enemy had prepared elaborate defences. A large quarry, eighty yards deep, had been organised as a complete fort, with casemates and underground shelters, and the French

lost heavily in the storming. The defenders, when they surrendered towards evening, numbered a thousand. They were the remnants of all the regiments who had been cut up in the fighting since the French attack had begun four days before—Bavarians, Saxons, and Badenese.

These were the best four days that the French had had since autumn, and they raised very great hopes. The French had bettered our example at Neuve Chapelle, thanks to a larger supply of high-explosive shells. Yet these victories had their dark side. That the losses of the French should be heavy was to be expected, for they were attacking positions which had been elaborated for many months. More serious was the evidence that the

comparatively small number of the captured at Carency afforded of the great trouble that a garrison could give to an attack many times its superior in numbers. The lesson of the attack on Pietre was being repeated. Everything that it was customary to say fifteen years ago of the defensive power of the modern rifle was now doubly and trebly true of the machine-gun. The practice of the Germans—and this was the great advantage which they derived from the long elaboration of their field fortifications—was to hold their advanced positions with a mere handful of men, trusting to their defences to protect them from artillery fire, or to their machine-guns from infantry attack, and to keep their masses in reserve in the rear, ready to counter-attack if the position should

be carried. This method had the further advantage of reducing the loss of life during the bombardment and of bringing the masses into action when it was at such close quarters that bombardment, at any rate by field and heavy artillery, was dangerous. It was new tactics, combining the advantages of open order and of massed attacks.

THE BATTLE OF FESTUBERT.

Late on Saturday night, May 15th, the British were again on the move, this time south of Neuve Chapelle, between Richebourg and Festubert. Here a German salient projected into the British lines and the object of the new movement (apart from the desire to help the French by engaging the enemy on our own front) was

to straighten out our lines. Sir John French had decided on a night attack, although the dangers of these incursions in the dark into a maze of unfamiliar trenches was not overlooked. Fortunately, the enterprise was successful, and our gain on Sunday night and on the following days was nearly a mile. The operations were exceedingly difficult from the nature of the country, which was intersected by numerous ditches, but it was well managed and there were few mishaps. One of these was moving in its incident. It happened on Monday, in a night of pitch darkness. The Fourth Camerons—a battalion recruited in Skye and Inverness, and containing probably a greater number of men speaking Gaelic than any other battalion



One of the communicating trenches to the French firing line.
[Photographic Service of the French Armies.]

in the army—moved out on the right wing to capture a trench. They found their way crossed by a ditch too wide to jump. Under heavy shell fire they crossed, swimming or on planks. One company lost its direction, another was wiped out, but a third struggled on and captured the trench—a communication trench—down which the occupants bolted to the rear. The Highlanders strengthened the trench, and sent for bombers to go down the enemy's communication, and for a machine-gun. Later, a lieutenant, with two deerstalkers, volunteered to communicate with headquarters about their position. After a perilous journey they reached the connecting telephone, to find that it was out of order, and on their return a German attack was in full swing. It was decided to retire. Some slid over the parapet of the trench, which was a high one. Most escaped by pulling up the flooring boards, which are put down in wet weather, and crawling out through the space underneath. This has been described as the most difficult withdrawal ever made by British soldiers. The operations near Festubert were memorable for the terrible fate of a battalion of Saxons.

"The remains of a battalion of Saxons, having decided to surrender *en bloc*, advanced towards our line. Not knowing what the movement of this mass of men implied, our infantry poured a hail of bullets into them, whereupon the survivors, some hundreds strong, halted, threw down their rifles and held up their hands, and one of their number waved a white rag tied to a stick.

"Our guns continued to fire from the rear; and as soon as the Prussian infantry on the north of this point realised what their Saxon comrades were trying to do, they opened rapid fire from the flank, enfilading the mass. It appears also that the news of what was happening must have been telephoned back to the German artillery further east—which was also probably Prussian—since its guns suddenly opened on the Saxon infantry, and under this combined fire most of the latter were very soon accounted for.

"Amongst the many scenes of the war there has probably been no more strange spectacle than that of the masses of grey-coated soldiers standing out in the open, hands raised, amidst the dead and dying, being butchered by their own comrades before the German advance. The British

infantry. The fact that the victims of this slaughter were Saxons was a source of regret to us, since the Saxons have always proved themselves more chivalrous and less brutal than either the Prussians or the Bavarians; in fact, cleaner fighters in every way."

Festubert was a battle of the Celtic regiments. Not only the Camerons, but the Welsh Fusiliers, won great distinction, and some days afterwards there were found eighty men of a company of Scots Guards, which had been missing, lying dead on grass which had been torn up by the fury of the fight, and surrounded by a heap of enemy corpses.

The French attacks continued until the middle of June, and in the course of them the French army did some of the finest work that was done in the war. The fighting at Souchez, Notre Dame de Lorette, and in the "Labyrinth," however, would seem to call for fuller treatment later. Here it is enough to say that the attacks stopped some three miles short of Lens, which was the objective of the French attacks, and that they obtained little active support from us.

THE BREAKDOWN AND ITS CAUSES.

The failure of the offensive, so far as the British army was concerned, was a bitter disappointment, for all through the winter hopes had been centred on what would happen in spring, and the remarkable success at the opening of the Battle of Neuve Chapelle, though

it had its dark side in the later stages of the battle, had encouraged these hopes. The circumstances of the failure made it the more disappointing. The Russians by this time were in very great difficulties, and the great German offensive in Galicia (to be described later), coupled with the beginning of the arrival of heavy British reinforcements, seemed to offer a better opportunity for decisive movements in the west than we had yet had, or were likely to have later in the year, if, as seemed not unlikely at the beginning of June, the Russians were to be so heavily defeated that the Germans would be able to transfer troops to the west and leave to the Austrians the task of guarding their frontiers and maintaining the ground won. At the beginning of May it



A trench cut through one of the ruined buildings of a French town.
[Newspaper Illustrations.]



The entrance to a village on the French front captured from the Germans after desperate fighting. In the foreground is seen a stone barricade made by the Germans.

[Photographic Service of the French Armies.]



Children playing among the ruins at Mont St. Eloi.

[Photographic Service of the French Armies.]

seemed for the Western Allies that it must be then or not for many months if the German lines were to be broken and Lille recovered. The French, moreover, had been encouraged by Neuve Chapelle, and had built great hopes on the prospects of successful co-operation with the British in the direction of Lille. When the joint attack began on May 9th, the British and French were to all intents left and right wings of the same army. When, therefore, we were unable to continue our attacks it was a check, not only to our own but to the French offensive too, and it forced the French to choose between the disagreeable alternatives of suspending their attacks until we were sufficiently prepared to be able to take a decisive and continuous part in the plan, or else proceeding

with their truncated plan and continuing their attack without our active assistance. For the first time we were not in a position to justify the hopes that our Allies had reposed in us, and which the great achievements of the British army in the earlier stages of the war had encouraged them to indulge. That our failure to play a continuous part in the offensive was not due to any lack of zeal on our side, but to circumstances over which the army in the field had very little control, did not alter the fact that at one of the critical moments of the war we were not able to second the efforts of the French as we could have wished. One gets the impression that Sir John French hardly expected to win through, and that his first general

attack on the Aubers ridge, and the local movement near Festubert later, were made not in any confidence of decisive success, but in discharge of a duty that he felt was owing to our Allies.

The cause of the paralysis of the British power of offence—temporary, no doubt, but singularly unfortunate in the moment of its manifestation—is usually summed up in the phrase, "lack of high-explosive shells." And the summary gives, if not a complete, at any rate a convenient and not misleading idea of its causes. This is not the time or place to attempt to fix the responsibility for that shortage; the overt facts are summarised in the next chapter. But this greatest disappointment of the

war—the failure of the operations in May and early June—is not to be left even in a History which is concerned to explore the facts of the war, and not the uncertain frontier lines between politics and military operations, without some attempt to obtain a general view of the causes of this disappointment. The causes would seem to be these:

First, and very important, was the surprise attack on Ypres, and the heavy losses of men and of ground that it caused. The loss of ground was particularly embarrassing to the attack further south, because it left the Germans in a position from which they could suddenly menace the security of our lines there. It is evident that Ypres was the source of constant anxiety to the British, and


prevented us from risking as much as we might otherwise have done south of the Lys. Unless success was reasonably likely further south, Sir John French must have felt that he was taking risks which might imperil the safety of the British defences at Ypres. With the enemy so close to the Yser there, he knew that if he committed himself to dangerous operations of attack south of the Lys the fate of Ypres might be decided before he had time to draw off his attack and bring up the reinforcements that Ypres might badly need. He was not—with the responsibility of Ypres upon him—free to take risks that he might otherwise have done, and his standard of the likelihood of victory in attack was not unnaturally a high



A photograph taken during the capture of Neuville St. Vaast, showing the French soldiers engaged in house-to-house fighting. [Topical Press.]

one. It would be difficult to exaggerate the influence which the unfortunate turn of events at Ypres exercised on our offensive plans.

It is possible that if we had had enough high-explosives at the Battle of Aubers our right wing would have been able to demolish the German trenches and to support the remarkable advance of our left wing. But the problem of munitions that began to present itself to the country at this time was a much wider one than the provision of high-explosive shells. The French had high-explosive shells in unlimited quantities, and they materially contributed to their success, though perhaps to a less extent than is commonly supposed. But they



The Railway System of Northern France.

did not break the main German line, or even bring them quite level with the position that the British had acquired further north without these advantages. What is meant by the problem of munitions is more broadly the whole of the mechanical side of war. When every allowance is made for the extreme thoroughness with which the Germans had thought out the war beforehand, the fact remains that a great deal was left to be discovered in the course of the war. On the whole, the Germans learned the lessons of the war more readily than the Allies, and were quicker to adapt them. The Englishman prides himself on his adaptability to circumstances, and what he likes to call his bull-dog tenacity. Of the second quality the Frenchman gave an exhibition in this war that surpassed what was expected of him even by those who knew how false were the current ideas of his levity and impressionableness; in the first quality the German excelled, and quite belied the generally accepted idea of him as an obstinate conservative in matters military. The German started the war with singularly few military ideas that were not already common property. But they picked up ideas at an alarming rate as the war went on. The submarine blockade and gas bombardment, whatever


may be thought of their immorality and cruelty, were at any rate notable examples of German adaptability to circumstances in war; but, apart from these, there are a sufficient number of more reputable instances. The whole art of trench warfare was elaborated in the most amazing ways. New tactics of defence were devised which were both effectual and economical of life. The capacity of the machine-gun, only half suspected at the beginning of the war, was realised early, and developed to a remarkable degree, comparable only to the remarkable use made of his rifle by the Boer. Instances might be multiplied almost indefinitely, but perhaps the most remarkable was the employment of massed artillery to break a strong defensive line at a particular point. The first use of this method in the war was by the British at Neuve Chapelle; yet, although we were the first to use the plan, the Germans were the first to apply it in Galicia on an extended scale, whereas we at the same time were still unequipped with the means of executing it. With the Germans, ideas materialised more promptly, and there was a quicker correspondence between thought and its execution. Yet the Germans neither in war nor in peace have been the great originators. In their whole

conduct of the war there was not visible a stroke of genius to compare with the strategy of General Joffre before the Battle of the Marne.

The problem of munitions was therefore an exceedingly wide one. The provision of heavy guns and of high-explosive shells was only one of its departments. The multiplication of machine guns was a second, and the mobilisation of inventions another. Yet other departments were the development of new tactics of offence to correspond with the new weapons, for it is hardly conceivable that faults of leading did not contribute to our unsucess as well as lack of materials, and a readier communication

between the Intelligence and the Munitions Departments, such as would have made the surprise by gas attack impossible.

It was an enormous problem this, of suddenly adapting ourselves after generations of an entirely different school of national strategy to the methods of Europe in military affairs—a feat, if it could be accomplished in time, comparable to the substitution by Japan within a generation of a Western for her Eastern civilisation. Such a revolution was not for soldiers alone or mainly, but called for a statesman with imagination, in close touch with the people, and with power to harness their enthusiasm.




The ruined towers at Mont St. Eloi.

[Photographic Service of the French Armies.]




Girl munition workers at their lathes in a Scottish mill.

[Central News.



Students of the London Polytechnic employed on the manufacture of munitions.

[Topical Press.



Girl workers at the Ministry of Munitions, temporarily accommodated in a large tent at the back of the building.

[L.N.A.]

CHAPTER XXXI.

THE WAR CRISIS AT HOME.

THE PROBLEM OF MUNITIONS—EARLY FAILURES TO SOLVE—MR. LLOYD GEORGE ON THE HANDICAP OF DRINK—THE COALITION GOVERNMENT—THE MINISTRY OF MUNITIONS.

BETWEEN the beginning of March and the end of May, 1915, the war broke through the surface of politics. A series of controversies arose in the Press and in Parliament which culminated in the formation of a Coalition Government and the creation of a special Ministry of Munitions.

How far the political events were the result of a shortage of munitions is still a matter of secret history. In rapid outline the series of incidents as publicly known was as follows. At the end of February Mr. Lloyd George made a speech at Bangor, in which he referred to the effect of the lure of drink on a small minority of munition workers. There followed a controversy about the drink habits of working men. For many weeks there were inspired reports of a drastic scheme contemplated by the Government for the control of the liquor trade; then certain much milder proposals for dealing with the evil were put before Parliament, and in fact carried. A few days later *The Times* published a sensational despatch from its Military Correspondent at the front, declaring that operations were being hampered and lives lost by deficiency of high-explosive shells, and followed it up by an attack on Lord Fisher as the

responsible minister; almost at the same time Lord Fisher resigned from the Admiralty, and in a few days Mr. Asquith announced the formation of a Coalition Ministry.

To interpret these facts we must consider what was certainly going on underneath. The war became a siege war—a war of positions—in November, 1914. The importance of attacking entrenched positions by high-explosive shells, as distinct from shrapnel, was first realised about Christmas; and at the beginning of 1915 arrangements were put in hand by the War Office for producing much larger supplies. These arrangements necessarily took time for the adaptation of plant, and it is very evident that the output was not so rapid as was expected—manufacturers did not fulfil their contracts, and no doubt justly or unjustly, or half-justly, put the blame on the slackness and the drinking habits of their workpeople. But in a detailed consideration of the events of March, April, and May, one must remember that the War Office had already at the beginning of the year made its arrangements for the production of high-explosive shells, and that for one reason or another those arrangements had practically failed.

EARLY WARNINGS.

Mr. Lloyd George made his Bangor speech referring to the lure of drink on February 28th, and no doubt it reflected one of the explanations given by manufacturers who were failing to fulfil their contracts. On March 9th a Defence of the Realm Bill was introduced, giving the Government power to control and close any factory in order to expedite the production of war materials. The Bill provided that the Government should have power to require any work in any workshop to be done in accordance with the directions of the Admiralty or Army Council; to close any factory, or remove the plant from it, in order to increase the production of war material in other workshops; and to take possession of any unoccupied premises for the storage or the housing of workmen. An undertaking was given that compensation should be paid. Evidently this Bill was drafted to meet complaints from manufacturers of munitions about difficulties in obtaining plant and workmen in competition with firms engaged on commercial work. In introducing the Bill Mr. Lloyd George made the statement, very significant at this early stage, that "It is vitally important that we should increase the output and every facility for the output of munitions of war. The duration of the war depends upon it, and I think the success of the war depends upon it." At the same time, Mr. Lloyd George announced that the Government intended to create a

Central Munitions Committee to organise the whole of the engineering community in order to increase the output. At the head of the Committee was to be "a good, strong business man, with some go in him, who will be able to push the thing through"—ever after referred to by the popular Press as "The man of push and go."

On March 15th Lord Kitchener made a frank statement to the House of Lords of the difficulty over the production of munitions. He said: "The output is not only not equal to our necessities, but does not fulfil our expectations, for a very large number of our orders have not been completed by the dates on which they were promised." He added that the armament firms had willingly under-

taken orders of vast magnitude, that the great majority of their employees were working overtime and on night-shifts. The difficulty was in the failure to obtain sufficient labour, and delays in the production of the necessary plant. At the same time, Lord Kitchener referred to labour difficulties, which afterwards became matters of acute controversy. There were instances, he said, where absence, irregular timekeeping, and slack work had led to a marked diminution in the output of war factories; and he mentioned other difficulties caused by Trade Union restrictions, and invited the Trade Unions to waive their rules for the period of the war. "The supply of war material at the present moment and for the next two or three months," he concluded, "is causing me very serious anxiety."

These difficulties and disappointments over output and the fulfilment of contracts must have been very largely concerned with the production of high-explosive shells.

Two days later, on March 17th, Mr. Lloyd George, as Chancellor of the Exchequer, and Mr. Runciman, as President of the Board of Trade, called a conference of Trade Union representatives at the Treasury. They invited the Trade Unionists to co-operate in solving the labour difficulties, at the same time pointing out the coercive powers already taken for dealing with factory owners.

The conference sat for three days, and the outcome of it was the issue of the series of "Recommendations to Workmen," signed by Mr. Lloyd George, Mr. Runci-

man, Mr. Arthur Henderson, Mr. William Mosses (the chairman and secretary of the workmen's representatives). The recommendations were: No strikes for munition workers, arbitration on labour disputes, and relaxation of Trade Union rules and trade practices as to the use of unskilled and female labour.


THE HANDICAP OF STRONG DRINK.

All this time, since Mr. Lloyd George's Bangor speech at the end of February, desultory discussion was going on about the drinking habits of workmen and their effect on output. On March 29th a deputation of shipbuilding



The Cabinet crisis: Lord Kitchener arriving at the War Office.


[Sport and General.



Lord Lansdowne, Minister without
Portfolio.
[Lafayette, London.]



Lord Curzon, Lord Privy Seal.
[L.N.A.]



Mr. Bonar Law, Colonial Secretary.
[Bassano.]

employers waited on Mr. Lloyd George and urged the closing of public-houses and clubs in areas where munitions of war were being produced. The deputation was received in private, but in the official report issued it was stated that less than the normal number of hours per week was being worked in almost all the shipyards, and in spite of working night and day, seven days a week, less work was being turned out. The deputation declared that this was chiefly due to drink, and gave some figures of the takings of public-houses and instances of work delayed in support of their contention. Mr. Lloyd George, in reply to the deputation, said that he had a growing conviction, based on accumulating evidence, that nothing but root and branch methods would be of the slightest avail in dealing with this evil. "We are fighting Germany, Austria, and drink," he said, "and so far as I can see the greatest of these three deadly foes is drink. Success in war is now purely a question of munitions. I say that not on my own authority, but on the authority of our great General, Sir John French. He has made it quite clear what his conviction is on the subject."

These quotations show that already, early in March, the importance of munitions was being urged by General French, and was fully realised by Lord Kitchener and by Mr. Lloyd George, and that strenuous efforts were being made to increase the output. In his speech in the House of Lords, on March 15th, already quoted, Lord Kitchener definitely said: "The supply of war material at the present moment and for the next two or three months is causing me very serious anxiety . . . the output of every round of ammunition is of the utmost importance, and has a large influence on our operations in the field." It is important to remember these dates and warnings in view of the sensational despatch of *The Times* Military Correspondent exactly two months later.

At the time popular interest in Mr. Lloyd George's address to the shipbuilding employers concentrated entirely on the strong statements made about the effect of drink. There was immediately a violent controversy as to the justice of the charge brought by the employers and admitted by Mr. Lloyd George. Representatives of Labour

denied the charges, and declared on the other hand that men employed on munitions were often working themselves to a standstill, and breaking down from overstrain. It was stated that there was a considerable increase in the sickness rate of the Trade Unions concerned, and that this was found among teetotal members as well as among the general body. This controversy continued for the next month, when Mr. Lloyd George brought forward in the House of Commons his proposals for dealing with the drink evil. On the day that Mr. Lloyd George met the shipbuilding employers he had an audience with the King, and was permitted to say that the King was very deeply concerned on this question. The following day (March 30th) Lord Stamfordham, writing for the King, addressed a letter to Mr. Lloyd George stating that from the evidence "it is without doubt largely due to drink that we are unable to secure the output of war material indispensable to meet the requirements of our army in the field." The letter concluded: "If it be deemed advisable, the King will be prepared to set the example by giving up all alcoholic liquor himself and issuing orders against its consumption in the Royal household, so that no difference shall be made, so far as His Majesty is concerned, between the treatment of rich and poor in this question." It was afterwards announced that this undertaking was to be carried out.


THE PROBLEM OF MUNITIONS NOT NEW.

In the meantime, while the drink controversy went on and proposals were being worked out by Mr. Lloyd George for dealing with the evil, other efforts were being made to organise the production of munitions, and other evidences were being published of the urgency of the need. Early in April a Departmental Committee of the War Office was appointed, with Lord Kitchener as chairman, and Mr. G. M. Booth, of the great Liverpool shipowning firm, as secretary. The work of this committee was to assist in expediting the supply of munitions of war. Mr. Booth was immediately identified by the popular Press as Mr. Lloyd George's "Man of push and go." In a somewhat vague relationship to this committee was a larger "Munitions of War Committee," which was appointed



Mr. Austen Chamberlain, Secretary
for India.

[Basanno.



Mr. Balfour, First Lord of the
Admiralty.

[J. Russell & Sons.



Mr. Walter Long, President of the
Local Government Board.

[Lafayette, London.

in March, and announced in the House of Commons by Mr. Asquith on April 15th. This committee was apparently intended to be in general control. Its chairman was Mr. Lloyd George, and its members, some of whom were Parliamentary and some technical experts, were Mr. Balfour, Mr. Montagu, Mr. G. M. Booth, Major-General von Donop, Mr. H. Baker (Financial Secretary to the War Office), Sir Frederick Black, Admiral Tudor, Mr. A. Henderson, M.P., and Sir H. Llewellyn Smith, with power to add to their number. It was explained that the functions of this committee were "to ensure the promptest and most efficient application of all the available productive resources of the country to the manufacture and supply of munitions of war for the navy and army."

The significant reference to the munitions difficulty in Sir John French's despatch on the battle of Neuve Chapelle has already been quoted. In dealing with the terribly heavy casualties, he said: "an almost unlimited supply of ammunition is necessary, and the most liberal discretionary power as to its use must be given to the artillery commanders. I am confident that this is the only means by which great results can be obtained with a minimum of loss." This despatch was published on April 14th. On April 21st Mr. Lloyd George made an important speech in the House of Commons on the subject of our shell output. He stated that orders were placed in this country involving the employment of 2,500 to 3,000 firms on contracts and sub-contracts. The result had been an immense increase in output. Taking the figure 20 as representing our output of artillery ammunition in September, the output in the following months was in the ratio of—October, 90; November, 90; December, 156; January, 186; February, 256; March, 388. He admitted that there was need for still more, but said that the concern of the Government is "not any deficiency at the moment, but to supply the necessary amount of ammunition for the inevitable war policy of our generals." In the same speech Mr. Lloyd George declared that our production of high-explosives had been put on a footing which relieved us of all anxiety and enabled us to supply our Allies. Mr. Bonar Law, Leader of the Opposition, said that he

was quite satisfied with this speech, and was inclined to think that the Government were doing everything that could be done.

THE LIQUOR PROPOSALS.

In the meantime, the question of a scheme for dealing with the Liquor Traffic was engaging the attention of Mr. Lloyd George and the Cabinet. It became known, and indeed inspired announcements were published, that Mr. Lloyd George contemplated no less a measure than the State purchase of the whole of the breweries and with them of the public-houses of the country—that is, of the whole machinery both of production (so far at least as regards beer) and of distribution of the Liquor Trade—with a view to bringing the whole problem of reform under the direct control of the Government. Temperance experts and trade experts were consulted, and brought more or less willingly to an agreement. The Leaders of the Opposition and the representatives of the Liquor Trade agreed to the measure on the understanding that the Trade should be fairly treated in the terms of purchase. There was, however, a great deal of opposition to the scheme on various grounds in the House of Commons, and it presently became evident that Mr. Lloyd George had not succeeded in persuading the Cabinet.

On April 20th, Mr. Asquith went to Newcastle, on a Trade Union invitation, to address the munitions workers of the Tyneside. "You may tell Lord Kitchener," the invitation added, "that we shall deliver the goods." Mr. Asquith summarised the measures that needed to be taken to increase output under three heads: "(1) Limitation of profits, (2) temporary suspension of restrictive rules and customs, and (3) the provision of reasonable compensation in cases of proved injury or loss." He denied that our army, or those of our Allies, were being hampered by our failure to provide the necessary ammunition. He denied also that there had been anything in the nature of general slackness on the part of either employers or employed. It was noted that he made no reference to the drink question, and the inference was drawn that he did not support any heroic measures for dealing with it. It must be remembered,



Mr. Arthur Henderson, Board of Education.

[L.N.A.]



Admiral Sir Henry Jackson, First Sea Lord of the Admiralty.

[Lafayette, London.]



Sir Edward Carson, Attorney-General.

[J. Russell & Sons.]

however, that the occasion was hardly an appropriate one for reproaches.

Mr. Lloyd George at last introduced his drink proposals in the House of Commons on April 29th, in the form of a Defence of the Realm Amendment to No. 3 Bill, and a series of resolutions for heavy fresh taxation on liquor in this year's Budget. The duty on spirits was to be doubled; there was to be a graded surtax on beer of from 12s. to 26s. a barrel, according to the specific gravity (that is, roughly, in proportion to alcoholic strength); the duty on wines was to be quadrupled, and the tax on sparkling wines raised to 15s. a gallon. The Bill proposed that the Government should have power to proclaim any area a Munitions Area, and in that area to exercise unlimited control of the Liquor Traffic. The measure was to be administered by a Central Control Board, and it was to have the power of closing, or controlling, or taking over any public-house, of opening public-houses or canteens, without the formality of applying for a licence, and, if necessary, of taking over the whole business of supplying liquor to public-houses, clubs, or shops. In other words, a State liquor monopoly was to be created in the munitions areas, but without taking over the actual manufacture of drink. The proposals in the Defence of the Realm Bill were obviously the salvage of the original scheme of State purchase.

It was at once seen that the taxation proposals had no chance of being carried. It was scarcely believed that they were even intended to be carried. When Mr. Lloyd George made his Budget speech, on May 4th, he made no reference to the drink question. But Mr. Chamberlain took the occasion to attack them as "penal and crushing."

Both the official Opposition and the Irish Party were irreconcilably opposed to the taxes. On May 6th, Mr. Lloyd George introduced the Second Reading of the Defence of the Realm Bill, embodying his proposals for State control of the Liquor Traffic in prescribed areas. Mr. Bonar Law and Mr. Redmond united in refusing to consent to the Second Reading of this Bill until the House was given assurances that the taxation proposals would be abandoned. To make sure, Mr. Redmond moved the

adjournment of the debate until the question of the taxes had been settled. The Prime Minister accepted the motion, and the debate was adjourned.

This incident was regarded in Parliament as a severe blow to the Government, and it was taken by some members as bringing appreciably nearer the project of a Coalition Government, which had already been mooted in the Press. Twenty-four hours later the liquor taxes were completely abandoned, when it was announced that the only general measure taken outside the munitions areas would be to prohibit the sale of spirits under three years of age. This was to meet the supposed evil of raw spirit drinking by workmen in certain districts, especially in Scotland. The Bill enacting this was afterwards carried, with an understanding that compensation should be paid to distillers injured by its operation. The Bill for State control of the Liquor Traffic in prescribed munitions areas was carried on May 12th, and a Central Control Board was created to administer it. This ended the whole public discussion of the drinking habits of munitions workers. In the next few days a sensational series of political events took place.

THE FORMATION OF A COALITION GOVERNMENT.

The Coalition Ministry came with startling suddenness. It was a complete surprise to the general public, and even in the House of Commons the first reports were received by most members with incredulity. The idea of a Coalition Government had, it is true, been advocated in a portion of the Unionist Press, with hints that it was a scheme under consideration. But on May 12th Mr. Asquith was asked in the House of Commons by Mr. Handel Booth, a Liberal member, whether he would "consider the desirability of admitting into the ranks of Ministers leading members of the various political parties." Mr. Asquith replied: "The step suggested by my right honourable friend is *not in contemplation*, and I am not aware that it would meet with general assent." Five days later, at most, the Coalition Government was in process of formation.

The intervening events have been generally taken to be the cause of the reconstruction of the Government,

but it is possible that they were rather the convenient occasion for it than the cause. They must, however, be recorded in connection with it.

On May 14th, *The Times* published a despatch from its military correspondent, Colonel Repington, describing the recent fighting about Ypres, and attributing the failure of certain British attacks and the heaviness of the casualties to "the want of an unlimited supply of high-explosives." The despatch created a great sensation. Colonel Repington was at the British Headquarters as the guest of General French when he sent it, though war correspondents were supposed to be barred from any place in or near the line of battle. It was generally supposed that the message reflected General French's views. Lord Kitchener referred to this despatch in the House of Lords the following day. "High-explosive shells for field-guns," he said, "have recently been brought into prominence by comments in the Press. At an early stage in the war we took the preliminary steps to manufacture these new projectiles; and though the introduction of any new departure in munitions of war naturally causes delay and difficulty to manufacturers, I am confident that in the very near future we shall be in a satisfactory position with regard to the supply of these shells to the army at the front." *The Times* followed this up by a leading article, putting some of the blame for the shortage of high-explosives on the Secretary for War.

"Men died in heaps," it said, "on the Aubers ridge ten days ago because the field-guns were short, and gravely short, of high-explosive shells . . . Lord Kitchener must bear his share of responsibility." The attack on Lord Kitchener as the minister responsible for the shortage of high-explosive shells was pursued for the next few days in *The Times* and other of the Northcliffe group of papers.

On May 18th, a still more sensational thing happened. It was announced in the Press that Lord Fisher had insisted on resigning from the post of First Sea Lord on account of differences with Mr. Churchill, the First Lord. On the same day the first newspaper report appeared of the formation of a Coalition Government,

and the next day Mr. Asquith announced it in the House of Commons.

The remarkable thing about this announcement was that Mr. Asquith did not give even a hint of the reasons for the Coalition. He merely informed the House of the reconstruction of the Government "on a broader personal and political basis," adding that there would be no change in the head of the Government or in the Foreign Secretaryship, and that the reconstruction would be for the purposes of the war alone, and was not to be taken as indicating any surrender or compromise on anybody's part of political purposes and ideals.

Mr. Bonar Law, in his brief reply on behalf of the Opposition, threw no more light on the matter. He

merely reiterated the assurance that the Coalition was for the prosecution of the war only, and that party causes would all be taken up again when the war was over. Immediately afterwards the House of Commons adjourned for a fortnight. The process of Cabinet making went on in the meantime, and occupied some two or three weeks, as far as the chief offices were concerned. The Cabinet, when completed, consisted of twenty-two members: twelve Liberals, eight Unionists, one Labour member, and Lord Kitchener. The Unionists added to the Cabinet were Lord Curzon, Lord Lansdowne, Mr. Bonar Law, Mr. Austen Chamberlain, Mr. Balfour, Mr. Walter Long, Lord Selborne, and Sir Edward Carson. The eight Liberal members who retired from the Cabinet



The entrance to the new Munitions Offices in Whitehall.

[Sport and General.

were Lord Haldane, Earl Beauchamp, Mr. E. S. Montagu, Mr. H. Samuel, Lord Lucas, Mr. J. A. Pease, Lord Emmott and Mr. C. E. Hobhouse.

There was also added to the Cabinet Mr. Arthur Henderson, chairman of the Parliamentary Labour Party, who became President of the Board of Education, with the duty besides of assisting the Government in labour matters. The co-operation of the Labour Party was not easily secured, and the decision to permit Mr. Henderson to take office was only carried by the votes of the executive of the party outside the House. A majority, though a very small one, of the Labour members in Parliament, was against it. The Irish Nationalists declined to accept

any share of office. Mr. John Redmond was pressed to take a seat in the Cabinet, but his decision and the decision of the party was against it. This was in accordance with the fixed policy of the Nationalist Party to take neither office nor emolument under the British Government until Home Rule is an accomplished fact. The Nationalists, however, promised the new Government the same loyal support in the prosecution of the war which they had given to the late Government. In several significant allusions to the abstention of the Nationalists, the Prime Minister showed that it was a deep disappointment to the Government, and that great importance had been attached to the absorption of all parties into the Administration.

In the course of filling up the minor offices of the Administration the Government caused serious offence to the Nationalists by nominating an extreme Orangeman, Mr. J. H. Campbell, to the Lord Chancellorship of Ireland. The Nationalists strongly protested against the appointment, and after a few days' "crisis" the Government gave way.

Two personal changes in the Administration call for notice—Lord Haldane's retirement and the transfer of Mr. Churchill from the post of First Lord of the Admiralty to a minor Cabinet office. The removal of Mr. Churchill from the Admiralty was evidently a result of the breach with Lord Fisher. But Mr. Churchill was succeeded by Mr. Balfour, who was understood to have been working very


closely and sympathetically with him in all matters of policy. The dropping of Lord Haldane is difficult to explain. He was one of the strongest members of the late Government, and he belonged to the innermost circle of the Cabinet. Lord Haldane had done a great work in reorganising the War Office and creating the Territorial Force. The complete readiness and efficiency of the Expeditionary Force in the first days of the war was his doing. The only thing against him was that a loud clamour had been raised in a certain section of the newspapers about his German education, his studies in German philosophy, and his interesting but not important confession, long before the war, that Germany was his

spiritual home. Liberal partisans believe that the Unionist leaders identified themselves with this vulgar and uneducated prejudice, and insisted that Lord Haldane should go. It is not unlikely that the Unionists insisted on Lord Haldane's retirement, but it is impossible to believe that they adopted the vulgar prejudice, though they may have thought it desirable to placate it.

THE REASONS FOR THE COALITION.

The reasons for the formation of the Coalition Government have never been adequately explained, and will only be fully known when the secret history of the period comes to be written, but two main facts stand out. On

the one hand, the Liberal Cabinet was not so fully united as a Cabinet should be which is responsible for the conduct of a great war. The fiasco of the National Purchase Scheme proves it. On the other hand, whatever the cause, there had been a great and glaring failure in the supply of certain essential munitions. The personal responsibility for this failure has yet to be determined, but the ultimate responsibility could only rest on the Government, and the leaders of the Opposition might well say that unless the whole matter was to be gone into publicly in Parliament they must have a share at once in the control of the Administration. The first course was clearly undesirable, at such a time, in the public interest, and the second was adopted.



Organising the War Industries: Mr. Lloyd George arriving at the Houldsworth Hall, Manchester, where he addressed a meeting on the Government's scheme. ["Manchester Guardian" Copyright.]

But there is a broader aspect of the whole matter which suggests a more complete explanation.

In his letter to Mr. Bonar Law inviting the Unionists to enter the Ministry, Mr. Asquith wrote: "After long and careful consideration I have definitely come to the conclusion that the conduct of the war to a successful and decisive issue cannot be effectively carried on except by a Cabinet which represents all parties of the State. I need not enter into the reasons, sufficiently obvious, which point to this as the best solution, in the interests of the country, of the problems which the war now presents." In agreeing to enter the Government Mr. Bonar Law replied: "The considerations to which you refer have

for some time been present to the mind of Lord Lansdowne and myself." These statements, obviously mutually understood by the two leaders, can hardly be read as referring to a munitions crisis, or to the resignation of a great permanent official. It would be an adequate explanation of the phrases used by both leaders if we suppose that they had come to the conviction that, in order to carry the war to a decisive conclusion, sacrifices of life and treasure must be exacted from the nation which only a Government of all parties, a ministry of national concentration, would have sufficient authority to enforce.

Mr. Asquith's public justification of the Coalition Ministry was given to the House of Commons on June 15th. In his speech he went out of his way to contradict all the current explanations of the Coalition. "Let me say at once, in the plainest possible terms," he said, "that I should not have been justified in doing what I have done under the pressure of any outside influence, or any temporary embarrassment, or any transient Parliamentary exigency." He declared that "no body of men could have done more, or could have done better," than the late Government. He stated very strongly all the reasons, political and historical, against coalition, and declared that there was not even anything gained in the substitution of A for B in this office or that. The justification of the Coalition was "a unique national exigency," a situation which made a demand "upon the energy and patriotism of the nation," and upon the confidence of the nation in the Government,

which "could not be measured by any precedent." In a later speech in the same debate he dismissed as unfounded every criticism of the policy of the late Government.

A very important incident of the Coalition was the creation of a new ministry, the Ministry of Munitions, to which Mr. Lloyd George was appointed. The function of the new ministry was to organise the manufacturing resources of the country for the production of munitions of war—a task which had grown beyond the powers of any existing department. It was to

gather up and solve all the problems which had been matters of such anxious discussion and effort since the beginning of the year. The drink evil had already been dealt with. The first act of the new Department was to introduce a Bill for dealing with labour difficulties. The Bill provided for compulsory arbitration in all labour disputes, and for the suspension of trade union rules and practices which tended to restrict output. It also put munition workers under certain restrictions as to leaving their employment. It was agreed that miners, who strongly resisted compulsory arbitration, should be exempted from the operation of the Bill. The Bill has only just become law, and no judgment is yet possible as to its

efficacy. More important, however, than the details of any particular legislation was the thorough and efficient ventilation of the question that might be expected to follow the intervention of a man of such ebullient energy and remarkable power of working up popular enthusiasm.



The Cabinet crisis: Sir Edward Grey (wearing blue glasses) and Sir John Simon leaving Whitehall. [Sport and General.]

The Manchester Guardian
HISTORY
of the
WAR



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
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
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
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A demonstration in support of Italian intervention in Rome.

[Topical Press.]

CHAPTER XXXII.


THE INTERVENTION OF ITALY.

THE ANOMALY OF THE TRIPLE ALLIANCE—ITALY'S RELATIONS WITH AUSTRIA—CLAUSE VII. OF THE ALLIANCE—THE MEANING OF AUSTRIA'S ATTACK ON SERBIA—ITALY'S TITLE TO COMPENSATION—HER PROTEST AND DEMANDS—AUSTRIA'S REPLIES—DENUNCIATION OF THE TRIPLE ALLIANCE—SIGNOR GIOLITTI'S INTERVENTION—RESIGNATION OF THE MINISTRY—A POPULAR OUTBURST—TRIUMPH OF THE MINISTRY—THE SPIRIT OF ITALY—DECLARATION OF WAR

ITALY entered into the Triple Alliance in 1882; she formally denounced it on May 4th, 1912. The Alliance is one of the curiosities of history. It was essentially a compact not of peoples but of politicians; but the same might be said of many other famous international instruments. It was the result of the isolation of Italy after the Franco-Prussian war, and her fear of attack from France on the one hand and Austria on the other. Her original idea was to secure the support of Germany against both her rivals, but Bismarck's fixed determination to go hand in hand with Austria eventually compelled the Italian Ministers to accept an alliance which had a point only against France. Even here the hopes of Italy were disappointed. While Bismarck lived he did indeed give Italy what diplomatic support he could in Mediterranean questions, but he never had the least intention of running the risk of war simply in order to forward Italian ambitions on the north coast of Africa. His successors bettered his policy; France got her way; Italy became more and more discontented, and eventually made an accommodation with France, supported her against her own Allies—Germany and Austria—at the Conference of Algiers,

and was clearly gravitating towards the Triple Entente and away from the Triple Alliance.

That Italy entered the Alliance from a sense of fear and a dread of isolation did not make it remarkable. What was strange was that for over thirty years this Alliance existed between two Powers which had been bitter enemies in the past, were present rivals, and almost certainly the antagonists in a future war. The Alliance always suffered from the weakness that it had no root in the sympathies of the two peoples. "Berlin," wrote Crispi, the Italian statesman who had discussed with Bismarck the beginnings of this Alliance, "cannot be ignorant of the strength that diplomatic compacts derive in our day from the support of the masses, this being even more the case when those compacts imply brotherhood in arms and in the shedding of blood. The efficacy of alliances to-day is proportionate indeed to the degree of popularity they enjoy, and they cannot be popular unless their utility be manifest." So far, however, was there from being any community of interest or bond of sympathy between Austria and Italy, that even their rulers could not at times conceal the latent but deep hostility. The most striking instance of this had occurred



Popular feeling before the outbreak of war: Police barring streets of Rome in order to prevent disorder among the demonstrators on behalf of intervention. [Newspaper Illustrations.]



Troops held in reserve in case of serious rioting.

[Newspaper Illustrations.]

in 1907, when the Austrian Chief of the General Staff had let it be known that in his opinion Austria should seize the opportunity to fall upon her Ally while she was engaged in the Tripolitan Expedition.

THE GROUNDS OF HOSTILITY.


The fact was that the future of Italy—all the hopes and ambitions which she cherished on her eastern frontiers both by land and sea—could only be realised at Austria's expense. Signor Salandra, who was Prime Minister of Italy at this period, defined the objects of his country as three, and there was none of them that did not involve a large surrender by Austria of her present rights or her ambitions for the future. "Italy," he said, "must defend the interests of the Italian race." She must, that was to say, recover for Italy those Italian regions which the War of Liberation had left within the Austrian Empire—Trent, the Italian-speaking lands of the Isonzo district, the Italian communities of the Istrian coast, and if not also Trieste, yet a large measure of independence for its Italian population, so that their Italian traditions and habit of mind should not be forced by Austria into an alien mould. The second ambition of Italy was to secure a better strategic frontier. Again, only Austria could give what was sought, holding, as she did, the gates of the mountains by which to send her armies down into the plains of Northern Italy. Third, but not least, Italy was concerned to make herself secure in the Adriatic. Her position there is one which an Englishman can well appreciate. Her eastern coast is a long and weakly-defended line, already exposed to attack from the Austrian bases at the head of the Adriatic, and certain to be endangered still more if at any time the Albanian coast fell into Austrian hands.

It was largely the Adriatic question which gave the Balkans their importance in the eyes of Italy. The aim which Austria had for many years kept before her was to penetrate through Serbia to Salonica and the *Ægean* Sea.

If she came through Serbia it was unlikely that she would not seek to absorb Albania and its coast, including Valona—the most valuable base still unoccupied in the Adriatic, and the possession of which by a hostile Power might easily close the whole sea to Italy. Italian policy, therefore, was designed, if possible, to acquire Valona and other bases on the eastern side of the sea, lest they should fall into possibly hostile hands; but, in any case, not to allow Austria to move one single step forward in the north without acquiring immediate and complete compensation for herself. To this end, agreements had been entered into between Austria and Italy on the subject of Albania, and a special clause was inserted in the Treaty of the Triple Alliance in order to deal with any change of conditions which one of the two Powers might bring about in the Balkans or on the neighbouring coasts. The careful and precise wording of this clause shows clearly the developments which each country feared, and how accurately they had foreshadowed the actual course of events. Never did two more jealous Powers enter into an alliance; never did Allies watch each other more jealously. Clause VII. of the Alliance ran as follows:—*

"Austria-Hungary and Italy who have solely in view the maintenance, as far as possible, of the territorial *status quo* in the East, engage themselves to use their influence to prevent all territorial changes which might be disadvantageous to the one or the other of the Powers signatory of the present Treaty. To this end they will

* The extracts from the Triple Alliance appeared in the *Vossische Zeitung*, and were translated in *The Times* of June 1st.



Signor Salandra.
[Stanleys Press Agency.]



Signor Giolitti.
[Record Press.]



After the Declaration of War : German beer being run away at an Italian Customs store.

[Newspaper Illustrations.]



Anti-German rioting in Milan : Burning the furniture from a German shop in one of the public squares.

[Sport and General.]



Italy and her Neighbours.

give reciprocally all information calculated to enlighten each other concerning their own intentions and those of other Powers. Should, however, the case arise that, in the course of events, the maintenance of the *status quo* in the territory of the Balkans or of the Ottoman coasts and islands in the Adriatic or the Aegean Seas become impossible, and that, either in consequence of the action of a third Power or for any other reason, Austria-Hungary or Italy should be obliged to change the *status quo* for their part by a temporary or permanent occupation, such occupation would only take place after previous agreement between the two Powers, which would have to be based upon the principle of a reciprocal compensation for all territorial or other advantages that either of them might acquire over and above the existing *status quo*, and would have to satisfy the interests and rightful claims of both parties."

AUSTRIA AND THE BALKAN WARS.

If Clause VII. had been drawn up entirely by the Italian Government it could scarcely have been better designed to meet the situation which arose after the Balkan Wars. The result of the first Balkan War was to dash all the plans of Austria. A strong and enlarged Serbia now stood in her path, closely allied with Greece, which had come into possession of Salonica and the adjoining coast. Albania, indeed, had been rescued from Serbia, and given an independent position, but Austria was not minded to accept even the partial aggrandisement of Serbia. A statement which was made by Signor Giolitti in the Italian Chamber early in December, 1914, made

it clear that even at the time of the Balkan Wars Austria had decided that she would not consent to the expulsion of the Turks from Macedonia, and the substitution for their rotten rule of a growing and ambitious Power. "In the summer of 1913," said Giolitti, "Austria had announced to her Allies, Germany and Italy, that she intended to take action against Serbia, that she nevertheless regarded her policy as defensive, and considered that under the Triple Alliance she had a *casus fœderis*, and could call on her Allies to assist her." The Italian Government were agreed that the *casus fœderis* did not exist. "It is not a case of defence," Giolitti said to his Foreign Minister, San Giuliano, "because no one thinks of attacking Austria. It is necessary that Austria should be informed of this in the most formal manner, and Germany must be urged to take action to turn Austria from this very dangerous adventure."

The object of Austria in taking this course must have been to test the attitude of the Italian Government; it could scarcely have maintained seriously that it was the object of attack, present or intended, by Serbia. Clauses III. and IV. of the Alliance, which also have been published in the German Press, show that Austria had no title to make any claim on the active help of her Allies, and that at the most she might only have attempted to argue that the expansion and the designs of Serbia were so great a danger to her that she was compelled in self-defence to make war, and proposed, therefore,



Italian infantry on the march.

[Central News.]



Italian Bluejackets and transport waggons.

[Central News.

to claim the "benevolent neutrality" of her Allies. These clauses were as follows :—

"CLAUSE III.—In case one or two of the high contracting parties, without direct provocation on their part, should be attacked by one or more Great Powers not signatory of the present Treaty, and should become involved in a war with them, the *casus fœderis* would arise simultaneously for all the high contracting parties.

"CLAUSE IV.—In case a Great Power not signatory of the present Treaty should threaten the State security of one of the high contracting parties, and in case the threatened party should thereby be compelled to declare war against that Great Power, the two other contracting parties engage themselves to maintain benevolent neutrality towards their Ally. Each of them reserves its right in this case, to take part in the war if it thinks fit in order to make common cause with its Ally."

THE POSITION IN 1914.


From the summer of 1913, therefore, the statesmen of the Triple Alliance must have known clearly where they stood. Austria had discovered that Italy would not support or countenance an unprovoked attack on Serbia; Italy knew that this was a design which Austria had in mind, and which might at any moment be carried out with incalculable results to her interests in the Balkans and the Adriatic. When Austria, in the following year, made the assassination of the Archduke the pretext for her war on Serbia, she showed that she had understood the lesson of the previous year. She came to no agreement with Italy, offered no compensation, did not consult with her, and did not even announce to her the steps which she was about to take. It was perfectly clear, therefore, that the provisions of the Triple Alliance—that is to say of Clause VII.—had been broken by the ultimatum

of July 23rd, and two days later the Italian Government formally intimated to Austria that they were of that opinion.

The Marquis Di San Giuliano sent a despatch to the Duke of Avarna, the Italian Ambassador in Vienna, in which he stated that he and the Premier had pointed out to the Austrian Ambassador in Rome that "Austria had no right, according to the spirit of the Triple Alliance, to make a *démarche* like that made in Belgrade without coming to an agreement beforehand with her Allies." This was the formal protest made by Italy, who, while proclaiming her neutrality, thus indicated that in her own good time she might take up with Austria the question of Clause VII.

OCCUPATION OF VALONA BY ITALY.

It was not until December that Italy came directly to the question of compensation with Austria, but at the end of October she took a step which indicated clearly what manner of course it was that she had marked out for herself. She occupied the island of Saseno and Valona, in front of which it lies, on the Albanian coast. The seizure of Valona gave Italy the control of both coasts at the mouth of the Adriatic. Italy now held the neck of the bottle, and Austria, with her fleet and commerce alike, was cooped up at the far end of the sea, and her access to the wider waters of the Mediterranean and beyond made dependent on the grace of her chief rival. In normal times Italy could not have gained Valona without drawing her sword against her Ally; if she took it now she was well aware that she would probably have to fight to retain possession of it against an Austria which emerged victorious from the war. It was a fair inference, therefore—since no one at this stage could say that Germany and



Baron Sonnino. [Central News.



Gabriele d'Annunzio (on the left) as an officer of an Italian cavalry regiment. [Record Press.




Reservists arriving in Rome for mobilisation.

[Central News.]



Italian infantry marching to the frontier after mobilisation.

[Newspaper Illustrations.]



Austrian offers and Italy's demands.

Austria were likely to be beaten—that the Italian Government had made up its mind to realise the interests of Italy to the full, and, unless the wholly unexpected should happen, to enter into the war on the side of the Allies. There were, as will be seen, other powerful reasons which impelled them to this end, besides the desire to attain the three objects described by Signor Salandra—the unity of the Italian race, a better frontier, and security in the Adriatic.

THE OPENING OF NEGOTIATIONS.

Early in December the Italian Ministry entered on the negotiations which were to lead to war in May. They instructed the Duke of Avarna to make a formal demand on Austria for compensation, and they pointed out that Clause VII. of the Triple Alliance laid it down that compensation might have to be granted if advantages were obtained in the Balkans which were not of a territorial kind. This despatch, which was one of the most important published in the Italian Green Book on the negotiations, was as follows:—

"The actual military advance of Austria-Hungary in Serbia constitutes a fact which must be the object of examination on the part of the Italian and Austro-Hungarian Governments on the basis of the stipulations expressed in Article VII. of the Triple Alliance. According to this article it is the duty of the Austro-Hungarian Government to consult Italy even as regards a temporary

occupation, and to come to an understanding in regard to compensations. The Imperial and Royal Government ought hence to have come to an agreement with us before the Austro-Hungarian army was ordered to cross the Servian frontier.

"To make our attitude clearer we must remind the Imperial and Royal Government that during our war with Turkey it forbade us certain military operations which would have certainly shortened the duration of the war. Our operations against the Dardanelles also gave occasion for formal reservations on the part of the Imperial and Royal Government.

"Italy has great interest in the maintenance of the full integrity as well as the political and economic independence of Serbia. The Austro-Hungarian Government has declared on various occasions that it did not aim at territorial acquisitions at the expense of Serbia, but such a declaration does not constitute a formal undertaking, and the very assurances which the Imperial and Royal Government gave us when Turkey entered the field suggest the possibility of further political modifications in the Balkan peninsula. It must also be noted that in accordance with the said Article VII. Italy may claim compensation for advantages not necessarily territorial which the Austro-Hungarian Government may obtain in the Balkan peninsula.

"Signs of restlessness are noticeable in Parliament and in Italian public opinion which clearly show the tendency of the national aspirations of Italy. This restlessness, these aspirations, the Italian Government is bound seriously to consider."

The Austrian Chancellor was still at this time Count Berchtold, whose policy had led to the war, and he

replied that such a momentary occupation as the Servian campaign was likely to entail could not be held to come within the scope of Clause VII. There was an unconscious irony about this answer, which was clearly inconsistent with both the letter and the spirit of the Triple Alliance, for just about the time when it was made Austria was suffering her greatest and most humiliating defeat in the mountains of Servia. Possibly it was the knowledge of the extent of the reverses in Servia which led more completely to a change of mind in Count Berchtold, himself shortly to be thrown from power. At all events, before the end of the month he had admitted that any territorial occupation of Servia whatever gave Italy ground for a demand for compensation, and that an agreement with her ought to have been reached before Austria went to war.


PRINCE VON BÜLOW GOES TO ROME.

With the beginning of 1915 two new personages came on the scene. Count Berchtold had fallen, and the Hungarian statesman, Baron Burian, had taken his place. Prince von Bülow, the former German Chancellor, and, before that, German Ambassador in Rome, had been sent to Italy in order to sustain the wavering Ally in her neutrality. The rôle of Germany was two-fold. Headquarters in Berlin was to put pressure on Vienna in order to persuade her to satisfy Italian ambitions, and in Rome Von Bülow—who had numerous and powerful connections among the Italian nobility, to whom his wife belonged—was to impress the virtues of moderation on the Salandra Ministry, and, if it showed itself inclined to a warlike policy, to mobilise against it the whole of that extensive influence—political, commercial, financial—which Germany had for many years commanded in Italy.

Von Bülow opened his campaign by saying that Italy should have the purely Italian district of Trent after the war. The Austrian Minister in Rome, when sounded on the subject, had nothing to say about Trent, but desired to turn the attentions of Italy towards Albania, which, if it was there to be taken, was at any rate not Austria's to give away. Baron Sonnino, who had succeeded San Giuliano as Italian Foreign Minister, replied to these

overtures by the remark that Italy's hopes might be said, in brief, to include both Trent and Trieste, to which Von Bülow rejoined that Austria would sooner fight than surrender Trieste. With February came a new stage. Since her last great defeat Austria had made no movement against Servia, nor did it seem likely that she would be able to do so, since all her fresh troops were tied up in the great Carpathian campaign. At the same time there were now and again rumours that a new expedition, possibly with German support, was preparing against Servia, and at any rate the unfortunate condition of that country, which was now stricken with a terrible epidemic of typhus, was such as to threaten a collapse if a fresh invasion in great force had to be met. The Italian

Government apparently thought that a renewed invasion was not impossible, and they, therefore, warned Austria that she must not take any fresh action in the Balkans until she had made a definite agreement with Italy on the basis of Clause VII. of the Alliance. That there might be no possibility of misunderstanding, Baron Sonnino declared that his warning had "the precise significance of a veto" on any further advance by Austria. There was so far no indication that Austria took the situation seriously, or that she thought it would be necessary to cede any of her own territories. Baron Sonnino, therefore, on the 4th of March, summed up the Italian position as it stood at that moment. "First,"



An Austrian sentry on duty on a railway bridge near the Austro-Italian frontier. [Photopress.]

he said, "there must be no further Austrian military action in the Balkans without an agreement as to compensation. Secondly, if this condition were broken, Italy would regain full liberty of action, and would take her own course. Thirdly, no agreement could be reached unless it were based on the surrender of land already in the possession of Austria. Fourthly, Italy must be compensated for what Austria had already done against Servia, even if she did nothing more; but if the advantage gained by Austria proved to be more than at present seemed likely, Italy's compensation must be proportionately increased. Fifthly, whatever territorial compensation was granted must be publicly announced,

and Italy must be allowed to enter into occupation at once."

This statement convinced the Austrian Chancellor that the situation was more critical than he had supposed, and he promptly agreed to accept the principle that Austria would have to surrender some of her own territory. But he refused entirely to allow Italy to enter into immediate occupation, and at this point Von Bülow intervened to save the situation. "Austria," he said, could not consent to surrender territory at once, but Germany herself would guarantee that Austria would fully execute all her promises when the war came to an end." On this basis, although it was not for one moment accepted by the Italian Government, Austria proceeded to frame her offer.

First of all, however, Baron Burian drew up a list of pledges which Italy was to give in return for what she received. She must concede to Austria full liberty of action in the Balkans—Albania excluded; she must renounce the idea of any further compensation, whatever course the war might afterwards take in favour of Austria; she must pledge herself to benevolent neutrality of every kind for the duration of the war; and, finally, she must agree to carry out the existing agreement by which the two Powers undertook not to gain any advantage over each other in Albania. In return for these promises, Baron Burian undertook that Austria would surrender part of the Trentino, and he asked for counter proposals from Italy. These he received at the end of the first week in April, and they proved to be very much larger than anything which had yet been discussed. Italy demanded that she should receive the Trentino; that on the eastern frontier her boundaries should be advanced to the Isonzo river; and that she should occupy the strong and strategic positions of Tolmino, Gorizia, Gradisca, Plezzo, Monfalcone, and Malborghetto. Trieste was to be formed into a State independent of Austria. A number of the Dalmatian islands were to be surrendered. Italian sovereignty over Valona was to be recognised, and Austria was to declare herself disinterested in Albania.

About this time there were rumours that Austria

and Russia were likely to conclude a separate peace. Possibly they were put about in the hope of persuading Italy to be more lenient in her terms. The result, at any rate, was that the Italian Government pressed for a definite answer to its proposals. But it received no satisfaction, and at the end of the month the Duke of Avarna declared that Austria did not believe that Italy would really go to war, that she was merely procrastinating, and that an agreement could not be reached. On May 4th, Baron Sonnino denounced the Triple Alliance, and proclaimed that Italy had regained complete freedom of action. Meanwhile, the Italian Ministry, seeing that the rupture with Austria had become inevitable, had entered into negotiations with the Allies, and an agreement had


been reached in principle. Its terms were kept secret; but apparently, besides giving to Italy the concessions which she had demanded from Austria on her northern and eastern fronts, it had assigned to her also Northern Dalmatia and the islands off the coast. The report of this last undertaking, which, if carried into effect, would involve the transference to Italy of a large Serbo-Croat population, led to some expressions of discontent in Serbia.

SIGNOR GIOLITTI.

It now appeared that war was certain and imminent. Germany and Austria were faced with a fresh enemy, and with the knowledge that their diplomacy had suffered yet another disaster, and that when the war was done they,


who were to have had the assistance of Italy against France and Russia, would not only have lost her aid for good, but had thrown her definitely into the ranks of their enemies. But Germany did not abandon the struggle. Von Bülow had certain resources to fall back upon, and he received a welcome and perhaps not unexpected ally, who, for a moment, seemed likely to turn Italy back from the path on which the Ministry had set her. Signor Giolitti came to Rome.

Signor Giolitti had for many years been virtually dictator of Italian politics. An astute manager of men, and an unrivalled manipulator of the political machine, he had gradually surrounded himself with a powerful



Italian engineers fortifying a position on the frontier.

[Topical Press



A demonstration of Italian residents, before the Italian Embassy in London, on the Declaration of War.

[Central Press.]

corps of politicians and officials who could be depended on at any time to do his bidding. His career as Prime Minister had more than once been interrupted by failure and political scandal, and it had been his habit when the storm broke, or as soon as he thought it was about to break, to retire from office in favour of a partisan of his own, who would form a temporary "caretaker" Ministry, or an opponent who would hold office at his pleasure. In retirement, Signor Giolitti would await the moment when he could give the word to his followers and return to power once more. Already since the beginning of the war he had made it known through one of his senator friends that he thought Italy could and should settle her differences with Austria by process of bargaining, and it was discovered now when he came to Rome at the height of the political crisis that his opinions had not changed. On the precise nature of his motives it is only possible to speculate. He had once been regarded as the Italian representative of *Realpolitik*, which, eschewing sentiment, guides itself only by considerations of material interest. But even these principles do not entirely explain Giolitti's attitude. What was to be the future for Italy after the war? If the German Powers were beaten, what would be the standing of his country with the Allies, from whom in this great struggle she had stood aloof? And how, when the fate of Turkey, of the Near East, and of the Ægean was being settled, would Italy be able to make her views heard and secure her future? On the other hand, if Germany and Austria emerged victorious from the war, how would they deal with Italy—Austria

having had wrenched from her a long list of concessions by the threat of war, and Germany triumphing over Europe and resentful of the Ally of whom before she had only been contemptuous?

These things at least, it might have been supposed, would have appealed to Signor Giolitti, although the larger vision which inspired the Italian Government and the great masses of the people—the idea of an Italy taking her stand on the side of the free nations, and making for herself a larger and more independent sphere of national action—awakened in him no response. At all events, his coming fell in aptly with the campaign which Germany entered on at the eleventh hour in order to overthrow Salandra. Von Bülow had reported to his Government that four-fifths of the Italian Senate and two-thirds of the Chamber of Deputies were in favour of neutrality. To work upon their feelings, and especially on the inclinations of the Clericals, Herr Erzberger, the leader of the German Clerical party, was brought to Rome. While Prince von Bülow worked his hardest among his senatorial and noble friends, while Signor Giolitti made it known to all his adherents that he was on the side of the foreign Powers so busily intriguing against his own Government, and while Herr Erzberger co-operated with the Vatican in urging that Italy should make a peaceful agreement with the greatest Catholic Power, circulars were being distributed containing a list of the greatly extended concessions which Austria was at last prepared to make in order to avert war. It will be seen that these concessions went beyond anything

that Austria had hitherto taken into consideration. They were read to the Reichstag on May 18th by the German Chancellor, and that he read them was a formal indication to the world that the breaking point had then been reached. They were these, he said :—

"(1) The part of the Tyrol inhabited by the Italians to be ceded to Italy.

"(2) Likewise the western bank of the Isonzo, in so far as the population is purely Italian, and the town of Gradisca.

"(3) Trieste to be made an Imperial free city, receiving an administration giving an Italian character to the city, and to have an Italian university.

"(4) The recognition of Italian sovereignty over Valona and the sphere of interests belonging thereto.

"(5) Austria-Hungary declares her political disinterestedness regarding Albania.

"(6) The national interests of Italian nationals in Austria-Hungary to be particularly respected.

"(7) Austria-Hungary grants an amnesty for political or military criminals who are natives of the ceded territories.

"(8) The further wishes of Italy regarding general questions to be assured of every consideration.

"(9) Austria-Hungary after the conclusion of the agreement to give a solemn declaration concerning the concessions.

"(10) Mixed commissions for the regulation of details of the concessions to be appointed.

"(11) After the conclusion of the agreement Austro-Hungarian soldiers, natives of the occupied territories, shall not further participate in the war."

There was one detail that was even yet to be added. On the next day the Austrian Embassy added a further clause. The Commissions, it said, which were to settle the boundaries of the territorial concessions, would begin

their work immediately the agreement was concluded, and as soon as they had reached a decision the territories surrendered would be assigned to Italy. But the moment had long passed for a promise of this kind to have effect.

DEFEAT OF THE INTRIGUERS.

Faced by the combined manœuvres of Giolitti, Von Bülow, Herr Erzberger, and all their train, the Salandra Ministry resigned on May 13th. For a moment it seemed possible that Italy would turn back. But Signor Giolitti's political acuteness had for once completely failed him. He was unable to read the temper of his own people, or to see that there was something afoot now which was bigger than a mere rivalry between Austria and Italy, to be settled by give-and-take, by haggling for patches of frontier, or bargaining about the neutrality of Albania. Even the three-fold programme of Italian aspirations which the Salandra Ministry had set before itself in the winter no longer expressed the hopes and fears which possessed the minds of the Italian people. Their sympathies, which from the beginning had been almost entirely with France and England, had been intensified, like those of every freedom-loving people, by the spirit and temper in which Germany had entered on and waged the war. They had sometimes said to themselves in earlier years that they were the vassal of Germany and the Alliance; they saw now in earnest that nothing less would be their future if they bargained with Austria and the German Powers triumphed in the war. "Suppose," said Signor Salandra, a few days later, "that Austria had refused at the end of the war to carry out her promises—



Italian reservists leaving Charing Cross Station after the outbreak of war.

[Sport and General.

to whom should we address ourselves? To our common superior, to Germany?" In some degree the Italian people felt as M. Venizelos felt when he addressed to the King of Greece his memorandum declaring that the future of the small and weak States was bound up with the defeat of Germany and the success of the Allies. Italy was not a small and weak State like one of those in the Balkans. She was a great Power, proud and ambitious, but she was much weaker both in a military and an economic sense than Germany, and for her no less than for smaller States the triumph of her German Allies meant a future of dependence. There was, too, a strong popular feeling that Italy was too much regarded as an appendage of the Germans. The poet D'Annunzio, who came to Rome at this time and played no small part in rousing the people by his impassioned appeals that they should play a worthy and generous part in a war of liberation, made this one of his most telling points. "We are not," he said, "and we will not be, a museum, an inn, a village summer resort, a sky painted with Prussian blue for international honeymoon couples, a delightful market for buying and selling, fraud and barter."

It was precisely at this moment that the Italians found that the diplomatic machinery of Germany and Austria, official and unofficial, was being used to step in between the Government which represented Italy and the wishes of the people. Then a storm broke which few had foreseen. Throughout Italy there were passionate demonstrations of anger against the intriguers, both

Italian and German, who had overthrown the Ministry. Some months before, an acute observer had said that eventually those who guided the policy of Italy would have to choose between war with Austria and revolution. The saying was not so exaggerated as it had seemed to be at the time. The adherents of Signor Giolitti were attacked in the streets. German institutions and those which favoured Germany were assailed. Giolitti himself was the object of bitter and almost universal execration. "An immense outburst of indignation," said Salandra, summing up the history of these days, "was kindled through Italy, and not among the populace only, but among the noblest and most educated classes, and among all the youth of the country, which is ready to shed its blood for the nation." The politicians were quick to read such signs as these. The statesmen whom the King consulted declined to make any attempt to form a Ministry. The reports that Giolitti would become Premier, or take a seat in someone else's Cabinet, died away. It was found that three hundred Conservative and Clerical deputies, who had been regarded as neutralists, were, after all, quite open to conviction. Neutralist editors saw the light with the suddenness and certitude of an evangelical conversion. Every obstacle was consumed in the flame of popular passion. On May 16th the King intimated to Signor Salandra that he should remain in office with his Ministry. Signor Giolitti withdrew from Rome. The neutralists were heard no longer. Parliament met and gave the Ministry an overwhelming vote of confidence. On May 23rd war was declared on Austria.



Windhoek, the capital of South-West Africa.

[Topical Press.

CHAPTER XXXIII.

THE CONQUEST OF SOUTH-WEST AFRICA.

DIFFICULTIES OF THE INVASION—THE END OF MARITZ—MACKENZIE'S ADVANCE—THE ATTACK FROM THE SOUTH—THE NORTHERN FORCE—THE POISONING OF WELLS—WINDHOEK AND AFTER.

BEFORE Christmas, 1914, General Botha had sufficiently completed his brilliant rounding-up of the rebels in the Free State and Transvaal to allow the attack on German South-West Africa, suspended for three months, to be energetically renewed. The plan of the attack was rigorously determined by the physical features of the colony. The fertile centre of South-West Africa, in which the capital and chief settlements are situated, lies on a tableland surrounded on all sides by a girdle of desert, rising in parts into bare and forbidding mountains, baked by an intolerable sun, and swept by violent sandstorms. Inside this belt of wilderness a railway system, some 900 miles in length, runs from end to end of the agricultural part of the colony, linking Grootfontein, on the extreme north, with Kalkfontein, near the Union frontier, on the south, and touching Windhoek, the capital, Keetmanshoop, and most of the other important settlements. From this backbone of railway two branches stretch westward across the desert to the colony's only ports, Luderitz Bay and Swakopmund. A little to the south of Swakopmund lies the little British possession, Walvis Bay, which, in spite of its small size, is one of the most important harbours in the South African region.

by German territory and its lack of railway communication with the interior, we had retained because of its excellent harbour and its value as a whaling station. It was now to prove of the first value.

To the north of the Germans lay the invertebrate and badly-administered Portuguese territory of Angola. Advance from the east was blocked by the Great Kalahari Desert in Bechuanaland; on the south, approach had to be made through the difficult and sparsely-populated part of the North-West Cape, which had given us so much trouble in the South African war, and where the scarcity of roads and railways made advance doubly difficult. The Germans were not content with the great natural defences of their colony. They meditated aggression, and prepared for it with characteristic thoroughness. For years three-fourths of the money voted for the colony by the Reichstag had been put to military uses. We have already seen (Vol. I., Chap. XXV.) that they had concentrated, as near Union territory as their railways would allow, a force of troops, artillery, and aeroplanes quite disproportionate to their defensive needs. Their intention was to take advantage of the disaffection which their agents



A detachment of the German Camel Corps on the march in South-West Africa.
[Underwood & Underwood.]



German cavalry in South-West Africa.
[Underwood & Underwood.]

had encouraged among the Dutch in the Union, and which Maritz assured them would be widespread, came to a head, to take command of the rebels, supply them with the arms they lacked, and march on Pretoria. Whether they would, if successful, have fulfilled their promise to the Boers by establishing the old Republics may be left to conjecture. In the face of any considerable German-cum-rebel invasion of the Union, General Botha could not, of course, have spared sufficient men to attack the German colony. The failure of the rebellion, the speed of the Union's recovery, and the force of her reply, paralysed the enemy. German South-West Africa went down in reality before a characteristic mistake of the Wilhelmstrasse, to which the ready treachery of Maritz and the open discontent of a few Boer irreconcilables lent colour.

It is curious now to reflect that had we taken Bismarck's early advice we might have had the colony as a gift. When the enterprising Bremen merchant, Luderitz, landed at the bay named after him, Germany had not yet embarked upon a colonial policy, and Bismarck believed that if she were wise she never would. He consulted us before he gave the Imperial blessing to Luderitz, and asked us if we would extend our protection to the new settlement. We had our hands full at the time, and declined. In 1884 Bismarck annexed Damaraland and Namaqualand, and soon a sanguinary war with its native population gave the colony an excuse for a bloated military expenditure. With the Boer War came the idea of shaping racial differences in South Africa to German ends, and thenceforward the Imperial Government seems to have counted less on the likelihood of having to defend the colony than on the chances of using it for a successful attack on its southern neighbour.

THE END OF MARITZ.

The danger to the Union of invasion was not quite ended with the breaking of the rebellion. Maritz and Kemp were still menacing the frontier with a force of mixed rebels and Germans. On December 22nd, with 800 men, they attacked a Union force half their size at Nours, near Schuit Drift, on the Orange River. Beaten off, they turned north and then east, and on January 24th, 1,200 strong, with four field guns and two pom-poms, they penetrated some seventy-five miles into the Union, and fell unexpectedly on the town of Upington, which was defended by commandoes under Colonel Van Deventer. They bombarded the town for three hours from the north bank of the river, but Van Deventer was then able to take the offensive and pursue them for fifteen miles. This was the last serious attempt of Maritz to justify himself to the Germans. It took what spirit was left out of the rebels under him, and completed his disgrace with his Allies, to whom he had promised the immediate support of at least 10,000, whereas he brought them at the most no more than 1,500. His burghers realised that they had been duped with the story of the restoration of the Republics, and told him so. Kemp and his commando, including the troublesome "prophet" Van Rensburg, surrendered at once, and the rest of the 1,200 or so rebels still with the Germans came in soon after. Hot on their heels, and designed perhaps to head them off, came a purely German attack on Kakamas, between Upington and the border. The enemy again bombarded from across the Orange River, with no better result than before. The defenders forced the river and routed them, and henceforth the frontier was safe. The chief fords of the Orange River were held and kept by us, and were soon

made bases for an advance. Maritz, suspected by the Germans of double-dealing in the matter of the surrender of his men, took no further part in hostilities, and fled, it was said, towards Central Africa. The history of his rebellion proved him a man of as little judgment as honour. He fell an easy prey to the promises the Germans held out in the preposterous "treaty" which he signed with the Governor of South-West Africa; he deluded them in turn into believing that they could march on Pretoria with the Transvaal and Free State at their backs; and he failed utterly to gauge the light in which the great mass of Dutch South Africans would regard his treachery.

The Union was now secure from invasion, and the attack on South-West Africa could be resumed. The troops used in the suppression of the rebellion were insufficient for so arduous a campaign, and commandeering was resorted to. In view of the recent troubles, the experiment might seem to British eyes a dangerous one. The South African point of view was well explained in an announcement made by the Union Government on January 1st:—

"There is a very large section of the Dutch-speaking community, with the most excellent military qualifications and war experience, who are perfectly ready to give their services in freeing South Africa from the menace of German militarism, but who have a fundamental prejudice against the principle of volunteering. Shortly, their attitude is that if the Government require their services they should commandeer them. A Proclamation, therefore, is being issued to-day providing the legal machinery to meet this feeling.

"While maintaining its undoubted constitutional right to demand the personal service of all able-bodied citizens, the Government desires to avoid imposing avoidable hardship. The Proclamation therefore calls upon certain areas to contribute a reasonable quota of the men required, leaving the local officers to make the most suitable selections, retaining, however, the right of legal compulsion."

Some 500 men advanced to their local commandants reasons why they should not serve, while professing willingness to do so if these reasons were duly considered and met. Local boards, consisting of a magistrate, a district staff officer, and a local commandant were appointed to weigh these cases, with good results. Seventy-one men refused point-blank to serve, and these were court-martialled. The backbone of General Botha's armies was thus composed of commandoes organised on the old territorial lines, together with units of the Defence Force, such as the Cape Field Artillery, the South African Mounted Riflemen, and the Rand Light Infantry, and regiments with some special sentimental bond, such as Major Naude's Scouts, the South African Irish, and the Transvaal Scottish. A striking picture of the variety and toughness of the army that resulted from these means of recruiting was given in a letter from a correspondent with the Northern Force:—

"We are an odd assortment of humanity in the Northern Force. There are men from Delagoa, men from Rhodesia, others from the malarial swamps of Central Africa, one hard-bitten warrior from Lake N'gami, and a wiry contingent of Swazies (all quite white, but occasionally heard to discourse in wild and wonderful languages). Then there are men who call a 'dixie' a 'billy,' and prate of the 'swag' and 'humping the bluey,' while others, from the rugged Rockies 'guess and calc'late' as to the duration of the campaign, in company with the bronzed, bearded, and 'happy-go-lucky' denizens of the illimitable veld. Intermingled with these woolly veterans are lawyers, doctors, magistrates, bankers, editors, farmers, and a whole 'Empire' full of actors and songsters, from whom the material for our concerts is drawn. Such, for the most



General Smuts (marked x) reviewing some of the troops returned from South-West Africa at Johannesburg.
[I.N.A.]



General Botha and his Staff in the field.

[Underwood & Underwood.]

part, is our composition, and a more formidable force it would be hard to find. With the majority, campaigning comes as naturally and gracefully as (to use a colloquialism) 'falling off a log,' and a camp on the unutterable sand dunes, or the luxury of being billeted in a furnished domicile in Swakopmund, is all one and the same to the old stager. Nothing comes amiss."

The plan of invasion consisted in an attack from four points. General Botha himself, using Walfish Bay as a base, was to capture the port and railway terminus of Swakopmund, which adjoins it, and, taking the line of the railway inland from that point, descend on Windhoek from the north. Sir Duncan Mackenzie and his men had been in possession of the other port, Luderitz Bay, since September, and awaited only a combined effort to advance along the railway which crosses the desert from Luderitz. Colonel Van Deventer, advancing from the Orange River, was to round up the enemy in the south of the colony, while a small force under Colonel Berrange would drive in his outposts on the east. As the campaign developed, the Central Force under Mackenzie, the Southern under Van Deventer, and the Eastern under Berrange were to join and advance on Windhoek from the south to meet the Northern Force under Botha.

MACKENZIE'S ADVANCE.

The Central Force, operating from Luderitz, was the first to move. A Lancashire man serving with it gave, in a letter home, a vivid description of Luderitz and the country beyond:—

"Luderitz is a barren-looking spot on the coast. Not a drop of fresh water nor a blade of grass or any other vegetation is to be seen. All the water used by the inhabitants has to be condensed from sea water.

"The houses are exceptionally well built, though the streets and roads are very bad, being about two feet deep in soft sand, which no doubt accounts for our failing to find any vehicles, motor-cars, motor-cycles, or cycles here. Not a sign of any plant life—nothing but rock and sand, sand and rock. One thing I noticed, and that was that there were no poor people in Luderitz, all the houses being splendidly furnished.

"From the coast to the fertile country inland there extends a sand belt, eighty to a hundred miles in width, and until this is crossed not a well, spring, stream, or a speck of vegetation is to be found, even though one searched with a microscope.

"The heat at our present camping-place is terrific, being about 120 in the shade, and to make matters worse the wind rises about ten a.m. daily and blows a gale until eight p.m., the result being a continual sandstorm, at times so severe that it is impossible for one to see a foot ahead. All the troops have had sand goggles issued to them, and they are really necessary. What with wind and dust and the scarcity of water, this is really the worst stretch of country I've ever struck."


The Germans retired by the railway, blowing it up behind them. Mackenzie had therefore to repair the line as he went, transport all his water from Luderitz Bay, guard his line of communication, and maintain the spirit of his men against continuous German rearguard actions and aeroplane attacks. His first objective was Chaukaib, forty-five miles inland. He moved forward at an average rate of two days to the mile, taking ninety days to reach Chaukaib. He fought continuous outpost actions, and all the while his men, in the words of one of them, were "daily swallowing huge mouthfuls of the astringent iron-laden dust, which is fashioned by ever-recurring winds into the most infernal fog, and daily burning perceptibly under a sun which shows its limitations only by not blistering the metallic water

bottles." On the way to Chaukaib a diversion was made to take possession of the colony's diamond mine, discovered in 1898. The stones are easily got, as one or two lucky troopers discovered, and the annual value of its output is about £1,000,000.

Chaukaib differed little from the rest of the desert except that a few shanties marked it as a railway halt, but here a base was made for some weeks, and here on February 8th General Botha inspected the troops. He approached in an open truck along the repaired railway which the Union forces had built a foot above the desert, and which had to be constantly guarded from disappearance in the sand, and he had a warm greeting from the scores of blockhouses along the line. "It was an event to be remembered," wrote a correspondent with the force, "this review in the heart of the desert, in sight of the enemy's outposts, under a blazing African sun, and amid an apparently illimitable expanse of sand save on the east, where by now the ridges of the verdant interior rise high above the horizon. There was something unique in such a setting, in the stirring skirl of the pipes as the Highlanders, men of magnificent physique, swung by, and in the drums and fifes and bugles playing the other units past this Dutch Commander-in-Chief, who, attended by a mixed Dutch and English staff, stood under a great Union Jack—the only splash of colour in this drab patchwork of sand and khaki—taking the salute, and, when all was over, doffing his helmet and calling for three cheers for His Majesty the King."

The next move was to Garub, twenty miles further on. The railway had been blown up wherever the Germans could conveniently attach a charge of dynamite, but the whole stretch of it was repaired in a fortnight. Garub was found to consist of a ruined station house and refreshment room, and the rusty odds and ends of what had been pumping plant all concealed behind a giant sand dune. For some days, until a new water supply could be tapped, water for the army had still to be condensed at Luderitz and brought seventy-five miles across the desert. The enemy at this time made constant use of a biplane, which visited the Union lines almost daily, dropping shells and dart-bombs, but doing little damage.

If Chaukaib had been hot, Garub was hotter. "Some years ago," wrote a trooper in his diary, "I substituted Mombasa for Colombo as the Place of Heat. I am now deposing Mombasa in favour of Garub. I don't expect to have to make another alteration." It was, moreover, subject to frightful sandstorms, which blew tents from their places, buried baggage and utensils, half suffocated the men with sand "about the consistency of oatmeal," and even altered the topography of the district. Garub brought the troops within sight of the important military post of Aus, some twenty miles further on. Here the desert ends in a range of bare hills, some four thousand feet high, across which lies the fertile tableland which gives the colony its value. Through two necks in these hills lay the approach to Aus, and in the advance through these necks it became fully apparent for the first time how entirely the strength and perseverance of the attack had upset the German plans. The approaches to Aus were defended by deep, well-designed trenches, with a telephonic system involving thirty miles of wire, and they bristled with gun emplacements, wire entanglements, and land mines. Yet the enemy made no serious attempt at defence. They destroyed the railway, taking the lines with them, filled up or poisoned the water-holes, and offered a few rearguard actions, but Mackenzie was



able to occupy the settlement on April 2nd with few casualties.

The forces had some narrow escapes from land mines. A mule exploded one in Aus Nek, and four mules were blown to fragments. The mine was composed of over a hundred sticks of gelatine and thirty pom-pom shells. The wheels of a gun carriage passed eighteen inches from another mine, a horse exploded a third in a stable at Aus, and many were discovered by the engineers and destroyed without damage.

THE ATTACK FROM THE SOUTH.

The Germans had not expected Mackenzie to bring so large a force almost intact through the desert, but they would no doubt have made a stand at Aus had they not had news from the south of their colony which the Windhoek paper described as "the most depressing they had yet received." It was on operations in the south, extending, with Boer assistance, into the Union, that they had chiefly counted for their success. We have seen how quickly and thoroughly the rebellion was ended, and how entirely the German-rebel attacks on Upington and Kakamas failed. Colonel Van Deventer lost no time in carrying the war into the enemy's country. He was reinforced by troops shipped to Port Nolloth (see map, p. 340), railed to Steinkop, and thence marched *via* Raman's Drift across the Orange River to advance on Warmbad. This town, the chief military post in the southern part of the colony, and the base at the beginning of the war for the enemy's operations against the Union, was occupied on April 4th. Meanwhile, Van Deventer had pushed his right flank across the Orange River at Schuit Drift, about a hundred miles east of Raman's Drift, and by a skilful enveloping advance had occupied, in rapid succession, Jerusalem, Ukamas, Nabas, Davignab, and other posts. Several of these were military posts, strongly prepared for defence, and had to be rushed from the open by the Union Commandoes after being shelled by the Cape Field Artillery.

North of Warmbad, Van Deventer united the flanks of his advance on the main railway line, and occupied the railway stations of Kalkfontein and Kanus on April 5th. Mackenzie and he were now each about 100 miles from the junction of Seeheim, the one approaching from the west, the other from the south. Meanwhile, on Seeheim there was also converging a small flying column from Bechuanaland, due east, which, under Colonel Berrange, had dislodged the enemy from Rietfontein, on the Bechuanaland border, and then from Hasuur. The Germans had now to choose between dealing with these various advances in detail or permitting them to become the closely-linked units of a Southern army, which would pursue a united plan of advance from the south to meet the Northern army under General Botha. Whatever may have been the German plan, the rapidity of the Union armies' movements gave them no time to carry it out. With the knowledge that every mile brought him nearer reinforcements, Mackenzie pushed the bulk of his force rapidly towards Seeheim. At the same time, with rare foresight, he used mounted troops for a flanking movement which was to prove one of the most effective points in the whole attack. From the map it will be seen that some twenty miles to the north of Seeheim lies the town of Keetmanshoop. It was strongly fortified, but experience of the enemy's Fabian tactics made Mackenzie suspicious that they would not defend even this position, but would prefer to retreat rapidly northwards and unite with the force preparing to resist Botha at Windhoek.

He therefore detached a mounted column from his westward advance, with instructions to push north-westward across the 200 miles of difficult land that lies between Aus and Gibeon and cut off the German retreat. The step was quite unexpected by the enemy, who offered no resistance. Indeed, the only Germans seen in the important settlement of Bethany, which was occupied on the way, were a couple of policemen retreating in pyjamas.

The wisdom of the movement was soon apparent. Van Deventer's men were the first to reach Keetmanshoop. They found the town deserted, except for natives and a white civilian population of under a hundred. Berrange, who from the east had struck the railway at Kabus, a little north of Keetmanshoop, was in time to hinder the retreat of the enemy and pursue them northwards. They aimed at reaching Gibeon and there entraining for Windhoek. Meanwhile, Mackenzie's cavalry had reached Gibeon. He despatched a small party to destroy the line north of the enemy, and himself attacked from the south, dispersed and pursued them for twenty miles, taking seven officers, 200 men, two field guns, and several maxims. By the cutting of the line a train in good order, with many transport waggons and much live stock, was captured. The Germans retreated by road, and, thanks to the difficulty of the country, were able to save themselves from being surrounded. But Mackenzie's strategy had succeeded in its object of demoralising their plans for an ordered retreat, and the greatest credit is due to his troops for their forced march of 200 miles over arid country, bereft of transport facilities, and for the spirit with which they engaged the enemy at the end of it. By June 1st the railway from Luderitz Bay to Keetmanshoop had been put in working order, and the Keetmanshoop-Kalkfontein portion had been continued across the border and linked with the Cape railways at Upington. Meanwhile, the chief importance of the campaign had shifted to the victorious advance of General Botha upon Windhoek.

THE NORTHERN FORCE'S ADVANCE.

Walfish Bay, the isolated little British possession which lay midway between the northern and southern boundaries of the German colony, had been occupied by the enemy at the beginning of the war. On Christmas Day, 1914, a Union force landed and reoccupied it. Britain had clung to this tiny settlement in the midst of arid sand dunes because of the excellence of its harbour—one of the finest on the African coast—but the township itself had never been developed, and the Union troops found it a ramshackle array of wooden shanties, mostly in the last stages of decay, and fighting an unending battle with the sand for their existence. A few days saw the original settlement hidden by a vast city of canvas, the surrounding country carefully reconnoitred, and preparations completed for the capture of the German port Swakopmund, a few miles to the north. Like Mackenzie, at Luderitz, Botha found the Germans quite unprepared for the advent so soon of so large an invading force. Except by the explosion of land mines, they offered little opposition to the landing, which was made at Swakopmund early in January. The use of the mines, however, showed a certain resourcefulness. The operator at Swakopmund was concealed in a large packing-case let into the sand on the beach, close to high-water mark, with an entrance through a small manhole cunningly concealed with seaweed and scrub. He remained in hiding throughout the day of the landing, while Union troops tramped over his head, and decamped at nightfall,



The German retreat before General Botha's forces : Preparing to evacuate Warmbad.

[Topical Press.]



A general view of Swakopmund.

leaving in his cabin a mattress, a candle, some literature, and a partly-consumed bottle of peppermint liquor.

Swakopmund was a striking contrast to Walfish. The Germans had made the most of its much inferior natural resources, and built an impressive town. Handsome and well-furnished houses, prosperous shops, displaying a good quality of wares, hotels, picture houses, a music hall, beer gardens, and streets with well-paved sidewalks and trolley lines—all gave evidence of a wealthy and ambitious settlement. It had been entirely deserted, and in some haste, for in many houses coffee and rolls still lay on the breakfast tables.

The railway from Swakopmund to Windhoek, after travelling east for upwards of a hundred miles, takes a wide bend to the north before descending upon the capital. It was Botha's plan to leave the railway before this bend, and with a portion of his force march straight upon the capital, leaving on the line sufficient men to secure his flank. Careful reconnaissances and a few skilful affairs of outposts secured him the first twenty miles of the line without much difficulty. Here, as in the south, the German defences consisted mainly of land mines, constructed with great ingenuity, but fortunately almost always discovered or rendered inoperative by an accident.

The Union forces had indeed some extraordinary strokes of luck, in which General Botha's earnest burghers could be forgiven for seeing the direct interposition of Providence. On one occasion, when a whole commando had gathered round a welcome water-hole, they found that they had been standing over a charge of dynamite that would have blown them to pieces, while a German in a cave pulled wires that either fouled or broke for their salvation. At Swakopmund, too, a volcanic disturbance at sea, which once in a score of years or so strews the beach with dead fish, occurred just in time to give the Union camp a bounteous variation on their regulation diet.

THE POISONING OF WELLS.

Both the Central and the Northern forces discovered before they had advanced far that the enemy would not be content with the use of mines in their desperate attempts to redress their inferiority in numbers and strategy. On the occupation of Swakopmund it was found that six wells had been poisoned with arsenical cattle dip, and already Mackenzie and Van Deventer reported that at Aus and Warmbad the water supplies had been systematically poisoned by the Germans as they retreated. General Botha addressed to Colonel Franks, who commanded the German forces, a protest, in which he pointed out that this was a direct violation of Article XXIII. of the Hague Convention, and stated that he would hold the officers concerned personally responsible. The practice of water-poisoning had never before, so far as history serves, been resorted to by a people calling itself civilised, and the reasoning by which Colonel Franks sought to excuse his atrocious breach of the laws of war was as striking an example of the characteristic German plea that "necessity" makes wrong right as any that events in Europe had furnished. He stated that he "could not allow any water supplies to fall into the hands of the enemy in a usable condition." He had tried to render the wells valueless by putting salt in them, but found this insufficient. He had then resorted to cattle dip, giving orders, which in most cases were not observed, that warning notices should be displayed at the water-holes. Botha replied that warnings, even had they

been displayed, would not have mitigated the crime, and renewed his threat of bringing home to individuals the responsibility.

On approaching Pforteberg, some sixty miles up the line, Botha found the enemy prepared to make a serious stand on a front stretching from that point to Reit, a few miles south. Through Pforteberg runs the railway; through Reit the main road inland. Botha despatched one force to outflank the enemy on the north and cut the line behind him at Jackalswater, a second to attack Pforteberg, and himself took command of a third, which advanced simultaneously on Riet. The three attacks were made on the morning of March 20th. At Jackalswater, Colonel Collins cut the line and captured a train, and though he was not able to dislodge the enemy from a strongly-entrenched position, he prevented reinforcements being sent down the line to Pforteberg. The enemy there resisted from dawn till 3 p.m., when they surrendered, yielding 200 men, two field guns, and two machine guns. Meanwhile, Botha had found the Germans in a strong position at Riet. Their flank rested on the Swakop river, and was further protected by six machine guns, which enfiladed the crossing of the river. In front of their line was an open field of fire, with no cover for some 800 yards, and the road approaching them was defended by two granite kopjes. Colonel C. J. Brits, who had done such excellent work in rounding up the rebels in the Union, directed the attack, and after a whole day's battle, in which the Transvaal Artillery bombarded the enemy's position with deadly precision, the Germans gave way. They destroyed the pumping plant, but left guns, ammunition and waggons.

The victory gave Botha access to a good supply of water, and cleared the road inland as well as the railway. He pushed on rapidly, his left flank holding to the railway, his right making straight across country for Windhoek. The enemy contented himself with rearguard actions, of which even the most threatening, such as the attack 700 strong on the commando under Colonel Skinner at Trekkopes on April 26th, were beaten off. Karibib, on the railway, fell on May 5th, after a forced march of thirty-five miles, carried out with great resolution in spite of intolerable heat and shortage of water. With it were taken seven locomotives and much rolling stock. Otjimbingue, sixty miles north-west of Windhoek, on the direct road across country, was reached by the right flank about the same time. On May 7th, General Botha reported with pride that in the previous five days the least distance covered in actual marching by any of the troops under his command was 190 miles, some brigades doing substantially more. About this time the arrival of aeroplanes for the Union force removed the only ascendancy hitherto enjoyed by the enemy.

WINDHOEK AND AFTER.

On May 12th, the Union troops saw at last the white walls, red roofs, and five tall wireless masts of the German capital lying in the valley before them, amongst green, bush-clad hills. General Botha rode into Windhoek with his burghers on May 12th, and hoisted the Union Jack on the Rathaus. The enemy made no resistance, and left to the care of the Union troops a white population of some 3,000, mainly women and children, and 12,000 natives. The troops, bronzed and travel-stained with their arduous desert marching, but in the best of health and spirits, were assembled before the Court House, and many of the civil population attended to hear the



German troops evacuating Keetmanshoop the day before the British arrival.

[Topical Press.]

proclamation read which promised them protection. General Botha's arrival came as a relief to them after an anxious period. Windhoek had been effectually beleaguered for long before it fell. The military authorities had served out just sufficient of the necessaries of life to the white population to last two months; and a bag of meal, for instance, was worth £7 10s. in the town by the time it was captured.

The whole railway system of the colony was now in Botha's hands except the line which runs to Grootfontein in the extreme north-east. Learning that a body of the enemy still remained in the vicinity of Windhoek, Botha marched out and engaged them near Gobabis, taking 150 prisoners, with the loss of one man wounded.

The Germans now endeavoured to come to terms on the basis of an armistice till the end of the war in Europe, under which they should retain their arms. With the colony practically in his hands, Botha naturally rejected the offer. The bulk of the garrison and the settlers were then anxious to surrender, but the military authorities persuaded them to a further resistance in the hope of material German success in Europe. The capital was transferred to Grootfontein, at the extreme northern terminus of the railway system, and thither the enemy retreated, with Botha hot on their heels. The end of the campaign was marked by a crowning series of the wide and rapid enveloping movements, in almost waterless country, which had paralysed the defence throughout, and for which the burgher commandoes had shown themselves better adapted than perhaps any troops in the world. In the second fortnight in June Botha made a swift and triumphant drive up the railway from Karibib

to Otavi. The Free State Brigade, to which he paid a special compliment, covered forty-two miles of arid bush country in a sixteen hours' march, and this was typical of the movements of all his units. South of Otavi he threw out columns on both flanks for a final envelopment. Brigadier-General Britz on the left made an immense detour of 200 miles, reaching the eastern edge of the Etosha Pan and clearing the country of the enemy. As a result of these remarkable forced marches all our prisoners in German hands were released, and a large proportion of the enemy's remaining forces captured.

Botha's centre, under General Myburgh, struck the final blow by defeating the enemy at Gaub, between the two extremes of the railway, Grootfontein and Tsumeb, and after sending an ultimatum, on July 9th, at Kilo, on the railway line just north of Otavi, Botha accepted from Governor Seitz the surrender of the colony. The troops were to be interned, retaining their rifles but no ammunition; all war material and the whole of the property of the colony were placed at the Union disposal; and German civil officials could remain in their homes on parole. Three thousand five hundred officers and men, with thirty-seven field guns and twenty-two machine guns, were handed over. The Germans confessed that they had had hopes of making a stand at Otavi, or, failing that, of flight towards Etosha Pan and dispersal in the direction of Portuguese Angola, but the rapidity of Botha's movements had completely disconcerted them. Colonel Franks was at first unable to credit the fact that the Union infantry had marched 270 miles through such country so quickly, and declared that they must have come most of the way by train. The enemy, on their


own admissions, had been outnumbered, out-generalled, and, above all, outmarched.

Botha and his men had added to the Empire a territory five times the size of England, with valuable diamond, copper, and lead mines, and thousands of square miles of fine stock-raising pastoral country, in the richer parts of which cocoa, coffee, silk, and even cotton can be successfully grown. They had, moreover, secured a hinterland and a railway system for one of the finest harbours in Africa—Walfish Bay—which, till then, had been derelict, but which could now play its proper part as a port that would lessen by days the journey to Rhodesia or Capetown. The full scope of Botha's achievement is seen when it is remembered how inadequate

were the forces in the Union in August, 1914, for the invasion of a territory of over 300,000 square miles, with 1,200 miles of strategic railways, a garrison of well-trained, well-armed troops, and a girdle of almost impassable desert. Botha had a nucleus of perhaps 4,000 fully-trained men, and from this, with the able assistance of his colleagues, particularly General Smuts, he constructed an army of some 40,000, transported it, supplied it, led it to victory—after dealing, during its organisation, with a rebellion which involved at one time 10,000 rebels, and all this in less than a year. That the leader, the men, and the spirit for this great enterprise were found was as wonderful and heartening an outcome as any even of the world war.



General Botha arranging the terms of surrender of Windhoek with the German Mayor of the town. [Topical Press.]




The Old Head of Kinsale Lighthouse, off which the Lusitania sank.

[Central News.



The funeral of some of the Lusitania victims at Queenstown.

[Topical Press.



The Lusitania at full speed.

[Record Press.]

CHAPTER XXXIV.

THE SINKING OF THE LUSITANIA.

THE WARNING TO THE LUSITANIA'S PASSENGERS—THE STORY OF THE DISASTER—THE PROTESTS OF THE UNITED STATES AND THE GERMAN REPLY—THE RESIGNATION OF MR. BRYAN.

ON the last day of April in this year there appeared among the steamship advertisements of the American papers the following paragraph :—

‘NOTICE!’

“Travellers intending to embark on the Atlantic voyage are reminded that a state of war exists between Germany and her Allies, and Great Britain and her Allies; that the war zone includes the waters adjacent to the British Isles; that, in accordance with formal notice given by the German Government, vessels flying the flag of Great Britain and her Allies are liable to destruction in those waters; and that travellers sailing in the war zone on ships of Great Britain or her Allies do so at their own risk.

“IMPERIAL GERMAN EMBASSY.

“WASHINGTON D.C.

“April 22nd, 1915.”

In many of the papers this notice was placed side by side with the printed sailings of the Cunard Company, whose liner, the *Lusitania*, was announced to leave New York on the 1st of May. Telegrams, bearing fictitious

names and threatening the torpedoing of the vessel, are said to have been received by prominent Americans who were intending to take the passage. Rumours rapidly spread through Washington and New York that the indiscriminate sinking of merchantmen by submarine attack was now to be carried on to a further stage, and that the German Government had singled out as a particular prey the largest of ocean passenger liners.

The *Lusitania* was without doubt the most famous ship afloat. In Germany she was almost as well known as in England. Eight years ago German vessels held for a time the supremacy of the Atlantic. For speed the Kaiser Wilhelm II., and for size the Kaiserin Auguste Victoria, were then unparalleled. During her early voyages the *Lusitania* brought back all the Atlantic records to England, and soon became the most-talked-of ship in the world. Since the beginning of the war, too, she had caught the notice of Germany conspicuously. There was, in the first week of hostilities, her historic voyage from New York, during which she skilfully eluded the cruisers

Karlsruhe and Leipzig lurking in her path. Above all, at the opening of the submarine campaign, when she flew American colours on approaching British waters, she had aroused fierce animosity throughout Germany. All these reasons made her a marked quarry, whose destruction would conceivably be gratifying to the Government and people of Germany. And if the main object of German "frightfulness" is to stir up world-wide horror by methods which, in Mr. Asquith's phrase, have been "carried on with a progressive disregard of the previously-accepted rules of warfare," nothing could have crowned the design more effectively than a sea calamity on the scale of the *Titanic*.

The *Lusitania* was not an armed ship. She had, it is true, been built under certain agreements, by which the British Government might requisition her to serve as an armed cruiser. But that policy had never been carried out. On her last voyage the *Lusitania* was a passenger ship, carrying a crew of 651 men, with a passenger list of over 1,200 souls, including 188 American citizens. According to the rules and conventions of civilised warfare, not one of these civilians (and among them were many children) was in peril of death from an enemy's attack.

At noon on May 1st the *Lusitania* left New York for the last time. Until the closing scenes the voyage was without any incidents apart from the ordinary experiences of an early summer crossing. It has been described as a comfortable passage, favoured by pleasant weather, the monotony of sea travel being varied by the usual games, and some concerts, at which large sums were collected for sufferers from the war. No warships were sighted, but all the way across wireless communications from shore passed to the ship, and near the end information that submarines were off the Irish coast was sent to the Captain, who received at the same time instructions from the Admiralty. For the passengers, the first outward sign of war was noticed on the night of Thursday, May 6th, when the portholes were shadowed, and all deck lights were dimmed. The look-outs were doubled, with orders to keep a sharp watch for submarines, and as soon as the Fastnet was reached on the next day the lifeboats were swung out. A little later the *Lusitania* ran into a belt of mist, the loud drone of the siren sounding, according to one of the passengers, like a note of safety, for it was argued that the great liner would not have noised abroad her presence but for the existence of a strong belief in her security. Later, when the mist lifted, with a morning of brilliant sunshine, the ship, at a moderate speed, drew towards the Old Head of Kinsale.

THE SUBMARINE SIGHTED.

Between twelve and one o'clock some of the passengers noticed that the steady onward sweep suddenly changed. The new motion has been variously described as a swaying, a zig-zagging of the ship, or a snake-like course. After a few minutes the *Lusitania* resumed her course straight ahead. It was just about this time that from the decks a strange craft was observed in the sea, on the port side, i.e., between the liner and the land. Dr. Foss has the following account:—

"We noticed the ship was making quick changes of her course, what I would call snake turns. We were informed that it was only practice. Shortly afterwards I saw between us and the land something which looked like a boat, and I was surprised that a boat should be so far from shore. Looking through my glasses, I could

see a wave parting in front of the boat, which indicated that it was travelling rapidly. Several of us agreed that it looked like the upper part of a submarine, and we assumed that it was British. It was apparently keeping pace with us."

The first presage of disaster came soon after two o'clock. At that time most of the passengers were below, some of them still discussing the appearance of the swiftly-moving object which had been sighted more than an hour before. Above, there were a few pacing the decks or joining in a game of quoits. Those who were glancing seawards over the smooth water at this moment were suddenly aware that a straight, white streak on the surface was rapidly rushing towards the ship's side.

"I was so high on the upper deck above the surface of the water that I could make out the outline of the torpedo. It appeared to me twelve feet long and possibly three feet under water, its sides bubbling with foam. I watched its passage fascinated, and in another moment came the explosion. The ship, recoiling under the force of the blow, was jarred, and lifted as if it had struck an immovable object. A column of water shot up to the bridge deck, carrying with it a lot of debris. Although I was twenty yards from the spot where it struck, I was knocked off my feet. Before I could recover myself the entire forepart of the ship was enveloped in a blinding cloud of steam, due not I think to the explosion of a second torpedo, as some thought, but to the fact that the two forehold boilers had been jammed close together, and jack-knifed upwards."—(From Mr. Brooks's story of the disaster.)

Some interesting points come out in the evidence given by Captain Turner at the Coroner's inquest held on bodies of the survivors.

"We were going at a speed of eighteen knots. I was on the port side of the lower bridge when I heard the second officer, Mr. Hefford, call out 'Here's a torpedo.' I ran over to the other side and just saw the wake of it approaching the vessel, and it struck. Smoke and steam went up between the third and fourth funnel. There was a slight shock. Immediately after the explosion there was a second, but that may possibly have been internal. I at once gave the order to lower the boats down to the rails, and get all women and children into them. I also gave orders to 'Stop ship,' but we could not stop her, because the engines were out of commission. It was not safe to lower boats until speed was off. The vessel did not stop; as a matter of fact there was a perceptible headway on her at the time she went down. The moment she was struck she listed to starboard. I stood on the ship as she sank, and the *Lusitania* went down under me. She floated about eighteen minutes after the torpedo struck her. My watch stopped at 2.36½. I was picked up from among the wreckage and afterwards brought aboard a trawler. I did not see a submarine."

Although it is not certainly known how many torpedoes were fired, the stories told by survivors of the disaster give the impression that two torpedoes found their mark on the starboard side. At the enquiry held at Westminster, an interesting addition was made in the evidence of a seaman, who positively asserted that after the two shocks he noticed a third torpedo passing the stern, this time from the port to the starboard side. As Lord Mersey, the President at the Board of Trade Court of Inquiry, points out, this evidence suggests that perhaps more than one submarine was engaged in the attack.

THE WRECK.

The watertight doors had been closed before the first blow was struck. After the impact the wireless operators were busily sending out the last signals for help, and preparations for launching the boats were immediately begun. There appear to have been few signs of panic

about the doomed vessel, nothing more than excited hurrying up the displaced staircases and along the slanting decks towards boats and life-belts. Some delay, which is now seen to have been unavoidable, occurred in getting the boats away, and this delay was caused not only by the forward movement of the vessel. The heavy list to starboard swung the portside boats over the deck, and rendered them useless for service. Nevertheless, in all, twenty boats were launched, and rowed to a safe distance from the sinking ship. By this time the starboard list had gradually increased, until suddenly the *Lusitania*, with her stern lifted high in the air, dipped her bows and plunged into the depths.

It is too painful to recall the last agonising scenes.


All the elements of one of the greatest of sea tragedies were there; a tragedy, moreover, in which the vast destructive forces of nature had been let loose by the hand of man. And yet, the story of all those dreadful sufferings is not without consoling records that by many life was given for life, and last kindnesses at a supreme cost were shown to the weaker and the more helpless.

The patrol vessels, hurrying to answer the distress signals, came too late to lessen in any material degree the heavy death-roll, which amounted to nearly 1,200. From the lifeboats and floating wreckage nearly 800 persons were brought ashore. No effort of any kind was made by the German submarine, or submarines, to rescue even one life. It is small wonder that the plain men of the jury at the Coroner's inquest, three days later, put into plain words the verdict: "We charge the officers of the submarine, and the German Emperor and Government of Germany under whose orders they acted, with the crime of wilful and wholesale murder." The view of a trained legal mind is reflected in equally emphatic words in the judgment of the Court of Inquiry. "It was a monstrous attack, because made with a deliberate and wholly unjustifiable intention of killing the people on board."

Some interesting questions rise up out of a consideration of the circumstances of the *Lusitania's* fatal voyage. Ought the liner to have been escorted

in dangerous waters by destroyers? One purpose undoubtedly at work in the prosecution of the German submarine campaign is the creation of panic, and of demands for further protection of British merchantmen at the cost of disarranging the general naval scheme. In this respect the destruction of the *Lusitania* was as ineffective as any earlier efforts. No change was made in the Admiralty's main plans, that have hitherto been so successful in securing the freedom of England from invasion, the blockade of the German High Sea Fleet, the disappearance of German sea trade, and the uninterrupted transport of troops and supplies to the many spheres of land warfare. It is recognised that to call off ships from these decisive services would be to invite disaster.

"The resources at our disposal," in Mr. Churchill's words, "would not allow us to supply destroyers as escorts for merchant and passenger ships, more than two hundred of which, on an average, arrive or depart safely every day. . . . Our principle is that each merchant ship must look after itself, subject to the general arrangements made." The main principle is, of course, undoubtedly correct. Moreover, the old system of convoys of merchantmen under protection would be attended with enormous risks in the presence of submarines. Yet in particular instances special protection has already been given to ocean-going liners. In February, for example, the *Hydaspes* was convoyed through the danger zone by two des-




The boat deck of the *Lusitania*, showing lifeboats.

[Photopress.]

troys. And whether the last voyage of the *Lusitania* did not call for similar exceptional treatment is a question that may well be argued. In every way she was an exceptional ship, because of her fame, her large passenger list, and, lastly, because of the sinister warnings and threats that her destruction was then a definite and remorseless object in the German submarine plans.


A difficulty for which no explanation has been offered arises over the course taken by the vessel. From the Fastnet to the Old Head of Kinsale she appears to have been on the track usually followed at the end of the eastward voyage. Along this line it was most reasonable to expect that the outrage would be attempted. Moreover,



The opening of the official enquiry into the sinking of the Lusitania: Sir Edward Carson examining Captain Turner, of the Lusitania. [Topical Press.

on the day previous to the disaster, two large steamers had been torpedoed in the seas off the south of Ireland. Captain Turner and Mr. Churchill have both made it known that warnings of the presence of submarines, and directions as to the liner's course, were sent by wireless

eighteen knots? According to the reason given in the evidence of the Captain, the purpose was to reach the Mersey with the tide and thus avoid a long wait for a pilot. It appears from the evidence of the Chairman of the Cunard Company that at no time since the autumn had the vessel been run at full speed. Difficulties connected with coal and labour had raised the alternative of either running the ship at twenty-one knots, maximum, or of withdrawing her from the Atlantic service. It is to be remembered that until the *Lusitania* disaster no ship steaming more quickly than fourteen knots had been torpedoed. One thing proved by this appalling calamity is that the security given by high speed has been exaggerated, and that a target 785 feet long, even when moving at a quick speed, is not invulnerable to a torpedo attack. The remark made by one of the seamen, who saw the torpedo from the crow's nest, "At 100 knots we could not have escaped," is perhaps a final reply in any controversies as to the liner's speed. Such a view has the support of Lord Mersey's opinion that "the reduction of the vessel's speed was of no significance, and was proper in the circumstances."



to the steamer; but it is not likely that the reasons adopted for following the ordinary course rather than a long loop voyage round the North of Ireland to the Clyde will be made public during the course of the submarine campaign. Why was the *Lusitania*, which could make over twenty-five knots, moving only at the rate of

AMERICAN INDIGNATION.

One in every ten of the victims of this terrible outrage on law and humanity was an American subject, and it was impossible that the United States Government should remain silent, especially as it had already protested against the legality of the original German Order declaring the British seas a war area which all ships would visit at their own risk. "The Government,"

the President then wrote, "would be constrained to hold the Imperial Government to a strict accountability" if American vessels or the lives of American subjects were lost in consequence of the action of German submarines under this Order (page 109). American public opinion, so far as it was reflected in the New York Press, was prepared to support the President in any measures that he might think it right to take to protect the lives of American subjects at sea. Not since the destruction of the *Maine* in Havana Harbour before the war with Spain had the surface of American opinion seemed so agitated. And the destruction of the *Lusitania*, though much the worst of the German outrages at sea, was not the only one in which American subjects had lost their lives. An American citizen had lost his life on the *Falaba* (page 114); an American vessel, the *Cushing*, had been attacked by a German aeroplane on April 28th; and on May 1st another American vessel, the *Gulflight*, had been torpedoed by a German submarine off the Scillies, and two Americans had met their death. The United States were not the only neutrals to suffer by the submarine war on commerce with Great Britain, but they were the only neutrals powerful enough to have any influence over German policy by their protests, and some at any rate of the neutral States who had suffered looked to the United States as the natural protector of their rights.

PRESIDENT WILSON'S PROTEST.

The protest of President Wilson was a firm statement of the rules of law and of humanity, expressed in language of singular adroitness. It began by recalling "the humane and enlightened attitude hitherto assumed by the German Government in matters of international right, particularly in regard to the freedom of the seas," and assumed that "acts so absolutely contrary to the rules and practices and spirit of modern warfare" could not have its sanction. It well pointed out why submarine war on commerce must of necessity be inhuman and illegal.

"... the objection to their present methods of attack against the trade of their enemies lies in the practical impossibility of employing submarines in the destruction of commerce without disregarding those rules of fairness, reason, justice, and humanity which all modern opinion regards as imperative. It is practically impossible for officers of submarines to visit a merchantman at sea and examine her papers and cargo. It is practically impossible for them to make her a prize, and if they cannot put a prize crew on board they cannot sink her without leaving the crew and all on board to the mercy of the sea in her small boats. These facts, it is understood, the German Government frankly admit.

"We are informed that in the instances of which we have spoken there was time enough, but even that poor measure of safety was not given, and in at least two cases cited not so much as a warning was received."

The despatch concluded by calling on the German Government to disavow the acts of its agents, and to make reparation, so far as reparation was possible, for injuries that were without measure.

THE GERMAN REPLY.

The German reply to the American protest was received at the end of May. In the case of the *Falaba* the German defence was that the commander of the submarine had intended to allow the passengers and crew an opportunity of escape, but that the master had not obeyed orders to heave to, but fled, and

summoned help by rocket signals. The defence did not fit the facts, but even if it had done it would still have been unsound. If a warship has a right to sink a vessel which refuses to stop when summoned, and resists search, it is because such resistance is in itself an admission that she is carrying contraband, and that her guilt is so evident that she recognises that her only safety is in flight, so as to escape arrest and adjudication of a Prize Court. But here was no case of the exercise of the right of search. A submarine cannot search a ship of any size, nor can she take a suspected ship into port for the judgment of a Court. She can only sink, and Germany had announced that every ship trading with our ports was liable to be sunk, irrespective of the nature of her cargo. In refusing to obey the orders of a submarine commander the *Falaba* was well within her rights; she had as much right to refuse as an ordinary citizen would have to take to his heels to escape from a man who, without a warrant for his arrest even, bade him, revolver in hand, to stand and be shot in lieu of trial. The German reply proceeded to make excuses for the sinking of the *Lusitania* which were even less in accord of the facts. It declared that she was armed with guns and manned with trained gunners, and that she carried Canadian troops and munitions of war.

"The German Government believes that it is acting in justified self-defence in seeking by all means of warfare at its disposal to protect the lives of its soldiers by destroying ammunition intended for the enemy. The British Shipping Company must have been aware of the danger to which passengers on board the *Lusitania* were exposed. Under these conditions the Company, in embarking them notwithstanding this, attempted deliberately to use the lives of American citizens as protection for the ammunition on board, and acted against the clear provisions of the American law, which expressly prohibits the forwarding of passengers on ships carrying ammunition, and provides a penalty for it. The Company was therefore wantonly guilty of the death of so many passengers. There can be no doubt, according to the definite report of the submarine's commander, which is further confirmed by all other information, that the quick sinking of the *Lusitania* is chiefly attributable to the explosion of the ammunition shipment caused by the torpedo. The *Lusitania* passengers would otherwise in all human probability have been saved."

It was true that among the cargo of the *Lusitania* were some 5,000 cases of cartridges, but the other allegations of fact in the German reply were "baseless inventions," as Lord Mersey called them in his finding. The *Lusitania* carried no masked guns nor gunners, nor was she transporting troops. The cases of cartridges were entered on her manifest, and had been passed by the New York Customs authorities. Mr. Bryan, the American Secretary of State, had himself argued at length that the manufacture of munitions for the belligerents was not a breach of neutrality; and if it was legal by American law to manufacture, it was also legal to ship them to their destination. President Wilson, in a further despatch, published on June 12th, stressed the point that she was carrying a cargo that was perfectly legitimate by the laws of the United States, and indignantly repudiated the implied charge that the American Government had been guilty of a breach of neutrality in allowing her to clear. These considerations, however, were in any case irrelevant to the main issue.

"The sinking of passenger ships involves principles of humanity which throw into the background any special circumstances of detail that may be thought to affect the case, principles which lift it, as the Imperial German Government will no doubt be quick to recognise and

acknowledge, out of the class of ordinary subjects of diplomatic discussion or international controversy.

"Whatever may be the other facts regarding the *Lusitania*, the principal fact is that a great steamer, primarily and chiefly for the conveyance of passengers, carrying more than 1,000 souls, who had no part or lot in the conduct of the war, was torpedoed and sunk without so much as a challenge or warning, and that men, women, and children were sent to their death in circumstances unparalleled in modern warfare.

"The fact that more than a hundred American citizens were among those who perished made it the duty of the Government of the United States to speak of these things, and once more, with solemn emphasis, to call the attention of the Imperial German Government to the grave responsibility which the Government of the United States conceives it has incurred in this tragic occurrence, and to the indisputable principle upon which that responsibility rests.

"The Government of the United States is contending for something much greater than the mere rights of property and the privileges of commerce. It is contending for nothing less high and sacred than the right of humanity, which every Government honours itself in respecting, which no Government is justified in resigning on behalf of those under its care and authority."

MR. BRYAN'S RESIGNATION.

On June 9th, just before this second Note to Germany was despatched, Mr. Bryan resigned. His reasons were that he disapproved the wording of the Note to Germany, and there was considerable surprise when the text of the Note was published later to find that it was on the whole somewhat milder in tone than the first Note had

been. The wording may have been modified somewhat in view of Mr. Bryan's objections, but on neither of the two specific points that he had raised was there any weakening in the position of the United States Government. Mr. Bryan had wished to offer an International Commission of Inquiry, but it was not at all obvious what there was to inquire into. He held, further, that American subjects ought to be warned by their Government against travelling on belligerent vessels, or with cargoes of ammunition. President Wilson expressly repudiated this view in his Note. "The Government of the United States," he wrote, "cannot admit that the proclamation of a war zone from which neutral ships have been warned to keep away may be made to operate as in any degree an abbreviation of the rights either of American shipmasters or American citizens bound on their lawful errands as passengers in merchant ships of belligerent nationality."


Mr. Bryan's resignation was interesting mainly for its bearing not so much on the particular controversy about the sinking of the *Lusitania*, but more generally on the rights of belligerents and neutrals at sea. In dissociating himself from the very moderately worded protests of President Wilson against the sinking of the *Lusitania*, Mr. Bryan showed that opinion in neutral countries was very far from accepting, even if it understood, the view—which is almost axiomatic here—that British sea-power made for the liberty of the seas. It pointed to the need of a clearer exposition than had yet been officially made of Great Britain's naval policy in relation to neutrals.



Mr. Bryan (left) and his successor, Mr. Robert Lansing.

[Topical Press.

The Manchester Guardian
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of the
WAR



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
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
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Part of a meeting of London business men on Tower Hill, held after the sinking of the *Lusitania*, and calling for the internment of all alien enemies in Great Britain.

[Photopress.]

CHAPTER XXXV.

GERMAN OUTRAGES AND BRITISH OPINION.

AN ACCUMULATION OF OUTRAGES—THE TREATMENT OF PRISONERS—SUBMARINES AND ZEPPELINS—THE GAS ATTACKS—THE "LUSITANIA" AND REPORT OF LORD BRYCE'S COMMITTEE—ANTI-GERMAN OUTBURSTS—THE GOVERNMENT'S NEW POLICY TOWARDS ALIEN ENEMIES.

THE sinking of the *Lusitania* and its effect on American opinion were described in the last chapter. The effect upon British opinion was no less immediate and important. It came towards the end of a month in which the tide of popular feeling in this country against Germany and German methods of making war had been steadily rising to a height never before reached, even in the first days of the invasion of Belgium. The *Lusitania* was sunk on the 7th of May, and on the 12th was published a document which counted for even more as an indictment of German policy—the Report embodying the exhaustive and sober enquiry by Lord Bryce's Committee into the outrages committed by German troops in France and Belgium during the first four months of the war. And if these dates are taken as the end of a month of which the early part of April was the beginning, it will be found that the period is one in which the persistent and calculated cruelty of German warfare was abundantly demonstrated, either by new examples of frightfulness or the continued application of old ones, in every department of the

war—in the air by Zeppelin raids, whose only purpose was to terrorise the civil population of the East Coast, in the sea by the lawless activities of the German submarines, and on land by such enormities as the use of asphyxiating gas in Flanders and the poisoning of wells in German South-West Africa. The sinking of the *Lusitania* and the publication of the Bryce Committee's Report marked the climax of this month, and the rousing in this country of what was described by Mr. Asquith, in a letter to the Archbishop of Canterbury, as "a temper of righteous and consuming indignation for which I believe there is no precedent or parallel in our national history." The purpose of this chapter is to examine the events which roused this temper, and its ultimate results as expressed, first, in the lamentable outbursts of anti-German rioting, and, secondly, in the increased rigour of the Government's attitude towards alien enemies in this country.

BRITISH PRISONERS IN GERMANY.

One source of anger which came to a head in the early part of April lay in the German treatment of



Packing gifts for despatch to British prisoners in Germany.

[Topical Press.]



British prisoners in Germany being marched to their daily labour.

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[Sport and General.]

British prisoners. For long enough ugly stories of ill-treatment of all kinds had been creeping into the British Press in more or less trustworthy form, and on April 10th the Government published a White Paper in which it was clearly proved that the rules of the Hague Convention relating to the treatment of prisoners had been freely violated by the German authorities. The Hague Convention is quite explicit upon two points: that, with the exception of "arms, horses, and military papers," prisoners must be allowed to retain the personal belongings in their possession at the time of their capture, and that for the period of their captivity they shall be treated, as regards rations, quarters, and clothing, on the same footing as the troops of the government which captured them. Nevertheless, the White Paper and later official documents supplied authoritative proof that British prisoners had been stripped of their great coats, and in some cases of their tunics: and that, while conditions varied very greatly in different camps and under different commandants, in some of them the prisoners—so far from receiving rations on the same scale as those served out to the German troops—though "not exactly dying of starvation," could "only just keep themselves alive and no more." The absence of proper housing accommodation in some of the camps, lack of heating apparatus and winter clothing, were also proved, and the British White Paper published at the end of June, in which all these abuses were classified and contrasted with the Hague rules and the British interpretation of them in the treatment of German prisoners, was one of the most effective indictments of German war policy that has been made. It should be added, however, that largely as a result of the humane activities of the United States authorities in Germany considerable improvement in the condition of British prisoners was effected from April onwards.

The abuses which have been touched on were, in a way, official ones supported by the sanction, if not by the orders, of the German Government. They arose for the most part, no doubt, from the embarrassment which Germany's great number of prisoners were to her, and were intensified by the spirit of vehement hatred for this country which was abroad in Germany. But this same spirit of hatred was responsible for another class of hardship, the news of which was, perhaps, more bitterly received in this country than in any other. Private exhibitions of hatred and contempt made the lives of British officers and men almost insupportable on their journey from the front to the concentration camps. The evidence of Major Vandeleur, a Scottish officer, who was taken prisoner at the beginning of October, was an important part of the first British White Paper on the treatment of prisoners. Both the officers and men of his party were constantly reviled and cursed by German officers, as well as the rank and file; and to the shame of the German army it is recorded that it was an officer in it who spat upon the holder of a British commission. At Douai Major Vandeleur, four brother officers, and fifty-two men were crowded into one closed-in railway waggon from which horses had just been removed, and in which the floor was still carpeted with three inches of fresh manure. In this waggon they were boxed up for thirty hours with no food.

Worse fates than this overtook some British prisoners immediately after capture. Evidence that in some cases they had been shot in cold blood is not wanting.

German deserters, examined by two Dutch journalists, declared explicitly that the Bavarian troops had done so under definitely official orders, and the British Ambassador at the Hague submitted a careful record of the evidence to Sir Edward Grey—a record which was published in this country with the authority of the Press Bureau. A deserter from the Second Bavarian Army Corps—"essentially a stupid creature," according to the journalist who examined him, "without sufficient intelligence to invent" the detailed story which he gave—spoke quite as a matter of course of having himself shot five British prisoners a few days before he deserted. The prisoners, he stated, were brought up to be shot in a formal way by a section under the command of an officer. Another Bavarian deserter spoke of an order, issued to the whole of the Bavarian Army, that no British prisoners were to be taken. Both men gave their reasons for deserting as the scarcity of food in the trenches and the harshness of their officers. Strange and terrible things happen in all armies when men lose their heads, and the existence of an official policy for the slaughter of prisoners cannot be said to be established on the testimony of these Bavarian deserters.* Such a policy, if proved, would surpass the worst of Napoleon's infamous exploits as cruel—the steady slaughter of the surrendered Spanish garrisons for no greater crime than that they were unable to keep up, through sickness and starvation, with the march of Napoleon's troops. It will readily be imagined that the publication, through an authoritative source, of evidence pointing to such a policy did little to soothe the rising indignation of the British people.

CUMULATIVE EFFECT OF THE SUBMARINE BLOCKADE.

The German submarine blockade has been mentioned as another source of bitterness in this country. It had now been in operation for nearly two months; and while its effect upon British shipping in proportion to the number of vessels concerned was seen to be very nearly negligible, the cumulative effect of each successive example of ruthlessness was decidedly important. During the month covered by this chapter there were many such examples. On April 11th the British steamer *Harpalyce*, a relief cargo ship which was flying the large and easily recognisable flag of the American Commission for the Relief of Belgium, was torpedoed, without any warning at all, in the North Sea. There was no time to launch any boats, and those of the crew that were saved owed their lives to two Dutch vessels which were passing. No craft seem to have been too small to escape the attentions of the submarines. Trawlers were freely sunk in the North Sea, and whether the crews were given an opportunity to save their lives in their small boats, or whether, like the Grimsby trawler *Vanilla*—where the Germans drove off another trawler which was going to the rescue—their ships were sunk with their nets down and without the slightest warning or attempt at provision for the safety of the crew, seems to have been entirely at the whim of the submarine commander. Four days before the *Lusitania* was sunk, on one day alone (May 3rd) eight British trawlers

* The issue, at the end of August, 1914, of such an order to one German Brigade has been pretty clearly proved by Professor Morgan. (See article in the "Nineteenth Century and After," June, 1915.) It was, however, repudiated by the German Government and denounced as a forgery.



The result of an air raid: A wrecked house in Southend.

[L.N.A.]



The interior of one of the wrecked houses in Southend.

[Central News.]

were destroyed off the North Sea fishing grounds. And it is worth noting that, on the same day that this exploit was announced, the English papers also contained the news of the poisoning of the wells in South-West Africa and of Lieutenant-Colonel Franks's bland statement of his reasons (page 343) for the adoption of this inhuman and deeply disgraceful breach of the rules of war.

In the air the Germans were also active about this time, though with very much less damage to life and property than was afterwards the case. Two people slightly injured and some little damage to buildings was the material result of an adventure in aerial terrorism over the north-east coast on April 14th; hardly as much from another Zeppelin raid on the following day, this time over the south of the same coast. At the end of April bombs were dropped on Ipswich and Bury St. Edmunds. And on May 10th, when popular feeling had risen to its fiercest and was already, in the poorer quarters of the large towns, breaking out in anti-German rioting, curiously ill-timed fuel was added to the fire by a Zeppelin raid on Southend, in which one life was lost.

THE USE OF ASPHYXIATING GAS.


But among all the evidences of calculated cruelty on the part of the Germans probably none roused more widespread horror and indignation, when its nature and consequences were fully realised, than did the use of asphyxiating gas. It was first used by the Germans on April 22nd during the second battle of Ypres, and for the next three weeks attacks begun and supported by this hideous weapon were an almost daily episode on this part of the French and British front. (Their military importance and the long preparations which they had involved have been dealt with in Chapter XXIX.)

It was some days before the precise nature of the gas attack was generally understood in this country. At first the impression was that the gas was contained in shells or bombs and released upon explosion. And it is interesting to notice how promptly the Germans seized on this belief in an attempt to disguise and belittle the real nature of the attack and its barbarity. On April 23rd the German official report referred with measured indignation to the British charge that German artillery had used shells which developed asphyxiating gas on explosion—"a practice," declared these admirable custodians of belligerent properties, "which is contrary

to all the laws of civilised warfare." With a somewhat suspicious precision they denied that any shells had been used whose "sole purpose" had been to spread poisonous gases: and, with a fine regard for juridical niceties, the report concluded with the statement that "the smoke-developing contrivances used by us in hand-to-hand fighting are in no manner contrary to the laws of warfare."

Under the mild masquerade of "smoke-developing contrivances" must, according to this interesting apology, be grouped the tanks of liquefied chlorine, the special masks and respirators worn by the German troops who were to use the new weapon, and all the other long-prepared apparatus for launching, with the help of a favouring breeze, a dense cloud of deadly, torturing gas against a hostile trench. This, and not the presence of gas-producing liquid in shrapnel or com-

mon shell, was the weapon on which the Germans really counted, and which they employed with such effect in the fighting round Ypres. Its use against a British trench has been described in the deposition of a Canadian officer, which was included in Dr. Haldane's report to Lord Kitchener, on the nature of the gas attack. The officer in question was himself in hospital suffering from the effects of the gas:—



Holland on Germany's conduct of war: A cartoon which appeared in the Amsterdam "Telegraaf" with the following text below it:—

Poisoning of Wells (German South-west Africa).
Poisonous Gases (western front).
Premeditated Murder (on the Lusitania with some 2,000 non-combatants).

Conscience: "All of you who do not protest against the barbarian war methods of this monster are his accomplices!"

"From a support trench about 600 yards from the German lines he had observed the gas. He saw first of all a white smoke rising from the German trenches to a height of about three feet. Then in front of the white smoke appeared a greenish cloud which drifted along the ground to our trenches, not rising more than about seven feet from the ground. When it reached our first trenches the men in these trenches were obliged to leave, and a number of them were killed by the effects of the gas. He made a counter-attack about fifteen minutes after the gas came over and saw 24 men lying dead from the effects of the gas on a small stretch of road leading from the advanced trenches to the supports."

AFTER-EFFECTS OF THE GAS ATTACK.

But the effects of the gas were by no means limited to the period during which the men were exposed to it.

The *Kölnische Zeitung*, in an attempt to justify the new weapon, referred to the gas as "stupefying" (*betäubende*). It is hard to conceive a less apt description of its effects. Even where it left the men dead in the trenches it killed them in agony, and those who escaped immediate death only escaped, in the majority of cases, to die slowly, painfully fighting for breath in a field hospital. "The survivors," wrote Sir John French, "are in little better case, as the injury to their lungs appears to be of a permanent character, and reduces them to a condition which points to their being invalids for life." Men who seemed to have successfully weathered a gas attack collapsed after the danger was apparently over and died a lingering and painful death in hospital. The truth was that where the gas did not asphyxiate at once, its irritant properties produced a state of acute bronchitis. The descriptions of the hospital wards where the gassed men were collected shows the full measure of the ghastly inhumanity of this new weapon which the Germans had devised. The following one was given by an English officer in a letter home:—"Yesterday and the day before I went with — to see some of the men in hospital at — who were 'gassed' yesterday and the day before on Hill 60. When we got to the hospital we had no difficulty in finding out in which ward the men were, as the

noise of the poor devils trying to get breath was sufficient to direct us. We were met by a doctor belonging to our division who took us into the ward. There were about twenty of the worst cases in the war on mattresses, all more or less in a sitting position, propped up against the walls. Their faces, arms, and hands were of a shiny grey-black colour, mouth open and lead-glazed eyes—all swaying slightly backwards and forwards trying to get breath. It was the most appalling sight—all those poor black faces struggling for life. What with the groaning and the noise of the efforts for breath, Colonel —, who, as everybody knows, has had as wide an experience as anyone all over the savage parts of Africa, told me to-day that he never felt so sick as he did after the scene.

"In these cases there is practically nothing to be done for them, except to give them salt and water to try to make them sick.


The effect the gas has is to fill the lungs with a watery, frothy matter, which gradually increases till it fills up the whole lungs and clogs up to the mouth: then they die. It is suffocation—slow drowning—taking, in some cases, one or two days. Eight died last night out of the twenty I saw, and most of the others I saw will die, while those who get over the gas invariably develop acute pneumonia.

"It is, without doubt, the most awful form of scientific torture. Not one of the men I saw in hospital had a scratch or wound.

The nurses and

doctors were all working their utmost against this terror, but one could see from the tension of their nerves that it was like fighting a hidden danger which was overtaking everyone."

The German "smoke-developing contrivances" and interpretation of "the laws of civilised warfare" had provided medical science with something of a new problem. Isolated cases of chemical workers or firemen being accidentally overcome by chlorine fumes and similar gases had been known, but never before had it been necessary to protect large numbers of men against the deliberate use of such poisons. If the gas had been at all deeply inhaled there seemed to be little that could be done for the patients. The remedy



Holland on the gas attack: "The New Death," a cartoon from the "Nieuwe Amsterdamer."


was to be sought in respirators which would minimise or prevent the initial mischief. An appeal to the public for respirators was promptly issued by the War Office, and proof of the immense effect which the news of this latest method of attack had upon popular imagination is given by the fact that within twenty-four hours all the respirators that were needed had been received. Various designs were tried and discarded, and it was only after the end of the first week in May that really effective preventives were devised and distributed to the troops. The important feature of the effective respirator lay in a pad of cotton waste saturated in a solution of sodium carbonate and hyposulphate—the “hypo” of the photographer’s fixing bath—through which the wearer breathed.

The deep indignation which had been roused at home by the gas attacks was paralleled by a fury of resentment among the British troops on the Continent, who had seen at first hand and on their comrades the agonies which the gas inflicted. The sinking of the *Lusitania* and gas attacks brought into the fighting of this period a merciless anger of which little had been heard before. “I heard men go into battle with the cry of ‘Remember the *Lusitania*’ on their lips,” said a corporal of the Black Watch who was wounded near La Bassée, “and when that cry was heard it had a terrible meaning for the Germans. It transformed the ordinary, kind-hearted soldier into an avenging fury.” Nor could the Germans comfort themselves with the assurance that the horror roused by their doings was merely the disguised envy of their enemies raging with impotent fury as they contemplated brilliant extensions of “civilised warfare” which they had been unable to devise for themselves. In the leading articles and cartoons of Holland and the United States neutral opinion was quite as outspoken in its condemnation of German methods. And for all the *Kölnische Zeitung*’s ingenious parallel between the Allies’ military use of water—in flooding the lowlands of Flanders—and the German use of “our ally air” as a vehicle for “stupefying gases,” the Government organ *Norske Intelligenssedler*, of Christiania, was found denouncing the gas attack as a “particularly repulsive weapon which will create a hate deeper and more lasting against Germans than the laying of Louvain in ruins or the sinking of the *Lusitania*.”

THE PUBLICATION OF THE BRYCE REPORT.

There had been only one other period of the war in which the popular imagination had been so greatly

exercised by the reported excesses of German military practice. That period was the one covered by the sweeping advance of the German armies through Belgium and Northern France almost to the gates of Paris. It was the period when to the news of the frenzied sack of Louvain were added countless stories of individual and collective atrocities on the part of German troops, which, well authenticated or not (and at the time of their first appearance most of them were not), obtained the widest belief in this country. It so happened that, as the climax to the month dealt with in this chapter, the proven charges from this earlier period were now to be revived and made public in an authentic and conclusive form. In December, 1914, the British Government had appointed a Committee to examine and report upon the evidence of outrages alleged to have been committed by the German troops



Viscount Bryce, O.M., Chairman of the Committee which investigated the German outrages in Belgium and Northern France.
[Lafayette, Dublin.]

during the earlier part of the war—evidence which had been collected in great quantity by the Home Office for some three or four months before the appointment of the Committee. The Committee’s Report was published on May 12th, five days after the sinking of the *Lusitania* and the day before the Government’s announcement of the new policy towards alien enemies in this country. It arrived, therefore, too late to have had any effect on that section of public opinion which had already adopted rioting and alien baiting as its highly-discreditable expression of disgust at German policy; nor was the form in which the evidence was presented one which was likely to influence very greatly those poorest quarters of the large towns in which the rioting took place. But on more intelligent and responsible opinion its effect, coming after the *Lusitania* outrage and all the other evidences

of brutality which have been mentioned, was immediate and considerable, and certainly produced much new support for, or, at the least, acquiescence in, the Government’s new scheme for the wholesale internment and repatriation of alien enemies. Those who, during the early days of the war, had endeavoured to preserve a charitably open mind towards the conduct of the German troops, and had resolutely set down the majority of the then unsubstantiated stories of their atrocious behaviour in Belgium to the workings of war hysteria or malice, found that, after the most painstaking and fair-minded examination of a great body of evidence, there was hardly one of the worst of those earlier stories which was not corroborated or paralleled in the British Government’s official report.



Anti-German rioting in London: A crowd breaking in the windows of a German shop.

[Central Press.]



A crowd watching the looting of a German house in Poplar.

[L.N.A.]

The Chairman of the Committee was Lord Bryce, and its remaining members were Sir Frederick Pollock, K.C., Sir Edward Clarke, K.C., Sir Alfred Hopkinson, K.C., Mr. H. A. L. Fisher, the Vice-Chancellor of Sheffield University, Mr. Harold Cox, and, a little time after the original appointments had been made, Sir Kenelm E. Digby, K.C. In the collection and examination of the evidence the most elaborate and thorough precautions were taken to ensure its trustworthiness. Its ultimate weight was unmistakable. The Committee themselves confessed in their Report that all the evidence had been approached, both by the collectors and examiners, with considerable scepticism and an expectation that it would be influenced by passion or imagination. But as the collection and examination proceeded scepticism vanished, and it became apparent that, when all doubtful evidence had been discarded, there remained an abundant residue of level-headed, moderate testimony—and a concurrence of similar testimony from witnesses who were unknown to each other—which established the most positive and damning indictment of the conduct of the German troops. From this the Committee reported it as proved:—

"(i.) That there were in many parts of Belgium deliberate and systematically organised massacres of the civil population, accompanied by many isolated murders and other outrages.

"(ii.) That in the conduct of the war generally innocent civilians, both men and women, were murdered in large numbers, women violated, and children murdered.

"(iii.) That looting, house burning, and the wanton destruction of property were ordered and countenanced by the officers of the German army, that elaborate provision had been made for systematic incendiarism at the very outbreak of the war, and that the burnings and destruction were frequent where no military necessity could be alleged, being indeed part of a system of general terrorisation.

"(iv.) That the rules and usages of war were frequently broken, particularly by the using of civilians, including women and children, as a shield for advancing forces exposed to fire, to a less degree by killing the wounded and prisoners, and in the frequent abuse of the Red Cross and the White Flag."

"FRIGHTFULNESS" IN PRACTICE.

The detailed report of the evidence on which these findings were based makes a sickening procession of horrors. It begins on August 4th with the burning and pillage of the frontier village of Herve and the shooting of some fifty civilians as they attempted to escape from their burning homes. And the advance of the German troops was everywhere followed by the same tale of arson, massacre, and outrage. At Melen, near Herve, it was forty men who were shot. At Liège a portion of the town was systematically fired with benzine, and many inhabitants were burned alive in their houses. Women were raped in daylight in the open square of the University on the same day that the square had been the scene of the shooting of 32 civilians. On entering Namur, on August 24th, the German troops gave notice of their arrival by firing on a crowd of 150 unarmed, unresisting civilians, only ten of whom escaped. At Andenne, on the Meuse, where firing on the German troops was alleged, 400 people were massacred. And so the long catalogue of barbarities continues, covering in varying degrees of bloodiness all the districts in German occupation during the terrible months of August and September. The fact that their troops had been fired on by civilians was the excuse urged by the Germans; but

hardly any pains were taken to verify the charges, or to ascertain the actual culprits, before these terrible collective vengeance were made against whole towns and villages. The habit of diary-keeping among the German troops provided the Committee with much valuable evidence on the manner in which these reprisals were made. In one diary which fell into the hands of the British authorities a Saxon officer displayed, with damning clarity, the German practice. About 200 men had been shot in the instance referred to. "There must have been some innocent men amongst them," wrote this observer, who cannot be accused of undue sympathy for the slaughtered. "*In future we shall have to hold an enquiry as to their guilt instead of shooting them.*"

The truth was as stated in the first and third of the Committee's findings. These massacres, and the accompanying pillage and arson, were not the punishment of carefully-established misconduct committed by the civilian population, but part of an official system of terrorism intended to overawe a population which might very conceivably be capable of some individual treachery. Sometimes they seem to have even been a deliberate revenge for the attacks of the lawfully-constituted Belgian army. It was "frightfulness" in practice, an official policy of "punishment" without trial and in advance of the offence—a conclusion which would be supported, apart from any other evidence, by the undoubted fact that the barbarity of the German behaviour in any of the districts cited was in direct proportion to the amount of peril or legitimate resistance which their troops were meeting there. This official terrorism was the blackest charge which the Committee's Report established against the German army. The hideous individual atrocities which it mentioned—the rapes, the mutilated corpses, the abominable slaughter of young children and women—were details which more readily arrested and horrified the average reader. But these individual abominations, as the Committee were careful to point out, were not an indictment of the official attitude of the German army, except in so far as authorised and collective terrorism opened the door to personal excess. The difference was between atrocious cruelty that was the result of individual passion, perverted instincts, or drunkenness, and cruelty that was a deliberately-thought-out system, put into practice by the German command with the cold ferocity of an intellectual conviction. The great crime which the Bryce Report fastened on the German army in the eyes of all the world was that it had made savagery not a mood but a policy.

THE STORM BREAKS.

With the news of the sinking of the *Lusitania* the anger which had been accumulating against Germany began to take shape in action against the German residents in this country. There were still a great number of these whose liberties had remained very little interfered with, in spite of the demands which had been made from time to time in a section of the Press for the prompt internment of all alien enemies, and even, in some not very responsible quarters, for the internment of naturalised Germans as well. The Government was now to yield to this agitation, but not before it had received proof that the domestic peace of the country and the safety of the German residents themselves could only be secured by such a

step. More or less complete details of the sinking of the *Lusitania* were published in the morning papers of Saturday, May 8th, and on the same day fierce anti-German rioting broke out in Liverpool and Birkenhead. In three days more than a hundred houses, supposed to be occupied by Germans, were wrecked or damaged. In Manchester and Salford there were outbursts, less considerable in the actual damage done, but equally significant as an expression of the mood of the hour. By the Wednesday the Lancashire mobs, sobered by some businesslike sentences at the police courts, were beginning to abandon their new crusade; but the day was marked by its being taken up with ferocious vigour in East London, where the fact that no lives were lost was due more to good fortune than to the amount of police protection which was at hand. Serious as was the amount of damage done—in Liverpool alone it meant a bill of some £50,000 for the ratepayers to settle—it would be a mistake to attach too much importance to this very unpleasant and discreditable disorder. Anti-German feeling took this extreme shape only in a few of the large cities, and there only among the least reputable of the people. And whatever real and uncontrollable anger began the demonstrations they were carried on to a great extent by brutal horseplay and the emerging of the inevitable hooligan. For the most part they constituted a cruel and senseless harrying of unoffending people whose only offence was their nationality; and as they were made without any intelligent discrimination, the victims were not always offenders even to this small extent. The sight of a pork butcher's shop was enough to excite the mob, though in some cases its proprietor was an Englishman. Russians and other friendly aliens suffered considerably, and those British subjects who made some attempt to protect neighbours who had been living peacefully in their midst for years were not safe from rough handling. Nothing, however, was seen in this country to equal the organised revenge which was wreaked on German property in Johannesburg and other South African towns. There anger at the sinking of the *Lusitania* blazed up into the most methodical sack and arson of German premises. The total damage done in South Africa was estimated at over a million pounds.

There were, of course, many more responsible and legitimate indications of the public temper. German members of the London Stock Exchange were requested by the Committee to absent themselves from the Exchange, and those who disregarded the warning were denied entrance by a body of the other members. Similar notices warning off, at any rate temporarily, members of German, Austrian, and Turkish nationality were posted in other Exchanges all over the country. Clubs and other institutions followed suit. For the moment not even British nationality by birth, so long as it was accompanied by enemy extraction, was safe from suspicion. At a Newcastle shipyard the workmen, by a threat to strike, secured the resignation of a manager, and the dismissal of a draughtsman and some workmen, who all were of German and Austrian antecedents. Clearly the mood of the moment would have to be recognised by the Government.

NEW RESTRICTIONS ON ALIEN ENEMIES.

Mr. Asquith announced their recognition of it in the House of Commons on May 14th. At the time that his speech was made there were 19,000 civilian

aliens interned in British camps. Some 24,000 men and 16,000 women were still at liberty, subject to the old registration restrictions. All adult males of this class, "for their own safety and that of the community," were now to be interned, or, if over military age, repatriated. Women and children were also to be repatriated. Advisory Committees under the Home Office were to examine all claims for exemption, and it rested with the applicant to show cause why he should be allowed at large in the country. The presumption was to be that he was not entitled to his liberty. As for the some 8,000 naturalised British subjects of enemy birth, their harmlessness was presumed, but the power to intern them was reserved in cases where necessity or danger could be proved to the satisfaction of the Advisory Committee. It was a drastic scheme involving much private misfortune and the break up of many innocent homes, in some cases long established in this country. But the new style of war, which was, in terrible truth, war between the nations, and the pressing exigencies of the times, made it a necessary one, and, apart from a little criticism that it went too far or that it should have been taken still farther from extremists of both camps, the scheme was generally approved by the House of Commons and the public.

The new arrangements were put into force as swiftly as possible. The police met with no resistance in their huge task of rounding up four times as many aliens as had already been interned—in many cases Germans from the districts where rioting had taken place, terrified by the ordeal of the past few days, presented themselves voluntarily for arrest. But no further internments on any considerable scale could be carried out until fresh camps had been provided, and even those aliens who were anxious to secure shelter from attack found some difficulty in gaining that shelter for the moment. By the middle of June the rate of internment was still being held back by the lack of suitable camp sites, though the Advisory Committees had been vigorously at work. The English Committee had received 2,160 applications for exemption, out of which up to this time 286 applications had been granted and 1,256 refused. By the end of July internment was proceeding at the rate of 1,000 cases a week, and there still remained 6,000 aliens to be interned. The number of alien enemies, including women and children, who had been repatriated up to that time was 6,302.


THE DISHONOURD KNIGHTS.

There remains one small but highly interesting indication of the widespread change which the month dealt with in this chapter had brought about in the attitude of the British people towards their enemies. That change had shown itself in rioting among the least educated, and in the commercial and social ostracism of alien enemies, and the new internment policy of the Government, and among the middle and executive classes of society. It was also to be shown in the attitude of the Court. There had been occasional complaints ever since the beginning of the war that the names of a number of enemy princes were still included on the roll of the most famous of all British Orders of Knighthood, the Garter, and that their banners were still to be seen hanging in the Chapel of the Order at Windsor. No notice had been taken of the complaints, however, and there was no evident desire

that notice should be taken of them; for it is not necessary to be a member of the College of Heralds to perceive that a knight does not part with his honour by being at war with a sovereign who has previously recognised it. So much, at any rate, may be said for ordinary warfare. But four days after the sinking of the *Lusitania* was known an official notification was issued that the King, as Sovereign of the Order of the Garter, had given directions that the names of eight alien enemy knights should be struck off the roll of the order. The dishonoured knights were: The Emperor of Austria, the German Emperor, the King of Württemberg, the German Crown Prince,

the Grand Duke of Hesse and the Rhine, Prince Henry of Prussia, the Duke of Saxe-Coburg and Gotha, and the Duke of Cumberland.

Their banners were privately removed from the Chapel at Windsor, and so the incident closed. It was generally taken as a very fitting comment on the German conduct of war, the more so since it was clearly dictated by the latest developments of that conduct. If for no other reason it commended itself now to most Englishmen for having provided the opportunity for a singularly dignified and effective vindication of all that was honourable and all that had been most abused in the profession of arms.



St. George's Chapel, Windsor, showing the banners of the Garter knights. Those of the eight German and Austrian knights were removed when their names were struck off the roll of the Order.

(Central News.)



Dockers in khaki: Lord Derby making his first inspection of the Dockers' Battalion at Liverpool.

[L.N.A.]



The Dockers' Battalion at work discharging a ship's cargo at Liverpool.

[L.N.A.]



Back to the trenches: Soldiers who have been home for a day or two on leave saying good-bye to their friends on Victoria Station, London. [Topical Press.]

CHAPTER XXXVI.

THE EXTERNALS OF WAR IN ENGLAND.

ENGLAND THE ONE INSULAR COMBATANT—RECRUITING FOR THE ARMY, THE FIRST AND LATER PHASES—THE MIDDLE CLASSES AND THE NEW ARMY—THE PROBLEM OF THE BELGIAN REFUGEES—ENGLAND AND HER WOUNDED MEN—ORGANISATION AGAINST SOCIAL DISTRESS—THE WAR AND SPORT—WOMEN AND NEW INDUSTRIAL OPPORTUNITIES.

IN two respects England stood apart from all the great Powers which plunged into war at the beginning of August, 1914. She alone was an insular Power, with the sea for a natural frontier and—dependent upon this and derivative from it—she alone was organised for war on the footing of voluntary service. These two facts conditioned vitally the results of the war, and especially the earlier results, upon the social life of the country. It has often been remarked that the Straits of Dover constitute a moral and a psychological, as well as a physical, dividing line. Our literature, our art and manners, and social life are all marked by the insularity of our lives—we have always been a people consciously on the right side of the water. And this attitude of the English mind survived the transition from a state of peace to a state of war. In the month of September the war had submerged a country which is as familiar to multitudes of Englishmen as the upper reaches of the Thames, and as quickly, if not more quickly, reached from London than some parts of the West of England. All through

the first autumn of the war, landowners in the South and East of England were writing to the papers to testify that their pheasants were being unmistakably alarmed by the play of the artillery across in France.

And yet, save for the spas and seaports of the East Coast, the war remained a thing of over the threshold, an economic presence affecting the bank rate and the price of bacon, a cause of parting and a cause of bereavement, but not a physical thing which we should ever see with our own eyes. England was not called on to domesticate the war, and it became a current saying that this, that, and the other State measure, of which the reason was not at once apparent, was taken to "bring the war home" to the people. There is more reassurance in twenty-one miles of sea than in half a continent of dry land, and it was probably, again, because we had an insular attitude towards the war that it was unaccompanied in England by the striking moral reaction—in regard, for instance, to alcohol—which it brought in France and in Russia.



A khaki wedding: Cutting the wedding cake with the bridegroom's sword. [Central News.



Sergeants hauling the bridal coach from the church.

[Central News.

VOLUNTARY SERVICE.

The other respect in which England stood apart, both from her Allies and her enemies, was in her continued dependence upon the professional and voluntary man of arms. Swift as were the results of the war in the manufactories and counting-houses and shops of the country, they were, for some weeks at any rate, unaccompanied by such a domestic dislocation as comes from a continental mobilisation. After the lapse of a few weeks there was, as we shall see, a general arming of even the most pacific sections of English society. But this had not yet begun. For a few weeks the general mind of England still regarded fighting as the business of the fighting man. One of the few spectacles afforded by the outbreak of war was that of the crowds of candidates around the recruiting offices, but these crowds were still, at the moment, made up out of that material on which the army always draws—the population to which the army is, even in time of peace, a possible career. The domestication of the army by the middle class had not yet occurred; and it is probable that to many a young man, thrown out of work or placed on half-pay by the outbreak of the war, it was, and remained for some weeks, an unthinkable thing that he also should go and fight.

The war, therefore, is to be conceived of as insinuating itself into the social life of England rather than taking it by any form of cataclysm or assault. And its coming was devoid of either noise or spectacle. The transition from peace to war was almost as smooth and silent as the launching of a ship. The music-halls inserted the "Marseillaise" into their programmes, and taught their audiences to identify as the Russian National Anthem what most people had only known as an old-fashioned hymn-tune; but they did little more than this—it was plain that the music-halls did not propose to lead the nation as they did before and during the South African War. There was, again, little, if any, perambulation of the streets; and in the average English town the great event manifested itself chiefly in successive proclamations on the church doors, and in the sudden swelling into quite a new significance of the familiar figure of the Territorial soldier. In many villages the commandeering of horses—all except the white and dappled ones—constituted the first real tidings of war. Horses were stopped, taken out of their shafts, bought and paid for, and spirited away into the mysteries of great events—no one knew where they had gone, but milkmen delivering their milk on foot two days after the declaration of war were the earliest effective agents in "bringing the war home."


It was, indeed, not so much an avalanche as the welling up of a flood through all sorts of unexpected cracks in the framework of society. The amateur photographer found himself an object of suspicion; the man who did a little in wireless telegraphy discovered that he had it in him to be a dangerous character; pigeon flying was a forbidden sport. England had to learn, by many painful examples, that the rifles of an army on active service contained cartridges and would go off. Quite a number of people were wounded, and several lost their lives, before it became common knowledge that the sentry, with his challenge at the cross-roads and on the bridge, was not playing a game of make-believe, in which one might join or not as one chose. Another of the early signs of war was in the appearance of officers and even of naval officers, who

are especially shy of their plumage, in full uniform in omnibuses and restaurants. England discovered, what she had perhaps not known, that a considerable proportion of her more eminent medical men were Territorial officers in the Royal Army Medical Corps. The medical profession also was mobilised, and went very extensively into khaki.

Meanwhile, the Expeditionary Force had gone abroad, and the Fleet was believed to have put out to the North Sea. Whatever anticipations he may have had of the war on land, it is certain that the average man expected at sea a decision both summary and swift. Both the Press and the public tried to take the war at a much faster speed than the war was prepared to go. Probably, in those early days, the country, or rather that part of the country which was not yet on the rack of a personal anxiety, was unconsciously visualising the war as something decidedly bigger and more momentous than a General Election, but of the same kind and species, and capable, like a General Election, or any other great political crisis, of being progressively unfolded in successive editions of the evening Press. And so, late every night in August and September, as England was going to bed, there was a rush of newsboys into the peaceful suburbs of the great towns, and the news sounded very alarming and decisive until it was carried in and read. The country made experience for the first time of a Censorship. It began to get accustomed to information in small doses, and, having no news, it took to gossip. The *on dit* became once more a power in the land. The great achievement of this revived institution was the passage through England of that large Russian force. The rumour went everywhere and it came from everywhere. The Russian force had been seen in every corner of England—no matter how unlikely the junction and no matter how fantastically on any conceivable journey the Russians must have lost their way, they had always been seen, usually the night before, and always by someone who was not present to give his evidence in person. It was like a mediæval rumour tuned up to the tension of modern times.

THE ARMY AND THE MIDDLE CLASS.

The New Army was, however, the great social phenomenon produced in England by the European War. It represented the militarisation of the English middle class. It is astonishing how few before the war were the bonds between the British army and the British public. In France the army has always been a domestic pet, but ordinary social England, on the other hand, had hardly been on nodding terms with its own army—either with officers or with men—for the British army had drawn its material from the far opposite ends of the social scale, from the highest and the lowest. There is, indeed, evidence that the courts and alleys of London and Liverpool and Bristol and Manchester were the partners of the playing-fields of Eton in the victory of Waterloo. Territorial soldiering had, it is true, become a recognised diversion of middle-class youth, but it had powerful rivals in golf and tennis, and never, to the average young man, held out the promise of a great and eminent career like cricket. We have seen that the first recruits of August represented the *levée* of the raw military material of the country. The New Army, which was to draw upon the banks and the counting-houses, to decimate the



Soldiers assisting the farmers by getting in the hay.

[Topical Press.]



School children helping in the sowing of potatoes.

[J. M. Dunn.]

active membership of tennis clubs, and to cause the carriage of golf-sticks in public places by men of military age to be "bad form," had not at the moment been born, or, at any rate, had not begun to grow.

Kitchener's Army was an army *ad hoc*. Enlistment was "for the duration of the war," and it was this which made it possible for those who had never thought of the army before. Gregarious enlistment was encouraged. Men were invited to join under guarantees that the social stratifications of civilian life would be preserved. Battalions were to be "atmospheric" and homogeneous—the nets brought up great hauls of "pals." And since a man was to go soldiering for a limited period, and in many cases among men of his own social class, it did not very much matter whether he went with a commission or in the ranks. Many, it is true, stipulated for commissions, but the great majority stood not upon the order of their going, but went. And these were the wise ones in their generation. The New Army had a double dose of original humanity, and a man made his way in it for all sorts of reasons not known at Aldershot, and not excluding the reason that he happened to be a nice fellow.

The truth is that very little of the old military caste survived the first two months of war. The social isolation of the private soldier was definitely broken down. He was to be seen constantly in the most elegant company, and it was quite possible—such were the fortunes of war—that he had younger brothers, and perhaps even nephews, whom it was his military duty to salute. And side by side with this humanisation of the army occurred what we have called the militarisation of the pacific deeps of English society. If the spectacle of army and even naval officers in the insides of omnibuses was something new, and if private soldiers in the stalls of theatres represented a social landslide, it was equally an innovation to see the elderly Nonconformist citizen in company with two soldiers of the line, who were quite obviously his sons. His acquiescence, his full sympathy even, and the tentative use in his conversation of military terms and

even military slang, was not the least striking of the signs of the times. He had trained up his sons to be "honorary secretaries" in evangelical causes, and the times had made them artillerymen.

RETURN TO PHYSICAL STANDARDS.

The war was the cause of a sort of overhauling of the physique of England. There was a return to the physical standards, a reassortment of men according to age, with a cross-classification by chest measurement. The men who were just a little too old to go before the doctor began to take more or less secret stock of themselves, and to put in a modest claim to be accounted physically righteous. Conscious as they were, in many

cases, of possessing more endurance and needing less sleep in the forties than in the twenties or thirties, they resented their total exclusion from the combatant strength of the country, and it was mainly from such men that a large body of special constables and home defence volunteers was recruited. The theory and practice of infantry drill became a subject of general study, and, concurrently with this, people set to work to catch up with the events which had led up to the great catastrophe of the war. The penny blue-book which stated the case for England had an enormous sale, and the book-stalls were loaded with popular expositions of Haeckel, Treitschke, and Nietzsche, while Bernhardi spoke for himself in a multitude



One of the New Army making himself useful in his billet.
[Newspaper Illustrations.]

of editions. English women read these books as assiduously as their men-folk, perhaps even more assiduously. The libraries all reported a marked resort to serious literature, not excluding even poetry. And as the winter came on, prodigies of knitting were done in khaki wool. The revival of knitting was commented on in several of the popular songs of the day.

We have seen how quietly and soberly England passed into a state of war. This mood was a promising and a reassuring symptom, especially to those who were old enough to compare the quietude and sobriety of August, 1914, with the feverishness and hysteria



The Kingsway Hall Creche, where little children, whose fathers are at the war and whose mothers are out working, are fed and looked after.

[Topical Press.]



The shortage of men workers: Women carriage cleaners at Marylebone Station.

[Record Press.]

which preceded the South African War. The Government seemed almost perverse in its determination to keep the fires of popular excitement damped down. In the first meagre accounts which came of the fighting in France the British army was treated of as a machine. There is a local patriotism as well as a national patriotism, and in England it is fostered by the mimic warfare and emulations of sport, but regimental achievements which would have set the local echoes ringing through this county or that city were suppressed, or only tardily and partially revealed. The country was left to feed on its own reserves of character and resolution, and it was very generally remarked that the early recruits moved off to their depôts as quietly and almost as forlornly as though they had been Irish harvesters on their annual migration. It was not until the first spring of the war that the military value of music—one of the oldest uses of that art—was generally perceived, and the new soldiers were given the privilege of stepping out to the nearest railway station and the unknown future which awaited them with some sort of swagger and rhythm. As for the Territorial battalions, they mainly left home in the night, and the towns which had bred them and brought them up wakened to find that they were gone.

THE BELGIAN REFUGEES.

And consequently the first real sight which England got of the war was its wreckage. In a great and probably typical English city the first popular rush into the streets was caused, weeks after the war had begun, by the arrival of the first Belgian refugees. These people, or at any rate the earlier parties to arrive, were given what must have been to many of them an overpowering civic reception, and were then distributed in small, and not always well-assorted, parties over all the provinces of England. There was hardly a town or a residential district of a great city in which "the Belgians" did not become a new interest in social life, and incidentally a considerable problem in handling and organisation. It was the Belgian

refugees who caused the mobilisation of middle-class England into a vast army of committees. Houses which had stood empty for years were turned into institutions. "Central" committees, "housing" committees, "furnishing" committees, and "amusements" committees sprang into existence, and considerable social distinction was acquired by ladies who knew conversational French in the very advanced degree that was required. It was found that the Belgian was a guest who needed handling with much tact. England had to learn by many awkward and embarrassing examples that the Belgian nation comprises two races who are politically rather than socially unified, and that while Walloon and Flemish make

excellent joint occupants of Belgium they are not to be contained together with the best results in a single house, even though it be a large one. The useful employment of the men, or of those above military age, was also a difficulty in a country where the entire industrial surface has been reclaimed and fenced about by the trade union. Glasgow distinguished itself greatly by its systematic treatment of the problem of the Belgian refugees. In Glasgow the work was municipalised from the very start, and other cities besides Glasgow experimented hopefully in Belgian workshops, the products of which were to be stored up against the day when the refugees might return to rebuild their own homes.




A woman ticket inspector at work.

[Record Press.]

TREATMENT OF THE WOUNDED.


But a very powerful rival to the Belgian refugee was coming in the person of the English soldier returned broken and wounded from the war. At his first coming he was an object of deep curiosity, but very shortly he became, especially in his convalescence, a principal care and occupation of leisured society. Modern England, if she does not feel more deeply, feels more quickly than she did. The war brought out very plainly that acute sensibility to physical suffering which may be due to a more active social conscience, and is probably caused in part by the overwrought nerves of modern civilised life. We have seen how



The Volunteer Defence Movement: The National Guard entering Buckingham Palace, where they were inspected by the King.
[Topical Press.]



Members of the National Guard learning trench digging in the heart of the city on the site of the old General Post Office.
[Central Press.]



The war and the Universities: Undergraduates who have become officers in the army going into the Senate House in order to take their degrees on Degree Day at Cambridge. [Central News]

the military plan denied to the people left at home the vicarious excitements of war which the "special correspondent" and, still more, the cinematograph operator, would have been only too glad to purvey. Nevertheless, forty years of popular education, a cheap and, in later years, an illustrated press, and the picture palace, teaching a sort of facile visualisation of strange and sometimes awful scenes, had done their work—people could not only read, but, what was still more to the point, they could read between the lines. The case of a certain "lonely corporal," who had received no letters at Christmas, having crept into the papers, scores and scores of people constituted themselves his regular correspondents; and the presents for the troops included not only woollen clothing and Christmas puddings in staggering quantities, but such refinements in life as tinted notepaper, scented soap, and boracic powder. England projected herself with all her complicated modern tastes and requirements into the trenches in the first winter of the war, and the parcels which went to the front constituted a sort of measure of the rise and the refinement of the general standard of life. As for the convalescent soldier at home, he was a patient, but even more a pet. The rule seemed to be to give him not so much the things which might conceivably be good for him as the things which he would be most likely to want. England had plainly learned the therapeutic value of amusement. He was borrowed from the hospital for organised motor-runs; he was taken to matinées; and when this was not possible, he was sung to, and played to, and

danced to as he lay in bed. Many of these wounded men were reservists, who had before the war settled down to the ordinary life of the artisan in English towns, and a new communion between the classes into which society is divided, and a better understanding between rich and poor, must be counted one of the minor blessings of war to be set against its major horrors—a slight edification amid all the ruins. A Red Cross Hospital, with its shaded lawn and open windows, with some soldiers playing cricket with their free arms, and others looking on from low chairs, made one wonder, if only for the moment, whether the war was not scattering pleasures almost as lavishly as pains.

EARLY FEARS OF DISTRESS.

It was with the same quick imaginativeness that the country assembled immediately on the outbreak of war a vast and complex machinery for the relief of social distress. It is to be remembered that on August 4th, 1914, not one Englishman in ten had the vaguest idea what a state of war would mean. The country was quite destitute of the experimental data which were the common property of elderly men both in Germany and France. While the Expeditionary Force was getting a footing on the Continent, England at home was finding its way out of a maze of equally false hopes and fears. We have seen how the country quite mistook the manner in which events would be shaped by England's mastery of the seas. In one other respect the miscalculation was complete. It was expected that the war would throw a great proportion

of the people out of work. For the first few weeks it appeared as though this anticipation would prove to be correct. The cotton trade was brought almost to a standstill, and it is curious to recall that the engineering trade, in which afterwards the demand for men was greater than the supply, was almost the first and the heaviest hit. But two influences on which the country had not reckoned checked the rise of unemployment and, growing stronger in the autumn, gave the country at Christmas the air and the feeling of an abnormal prosperity.

The first of these influences was the wholesale withdrawal of able-bodied men from the industrial service of the country, and the second, operating with the first influence and intensifying its effect, the demand for war material, which speedily had large parts of industrial England working day and night. In these circumstances there was work for almost anyone and everyone with a pair of hands, and it was said that down the length of long streets in many industrial towns there had not been a better and fuller Christmas for years. Moreover, if the British Navy did not, in pitched and arrayed battle, sink the German fleet, as the average Englishman expected it would, it yet gave a substantial, if an unsensational, account of itself in the grocers' shops. Prices after the first few weeks of panic, during which England was buying-in apparently for a siege, fell almost



Village workers making toys to take the place of those previously supplied from Germany. [L.N.A.]

to their pre-war level, and though it was in the order of things that they should go up again, their next ascent, when it came, was a gradual one, with which rising wages kept in some correspondence. Moreover, the well-to-do who received the war with a sudden and violent turning over of new leaves, as though it was likely to last about as long as Lent, kept their good resolutions not much longer than those which are made at the beginning of the New Year. From August 4th till about August 23rd the restaurants of England might as well have been closed. By the end of August their customers were coming back. In the third week of the war the picture palaces were

recovering their audiences, and on September 5th the football season deliberately began again. The temperature of the country had returned to 98.4. It became almost a morbid symptom that it refused to rise again.

SPORT AND AMUSEMENTS.

Indeed, throughout the first winter of war the country carried out almost the full programme of its amusements. There was, for instance, the professional football player. Although a much-threatened man, he survived as a figure and an institution through a complete winter of the war, and finished his appointed programme towards the end of April in the presence of some fifty thousand of the faithful. Vicarious

athletics, the sport of "looking on," had been the cause of much misgiving to those who stood around the bedside of the sick man of civilisation, and it was believed and hoped that this would be one of the cankers of a long peace which the war would infallibly cure. It soon became evident, however, that the country had mind and to spare for the game. On Christmas Day there were 40,000 spectators at Newcastle; at Bradford, 25,000; at Blackburn, 25,000; at Sheffield, 25,000; at Bolton, 18,000; and at Chelsea, 15,000. In its progress towards the cup final on April 24th the game bore down without difficulty the obstacle of a polite but highly-scandalised protest.

It is stated that the restaurants


in Manchester on the day of that great event prepared for almost "unprecedented patronage," engaging waiters and waitresses from all over Lancashire and Yorkshire. The managers of the game were, however, betraying before the season was quite over a very considerable degree of nervous self-consciousness. They dwelt much on the mental recreation which they were providing for overworked men in the munitions factories, and pointed to the trenches—even the German trenches—as being all impatient for football news, and it was perhaps out of the same desire to get into better tune with the times that the band at the great match for the Cup played

through a long programme of hymns. Lord Derby's speech at the end of the match contained rather more than a sigh of relief that this diversion was at an end. For horse-racing on a modified programme, and without its usual social glamour, the defence was made that the upkeep of the best thoroughbred stock was one of the military necessities of the country.

WOMEN'S WORK.

The war, then, failed to bring about in England any of the cataclysmic changes which were expected of it. It neither produced great evils nor—as it is said to have done in France and Russia—removed them. The changes which it did make came late and had to be sought deep, but some of them, at any rate, were of a kind to outlast the war and survive into the days of peace. There was, for instance, a definite enlargement of the boundaries of women's work. The railway, for instance, lent itself in quite an unexpected degree to feminine management. From the cleaning of offices, almost immemorially the province of women, to the cleaning of railway carriages seems a step

involving no question of principle, and it is curious that the mobilisation of charwomen for this work should have excited some curiosity. More significant from the social point of view was the introduction of women to duties which put them as collectors and examiners of tickets in control of the rough-and-tumble of mankind on railway platforms. The appointment of women as tramguards was an even bolder experiment, but women had only to be seen once in such a setting and thenceforth they belonged—as lift attendants and chauffeurs also—to the natural order of things. It is curious how long mankind will go on thinking itself imprisoned within doors that are not locked and will open at a touch. These wide extensions of women's work were perhaps thought by many an adequate compensation for the arrest of the agitation for the vote. It is true that masculine jealousy was placated whenever necessary by the assurance that each innovation of the kind was a war measure, but much of the social experimentation which was made in a long series of war measures has probably been made for all time.



The opening of the Red Cross Sale in London.

[Central News.

A RETROSPECT.

THIS volume has brought the general narrative of events down to the end of the third quarter of the first year. For British readers the story has been less inspiring than that told in the first volume. The first volume saw the British army on the broad main current of military events. In their invasion through Belgium the Germans put their chief strength on their right wing. The British were opposite, and on them fell the full force of the shock. General Joffre's strategy before the Marne was to decline his centre while accumulating armies on the German flank. Of these armies the British were the centre, and on them again fell the brunt and much of the honour of the victory of the Marne. Fortune, and the prescience of Sir John French, made the British the protagonists in the great struggle in Flanders, when the Germans, having fallen back on entrenched positions along the Aisne, sought to repeat their great encircling movements, but this time with a wider sweep along the coast from Antwerp to Calais. The second and third quarter of the year had nothing to compare with the crowded excitements of these first three months. To the rapid movement of the first three months succeeded the trench war of winter, like molten iron poured in an ice-bound mould, and spring, on which hope had been so confidently set, brought its disappointment. Neuve Chapelle was a fruit that tasted sweet, but somewhat soured in the digestion. And there was a remarkable and not an agreeable contrast between the prominent part which the small Expeditionary Force played in the early operations of the war and the comparative inactivity of the much larger British army in the spring, when General Foch began his attack on Lens.

The contrast helped to swell the wave of pessimism which began to spread over British opinion as the end of the first year approached and no progress made. Yet the sense of discouragement, natural as it was, was irrational and in great measure ill-informed. The disproportion between the achievement of the British army in the late summer and autumn and in the winter and spring was more in appearance than in reality. The distinction of the British army at the beginning of the war was for the most part in retreat, and there is one standard of strength required for retreat and another—and a much higher standard—for successful attack, or even for successful defence. The army of the summer of 1914 was even less capable of holding its ground than the army of the spring was of attacking with success the elaborately prepared positions of the enemy. Our army gained vastly in strength as the months went by, and its gain was a measure of the work of organisation that had been done in the meantime. If this work was still insufficient for the task in hand, it was proof not that no progress had been made, but that the enormous strength of the enemy's positions had been under-estimated. That fact and its causes were much to be regretted; but they did not justify the depression of spirits which became fashionable in England, and indeed, after the

ill-success of April and May, was artificially cultivated in some quarters as a patriotic virtue.

Lord Kitchener's original estimate of the duration of the war, made before even he understood the great defensive power of modern entrenchments scientifically built and equipped, was three years. It was much that three months of war had established a strong probability of our winning the war; and it was too much to hope that they would bring us within sight of actual victory. The theory on which we began the war was that a comparatively small reinforcement on land would serve to turn the balance of war in favour of the Allies. Neither France nor Russia before the war expected us to supply an army of the Continental size and model. What they wanted was our sea-power, without which they stood no chance of success. By the end of the first six months it was clear that there was no such thing as a war with limited liability, and that we should have to equip ourselves with military power and become an equal partner on land, as well as the predominant partner at sea. But even then it was not generally realised that to be a great military Power meant something more than having two or three millions of men under arms. The individual cannot suddenly develop his muscles without throwing a great strain on his nervous and circulatory system. Similarly, an army is not an appendage that a nation can develop or contract at will. Any sudden increase necessarily involves a great organic change in the whole life of the nation. That would have been so in a war against any enemy, but in a war against an enemy like Germany, who for forty years had studied the art of war, and had organised its whole scientific and industrial development with a view to its enlistment in the service of the State, the resultant disturbance was proportionately greater. This country was called upon to extemporise within a year a military system of a magnitude equal to that which it had taken Europe a generation to develop. Its failure to accomplish this feat is the failure of our spring campaign. We had the men, but not the machinery of an army.

And, in justice to ourselves, it should be borne in mind that our failure was not redeemed by any conspicuous French success in the field. The Germans were not far wrong in their estimate of the material strength of France, and but for the reforms of General Joffre in the winter the French army would never have been in a condition to attack. It is impossible to exaggerate the quality of the work done by General Joffre, or the splendid qualities of endurance shown by the French people. But they were none the less inadequate to the task of expelling the Germans from France, to say nothing of Belgium. Both in Champagne and in the Woevre the results of the French attacks were small in proportion to the expenditure of life. On the two flanks, in Alsace and in Artois, the progress of the French was more substantial; yet it never looked like breaking the main line of the German resistance. Long before spring it was clear that the

French alone could not overcome the German resistance. What was to be done in the west depended partly on the assistance that the British were able to give to the French on land, partly on the success of the Russians in compelling the Germans to draw off from the western front.

The failure of the British spring campaign showed that months must elapse before the conversion of England into a first-class military Power was complete. This conversion was not solely, as seemed to be assumed in England, a question of munitions; but at any rate a superabundant supply of munitions, and especially of machine-guns and of high-explosive shells, was a primary condition of success. Reasonable Frenchmen, and all who knew the difficulties of Britain's task in effecting, as she was now required and prepared to do, a complete revolution in her ideas of national defence—a revolution extending beyond the army into all departments of the national life—were willing to wait patiently until the transformation was effected. But it is to be feared that the indiscreet zeal of some English newspaper writers, by belittling the sacrifices of Englishmen and the services that this country was rendering to the common cause, made it easy for Frenchmen who were not well-informed to misunderstand us.

All through the winter the centre of gravity of the war was in the east rather than the west. Popular opinion in England grossly over-estimated the numbers of men engaged in the war on the east, and in particular the numbers of men which Russia was capable of putting and of maintaining in the field. It may be doubted whether Russia ever had more than two million men under arms at any one time. In other words, Russia, in spite of her enormous population, never probably had as many men in the field as France. At the beginning of the war the Germans had six times as many men on the west as on the east front, where the burden of attack fell on the Austrians. The original German plans failed no less completely on the east than on the west. Not only did the Austrian offensive break down, but East Prussia was invaded and Galicia was lost. All through the winter Russia maintained her advantage over Austria, in spite of increasing German pressure on the Polish front. Yet so far from overwhelming the enemy by weight of numbers, the Russians were frequently outnumbered. The immense work done by Russia during these months has not been justly appreciated in this country. The familiar metaphor of the "steam roller" concealed from English minds the fact that all through these months the odds were steadily mounting against her. They saw that the number of Germans in the west remained fairly constant—it never sank much below two millions; they ignored for the most part the wonderful power of Austria to sustain defeat; and the idea that the Russians could possibly be outnumbered hardly ever occurred to them.

And more important than the occasional and local inferiority in numbers was the constant inferiority in artillery and in technical equipment. Russia was in a position not unlike that of Britain herself in the spring of this year. She had the men, but could not equip them. And, unlike France, she did not, thanks to her geographical position, enjoy the full advantage of our command of the seas. That a country which was virtually blockaded, and had no great industrial resources to fall back upon, should do what Russia did in the autumn and winter was a great achievement, the full merits of which have not been properly recognised in this country.

Russia inflicted on Germany what Berlin regarded as its worst humiliation in the war—the invasion of East Prussia. In addition, she defeated three separate attempts on Warsaw—the first attack along the line of the Vistula, the second by way of Lodz, which was stayed on the Rawka and Bzura lines, the third further north, which was checked at the battle of Przasnysz. After the repulse of the early invasion of East Prussia, Russia's whole object was to turn the Austrian flank of Germany's defences; and, in spite of the repeated German campaigns against Warsaw, she so far succeeded that by the beginning of spring the Carpathian Passes were in her hands. It was at this juncture that our naval campaign against the Dardanelles forts was opened, and Great Britain, with the help of the French, began to take a direct part in the Eastern campaign. Russia had richly earned that assistance, and the prospects of success seemed bright.

How those prospects were clouded will be told in the next volume. But later ill-success ought not to blind us to the fact that in the late winter all the omens pointed to decisive success in the east. There were two occasions in the first nine months of the war in which very little would have given us decisive victory. The first was in September, after the battle of the Marne, when an army of 250,000 men in Belgium might not only have saved Antwerp but have ruined the whole German invasion of Belgium—perhaps ended the war then and there. The second was in February, when the Russian success in the Carpathians was at its height, and we were thinking of attacking the Dardanelles. A little more imagination and skill in our diplomacy, a little more patience and secrecy in our arrangements for attack on the Dardanelles, and early summer might have seen the Balkan States fighting on our side and a double invasion of Hungary in progress, over the Carpathian Passes and by the Balkan States on the south.

In that case the adhesion of Italy to the cause of the Allies might have brought about the downfall of Austria. As it was, her intervention, though it was the one bright spot in a spring that was full of disappointment, brought no immediate improvement, though its promise for the future was full of hope.

APPENDICES.

A.—GENERAL FRENCH'S DESPATCHES

1.—THE BATTLE OF GIVENCHY.

February 17th, 1915.

From the Field Marshal Commanding-in-chief the British Army in the Field to the Secretary of State for War:—

MY LORD,

I have the honour to forward a further report on the operations of the army under my command.

In his desire to act with energy up to his instructions to demonstrate and occupy the enemy, the General Officer commanding the Indian Corps decided to take advantage of what appeared to him a favourable opportunity to launch attacks against the advanced trenches in his front on the 18th and 19th December. The attack of the Meerut Division on the left was made on the morning of the 19th with energy and determination, and was at first attended with considerable success, the enemy's advanced trenches being captured. Later on, however, a counter-attack drove them back to their original position with considerable loss.

The attack of the Lahore Division commenced at 4.30 a.m. It was carried out by two companies each of the First Highland Light Infantry and the First Battalion Fourth Gurkha Rifles of the Sirhind Brigade, under Lieutenant-Colonel R. W. H. Ronaldson. This attack was completely successful, two lines of the enemy's trenches being captured with little loss. Before daylight the captured trenches were filled with as many men as they would hold. The front was very restricted, communication to the rear impossible. At daybreak it was found that the position was practically untenable. Both flanks were in the air, and a supporting attack, which was late in starting, and therefore conducted during daylight, failed, although attempted with the greatest gallantry and resolution. Lieutenant-Colonel Ronaldson held on till dusk, when the whole of the captured trenches had to be evacuated, and the detachment fell back to its original line.

By the night of the 19th December nearly all the ground gained during the day had been lost.

From daylight on the 20th December the enemy commenced a heavy fire from artillery and trench mortars on the whole front of the Indian Corps. This was followed by infantry attacks, which were made in especial force against Givenchy and between that place and La Quinque Rue. At about 10 a.m. the enemy succeeded in driving back the Sirhind Brigade and capturing a considerable part of Givenchy, but the Fifty-seventh Rifles and Ninth Bhopals, north of the canal, and the Connaught Rangers, south of it, stood firm. The Fifteenth Sikhs of the divisional reserve were already supporting the Sirhind Brigade. On the news of the retirement of the latter being received, the Forty-seventh Sikhs were also sent up to reinforce General Brunner.

The First Manchester Regiment, the Fourth Suffolk Regiment, and two battalions of French Territorials, under General Carnegie, were ordered to launch a vigorous counter-attack from Pont Fixé through Givenchy, to retake by a flank attack the trenches lost by the Sirhind Brigade. Orders were sent to General Carnegie to divert his attack on Givenchy village and to re-establish the situation there. A battalion of the Fifty-eighth French Division was sent to Annequin in support.

About 5 p.m. a gallant attack by the First Manchester Regiment and one company of the Fourth Suffolk Regiment had captured Givenchy and had cleared the enemy out of the two lines of trenches to the east of the village. The Ninth Bhopal Infantry and the Fifty-seventh Rifles had maintained their positions. But the enemy were still in possession of our trenches to the north of the village.

COUNTER-ATTACKS FAIL.

General Macbean, with the Secunderabad Cavalry Brigade, the Second Battalion

Eighth Gurkha Rifles, and the Forty-seventh Sikhs, was sent up to support General Brunner, who at 2 p.m. directed General Macbean to move to a position of readiness in the second line trenches from Maris northward and to counter-attack vigorously if opportunity offered. Some considerable delay appears to have occurred, and it was not until 1 a.m. on the 21st that the Forty-seventh Sikhs and the Seventh Dragoon Guards, under the command of Lieutenant-Colonel H. A. Lempriere, D.S.O., of the latter regiment, were launched in counter-attack. They reached the enemy's trenches, but were driven out by enfilade fire, their gallant commander being killed.

The main attack by the remainder of General Macbean's force with the remnants of Lieutenant-Colonel Lempriere's detachment (which had again been rallied) was finally pushed in at about 4.30 a.m., and also failed.

STUBBORNNESS UNDER STRAIN.

In the northern section of the defensive line the retirement of the Second Battalion Second Gurkha Rifles at about 10 a.m. on the 20th had left the flank of the First Seaforth Highlanders on the extreme right of the Meerut Division line much exposed. This battalion was left shortly afterwards completely in the air by the retirement of the Sirhind Brigade. The Fifty-eighth Rifles therefore were ordered to support the left of the Seaforth Highlanders, to fill the gap created by the retirement of the Gurkhas.

During the whole of the afternoon strenuous efforts were made by the Seaforth Highlanders to clear the trenches to their right and left. The First Battalion Ninth Gurkha Rifles reinforced the Second Gurkhas near the orchard where the Germans were in occupation of the trenches abandoned by the latter regiment. The Garhwal Brigade was being very heavily attacked, and their trenches and loopholes were much damaged, but the Brigade continued to hold its front and attack, connecting with the Sixth Jats on the left of the Dehra Dun Brigade. No advance in force was made by the enemy, but the troops were pinned to their ground by heavy artillery fire, the Seaforth Highlanders especially suffering heavily.

Shortly before nightfall the Second Royal Highlanders, on the right of the Seaforth Highlanders, had succeeded in establishing touch with the Sirhind Brigade, and a continuous line (though dented near the orchard) existed throughout the Meerut Division.

THE FIRST CORPS ORDERED UP.

Early in the afternoon of December 20th orders were sent to the First Corps, which was then in general army reserve, to send an infantry brigade to support the Indian Corps. The First Brigade was ordered to Béthune, and reached that place at midnight on the 20th-21st December. Later in the day Sir Douglas Haig was ordered to move the whole of the First Division in support of the Indian Corps. The Third Brigade reached Béthune between 8 a.m. and 9 a.m. on the 21st, and on the same date the Second Brigade arrived at Lacon at 1 p.m. The First Brigade was directed on Givenchy via Pont Fixé and the Third Brigade through Gorre on the trenches evacuated by the Sirhind Brigade. The Second Brigade was directed to support the Dehra Dun Brigade, being placed at the disposal of the general officer commanding the Meerut Division.

At 1 p.m. the general officer commanding the First Division directed the First Brigade to attack from the west of Givenchy in a north-easterly direction and the Third Brigade from Festubert in an east-north-easterly direction, the object being to pass the position originally held by us and to capture the German trenches 400 yards to the east of it. By 5 p.m. the First Brigade had obtained a hold in Givenchy and the Third Brigade had progressed to a point half a mile west of Festubert. By nightfall the First South Wales Borderers and the

Second Welsh Regiment, of the Third Brigade, had made a lodgment in the original trenches to the north-east of Festubert, the First Gloucestershire Regiment continuing the line southward along the track east of Festubert. The First Brigade had established itself on the east side of Givenchy.

By 3 p.m. the Second Brigade was concentrated at Le Touret, and was ordered to retake the trenches which had been lost by the Dehra Dun Brigade. By 10 p.m. the support trenches west of the orchard had been carried, but the original fire trenches had been so completely destroyed that they could not be occupied. This operation was performed by the First Loyal North Lancashire Regiment and the First Northamptonshire Regiment, supported by the Second King's Royal Rifle Corps in reserve. Throughout this day the units of the Indian Corps rendered all the assistance and support they could in view of their exhausted condition.

THE WHOLE POSITION RESTORED.

At 1 p.m. on the 22nd Sir Douglas Haig took over the command from Sir James Willcocks. The situation in the front line was then approximately as follows:—South of the La Bassée Canal the Connaught Rangers, of the Ferozepore Brigade, had not been attacked. North of the canal a short length of our original line was still held by the Ninth Bhopals and the Fifty-seventh Rifles, of the same brigade. Connecting with the latter was the First Brigade, holding the village of Givenchy and its eastern and northern approaches. On the left of the First Brigade was the Third Brigade. Touch had been lost between the left of the former and the right of the latter. The Third Brigade held a line along and in places advanced to the east of the Festubert road. Its left was in communication with the right of the Meerut Division line, where troops of the Second Brigade had just relieved the First Seaforth Highlanders. To the north, units of the Second Brigade held an indented line west of the orchard, connecting with half of the Second Royal Highlanders, half of the Forty-first Dogras, and the First Battalion Ninth Gurkha Rifles. From this point to the north the Sixth Jats and the whole of the Garhwal Brigade occupied the original line they held from the commencement of the operations.

The relief of most units of the southern sector was effected on the night of the 22nd December. The Meerut Division remained under the orders of the First Corps, and was not completely withdrawn until the 27th December. In the evening the position at Givenchy was practically re-established, and the Third Brigade had reoccupied the old line of trenches.

During the 23rd the enemy's activities ceased, and the whole position was restored to very much its original condition.

THE INDIANS' STEADFASTNESS.

In my last despatch I had occasion to mention the prompt and ready help I had received from the Lahore Division, under the command of Major-General H. B. B. Watkis, C.B., which was thrown into action immediately on arrival, when the British forces were very hard pressed during the battle of Ypres-Armentières. The Indian troops have fought with the utmost steadfastness and gallantry whenever they have been called upon.

"A FINE PIECE OF WORK."

On the 1st February a fine piece of work was carried out by the Fourth Brigade in the neighbourhood of Cuinchy. Some of the Second Coldstream Guards were driven from their trenches at 2.30 a.m., but made a stand some twenty yards east of them in a position which they held till morning. A counter-attack, launched at 3.15 a.m. by one company of the Irish Guards and half a company of the Second Coldstream Guards, proved unsuccessful, owing to heavy rifle fire from the east and south.

At 4 a.m., acting under orders of the First Division, a heavy bombardment was

opened on the lost ground for ten minutes, and this was followed immediately by an assault by about fifty men of the Second Coldstream Guards with bayonets, led by Captain A. Leigh-Bennett, followed by thirty men of the Irish Guards, led by Second Lieutenant F. F. Graham, also with bayonets. These were followed by a party of Royal Engineers with sandbags and wire. All the ground which had been lost was brilliantly retaken, the Second Coldstream Guards also taking another German trench and capturing two machine guns. Thirty-two prisoners fell into our hands.

The General Officer commanding the First Division describes the preparation by the artillery as "splendid," the high-explosive shells dropping in the exact spot with absolute precision.

In forwarding his report on this engagement, the General Officer commanding the First Army writes as follows:—

Special credit is due (1) to Major-General Haking, commanding First Division, for the prompt manner in which he arranged this counter-attack and for the general plan of action, which was crowned with success.

(2) To the General Officer commanding the Fourth Brigade (Lord Cavan) for the thorough manner in which he carried out the orders of the general officer commanding the division.

(3) To the regimental officers, non-commissioned officers, and men of the Second Coldstream Guards and Irish Guards, who, with indomitable pluck, stormed two sets of barricades, captured three German trenches, two machine guns, and killed or made prisoners many of the enemy.

THE WAR IN THE AIR.

During the period under report the Royal Flying Corps has again performed splendid service. Although the weather was almost uniformly bad and the machines suffered from constant exposure, there have been only 13 days on which no actual reconnaissance has been effected. Approximately one hundred thousand miles have been flown.

In addition to the daily and constant work of reconnaissance and co-operation with the artillery, a number of aerial combats have been fought, raids carried out, detachments harassed, parks and petrol depôts bombed, &c. Various successful bomb-dropping raids have been carried out, usually against the enemy's aircraft material.

The principle of attacking hostile aircraft whenever and wherever seen (unless highly important information is being delivered) has been adhered to, and has resulted in the moral fact that enemy machines invariably beat an immediate retreat when chased. Five German aeroplanes are known to have been brought to the ground, and it would appear probable that others, though they have managed to reach their own lines, have done so in a considerably damaged condition.

THE TERRITORIALS.

In my despatch of the 20th November, 1914, I referred to the reinforcements of Territorial troops which I had received, and I mentioned several units which had already been employed in the fighting line.

In the positions which I held for some years before the outbreak of this war I was brought into close contact with the Territorial Force, and I found every reason to hope and believe that when the hour of trial arrived they would justify every hope and trust which was placed in them.

The Lords Lieutenant of counties and the associations which worked under them bestowed a vast amount of labour and energy on the organisation of the Territorial Force; and I trust it may be some recompense to them to know that I, and the principal commanders serving under me, consider that the Territorial Force has far more than justified the most sanguine hopes that any of us ventured to entertain of their value and use in the field.

Commanders of cavalry divisions are unstinted in their praise of the manner in which the yeomanry regiments attached to their brigades have done their duty both in and out of action. The service of the

cavalry is now almost entirely performed by yeomanry, and divisional commanders report that they are very efficient.

Army corps commanders are loud in their praise of the Territorial battalions which form part of nearly all the brigades at the front in the first line, and more than one of them have told me that these battalions are fast approaching—if they have not already reached—the standard of efficiency of regular infantry.

THE OFFICERS' TRAINING CORPS.

I wish to add a word about the Officers' Training Corps. The presence of the Artists' Rifles (Twenty-eighth Battalion London Regiment) with the army in France enabled me also to test the value of this organisation. Having had some experience in peace of the working of the Officers' Training Corps, I determined to turn the Artists' Rifles (which formed part of the Officers' Training Corps in peace time) to its legitimate use. I therefore established the battalion as a training corps for officers in the field.

The cadets pass through a course which includes some thoroughly practical training, as all cadets do a tour of 48 hours in the trenches, and afterwards write a report on what they see, and notice. They also visit an observation post of a battery or group of batteries and spend some hours there. A commandant has been appointed, and he arranges and supervises the work, sets schemes for practice, administers the school, delivers lectures, and reports on the candidates. The cadets are instructed in all branches of military training suitable for platoon commanders. Machine-gun tactics, a knowledge of which is so necessary for all junior officers, is a special feature of the course of instruction.

When first started the school was able to turn out officers at the rate of 75 a month. This has since been increased to 100.

Reports received from divisional and army corps commanders on officers who have been trained at the school are most satisfactory.

THE SOLDIERS' ENDURANCE.

Since the date of my last report I have been able to make a close personal inspection of all the units in the command. I was most favourably impressed by all I saw.

The troops composing the army in France have been subjected to as severe a trial as it is possible to impose upon any body of men. The desperate fighting described in my last despatch had hardly been brought to a conclusion when they were called upon to face the rigours and hardships of a winter campaign. Frost and snow have alternated with periods of continuous rain. The men have been called upon to stand for many hours together almost up to their waists in bitterly cold water, only separated by one or two hundred yards from a most vigilant enemy.

Although every measure which science and medical knowledge could suggest to mitigate these hardships was employed, the sufferings of the men have been very great. In spite of all this they presented at the inspections to which I have referred a most soldier-like, splendid, though somewhat war-worn appearance. Their spirit remains high and confident; their general health is excellent, and their condition most satisfactory.

I regard it as most unfortunate that circumstances have prevented any account of many splendid instances of courage and endurance, in the face of almost unparalleled hardship and fatigue in war, coming regularly to the knowledge of the public.

THE REINFORCEMENTS.

Reinforcements have arrived from England with remarkable promptitude and rapidity. They have been speedily drafted into the ranks, and most of the units I inspected were nearly complete when I saw them. In appearance and quality the drafts sent out have exceeded my most sanguine expectations, and I consider the army in France is much indebted to the Adjutant-General's Department at the War Office for the efficient manner in which its requirements have been met in this most essential respect.

With regard to these inspections, I may mention in particular the fine appearance presented by the Twenty-seventh and

Twenty-eighth Divisions, composed principally of battalions which had come from India. Included in the former division was the Princess Patricia's Royal Canadian Regiment. They are a magnificent set of men, and have since done excellent work in the trenches.

THE INDIAN TROOPS.

Some weeks after the battle of Givenchy I made my inspection of the Indian Corps under Sir James Willcocks. The appearance they presented was most satisfactory, and fully confirmed my first opinion that the Indian troops only required rest and a little acclimatising to bring out all their fine inherent fighting qualities. I saw the whole of the Indian Cavalry Corps, under Lieutenant General Rimington, on a mounted parade soon after their arrival. They are a magnificent body of cavalry, and will, I feel sure, give the best possible account of themselves when called upon. In the meantime, at their own particular request, they have taken their turn in the trenches and performed most useful and valuable service.

THE CHAPLAINS' DEVOTION AND ENERGY.

The Right Rev. Bishop Taylor Smith, C.V.O., D.D., Chaplain General to the Forces, arrived at my headquarters on the 6th January on a tour of inspection throughout the command. The Cardinal Archbishop of Westminster has also visited most of the Irish regiments at the front and the principal centres on the line of communications.

In a quiet and unostentatious manner the chaplains of all denominations have worked with devotion and energy in their respective spheres. The number with the forces in the field at the commencement of the war was comparatively small, but towards the end of last year the Rev. J. M. Simms, D.D., K.H.C., principal chaplain, assisted by his secretary, the Rev. W. Drury, reorganised the branch, and placed the spiritual welfare of the soldiers on a more satisfactory footing. It is hoped that a further increase of personnel may be found possible. I cannot speak too highly of the devoted manner in which all chaplains, whether with troops in the trenches or in attendance on the sick and wounded in casualty clearing stations and hospitals on the line of communications, have worked throughout the campaign.

ADMIRABLE MEDICAL ORGANISATION.

Since the commencement of hostilities the work of the Royal Army Medical Corps has been carried out with untiring zeal and devotion. Whether at the front under conditions such as obtained during the fighting on the Aisne, when casualties were heavy and accommodation for their reception had to be improvised, or on the line of communications, where an average of some 11,000 patients have been daily under treatment, the organisation of the medical services has always been equal to the demands made upon it. The careful system of sanitation introduced into the army has, with the assistance of other measures, kept the troops free from any epidemic, in support of which is to be noticed that since the commencement of the war some 500 cases only of enteric have occurred.

The organisation for the first time in war of motor-ambulance convoys is due to the initiative and organising powers of Surgeon-General T. J. O'Donnell, D.S.O., ably assisted by Major P. Evans, Royal Army Medical Corps. Two of these convoys, composed entirely of Red Cross Society personnel, have done excellent work under the superintendence of regular medical officers. Twelve hospital trains ply between the front and the various bases. I have visited several of the trains when halted in stations, and have found them conducted with great comfort and efficiency.

During the more recent phase of the campaign the creation of rest depôts at the front has materially reduced the wastage of men to the line of communications.

Since the latter part of October, 1914, the whole of the medical arrangements have been in the hands of Surgeon-General Sir A. T. Sloggett, C.M.G., K.H.S., under whom Surgeon-General T. P. Woodhouse and Surgeon-General T. J. O'Donnell have been responsible for the organisation on the line of communications and at the front respectively.

CAVALRY IN READINESS.

As most of the objects for which the operations had been undertaken had been attained, and as there were reasons why I considered it inadvisable to continue the attack at that time, I directed Sir Douglas Haig on the night of the 12th to hold and consolidate the ground which had been gained by the Fourth and Indian Corps, and to suspend further offensive operations for the present.

On the morning of the 12th I informed the General Officer Commanding First Army that he could call on the Second Cavalry Division, under General Gough, for immediate support in the event of the successes of the First Army opening up opportunities for its favourable employment. This division and a brigade of the North Midland Division, which was temporarily attached to it, was moved forward for this purpose.

The Fifth Cavalry Brigade, under Sir Philip Chetwode, reached the Rue Bacquerot at 4 p.m., with a view to rendering immediate support; but he was informed by the General Officer Commanding Fourth Corps that the situation was not so favourable as he had hoped it would be, and that no further action by the cavalry was advisable.

General Gough's command, therefore, retired to Estaires.

The artillery of all kinds was handled with the utmost energy and skill, and rendered invaluable support in the prosecution of the attack.

THE BRITISH AND GERMAN LOSSES.

The losses during these three days' fighting were, I regret to say, very severe, numbering—

190 officers and 2,337 other ranks, killed.

359 officers and 8,174 other ranks, wounded.

23 officers and 1,728 other ranks, missing.

But the results attained were, in my opinion, wide and far-reaching.

The enemy left several thousand dead on the battlefield, which were seen and counted; and we have positive information that upwards of 12,000 wounded were removed to the north-east and east by train.

Thirty officers and 1,657 other ranks of the enemy were captured.

I can best express my estimate of this battle by quoting an extract from a Special Order of the Day which I addressed to Sir Douglas Haig and the First Army at its conclusion:—

"I am anxious to express to you personally my warmest appreciation of the skilful manner in which you have carried out your orders, and my fervent and most heartfelt appreciation of the magnificent gallantry and devoted, tenacious courage displayed by all ranks whom you have ably led to success and victory."

HOW THE MUNITION WORKER SAVES LIVES.

I have already commented upon the number and severity of the casualties in action which have occurred in the period under report. Here, once again, I have to draw attention to the excellent work done by Surgeon-General O'Donnell and his officers. No organisation could excel the efficiency of the arrangements—whether in regard to time, space, care and comfort, or transport—which are made for the speedy evacuation of the wounded.

I wish particularly to express my deep sense of the loss incurred by the army in general, and by the forces in France in particular, in the death of Brigadier-General J. E. Gough, V.C., C.M.G., A.D.C., late Brigadier-General, General Staff, First Army, which occurred on 22nd February as a result of a severe wound received on the 20th February when inspecting the trenches of the Fourth Corps.

I always regarded General Gough as one of our most promising military leaders of the future. His services as a staff officer throughout the campaign have been invaluable, and I had already brought his name before your Lordship for immediate promotion.

I can well understand how deeply these casualties are felt by the nation at large, but each daily report shows clearly that they are being endured on at least an equal scale by all the combatants engaged throughout Europe, friends and foes alike.

In war as it is to-day between civilised nations, armed to the teeth with the present deadly rifle and machine-gun, heavy casualties are absolutely unavoidable. For the slightest undue exposure the heaviest toll is exacted.

The power of defence conferred by modern weapons is the main cause of the long duration of the battles of the present day, and it is this fact which mainly accounts for such loss and waste of life.

Both one and the other can, however, be shortened and lessened if attacks can be supported by the most efficient and powerful force of artillery available; but an almost unlimited supply of ammunition is necessary, and a most liberal discretionary power as to its use must be given to the artillery commanders.

I am confident that this is the only means by which great results can be obtained with a minimum of loss.

I have the honour to be, your Lordship's most obedient servant,

J. D. P. FRENCH, Field Marshal,
Commanding-in-Chief the British Army in the Field.

III.—THE SECOND BATTLE OF YPRES.

General Headquarters, 15th June, 1915.

MY LORD,

I have the honour to report that since the date of my last despatch (5th April) the army in France under my command has been heavily engaged opposite both flanks of the line held by the British forces.

1. In the north the town and district of Ypres have once more in this campaign been successfully defended against vigorous and sustained attacks made by large forces of the enemy, and supported by a mass of heavy and field artillery which, not only in number but also in weight and calibre, is superior to any concentration of guns which has previously assailed that part of the line.

In the south a vigorous offensive has again been taken by troops of the First Army, in the course of which a large area of entrenched and fortified ground has been captured from the enemy, whilst valuable support has been afforded to the attack which our Allies have carried on with such marked success against the enemy's positions to the east of Arras and Lens.

THE BARBARITY OF GAS.

2. I much regret that during the period under report the fighting has been characterised on the enemy's side by a cynical and barbarous disregard of the well-known usages of civilised war and a flagrant defiance of the Hague Convention.

All the scientific resources of Germany have apparently been brought into play to produce a gas of so virulent and poisonous a nature that any human being brought into contact with it is first paralysed and then meets with a lingering and agonising death.

The enemy has invariably preceded, prepared, and supported his attacks by a discharge in stupendous volume of these poisonous gas fumes whenever the wind was favourable.

Such weather conditions have only prevailed to any extent in the neighbourhood of Ypres, and there can be no doubt that the effect of these poisonous fumes materially influenced the operations in that theatre, until experience suggested effective counter-measures, which have since been so perfected as to render them innocuous.

The brain power and thought which has evidently been at work before this unworthy method of making war reached the pitch of efficiency which has been demonstrated in its practice shows that the Germans must have harboured these designs for a long time.

As a soldier, I cannot help expressing the deepest regret and some surprise that an army which hitherto has claimed to be the chief exponent of the chivalry of war should have stooped to employ such devices against brave and gallant foes.

4. It was at the commencement of the second battle of Ypres on the evening of the 22nd April, referred to in paragraph 2 of this report, that the enemy first made use of asphyxiating gas.

Some days previously I had complied with General Joffre's request to take over the trenches occupied by the French, and on the evening of the 22nd the troops holding the lines east of Ypres were posted as follows:—

From Steenstraete to the east of Langemarck, as far as the Poelcappelle Road, a French Division.

Thence, in a south-easterly direction toward the Passchendaele-Becelaere Road, the Canadian Division.

Thence a Division took up the line in a southerly direction east of Zonnebeke to a point west of Becelaere, whence another Division continued the line south-east to the northern limit of the Corps on its right.

Of the Fifth Corps there were four battalions in Divisional Reserve about Ypres; the Canadian Division had one battalion in Divisional Reserve and the First Canadian Brigade in Army Reserve. An Infantry Brigade, which had just been withdrawn after suffering heavy losses on Hill 60, was resting about Vlamertinghe.

THE FIRST GAS ATTACK.

Following a heavy bombardment, the enemy attacked the French Division at about 5 p.m., using asphyxiating gases for the first time. Aircraft reported that at about 5 p.m. thick, yellow smoke had been seen issuing from the German trenches between Langemarck and Bixchoote. The French reported that two simultaneous attacks had been made east of the Ypres-Staden Railway, in which these asphyxiating gases had been employed.

What follows almost defies description. The effect of these poisonous gases was so virulent as to render the whole of the line held by the French Division mentioned above practically incapable of any action at all. It was at first impossible for anyone to realise what had actually happened. The smoke and fumes hid everything from sight, and hundreds of men were thrown into a comatose or dying condition, and within an hour the whole position had to be abandoned, together with about fifty guns.

I wish particularly to repudiate any idea of attaching the least blame to the French Division for this unfortunate incident.

After all the examples our gallant Allies have shown of dogged and tenacious courage in the many trying situations in which they have been placed throughout the course of this campaign it is quite superfluous for me to dwell on this aspect of the incident, and I would only express my firm conviction that, if any troops in the world had been able to hold their trenches in the face of such a treacherous and altogether unexpected onslaught, the French Division would have stood firm.

THE CANADIANS' STAND.

The left flank of the Canadian Division was thus left dangerously exposed to serious attack in flank, and there appeared to be a prospect of their being overwhelmed and of a successful attempt by the Germans to cut off the British troops occupying the salient to the east. In spite of the danger to which they were exposed the Canadians held their ground with a magnificent display of tenacity and courage, and it is not too much to say that the bearing and conduct of these splendid troops averted a disaster which might have been attended with the most serious consequences. They were supported with great promptitude by the reserves of the divisions holding the salient and by a brigade which had been resting in billets.

Throughout the night the enemy's attacks were repulsed, effective counter-attacks were delivered, and at length touch was gained with the French right and a new line was formed.

The Second London Heavy Battery, which had been attached to the Canadian Division, was posted behind the right of the French Division, and, being involved in their retreat, fell into the enemy's hands. It was recaptured by the Canadians in their counter-attack, but the guns could not be

withdrawn before the Canadians were again driven back.

During the night I directed the Cavalry Corps and the Northumbrian Division, which was then in general reserve, to move to the west of Ypres, and placed these troops at the disposal of the General Officer commanding the Second Army. I also directed other reserve troops from the Third Corps and the First Army to be held in readiness to meet eventualities.

PLANS WITH GENERAL FOCH.

In the confusion of the gas and smoke the Germans succeeded in capturing the bridge at Steenstraete and some works south of Lizerne, all of which were in occupation by the French.

The enemy having thus established himself to the west of the Ypres Canal, I was somewhat apprehensive of his succeeding in driving a wedge between the French and Belgian troops at this point. I directed, therefore, that some of the reinforcements sent north should be used to support and assist General Putz, should he find difficulty in preventing any further advance of the Germans west of the canal.

At about 10 o'clock on the morning of the 23rd connection was finally ensured between the left of the Canadian Division and the French right, about 800 yards east of the canal; but as this entailed the maintenance by the British troops of a much longer line than that which they had held before the attack commenced on the previous night, there were no reserves available for counter-attack until reinforcements, which were ordered up from the Second Army, were able to deploy to the east of Ypres.

Early on the morning of the 23rd I went to see General Foch, and from him I received a detailed account of what had happened, as reported by General Putz. General Foch informed me that it was his intention to make good the original line and regain the trenches which the French Division had lost. He expressed the desire that I should maintain my present line, assuring me that the original position would be re-established in a few days. General Foch further informed me that he had ordered up large French reinforcements, which were now on their way, and that troops from the north had already arrived to reinforce General Putz.

I fully concurred in the wisdom of the General's wish to re-establish our old line, and agreed to co-operate in the way he desired, stipulating, however, that if the position was not re-established within a limited time I could not allow the British troops to remain in so exposed a situation as that which the action of the previous twenty-four hours had compelled them to occupy.

A CRITICAL TIME.

During the whole of the 23rd the enemy's artillery was very active, and his attacks all along the front were supported by some heavy guns which had been brought down from the coast in the neighbourhood of Ostend.

The loss of the guns on the night of the 22nd prevented this fire from being kept down, and much aggravated the situation. Our positions, however, were well maintained by the vigorous counter-attacks made by the Fifth Corps.

During the day I directed two brigades of the Third Corps and the Lahore Division of the Indian Corps to be moved up to the Ypres area and placed at the disposal of the Second Army.

In the course of these two or three days many circumstances combined to render the situation east of the Ypres Canal very critical and most difficult to deal with.

The confusion caused by the sudden retirement of the French Division, and the necessity for closing up the gap and checking the enemy's advance at all costs, led to a mixing up of units and a sudden shifting of the areas of command which was quite unavoidable. Fresh units, as they came up from the south, had to be pushed into the firing line in an area swept by artillery fire, which, owing to the capture of the French guns, we were unable to keep down.

GENERAL HULL'S RESOURCE.

All this led to very heavy casualties, and I wish to place on record the deep admiration

which I feel for the resource and presence of mind evinced by the leaders actually on the spot.

The parts taken by Major-General Snow and Brigadier-General Hull were reported to me as being particularly marked in this respect.

An instance of this occurred on the afternoon of the 24th, when the enemy succeeded in breaking through the line at St. Julien.

Brigadier-General Hull, acting under the orders of Lieutenant-General Alderson, organised a powerful counter-attack with his own brigade and some of the nearest available units. He was called upon to control, with only his brigade staff, parts of battalions from six separate divisions which were quite new to the ground. Although the attack did not succeed in retaking St. Julien, it effectually checked the enemy's further advance.

It was only on the morning of the 25th that the enemy were able to force back the left of the Canadian Division from the point where it had originally joined the French line.

During the night and the early morning of the 25th the enemy directed a heavy attack against the division at Brookseinde cross roads, which was supported by a powerful shell fire, but he failed to make any progress.

During the whole of this time the town of Ypres and all the roads to the east and west were uninterruptedly subjected to a violent artillery fire; but in spite of this, the supply of both food and ammunition was maintained throughout with order and efficiency.

EFFORTS TO RECOVER GROUND.

During the afternoon of the 25th many German prisoners were taken, including some officers. The hand-to-hand fighting was very severe, and the enemy suffered heavy loss.

During the 26th the Lahore Division and a cavalry division were pushed up into the fighting line, the former on the right of the French, the latter in support of the Fifth Corps.

In the afternoon the Lahore Division, in conjunction with the French right, succeeded in pushing the enemy back some little distance towards the north, but their further advance was stopped owing to the continual employment by the enemy of asphyxiating gas.

On the right of the Lahore Division the Northumberland Infantry Brigade advanced against St. Julien and actually succeeded in entering, and for a time occupying, the southern portion of that village. They were, however, eventually driven back, largely owing to gas, and finally occupied a line a short way to the south. This attack was most successfully and gallantly led by Brigadier-General Riddell, who, I regret to say, was killed during the progress of the operation.

Although no attack was made on the south-eastern side of the salient, the troops operating to the east of Ypres were subjected to heavy artillery fire from this direction, which took some of the battalions, which were advancing north to the attack, in reverse.

Some gallant attempts made by the Lahore Division on the 27th, in conjunction with the French, pushed the enemy further north; but they were partially frustrated by the constant fumes of gas to which they were exposed. In spite of this, however, a certain amount of ground was gained.

A SKILFUL RETIREMENT.

The French had succeeded in retaking Lizerne, and had made some progress at Steenstraete and Het Sas, but up to the evening of the 28th no further progress had been made towards the recapture of the original line.

I sent instructions, therefore, to Sir Herbert Plumer, who was now in charge of the operation, to take preliminary measures for the retirement to the new line which had been fixed upon.

On the morning of the 29th I had another interview with General Foch, who informed me that strong reinforcements were hourly arriving to support General Putz, and urged me to postpone issuing orders for any retirement until the result of his attack, which

was timed to commence at daybreak on the 30th, should be known. To this I agreed, and instructed Sir Herbert Plumer accordingly.

No substantial advance having been made by the French, I issued orders to Sir Herbert Plumer at one o'clock on May 1st to commence his withdrawal to the new line.

The retirement was commenced the following night, and the new line was occupied on the morning of May 4th.

I am of opinion that this retirement, carried out deliberately with scarcely any loss, and in the face of an enemy in position, reflects the greatest possible credit on Sir Herbert Plumer and those who so efficiently carried out his orders.

The successful conduct of this operation was the more remarkable from the fact that on the evening of May 2nd, when it was only half completed, the enemy made a heavy attack, with the usual gas accompaniment, on St. Julien and the line to the west of it.

GERMAN ATTACKS DRIVEN BACK.

An attack on a line to the east of Fortuin was made at the same time under similar conditions.

In both cases our troops were at first driven from their trenches by gas fumes, but on the arrival of the supporting battalions and two brigades of a cavalry division, which were sent up in support from about Potijze, all the lost trenches were regained at night.

On the 3rd May, while the retirement was still going on, another violent attack was directed on the northern face of the salient. This was also driven back with heavy loss to the enemy.

Further attempts of the enemy during the night of the 3rd to advance from the woods west of St. Julien were frustrated entirely by the fire of our artillery.

During the whole of the 4th the enemy heavily shelled the trenches we had evacuated, quite unaware that they were no longer occupied. So soon as the retirement was discovered the Germans commenced to entrench opposite our new line and to advance their guns to new positions. Our artillery, assisted by aeroplanes, caused him considerable loss in carrying out these operations.

Up to the morning of the 8th the enemy made attacks at short intervals, covered by gas, on all parts of the line to the east of Ypres, but was everywhere driven back with heavy loss.

SIR H. PLUMER'S DESPERATE BATTLE.

Throughout the whole period since the first break of the line on the night of April 22nd all the troops in this area had been constantly subjected to violent artillery bombardment from a large mass of guns with an unlimited supply of ammunition. It proved impossible whilst under so vastly superior fire of artillery to dig efficient trenches, or properly to reorganise the line, after the confusion and demoralisation caused by the first great gas surprise and the subsequent almost daily gas attacks. Nor was it until after this date (May 8th) that effective preventatives had been devised and provided. In these circumstances a violent bombardment of nearly the whole of the Fifth Corps front broke out at 7 a.m. on the morning of the 8th, which gradually concentrated on the front of the division between north and south of Frezenberg. This fire completely obliterated the trenches and caused enormous losses.

The artillery bombardment was shortly followed by a heavy infantry attack, before which our line had to give way.

LINE BROKEN.

I relate what happened in Sir Herbert Plumer's own words:—

"The right of one brigade was broken about 10-15 a.m.; then its centre, and then part of the left of the brigade in the next section to the south. The Princess Patricia's Canadian Light Infantry, however, although suffering very heavily, stuck to their fire or support trenches throughout the day. At this time two battalions were moved to General Headquarters second line astride the Menin road to support and cover the left of the division.

"At 12-25 p.m. the centre of a brigade further to the left also broke; its right

battalion, however, the First Suffolks, which had been refused to cover a gap, still held on, and were apparently surrounded and overwhelmed. Meanwhile, three more battalions had been moved up to reinforce, two other battalions were moved up in support to General Headquarters line, and an infantry brigade came up to the grounds of Vlamartinghe Chateau in corps reserve.

"At 11-30 a.m. a small party of Germans attempted to advance against the left of the British line, but were destroyed by the Second Essex Regiment.

"A counter-attack was launched at 3-30 p.m. by the First York and Lancaster Regiment, Third Middlesex Regiment, Second East Surrey Regiment, Second Royal Dublin Fusiliers, and the First Royal Warwickshire Regiment. The counter-attack reached Frezenberg, but was eventually driven back and held up on a line running about north and south through Verlorenhoek, despite repeated efforts to advance. The Twelfth London Regiment on the left succeeded at great cost in reaching the original trench line, and did considerable execution with their machine-gun.

"The 7th Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders and the First East Lancashire Regiment attacked in a north-easterly direction towards Wieltje, and connected the old trench line with the ground gained by the counter-attack, the line being consolidated during the night.

"During the night orders were received that two cavalry divisions would be moved up and placed at the disposal of the Fifth Corps, and a Territorial Division would be moved up to be used if required.

TERRIFIC SHELLING.

"On the 9th the Germans again repeated their bombardment. Very heavy shell fire was concentrated for two hours on the trenches of the Second Gloucestershire Regiment and Second Cameron Highlanders, followed by an infantry attack which was successfully repulsed. The Germans again bombarded the salient, and a further attack in the afternoon succeeded in occupying 150 yards of trench. The Gloucesters counter-attacked, but suffered heavily, and the attack failed. The salient being very exposed to shell fire from both flanks, as well as in front, it was deemed advisable not to attempt to retake the trench at night, and a retrenchment was therefore dug across it.

"At 3 p.m. the enemy started to shell the whole front of the centre division, and it was reported that the right brigade of this division was being heavily punished, but continued to maintain its line.

"The trenches of the brigades on the left centre were also heavily shelled during the day, and attacked by infantry. Both attacks were repulsed.

"On the 10th instant the trenches on either side of the Menin-Ypres road were shelled very severely all the morning. The Second Cameron Highlanders, Ninth Royal Scots, and the Third and Fourth King's Royal Rifles, however, repulsed an attack made, under cover of gas, with heavy loss. Finally, when the trenches had been practically destroyed and a large number of the garrison buried, the Third King's Royal Rifles and Fourth Rifle Brigade fell back to the trenches immediately west of Bellewaarde Wood. So heavy had been the shell fire that the proposal to join up the line with a switch through the wood had to be abandoned, the trees broken by the shells forming an impassable entanglement.

ENEMY'S GREAT LOSS FOR SMALL GAIN.

"After a comparatively quiet night and morning (10th-11th) the hostile artillery fire was concentrated on the trenches of the Second Cameron Highlanders and First Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders at a slightly more northern point than on the previous day. The Germans attacked in force and gained a footing in part of the trenches, but were promptly ejected by a supporting company of the Ninth Royal Scots. After a second short artillery bombardment the Germans again attacked about 4-15 p.m., but were again repulsed by rifle and machine-gun fire. A third bombardment followed, and this time the Germans succeeded in gaining a trench—or rather what was left of it—a local counter-

attack failing. However, during the night the enemy were again driven out. The trench by this time being practically non-existent, the garrison found it untenable under the very heavy shell fire the enemy brought to bear upon it, and the trench was evacuated. Twice more did the German snipers creep back into it, and twice more they were ejected. Finally, a retrenchment was made, cutting off the salient which had been contested throughout the day. It was won owing solely to the superior weight and number of the enemy's guns, but both our infantry and our artillery took a very heavy toll of the enemy, and the ground lost has proved of little use to the enemy.

"On the remainder of the front the day passed comparatively quietly, though most parts of the line underwent intermittent shelling by guns of various calibre.

"With the assistance of the Royal Flying Corps the Thirty-first Heavy Battery scored a direct hit on a German gun, and the North Midland Heavy Battery got on to some German howitzers with great success.

"With the exception of another very heavy burst of shell fire against the right division early in the morning, the 12th passed uneventfully.

CAVALRY IN THE TRENCHES.

"On the night of the 12th-13th the line was reorganised, the centre division retiring into army reserve to rest, and their places being taken in the trenches by the two cavalry divisions; the artillery and engineers of the centre division forming with them what is known as the 'Cavalry Force,' under the command of General de Lisle.

"On the 13th, the various reliefs having been completed without incident, the heaviest bombardment yet experienced broke out at 4-30 a.m., and continued with little intermission throughout the day. At about 7-45 a.m. the Cavalry Brigade astride the railway, having suffered very severely and their trenches having been obliterated, fell back about 800 yards. The North Somerset Yeomans on the right of the brigade, although also suffering severely, hung on to their trenches throughout the day, and actually advanced and attacked the enemy with the bayonet. The brigade on its right also maintained its position; as did also the cavalry division, except the left squadron, which, when reduced to sixteen men, fell back.

THE SECOND ESSEX'S INITIATIVE.

"The Second Essex Regiment, realising the situation, promptly charged and retook the trench, holding it until relieved by the cavalry. Meanwhile a counter-attack by two cavalry brigades was launched at 2-30 p.m., and succeeded, in spite of very heavy shrapnel and rifle fire, in regaining the original line of trenches, turning out the Germans who had entered it, and in some cases pursuing them for some distance. But a very heavy shell fire was again opened on them, and they were again compelled to retire to an irregular line in rear, principally the craters of shell holes. The enemy in their counter-attack suffered very severe losses.

"The fighting in other parts of the line was little less severe. The First East Lancashire Regiment were shelled out of their trenches, but their support company and the Second Essex Regiment, again acting on their own initiative, won them back. The enemy penetrated into the farm at the north-east corner of the line, but the First Rifle Brigade, after a severe struggle, expelled them. The First Hampshire Regiment also repelled an attack, and killed every German who got within fifty yards of their trenches. The Fifth London Regiment, despite very heavy casualties, maintained their position unflinchingly. At the southern end of the line the left brigade was once again heavily shelled, as indeed was the whole front.

THE LINE PRACTICALLY MAINTAINED.

"At the end of a very hard day's fighting our line remained in its former position, with the exception of the short distance lost by one cavalry division. Later the line was pushed forward, and a new line was dug in a place exposed to position slightly to the east of the original line. The night passed quietly.

"Working parties of from 1,200 to 1,800

men have been found every night by a Territorial Division and other units for work on rear lines of defence, in addition to the work performed by the garrisons in reconstructing the front line trenches which were daily destroyed by shell fire.

"The work performed by the Royal Flying Corps has been invaluable. Apart from the hostile aeroplanes actually destroyed, our airmen have prevented a great deal of aerial reconnaissance by the enemy, and have registered a large number of targets with our artillery.

"LANCASHIRE LYNN'S" FEAT.

"There have been many cases of individual gallantry. As instances may be given the following:—

"During one of the heavy attacks made against our infantry gas was seen rolling forward from the enemy's trenches. Private Lynn, of the Second Lancashire Fusiliers, at once rushed to the machine gun without waiting to adjust his respirator. Single-handed he kept his gun in action the whole time the gas was rolling over, actually hoisting it on the parapet to get a better field of fire. Although nearly suffocated by the gas, he poured a stream of lead into the advancing enemy and checked their attack. He was carried to his dug-out, but, hearing another attack was imminent, he tried to get back to his gun. Twenty-four hours later he died in great agony from the effects of the gas.

"A young subaltern in a cavalry regiment went forward alone one afternoon to reconnoitre. He got into a wood, 1,200 yards in front of our lines, which he found occupied by Germans, and came back with the information that the enemy had evacuated a trench and were digging another—information which proved most valuable to the artillery as well as to his own unit.

A NIGHT ADVENTURE.

"A patrol of two officers and a non-commissioned officer of the First Cambridgeshires went out one night to reconnoitre a German trench 350 yards away. Creeping along the parapet of the trench, they heard sounds indicating the presence of six or seven of the enemy. Further on they heard deep snores, apparently proceeding from a dug-out immediately beneath them. Although they knew that the garrison of the trench outnumbered them, they decided to procure an identification. Unfortunately, in pulling out a clasp knife with which to cut off the sleeper's identity disc, one of the officer's revolvers went off. A conversation in agitated whispers broke out in the German trench, but the patrol crept safely away, the garrison being too startled to fire.

"Despite the very severe shelling to which the troops had been subjected, which obliterated trenches and caused very many casualties, the spirit of all ranks remains excellent. The enemy's losses, particularly on the 10th and 13th, have unquestionably been serious. On the latter day they evacuated trenches (in face of the cavalry counter-attack) in which were afterwards found quantities of equipment and some of their own wounded. The enemy have been seen stripping our dead, and on three occasions men in khaki have been seen advancing."

THE BRILLIANT FRENCH ADVANCE.

The fight went on by the exchange of desultory shell and rifle fire, but without any remarkable incident until the morning of May 24th. During this period, however, the French on our left had attained considerable success. On the 15th instant they captured Steenstraete and the trenches in Het Sas, and on the 16th they drove the enemy headlong over the canal, finding two thousand German dead. On the 17th they made a substantial advance on the east side of the canal, and on the 20th they repelled a German counter-attack, making a further advance in the same direction, and taking one hundred prisoners.

EAST OF YPRES.

On the early morning of the 24th a violent outburst of gas against nearly the whole front was followed by heavy shell fire, and the most determined attack was delivered against our position east of Ypres.

The hour of attack commenced at 2-45 a.m. A large proportion of the men were asleep, and the attack was too sudden to give them time to put on their respirators.

The Second Royal Irish and the Ninth Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders, overcome by gas fumes, were driven out of a farm held in front of the left Division, and thus the enemy proceeded to hold and fortify.

All attempts to retake this farm during the day failed, and during the night of the 24th-25th the General Officer commanding

the left Division decided to take up a new line, which, although slightly in rear of the old one, he considered to be a much better position. This operation was successfully carried out.

Throughout the day the whole line was subjected to one of the most violent artillery attacks which it had ever undergone, and the Fifth Corps and the Cavalry Divisions engaged had to fight hard to maintain their positions. On the following day, however, the line was consolidated, joining the right

of the French at the same place as before, and passing through Wiltje (which was strongly fortified) in a southerly direction on to Hooge, where the cavalry have since strongly occupied the chateau, and pushed our line further east.

J. D. P. FRENCH, Field Marshal,
Commanding-in-Chief the British
Army in France.

B.—THE GERMANS IN BELGIUM.

CONCLUSIONS OF LORD BRYCE'S COMMITTEE ON THE EVIDENCE SUBMITTED TO THEM.

... If a line is drawn on a map from the Belgian frontier to Liège and continued to Charleroi, and a second line drawn from Liège to Malines, a sort of figure resembling an irregular Y will be formed. It is along this Y that most of the systematic (as opposed to isolated) outrages were committed. If the period from August 4th to August 30th is taken it will be found to cover most of these organised outrages. Termonde and Alost extend, it is true, beyond the Y lines, and they belong to the month of September. Murder, rape, arson, and pillage began from the moment when the German army crossed the frontier. For the first fortnight of the war the towns and villages near Liège were the chief sufferers. From the 19th of August to the end of the month outrages spread in the directions of Charleroi and Malines, and reach their period of greatest intensity. There is a certain significance in the fact that the outrages round Liège coincide with the unexpected resistance of the Belgian army in that district, and that the slaughter which reigned from the 19th August to the end of the month is contemporaneous with the period when the German army's need for a quick passage through Belgium at all costs was deemed imperative.

Here let a distinction be drawn between two classes of outrages.

Individual acts of brutality—ill-treatment of civilians, rape, plunder, and the like—were very widely committed. These are more numerous and more shocking than would be expected in warfare between civilised Powers, but they differ rather in extent than in kind from what has happened in previous though not recent wars.

In all wars many shocking and outrageous acts must be expected, for in every large army there must be a proportion of men of criminal instincts whose worst passions are unloosed by the immunity which the conditions of warfare afford. Drunkenness, moreover, may turn even a soldier who has no criminal habits into a brute, who may commit outrages at which he would himself be shocked in his sober moments, and there is evidence that intoxication was extremely prevalent among the German army, both in Belgium and in France, for plenty of wine was to be found in the villages and country houses which were pillaged. Many of the worst outrages appear to have been perpetrated by men under the influence of drink. Unfortunately, little seems to have been done to repress this source of danger.

In the present war, however—and this is the gravest charge against the German army—the evidence shows that the killing of non-combatants was carried out to an extent for which no previous war between nations claiming to be civilised (for such cases as the atrocities perpetrated by the Turks on the Bulgarian Christians in 1876, and on the Armenian Christians in 1895 and 1896, do not belong to that category) furnishes any precedent. That this killing was done as part of a deliberate plan is clear from the facts hereinbefore set forth regarding Louvain, Aerschot, Dinant, and other towns. The killing was done under orders in each place. It began at a certain fixed date, and stopped (with some few exceptions) at another fixed date. Some of the officers who carried out the work did it reluctantly, and said they were obeying directions from their chiefs. The same remarks apply to the destruction of property. House burning was part of the programme; and villages, even large parts

of a city, were given to the flames as part of the terrorising policy.

Citizens of neutral states who visited Belgium in December and January report that the German authorities do not deny that non-combatants were systematically killed in large numbers during the first weeks of the invasion, and this, so far as we know, has never been officially denied. If it were denied, the flight and continued voluntary exile of thousands of Belgian refugees would go far to contradict a denial, for there is no historical parallel in modern times for the flight of a large part of a nation before an invader.

The German Government have, however, sought to justify their severities on the grounds of military necessity, and have excused them as retaliation for cases in which civilians fired on German troops. There may have been cases in which such firing occurred, but no proof has ever been given, or, to our knowledge, attempted to be given, of such cases, nor of the stories of shocking outrages perpetrated by Belgian men and women on German soldiers.

Two classes of murder in particular require special mention, because one of them is almost new, and the other altogether unprecedented. The former is the seizure of peaceful citizens as so-called hostages to be kept as a pledge for the conduct of the civil population, or as a means to secure some military advantage, or to compel the payment of a contribution, the hostages being shot if the condition imposed by the arbitrary will of the invader is not fulfilled. Such hostage taking, with the penalty of death attached, has now and then happened, the most notable case being the shooting of the Archbishop of Paris and some of his clergy by the Communards of Paris in 1871, but it is opposed both to the rules of war and to every principle of justice and humanity. The latter kind of murder is the killing of the innocent inhabitants of a village because shots have been fired, or are alleged to have been fired, on the troops by someone in the village. For this practice no previous example and no justification have been or can be pleaded. Soldiers suppressing an insurrection may have sometimes slain civilians mingled with insurgents, and Napoleon's forces in Spain are said to have now and then killed promiscuously when trying to clear guerillas out of a village. But in Belgium large bodies of men, sometimes including the burgomaster and the priest, were seized, marched by officers to a spot chosen for the purpose, and there shot in cold blood, without any attempt at trial or even inquiry, under the pretence of inflicting punishment upon the village, though these unhappy victims were not even charged with having themselves committed any wrongful act, and though, in some cases at least, the village authorities had done all in their power to prevent any molestation of the invading force. Such acts are no part of war, for innocence is entitled to respect even in war. They are mere murders, just as the drowning of the innocent passengers and crews on a merchant ship is murder and not an act of war.

That these acts should have been perpetrated on the peaceful population of an unoffending country which was not at war with its invaders, but merely defending its own neutrality, guaranteed by the invading Power, may excite amazement and even incredulity. It was with amazement and almost with incredulity that the Committee first read the depositions relating to such acts. But when the evidence regarding

Liège was followed by that regarding Aerschot, Louvain, Andenne, Dinant, and the other towns and villages, the cumulative effect of such a mass of concurrent testimony became irresistible, and we were driven to the conclusion that the things described had really happened. The question then arose how they could have happened. Not from mere military licence, for the discipline of the German army is proverbially stringent, and its obedience implicit. Not from any special ferocity of the troops, for whoever has travelled among the German peasantry knows that they are as kindly and good-natured as any people in Europe, and those who can recall the war of 1870 will remember that no charges resembling those proved by these depositions were then established. The excesses recently committed in Belgium were, moreover, too widespread and too uniform in their character to be mere sporadic outbursts of passion or rapacity.

The explanation seems to be that these excesses were committed—in some cases ordered, in others allowed—on a system and in pursuance of a set purpose. That purpose was to strike terror into the civil population and dishearten the Belgian troops, so as to crush down resistance and extinguish the very spirit of self-defence. The pretext that civilians had fired upon the invading troops was used to justify not merely the shooting of individual franc-tireurs, but the murder of large numbers of innocent civilians, an act absolutely forbidden by the rules of civilised warfare.

In the minds of Prussian officers War seems to have become a sort of sacred mission, one of the highest functions of the omnipotent State, which is itself as much an Army as a State. Ordinary morality and the ordinary sentiment of pity vanish in its presence, superseded by a new standard which justifies to the soldier every means that can conduce to success, however shocking to a natural sense of justice and humanity, however revolting to his own feelings. The Spirit of War is deified. Obedience to the State and its War Lord leaves no room for any other duty or feeling. Cruelty becomes legitimate when it promises victory. Proclaimed by the heads of the army, this doctrine would seem to have permeated the officers and affected even the private soldiers, leading them to justify the killing of non-combatants as an act of war, and so accustoming them to slaughter that even women and children became at last the victims. It cannot be supposed to be a national doctrine, for it neither springs from nor reflects the mind and feelings of the German people as they have heretofore been known to other nations. It is a specifically military doctrine, the outcome of a theory held by a ruling caste who have brooded and thought, written and talked, and dreamed about War until they have fallen under its obsession and been hypnotised by its spirit.

The doctrine is plainly set forth in the German Official Monograph on the usages of war on land, issued under the direction of the German staff. This book is pervaded throughout by the view that whatever military needs suggest becomes thereby lawful, and upon this principle, as the diaries show, the German officers acted.

If this explanation be the true one, the mystery is solved, and that which seemed scarcely credible becomes more intelligible, though not less pernicious. This is not the only case that history records in which a false theory, disguising itself as loyalty to State or to a Church, has perverted the conception of Duty, and become a source of danger to the world.

The Manchester Guardian
HISTORY
of the
WAR



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
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
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[Record Press.

HISTORY OF THE WAR.

CHAPTER I.

THE FLYING SERVICES.

THE NAVAL AIR SERVICE—OPERATIONS ON THE BELGIAN COAST—AEROPLANES V. MINES—THE KITE BALLOON—LIEUTENANT WARNEFORD'S EXPLOIT—THE ROYAL FLYING CORPS—THE NEW GERMAN AEROPLANES.

A CURRENT narrative of the work of the Flying Services in the war must err on the side of reticence, for even in describing past events it is easy to disclose facts that might be of service to the enemy. It would not, however, be just to two of the hardest working services in the war to defer notice of their achievement, even though such notice can hardly do more than gather up the facts set forth in the official *communiqués*.

As a branch of the Senior Service, the work of the Royal Naval Air Service must of course have precedence. The Naval Air Service was obviously intended to co-operate with the fleet, and the fact that its co-operation has had no particular effect on the course of the war at sea is primarily due to the fact that the fleet has had very little to do except police work, the German navy having elected to intern itself in the vicinity of the Kiel Canal, and merely to send out occasional fast cruisers and small patrol boats, which have been faithfully dealt with by our own surface boats intended for that purpose. Owing to the war taking this particular course, the Royal Naval Air Service was deprived of the prime reason for


its existence, but in spite of that it has done an enormous amount of very hard work.

In an earlier chapter of this history (Vol. I., Chapter XXVII.) the major actions of the Royal Naval Air Service have been dealt with up to Christmas of 1914, these including the raids on Düsseldorf, Cologne and Friederichshafen by shore-going naval aeroplanes, and the raids on Cuxhaven and the surrounding district by seaplanes. On January 10th, there was what practically amounted to an aerial battle in the neighbourhood of Dunkirk, disclosed in an Admiralty *communiqué* stating that twelve or thirteen German aeroplanes appeared over Dunkirk and dropped bombs. British naval aeroplanes, with French and Belgian machines, promptly attacked the Germans, one of which was brought down just over the Belgian frontier, pilot and passenger being captured. On this same day one of the most gallant actions of the war was performed by Squadron-Commander R. B. Davies, R.N. He and Flight-Lieutenant Peirse, each alone on an aeroplane, made a raid on Zeebrugge, and dropped twenty-seven bombs on two submarines in the harbour. One submarine was damaged, and there




The remains of Zeppelin LZ, which was wrecked and burnt on the Danish island of Fanoe.

[Central News.



A giant aeroplane built for the Russian army.

[Record Press.



French aeroplanes ready to start out on a reconnaissance.

[Photographic Service of the French Armies.

were many casualties among the crews of the guns on the mole. On his way to Zeebrugge, Commander Davies was wounded in the thigh, but, despite his wound, continued his flight, dropped his bombs, and returned. For this action he and Lieutenant Peirse received well-merited D.S.O.'s.

On February 12th, combined aeroplane and seaplane operations were carried out along the Belgian coast, and bombs were dropped on Bruges, Zeebrugge, Blankenberghe, and Ostend, the intention being to prevent the development at those points of submarine bases by the enemy. Thirty-four naval aeroplanes and seaplanes took part in this raid, and great damage was done to the railway station at Ostend and to the Grand Hotel, which was being used as the German Headquarters. The railway was damaged at Blankenberghe, and the electric power station at Zeebrugge was also damaged. Various German mine-sweeping vessels at the latter port were also hit. This particular operation was carried out under the most unpleasant conditions, for there were several snowstorms during the day, through which the pilots had to fly. Also, the low clouds compelled the pilots to fly lower than they would otherwise have done, and thus exposed them to extra risk from gun-fire. Happily, only two machines were damaged in this raid, although a number of the pilots had somewhat extraordinary adventures. One of them so completely lost his way in a cloud that his entire

sense of orientation disappeared—he literally did not know whether his head pointed up or down, and he only came to the conclusion that he was upside down by his revolver falling out of its holster, and various loose things on the floor of the machine disappearing overboard. He had the good sense to leave his machine alone, and finally it came out under the cloud, nose first, only a few hundred feet above the sea, whereupon he persuaded it to resume its normal position, and continued his flight.

Lest the Germans should receive the impression that the aforementioned raid was a grand finale to naval operations against the Belgian coast, it was followed promptly, on February 16th, by a still bigger raid, in which

forty aeroplanes and seaplanes took part. These machines dropped bombs on the heavy batteries protecting the harbour of Ostend, and on various gun positions at Middlekirke, on the locks at Zeebrugge, and on barges outside Blankenberghe. Unfortunately, three young officers were lost in this raid. By way of causing a diversion of German attention, a detachment of French aeroplanes, acting in co-operation, made a vigorous attack on the aerodrome at Ghistelles, which kept a good many German aircraft busily employed when they might have been interfering to some extent with the navy's operations.

In issuing this news, the Secretary of the Admiralty was moved to remark that instructions are always issued to confine attacks to points of military importance, and every effort is made by the flying officers to avoid dropping bombs on any residential portions of the towns.

The point should be noted, because whenever an air raid by the Allied forces is carried out the German *communiqués* on the subject invariably state that no damage of military importance has been done, and that a number of civilians, chiefly women and children, have been killed, which of course bears a strong family resemblance to our own announcements on the same subject.



SEAPLANE CARRIERS.

On February 20th, the Secretary of the Admiralty announced that the special aeroplane ship *Ark Royal*, which was known before the war to be under construction for the express purpose of transporting and handling aeroplanes, was in attendance on the fleet at the Dardanelles, carrying a number of aeroplanes and seaplanes belonging to the Naval Wing. At the same time, various published information from the Dardanelles showed that the seaplanes taken there by the *Ark Royal* were doing quite good work. Since the Cuxhaven raid nothing had been heard of the flotilla of seaplane-carrying ships which took part in that raid. But it was not by any means idle during the spring and summer. Its work had been of a strictly routine nature, and therefore people were no more likely to hear of its performances than they were to hear of any one individual squadron of the



Some of the bombs which were carried by the wrecked Zeppelin L3.
[Central News.]

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Views, taken from a French aeroplane, of a stretch of the Dardanelles coast and Turkish town.

[Wyndham, Paris (C.N).]

Royal Flying Corps. It had done nothing sensational, but a large amount of very useful and steady work, keeping up constant patrols at sea wherever the fleet needed it. One very useful part of its work was hunting for mines. The ordinary submarine mine must not be too far below the surface, otherwise of course it would miss the hull of any vessel passing directly over it; and it is found that, given moderately calm weather, it is possible for aircraft to spot mines from above when they could not possibly be seen from a ship unless it was practically alongside them. Therefore, seaplanes from the carrying ships have on many occasions flown over mine-fields and have spotted the positions of the mines, so that the attendant mine-sweepers have been able to destroy them with comparative safety. This, of course, is a purely supplementary use of aircraft; but, provided enough mines can be spotted and destroyed, it is an undoubtedly valuable work. It also was made known officially that seaplanes from ships were used with good effect in the final destruction of the German cruiser *Königsberg*, which hid itself up an East African river early in the war, and could not be satisfactorily located until it had been there nearly a year. Then a seaplane carrier was sent out, and the aeroplane from that ship quickly located the *Königsberg*, and by signalling the results of the fire from the attendant warships enabled them to destroy the vessel.

Various other seaplane-carrying ships were used in different parts of the world; but though it did not please the authorities to specify their operations, it is permissible to say that, although the use of aeroplanes from ships at sea was practically a new thing evolved during the course of the war itself, the work done was much better than anyone had any right to expect, and the casualties were surprisingly few. It is true that before the war some mild attempts were made at dropping aeroplanes overboard from ships by means of a derrick, and letting them get off the water on their own account, but no experiments of a really important kind had been carried out, and consequently all the work done by the aeroplane-carrying ships had to be done as circumstances permitted, and without any of the mechanical aids which will come into use when there is time to develop this particular branch of the Service.

On March 24th, a particularly striking action was announced. Squadron-Commander Ivor Courtney and Flight-Lieutenant Rosher attacked the Cockerill Shipyard at Antwerp, which was being used by the Germans for the construction of submarines. At that time five submarines were observed on the launching slips, and eight bombs were dropped on them. It was found out afterwards, from Belgians who were in the Cockerill Yard at the time, that a very considerable amount of damage was done to the submarines, and that a number of German soldiers were killed and wounded, owing to the fact that when the first bomb was dropped the soldiers promptly rushed out into the open to shoot at the aeroplanes, whereas the men working on the submarines naturally took cover in the workshops. On April 1st, similar raids were made on submarines under construction at Hoboken, and on submarines moored at Zeebrugge, by Flight-Lieutenant Andreae and Flight-Lieutenant J. P. Wilson. Both officers started in the moonlight in the early morning, reaching their objective at dawn. On the 1st May, it was announced that the position of the big German gun which had bombarded Dunkirk, with a range of about twenty miles, had been verified by air scouts, and had been attacked in the evening by bombs from aeroplanes.

Whether these bombs did any material damage to the gun is not known, but it is certain that that particular gun ceased its operations for quite a considerable period.

KITE BALLOONS.


About this time it became publicly known that the Naval Air Service had formed a special section to deal with the operations of kite balloons. These curious implements had been largely used by the German army ever since the beginning of the war, and had also been adopted by the French and Belgians. But it was not until after considerable opposition that those in the British Services who believed in these balloons succeeded in bringing them into use. The kite balloon consists of a long sausage-shaped envelope with an air bag at one end, and it is so balanced that the air bag end sits lower in the air than the other end, giving the whole thing rather the aspect of an enormous pistol pointing at the clouds. It is impossible here to go into the precise points of design which causes these balloons to operate as they do, but it may be stated that instead of swinging backwards and forwards in the air with every gust, and spinning round at the same time as an ordinary captive spherical balloon does, the kite balloon remains steadily head to wind, and is so arranged that a gust has a tendency to lift it like a kite, at the same time that it tries to blow it back, with the result that it remains almost stationary in the air and always pointing practically in the same direction, so that it affords a very steady observation post either for controlling artillery fire or watching distant roads and railways.

These kite balloons soon proved their high value when put into regular use. A good many of them were used at the Dardanelles, and many more were sent to France, where they have been received with enthusiasm by those portions of the army with which they have had to co-operate, thus fully justifying the faith of those who urged that, as they were largely used by the German army after many years of experience, they must necessarily be of some military value. One of these balloons was directly responsible for the sinking of a large Turkish transport in the Sea of Marmora by a British battleship on the opposite side of the Gallipoli Peninsula, which was unable to see anything of the mark at which it was firing.

An Admiralty *communiqué* of May 8th disclosed one of the most unexpected incidents of the war. Some few days before, the German *communiqué* had stated that a German airship had fought several British submarines in the North Sea, and had sunk one of them. The British Admiralty, in issuing its corrected version of the facts, stated that the submarine had returned uninjured, and reported that she had damaged the airship by gun-fire and had driven her off. The idea of a battle between an airship and a submarine, two of the newest weapons of warfare, and two as far distant from one another as one could imagine any two weapons to be, is really of considerable interest. Those who have reason to know what did happen state that the submarine on coming to the surface was spotted by the airship, which endeavoured to drop bombs on her. Before she had succeeded in scoring a hit the submarine had got its gun on deck, and had succeeded in hitting the airship. Unfortunately, about the same time various German destroyers appeared, and the submarine was forced to submerge, but not before she had seen the airship coming down towards the water, very much down by the head. In confirmation of this, there was published in Holland within a few days' time



At a Belgian aeroplane camp, showing officers watching one of their airmen pursuing a German aeroplane.
[Newspaper Illustrations.]



Sending up one of the French war kites, to which a camera is attached.

[Central News.]

a rumour that some Dutch fishermen had seen a Zeppelin airship wrecked in the North Sea.

LIEUTENANT WARNEFORD'S EXPLOIT.

On May 17th, the Admiralty announced a Zeppelin attack at Ramsgate, which was chased off by aeroplanes from Eastchurch and Westgate. When this airship reached the Belgian coast she was attacked by eight naval aeroplanes from Dunkirk. Three of these machines got quite close to her, and Flight-Commander Bigsworth dropped four bombs from a height of only two hundred feet above the airship. A column of smoke was seen to come out of one of her compartments, and the airship then rose to a height of about 11,000 feet and appeared to be severely damaged. It was learned later that although the bombs hit the airship they apparently either passed straight through without exploding, or else exploded in the middle of the hydrogen, which, having no air mixed with it, did not catch fire. The column of smoke mentioned in the Admiralty *communiqué* seems to have come from the engines, and not from anything burning on the airship, for undoubtedly if there had been any fire on board one or other of the gas bags would have ignited and the whole thing would have come down. However, not long afterwards, the Naval Air Service had its compensation, for on June 7th, Flight-Lieutenants Wilson and Mills, starting out very early in the morning, attacked the airship shed at Èvere, north of Brussels, at 2-30 a.m., and destroyed it utterly. Flight-Lieutenant Wilson, who arrived there first, dropped a large bomb on the shed, which apparently did considerable damage to the Zeppelin inside, without however setting fire to it. A few seconds afterwards Lieutenant Mills came along, and dropped several smaller bombs, one or other of which set fire to the gas released by the previous explosion, and so the whole ship and its shed and part of its crew were effectually abolished. On the same morning, Flight Sub-Lieutenant Warneford, who had gone out to look for another airship shed, and had apparently not reached his objective, met while in the air a Zeppelin which was returning from another raid on Ramsgate. He dropped six bombs on the airship. The force of the explosion turned the pilot's aeroplane upside down, and apparently stopped his engine, so that he was forced to land. However, before the local German troops were able to arrest him, he had succeeded in getting his machine going again, and returned safely to his base. For this service Mr. Warneford was given the V.C., and the other two officers D.S. Crosses. It may be pointed out that if an airship is destroyed in its shed a greater amount of damage is done than if it is destroyed while in the air, for in the former case the material in the shed and the means of sheltering another

airship are destroyed at the same time, whereas in the alternative only the ship itself is damaged. Moreover, as in the case just mentioned, it may fall on friendly property, and do a considerable amount of damage which was not intended by those who attacked it. The airship struck by Lieutenant Warneford fell on a convent and killed some of the inmates. Mr. Warneford was most unfortunately killed on June 17th, while demonstrating at a French aerodrome with an American journalist as his passenger.

A later feat of the Naval Air Service at the moment of writing was the destruction of another Zeppelin off Ostend, on August 10th. This airship had been carrying out a raid on the British coast, and had apparently been damaged by a lucky shot from an anti-aircraft gun. It was discovered at daylight being towed into Ostend after having come down on the water, whereupon it was attacked by a British aeroplane and still further damaged, its destruction being ultimately completed by a mixed force of British and French aircraft.



Lieutenant R. A. J. Warneford, V.C.


[Central Press.]

THE ROYAL FLYING CORPS.

When one comes to describe the work of the Royal Flying Corps one is faced by rather a difficult problem, namely, that the military authorities in this country are very chary of giving any official information, and that, whatever may be the feelings of individual officers, there is a convention in the army which decrees that it is bad form for any officer's name to appear in print, except in an official list of D.S.O.'s or other honours. It is doubtless a thoroughly salutary custom, as it prevents an officer from wasting time in advertising himself when he ought to be working for the benefit of the army as a whole. Even as a corps, the Royal Flying Corps dislikes being praised, possibly because, before the corps had distinguished itself in any particular way, a Minister of State was so indiscreet as to call it "the Corps d'Elite

of the British Army," a title which obviously is the sole property of the Brigade of Guards; and doubtless the collective humility of the R.F.C. was a kind of silent protest against any suggestion that it wishes to usurp the Guards' prerogative.

When aircraft were first thought of seriously as implements of war it was prophesied that by enabling any individual commanding officer to "see behind the hill," or to "penetrate the fog of war," the end of any war would thus be hastened, because the information gathered by air scouts would precipitate a general and decisive action. What has actually happened is that each commander is so well able to watch the movements of the enemy commander that it is exceedingly difficult to concentrate troops for a surprise attack without that concentration being seen. The natural result is that a



French soldiers cutting up the framework of a captured German airship.

[Underwood & Underwood.]

corresponding concentration takes place on the opposite side, a particularly ferocious action is fought, an enormous casualty list is piled up, and things remain exactly as they were before. Even when one force is actually outnumbered, aircraft may delay the decision of events by enabling that force to escape annihilation. It may be remembered that right at the beginning of the war the little British Expeditionary Force was warned by its air scouts that it was opposed by a German army outnumbering it by at least three to one, and advancing at a speed which had never been contemplated even in the best military books. Without this warning the British force would undoubtedly have stood and fought, and would almost equally certainly have been annihilated by sheer weight of artillery, even without the three to one disadvantage in men. Even the minute force of British aircraft attached to the army at that period had thus a very decided effect on the course of events.

As the Anglo-French army grew stronger, and threatened in turn to outflank the German right, the British aircraft, which did practically the whole of the work for the Allied armies on the far west front, were able to keep an exact account of every German move. At this period the French aircraft were busily occupied on the eastern French frontier, where a heavy German blow was expected. Unfortunately, from the Allies' point of view, the German air service was numerous, exceedingly well equipped, beautifully organised, and very keen on its work, except when that work involved personal encounters with British aviators.

It was in this personal ascendancy, first noted by Sir John French after about three months of war, that the

Royal Flying Corps scored throughout the campaign. The German air scouting has been excellent, but its value has been diminished by the fact that the British aviators have on every occasion been the attackers, and in very few instances have the Germans remained to fight.

During one period, roughly from the beginning of May until midway through July, German aeroplanes were scarcely ever seen over the British lines. It scarcely seems likely that this scarcity of German aeroplanes was due to any falling off in the supply of machines, for the German aircraft factories are so numerous and well organised that their output must of necessity be greatly in excess of the English output, and probably is equal to the French and British output combined. It is, therefore, very probable that the bulk of the German aeroplanes—and especially all the best German pilots—were sent over to the Eastern front, where aeroplane reconnaissance must have been of the greatest importance in following the movements of the rapidly retreating Russian armies, and indicating to the German commanders where they might strike with the greatest effect. The Russian front is of such extraordinary length, and so much of the country is so absolutely unsuited to the use of aircraft, that great numbers of aeroplanes must have been necessary to replace those broken up, and an enormous number of pilots must also have been necessary in order to keep properly in touch with every movement of the Russian armies. It seems, therefore, that the absence of German aircraft, out of which some writers seemed to extract the conclusion that the Royal Flying Corps had beaten the German aviators out of the air, was really accounted for in quite another way.

THE NEW GERMAN AEROPLANES.

Towards the end of July, German aircraft of newer types began to appear, few in number, but exceedingly unpleasant in their habits. It may be inferred that having sent all their ordinarily effective machines to the Russian front, the Germans were experimenting on the Western front with their latest machines and picked pilots. The new machines belong to one of three general types.

One is an exceedingly large biplane, which has two bodies projecting aft instead of the one commonly seen, and an engine in front of each of these bodies, and a third engine between them. In the middle, in front of this third engine, is the seat for the pilot, and in front of him is seated a gunner, who is reputed to have control of a gun considerably larger than the ordinary machine-gun. This gun commands the air in front of the machine, and upwards and downwards. In each of the bodies, and seated behind the wings, is another machine-gunner, who is thus able to fire backwards and upwards, and so protect the machine from attacks by faster aircraft chasing it. When all three engines are opened out at once, this machine is said to have enormous speed, but it is also able to fly very slowly, and owing to the armament it carries it is a very awkward opponent.

The second type of machine is one with a single body, which would appear to the uninitiated very similar to the ordinary tractor biplane commonly seen in this country, but it has two engines, one on each side of the body, and the place usually occupied by the engine is taken by a man with a machine-gun. Behind him is seated the pilot, and behind him again is a third man, also with a machine-gun, to protect the machine against

attacks from the rear. This type of machine is said to be terrifically fast, and to be able to climb very rapidly, so that it is comparatively safe from being chased, and is able to defend itself if anything very fast does happen to meet it.

The third type is an ordinary tractor biplane, but with a 200-H.P. engine in front, carrying three men, stationed as in the second type of machine mentioned. This also is a fast machine, but not quite so terrible an opponent as either of the other two. One machine of this type was brought down by the French aviator Gilbert just before he unfortunately landed in Switzerland by accident.


It has been made known in the House of Commons, and also quite publicly on many occasions, that for some time after these new types of German aircraft appeared, the Royal Flying Corps had nothing capable of approaching their speed or rate of climb, except some of our very fastest single-seat scouting machines; but it is highly probable that by this time we may once more have proof that, slow as we may be in this country, we eventually succeed in catching up with our opponents. At any rate, one may be quite sure that, given machines which are as good or nearly as good as those made in Germany, the pilots of the Royal Flying Corps are quite competent to beat the German pilots, man for man.

The only regrettable thing is that the high authorities who were responsible for the equipment of the Royal Flying Corps before the war did not see their way to take the advice of the senior officers of the R.F.C. itself, who, at various meetings of societies concerned with aviation, pointed out the importance of big fighting aeroplanes and, generally, of adequate equipment for the Royal Flying Corps.




French peasants inspecting a British aeroplane which has descended near their village.

[L.N.A.]



Pre-Dreadnought battleships in the Dardanelles.

[Newspaper Illustrations.



The crew of a British battleship cheering another warship which had done good work at the Dardanelles under heavy fire.

[Sport and General.



A scene in the Dardanelles in peace time.

[Topical Press.

CHAPTER II.

THE FLEET AND THE DARDANELLES CAMPAIGN.

CRITICISMS OF THE DARDANELLES CAMPAIGN—A SOUND STRATEGIC IDEA, BUT MARRED IN THE EXECUTION—THE FAILURE OF THE NAVAL ATTEMPTS TO FORCE THE DARDANELLES—THE ATTACK OF MARCH 18—SUBSEQUENT NAVAL LOSSES.


SOME account has already been given in the chapter on Balkan politics of the arguments for and against the campaign in the Dardanelles. In the whole of our history there is no military operation about which, at any rate in its earlier stages, such widely-divergent views have been held as about this. To the excessive and quite unreasonable optimism that prevailed in the early stages of the campaign there succeeded a feeling of despondency, equally unreasonable, which found no condemnation of it too strong. There were those who thought, and even wrote, of it as though it were a modern parallel to the Sicilian Expedition of Athens. Athens, a sea-power, at war with the great military State of Sparta, was under no compulsion to undertake the expedition against Syracuse, which led to her downfall; and this campaign against Turkey came similarly to be regarded as a gratuitous doubling of a task which was already grave enough. Why, it was asked, should this country, already committed to a continental war on a scale wholly without precedent in our history, have embarked on a second enterprise against a Power of great military strength and repute, which, however, had shown in the Egyptian campaign that it was not capable of doing us much injury? To do nothing at all against Turkey, it was urged, was to disappoint the hopes of Germany in dragging her into the war; whereas even a successful campaign, unless victory were easy and immediate, might by diverting our energies enable her to win in the more decisive field. Was it not a violation of the principle

of the strategic art which counsels victory in the main area of war as the one thing that matters? Such were the thoughts that possessed many minds as the campaign grew in magnitude and news came of heavy losses without decisive result.

Only the result could resolve these doubts, and it is not seemly for history indulging in prophecy, the most gratuitous form of error, to anticipate the event. But the gloomier views about the Dardanelles campaign which were cultivated towards the last quarter of the first year of the war were certainly much less than just to the intelligence of those who planned it. So far was it from being an excrescence on the war that if we had had before the war to select an area in which the chief sea-power, with only a moderate-sized army, might find the most natural and suitable employment for its energies in a European war, the Dardanelles would have been the most promising choice.


THE REASONS FOR THE CAMPAIGN.

An earlier chapter, discussing a precedent for the employment of a British army as a contingent, though under separate command, on the Continent of Europe, could find no later precedent than Minden, where a British contingent of some 7,000 or 8,000 men, in an Allied force of 36,000, fought under the over-command of Prince Ferdinand of Brunswick. Close as was the connection in the great war between this country and its Continental Allies against Napoleon, it supplied no example of British



H.M.S. Majestic, sunk in the Dardanelles.

[Central News.]



H.M.S. Goliath, sunk in the Dardanelles.

[Record Press.]


military co-operation like that between Sir John French and General Joffre. Pitt's idea was to limit the military partnership to attacks on the enemy's colonies, or at any rate to strictly subsidiary operations. A second model adopted after his death was the Peninsula campaigns of Wellington, and to this model the campaign in the Dardanelles approximated much more closely than that in Flanders. It was a more or less independent military operation of our own, separable from the rest of the European campaign, and it seemed possible to carry it to a successful conclusion by the employment of an army larger indeed than we should have dreamt of employing a century ago, but still such as a great Power, whose right arm was its fleet, could command without breaking with its strictly naval traditions in war. In other than a purely geographical sense a campaign in the Dardanelles might be regarded as a Peninsula War, and had we been free at the outset of the war to choose a field for the co-operation of our great fleet and a comparatively small army, the Gallipoli Peninsula would have been in direct accord with the main precedents of English history. We were not so free; for the war in the West developed into a struggle for the Straits, the possession of which was vital, not only for the successful prosecution of the war on land, but also for the naval defence of the country and of its over-sea communications. That, however, does not alter the fact that the Gallipoli campaign, so far from being an excrescence

on our general military policy, was really a return to an old model, and had very solid precedent in its favour.

But there were stronger reasons in its favour than precedent. Our chief service to the cause of the Allies—and the only one which was much in their thoughts before the war—was our keeping of the seas open. France enjoyed the full advantage of this service, but not Russia after the entry of Turkey into the war. Although allied with a Power whose supremacy at sea was unquestioned, Russia, owing to her geographical position, with the Baltic and the Black Sea both closed, became virtually a blockaded country. The only service that our naval power could render her (apart from keeping open the

route to Archangel in summer) was to free either the Baltic or the Black Sea; and of the two operations the opening of the Black Sea was the easier. It was the more incumbent on us to do what was possible, as it was largely due to our past policy that Russia had been deprived of access to the Mediterranean. Loyalty to Russia, therefore, and the duty of placing our sea-power at her service, persuaded us to this new Peninsula War. And the course of her campaigns reinforced this persuasion. It was obvious that unless Russia could put and keep her millions in the field, the Allies could hardly expect to win outright. The effect of the closing of the Dardanelles by Turkey was that Russia could not use her millions to advantage; that is to say, it transferred the superiority in numbers definitely


from the side of the Allies to that of the Germans. Except locally, Russia was always outnumbered; and it seems probable that she never had more than two million men in the field. In the critical campaigns for Warsaw in the summer of 1915, the superiority of the combined Austro-German forces may have been as three to two, and that not merely locally but over the whole front. It was not that Russia had not the men, but that she could not equip them; and she could not equip them because, owing to the closing of the Baltic and the Black Sea, British sea-power could not avail her. So far from being a rival to the campaign in Flanders, this campaign in Gallipoli was a corollary of it, the necessary condition of its




The Majestic sinking after being torpedoed by an enemy submarine.
[Central News.]

success. For without the Russian millions the chances of the Allies in the West carrying the huge German fortress of Belgium were very small.

Lastly, the idea of a campaign in the Dardanelles fitted in with the development of Russian strategy. Her whole aim had been to throw the weight of the campaign against Austria, in the hope that by overthrowing her she might transfer the war from the eastern frontiers of Germany to the south-eastern and southern, and enlist on the side of the Allies the non-Germanic elements of Austria. A campaign for the forcing of the Straits had this further advantage, that if successful it was likely to bring Roumania and Bulgaria into the war, and so



Church service on board H.M.S. Queen Elizabeth in the Dardanelles, under the muzzles of her 15-inch guns. [Central News.]



Mine-sweepers at work in the Dardanelles.

[Central News.]

raise up an impassable barrier between Germany and the East. The war, it must be remembered, was in its origin Balkanic; a struggle for the creation of a great Germanic Confederation stretching from Hamburg to the Persian Gulf. Constantinople lost, this ambition was defeated and the war was lost. Further, Buda Pest and Vienna were likely to fall with Constantinople, and without Austria the invasion of Germany was a matter of months only. Such were the hopes which in February not only fascinated but seemed almost within the grasp of the Allies; for at this time it must be remembered Russia was forcing the Carpathian Passes, and an invasion of Hungary seemed assured in the spring. Was it possible for this country to stand by and not make a movement to bring these bright prospects nearer? It was not as though success in Flanders was assured if only we did nothing elsewhere. The closer we approached to the problem of Flanders the more desirable it seemed to find a way round if one were possible.

THE GOVERNMENT AND THE CAMPAIGN.

Such were the arguments by which some prominent members of the Government became convinced of the desirability—even the necessity—of our taking part in the Eastern campaign on the left flank of the Russian armies, for this is what an attack on Constantinople amounted to. Among these members is believed to have been Mr. Churchill, the First Lord of the Admiralty, and in urging this project he showed, not for the first time in the war, a sound strategic instinct not unworthy of his great ancestor. A previous example of his grasp of a strategic situation was the Antwerp Expedition (Vol. I., pp. 275, 293), which, if it had been as sound in its organisation and its execution as in its general idea, would have solved most of our difficulties in Belgium. The Dardanelles campaign, like the Antwerp Expedition, was a great idea marred in the execution. It seems almost incomprehensible to us, knowing what happened later, to understand how any one could have conceived of the forcing of the Dardanelles as an operation for the fleet alone. How came it to be attempted without the assistance of an army? The materials for a complete

answer to that question will not be available for many years, and we can only hazard a guess. How far those responsible for the direction of our war operations had convinced themselves that the Dardanelles could be forced by the fleet alone is still uncertain. As late as March 22nd, the Admiralty issued a statement that "the power of the fleet to dominate the fortresses by superiority of fire seems to be established," and again that "nothing has happened which justifies the belief that the cost of the undertaking will exceed what has always been expected and provided for." On the other hand, Lord Fisher, the First Sea Lord, is believed to have been against a purely naval expedition, and it is certain that the Admiralty at the beginning of the war still held the view that a

fleet could not hope to reduce modern coast fortifications. Otherwise, it would have begun the war by an attack on Wilhelmshaven and utilised its naval supremacy to destroy the German fortifications along the Belgian coast between Antwerp and Ostend. The conversion to the uses of a naval bombardment of coast fortifications if it really took place would, therefore, seem to have been remarkably sudden. The probability is that the conversion was only partial. Mr. Churchill and others had convinced themselves that an attack ought to be made on the Dardanelles forts; might it not prove that against the fire of battleships coast fortifications would be as helpless as the forts of Liège and Antwerp against the German heavy artillery? There were some at any rate




A British sentry on the sea-shore.

[Central News.]

who thought it possible. Mr. Archibald Hurd, for example, a very competent critic of naval affairs, wrote soon after the bombardment had begun:—

"The consideration which has usually been rather overlooked is that in the 'fifties, when the belief in forts took root, the ships were not very different from those which fought at Trafalgar, and many changes have since occurred. The development of men-of-war, the improvement of the steam-engine, and the comparative lightness of the modern high-powered wire-wound gun has changed the conditions. In land warfare mechanical science has added immensely to the power of the defensive, as the conditions on the Continent continually remind us, but whenever naval power, strong and mobile, can be employed there are now good chances of success."




Why? It was an axiom that the amount of gunpowder which could be carried afloat was limited, whereas the weight-bearing capacity of a fortress was practically unrestricted.

"That is still true. But during the recent keen naval competition ships have increased in displacement. This growth in size and the advance in the power of the naval gun has enabled an armament to be mounted which, in fact, exceeds in power that of most forts. Concentration of effort on the creation of naval power resulted throughout the world, except in Germany and the United States, in a neglect of fixed defences. Moreover, by means of mobile ships carrying heavy guns, immense volume of fire can be brought speedily to any spot and concentrated on this or that shore fortress at will, the ships in the meantime by moving backwards and forwards proving elusive targets, whereas at Sebastopol the ships were anchored. Thus it happens that we are witnessing in process of execution an operation which a year ago, owing to a failure to realise the transition in naval power effected in the past sixty or seventy years, would have been regarded as extremely hazardous, if not impossible."

These views may or may not have been held with complete conviction in some official quarters, but they seem to have been held sufficiently strongly to make an experiment

desirable. They might be wrong; but the great thing was to begin. Perhaps the fleet might get through without assistance from an army; perhaps Greece, whose Premier, M. Venizelos, was in favour of intervention, would supply an army; perhaps, even if the fleet failed to get through, it might at any rate gain successes that would have a beneficial effect on the attitude of the Balkan States; and if all else failed, we might supply the army nucleus from Egypt. It was a typically British way of beginning a great military operation. Yet, haphazard as the means taken to carry out the idea may have been, the idea itself was perfectly sound, and censure, if censure is due, should be directed not against the enterprise as a whole, but against the impatience with which it was begun as an experiment in a theory of naval tactics which had hitherto been untested, and was not believed in by the responsible naval advisers.

The Dardanelles Straits are thirty-five miles long, and of a width varying from one to seven miles. At the entrance from the Aegean Sea they are three miles wide, and past the forts which guard the entrance the Straits



CONSTANTINOPLE.

widen out to the Bay of Erenkoi. Further up, the Straits suddenly narrow to a mile wide, and here, in a quadrilateral, four miles square, of which Midos and Kilid Bahr on the European side and Chanak and Nagara on the Asiatic side are the corners, the shores are studded with forts. Nagara is the ancient Abydos, where Leander, and after him Lord Byron, swam the channel—no very great feat except in bad weather, when the currents, always strong, become dangerous. Beyond the Narrows the Straits widen to two and three miles, until they emerge in the Sea of Marmora. Three times has a British fleet passed the Straits. The first time was in 1807, when Admiral Duckworth forced a passage, which, however, was hardly resisted, but was badly mauled on the return, after a stay at Constantinople sufficiently long to give the Turks time to fortify the Straits. The second time was in the Crimean War. The third time was in 1878, when Admiral Hornby passed the Straits at the height of the Anglo-Russian crisis. The progress of naval invention since then had undoubtedly been favourable to the defence, and in addition to the barriers of numerous

and well-planned forts, the waters were heavily mined. The forcing of the Straits was the most formidable naval operation ever attempted by the British or any other fleet.

THE REDUCTION OF THE FORTS AT THE ENTRANCE.

The attacks lasted over a month, and fall into three groups, separated from each other by intervals of bad weather, which, as most of our fire was at long range, and often indirect, depending on the ability of our aeroplanes to take careful observations and signal the results, interrupted the work. In the first group are the attacks on the four forts which guard the entrance. These began on February 18th, and were completed by the 26th. There followed a number of attacks on the forts inside the Straits on the Bay of Erenkoi and the Narrows. Finally, there was a general attack on March 18th, which failed badly, and may be said to have ended the attempts to force the passage by the fleet unassisted by an army. From this point onwards the main work of the fleet was in assisting the operations of the army, and in keeping it



British sailors round a hole [in] the deck of their vessel, caused by a shell from one of the Turkish forts.
[Central News.]



Members of a landing party of marines ashore during the early part of the operations against the
Dardanelles.
[Central News.]

supplied with all the necessities of life to itself and death to the enemy—acting, as the British Commander-in-Chief expressed it, as “father and mother of the army.”

The despatch describing the opening attack on the forts at the entrance has already (Vol. II., p. 255-6) been quoted. This was not quite the first attack on these outer forts in the war, for early in November two British and two French ships had for a short time at long range bombarded them, and, according to the report of a Consul who was on land, did very considerable damage. But it was the first formal attack with a view to their reduction. These outer forts were much the easiest part of the work, for not only were they less modern in construction and armament than the inner forts, but the fleet operating in the open waters of the Ægean had much greater freedom of movement, and were a harder target to hit. But three days' bombardment were necessary before they were reduced—on the 18th, again—after a pause due to the misty weather—on the 25th, and on the 26th. On the first day five British ships, the *Inflexible*, the *Agamemnon*, the *Cornwallis*, the *Vengeance*, and the *Triumph*, and three French ships, the *Suffren*, *Gaulois*, and *Bouvet*, were engaged. All were powerful ships, though the latest, the *Inflexible*, completed in 1908, was a pre-Dreadnought. They succeeded in silencing the fire of the forts except of Kum Kale, but not in dislodging the garrisons or dismantling the guns. The plan of this, as of all the attacks that followed, was the same: first, a preliminary bombardment at long range by the heavy guns, and then, when it was hoped that the garrison could no longer serve their guns, a bombardment at closer range with the secondary armament. In the bombardment of the 25th, the *Queen Elizabeth*, one of the newest Dreadnoughts, and the proud possessor of the first 15 in. guns, took part. The *Queen Elizabeth* concentrated her fire on Fort A, near Cape Helles, and before noon had put both of its 9·2 in. guns out of action. They had been well served, and one shell hit the *Agamemnon* at a range of 11,000 yards. The *Vengeance* and *Cornwallis* afterwards engaged the fort at close range, and completed its destruction. The *Suffren* and *Charlemagne* did the same at Forts C and D on the Asiatic side. It was not, however, until the following day, when the ships entered the Straits and shelled them in reverse, that the garrisons evacuated the forts. Parties were then landed, and Forts A, B, and C were completely, and D partially, demolished. Already, however, it began to be suspected that the main difficulty in forcing the Straits was not likely to be the forts, but the concealed batteries. Until the army was landed, the Turks were constantly running field guns to the end of the Peninsula, and their fire, though not dangerous, was always troublesome to the ships that entered the Straits.

Admiral Carden, who was in command, continued his attack with energy. Three ships entered the Straits, on March 3rd, and engaged the batteries at White Cliff, in Erenkoi Bay. At night mine-sweepers covered by destroyers swept to within a mile and a half of Cape Kephez. On the following days Fort Dardanus, and some concealed batteries near, gave a great deal of trouble, and it was necessary to put parties ashore near Kum Kale and Seddil Bahr to destroy Turkish field-guns which were annoying the ships inside the Straits by fire from the entrance. On March 5th, an attack was delivered on the forts in the Narrows. The magazine of Fort L, the heaviest armed, was blown up, and in this attack the *Queen Elizabeth* took part by fire directed by aeroplanes from the Ægean. On the same day the Smyrna forts were bombarded by a squadron under Admiral Peirse. “The reduction of the Smyrna defences,


said the Admiralty statement, in a somewhat cryptic passage, “is a necessary incident in the main operation.” Why it should have been necessary was not explained, but it may have been that Smyrna was to have been the field of operations for the Greek army. On March 6th, however, M. Venizelos resigned, owing to a disagreement with the King over his policy of intervention, and whether for that or for other reasons the operations at Smyrna were shortly afterwards discontinued. The operations in the Dardanelles for the next ten days were much interrupted by bad weather.

THE GENERAL ATTACK.

A general attack on the Narrows had now been decided. On March 16th, Admiral Carden had been succeeded in the chief command by Admiral de Robeck. The reason officially assigned was that Admiral Carden had been incapacitated by illness. He therefore cannot be made responsible for the attack. On March 18th, exactly a month after the first bombardment of the outer forts, this attack was delivered. The following is a list of the ships of the line that took part in it:—

BRITISH.					
	Completed.	Tons.	Guns.		
<i>Queen Elizabeth</i>	1915	27,500	8 15-in.	12 6-in.	
<i>Inflexible</i>	1908	17,250	8 12-in.	16 4-in.	
<i>Agamemnon</i>	1908	16,500	4 12-in.	10 9·2-in.	
<i>Lord Nelson</i>	1908	16,500	4 12-in.	10 9·2-in.	
<i>Irresistible</i>	1901	15,000	4 12-in.	12 6-in.	
<i>Majestic</i>	1895	14,900	4 12-in.	12 6-in.	
<i>Prince George</i>	1896	14,900	4 12-in.	12 6-in.	
<i>Cornwallis</i>	1904	14,000	4 12-in.	12 6-in.	
<i>Vengeance</i>	1901	12,950	4 12-in.	12 6-in.	
<i>Albion</i>	1902	12,950	4 12-in.	12 6-in.	
<i>Ocean</i>	1900	12,950	4 12-in.	12 6-in.	
<i>Canopus</i>	1899	12,950	4 12-in.	12 6-in.	
<i>Triumph</i>	1904	11,800	4 10-in.	14 7·5-in.	
<i>Swiftsure</i>	1904	11,800	4 10-in.	14 7·5-in.	
FRENCH.					
<i>Suffren</i>	1903	12,520	4 12-in.	10 6·4-in.	
<i>Bouvet</i>	1898	12,007	2 12-in.	2 10·8-in.	
				8 5·5-in.	
<i>Gaulois</i>	1899	11,080	4 12-in.	10 5·5-in.	
<i>Charlemagne</i>	1898	11,000	4 12-in.	10 5·5-in.	

Admiral de Robeck's plan was certainly bold. He proposed, having silenced the fire of the shore batteries and swept the Straits of mines as well as it could be done in the course of an action, to make a dash through the Straits. Everything turned on silencing the fire of the forts, and this it would seem the Admiral felt fairly confident of doing. The passage of the Narrows, which was not more than five miles long, could be done in fifteen minutes, provided the fleets were secure from the shore batteries, and it was hoped that, even though one or two of the ships might be sunk by mines, the others might get safely through to the Sea of Marmora. There they would be in an excellent position either to hold up Constantinople or to assist in any land operations (for an army was now collecting on Lemnos) against the isthmus which joins the Peninsula of Gallipoli with the mainland. It was a bold plan, but, granted the likelihood of silencing the fire of the forts, not a rash one. It is improbable that Admiral de Robeck meant to force the passage with the whole of his fleet, and the six ships which were held in reserve in the earlier part of the action were apparently those which were intended to make the dash across the mines. These ships were the *Vengeance*, the *Irresistible*, the *Albion*, the *Queen*, the *Swiftsure*, and the *Majestic*.



The crew of H.M.S. Grampus cheering the Eif as she came out of the Dardanelles Straits after her exploits in the Sea of Marmora. [Central News.]

At 10-45 in the morning the *Queen Elizabeth*, *Lord Nelson*, *Agamemnon*, and *Inflexible* entered the Straits in line ahead, and then opened out, forming a line abreast where the Straits widen between Eski Hissarlik and Erenkoi. On the left of the line, hugging the European shore, was the *Prince George*, and at the other extremity the *Triumph*. The four large ships engaged the forts round Chanak and Kilid Bahr at long range, while the *Prince George* bombarded Fort F on the European side and the *Triumph* Fort E (Dardanus), which still continued to give trouble from the near side of Kephez Point. After the bombardment had opened, the four French battleships entered the Straits, and at 12-22 they, with the *Prince George* and the *Triumph*, went ahead to engage the forts at closer range. Almost all the ships were hit by the fire of the shore batteries; the worst sufferers were the French ships, especially the *Bouvet* and the *Gaulois*; the *Inflexible*, about one o'clock, had her foretop struck by shrapnel, and either at the same time or later in the afternoon suffered further damage. At 1-25 all the forts had ceased firing, and it seemed that the moment had now come to call the six reserve ships into action. Accordingly, the four French ships, the *Prince George*, and the *Triumph* were ordered to retire and the reserve ships to take their place. As the *Bouvet*, considerably damaged by the fire of the forts, retired she struck what is described in the Admiralty report as a drifting mine, and went down in three minutes with most of her crew. The mine may have been a torpedo fired from

the White Cliff near Dardanus, or it is possible, as an observer on the *Prince George*, which was abreast of her, seems to have suspected, that a shell exploded her magazines. She sank in thirty-six fathoms, north of Erenkoi village. Soon afterwards all the forts reopened fire. It must have been a great disappointment to the Admiral, who had evidently hoped, when he gave the order to his reserve ships to take the place of the French, that the forts had been put out of action and that the time had come to rush the passage. He could have no thought of that, with the forts still firing. At 2-36 the attack on the forts began anew. Soon after 4-0, the *Irresistible* quitted the line listing heavily, and at 5-50 she sank. At 6-5 the *Ocean* sank. Both are said to have struck mines, but their crews, more fortunate than that of the *Bouvet*, were saved. The bombardment continued till nightfall, apparently without silencing the fire of the forts.

The Admiralty report on this very unfortunate action attributed our losses to "mines drifting with the current which were encountered in areas hitherto swept clear," and added that "this danger will require special treatment." The sentence is a remarkable one; and the intention would seem to be to throw the whole blame for the failure on the ill-luck of our ships in striking mines in seas which had already been swept. It is possible, as has already been suggested, that the cause of the destruction may not have been drifting mines but torpedoes fired from the land. But even if it were drifting mines, the danger from them


in a strong current like that which flows through the Dardanelles would seem obvious, and it is strange that the Admiralty should speak of it as though it could not have been foreseen. But though mines may have caused our losses, they were not responsible for the defeat. It is quite evident that the central idea of the attack—that the fire of the forts might have been silenced by a few hours' bombardment so as to allow a force of ships to dash through—was wrong. The effect of the long-range fire by heavy guns on modern fortifications was clearly nothing like so great as was supposed. The men might be driven from their guns temporarily, but it was rarely that a gun was actually hit by a shell, and nothing less could put it permanently out of action. Moreover, in the narrow waters of the Straits ships were at a great disadvantage through being unable to manœuvre. The great advantage of an attack from the sea on fixed defences, that it presents a moving target, was lost. If the attack was delivered in the hope that the failure of the forts of Liège and Antwerp against the German heavy guns would be repeated against a naval attack, the calculation was clearly wrong.

The general attack was never renewed, and henceforward the fleet confined itself to the less brilliant, but not less difficult, rôle of assisting the siege operations of the army. Its losses continued. On May 12th the *Goliath* was torpedoed; on May 26th the *Triumph*, and on the following day the *Majestic*, were sunk by a German submarine in the Gulf of Saros. The appearance of German submarines—there seem to have been several—in Near Eastern waters gravely complicated the task of the Allied fleet, for these waters,

studded with islands, are ideal for the operations of these craft. But, as will be seen in the next chapter, German submarines were not alone to win distinction.


Here should be mentioned a brilliant exploit by a British submarine in the Dardanelles two months before the first naval attack on the forts was delivered. On December 13th Lieutenant-Commander Holbrook entered the Straits in the *B11*, dived under five rows of mines, and torpedoed the Turkish battleship *Messudiyeh*.

On May 15th Lord Fisher resigned, and in the reconstruction of the Cabinet that took place at that time Mr. Churchill was succeeded at the Admiralty by Mr. Balfour. It is believed that the main cause of Lord Fisher's resignation was the incompatibility of his temper with Mr. Churchill's. Both were masterful, not to say headstrong; and both were men who had no fondness for divided authority and compromise. There were also differences between them on questions of policy, and the chief of them was the naval attack in the Dardanelles, which Mr. Churchill believed in and Lord Fisher did not. Events justified Lord Fisher; and it might have been expected that when Mr. Churchill went, Lord Fisher would have come back. His views, however, on the powers that the First Sea Lord ought to have did not commend themselves to the Government; and Mr. Balfour was not, any more than Mr. Churchill, the sort of man to consent to act as the mouthpiece of any naval officer, however distinguished, and this, it was thought, was what the satisfaction of Lord Fisher's demands would have meant. Mr. Balfour, moreover, was in general sympathy with Mr. Churchill. The new First Lord was Sir Henry Jackson.




H.M.S. *Swiftsure* going into action in the Dardanelles.

[Central News.



One of the most remarkable photographs of the war: An official photograph of the landing beach at Seddil Bahr, taken from the beached River Clyde immediately after the British troops had established themselves on the Peninsula, and showing the horses, provisions, baggage, etc., going ashore.

[Central News.



The River Clyde as she lay beached after the landing at Soddil Bahr.

[Central News.]

CHAPTER III.


THE LANDING IN GALLIPOLI.

THE CONCENTRATION IN LEMNOS—THE DARDANELLES AND THE DEFENCE OF CONSTANTINOPLE—SIR IAN HAMILTON'S PLANS—THE SEVEN LANDINGS—FAILURE OF FIRST ATTACKS ON KRITHIA AND OF THE TURKISH COUNTER-ATTACKS.

IN its account of the attack of March 18th, the Admiralty stated that the operations were proceeding and that there were ample naval and military forces on the spot. It was odd that it should advertise beforehand its intention to use an army, seeing how strict its secrecy was with regard to other matters, but no doubt it was assumed that the Turks already knew everything that there was to be known about our intentions. It is interesting to speculate on what might have happened had the fleet not delivered an attack alone, but had waited until our military preparations were complete, and had the two then delivered simultaneously by sea and land a surprise attack, if surprise were possible. The Turks had been busy in the late autumn strengthening the defences of the Straits, and the widely-held idea that it was the work done in the month between the first and final naval attack that made our task formidable is an exaggerated distortion of the facts. But it is undeniable that the notice of the impending attempt to reach Constantinople through the Straits which was given by the bombardments, the terms in which they were described by the Admiralty statements and the comments in the newspapers, were of extreme value to the Germans, and it is to be regretted that the chance of a surprise for what it was worth was sacrificed to what turned out to be a baseless hope that the fleet alone might be able to get through.


Even on March 18th this hope had not been abandoned, though preparations for military cooperation were by that

time fairly advanced, and a considerable force had been landed on Lemnos Island, or were in transports in harbour, by an arrangement with the Premier of Greece. Presumably, the result of the early bombardments had suggested doubts about the ability of the fleet to do the work alone, and in any case, even if the fleet had forced a way, an army would have been necessary to take full advantage of the success at sea. Still, the Government was anxious to restrict the number of troops used as much as possible. On March 13th, General Sir Ian Hamilton, who had been appointed to the command of the Allied armies in the Eastern Mediterranean (the French had also arranged to send a force, which was to be under the command of General D'Amade, of Morocco fame), left London, and arrived at Lemnos on the day before the naval attack. The attack which he witnessed convinced him that there was no possibility of success by the fleet alone. He telegraphed to the War Office his "reluctant deduction" that the whole of the forces under his command would be required to enable the fleet "effectively" to force the Dardanelles. By "effectively" he seems to have meant that unless there were a considerable military force the passage of the Straits by a few warships would not have any great permanent effect on the situation. The accommodation in Lemnos was too cramped to allow him to redistribute the troops on the transports in accordance with the plans he had formed, and his first step was to order all the transports, with the troops on board, back to Egypt, so that they could be rearranged as they were required



Troops going ashore from their transports in the Dardanelles.

[Underwood & Underwood.]



Off Seddil Bahr: A battleship searching the enemy trenches with shell immediately after the landing of the British troops.

[Sport and General.]

for disembarkation on the Gallipoli Peninsula. A few details who had been landed, and the Australian Infantry Brigade, remained on Lemnos.

SIR IAN HAMILTON'S PLANS.

Constantinople on the land side is defended by the famous lines of Chataldja, which, as the Bulgarians found to their cost in the Balkan war, are impregnable. They can, however, be turned from the sea, for the Power that commands the Sea of Marmora can land troops in the rear of Chataldja. The Straits lead from the Ægean into the Sea of Marmora. The Peninsula of Gallipoli, as the land on the European side of the Straits is called, is connected with the mainland by the Isthmus of Bulair, and some plans for the capture of the Straits have contemplated a landing on the low land near the Isthmus. Its possession not only enables an enemy to attack from the north the forts commanding the Straits, but also completely bars the main channel by which supplies and reinforcements can reach them. It was generally expected that an attempt would be made to secure the Isthmus. Sir Ian Hamilton decided against it. His main reason seems to have been that it was essential to success that his whole army should be landed simultaneously, that is to say, at a number of points at once. Otherwise, the first detachments to land would be overwhelmed before they could establish themselves. A landing on the Isthmus itself was particularly dangerous, because of the absence of cover and the strength of the Turkish lines here. The only way in which an army could hope to establish itself for the attack on these lines would have been to land some distance away and march by the coast, and some Germans were persuaded that this would be the plan adopted, and that the landing would be made at Enos. But the march from Enos to the Isthmus would have been long, difficult, and exposed to attack from the flank, and at the end of it the force would find itself on the wrong side of the lines of Bulair. The advantage of cutting off the communications of the Dardanelles forts with Constantinople was great, but it was not worth these great risks. An ideal position for landing would have been along the southern shores of the Gulf of Xeros, between Bulair and Suvla Burnu (see map on page 16), but, unfortunately, the whole of this coast is a wall of precipitous cliffs, unbroken except by a few gullies, which were quite impracticable for any serious military movement. He therefore found his choice restricted to the coast line between Suvla Burnu and Eski Hissarlik. Accordingly, here he proposed to land at as many points as possible.

For the great enterprise that he was now to begin Sir Ian Hamilton had in his command a Division of Regular Troops—the Division afterwards famous as the Twenty-ninth—the Australian and New Zealand contingents, the East Lancashire Territorials from Egypt, and a Marine Brigade, perhaps 60,000 men in all. The composition of the Twenty-ninth Division has never been officially given, but among the regiments mentioned in official despatches as belonging to it are the following :—

- The King's Own Scottish Borderers.
- The South Wales Borderers (Second).
- The Royal Fusiliers (First).
- The Lancashire Fusiliers (First).
- The Inniskilling Fusiliers.
- The Dublin Fusiliers.
- The Munster Fusiliers.
- The Hampshires.
- The Essex.
- The Worcesters.

Observers of this Division in the camp in Egypt, at San Stefano, spoke in the very highest terms of its fine military appearance and efficiency, and the great expectations which were formed of it were splendidly fulfilled.

Sir Ian Hamilton's despatch describing the landing operations is the finest that any British General has ever written, both for the clarity with which he sets out the principles which decided the form his plans for landing were to take and for the great skill with which he characterises each part in an extremely elaborate set of operations. There were no fewer than seven distinct landings, and Sir Ian Hamilton has described why so many were necessary :—


"Altogether the result of this and subsequent reconnaissances was to convince me that nothing but a thorough and systematic scheme for flinging the whole of the troops under my command very rapidly ashore could be expected to meet with success; whereas, on the other hand, a tentative or piecemeal programme was bound to lead to disaster. The landing of an army upon the theatre of operations I have already described—a theatre strongly garrisoned throughout and prepared for any such attempt—involved difficulties for which no precedent was forthcoming in military history, except possibly in the sinister legends of Xerxes. The beaches were either so well defended by works and guns or else so restricted by nature that it did not seem possible, even by two or three simultaneous landings, to pass the troops ashore quickly enough to enable them to maintain themselves against the rapid concentration and counter-attack which the enemy was bound in such case to attempt. It became necessary, therefore, not only to land simultaneously at as many points as possible, but to threaten to land at other points as well. The first of these necessities involved another unavoidable, if awkward, contingency, the separation by considerable intervals of the force."

No official information has ever been given of the points at which feint landings were made, but it is possible that one of them was at Enos. At any rate, the very categorical statements in the German press that a landing had been effected at Enos can hardly have been invention; and as nothing ever came of it, any landing or show of landing here must have been a mere feint designed to deceive the enemy.

The British army, under the escort of the fleet, left Mudros, in Lemnos Island, for the Gallipoli Peninsula on April 23rd and 24th. The Twenty-ninth Division was the first to leave, on the evening of the 23rd, arriving at Tenedos the next morning, and the Australians followed on the afternoon of the 24th. The two expeditions had a separate naval escort. The Australian escort consisted of five battleships, the *Queen*, *London*, *Prince of Wales*, *Triumph*, and *Majestic*, with one cruiser and eight destroyers.

THE AUSTRALIAN LANDING.

The point selected for the Australian landing was under Sari Bair, a group of hills which lies to the north-west of the Kilid Bahr Plateau, on which the Narrows forts are situated, and rises to a height of nearly a thousand feet by a series of steep terraces covered with thick undergrowth. It was intended to be the most northerly landing, and owing to an accident the actual point of disembarkation was a mile further north than that which Sir Ian Hamilton had selected. North of Gaba Tepe the cliffs had seemed to him too steep for a landing, but in fact their precipitousness turned out to be a protection, screening the seashore from artillery fire. The beach was a narrow strip of sand, rather more than half a mile from end to end. The line of the cliffs almost overhangs the



The Dardanelles Expeditionary Force sets out: A transport loading up at Alexandria.

[Central News.]



General d'Amade and Sir Ian Hamilton at a review of French troops at Alexandria before the French force was despatched to the Dardanelles.

beach, but at each end a narrow ravine runs up from the shore and gives access to the maze of cloughs which form the underfeatures of Sari Bair.

It was decided to attempt a surprise. At three o'clock on the morning of the 25th the Australians approached the shore in the *Queen* and two other battleships, steaming very slowly, and when a very short distance from the land took to the boats. Through the darkness a Turkish battalion could be seen, apparently surprised by their approach, and preparing to resist. The Australians, obeying their instructions, remained silent. The enemy fired as the boats approached, causing many casualties. The moment the boats touched the sand the Australians charged straight for the enemy with such downright fury that the enemy fled without waiting up the ravine at the south end of the beach. By two o'clock in the afternoon 12,000 men and two Mountain Batteries had landed. By that time the enemy had recovered from his surprise, and his heavy guns forced the transports containing the field artillery to stand further out to sea. The Australians were scattered northwards along the shore as far as Fisherman's Hut, and inland, where they had penetrated for two miles in pursuit of the Turks. As the Turks, now 20,000 strong, advanced to the attack, there was much confusion amongst the Australians, and it was impossible to sort out the units.

That did not affect their impetuous valour. Three Krupp guns were put out of action in a charge. The Turkish attacks, however, persisted all through the afternoon and into the night, and another two days passed before the troops gained a sufficiently long respite to disentangle the confusion of the units. All that time they lay in their trenches resisting the enemy's attacks, with the assistance of the guns of the *Majestic*. The enemy's losses were exceedingly heavy during this time. On the other hand, neither were the Australian attacks successful. They lost 800 men on May 2nd in an attack on an eminence in the centre of the enemy's line, and an attack two days later on Gaba Tepe also failed. Here

they must be left, in order that we may see how other portions of the line fared.


THE FRENCH LANDING.

The Australians were at the extreme left; at the extreme right, on the Asiatic side of the Straits, the French Colonial Division had been landed at Kum Kale. The object of this landing was to prevent the enemy from shelling our troops at the tip of the Gallipoli Peninsula. The landing was quite successful, and some 400 Turks, whose retreat after an unsuccessful counter-attack had been cut off by the fire from the ships, were taken prisoners. The French troops, however, were

unable to make any progress along the coast; and as it appeared that an advance would be too costly, they were withdrawn on the 26th, the main object of the landing having been attained. They were later transferred to the extreme right of the Allied line, on the European side of the Straits.

THE FAILURE AT Y BEACH.

How in the meantime had the Twenty-ninth Division fared in the centre between the Australians and the French? No fewer than five separate landings were attempted. Two of these, on Y Beach and S Beach (Morto Bay), were made mainly to protect the flanks of the other landings at X, W, and V. The landing at S Beach, in spite of delays caused by the strength of the



The Landing Beaches in Gallipoli.


current, was successfully accomplished by 7-30 a.m. on the 25th, and Colonel Casson, with the South Wales Borderers, was able to establish himself at the top of the cliff near De Tott's Battery, and to hold his own for two days until the other landing parties came into line with him. Less fortunate was the landing at Y Beach, immediately to the west of Krithia.

The force at Y Beach consisted of the King's Own Scottish Borderers and the Plymouth Battalion of Marines, the whole under the command of Colonel Koe. The very difficulties of the coast at this point—a precipitous cliff some 200 feet high—favoured the success of the landing, for the Turks, who had elaborately entrenched



Inside the wrecked fortress of Seddli Bahr.

[Central News.



One of the wrecked Turkish guns at Seddli Bahr.

[Central News.

a beach for a mile and a half to the south, had done nothing to strengthen the defence at this point. Moreover, there were gullies in the face of the cliff which both gave cover and helped the climb to the top, and the force was able to establish itself by morning. Water, food, and ammunition, as arranged, were hauled up to the top of the cliff by ropes. Later in the day, however, the Turks began to develop strong counter-attacks from the direction of Krithia, and indeed the position on the flank of Achi Baba, the main work of the Turks in front of the Narrows forts, was too important to leave unmolested. It was a bad position to defend, for the ground at the top slopes down inland, making it difficult for the guns of the fleet to give the defenders much assistance. The Turks made repeated assaults on the British lines, which continued through the night, and so great was the confusion of the fighting in the dark that the Turks actually "led a pony with a machine-gun on its back into the middle of the defences, and were proceeding to come into action in the middle of our position when they were bayoneted." At seven o'clock next morning it was seen that the position was untenable, and what was left of the force, with all its wounded and its supplies, were successfully withdrawn under the guns of the *Goliath*. The losses were heavy, and amounted to half of the Scottish Borderers, including Colonel Koe; but though the enterprise miscarried, it did service to the other landings by detaining very large numbers of Turkish troops.

THE IMPLACABLE LANDING.

The principal landings were at the three other beaches, X, W, and V. X is a strip of sand beach two-hundred yards by eight. Here the Royal Fusiliers were engaged, with the *Implacable* in support. This landing was brilliantly managed. The *Implacable* stood right into shore, and, firing with every gun she had at close range, did such execution amongst the Turks that the Fusiliers were able to land without a single casualty.* "The nature of the beach was very favourable for the covering fire from ships," writes Admiral de Robeck, "but the manner in which this landing was carried out might well serve as a model." The beach has since been called after the ship, *Implacable Landing*. The Royal Fusiliers did not wait to be attacked, but advanced boldly against Hill 114, near W Beach, but were compelled to give way before a heavy attack. Later, however, they were reinforced by two more battalions, and by night they had established themselves on a radius of half a mile round their landing place, and were in touch with the Lancashire Fusiliers on W Beach.

SEDDIL BAHR.

The landing on W Beach was perhaps the most remarkable of all; but though it lies nearest to *Implacable Landing*, it is convenient to turn to what happened at Beach V—Seddil Bahr. This was the most important landing in the number of troops engaged, and at one time looked like ending in complete failure. The cliffs at Seddil Bahr form a grassy amphitheatre, with the beach as stage. The Turks had expected a landing here, and made most elaborate preparations to meet it. At the eastern end of the beach is the old fort of Seddil Bahr, whose walls—though they had been dismantled by the fleet in the bombardment of

February—gave excellent cover for the enemy's riflemen, and right round the circle of the amphitheatre ran rows of desperate wire entanglements. Across the narrow strip of beach sand there is a little ridge about four feet high, forming a natural escarpment, which saved many lives in the fighting. The top of the cliffs was lined with skilfully-concealed machine-guns.

The Turkish position was heavily bombarded by the fleet before the landing was attempted, but the enemy held his fire until the landing began. An old collier, the *River Clyde*, had been prepared to assist in the landing. Large holes had been cut in her sides, through which the troops were to pour over a wide gangway into lighters which she had in tow. She was nicknamed the "Trojan Horse" by the troops, and the name was doubly appropriate, for over the straits, east of Kum Kale, is the site of ancient Troy. The Turks watched the *River Clyde* approach with her lighters, as they had endured the bombardment, in complete silence. Even when the *Clyde* was driven on the beach they refrained from fire, and it almost looked as though the landing was to be unopposed. The first troops were sent ashore in boats, and when their keels grounded, then and not before, there suddenly broke out from the hillside a tornado of fire. Most of the men—the Dublin Fusiliers—were killed in the boats before they could leap ashore; a few raced across the sand to the little escarpment, where they obtained some cover. But not one of the boats or of the men who stayed in them was saved. Nor was the device of the *Clyde* very successful at first. Commander Unwin had the greatest difficulty, owing to the strength of the current, in getting the lighters in position between his ship and the shore; the seamen were shot down when they exposed themselves in this work.

When the lighters were in position, a company of the Munster Fusiliers rushed across the gangway. Short as the distance was, few of them reached the protection of the escarpment. When the next company followed, the extemporised pier of lighters gave way in the current and drifted into deep water, the men who escaped being shot. It was then that Commander Unwin did the acts for which he has been so deservedly praised.

"Observing that the lighters which were to form the bridge to the shore had broken adrift, Commander Unwin left the ship and under murderous fire attempted to get the lighters into position. He worked on until, suffering from the effects of cold and immersion, he was obliged to return to the ship, where he was wrapped up in blankets. Having in some degree recovered, he returned to his work against the doctor's order and completed it. He was later again attended by the doctor for three abrasions caused by bullets, after which he once more left the ship, this time in a lifeboat, to save some wounded men who were lying in shallow water near the beach. He continued at this heroic labour under continuous fire, until forced to stop through pure physical exhaustion."

By noon, out of 1,000 men who left the collier, nearly half had been killed or wounded, and it was decided to discontinue the landing. Fortunately, the collier gave good protection to those who were still aboard her, and her machine-guns prevented the Turks from delivering a counter-attack against those who had landed and clung to the beach under cover of the escarpment. There they lay, unable to move, all through the night. With the remnants of the Dublins and Munsters on the shore were two companies of the Hampshire Regiment. Almost

* So says Admiral de Robeck in his report. Sir Ian Hamilton says "with but little loss."



Turkish prisoners being marched to the British landing place on the Gallipoli Peninsula: A photograph which illustrates the nature of the type of country being fought over in the Dardanelles campaign.

[Central News.]



French soldiers sorting out the kits of their dead and wounded comrades.

[Central News.]

LANCASHIRE LANDING.

Meanwhile, better success had attended the landing of the Lancashire Fusiliers on W Beach, between Cape Tekke and Cape Helles. The beach, known now as Lancashire Landing, is some 350 yards long and from 15 to 40 yards wide. Its flanks are precipitous, but in the centre the ground slopes more gradually. The sand is dry and powdery. The beach was heavily fortified. Wire entanglements ran across the beach at the water's edge, and even under the water; there were both land mines and sea mines, and elaborate entrenchments had been made in the hills. There were redoubts on Cape Helles, between Lancashire Landing and the Seddil Bahr Beach, where the Irish regiments were to attack. As at Seddil Bahr, the enemy withheld his fire during the bombardment by the fleet, and until the boats grounded there was not a sign that the landing was to be opposed.


The landing was brilliantly successful. Three companies, under Brigadier-General Hare, made at once for a ledge of rocks in the cliffs on the left of the beach, near Cape Tekke, and this body contributed very materially to the success that was won. The main landing on the beach was a most heroic affair. The first men ashore fell instantly as though mown down by a scythe, but under cover of fire from the warships the following ranks hacked their way through the wire entanglements, and re-forming under the cliffs at once began to storm the entrenchments. Most of them moved to the left, and, helped by the fire of the three companies under General Hare, stormed Hill 114 and effected a junction with the men from Immacable Landing. The storming of the cliffs at the Cape Helles end of the beach took longer. The small party of the Lancashire Fusiliers which moved in this direction was not strong enough to make any progress, and the Worcester Regiment, which was brought to its assistance, for a long time fared no better. By four o'clock in the afternoon, however, Hill 138 was carried, and the redoubt captured. Some further progress was made in the direction of the Seddil Bahr Beach, but the wire entanglements were too numerous. Through

glasses, the wire cutters could be seen "quietly snipping away as if they were pruning a vineyard." They failed, however, to carry the hill overlooking Seddil Bahr Beach. All through the night the Turks counter-attacked, but not a yard of ground did they gain.

Sir Ian Hamilton's praise of the achievement of the Lancashire Fusiliers is as high as any regiment ever had from its general. "So strong," he writes, "were the defences of W Beach that the Turks may well have considered them impregnable, and it is my firm conviction that no finer feat of arms has ever been achieved by the British soldier—or any other soldier—than the storming of these trenches from open boats on the morning of the 25th. It was to the complete lack of the sense

of danger or of fear of this daring battalion that we owed our astonishing success."

On the morning of the 26th Cape Tekke and the beaches on either side, and the western side of Cape Helles, were firmly in our possession. A landing had been effected at Eski Hissarlik (Beach S), and between these two were the remnants of two Irish regiments on Seddil Bahr beach. At dawn, the fleet opened a furious bombardment of Seddil Bahr, and under cover of it our troops obtained a footing in the village about ten in the morning. In leading the attack from the west, Col. Doughty-Wylie, who had behaved with conspicuous gallantry, was killed just as the last defences were broken down. The fall of Seddil Bahr gave us the whole coast from the



H.M.S. Implacable, which, standing quite close into the beach, rendered great service during the landing of the troops at the Dardanelles.

(Newspaper Illustrations.)

Immacable Landing to Eski Hissarlik. In the evening of the 26th, Seddil Bahr Beach was given to the French Colonial Corps, who had now been withdrawn from Kum Kale on the Asiatic side. By the following night we had advanced our position to a line running across the peninsula from two miles north of Cape Tekke to Eski Hissarlik. Orders were issued for a general attack on the following day.

THE ATTACK ON KRITHIA.

The decision whether to make the attack at once or to defer it was a difficult one. Sir Ian Hamilton had not yet decided his full strength, and he was especially

weak in artillery; but he reflected that delay would give the enemy time to strengthen his defences, and on a balance of the drawbacks immediate action seemed preferable. The attack was directed towards Krithia, and was entrusted to the Twenty-ninth Division. The French were to keep their right on the south side of the Kerevedagh, a small stream flowing through a deep, narrow glen into the Straits just beyond Eski Hissarlik, but their left was to co-operate with the British. The attack on Krithia narrowly failed, mainly through inability to keep the line supplied with ammunition. Two days later the necessary transport had been landed. Both the British and the French losses in this day's fighting were heavy.

On April 30th, at ten o'clock at night, the Turks began a series of attacks all along the line. A proclamation had been issued to the rank and file, signed by Von Lowenstein, a German officer. (It must be understood that throughout these Turkish operations the directing intelligence was always German):—


"Attack the enemy with the bayonet and utterly destroy him!

"We shall not retrace one step; for if we do, our religion, our country, and our nation will perish!

"Soldiers! the world is looking at you! Your only hope of salvation is to bring this battle to a successful issue or gloriously to give up your life in the attempt."

The Turks attacked in dense formation in three lines, the front rank having no ammunition in order to encourage it to use the bayonet. The officers fired coloured Bengal lights from their pistols—red indicating to the Turkish artillery that the range was to be lengthened, white that our front trenches had been stormed, green that our main position had been carried. Until the final rush the Turkish attack was to crawl on its hands and knees. The attacks failed. Only at one point was there any breach made in our lines, and it was immediately cleared by the Fifth Royal Scots (Territorials). The French Senegalese troops were in greater difficulties, and had to be reinforced by the Worcesters and Essex battalions. The repulse of the attack was followed in the early morning by a vigorous Allied counter-attack, which at first had considerable success. It was held up later by machine-guns and barbed wire—"those inventions of the devil," Sir Ian Hamilton calls them—and the French were again in difficulties.

Our losses in these operations were heavy: 177 officers and 1,990 other ranks were killed, 412 and 7,807 wounded, and 13 and 3,580 missing—a total of 602 officers and 13,377 other ranks. The landing was the most brilliant operation of its kind ever attempted by an army; but the events of the week following showed that it was only an introduction to a long and arduous campaign.



Barbed wire entanglements constructed by the Turks to hinder the landing at Seddii Bahr.

[Central News.]

The Manchester Guardian
HISTORY
of the
WAR

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
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The beginning of an advance on the Turkish positions.

[Central News.]

CHAPTER IV.

THE FRONTAL ATTACKS ON ACHI BABA.

THE DIFFICULTIES OF THE BRITISH GENERAL AFTER THE LANDING—DESCRIPTION OF THE ACHI BABA POSITION—THE WORK OF THE FLEET—THE BRITISH SUBMARINES IN THE SEA OF MARMORA—THE GREAT ATTACK OF JUNE 4TH—THE ANZAC POSITIONS—THE OUTLOOK—DESPONDENCY AT HOME.

BRILLIANT as was the exploit of the British army in forcing a landing on the Gallipoli Peninsula, it left Sir Ian Hamilton in a position of great difficulty and even of some peril. Ten days after the landing, after repulsing two desperate Turkish attacks and making strong onslaughts on the enemy's position, the Allied armies were at no point further from the sea than one mile; at some points, notably at Gaba Tepe, where the Australians landed, they held little more than the summit of the cliffs on the seashore. The landings were all on open beaches, without even a wharf. All supplies had to be put ashore on lighters, and the landing places were under fire from the enemy's batteries. There was no base away from the firing line in which men could find temporary relief on the Gallipoli Peninsula; to escape from the fire a sea voyage was necessary. The beaches where supplies and reinforcements were landed and wounded men disembarked resembled in their

disorder not the docks of a seaport but the foreshore of a diminutive seaside resort, littered over with the impedimenta of a great overseas expedition. There was no apparatus on shore for unloading and loading; everywhere was extemporisation. Few armies could have survived the confusion of the first few days; and the feat of making the landing good on a harbourless shore in the face of hostile attacks was as great as the landing itself. It would have been impossible of accomplishment but for the fleet, which took over the whole responsibility of landing stores and keeping up the supplies of food and ammunition.

"Our Naval Commanders, Lieutenants, and Midshipmen in charge of this work have developed an efficiency which has completely upset all expert theories. Piers have been built out into deep water by our sappers, so that the largest lighters can come alongside. Roads have been cut along the cliffs to increase the area of disembarkation, and a hundred labour-saving devices have been extemporised, including a system of lighting which allows the work to



An ambulance waggon passing down one of the gullies on the Gallipoli Peninsula.

[Central News.]



Carrying wounded through the trenches.

CC-0. Jangamwadi Math Collection. Digitized by eGangotri

[Central News.]

go on without interruption by night and by day. Work never stops. Even when the day's work is over and the last lighter has discharged her cargo, the wounded are walking or being carried down to the beaches, where they are embarked on the empty barges and despatched for transportation to Egypt, to the hospital ships, and transports.

"The line of demarcation between the authority of the army and of the navy is strictly drawn. As long as a soldier, a horse, a gun, or a biscuit is in a ship or in a lighter, on its way to the shore, all are under the control of our beach parties. Standing on one of the piers in the sweltering heat of the last few days, with the beach behind him crammed with men, stores, and animals, a young officer, with a megaphone in his hand, shouts orders to a dozen different lighters, each towed by a steam pinnace, in the offing. One contains mules, another guns, a third biscuits, a fourth tinned meat, a fifth ammunition, a sixth troops, a seventh Generals and Staff officers. Every one is directed to its right destination as if by some enchanter's wand, and no one dares to step ashore until he has received his orders. At the end of the pier the naval authority ceases and that of the army begins. Here are Army Service Corps officers, who are waiting to seize what the navy has brought them. The thousand miscellaneous articles, which look as if they never could be sorted out, are speedily divided, checked, and sent on their way down the lines of communication to the troops in the front trenches. The whole is a marvel of organisation."*

Great as was the service done by the navy in the actual fighting, it was as nothing compared with this work.

THE TURKISH POSITIONS.

The chief military problem after the landing was the confined space which made manœuvring and deployment over an extended area impossible. The map (p. 39) shows the position after the end of the fighting at the beginning of May. When the fury of the first Turkish attacks had subsided, the Allied front covered about two miles and a half, from Morto Bay to Immacable Beach, north of Tekke Burnu. On the left was the famous Twenty-ninth Division—the Eighty-seventh Brigade to the left, the Eighty-eighth Brigade to the right. On the right of our line were the Senegalese troops, and connecting the French and British fronts was the Naval Division. In reserve were (from left to right) the Indian troops, Australians, and New Zealanders (other than those who were still holding Gaba Tepe up the coast), and behind the Senegalese a brigade of French infantry, Zouaves, and the Foreign Legion. The East Lancashire Territorials were in the rear of the Indians and Australians. As a result of the three days' fighting, the Senegalese had pushed forward to the hills overlooking the ravine of Kereves Dere; our left, after almost reaching Krithia itself, had fallen back to the foot of the hill, a mile and a half away; and in the centre the Naval Division was between the Krithia and the Maidos roads on the foothills of Achi Baba. It was not great progress, measured in miles; but it was satisfactory measured by the extraordinary strength of the Turkish positions.

There was, it was now seen, no break in the Turkish line of fortifications. Achi Baba and its spurs straddled across the whole width of the Peninsula. It is a conical hill, marked 730 feet on the Admiralty maps, but probably under rather than over 700 feet. Its strength is not in its height but in its shape, and in the natural protection afforded by its underfeatures.


* From an excellent letter by Mr. Ashmead Bartlett (May 13th). The passage illustrates what Sir Ian Hamilton meant by calling the fleet the "father and mother" of the army in Gallipoli.

The side that faced the Allies' centre was a regular slope forming a natural glacis to the top. Many apparently precipitous and inaccessible hills are a trap to the defenders, because of the amount of "dead ground" on their slopes which cannot be touched by rifle fire from the summit. Majuba is a famous example. But round Achi Baba there was no dead ground. At the top there was a strong redoubt; and its sides were terraced from bottom to top with rows after rows of trenches. The top of the hill is about seven miles from Lancashire Landing, and of this distance our troops by the second week in May had covered perhaps three miles. Achi Baba, which completely concealed from view the hills behind it at the back of the Narrows Forts, is only the central point of a wonderful system of natural fortifications. It has two spurs, one running south-east towards Morto Bay, the other south-west to the Gulf of Xeros. The Morto Bay spur is intersected by a deep narrow ravine, the Kereves Dere, which the French had now reached but not crossed. There is a similar ravine, the Saghir Dere on the other spur, and along this spur, half way to the sea, is the village of Krithia, the hill above the village forming the shoulder to Achi Baba.

Sir Ian Hamilton's idea evidently was that if he could obtain possession of this shoulder it would give him access to the back of Achi Baba, and to this end his attacks in May and June were steadily directed. This enterprise would have been assisted had we been able to maintain our footing on the Y Beach; but after the failure of our landing there on April 26th (p. 27) the attempt to establish ourselves there from the sea was not repeated. A similar idea had evidently dictated the landing of the Australians near Gaba Tepe. They were to have landed about a mile to the south of Beach Z (christened "Anzac," after the initials of the troops engaged—the Australian and New Zealand Army Corps), and that would have put them in command of Gaba Tepe in a position to operate from the rear against Pasha Dag, the hill immediately to the west of the Narrows and behind Achi Baba. Had the earlier attacks on Krithia succeeded, this would have been a most menacing position; as it was, the movement from Anzac had to be postponed to the more urgent need further south. Nor indeed was advance from Anzac easy without further reinforcement, for immediately to the west was the hill of Sari Bair, the centre of a wilderness of cloughs and sunken eminences. Sari Bair, too, had been very heavily fortified by the Turks, who indeed attached very great importance to the security of this flank. The Turkish scheme of defence may be conveniently figured in the form of two crescents back to back. The concave crescent has Achi Baba for its star and the two ravines of Kereves Dere and Saghir Dere for its horns. The convex crescent has Sari Bair and the Narrows for its horns and Pasha Dag as its star.*

After the fighting at the beginning of May there were no general attacks of the Allies that month. There was much to be done in consolidating the positions

* Lancashire readers who know the geography of the Isle of Man may be helped by remembering that the Gallipoli Peninsula is in size almost exactly equal to Man, and is not unlike it in shape and physical features. If they think of Kild Bahr and the Narrows as Douglas, Gallipoli town is Ramsey, Bulair is the flat land towards the Point of Ayre, Suvla Bay is Peel, Sari Bair is Cronk-ny-Irey-Lhaa, Anzac is Dalby, Lancashire Landing is Port Erin, Seddil Bahr is Port St. Mary, De Tott's Battery and Morto Bay is Castletown, and Achi Baba is South Barrule. (See page 37.)



Admiral de Robeck introducing Admiral Nicholson to General Gouraud on board the Lord Nelson.


[Central News.]



The officers and crew of the submarine E14, who carried out the daring raids against Turkish shipping in the Sea of Marmora.

[Central News.]

already won; and the Turks showed themselves adepts in the methods of siege warfare to which the advances from the south were for the present restricted. Their snipers were persistent and ingenious; protective colouring was never carried further than by the captured sniper who was found to have painted himself green so that



he could not be seen firing from the scrub. That the Turks were magnificent soldiers in the defence of fortified positions, the slopes of Plevna, to which Achi Baba bore some resemblance, had proved for all time. Their extreme ingenuity in their methods, the vigour of their counter-attacks, and the quickness with which they divined the meaning of every movement of the attackers were new to their warfare, and were due in part, at any rate, to the excellent training of their German officers. The average Turk does not seem to have liked his German officers, but that he benefited immensely by his teaching was undeniable. He may have regretted Turkey's participation in the war, and have resented both the politics and the methods of the Germans; but he knew, too, how much the army owed to its German officers in the field; and the stories of mutiny against them, which were current in the English newspapers of the time, were wild exaggerations, and often the invention of prisoners anxious, as prisoners usually are, to please their captors.

WAR COMMUNICATIONS—SUBMARINE ACTIVITY.

The month was an anxious one for the Allies, for it saw the loss of three large British warships, the *Goliath*, the *Triumph*, and the *Majestic* (p. 21). The loss of the *Goliath*, which was torpedoed just inside the Straits, was the more regrettable for the fact that 500 of her crew went down with her, and that it was the work of a Turkish destroyer. The *Triumph* and *Majestic* were sunk in the Gulf of Xeros by a German submarine, the *U23*, whose appearance in the Ægean, where its presence had for some time been suspected, caused very great uneasiness. The larger ships in the fleet seem, temporarily at any rate, to have retired from the shores of the Peninsula to a place of greater protection and less exposure; but happily the fears caused by the appearance of the submarines (there seems to have

been more than one) were not justified. There was no interference with the supplies for the army, and as no general attack was in progress the temporary absence of the battleships' heavy guns made the less difference to the progress of the operations. On the other hand, the activity of the British submarines was beginning to cause the Turks very great alarm. Towards the end of May a British submarine, the *E14*, entered Constantinople harbour and torpedoed the Turkish transport *Stamboul*. The sinking by the same submarine of another transport, the *Nagara*, has been described by an American newspaper correspondent who was on board:—

"At daylight a submarine suddenly came awash alongside the *Nagara*. Five men appeared on her deck, one firing a rifle across the bow of the transport until the latter's engines were stopped. The captain of the submarine, a large, ruddy-faced man in a white sweater, hailed:—

"Who are you?"

"The American correspondent replied: 'I am Mr. Swing, of the *Chicago Daily News*.'

"The submarine officer answered: 'Glad to meet you, Mr. Swing; but what I want to know is, what ship is this?'

"The *Nagara*, a Turkish transport,' was the reply.

"Well, I am going to sink you.'


"Can we get off?'

"Yes, and be damn quick about it.'

"In the ensuing panic the *Nagara*'s crew swamped two boats while lowering them, but managed to bail them out with the fezes of the Turkish sailors. All got off safely.

"The captain of the *E11* made an inspection of the hold of the transport. The submarine then backed off and fired. There was a double explosion, and the *Nagara* blew up and sank in a cloud of orange-coloured smoke."

In the succeeding months the activity of the submarines increased. Their operations had a very important



bearing on the land campaign. There is no railway connection between Constantinople and Gallipoli. The roads, moreover, are bad, and the country is barren and incapable of supporting the heavy reinforcements which the Turks found necessary to replace casualties and to hold their lines against the increasing pressure of the




Getting a big gun into position at the Dardanelles.

[Central News.



A big gun in action behind the British trenches.

[Central News.



The advance of the Allies on May 6-7-8.


Allies. Much the easiest way of transporting supplies and troops to the front was by sea. There is fairly good railway connection from Asia Minor and Syria, which supply the bulk of Turkey's army, to Scutari, opposite Constantinople, and from there across the Sea of Marmora is a passage which would take as many days as the land journey along the European side would take weeks. The British submarines in the Sea of Marmora by interrupting the transport of supplies and troops by sea were thus strengthening our prospects at their weakest point. The chances of an early decisive victory were very small indeed if Turkey was to be free to keep up the strength of her army in Gallipoli by a constant influx of reinforcements, for she had by now a million men in the field or under training; but if her supplies could be interrupted the attack was much more promising.

The passage of the Straits by the submarines was attended with great risks, but was usually accomplished without mishap. Two mishaps, however, there were:—

On April 17th the *E 15* was lost by stranding off Kephiez Point, where there is a shelf of rock rising precipitately from the deep water, and in the following month the *AE 2* (of the Australian navy) was reported sunk by Turkish warships while trying to enter the Sea of Marmora. The French also lost a submarine by mine in the Dardanelles early in the year. But on the whole, the Allied submarines, considering the number

of mines and the narrowness of the waters, suffered very little. Nor should the excellent work of the Russian Black Sea fleet escape notice. The arrival of the *Goeben* and *Breslau* in the Golden Horn (Vol. I., p. 73) did much to encourage the Turks to throw in their lot with the Germans, but the *Goeben* had her big guns damaged in an engagement with the Russian squadron, under Admiral Ebenhardt, in November, 1914, and though she was later reported out, her injuries were evidently serious, and the Russian command of the Black Sea could not be disputed. In the first week of April the *Medjidieh*, a Turkish cruiser, ran on a floating mine; and at periodical times the Russian fleet cleared the Black Sea of Turkish shipping.

All through May, both Allies and Turks were much preoccupied with the question of their communications. With the British submarines, which were infesting their sea bases of supply, the Turks could not deal effectively; but in May they made persistent attempts to clear their other flank by driving the Australians into the sea. At Gaba Tepe the Australian corps, though not at this time active, was strongly entrenched in a position flanking the Turkish communications, and the enemy was clearly apprehensive of a danger which they foresaw might develop later. In July the Australian position had been made impregnable by the labour of the troops, who showed themselves as patient and unwearying with the spade as they were impetuous




British soldiers posing for their photograph on a wrecked Turkish gun. [Central News.]



A bathing place at the Dardanelles.

[Central News.]



One of the guns of a French battery in action near Seddil Bahr.

[Central News.]

with the bayonet. The front was about three miles wide and three-quarters of a mile deep from the edge of the sea-cliff to the furthest point in our lines inland; and within that narrow space there were far more than one hundred miles of sap and trench. But in May they were not so firmly established. In the second week of the month the Turks began to sap towards the Australian trenches, and at Quinn's Post, a very dangerous corner, which was enfiladed by very cleverly hidden machine-guns, the opposing trenches approached to within twelve yards of each other, and the fighting was carried on by lobbing grenades over the parapet. Several times the position had to be temporarily abandoned, but it was always recovered. Another post of great danger was on the extreme left, where at one time a party of Wellington (N.Z.) Mounted Rifles were pressed until their ammunition was exhausted; but, the Turks delaying to come to close quarters out of respect for the New Zealanders' vigour with the bayonet, they were finally relieved by a company of Canterbury men. On May 19th the Turks made a general attack on the whole Anzac line. It failed badly, and the enemy suffered heavier casualties than on any other day up to that time. Sir Ian Hamilton, in a message to the Governor-General of the Commonwealth, estimated the enemy's losses at 7,000; ours at under 500.

"The terrible carnage amongst the Turks during their supreme effort to dislodge us on May 19th put great heart into our ranks. Ever alert, the Colonials were ready to meet the strain when it came. The sight of seemingly

endless masses of the enemy advancing upon them might well have shaken the nerve of the already severely tried troops. Our machine-guns and artillery mowed the attackers down in hundreds, but still the advancing wall swept on. On still! Would the ranks never waste in strength? Not till the wave was at point-blank range from the nimble trigger-fingers did it break and spend itself amongst our barbed wire entanglements. Turks were shot in the act of jumping into our trenches. Corpses lay with their heads and arms hanging over our parapets. Our fire gradually dominated the ground in front. Those who turned to fly were mowed down before they could go a dozen yards. The Germans sent their supports and reserves forward in droves. It was sickening to behold the slaughter our fire made amongst the massed battalions as they issued from concealment into open spaces. One realised the truth of the saying that the German officers regard the rank and file as "cannon fodder." These unfortunate Turks scrambled along towards us over piles of dead bodies. In an instant a company would be enveloped in the smoke of a shrapnel salvo. When the air cleared that company would be stretched or writhing on the ground, with another company approaching and ready to share its predecessor's fate. It became a question not of the success or otherwise of the attack, but how many Turks we could kill. The wastage of life continued long after the failure of the assault had become apparent. A green patch of cultivation on our right centre was a shambles. On these few acres our burial party, working during the armistice which followed, counted no fewer than 4,000 Turkish and German dead."

THE ATTACK OF JUNE 4th.

Meanwhile, our main body at the southern end of the Peninsula was not idle in the month, although it




A French telephone post.

[Central News.



The interior of a naval underground observation station.
CC-0. Jangamwadi Math Collection. Digitized by eGangotri

[Central News.



The fighting in Gallipoli in June.

made no general assaults. It had been sapping towards the slopes of Achi Baba, and by dint of a succession of small advances, made for the most part during the night, the distance between the two fronts had been reduced from an average of 1,000 yards to, at some points, 200, and even 100. In this work the East Lancashire Territorials, who had been brought from Egypt, had opportunity, which they used, of showing their quality. They held the ground between the famous Twenty-ninth Division and the Naval Division. Towards the end of the month the French made progress on the right of the line, and on the 28th a Turkish redoubt on the south side of the Kereves Dere, which had been giving much trouble, was captured in a night attack by a mixed party of French and Senegalese volunteers. It was a starlit night, and the full moon was so low in the sky that its rays shone full in the face of the defenders and concealed the approach of the attackers. The same moon betrayed a battalion of Turks who were advancing in support to the French artillery fire. At the end of the month General Sir Ian Hamilton decided on a general attack. Except that he was now stronger, the conditions had not materially altered since the last general attack, but the spirits of the army were high and eager for attack. It was fixed for Friday, June 4th.

The day was overcast, with a north wind blowing clouds of dust in the faces of the Allies. An exceedingly

heavy bombardment by both army and naval guns; the troops waited in the trenches with bayonets fixed. At twelve the bombardment ceased, and the men moved out, preceded by bomb throwers. At the extreme left of the line were the Indians, then (in succession from left to right) the Twenty-ninth Division, the Territorials, the Naval Division, and the French. The bombardment had done its work very well except at one or two points, where the wire entanglements had escaped destruction. The chief of these points was the juncture of the Indians and the Regulars. After a fine advance, in which two rows of trenches were carried, the Indians found that the troops immediately to their right could not advance, and their right wing hung in air and in danger of being outflanked. They were obliged to retire to their original position. Except opposite the undestroyed entanglements, the Regular Corps made good progress, and advanced some 500 yards. On the right, the French captured a strong line of trenches—still on the south side of the Kereves Dere—but were then held up by the Haricot Fort, so called from its shape; and the Naval Division stormed three lines of trenches, but, coming under enfilading fire from their right, they, too, had to retire. The principal advance was made by the Territorials in the centre. In spite of heavy casualties, the Territorials went on, unwavering, until as many as five rows of trenches had been carried, and their line had been carried nearly a mile forward. The Turks

at this point were now fairly on the run, but, unfortunately, the flanks, who had advanced nothing like so far, were compelled to fall back from the ground they had won, and the centre, too, had to evacuate its advanced gains to preserve the alignment. As it was, our centre at nightfall made a salient projecting beyond the flanks. The centre (including the Essex Regiment, which was immediately to its left) seems to have been favoured by the ground, but its achievement was by far the finest work yet done by Territorials in the war, and worthy of the very best regular troops.

The Turks were not slow to launch a counter-attack, bringing up troops from behind Achi Baba, and even from Maidos, in spite of a very vigorous demonstration made by the Anzacs from the Quinn's Post end of their line. These counter-attacks reached their climax on Sunday; but though some more of the gains in the centre were lost, the net result was to leave the army with an advance averaging some 500 yards ahead of its former positions. There was still a very marked salient in the centre of our line. This progress was less than had been hoped for, or than seemed likely to be realised in the earlier stages of the advance, but it was not unsatisfactory in view of the great strength of the enemy's positions. Our losses were very heavy, and the lists published toward the end of June greatly depressed feeling in England.

THE STRAIGHTENING OF THE LINE.

The first task after the battle of June 4th was to straighten out the line so as to reduce the salient, which was dangerously exposed and expensive of life to defend. The next fortnight witnessed some very small local actions. By a night attack on June 11th-12th, the Border Regiment and the South Wales Borderers carried two trenches. They were lost four days later, but recovered again at dawn of the sixth day by the Dublin Fusiliers. On June 19th the Turks effected a lodgment in a portion of our line, but were driven out by the Fifth Royal Scots—Edinburgh Territorials, brigaded with the Twenty-ninth Division—and a company of the Worcesters. Two days later an advance was made by the French, and after two failures they succeeded in a third attack, just before sunset, in carrying the Haricot Redoubt, and in establishing themselves firmly on the south side of the Kereves Dere. The fall of the redoubt in the light of the setting sun was one of the great spectacles in a war which, as a rule, has been too deeply felt to be regarded as a spectacle:—

"The smoke of the shells, which at dawn had been ethereal, almost translucent, was now, in the sunset, turbid and sinister, yet the sunset was very splendid, flaming in crimson streamers over Imbros, tinting the east with rosy reflections and turning the peaks of Asia to sapphires. It had a peculiar significance on this longest day of the year, crowning as it did those precious five hours of daylight that, for the French, had been fraught with such achievement. Slowly the colour faded out, and now, minute by minute, the flashes of the guns became more distinct; the smoke was merged in the gathering dusk, and away over the more distant Turkish lines the bursts of shrapnel came out like stars against the brief twilight. One knew the anxiety there would be in the darkness that now was falling upon this 21st of June, but in the morning we heard gladly that the enemy's counter-attacks had failed, and that our Allies were indeed firmly established.

"The Turkish casualties were at least 7,000. One trench, 200 yards long and ten feet deep, was brimming over with the dead. They were valiant those dead men. French officers who have fought in the West say that, as a fighting unit, one Turk is worth two Germans; in fact, with his back to the wall, the Turk is magnificent. The

French casualties were marvelously few considering what a day it had been, what an enemy was being attacked, and how much had been gained."*

THE GULLY RAVINE

This success was followed up at the end of the month by the crossing of the Kereves Dere and the capture of a system of entrenchments known from their shape as the Quadrilateral—the fighting in which the Quadrilateral was the sequel to a Turkish night attack along the shores of the Dardanelles, which H.M.S. *Wolverine* helped to keep in check.

Meanwhile, on the previous day—June 28th—there had been important operations on our left flank, again with the object of straightening out our line and reducing the Territorial salient. On the west of the Peninsula, and corresponding to the Kereves Dere on the east, there is the deep clough or gully known as the Saghir Dere. At the sea end, which was in our possession, the cliffs on either bank are high—some 200 feet—and the gully is narrow. Upstream—for there is a small stream at the bottom of the gully, besides many springs of very precious cold water, which were left carefully guarded against contamination—the cliffs fall in height, and the clough opens out to the plateau near the shoulder of Krithia mountain. The sides of the clough were covered with scrub, with here and there bare patches of the yellow marl characteristic of this part of the Peninsula. There had been no advance up the gully from the sea coast, but as our main body advanced from Seddil Bahr towards Achi Baba, the Turks between Saghir Dere and the sea fell back, and at the end of June more than half of the clough was in our possession. At the north end the Turks were heavily entrenched on the bank tops on either side, with a redoubt christened Boomerang Fort at the entrance to the clough. The clough within the Turkish lines was found to be a horrible place—cemetery, latrine, and rubbish heap, swarming with flies and oppressively hot, with a sedimentary atmosphere that the breeze alone could not stir, and an overpowering stench of insanitation—a veritable valley of death. On June 28th, General Hamilton began his attack on this valley, his idea being to pivot his line on the cliffs about a mile from the sea, and to swing his left round to the west of Krithia. The bombardment, assisted by the French artillery and by the ships' guns, began at 10-20, and at 10-45 the Boomerang Fort was captured by the Border Regiment, and soon after 11-0 the trenches west of the gully were in our hands. East of the gully our success was less marked, though the Royal Scots again distinguished themselves; but in the second stage of the attack we reached on the west bank of the ravine the desired extension. Further to the left, the Gurkhas pressed on under cover of the cliffs and captured some rising ground due west of Krithia. The ground now was all held, in spite of very heavy counter-attacks by the Turks. The Anzacs gave great assistance to this movement by demonstrating against the enemy on their front. These attacks were not meant to be pressed, but for several days the enemy delivered a series of counter-attacks in which he lost very heavily without any gain of ground. These wasteful attacks were made under the order of Enver, overriding the instructions of the German officers. They betrayed much uneasiness at the progress of the attack. A captured Divisional Order contained the following passage:—

"There is nothing that causes us more sorrow, increases the courage of the enemy, and encourages him to attack

* Mr. Compton Mackenzie.

more freely, causing us great losses, than the losing of these trenches. Henceforth commanders who surrender these trenches, from whatever side the attack may come, before the last man is killed will be punished in the same way as if they had run away. Especially will the commanders of units told off to guard a certain front be punished if, instead of thinking about their work, supporting their units and giving information to the higher command, they only take action after a regrettable incident has taken place.

"I hope that this will not occur again. I give notice that if it does I shall carry out the punishment. I do not desire to see a blot made on the courage of our men by those who escape from the trenches to avoid the rifle and machine-gun fire of the enemy. Henceforth I shall hold responsible all officers who do not shoot with their revolvers all the privates who try to escape from the trenches on any pretext.

"Commander of the Eleventh Division,

"COLONEL RIFAAT."

To the copy from which this extract was taken the following note is appended:—

"To Commander of the First Battalion.

"The contents will be communicated to the officers, and I promise to carry out the orders till the last drop of our blood has been shed. Sign and return.

(Signed) HASSAN,

Commander, 127th Regiment."

Then follow signatures of company commanders.

SUMMARY OF THE OPERATIONS.

By the middle of July General Sir Ian Hamilton had established himself firmly on the west side of Krithia. One horn of the Achi Baba crescent had been bent right back, and the tip of the other horn opposite the French was also turned. Our line had been straightened out, and the dangerous salient in the centre of our position had disappeared. At the same time, the Australians at Gaba Tepe were firmly established and were gradually extending their lines. These were great successes, and their quality was imperfectly appreciated at home. The landing was perhaps the most brilliant ever effected by an army in the history of war. But no less remarkable were the series of operations by which we gradually crumpled up the Turkish flanking positions and formed for ourselves freedom of movement. General Hamilton was now free to begin extended operations against the Narrows defences. It was no part of his plan merely to drive the Turks back on to a second line of defences, there to repeat the same obstinate resistance that they had offered on the first line. He still clung to the idea of an enveloping movement from the north, which should cut off the Narrows forts from their supplies and so force a surrender, and spare the army the carnage of storming operations. How he proceeded to carry out this enveloping movement will be narrated in a later chapter.

THE REAL ISSUE IN THE CAMPAIGN.

If people at home were somewhat unappreciative of the greatness of these operations in the Dardanelles, the reason perhaps was that they were doubtful of the policy of attacking the Straits. Yet the defeats of the Russians in Galicia and in Poland, narrated in the following chapters, went far to justify this great enterprise in the East. Had we been able by putting our whole strength on the West to make sure of breaking through and driving the Germans over the Belgian and French frontiers, say before the winter of 1915-16, the case might perhaps have been different. For the most certain way to complete victory was the occupation of Essen and of the industrial centre of Germany in

Westphalia. Yet the events of 1915 in the West showed that there was very little chance of that, and made it seem probable that, though local advances might be attempted, the great offensive in the West could hardly begin with any reasonable prospect of success before the spring of 1916. Had there been no expedition to the Dardanelles, therefore, the alternative would have been a long period of stagnation on the West, broken only by local attacks which it hardly seemed likely that we could have carried through to a decisive result. The campaign in the Dardanelles did not subtract from what we were able to do in France; it did, however, relieve from the reproach of complete inactivity a success which would otherwise have had no positive contribution to show towards the end of the war. Nor was there any rivalry between the Eastern and Western campaigns. With the Black Sea closed, the Russian left was deprived of its natural supports, and the ports which should have been open to the export of her products and the import of arms and munitions, of which our Allies were in such need, might just as well have had no existence. Complete and decisive victory on the West was past hoping for without the assistance of the Russian millions; but the events of the summer were to make it quite clear that that assistance was not to be had until the forcing of the Dardanelles and the Bosphorus had given Russia communications with the outside world.

But there were other and even more important reasons still for the campaign in the Dardanelles. The beginning of the war had made it seem as though its principal object was the acquisition by Germany of power in the West. But as the war progressed, the scale inclined steadily to the East, and it became evident that the end of the war, as well as its origins, might have to be sought there. On the West, the last word after all was with sea-power. It was not so, necessarily, in the East. Had Germany won her great victories over Russia in the summer of 1915, and this country not taken the offensive, we should have been on the defensive in the whole of the East. What is more, the decision in the East could have been forced without victory on sea. In such a case it would have been quite sufficient for Germany to hold her own in Flanders and France; she might have forced a decision in her favour by the invasion of Egypt. The protecting desert is, after all, not an insuperable obstacle if there is time to build railways. India itself might have been threatened. That would have meant not a drawn war for this country, but crushing defeat, and that, too, without defeat at sea. Egypt was the Achilles-heel of our sea-power, and Germany knew it. It is not, therefore, too much to say that the campaign in the Dardanelles was one for the defence of our whole position in the East. The control of the Dover Straits might have been lost without our being defeated at sea or suffering any irremediable disaster. The loss of our Mediterranean communications with India would have been a far greater blow. True to the sound strategical principle by defending by attack, we were fighting in the Dardanelles for the sake of our empire in the East.

The losses of the campaign were exceedingly heavy, but they were not disproportionate to the issues involved. Was it to be supposed that the Turkish Empire would fall to the first assault? The wonder was not that the campaign lasted so long and was costly in life, but that in the face of difficulties without precedent we came so soon to within two or three small mountain ranges of decisive victory.



The German advance through Galicia: A bivouac of troops by the roadside.

[Newspaper Illustrations.]



On a Gallician road: German transports and field kitchens on the left, cavalry on the right.

[Newspaper Illustrations.]



Austrian troops, resting by the roadside after being withdrawn from the trenches, watch their German allies marching up to take their place. [Topical Press.]

CHAPTER V.

THE GERMAN RECOVERY OF GALICIA: RECAPTURE OF PRZEMYSL.

POSITION IN APRIL, 1915—THE RUSSIAN ADVANCE ON HUNGARY—COUNTER-STROKE EXPECTED—THE RUSSIAN FRONT IN WESTERN GALICIA BROKEN—MACKENSEN'S "PHALANX"—RUSSIAN STAND ON THE SAN—FALL OF PRZEMYSL.

AT the end of April, 1915, there was movement only at the extremities of the Russian front, which stretched for nearly a thousand miles from the coast of the Baltic provinces to Bukowina. In the far north a German force, consisting largely of cavalry, was raiding beyond the Niemen river for an object which, for some time, remained obscure. It was thought that it was perhaps playing a part in some larger scheme—the nature of which would only be seen later, or that it was perhaps conducting nothing more than a large foraging expedition; its real motive was apparently to create a diversion which should keep the Russians in uncertainty as to the dangers which might threaten them on their right flank and prevent them from detaching troops freely to any other quarter of the field. On the East Prussian front, further south, there was little or no movement, and in Poland itself the war had become one of positions, in which the Germans appeared to have done their worst.

In Western Galicia, also, from a few miles east of Cracow, where the Russian line ran almost due south to the crest of the Carpathians, the campaign had for months been an affair of trenches, in which neither side seemed either anxious or able to press for a decisive issue. But this part of the Russian front was of the first importance. On its stability depended the efforts

of the Carpathian armies to penetrate into Hungary. The attack on the Hungarian passes had continued from the winter into the spring, and, in spite of the utmost endeavours of the Russians, had made progress almost by inches. By the end of April the Russian forces had succeeded at last in descending from the ridge of the mountains between the Dukla Pass on the west and the Uzsok Pass towards the centre of the range, and at heavy cost they were slowly gaining ground along the upper courses of the Hungarian rivers. The most persistent attacks, however, had failed to give them possession of the Uzsok Pass itself or of the ground on either side of it. Farther east, they were either confined to the crests or, on their extreme left towards the Dniester and the Bukowina border, still held on the northern slopes. For many weeks Russia had seemed always to be on the point of breaking down the resistance of the enemy and laying her hand on the Hungarian plain. But success, however close at hand, always evaded her, and the most that could be said at the moment to which we have come was that in months of desperate and exhausting warfare the balance of advantage had been with her, and that if she found it unexpectedly difficult to achieve her purpose of invading Hungary, the Germans and Austrians could not hope to drive her back into Galicia by a frontal attack



German troops, ammunition, and baggage advancing through Galicia. [Newspaper Illustrations.]

along the way by which she had come. There was, however, another means by which that end might be attained, and the Germans proceeded to take it.


THE LINE OF COUNTER-ATTACK.

In an invasion of Austria-Hungary through Galicia the lines of attack and counter-attack are dictated clearly by the geography of the country. The invader—that is to say, Russia—has three courses open to him. He may, if he has sufficient men and is assured of the neutrality of Germany, march both on Vienna through the gap which lies between Cracow and the Carpathians, and on Hungary and Buda Pest through the main Carpathian passes. It was not open to the Russians to follow this plan, because hostile German armies lay on the flank of any advance towards Cracow. For the same reason they could not adopt the second possible course, which would have been to march past Cracow while contenting themselves to hold the line of the Carpathians as a wall against the counter-attack by which the Austrians would have struck at their lines of communication in Galicia. Anxious to overrun Hungary, and in any event controlled by the general strategical position, the Russians followed the third plan. They established the line between the Upper Vistula, near Cracow, and the Carpathians as a wall of defence, while their armies along the line of the Carpathians, which lay, roughly, at right angles to the wall, were to descend into the Hungarian valleys. This wall of defence, the preservation of which was essential to the security of the armies entering Hungary, was about fifty miles in extent. Its northern section lay along the right bank of the Dunajec river, from its junction with the Upper Vistula, down to the point near Tarnow, where the river Biala joins it. From Tarnow for some distance it ran along

the right bank of the Biala, and then, with a southeasterly trend, through Gorlice to the Carpathian ridge, some twenty miles west of the Dukla Pass. Text-books and common sense alike indicated that if this line of defence were to be battered down the Russian scheme for the invasion of Hungary must collapse—unless, of course, the Russians had taken the precaution of setting up a second line which they could hold. But this line, if it existed, must not be far behind the first, for the danger of the Russian position was that the line of defence in Western Galicia ran very nearly at right angles to the front in the Carpathians. Break down the northern line, therefore, and it was clear that some of the columns on the southern slopes of the mountains would be in serious danger. The passages of their retreat were few and narrow, and the enemy would be within a few miles of them. All these were good reasons why the Russian line in Western Galicia should be of the most formidable kind; they were reasons, too, why the Germans, following both common sense and text-books, should strike at this quarter as soon as they had decided that the time had come to strike at all. So obvious were the elements of this strategical problem that at recent Austrian manœuvres the plan of dealing with the invader, which the Austro-Germans were now to put in operation, had actually been practised.

THE GERMAN PLAN.

The Germans decided to deliver an attack on these fifty miles of Russian positions in Western Galicia. It was essential to the success of their plan that they should break the line at so many points and press the pursuit so rapidly that the Russians should not be able, after a retreat of a few miles, to call a halt, as they had done on some occasions, and then bring up their reserves and



Galicia and the Carpathian Passes.

withdraw their Carpathian columns in an orderly retirement. The moment that the main attack was seen to be succeeding, the Austrian and German armies along the Carpathians were to fasten on the troops in front of them in order to hinder their withdrawal. The faster the advance could be pressed after the line of the Dunajec and Biala had been broken, the more urgent would be the need for the Russians in the Carpathians to withdraw along the railways in Galicia which supplied their needs; the harder the Austro-German armies in the south pressed on the retreating Russians, the less would the Russian commanders be able to strengthen their forces in Western Galicia and the more numerous would be the detachments cut off in the retreat.


It would probably be inaccurate to suppose that in organising this attack the Germans had before them any larger scheme than that of driving the Russians out of Hungary and clearing Galicia. No doubt the German General Staff would have been well pleased to achieve the maximum of success at one blow, and, by completely crushing the Russian line in Western Galicia, break up the Russian armies, divide them into two sections, and deal with them separately. But with the possibility of large Russian reserves along the main railway through Galicia, this was a grandiose scheme which the Germans could scarcely at this stage have expected to carry through. Even General Staffs must wait on circumstances, and probably the Germans saw no further than the recovery of Galicia and the hope which lay beyond of striking a still heavier blow at Russia.

THE GERMAN METHOD OF ATTACK.


For the special purpose which they had in view the Germans had framed a special instrument. In the

winter they had on one occasion attacked the Russians with great force and driven them back, but after a few days the steam went out of their attack, the Russians had recoiled, and the face of the campaign had been scarcely changed. A large success was a question of surprise and speed: surprise in organising the attack with instruments and on a scale which had not been anticipated; speed in following up the blow so rapidly that a Russian recoil would be impossible. It was natural to assume that the Russians, standing on the defensive and having elaborated their positions for many months, would have a great advantage. The Germans met it by a great concentration of troops from the mouth of the Dunajec to the Carpathian heights and by assembling masses of artillery (field guns, howitzers, and the heaviest mobile guns which they possessed) at those sections of the line where they had a railway to assist them.

Once more, as so often in the Russian campaign, tactics and strategy alike depended on the railways of the country. One mass of the German artillery lay on either side of, and depended for transport on, the great trunk railway running from Cracow, through Tarnow, to Jaroslav on the San, Przemyśl, and Lemberg; another, which was assembled about Gorlice, depended on the line which runs through that place north-eastwards to the trunk line. It was the intention of the Germans with these masses of artillery to breach the Russian lines as though they were the walls of a besieged town, and then hurl their troops into the breach. The Russians being thus driven to retreat, the guns would be pushed forward along the railway on which they depended, together with ample supplies of shells, and when the Russians attempted to make a stand the breaching



Naphtha mines fired by the Russians on their retreat to prevent them falling into the possession of the advancing Austrians. [Topical Press.



A factory wrecked by the Russians to prevent its being any use to the Germans. [Photopress.



A Russian commander watching the progress of the battle from outside his dug-out.

[Record Press.]

operation was to be repeated. The execution of this stroke, in devising which the Germans utilised the experience that they had gained during their massed attacks on the Ypres and Warsaw lines, was entrusted to General von Mackensen, who in the winter had commanded the Germans in the great Battle of Lodz.

THE OPENING OF THE ATTACK.

The work began on the night of May 1st. The Staff reports of that day gave no inkling of the imminent attack. They were composed of the usual catalogue of insignificant advances and retreats at different parts of the front, and it is a curious point that one of the foreign correspondents, writing on the prospect in Western Galicia at this time, remarked that the scouting by airmen was so efficient on both sides as to preclude all possibility of a surprise. Surprise, however, there was. On the Saturday night and throughout Sunday the Germans maintained a bombardment of unprecedented violence. At least fifteen hundred guns were concentrated against two corps under General Radko Dimitrieff. In an explanation of the retreat which the Russian Staff issued at a later date, they declared that at the height of the bombardment, immediately before an assault was delivered, the Germans discharged 700,000 shells in four

hours—"double what is necessary for a six-months' siege of a great and well-provisioned fortress"—and that another 700,000 were held in readiness for the development of the attack. "Generally speaking," says the report, "the enemy uses in an attack on our positions ten projectiles of medium calibre, weighing over eight hundred pounds, against each of our riflemen holding a space of about a yard on the front of our trenches. . . . In presence of such a violence of fire, without speaking of serious losses, all within the sphere of its action became more or less bruised or stupefied."

The Germans brought to the attack the use of stratagems which they had carefully prepared during the preceding weeks, and of which one instance may be given. Part of Mackensen's left wing was to cross the Dunajec a few miles south of its junction with the Vistula. Here the banks were high, and the Russians had excellent positions for their guns, so that the Germans were in great difficulties as to how they might bridge the river. What they did was to dig an excavation some distance from the bank of the river, and then to bore huge tunnels towards it. In these they laid railway tracks, put their pontoon boats on wheels and collected them on the light railways in the tunnels. When the appointed night came they suddenly blew up the ends



Transporting German high-explosive shells in wicker baskets.

[Photopress.]

of the tunnels close to the river, cleared out the débris and launched the boats—of which there were twenty, already filled with men—and at the same time protected the movement by a violent bombardment. Of the twenty boats, nine were sunk. The others reached the eastern bank of the river, and, succeeding in carrying the first line of the enemy's positions, gave time for larger forces to cross.

THE RUSSIAN LINE BROKEN.

The result was decisive. Dimitrieff's army was shattered, and at the close of the attack was in full flight towards the east. The German report referred ominously to the "portions of the enemy's army which were able to escape." Over 20,000 prisoners had been captured, and there was little chance of stemming the retreat short of the line of the San river, although vigorous rearguard actions were fought at intermediate positions.

The immediate and striking success of the German attack was everywhere unexpected. The likelihood of an onslaught in Western Galicia had been foreseen for weeks by military critics. Its preparation had been mentioned in war correspondents' telegrams, and the Russian Staff afterwards announced that it had been well aware of the stroke which was about to fall. "From the middle of April," they said, "news began to reach us of the transport in great numbers of German troops from the western front and of their concentration in Western Galicia. The state of affairs thus created obliged us to stop the development of our advance in the direction

of Mezo Laborcz (Hungary) and Uzsock in order not to extend our movements too far, and to ensure ourselves facilities for sending available reserves to the threatened section of our front." It was found, however, that General Ivanoff, the commander of the Galician group of armies, had neither left General Dimitrieff with sufficient men nor had retained a large enough reserve.

Even the Germans, though they were naturally interested in ascribing the credit for the victory to the superiority of their men and guns, cast round for some reason to explain the weakness of Dimitrieff's army, and some of them evolved the fanciful theory that he had been made the victim of jealous rivals on the General Staff. There is no reason to doubt that the explanation which was offered in Austria was the true one, and that Dimitrieff's army had been dangerously weakened and the general reserves drained away by the demands of the Carpathian fighting, especially in the prolonged and unsuccessful struggle for the Uzsock Pass. The Russian generals had trusted too much in the power of the defensive and of the works, in themselves not unformidable, which had been constructed on the Dunajec and the Biala. Their Intelligence Department, also, had failed to warn them of the character of the attack which was preparing for them. Concentration of guns is comparatively easy to conceal, but the experience both of the Japanese campaign and of some of the earlier battles in this war—that of Tannenberg and the defeat of the Tenth Army on the borders of East Prussia—have shown that the intelligence system is a weak spot in the Russian armour.

THE "PHALANX."

Some fifteen miles east of Gorlice the Russians made a stand on the Wisloka river, but they were driven back again by Mackensen's artillery, to which they frankly owned their inferiority. Here the so-called "phalanx," moving along the railway towards the trunk line in the north, was in operation. Perhaps the more accurate analogy would have been with the battering-ram, for the core of the "phalanx" was a mass of guns which followed the railway and at intervals breached the enemy's defences. Where the Russians had torn up the railway the Germans relaid it at the rate of about four miles a day.

A week after their first defeat, the Russians made an effort to hold back the pursuit. At three points—just south of the Upper Vistula, across the Lemberg railway, about half-way between Cracow and the San, and across the line which runs along the southern Galician slopes—they made a stubborn resistance, and then fell back towards Przemyśl and the San, where it was thought that reserves would be available and the retreat might definitely be stayed. It was noted, as an indication of the shock which Dimitrieff's army had suffered, that at one place prisoners were captured who belonged to five separate divisions. On May 14th the Russians deployed on the line of the San, and the campaign entered on its second phase. Their retreat had led to a corresponding withdrawal of their forces immediately on the other side of the Vistula, which had been outflanked by the advancing Germans.

THE CARPATHIAN ARMIES.

The battle in Western Galicia had reacted immediately on the campaign in the mountains. The Russians who were south of the Dukla Pass, in the upper valleys of the Ondawa and Laborcz rivers, hastened to extricate themselves, and the Austro-German armies along a hun-

dred miles of front hotly attacked them. The whole front south of the Vistula was engaged. Germans and Austrians combined had recently had in the east some forty-one corps, of which twenty-six were engaged in the Galician fighting. To these were now added some units which had been transferred from the West—the active Guard Army Corps, the Forty-first Reserve Army Corps, the Eleventh Bavarian New Division, and the 119th New Division (their places being taken in the West by other troops). There were also newly-trained


Austrian divisions and some from the Serbian front, so that in all the Austro-Germans probably numbered thirty-five corps, or nearly a million and a half of men.

In less than a week after the opening attack the passes were again in German hands, and the Russians had entirely evacuated Hungary. The keystone had been pulled out of the arch. Almost in a single day they had lost all that they had gained in so many laborious months. The retirement through the passes was not made without heavy loss. The Germans, pushing eagerly eastwards, came after a few days on the Russian columns still marching up through the Dukla Pass. One division, that of General Korniloff, was entirely surrounded, but managed eventually to cut its way through at heavy cost. The extent of the Russian losses during these days is not exactly known, but it was inevitable that they

should be very heavy; had it not been for the Russian resistance on the Wisloka and the Upper San, they must have been much worse than in fact they were.

RUSSIAN OFFENSIVE IN EASTERN GALICIA.

The Russians attempted to relieve the situation by opening a vigorous offensive in Eastern Galicia. They succeeded in inflicting a check on the army of General von Linsingen in the Carpathian foothills, and a severe defeat on that of General von Pflanzer, which lay further



The German loop round Przemyśl.



The recapture of Przemyśl: The entry of the Austro-German troops.

[Newspaper Illustrations.]



Inside one of the recaptured forts at Przemyśl.

[Topical Press]

to the east, along the Dniester river and the borders of Bukowina. The attack was pressed for several days, and Pflanzer was finally driven southwards over the River Pruth, with a loss of twenty thousand men. This success was without any effect on the general military situation. If its object was to divert troops from the onslaught in Galicia, it failed. The Austrians were hard beset; they pressed into the firing line even sappers, railway guards, and the like, but nothing was done to weaken the main attack, and the scene of operations was much too far removed from the lines of communication of the main Galician armies to cause them inconvenience. It was not essential to the Germans at this moment that the Russians should be driven out of Eastern Galicia; their calculation was that everything would come in good time if they succeeded in making steady progress in Northern Galicia from west to east.

THE POSITIONS IN THE MIDDLE OF MAY.

When the second stage of the campaign opened the Austro-German armies held the following positions:—North of the Upper Vistula, and pressing the Russians in their retreat from Kielce, was General von Woyrsch, with three army corps. South of the Vistula, facing the Lower San up to Przemyśl, was Mackensen, with ten corps under his command; of these, five were led by the Austrian Archduke, Joseph Ferdinand, and were posted to the west and south of Przemyśl. South and south-east of the fortress, and pushing up towards it, was Boehm-Ermolli's Austrian army of five corps; its mission was to attack from the south the railway connecting with Lemberg, and join hands with Mackensen if he succeeded in his plan of coming down upon the line from the north-east. Between them these three were to surround and capture Przemyśl. Next in order, and covering the country as far as the marshes lying to the south of the Dniester river, was General von Marwitz; beyond him, Linsingen on the Dniester; and farthest to the east, Pflanzer. Each of these had about five corps, making in all some thirty-five engaged in the great attack.

The Russians had taken up their positions on the San river on May 14th. On the 15th they withdrew from Jaroslav, which lies on the west bank, and on the next day Mackensen delivered his attack. It was directed at a small section of the Russian line, and it achieved an immediate success. Jaroslav and its bridgehead were seized, and farther to the north bridges were thrown over the river on a section about twelve miles long. The forces which had crossed established themselves firmly, and for the next four days they extended their foothold gradually towards the east. At the same time, the army to the south-east of Przemyśl began to deliver a series of violent attacks on the Russian positions. The encircling movement was in progress. Between Jaroslav and Przemyśl the Russians still held both banks of the San, and, north of the narrow strip where the Germans had crossed, they were on the western bank.

The question was now whether the Russians, having failed to hold the line of the San at a most important point, would be able to dislodge the Germans either by frontal attack or by coming down from the north on the rear of the columns which had crossed. There was no time to be lost, and their first effort was made at once. They delivered a counter-attack in Southern Poland against the army of Von Woyrsch, and drove him back ten miles. At the same time they sought to enlarge the ground which they held on Mackensen's flank in the apex of the triangle made by the junction of the

Vistula and the San. Mackensen was compelled both to send some troops across the Vistula to the aid of Von Woyrsch and to front north-east to face the pressure on his flank. But he held up the attack successfully, and by May 20th saw his way clear to carry his plans a stage further. For the next four days he made no attack on the Russian positions, but sundry movements in a southerly and south-easterly direction were observed to be taking place in his army. The Russians believed that he had been reduced to the defensive, and might even be meditating a partial retirement. He was, in fact, preparing to make the final onslaught over the San river, both north and south of Jaroslav. While his army was changing front, he brought up further supplies of munitions and arrayed again the famous "phalanx" for the new attack. By this time he had constructed no less than fifteen bridges over the San in the few miles which he held north of Jaroslav.

On May 24th he struck again. He attacked the Russian positions on the west of the river between Jaroslav and Przemyśl, and, while aiming at breaking them down, sought also to outflank them on the north by pushing his advance south-east of Jaroslav. The Russian reports pointed out the similarity of this manoeuvre to that which Mackensen had almost succeeded in carrying out during the great battle of Lodz in November. Against the Russian western positions, on a front of fifteen miles, were brought up "hundreds of thousands of infantry, supported by a thousand guns of various calibre, well supplied with munitions." The onslaught was again successful. The ground west of the San being cleared of Russians, the Germans advanced a further stage towards the complete envelopment of the fortress. On the south the loop was tightened after an artillery bombardment which the Russians described as "a perfect hurricane of artillery fire." By this time the attacking forces were within about six miles of the railway on the north and on the south, and it was obvious that only a miracle could prevent the fall of Przemyśl. The Russians had, however, decided long before to abandon it, and had been busy since the first defeat in Western Galicia in clearing it of its munitions and stores. They were not yet ready, however, to abandon the forts, and they offered a fierce resistance to the attack which Mackensen, the Archduke, and his neighbour to the right pressed day after day with increasing violence.

A BLOW AT THE GERMAN FLANK.

Not only so, but the Russians delivered a last counter-attack. North and east of Sieniawa, a few miles north of Jaroslav, they drove the Germans back with heavy losses, and for a moment seemed likely to threaten the success of Mackensen's plans, for they were, as their report announced, "behind General Mackensen's army." Only a few miles separated them from the first of the bridges by which he supplied his troops lying in the restricted area across the San, and popular report in Russia had it at the time that some of the bridges had actually come under the Russian fire. It was not so, and the Germans escaped with a loss of seven thousand men and a dozen guns. It was a small price to pay for the success of their main plans, but there can be little doubt that the Russians were at this time almost within reach of a large success, and that if they could have thrown into the scale a few more well-armed divisions, Mackensen's plan might have ended in disaster. The question was merely whether the Russians could put sufficient extra pressure on his flank and rear to

make him withdraw his troops from across the San, or to isolate them where they lay on the eastern bank; or whether, on the contrary, Mackensen could hold up the attack from Sieniawa with such satisfaction to himself as to press on with his southerly thrust towards the rear of Przemysl. So soon as the Lemberg railway was under German fire, the troops and guns within the large loop which the Russians were at present holding would be lost. Mackensen held to his plans. He held off the attack on the north and his bridges remained safe. He pushed forward a short distance further towards the railway, while on the south, after days of incessant fighting, the railway line was at last coming within range of the Austrian guns. All that remained for the Russians was to straighten out their line and to withdraw their troops from the Przemysl salient with as little loss as possible.

FALL OF PRZEMYSL.

On May 30th the last stage of the attack on Przemysl was reached. While the Germans on north and south, who were well aware that the evacuation of the place was being systematically carried out by day and night, sought to complete their lines of encirclement, Mackensen brought up 16-inch guns on the west and north-west and opened an attack on the defences of the fortress. The result was not for a moment in doubt. The forts of Przemysl, especially on the front which was now attacked, had been systematically demolished by the Austrian General, Kusmanek, before he surrendered on March 22nd, and the Russians had had no time to restore them. But as they were not able, so neither was it any part of their plans, to attempt a prolonged resistance to a siege train; their object was to hold back the Germans sufficiently long to enable them to withdraw their troops and guns.

In the night of May 30th-31st the Germans gained a footing in part of the western defences, but were driven out. On May 31st they captured three of the northern forts, and on the following day two more. In the night of June 2nd-3rd the Russians withdrew their troops from the western and northern positions, the besiegers became masters of all the remaining fortifications, and early in the morning of June 3rd Przemysl was once more in their hands. During all this time the Russians delivered incessant and violent attacks against the encircling forces on both sides of the railway. An official Russian explanation of the evacuation of Przemysl was published a little later:—

"As Przemysl, in view of the state of its artillery and of its works, which were destroyed by the Austrians before the capitulation, was recognised as incapable of defending itself, its maintenance in our hands only served our purpose so long as our possession of the positions surrounding the town on the north-west facilitated our operations on the San.

"When the enemy captured Jaroslav and Radymno, and began to spread along the right bank of that river, the maintenance of the said positions forced our troops to fight on an unequal and very difficult front, increasing it by thirty-five verst (twenty-two miles), and subjecting the troops occupying these positions to the concentrated fire of the enemy's numerous heavy guns.

"Consequently we had for some time been proceeding with a gradual removal from this point of various material which we had taken from the Austrians. This having been completed, we removed on June 2nd the last batteries, and the following night, in conformity with orders received, evacuated on the north and west fronts the positions surrounding Przemysl, and formed on the east a more concentrated force."

The recovery of Przemysl was a substantial military achievement for the Germans, but the orderly evacuation was very creditable to the Russian commanders. The Germans captured with the fortress neither men, nor guns, nor supplies; all had been removed. This had only been made possible by the resistance which the Russian army had offered for a full fortnight on the San and in front of the Lemberg railway, and which had been broken down by the same concentration of men and guns on a narrow front which had led to the first collapse in Western Galicia. The second phase of the retreat was now over. The line of the San had gone, and it was becoming more and more doubtful whether Eastern Galicia and Lemberg could be held. Preparations were already begun to evacuate Lemberg, and to throw up defences against the advance northwards which was expected to follow if Lemberg should be lost.

THE TWO SIDES.


The Russians had suffered a very severe defeat during this month, but they had averted a disaster. They had succeeded in withdrawing the great bulk of their forces from the Carpathians and had kept their armies together; they had reduced Przemysl to the condition of an empty shell before abandoning it; they had gained a breathing space for themselves, and they had from time to time hit the enemy hard. Their soldiers had fought most gallantly against very heavy odds. In artillery they were outmatched. On the Dunajec and Biala, in the rearguard actions on the railways leading to the San, in the first crossing of the river, in the onslaught against the positions north of Przemysl and in the final bombardment of the forts, the Germans were carried to victory by the hurricane attack of their heavy guns. It was foolishly said at the time that the German soldier could no longer fight without the protection of a great array of guns. This was, of course, untrue; seldom had the German soldier had bitterer fighting to go through than during this month in Galicia. But it is true that without the special weapon which the German commanders had devised for him he would probably not have made this march to Przemysl. That it gained so decisive a victory in Galicia, as compared with the moderate success which similar artillery concentrations won in the west when employed either by the Germans or the Allies, was due to the inferior resources of the Russians; their guns and their numbers alike were less than those employed on the western front, and their defensive system was less powerful. The Russians were in a difficult position. They had to hold a line almost a thousand miles in length, and, as they said themselves, they could not be equally strong at all points. A great advantage lay with the side that held the initiative. In the spring the Russians had had it. They gathered their strength for a blow against Hungary, but the enterprise had small success; the enemy and the mountains had been too much for them. Then the initiative passed to the Germans, and when they struck in overwhelming force they found that the Russians were weak at a vital point of their line.

THE LOSSES.

Of the extent of the casualties on either side it is impossible to speak with certainty. The Germans and Austrians stated that during the month of May they took close on 270,000 prisoners, 250 guns, and nearly 600 machine-guns in the south-eastern area alone, and that


of these Mackensen's captures accounted for 150,000 prisoners, 160 guns, and 400 machine-guns. A single Austrian army was declared to have taken over 81,000 rounds of artillery ammunition, five and a half million cartridges, 32,000 rifles, and 21,000 swords and bayonets. If it is impossible to accept these figures, neither is it possible to reject them outright, in view of all the circumstances of the defeat and the far-reaching and long-continued retirement which was its consequence. Every retreat means a large continuous wastage, especially when positions have to be held to the end in order

to secure the safety of the main body. On their side the Germans undoubtedly suffered severely, though nothing like so much as the Russians. The Russians claimed 40,000 prisoners during the first three weeks of the month, and asserted that in the early days of the campaign the Germans had lost "several tens of thousands" daily, and had, in all, been weakened to the extent of a fourth or even a third of their total strength. However this may be, the Germans had gained a great advantage, which, unless it could be checked, threatened disaster to Russia's military fortunes.



One of the blown-up bridges at Przemyśl.

[Topical Press.



A foot-bridge built by the Germans in their advance. [Newspaper Illustrations.



Russian prisoners in Galicia, proceeding to the rear under escort, meet German reserve troops on their way to the trenches. [Central News.



At the heels of the Russians: Tyrolean cavalry riding in pursuit of the Russian rear-guard.

[Topical Press.]

CHAPTER VI.

THE AUSTRO-GERMAN RECOVERY OF LEMBERG.

POSITION AFTER THE RECOVERY OF PRZEMYSL—ATTACK ON THE LINE OF THE DNIESTER—THE GRODEK LINES—THE DNIESTER CROSSED—SUCCESSFUL RUSSIAN COUNTER-ATTACK—MACKENSEN'S ADVANCE—GRODEK LINES TAKEN—FALL OF LEMBERG.

IT was about this time that the Germans introduced some of their barbarous devices on the eastern front. On the Dniester they used projectors of liquid fire, and poisonous gases were employed in some of the attacks in front of Warsaw. The users of gas, however, must have found their weapon disappointing. Towards the end of May, during the night, large volumes of it were set rolling towards the Russian trenches. So lavish was the use that the fumes were felt twenty miles behind the Russian lines: women and children, horses used in transport service, cattle in the country, and even fowls were said to have been destroyed. But the Russians in the trenches, warned by the experiences of the western front, were better prepared than the Germans had anticipated. When the infantry attack following on the cloud of gas was made it was received with an unexpectedly violent reply from rifles and machine guns, and, while the Germans were still hesitating, fresh reserves arrived in the Russian trenches with muffled faces and, charging out, drove the attackers back. On one section of the front the breeze changed suddenly, and the gas was driven back again into the German trenches. The Germans who were not suffocated fled over open ground, and were the mark for Russian fire.

THE THIRD PHASE.

After the fall of Przemyśl the Galician campaign entered on its third phase. Lemberg was now to be recovered. On the left flank of the Germans, protecting

the movements of their main forces against the Russians, who still occupied a threatening position between the Vistula and the San, was the Archduke Joseph Ferdinand. South of his army, lying to the north of the Przemyśl-Lemberg railway, was Mackensen, and linked up with him to the south of the railway, and as far as the Dniester marshes, was Boehm-Ermolli, together with Marwitz. Next in order from the Dniester marshes came Linsingen's army, holding positions south-east and south-west of Stryj, on the river of that name, and threatening Lemberg by a direct approach from the south. Beyond Linsingen the line tailed off south-eastward towards Bukowina.

The base of the Russian positions was Lemberg—the capital of Galicia and the centre of the railways of the country. The Russian front might be regarded as in four sections. On the far right was the army between the Vistula and the San, which might threaten the advance of the whole of the Austro-German forces along the northern railway to Lemberg. Facing Mackensen and Boehm-Ermolli, in front of Przemyśl, lay the bulk of the Russian army. The third section held the Upper Dniester, south of Lemberg; a fourth covered the lower stretches of the river in Eastern Galicia.

THE NEW POSITION.

Hitherto the main thrust of the Germans had been from west to east. Automatically by its success the Russians had been forced to retreat through all the western and central passes of the Carpathians. The



An abandoned Russian trench, showing the effect of the German high-explosive shells.


[Newspaper Illustrations.]

position was now somewhat changed. From Przemyśl to Lemberg is a distance of about sixty miles. From Lemberg southwards towards Stryj was only forty. The Germans would therefore achieve their object more easily if, by advancing over the shorter road from Stryj to Lemberg, they could compel the main Russian forces facing them along the Przemyśl-Lemberg line to fall back than if they adopted the converse plan. There were two further advantages about this course. In the first place, the less heavy fighting Mackensen had to do the better would he and the Archduke be able to push out north-eastwards and remove the very real danger on their left flank. Secondly, if Linsingen's army, by advancing from Stryj, could force the passage of the Dniester south and south-east of Lemberg, they would have placed themselves in the rear of the Grodek lines, which were the most formidable obstacle that an enemy had to meet in attacking Lemberg from the west. These lines, which were a little more than fifteen miles to the west of Lemberg, stretched for almost fifty miles north and south. Beginning in the region of the Dniester marshes, they consisted of a chain of river and lake and swamp, and, like the similar districts of East Prussia and the Russian province adjoining it, were thought, if vigorously defended, to be almost impregnable. The Austrians had prepared them mainly for defence against an enemy approaching from the east; but for the most part the strength of the lines lay in natural obstacles which could be as well defended from one side as from the other, and the Russians had had nearly nine months in which to add art to nature. There

was good reason why the German commanders, at the moment when they knew Przemyśl was about to fall into their hands, had opened up a great attack on the passages of the Dniester between Stryj and Lemberg.

LINSINGEN'S SUCCESSES.

About the end of May the Germans had brought up large numbers of fresh troops and guns into the Stryj district, and a sudden attack delivered under the command of the Bavarian general, Count Bothmer, broke and drove back the Russians. This was a repetition on a smaller scale of the success which in the north had accompanied Mackensen's sudden blows. The Germans first of all pursued the retreating Russians along the main road and railway to Lemberg, which cross the Dniester at the fortified position of Mikolajow, and to the west of it. It was not, however, their intention to attempt a crossing of the river at this point. The Dniester marshes were close to their left hand, and Mikolajow itself was a strong point from which the Russians would have been able to resist attack. As soon, therefore, as they had disposed of the enemy to the north-west of Stryj, the main part of Linsingen's army turned along the two roads running north-east towards the Dniester below Mikolajow. A special reason for this diversion of their line of advance lay in the character of the country on the north bank of the river. Opposite Zurawno, the point at which their attack was now to be aimed, and which lay about twenty-five miles below Mikolajow, there was a thick forest coming down close to the river bank. The German calculation was





A Polish town under German occupation.

[Newspaper Illustrations.]

that the forest would prevent the Russians planting their guns in good positions to prevent the rapid crossing of the river at the points where pontoon bridges were to be thrown over it. On the 3rd and 4th of June the Germans delivered attacks both at this place and at others farther to the south. These were repulsed, but on the 6th the bridgehead at Zurawno was captured, and strong forces were thrown across the river. Russian counter-attacks failed, and Linsingen's troops, spreading northwards, soon reached and cut the railway which ran along the northern bank of the river and served the Russian line of communication. At the same time German forces farther to the south-east pushed up towards the north, and approached the river at points from which they might be able to support the troops who were already across.

Linsingen's advance was threatening, and on June 8th strong Russian reserves were brought south from Lemberg. In front of Mikolajow, where the Russians still held their ground south of the river, they drove the Germans back. North of the river, on the Zurawno front, they pushed them first from the railway towards the river and then back to the southern side, when they retook Zurawno. It was the most substantial success that they obtained in the Galician campaign; in three days they took over 15,000 prisoners and nearly a hundred guns and machine-guns. They were not able to push their victory further, but it was no part of their plans to attempt a large offensive south of the Dniester. Such strength as they could spare for anything beyond the maintenance of the river line was likely to be required to meet a violent attack in the north so soon as it was apparent that the advance on the Dniester line had failed.

MACKENSEN MOVES AGAIN.

The attack soon came. For some days there had been stubborn fighting a few miles east of Przemyśl, in which

the Germans had made only slow progress, but on June 12th Mackensen made a great assault along forty miles of the Russian front, and met with complete success. The Russians fell back towards the northern half of the Grodek lines, and their forces on the south retired simultaneously before Boehm-Ermolli. At the same time the Archduke Joseph Ferdinand, guarding Mackensen's flank, pushed out towards the north-east, and the Russian armies both on the Lower San and across the Vistula withdrew before him. The Russians had lost their chance of striking at Mackensen's flank and rear. On June 17th the German armies stood before the Grodek lines and were threatening already to outflank them on the north.

The position of the Russians, in spite of their gallant resistance and their constant counter-attacks, had become very difficult. They were fighting day after day with inferior forces, and yet the enemy were bringing into the field troops which had not before appeared on the eastern front. It had been so in the Battle of Stryj, and again in the heavy fighting which broke down the Russian resistance east of Przemyśl. The Russian infantry, on the other hand, were becoming worn out. The Russians themselves described how in the region of Lubaczow (east of the San), when their infantry had been exhausted by four days' heavy fighting cavalry had been ordered to charge the German infantry. The exploit was no doubt a gallant one, but its necessity illustrates the straits to which, at least in this quarter of the field, the Russian troops had now been reduced.

THE GRODEK LINES CARRIED.

It was perhaps the strain on the Russian army, due both to the lack of reserves and to the deficiency in artillery (which threw an excessive amount of work on the men) that led to the immediate loss of the Grodek lines. On the 17th an attack on the southern part of the position was repulsed, but on the 19th the attack was general.

It began in the early morning, and by the afternoon twenty miles of the northern positions had been carried. As a consequence, the southern half of the line could not hold out against the Austrian attack. At the same time the Russians withdrew from all the positions on the south side of the Dniester which they had held so stubbornly since the end of May.

The Grodek lines had fallen with unexpected quickness, and it seems likely that after the failure of their prolonged efforts against Mackensen the Russians decided that Grodek could not be defended, and that it would be better to husband their strength for another stand in defence of the Lublin-Cholm railway, which was certain to be attacked after the fall of Lemberg. Their troops were weary, and Lemberg, they knew, had already been cleared of munitions and supplies, so that it could as well be surrendered now as later. They had also to consider that the Germans might succeed in working round from the north to the rear of the Grodek positions, and that at this time it was a less evil to sacrifice a good defensive position than to lose an army in defence of it.

The fall of Grodek meant the loss of Lemberg, which promptly followed. On June 21st the Austrians reached the railway south of Lemberg, and on the next day they carried all the Russian positions down to Mikolajow on the Dniester. On the same day the Russian positions to the west and north-west of Lemberg were captured. The attacking forces passed round to the east, and the city fell into their hands.

The hard fighting that went on during part of this time far down the Dniester had no effect on the major operations. More than seventy miles below Mikolajow the Austrians crossed the Dniester near Nizniow, where there are deep windings in the river.

"The Dniester in this region follows a most erratic course. A rectangle fifteen miles long, in the direction of the general course of the Dniester, and seven miles wide, encloses over fifty miles of stream. The larger bends are to the south, with narrow necks of land between sharp curves to the north. In these narrow necks the Russians placed adequate containing forces."*

North of Nizniow the Russians annihilated the enemy who had crossed; to the south of it they drove him back so impetuously that he could not destroy his bridges, and the pursuing Cossacks crossed over close behind him.

FIRING THE OIL-FIELDS.

It had been counted among the successes gained by Russia that since September, 1914, she had deprived the Central Empires of the rich Galician oil fields, and when, in May, 1915, the Austrians came back to recover their own the Russian armies destroyed as much of the oil-fields as the circumstances of the retreat allowed. It was a great deal, though probably not as much as the Russians hoped and the Austrians feared. One who witnessed the Russian retreat, the northward march of the crowds of refugees and the beginning of the fires, thus described the scene:—

"As dusk came on I became aware of something on the horizon to the south—a lurid glare which tinged the sky with crimson. It flickered and went out, appeared again, and columns like tongues of fire shot up from the earth. 'They are burning,' said a Cossack to his mate as he galloped by; 'our brothers will leave them nothing.' The naphtha fields at the foot of the Carpathians were burning, and the contents of oil tanks, refineries, and six square miles of wells were going up to heaven in shafts of flame

and columns of smoke. Two huge smoky coils rose up to the clouds, closing up above into a gigantic arch. Within the arch tongues of fire shot up from the oil wells, rising and falling, lighting up the vault of heaven with a flickering glare. A veritable inferno! and hundreds of thousands of pounds of capital were going into the air. But it is war, and all obstacles must be put in the way of the enemy.

"Next morning the road was packed with refugees moving northwards. Some of them came from the scene of the burning oil wells. One peasant told me that for twelve hours he had been rained upon by oily rain. The reservoirs and underground tanks had been blown up by dynamite; dense clouds of smoke had risen up in coils, forming huge banks of soot up in the sky. Every now and then some unburnt gas escaping from the ground would explode in the air with a loud rumble, and a flash, like lightning, would light up the whole sky. This was the flicker that I had seen the night before. The whole countryside, he said, was turned into a black inferno. The trees, budding with the green shoots of spring, were blighted with an inky film; horses, cattle, ducks, and geese fled wildly from the scene of terror. I looked southwards, in the direction pointed by my narrator, and there I beheld a huge bank of smoke drifting slowly northwards in the south wind. All that day and the next it lay over Lemberg like a thunder-cloud, and the inhabitants of the town had to use candles and lamps at mid-day.

"All along the road I met large numbers of Ruthenian peasants from the Carpathians, who were pouring northwards with wives, families, and household goods in creaking waggons. Though they were flying before an army and had left behind all that they possessed, and though many of them had seen the terrors of a burning oil-field, still there was a look on all these peasants' faces as if they were only going to the weekly market. Their household goods consisted of a large painted chest, in which were packed crockery, linen, and sacred pictures. Outside the city of Lemberg they camped in the open fields, and here I witnessed a seething mass—boxes, bundles, babies, wives, and waggons. Those who had food ate it and passed on to the Russian frontier. Those who were penniless and had no food stayed and got something from the soup kitchens which had been provided by the Polish municipal authorities."

THE AUSTRIAN ARMIES.

The Galician campaign showed how exaggerated had been the reports of the demoralisation of the Austrian armies, which were based on the earlier Russian successes and the surrender of Przemyśl. The Austrians, as it proved, had suffered comparatively little from the heterogeneous composition of their forces, and, to judge from all the available evidence, Poles, Italians, and Roumanians did their duty no less bravely than the Hungarians. The Czechs, the Slav inhabitants of Bohemia, gave serious trouble. They did not forget their feud with Austria nor their nationalist aspirations, and in the Galician fighting some of them went over to the Russians. The 28th Infantry Regiment was disbanded on this account. On the whole, the Austrian army gave a good account of itself. Nor is this to be ascribed simply to its being "stiffened" by the admixture of Germans, though it is true that it could make little headway against the Russians by itself, and that its recovery was made under German leadership and side by side with large masses of German troops. The truth is that the modern armies of millions cannot be demoralised nor made to crumble away any more easily than they can be surrounded or broken through. They suffer the heaviest blows, lose whole army corps, retreat over a vast front, yet their numbers are so great, the organisation so elaborate, the means of reinforcing them so many and varied, that while the contemporary observer continually announces their approaching end, they are found to be yet far from

* *Morning Post* Petrograd message.

the end of their resources, and able, perhaps, if the turn of fortune favours them, to renew the struggle with some hope of victory.

A NOTE OF DISCONTENT IN RUSSIA.

While the Germans were on their way to Lemberg the first slight evidence developed that there was some little discontent in Russia at the supposed failure of the Western Allies to take their fair share in the attack. A semi-official statement was issued in Petrograd, which remarked that the position of Russia was many times better than that of France when the Germans were in the very heart of the country and under the walls of Paris. It added: "In that period, when our foe was occupied on the west front, we successfully developed our advance. Now it is the turn of our Allies." This was not a pronouncement of the Russian Staff, but apparently a hint of the Government that England and France might be expected to take advantage of Germany being so involved with Russia and strike a blow which would lead to an advance in the west and thereby quickly relieve the strain on Russia and the east. A Petrograd newspaper followed up the hint by suggesting that thirty per cent of the German forces in the west, as they stood in the middle of April, had been withdrawn for use

against the Russians. This was quite inaccurate. It was only known with certainty that two or three corps had been withdrawn, but it was also known that their places had been filled by an equivalent number of fresh men. It was not, of course, unnatural that there should be some such feeling as this in Russia, which saw herself made the target of a tremendous and sustained attack, while, except for the long French offensive round Arras, there was comparative inactivity in the west.

After the capture of Lemberg the Germans did not proceed at once to clear the whole of Galicia. North of Lemberg they followed the Russians up to the River Bug; to the south they drove them back to the Zlota Lipa. These two rivers, whose sources are close to each other, gave the Russians a fairly straight front from north to south, and left a long and narrow strip of Galicia in their hands. This was of no great military importance to the enemy, and could be neglected by them for the present. For the Austro-German armies were now to take up the plan which Austria had had before her at the beginning of the war. They intended to move into the country east of the Vistula, and they would then combine with the German armies of the north in executing a great strategic scheme against the main Russian armies and all their positions southwards from the Baltic.



Men of a Landsturm regiment repairing a Polish road in order to facilitate the German advance.

[Newspaper Illustrations.]

The Manchester Guardian
HISTORY
of the
WAR




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GENERAL SARRAIL, in command of French Troops at the Dardanelles.

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


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
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
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
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
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The launching of the War Loan: The platform at the great Guildhall meeting in support of the new loan. Mr. Asquith is seen speaking, and Mr. Bonar Law is on his left, next to the Lord Mayor of London, who presided.

[Central News.]

CHAPTER IX.

THE FINANCE OF THE WAR.

ESTIMATES OF THE TOTAL COST OF THE WAR—THE GOVERNMENT'S FINANCIAL POLICY—THE WAR LOAN—MR. McKENNA'S WAR BUDGET—THE FINANCE OF THE ALLIES AND OF GERMANY.

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THE cost of the war to Great Britain has risen steadily. For the 240 war days of the financial year 1914-15 it averaged 1·7 millions daily. From April 1st, 1915, to the end of June it averaged 2·7 millions a day; from July 1st to July 17th, 3 millions; from July 17th to September 11th, over 3½ millions. These figures, of course, include the ordinary peace expenditure on armaments as well as the extraordinary war expenditure. In moving a Vote of Credit for 250 millions on September 15th, Mr. Asquith estimated the weekly average gross expenditure until the third week of February at 35 millions, or 5 millions a day. It would seem that the expenditure had been abnormally heavy during the last stages of the period under review owing to three causes:—Repayments to the Bank of England exceeding 50 millions, big advances to Allies and other associates, considerable purchases of food-stuffs and raw materials. Apart from these perhaps extraordinary factors, the increased daily expenditure has been chiefly due to the higher cost of the army and of munitions. In September the army, including muni-

tions, absorbed 60 millions, or 2 millions a day. The cost of the navy rose steadily till the end of June, but has been declining since, and from September the daily cost was £600,000.

The vote of credit for 250 millions which the House of Commons passed on September 15th was the seventh since the outbreak of war. There were three in the financial year ending March 1st, 1915, amounting to 362 millions, and the four in the current year amounted to 900 millions, bringing the total since the beginning of the war to 1,262 millions. Mr. Asquith estimated that these votes would last until the third week in November, or less than sixteen months of war. The Prime Minister gave some details of actual realised expenditure in the current financial year up to the time of his statement. Between April 1st and September 11th the army cost 374 millions; repayments to the Bank of England amounted to 50 millions (mostly made up of loans to foreign powers); loans direct to foreign Governments 30 millions, and to the Dominions 18 millions; food supplies, 16½ millions; railways, 1·1 millions.

MR. McKENNA'S SURVEY.

In his Budget speech on September 21st Mr. McKenna gave a larger survey of the financial situation. Last May Mr. Lloyd George estimated the total Government expenditure in 1915-6 (including non-war services) at 1,136 millions. In Vol. II. of this History reasons were given for concluding that on the most optimistic view the expenditure could not be less than 1,338 millions. Mr. McKenna's figures show that this was still too cheerful. He anticipates that during the last six months of the financial year the daily expenditure on all services will be more than $4\frac{1}{2}$ millions, and that in the later weeks it will exceed 5 millions. He, therefore, estimates the total expenditure of the year at 1,590 millions. The principal items in this estimate are:—Navy, 190 millions; army, 715 millions; external advances, 423 millions; ordinary national services, 170 millions; pre- and post-moratorium bills, 36 millions. The deficit in 1914-5 was 334 millions, and Mr. McKenna estimated the revenue for 1915-16 (apart from the new taxes in his Budget) at 272 millions. The deficit, therefore, for 1915-16 would be 1,318 millions, and for the two years under review 1,652 millions. As the National Debt before the war was over 700 millions, the National Debt at the end of March, 1916, would thus stand at 2,352 millions. Mr. McKenna gave the figure 2,200 millions. But this is difficult to understand, even making allowance for the revenue from Mr. McKenna's war taxes, which would not amount in the current year to more than 30 millions.

Certain items in the above estimates—the loans to the Dominions and Allies, expenditure on food purchases and the like—will one day be made good in whole or in part; but against this must be set other charges which are not fully taken into account in a mere annual survey. The charge for pensions will continue for many years; the actual war operations will almost certainly last beyond March next; the months immediately following peace will be exceedingly costly. In Volume II. of this History an attempt was made to calculate the total cost and the addition to our indebtedness if the war were to last three years—that is to say, for another sixteen months beyond the term of Mr. McKenna's estimate. We may take the average daily expenditure during those sixteen months at the low figure of 5 millions. To this we may add expenditure for four months of peace at the same rate, and put the capital cost of pensions and allowances at 150 millions. These estimates are, almost certainly, too favourable. We get the following results:—

ESTIMATED COST OF THREE YEARS' WAR.

	Millions.
Expenditure, August, 1914, to March 31st, 1915	561
Expenditure, 1915-6	1,590
Expenditure to August, 1917	2,280
Expenditure of four months of reorganisation	450
Capital Cost of Pensions, &c.	150
Total (say)	5,030

This estimate, it should be observed, includes non-war as well as war expenditure and advances, and other outlay, which should not be a permanent charge. The National Debt, it was shown above, would, on the basis of Mr. McKenna's Budget, rise by the end of March, 1916, to 2,350 millions. On the same basis a war lasting for three years would add to our national indebtedness the equivalent of another 2,200 millions, so that the total National Debt as a result of such a war would be not less than, say, 4,500 millions.

We can hardly estimate the cost of interest and sinking fund at less than 7 per cent; so that the annual charge upon the revenue to meet this would have to be some 315 millions. This, of course, would be additional to the ordinary expenditure on army, navy, civil service, &c., though exclusive of the pre-war debt charge. A three years' war would thus raise the total annual Government expenditure afterwards to some 480 millions. The national income before the war was estimated at 2,400 millions, and the State took from this about 200 millions, or one-twelfth. If the national income rises again to 2,400 millions after peace (a rather speculative proposition owing to the variety of factors), then, as a result of a three years' war, the State will have to take until the extinction of the debt one-fifth of the whole income of the nation.

THE COMMITTEE ON RETRENCHMENT.

The advantage of attempting an estimate of total cost (hypothetical though many of the elements must be) is that it gives a standard by which to test the financial provision made by the Government to deal with the situation. There are three devices open to the Government:—Retrenchment in non-essential expenditure, loans, and taxation. In July the Government appointed a Committee on Retrenchment to suggest economies in public expenditure. The Committee was presided over by Mr. McKenna, assisted by Mr. Montague, and it included non-official members, although its composition was not perhaps very strong. The Committee issued its first report on 21st September. It will, in a later report, deal in detail with the various public departments, but its immediate suggestions were the following:—

- (1) Various increases in postal charges.
- (2) The suspension of the Road Board's activities and the diversion of its income of $1\frac{1}{2}$ millions derived from motor car licences and petrol, and of its surplus of 3 millions, to the National Exchequer.
- (3) An enquiry into the possibility of reducing the present heavy expenditure of local authorities on highway maintenance by restricting the speed or types of heavy motor traffic.
- (4) Pressure on local authorities to undertake new work to be relaxed.
- (5) No vacancies to be filled except in special cases; discouragement of war bonus to civil servants.
- (6) Economy in stationery, shorthand notes, coal and lights.

The Government has adopted some of the proposals relating to postal charges, though some of them are very ill-considered, but it has not yet pronounced on the others. The suggestions under (5) would probably cause discontent out of all proportion to the gain. In any case, the economies here outlined, taken altogether, amount to very little. As the Committee is not permitted to enquire into Admiralty and War Office expenditure, the most fruitful field for economy is closed to it.

It is obvious that for any efforts at economy to be of serious effect, the Government must be backed by the co-operation of the nation. The expenditure of 1,590 millions out of a national income of 2,400 millions means that two-thirds of all the earnings of the nation must be taken by the State. To some extent assistance may be obtained by foreign loans—such as that now being raised at the time of writing in America—and a

good deal of the war expenditure is not so much pure loss as a taking by the Government of national earnings and the redistribution of them. Still, clearly only by strict economy can the nation find out of its own resources what is needed and can be obtained from no other quarter. The Prime Minister and Mr. Bonar Law, at the end of June, opened a thrift campaign, and speeches were followed up by the issue of literature. It cannot be said that the results have been appreciable. The best way of bringing the necessity of thrift open to the nation is by heavy taxation, which compels economy. Mr. McKenna alleged that his absurd import duties are designed to discourage luxury. They are, of course, quite impotent to do anything of the kind. Nor is his Budget as a whole as effective as it should be for this purpose. It raises little more than 30 millions of new revenue in the current year, and, as will be seen later, most of the new taxes press with especial gravity on the middle and working classes, whose margin for thrift is scantiest.

THE SECOND WAR LOAN.

The second device open to the Government for dealing with the financial situation is the raising of loans. On November 17th, 1914, Mr. Lloyd George introduced, as set out in Vol. II. of this History, a Bill to raise a loan for 350 millions. It was a $3\frac{1}{2}$ per cent security issued at 95, and redeemable in March, 1928. On June 21st, 1915, Mr. McKenna proposed a new loan. It had several novel features :—

- (1) The issue price was par, a wise decision, because an issue at par is much easier to convert when at a later period the money market favours such an operation.
- (2) The interest was to be $4\frac{1}{2}$ per cent, an increase of at least $\frac{1}{2}$ per cent on the real return on the old War Loan.
- (3) The Government was to have the right to redeem in 1925, and must redeem by 1945.
- (4) The amount of the issue was unlimited.
- (5) Subscribers to the new War Loan might convert equal nominal amounts of old War Loan and Consols, rating old War Loan at 95 and Consols at 66 $\frac{2}{3}$.

- (6) The minimum for ordinary subscribers was £100. Small subscribers might buy £5 or £25 bonds through the Post Office. Vouchers for 5s. could be bought through the Post Office, to be subsequently converted into £5 bonds.
- (7) Should any later War Loan be issued on better terms, holders of the Second War Loan Stock could convert into it without charge.

The subscriptions through the Bank of England closed on Saturday, July 10th, and on July 13th Mr. McKenna announced the result. Through the Bank of England alone 570 millions was subscribed, independently of 15 millions by that date through the Post Office. The total of subscriptions through the Post Office is not yet

known, but it is believed that it should bring the proceeds of the loan to some 620 millions. There were 550,000 subscribers through the Bank of England, and the 15 millions through the Post Office were subscribed by 547,000 persons. This result was very gratifying, because the practical closing of the Stock Exchanges made it impossible to sell securities in order to subscribe to the War Loan. There will, doubtless, be need to issue another loan early next year. It is not possible for the layman to estimate the date, because we do not know how much the Government is raising by means of short-term loans, such as Exchequer bonds and Treasury bills. At the end of March, 1915, the amount of Exchequer bonds issued was 47·7



Issuing prospectuses of the War Loan at a counter set up in the courtyard of the Bank of England. [Central News.]

millions, and of Treasury bills 64·15 millions. There is also the uncertainty as to the yield of the loan in the United States now being negotiated.

MR. McKENNA'S BUDGET.

The third resource open to the Government for meeting the financial demands upon it is taxation. As was stated in Vol. II. of this History, Mr. Lloyd George, in his first War Budget (November, 1914), imposed new taxes estimated to produce in a full year 68·5 millions. His second War Budget (May, 1915) included no new taxation. Mr. McKenna introduced the third War Budget on September 21st, 1915. The new taxes he proposed were :—

- (1) Forty per cent on the income tax. The exemption limit was to be reduced from £160 to £130, and the abatement from £160 to £120. Agriculture is to be assessed on the rent paid, not, as before, on one-third the rent. Payment to be by half-yearly instalments in the case of firms and individuals liable to direct assessment, and employes to be assessed and pay quarterly.
- (2) The super-tax to be raised for incomes above £8,000 :—2s. 10d. between £8,000 and £9,000, 3s. 2d. between £9,000 and £10,000, 3s. 6d. above £10,000.
- (3) A tax of 50 per cent on all profits greater by £100 than in the pre-war period.
- (4) Bankers' interest to pay income tax at the source.
- (5) The sugar duty to be raised from 1s. 10d. to 9s. 4d. per cwt., but the Royal Commission on sugar supplies to reduce its price from 2s. 6d. to 3s. a cwt.
- (6) Duties on tea, coffee, tobacco, cocoa and chicory, and dried fruits to be raised 50 per cent.
- (7) Import duties without countervailing excise duties on motor cars, cinema films, clocks, watches, musical instruments, plate glass, hats.
- (8) Postal charges, including abolition of halfpenny post, reduced letter-weight, higher charges for parcels post, 9d. for first twelve words of a telegram, higher rates for press telegrams, ½d. more poundage on postal orders up to 2s. 6d., higher telephone charges.

The estimated revenue is as follows :—

	£	Totals. £
Customs	37,600,000	
Do. new taxes	11,300,000	
		48,900,000
Excise	54,650,000	
Do. new taxes	200,000	
		54,850,000
Estate, &c., duties		30,000,000
Stamps		6,500,000
Land tax		660,000
House duty		1,990,000
Income tax, including super-tax	103,000,000	
Do. added	13,424,000	
		116,424,000
Excess profits tax		6,000,000
Land value duties		350,000
Total receipts from taxes..		£265,674,000
Postal service	22,700,000	
Do. added	1,505,000	
		24,205,000
Telegraph service	3,100,000	
Do. added	270,000	
		3,370,000
Telephone service	6,500,000	
Do. added	205,000	
		6,705,000
Crown lands		530,000
Suez Canal, &c.		2,100,000
Miscellaneous		2,430,000
Total non-taxed revenue		£39,340,000

The estimated yield of the alterations of taxation is given as follows :—

CUSTOMS.		Estimate. 1915-16. £	Estimate. 1916-17. £
Tea	1,900,000	..	4,500,000
Cocoa, coffee, and chicory	140,000	..	290,000
Sugar, &c.	5,270,000	..	11,500,000
Dried fruits	150,000	..	180,000
Tobacco	2,300,000	..	5,090,000
Motor spirit	540,000	..	1,080,000
Imported motor-cars and cycles.	600,000	..	1,080,000
Do. kinema films	200,000	..	400,000
Do. clocks and parts	20,000	..	40,000
Do. watches and parts ..	90,000	..	180,000
Do. musical instruments..	20,000	..	40,000
Do. hats	40,000	..	80,000
Do. plate glass	30,000	..	60,000
Total Customs.....	£11,300,000		£24,590,000
EXCISE.			
Sugar, &c.	90,000	..	200,000
Motor spirit	10,000	..	20,000
Patent medicines	100,000	..	250,000
Tobacco	—	..	10,000
Total Excise	200,000	..	480,000
Total Inland Revenue.....	19,424,000	..	85,002,000
Grand total Customs, Excise, and Inland Revenue	30,924,000	..	110,072,000

It is worth while examining the character and effect of some of these imposts. The import duties are, without doubt, purely protective in character and purpose. The changes in income tax and super-tax are much less than was anticipated, and they are so devised that they fall more heavily on small than on large incomes. Some of the postal changes were severely criticised, as dislocating industry far beyond their merits. But the chief test to apply from the standpoint of sound finance is whether the revenue from the new taxes suffices to provide an adequate sinking fund and interest on the war debt. It was estimated above that the war debt (as distinguished from the pre-war debt) would by the end of March, 1916, exceed 1,600 millions. Allowing 7 per cent for interest and sinking fund, this would involve an extra burden of 112 millions a year. The national revenue in the last peace year was 198 millions. The revenue in 1915-16 will, as a result of Mr. Lloyd George's and Mr. McKenna's new taxes, be 305 millions, an increase of 107 millions. That is not quite enough to meet the interest and sinking fund charges. The revenue for 1916-17 is estimated at 387 millions, but those additional twelve months would add another 1,400 millions, resulting in a total war debt of 300 millions, and requiring an annual provision of 210 millions to meet it. For this, Mr. Lloyd George and Mr. McKenna have so far provided only 189 millions. Nor is that all permanent taxation; the tax on excess profits, amounting in a full year to 30 millions, will be exhausted in a year or two. It follows that the country will have to provide further permanent revenue, amounting to over 50 millions, merely in order to deal with the war debt should the war last until March, 1917. Mr. McKenna made it clear that he foresees the necessity of further War Budgets. These figures should leave no doubt

Before leaving British finance, two other points must be referred to. Since the summer the British Government and the banks have been taking measures to increase the gold reserves of the Bank of England by substituting paper for gold in domestic circulation, and by transferring gold from the joint-stock banks. Under a minute issued in August, 1915, the Treasury sanction is waived for the most important military and naval expenditure. The system of token votes introduced early in the war abolished Parliamentary control over war expenditure. Now Treasury control is gone, also, and the Admiralty and the War Office are given, with few exceptions, unfettered freedom. The justification urged for this grave change is the necessity of taking and acting upon decisions with rapidity.

FRANCE.

On September 24th, 1915, M. Métier, the Reporter-General of the Budget Committee, presented to the Chamber a review of French finance during the war. From the declaration of war till the end of 1915 the total outlay for all purposes was estimated at 30 milliards of francs, or 1,200 million pounds; for 1915 alone, at 840 million pounds. In the early weeks of the war the monthly outlay was 32 millions for war purposes only, and in September 62 millions. These figures are lower than for England, Germany, or Russia; so low, indeed, as to suggest that the French are carrying on the war not only cheaper but more economically than ourselves, although M. Métier complained that some departments were

persisting in avoidable undertakings, apparently for no better purpose than to exhaust the credits voted to them. It is worth noting that in France the Parliamentary control of finance remains strict in spite of the war, and M. Métier insisted on the Chamber being allowed ample time to consider demands for credit. This practice may be contrasted with the system now in vogue in England.

The expenditure on relief arising out of the war amounted to 120 millions sterling since the beginning of the war. For the last three months of 1915 there were voted for the assistance of families of soldiers 24 millions sterling. The outlay under this head has risen

from 2.6 millions sterling a month to 8 millions a month. From August, 1914, to August, 1915, the ordinary revenue declined by 56 millions sterling, as compared with 1913. There has been a steady revival. In August, 1915, the receipts from indirect taxes and State monopolies were 2½ millions sterling higher than in August, 1914, but this is chiefly due to heavier imports, owing to the diminution of production in France and the heavy imports for army purposes. As compared with August, 1913, these sources of revenue declined by 17.2 per cent. The extent to which French industry has suffered by the mobilisation, and by the occupation of her richest provinces is indicated by certain taxes. The stamp duty on commercial and civil transactions has fallen by 44.85 per cent; against that, there has been a revival of sales of real property

land of the goodwill of businesses. From January 1st to September 19th the excess of withdrawals from the Post Office Savings Bank over deposits was £3,700,000. Generally speaking, the cost of living has gone up much more in France than in England. Thus, a leg of mutton is now 1s. 9½d. per lb., and fish has become a luxury. But there are two exceptions. The import duties on wheat and flour have been suspended, and as a result bread is no dearer than before the war. The quartern loaf costs a trifle more than 8d. Rent, again, has been in many cases suspended or reduced.

According to M. Ribot, France has financed the war, apart from the ordinary revenue, from the following extraordinary sources:—

	Millions sterling.
National Defence Bonds	480
Treasury Bonds	120
To which M. Métier adds—	
Advances from the Banque de France	260
Total	860

It will be seen that France has resorted neither to war taxation nor to a long-term loan. The decision not to tax is explained by the rise in prices and the depressed state of industry, which would make indirect taxation—the customary French system—oppressive. On the other



The crowd waiting outside the Guildhall, London, in order to gain admission to the meeting, addressed by Mr. Asquith and Mr. Bonar Law, on behalf of the War Loan.

[Central News.]

hand, the advisability of an income tax was perhaps the most embittered of political controversies during the war. It has now become clearly unavoidable. M. Ribot, the Minister of Finance, promises a long-term loan early in October. It is only after the loan is launched that the question of further tax revenue will be taken up. It is believed that M. Ribot contemplates heavier duties on alcohol and a State monopoly of commercial alcohol.

Since the summer, with the exchange persistently unfavourable, great efforts have been made to strengthen the gold reserve of the Banque de France. These have been so far successful that, in spite of large shipments for American use, the amount of gold in the Banque is steadily growing.

RUSSIA.

In addressing the Duma on August 1st, 1915, M. Bark, the Finance Minister, stated that up to July 28th, 1915, the war credits voted amounted to 735 millions sterling, of which, up to July 14th, 576 millions had been expended. This was equal to an expenditure of £1,657,000 a day, while in future it would not be less than 2 millions a day. The ordinary revenue fell 71 millions below the estimate, and, in spite of economies, the ordinary non-war expenditure exceeded revenue by 50 millions. The decline in revenue was due chiefly to the vodka changes, £45,600,000. M. Bark anticipated for the current year:—

Receipts from old taxation	£243,617,000
Receipts from new taxation	51,510,000

Total £295,127,000

This is 35½ millions less than the original estimate.

M. Bark estimated the war expenditure from June 14th to end of the year at £429,188,000, and a total of £764,233,000 for the whole year 1915, or from the commencement of the war, 1,000 millions. Some account was given in Vol. II. of Russia's war taxation. The Ministry of Finance is now drafting proposals for the complete reform of the Russian tax system, and the foundation of any such reform will be an income tax. M. Bark enlarged upon the fact that savings had increased. He expected the amount to be 600 or 700 million roubles for the year, instead of the usual 40 to 60 millions. He explained this by the suppression of the sale of vodka. He described the measures taken for strengthening the gold reserve, which resulted in an influx into the coffers of the State Bank of 30·5 million roubles during the first six months of 1915, as compared with 14·8 during the first six months of 1914.

The commercial dislocation due to the closing of the Baltic and the Black Sea has persisted and been accentuated by the German invasion, and by the necessity of increasing purchases abroad for war purposes. To mitigate the consequent derangement of the exchanges, the Government has raised loans abroad amounting to £158,330,000 to cover foreign purchases. Moreover, as Russian private banks had heavy commitments abroad, the State Bank obtained credits from the Banque de France to liquidate this, amounting to £52,770,000, and from the Bank of England amounting to £10,000,000. Five hundred and twenty-eight thousand pounds was assigned from the Treasury for relief to the inhabitants of the Polish provinces, and the State Bank opened supplementary credits. Under the law of 1912 the dependents of soldiers receive a monetary grant equivalent to the cost of food necessary for subsistence. Between August 1st, 1914, and 28th July, 1915, this cost the Treasury 500 million roubles.

THE JOINT FINANCE OF THE ALLIES.

The British and French Finance Ministers have had several meetings to discuss their common financial affairs, and at the time of writing M. Bark is in London, after having visited Paris. But no conference of the Finance Ministers of all the Allied States has taken place. From Mr. McKenna's Budget speech we know that Great Britain is advancing to her Allies and the Dominions over 450 millions, but the proportions in which this vast sum is distributed are naturally a secret, although M. Bark's Budget speech leaves little doubt that the lion's share has gone to Russia. It is to be supposed that France is acting in the same way as England.

A problem which has caused the Allies some concern has been the steady fall of the rate of exchange. The sovereign fell in terms of the dollar 4 per cent, and the franc in terms of the sovereign some 8 per cent. The decline of the rouble was far heavier, amounting in terms of the sovereign to about one-third. The cause of these phenomena commonly offered is the unfavourable balance of trade owing to decreased exports and increased imports, but this is not the full explanation. The vast output of inconvertible paper money in France and Russia is one important factor. Another is the disinclination of all the States to export gold in order to correct the unfavourable balance. These two circumstances account for the depreciation extending so far beyond the gold point. In September the British and French Governments sent a joint financial commission over to the United States to discuss with the American bankers the means that should be taken to correct the rate of exchange. It would appear that from the first the obvious and proper course—the sending of bullion and the organisation of the export of American securities—was put aside, or reduced to a subordinate place, in the deliberations. The English bankers object to sending gold because they are apprehensive of their reserves; the American bankers object to receiving gold because it gives them no profit, and would send prices up in America.

The Joint Commission negotiated a loan in America to be employed in paying for Allied purchases there. It is understood that the loan will be of the following character:—

- (1) Loan of 100 millions through the sale of notes on the joint and several credit of Great Britain and France, the proceeds to be wholly expended in the United States.
- (2) The notes for five years, with conversion at option into long-term bonds.
- (3) Interest to be 5 per cent; price to the public 98; syndicate to get 2 per cent discount.
- (4) Notes to be free of all British and French taxation, including income tax.

Such an arrangement would be of a revolutionary character, in so far as the loan would be on the joint security of two countries, and, in the case of England, in so far as free of taxes. The terms of issue, too, represent a heavy fall in British credit.

GERMANY.

The German Government is reticent as to German war finance, but some facts may be gleaned from the speech to the Reichstag on August 20th, 1915, by Dr. Helfferich, the Finance Minister, and other sources. Credits of each 250 millions sterling were voted by the Reichstag in August and December, 1914, and of 500 millions in March, 1915. In August, 1915, a further

500 millions was voted, bringing the total up to 1,500 millions. This does not represent the full amount of German war expenditure, because it takes no account of payments by the local authorities and the States, and probably excludes the transport charges of the railways and contributions from other properties owned by the State; nor can there be any certainty that the Imperial Government is not directly or indirectly spending money without the authorisation of the Reichstag. Dr. Helfferich estimated the cost of the war to all belligerents at 15 millions a day, and 5,000 millions a year, or a third of the whole movable and immovable property, public and private, of Germany. He suggested that the Allies are bearing nearly two-thirds of this burden, and Germany and her associates not much more than one-third. He admitted that up to the time of speaking Germany had spent more than any other power, but contended that England's rate of expenditure now exceeded that of Germany, which in an interview he put at 3 millions daily. We have no means of applying a rigorous test to these statements.

In default of taxation, Germany has met her war costs from (1) the surplus of the 1914 Budget, which amounted to nearly 11 millions sterling; (2) paper money; (3) Treasury bonds and other short-term loans; (4) advances from the Reichsbank and other banks; (5) war loans. In Vol. II. it was pointed out that the first German 5 per cent war loan, issued in September at 97½, brought in 223 millions, and that the second, issued in February, 1915, at 98½, brought in 450 millions. The third war loan was issued in September, 1915. The issue price was 99, and the amount subscribed, apart from small subscriptions, was stated to be 601 millions sterling. How far this figure, which looks like an attempt to beat the British record, may be accepted, is not clear. There were again stories of pressure brought to bear upon individuals and institutions to subscribe. More important is the question how far the War Loan Banks have been called upon to assist. These institutions are empowered to lend money for the purpose of subscription to the war loan on securities and commodities. According to Dr. Helfferich they provided the funds for 75 millions of the second war loan. It should also be remembered that German capital is concentrated in the great banks and savings banks more than is English capital, and that these institutions are very amenable to official pressure. The savings banks alone subscribed for one-fifth of the second war loan.

GENERAL REFLECTIONS.

The cost of the war to each of the belligerents is growing steadily. It already exceeds not only anything before known to history, but any guesses before the outbreak of the war. That is due to three circumstances:—The armies in the field are much larger than was anticipated; the wastage of munitions and material is immensely greater; and the war has lasted much longer than was believed to be possible for a war between so many great Powers. If we put the income of the British nation at the pre-war figure of 2,400 millions, then the Treasury is taking by way of loan and taxation some 1,600 millions, quite apart from what the local authorities take. Between the central and the local

authorities some five-sixths of the national income must be going for public purposes. The proportion is pretty much the same for France and Germany. The war credits already voted by Germany are equal to the value of the whole German railway system, with all its apparatus and rolling stock.

Figures of this kind are difficult to understand. It might be asked how it is that the nations do not become bankrupt, or the peoples at least starve? The answer to this second question would appear to be that the war finance involves a vast scheme of redistribution. The State takes a considerable part of the whole earnings of the nation. Part of this is irretrievably wasted, but that part is not enough to reduce the residue below the amount necessary to sustain the people; the rest is redistributed among the people. One reason why the war is so costly to the British State is that the British State is carrying out the redistribution on a far more comprehensive scale. The scale of pay, of allowances, and of pensions is much higher. This is reflected in a bigger war bill, but on the other hand the English people feel the pinch of suffering less than do any other belligerent people. What are called "economies" are often savings to the Treasury at the expense of disproportionate suffering to the masses. It is this fact of redistribution which explains why the nations are passing through the war with, on the whole, far less privation than might have been expected. That the belligerent States can raise the vast sums needed for the war mainly out of their own resources without bankruptcy is due to the power of the modern economic machine. So long as the economic machine of a country can turn out supplies for the army and maintenance for the people, it can keep going. This implies that a certain relation must be maintained between the number of persons retained in productive work and the number under arms. If that proportion be passed, there will be collapse. Economists, with their minds fixed upon money rather than the realities, of which money is only a symbol, have tended to under-estimate the capacity of a State or nation to bear the financial burden of a great war. They have also been inclined to exaggerate the importance of those international relations which in peace time distinguish the world's finance.

The war will doubtless leave all the belligerents saddled with a heavy debt, necessitating taxation perhaps three times as heavy as before the war. The recuperative power of the modern economic machine is such that this should not be an intolerable burden, though it may cause serious internal crises by checking expenditure on social reform. But it is bound to affect the financial and economic position of Europe in relation to America. A heavy tax system will be a handicap for all European countries in industrial and commercial competition with the United States. The United States, again, from being a borrowing nation, has not only been compelled to satisfy her own needs, but has even begun to lend to the belligerents. This tendency for the monetary centre of the world to shift across the Atlantic is bound to be accentuated. It will be stimulated by the unfortunate manner in which the exchange difficulty has been handled. In effect, England has ceased to be a free market for gold, and it will be difficult to recover the prestige lost, or to shake off the bad precedent created.




The platform at the National Conference on Food and Fuel Prices, with Mr. Arthur Henderson in the chair.

[Topical Press.



Part of Canada's gift of flour for the relief of war distress in England.

[Sport and General.



The Coal Strike: Mr. Lloyd George addressing the miners' representatives at Cardiff.

[Central Press.]

CHAPTER X.


LABOUR IN THE WAR.

THE INDUSTRIAL TRUCE—TRADE DISORGANISATION AND UNEMPLOYMENT—GOVERNMENT GRANTS TO UNIONS—RISE IN FOOD PRICES—EFFECT ON THE WORKERS—THE WAR BONUS MOVEMENT—ASTONISHING FIGURES—RECURRENCE OF STRIKES—COMPULSORY ARBITRATION—LABOUR AFTER THE WAR.

DURING the two years which preceded the war Great Britain was distracted by bitter industrial struggles. A ferment of unrest and angry discontent spread through the ranks of the workers, the sympathetic strike policy gained adherents in many industries, and the controlling influence of trade union officials was extensively undermined.

From the beginning of 1913 until July, 1914, no fewer than 2,300 disputes occurred, and preparations

for future conflicts were being made by both employers and workers. A far-reaching treaty of alliance between the railwaymen, transport workers, and miners had been drafted by joint conferences of the representatives of the unions concerned, and it was just about to be ratified when all thoughts were turned abruptly to the problems created by the war. Only by keeping these facts in mind can the events in the world of labour during the succeeding twelve months be seen in true perspective.



The King pays a visit to a munitions factory in the Midlands.

[Central News.]



The Navvies Battalion, raised by Colonel John Ward, M.P., erecting an internment camp for German prisoners.

[Photopress.]

Within a fortnight of the entry of this country into the war virtually all causes of difference between employers and workers were put aside. The London building trade lockout, which was just on the point of extending to the whole country, was ended; Scottish coalowners withdrew a demand for reduction of wages; railwaymen postponed indefinitely the claim they were about to make for higher wages and improved conditions; and sectional disputes in various trades in all parts of the country were hurriedly settled. The country braced itself for a period of unprecedented unemployment and distress, and the rapidity with which national and local relief funds mounted into millions was the measure of the belief that trade and manufacture were about to suffer a serious disaster. None could then foresee the magnitude of the military operations which England would be called upon to undertake within the next year, or the industrial effects of the withdrawal of millions of men, and the events of the first few weeks of the war seemed to confirm the gloomiest prophecies concerning the prospects of labour.

HELP FOR TRADE UNIONS.

In the first derangement of trade many thousands of workers were thrown out of employment, and in Lancashire, which was already feeling the effects of short time in the mills, a complete stoppage of the cotton industry was feared.

The principal trade unions, which included unemployment pay in their benefits, were called upon to distribute so large a sum each week that the exhaustion of their funds was threatened. No such menace to the stability and power of the unions had arisen since the early struggles for the legal right to exist. Some officials suggested the suspension of unemployment benefit in order to throw the burden of distress upon the relief funds. An appeal for Government aid was powerfully supported and sympathetically considered. A proposal that block grants should be made to the unions from the National Relief Fund was rejected on grounds of expediency, but the need was met by extending the scope of the clause in the Insurance Act which provides for the refund of a certain proportion of trade union expenditure on unemployment benefit. This proportion was increased according to the amount of levy imposed upon employed members—the maximum refund being one-half—and the unions were thus relieved of a great part of the burden thrown upon them during the acute stage of industrial disorganisation. With this help, and the gradual improvement in trade which now set in, the peril of imminent financial collapse passed away from the thoughts of trade union members. After

four weeks of war the percentage of unemployed reported by certain representative unions to the Board of Trade was 7·1, as compared with 2·8 at the end of July. These figures, however, do not indicate the full extent of unemployment, for the stroke fell heavily on the ranks of unorganised labourers, casual workers of all kinds, and women and girls employed in factories and warehouses. In Lancashire the position was worse than anywhere else in the country. It was estimated that 50,000 people were unemployed at one time in the Oldham district. Ten thousand operatives were out at Bolton, and in all the other important centres of the industry widespread distress was manifest.

The turn of the tide was hardly perceptible for two or three weeks, except in certain trades to which the War Office sent large orders for equipment, but the rate of progress was accelerated as more and more men joined the forces, and as the financial measures of the Government restored stability to the financial world. By the end of October the trade union rate of unemployment was down to 5½ per cent. Six weeks later it reached 3·46, and was still falling. Both men and women were being absorbed from other trades into those engaged on war orders. At the end of November reports indicated remarkable activity in the engineering, shipbuilding, woollen, worsted, hosiery, clothing, cutlery, boot and shoe, and metal trades, while some recovery in the cotton industry was noticeable.

GROWTH OF UNREST.


Up to the end of the year the industrial truce was generally observed, but with the subsidence of unemployment and the diminution of distress other matters increasingly claimed the attention of the wage-earners. The rapid upward rush of prices in the first



Sir George Askwith.

[Lafayette, Manchester.

days of the war was regarded as a temporary result of panic, but when, after a period of fairly tolerable conditions, a rising movement set in with a steady sweep which had a sinister look of permanence about it, there was a corresponding reaction in the mind of labour. It could be said that up to this time the majority of the workers were disposed to make sacrifices without much complaint, but when the price of flour and bread went bounding up, and the general cost of living rose by nearly a quarter, the temper of the people changed. They saw freight charges advanced to unexampled rates, and wheat quotations rising by shillings at a time, while the Government apparently looked on without any intention to intervene. Stories of the accumulation of enormous war profits by firms engaged on Government work passed from mouth to mouth, and



The shortage of farm labour: Soldiers assisting with the harvest.

[Newspaper Illustrations.]



Girl workers in a munitions factory.

the demand of some employers for the abolition of rules which limited output and restricted the use of unskilled labour had the effect, in the circumstances in which it was made, of heightening suspicion that the nation was being exploited by "profit-mongers," and that many employers were prepared to take advantage of the war to lower standards of wages and working conditions which the unions had won by long and costly effort.

The first hint of impending trouble was conveyed in a striking warning and protest by the secretary of the Boilermakers' Society in the middle of January. A few days later a conference called by the Workers' National Committee demanded Government control of shipping, and on January 25th Tyneside workers threatened industrial revolt if the Government remained inactive. The announcement on the same day that a Cabinet Committee had been appointed to consider the situation, while it showed that the authorities were already concerned at the growing irritation of the wage-earners, did not silence the chorus of protest. The Management Committee of the General Federation of Trade Unions published a manifesto in which they asked for more efficient organisation of the ports to reduce congestion of traffic, for a reduction of freight charges, and for Government control of the wheat supply. "The situation is not yet desperate, but it is serious, and will become increasingly so unless the Government moves quickly." Point was given to the warning by the demand of railway workers, transport workers, and engineers for higher wages. Miners organised meetings of protest, and widely representative trade union and labour conferences in London, Manchester, and other industrial centres were held on one day to discuss the food question. Government control of wheat and shipping was again suggested, and Mr. W. Brace, who was later to enter the Coalition Government, demanded at Cardiff the organisation of the coal supply. "The Government must check monopolist power," he said, "or the workers must be free to use their own power to demand advanced wages to meet the advanced cost of necessities." In the middle of February the question was discussed in the House of Commons, and Mr. Runciman, who did not appear to favour definite Government control, suggested that the practicable remedy was to be found in higher remuneration, which had just been conceded to railwaymen and workers in Government dockyards. The demand for direct Government action was pressed forward, however, and in the middle of March Mr. Arthur Henderson, another Labour member who was destined to enter the Coalition Government, presided at a conference called by the War Emergency Workers' National Committee. In a circular issued a few days later by the Parliamentary Committee of the Trade Union Congress, the industrial unrest which had now become general was attributed to the increase in the cost of living, and, in certain trades, to the strain of

overwork. About this time it became known that the Government had purchased considerable quantities of wheat—in the Argentine it was surmised—but the details of the transaction were kept secret, and its effect on prices, coupled with that of the control of the Indian wheat market, was not felt for some months.

Meanwhile, workers all over the kingdom, adopting Mr. Runciman's advice, presented demands to their employers for increased wages or war bonuses, and the attention of the Government was directed by a recurrence of strikes and threats of stoppages to the question of devising new conciliation and arbitration machinery. These measures, and others of greater importance which followed them, profoundly affected industrial conditions and the position of trade unions from this time onwards. The correlation between all the complex happenings of this period will be better understood, however, if the changes in the state of employment, the rise of prices, the wages movement, and the Government action which led to compulsory arbitration are separately reviewed. A close examination shows that the correspondence between the rise in prices and the growth of discontent which led to a renewal of industrial disputes is too clearly marked

to admit of much doubt that the main cause of the one was the pinch of hardship produced by the other.

THE COURSE OF EMPLOYMENT.

By the end of December substantial improvement in the labour market was reported, and the trade union rate of unemployment was down to 2.5 per cent, as compared with 7.1 per cent at the end of August. In all trades engaged on war work there was increasing pressure and more overtime. In April the percentage had fallen to 1.2, the lowest for twenty-five years, and a growing


shortage of men in engineering, shipbuilding, coal-mining, and agriculture was noted. An improvement had taken place in the cotton industry, and linen, lace, brick, pottery, and tinplate were the only important trades to be adversely affected by the war at this period. The amount of abnormal unemployment benefit paid by trade unions was now so small that the special Government grants were discontinued. Altogether, a sum of £84,175 was refunded to 185 unions, and this represented roughly one-half of their expenditure caused by the war.

By June there was very little unemployment except in luxury trades, and transference of workers from these trades to others where the demand could not be satisfied was proceeding rapidly, while the expansion of women's employment on classes of work to which they were accustomed was steadily going on. The engagement of women for work which had previously been done exclusively by men was also beginning, and in subsequent months this process of replacement was accelerated. At the end of the first year of war the trade union rate of unemployment was as low as .09, while in the engineering industry it was down to .06. The demand for skilled



A girl worker making ammunition boxes and testing the finished result with a dummy shell.

[*Topical Press.*]



The scene of the Coal Strike : A typical South Wales coal mine.

[Topical Press.

workers was unabated, and the absorption of women and girls into a variety of trades continued. In certain industries, particularly in engineering and shipbuilding, pressure was abnormally high, and much overtime and Sunday labour was recorded.

CAUSE AND EFFECT.

After the rapid rise and fall in food prices immediately after the declaration of war, the general standard was for two or three weeks about ten per cent higher than the level in July. Another upward movement began much more slowly in the early days of October, and at the end of the year the principal necessities cost 19 per cent more than in July. A month later the increase had risen to 23 per cent, while flour was higher by 33 per cent and bread by 29 per cent. The increase continued in March, and it was still more acutely felt in May owing to an addition of from 11 to 15 per cent to the cost of meat. The general average of prices at the beginning of July was 35 per cent above the level of the previous July, but the price of flour and bread was respectively 60 and 45 per cent higher. This was the top point reached during the first year of war, and although during the next few weeks there was a downward movement in the price of wheat quotations it made little difference to the price of a loaf, and the general high cost of living continued to press heavily on the poorer classes of the population. In September the price of butter, eggs, and bacon became almost prohibitive, and the new Budget opened a prospect of further increases on tea, sugar, and other articles of food.

The higher wages and war bonus movement first assumed definite shape towards the end of January, by which time the housewife's purchasing power had been reduced by nearly one-quarter. The railwaymen demanded a 5s. per week increase for all grades, and so menacing was the attitude of some of the branches of the unions that negotiations with the companies were completed within a fortnight. The men accepted a compromise, under which a war bonus of three shillings a week was awarded to those who received under thirty shillings a week, and one of two shillings to the remaining employes, and the Government agreed to bear part of the cost. Scottish companies announced similar concessions a week later.

Meanwhile, other wage-earners were claiming increases. The transport workers achieved their first success at Hull, where an advance of a penny an hour was conceded, and during the next few weeks dock workers in London, Liverpool, Manchester, Dublin, and other ports were granted increases or war bonuses. Agitation in the engineering trade led to Government intervention early in February, and Sir George Askwith, Sir Francis Hopwood, and Sir George Gibb were charged with the duty of investigation. They presented a report shortly afterwards, and on February 21st it was announced that they had been constituted a new tribunal, under the name of the Government Committee on Production in Engineering and Shipbuilding Establishments, to prevent stoppages on work for Government purposes. One of their first successes was the settlement of the claims of the North-East Coast engineers, to whom they awarded a war bonus of four shillings on weekly wages and ten per cent on piece rates.

By the end of March the wages movement had extended to nearly every industry, and in very few cases did the claimants fail to achieve some measure of success. The Gas Workers and General Labourers'

Union rescinded a resolution passed at the beginning of the war that no advance should be asked for before the end of hostilities, and defended its action on the ground that the increased cost of living made it impossible to keep the pledge. Engineers in many centres, carters, general and agricultural labourers, and large numbers of workers in miscellaneous trades, came forward with varying demands. In April 193,000 workers secured increases or bonuses amounting to £12,900 a week, and thirty-four claims were dealt with either by courts of arbitration or by the Committee on Production. In May awards of war bonuses to miners, and to large numbers of engineers and boot and shoe trade employes, became operative, and the total of the awards this month was equal to no less than £188,000 a week, divided among 970,000 workers.

In the words of the official report, this was "by far the largest increase ever recorded in any month." June showed a considerable falling off, but in July a war bonus of five per cent, to date back to June, was awarded to 170,000 Lancashire cotton operatives. An application by the weaving section of the industry was not successful, and the agitation was renewed some weeks later. In August 438,000 workpeople benefited, at a cost to the employers of £55,000 a week. In the same month a new movement was started in the ranks of the railwaymen for an increase of the bonus, on the ground that it was insufficient to meet the advance in the cost of living since February, and by September the demand was so widespread and insistent that the Executive was compelled to approach the companies again.

£24,000,000 IN BONUSES.

By this time the astonishing nature of the movement, and its equally astonishing results, could be surveyed broadly, and it was ascertained by the Board of Trade that, in the eight months from January to August, 2,564,480 workpeople, not including Government and railway employes or agricultural labourers, had participated in wage increases or bonuses amounting to £467,470 a week, or in round figures over twenty-four million pounds a year. Yet, gigantic as this sum appears, it only compensated partly for the heavier burden of food prices. The average increase per head was 3s. 8d., and the average for different trades varied from 1s. 7d. in the textile section to 5s. 6d. for iron miners and 5s. 3d. for coal miners. Leaving the miners out of account, the average for the rest of the workers was 2s. 1d., with which to meet an increase of over one-third in the cost of living. Many workers, of course, earned considerable sums by overtime, at the risk of impairing their health, but the great majority of workers were not able to augment their incomes in this way, and many received neither higher wages nor war bonuses.

As a rule, little difficulty was experienced in convincing employers or arbitrators of the justice of the claim to higher remuneration. Indeed, some firms, whose employes numbered many thousands, took the initiative and conceded war bonuses before a claim was presented to them. These facts must be kept in mind if an impartial judgment is to be passed upon those workers who answered opposition and refusal by a re-assertion of the power of the strike at a time when maximum production was imperatively needed. If certain sections of the men flouted appeals to patriotism, and ignored the needs of the soldiers in the trenches, some employers showed equal disregard of their duties and obligations to the nation. The majority



The beginning of the Coal Strike : Miners leaving the pithead after the expiration of their strike notices.
[Newspaper Illustrations.]



After the settlement : Miners taking their ponies back to the pit.
CC-0. Jangamwadi Math Collection. Digitized by eGangotri

[Topical Press.]

of the workers who engaged in disputes were impelled to their course of action by a burning sense of injustice, or by the conviction that they were being exploited for the production of abnormal war profits, and the Government delayed far too long before taking even the mildest action to make such exploitation difficult.

During the first five months of the war only 137 disputes, affecting 23,000 people, were recorded, and all these were unimportant and of short duration. Contrasted with the number for the preceding seven months—836 disputes, directly affecting 423,000 workers—they emphasise the state of industrial tranquillity which succeeded the ferment of 1913 and the first half of 1914. It was in the seventh month of the war, on the Clyde, that the storm first broke.

During the seven months January to July there were 414 disputes, affecting 343,680 people, but of these the South Wales and Clyde strikes were by far the most important and alarming. From March to August the monthly number of disputes fluctuated between seventy-four and forty-nine, and at the end of August only thirteen, affecting 3,300 workers, remained unsettled.


In the majority of these troubles agreement was reached without much difficulty, either by direct negotiation between employers and workers, by the intervention of Sir George Asquith's Committee, or by recourse to courts of arbitration.

THE CLYDE STRIKE.

The strike of Clyde engineers began in a small way in the middle of February, following a demand, made some weeks earlier, for an increase of 2d. an hour on a wage rate of 8½d. The employers were not conciliatory, and the offer of an advance of a halfpenny, extended subsequently to three farthings, was described by many of the employes as an insult. In this mood the men got out of the control of their leaders, and the strike extended sporadically until virtually the whole of the engineering industries on the Clyde were held up.

On February 27th the Government, acting through the Committee on Production, ordered the men back to work, pending immediate arbitration proceedings, but

this action inflamed the temper of the men still more. They argued that without guarantees as to Government control of the workshops it was in effect the initiation of compulsory service for private profit. Conferences and appeals to reason were more successful than peremptory demands, and on March 2nd the men agreed to return to the shops, but in order to hasten a settlement they decided not to work overtime until the result of the arbitration was made known. On March 22nd they were awarded and accepted an increase of a penny an hour and ten per cent on piece rates. On the Tyne similar terms were negotiated in a few days with little friction, and it was widely believed that if equal readiness to meet the men had been exhibited by the Clyde employers the strike stage would not have been reached.



Mr. Lloyd George, Mr. Runciman, and Mr. Henderson at the Park Hotel, Cardiff, after their interview with the coalowners.

[Central Press.]

SOUTH WALES MINERS.

The dispute in the South Wales coal-field, although far more extensive and dangerous, bore certain resemblances to the Clyde trouble. The employers were less yielding than the English or Scotch coalowners. The men were angered by long delays, and stiffened to stubborn resistance by an attempt to impose compulsory service upon them without the establishment of State control over the mines or prices, and the employers had finally to yield what English owners conceded without strife.

The dispute had its origin in a request by the miners for a new wages agreement to supersede the one which expired in March. Under that agreement the maximum rate of wages had been reached.

Prices had gone up by leaps and bounds, but until a new agreement was negotiated the men were unable to present to the Conciliation Board any claim for an advance proportionate to the increase in prices. It was apparently the object of the employers to prevent such a claim being put forward by refusing to be a party to a new agreement.

Interposing upon this cause of contention came the war bonus movement, which was initiated simultaneously in England, Scotland, and Wales. The Welsh miners asked for twenty per cent upon the current wage rate. The employers offered ten per cent upon the old

COMPULSORY ARBITRATION.

standard, which was much lower than the current rate. The men were awarded $17\frac{1}{2}$ per cent on the standard rate, and in this affair they again saw a determination of the employers to give less than an impartial arbitrator considered the men were entitled to.

When the question of the agreement had dragged on for three months it was taken up by the Board of Trade, and certain rulings were made by Mr. Runciman in July. The men's claim for a new standard rate was allowed, but the proposed abolition of a minimum rate, and other points in the rulings, aroused hostile feelings, and a delegates' conference decided upon a strike policy, against the advice of a majority of their executive. The Munitions Act was now in force, and the area was proclaimed under that Act on July 13th. The threatened strike was forbidden; but warnings of pains and penalties and the institution of a Munitions Tribunal had the effect of consolidating the position of the miners by stiffening the attitude of those who had joined reluctantly in the strike movement. The action of the Government, it was quickly seen, had destroyed any hope that a large section of the men would refuse to strike. Not a single miner entered the pits on July 15th. Mr. Runciman's Coal Prices Bill came too late to persuade the miners that censure was not reserved for them alone, or to shake their conviction that the coalowners were to be permitted to maintain prices at the abnormally high level which had been reached.

Within three or four days it was tacitly acknowledged that compulsion could not possibly be enforced against a large, solid body of workers determined to resist, and the hurriedly-arranged visit of Mr. Lloyd George, Mr. Runciman, and Mr. Henderson to Cardiff resulted in the immediate settlement of the dispute in favour of the men. Even yet the trouble was not at an end. The ratification of the new agreement was delayed week after week, and points of settlement were questioned. Mr. Runciman gave a ruling which conflicted with the men's understanding of the Cardiff settlement, and the strike was partially renewed. The union officials, while endeavouring to avoid another stoppage, supported the contention of their members, and after a further discussion with Mr. Runciman and Mr. Lloyd George the tangle was satisfactorily straightened out. The agreement was signed, and the men were now free to press forward a claim for increased wages on the new standard. They asked for $12\frac{1}{2}$ per cent, which they contended was very moderate in view of the price of coal. The employers offered five per cent, but they failed to convince the chairman of the Conciliation Board that that was the utmost the conditions justified. After carefully considering all arguments, Lord St. Aldwyn awarded the full $12\frac{1}{2}$ per cent, and thus confirmed the justice of the miners' case throughout the long and regrettable struggle.

The strange strike of coalheavers, and the week-end strike of dock workers at Liverpool and Birkenhead in February and March, followed a concession of increased wages. Only a small proportion of the dock workers of the ports were involved. They objected to the abolition of the pernicious old system of "subbing" wages during the week, but they could not stand up against the opposition of their leaders, a hostile public opinion, and the pressure of Lord Kitchener. The organisation of the "Khaki Dockers" arose out of this trouble. It was thought at first that the establishment of the Liverpool battalion might develop into an important mobilisation of transport labour for Government service, but this hope was not realised.

In the early months of the war the trade unions showed no disposition to respond favourably to the request for relaxation of workshop rules and restrictions, and at the Elswick works a dispute was threatened in February because of the employment of unskilled labour on work which had been performed hitherto by trained men. The union leaders were won over in a series of conferences with Mr. Lloyd George, but they insisted on certain guarantees, which the Minister of Munitions persuaded the employers to accept. The question of relaxation of rules became linked up with that of compulsory arbitration, the establishment of which Mr. Lloyd George had foreshadowed at Bangor on February 28th, and which up to this time had been strenuously resisted by the unions.

Thirty-two organisations accepted on March 19th an agreement which included, as a set-off to the sacrifices made by the men, a guarantee that the old conditions should be re-established after the war, and an undertaking to limit profits in works engaged on Government orders. The agreement provided that the restrictive rules and customs should be relaxed in order to accelerate the output of war equipment and munitions. Disputes were to be settled, if employers and workers failed to agree, by reference either to Sir George Askwith's Committee, to a single arbitrator, or to a court of arbitration.

The points embodied in this agreement were carried to a more drastic stage in the Munitions Act, which set up control over workshops and attempted to make compulsory arbitration effective by a provision for the imposition of penalties. In small disputes it was found possible by the infliction of fines to compel an immediate resumption of work, but it soon became evident that opposition of the kind which was offered in South Wales had not been contemplated by the framers of the Act.

Restrictions on the freedom of workers engaged by war contractors operated in practice as a species of compulsory industrial service. The Munitions Courts constituted under the Act were kept busy, and in some respects the operation of the Act was thought to favour the employers as against the workers. Much local irritation was set up, and the cumulative effect of this was largely the cause of the vehemence of the opposition which was manifested when suggestions were made for the establishment of general compulsory industrial service.

The reluctance of the workers to relax their rules and customs which limited output and restricted the employment of unskilled labour was ill-understood by the other classes in the community, and much acrid criticism was directed against trade unionists because of it, not a few of the critics being members of the professional classes, which rigidly preserve their own restrictions and privileges. Limitation of output was, under normal conditions, the workers' effective safeguard against excessive speeding up and the consequent reduction of piece rates of pay, while employment restrictions acted as barriers against a flood of cheap labour which, it was feared, might sweep away the hardily-won standard wage of the trained artisan.

LABOUR'S SACRIFICE.

Looked at from this standpoint, and not underrating the trouble caused to employers by "slackers" and careless workers, it is seen that trade unionists have made great sacrifices upon guarantees which many of them consider inadequate. It is hardly possible to judge at present how far the strength and influence of labour

will be modified after the war, or what problems its leaders will be called upon to face. It may gain new power from the closer association of those leaders with the Government. On the other hand, it may have to struggle hard to recover its lost privileges and freedom in the workshops. Will some employers endeavour to retain the use of semi-trained labour for machine work, and to what extent will women strive to keep the new positions they have taken in productive industry? The answer to these questions must depend upon the conditions which prevail at the end of the war, and in the uncertainty


which veils the future it is not surprising that trade union leaders prefer expediency to the task of elaborating a precise policy to meet problematical contingencies

During the past year the industrial workers have had a more vivid revelation of their real place and value in the life of the nation than has ever been given to them before. In the light of recent experiences, it seems clear that the task of guiding this newly-awakened consciousness will need all the knowledge, sympathy, and foresight that statesmen can bring to the aid of the trade union leaders.



A war meeting of the Executive of the National Union of Railwaymen, with Mr. Bellamy in the chair.

[L.N.A.]



The copper shortage in Germany: A schoolmaster collecting copper household articles from his pupils.
[Photopress.]



Russian prisoners of war at work in the fields in Prussia.



Part of a Government store of flour in Berlin.

[Photopress.]

CHAPTER XI.

THE TREND OF GERMAN POLICY.

AIRSHIP RAIDS AND SUBMARINE WARFARE—GERMANY AND THE UNITED STATES—DISCUSSION OF PEACE TERMS—THE ANNEXATION QUESTION—PETITIONS AND COUNTER-PETITIONS—A YEAR'S WARFARE—NEW HOPES IN THE BALKANS—THE INFLUENCE OF THE PRESS—INTERNAL POLITICS.

IT will be remembered that at the beginning of the new year the question most prominent in the minds of the German people was the question of the food supply. Allied statesmen had declared that Germany could be reduced by starvation—the image of a besieged fortress had been quoted—and the strict measures which were taken by the Federal Council with regard to the distribution of grain made it seem as if, after all, they might be right. As in a besieged fortress, everyone was placed on rations. Within a short time of the seizure of stocks by the authorities the system of bread tickets was introduced throughout the whole country, and each individual had to be content with an allowance of a little over seven ounces per day. For a while there was a certain suspense. The public was encouraged to return as many bread tickets as possible unused; the town of Bochum offered rewards of money to those who effected a saving in the course of the week. The patriotism of the German people was, however, equal to the sacrifices demanded of them. Gradually it became apparent that, by continuing to exercise strict economy, Germany could hold out in the matter of food for an almost

indefinite period, assuming, of course, that the German armies held their ground. The authorities were able to enter upon the new harvest year of 1915 with a surplus of wheat and rye amounting to more than 70,000 tons.

It is true that at the same time the cost of foodstuffs steadily increased. At the end of the first year of the war there was only salt which could be obtained at the same price as before; almost all the other important foodstuffs had become considerably more expensive—some by 100 to 200 per cent. Great bitterness was felt against the "usurers" who took advantage of the general scarcity to fill their own pockets. After a year's hesitation, the Federal Council was induced to pass a decree empowering the authorities to suppress any unreliable dealer, and exposing the dealer himself to imprisonment and the loss of his civil rights. All this, however, belongs mainly to the chapter of internal organisation. What should be noted here is that the menace of starvation which seemed to hang over Germany in the early months of the year made a deep impression on the German people, and helped to prepare their minds for methods of warfare hard for the outside spectator to understand.



An inspector visiting a Berlin bakery in order to see that the Government limitation on the use of flour is being observed. *[Universal.]*



A store of war bread for the German troops.

[Newspaper Illustrations.]

AIRSHIP RAIDS AND SUBMARINE WARFARE.

The menace of starvation left the German population, as a matter of fact, firmly persuaded that the Allies were waging war on non-combatants. The *Aushungerungsplan*—the attempt to starve out a population of seventy millions, old men, women, and children—was depicted as the *non plus ultra* of inhumanity, and the exasperation which prevailed may be judged by a threat in the *Kölnische Zeitung* to the effect that if matters looked serious the entire Belgian population, not to mention the prisoners of war in German hands, would be left to die. Once again it was England that came in for all the fury. The *Aushungerungsplan*, though it was declared to have failed, became a catchword which served to cover the extension of the war to non-combatants which followed shortly after in the air raids, and the submarine blockade of the English coasts proclaimed on February 4th.

There were, however, further excuses for these two new forms of warfare. How far the German people sincerely believed and believes in them, it is not easy to tell. At any rate, they are constantly to be found in the German press. They remind one rather of that wicked animal in La Fontaine, of whom it was said: "Quand on l'attaque, il se défend." The towns liable to airship attack are armed with anti-aircraft guns: therefore, according to the German view, they are fortresses; therefore they must not complain if they are attacked. As an example of the grotesque extremes to which certain German critics were prepared to go might be mentioned an article by Count Reventlow, which accused the English of a crime against justice, civilisation, and international law for not removing the population of London from this "fortress." In the case of the submarine blockade, justification for sinking merchantmen at sight was found in the fact that these can ram the submarine with their bow: therefore they are really warships; therefore they must not complain if they are attacked. The ingenious phrase, "Franc-tireurs at sea" was devised for the occasion. The sense of righteousness was further kindled by the reports that English ships frequently flew a neutral flag in the threatened waters. The disappearance of Commander Weddigen, in the *U 29*, was ascribed, in the absence of details from the British Admiralty, to treacherous attack on the part of some disguised merchant ship, and his name was glorified as that of a hero and martyr.

GERMANY AND THE UNITED STATES.

It may be taken for granted that the German Admiralty, in ordering the submarine blockade hoped to accomplish one or more of the following objects:—Firstly, to cut off England's food supply; secondly, to interfere with English trade; thirdly, to reduce the numbers of British merchant ships; fourthly, to create the impression that England had lost the supremacy of the seas. As time went on, however, it became obvious that none of these objects had effectively been achieved. There was no likelihood of England being starved out; English trade continued, not very much diminished; the merchant marine was still formidable in numbers; and the supremacy of England at sea, especially after the North Sea battle, was undisputed by all except Germans—it was even acknowledged by cooler naval critics like Captain Persius. On the other hand, besides very considerable wastage of material, there were complications with neutral powers like the United States. For some time feeling had been growing very intense

against America. Her regular supply of munitions to the Allies was interpreted as a direct breach of neutrality. In modern warfare to give bullets and guns was as good as giving men, indeed better. Very easily, it was said, could America have put an embargo on the export of munitions if she had liked. By her selfish action she was prolonging the war, and losing the lives of many brave Germans. The hatred of America threatened, indeed, to rival the famous hatred of England. The temper of the people is best described by quoting the letter of a German mother announcing the death of her son: "Yesterday I received news that my son fell a victim to an American bullet."

Under the circumstances, it may be understood that the sinking of the *Lusitania* was not greeted with the protests it deserved. Even those who regretted the heavy loss of innocent life—and they were perhaps more than is generally thought—maintained that generally right was on their side. It seemed likely as if relations with America would become strained to the point of war. The Admiralty encouraged the opinion that the submarine war must not be modified. More moderate counsels, however, began to assert themselves. In June the first signs of divergence in the German command became obvious in the suppression of the *Deutsche Tageszeitung*. This journal, the organ of the intrepid Count Reventlow, had openly attacked the Chancellor for his "cowardly, weak, and undignified" policy towards America. The divergence showed itself in a sharper form later when the *Arabic* and *Hesperian* were torpedoed with Americans on board, at the very moment when the German Government was assuring Washington of its friendly intentions. Why should Admiral von Tirpitz set himself at variance with the Chancellor in this fashion? It is impossible to give a definite answer as yet, but a reasonable hypothesis seems to be that the authority of his department was at stake. The German battle-navy, which was instrumental in bringing on the war, proved useless in it. The prestige of the Admiral responsible was therefore bound up with the submarine war and the air raids, which, however futile they may relatively have been, were showy enough in their results to keep Admiral von Tirpitz in office.

The failure of the German navy may also explain the invention of a new object in the war—"The freedom of the seas." This object of the war was formally adopted by the Chancellor in his speech in the Reichstag in August, and is the only case where Germany professes to be fighting for any other interests besides her own. What precisely is understood by the phrase is less clear than the motives which inspired it. Certainly the freedom of the seas includes the abolition of the right to capture private property at sea, most probably also the right of blockade and the right to capture contraband. But there is a good deal of humbug behind the phrase. One of Count Reventlow's most persistent demands is that Germany should wrest the freedom of the seas by force, otherwise, according to him, it is valueless. That is, evidently: there can be no real freedom at sea until Germany is navally supreme. But in that case it can hardly be expected that Germany will forego the chief advantages which naval supremacy can confer. Even in Germany, amongst the general chorus of self-righteousness, there were critics who saw through the humbug. Captain Persius, the well known writer in the *Berliner Tageblatt*, concluded a candid article on the subject by adopting the ironical observation of an American to the effect that "Germany will begin to think over what this great,



Showing civilians round the exhibition trenches on the outskirts of Berlin.
[Newspaper Illustrations.]



Explaining the construction of trenches to a party of civilians.
[Newspaper Illustrations.]



The German pride in the exploits of their submarines is shown by the fact that pleasure boats, as in the photograph, are christened after the notable vessels.

[Newspaper Illustrations.]

noble, and large-minded ideal of the freedom of the seas means when she has crushed England."

DISCUSSION OF PEACE TERMS.

The discussion of the objects of the war was nominally forbidden by the censorship. However, under one pretext or another, the question of Germany's peace terms was brought up, and the Conservative press, at any rate, was able to express its views more or less freely. In June, the controversy as to who was Germany's chief enemy was revived. The Junker party began to suggest that the real interests of Russia and Germany did not clash, and linked up with this the statement that Russia might possibly be prepared to conclude a separate peace with Germany. This at once called to arms the Radical press, who have always insisted on the cultural bonds between the Central Powers and the Western Powers. A league called the "Neues Vaterland" was formed by a group of well-known men with the object of furthering an understanding with France and England. This league carried on an active propaganda by means of privately-circulated pamphlets, amongst which should be mentioned a letter on Belgium by Dr. Hans Wehberg, a prominent jurist—the only vigorous protest against the violation of its neutrality which appeared in Germany. Within a short time the rumour went round that consultations about peace were taking place. The English Government was reported to be putting out feelers through the medium of neutral personalities. To this and similar rumours the *Norddeutsche*

Allgemeine Zeitung gave an emphatic denial. Nevertheless, the Conservatives were alarmed, and continued to agitate more actively than before.

The success of the operations against Russia in June and July gave a great impetus to the discussion of the prospects of peace. Hindenburg's victories in Poland led the people to think that the end of the war was in sight. The object of his campaign, it was repeated again and again, was not to capture territory, but to encircle and annihilate the Russian armies. An Austrian paper, the *Wiener Allgemeine Zeitung*, published various speeches made by the Kaiser after the recapture of Lemberg, all of them asserting that "we are nearing the end." It is significant that the German people should thus have to be buoyed up with hopes of an early peace. In none of the other Allied countries was this done. It would be quite wrong to suppose that there was any wavering in the resolution to hold out. Nevertheless, the toil of the past year could not but be beginning to tell. There is no doubt that in many circles the opinion was held that enough had been done to secure an honourable peace. Towards the end of June the Committee of the Social Democratic party published a manifesto calling for peace. "If the war is not to go on indefinitely until all the nations have been completely exhausted, one of the powers taking part must stretch out its hand to peace. Germany has already proved itself unconquerable, and can therefore take the first step towards peace. In the name of humanity and culture, supported by the bravery of our men in arms, who have created a favourable situation, we demand

of the Government that it shall announce its willingness to enter into negotiations for peace in order to make an end of the bloody struggle." For publishing this manifesto the Socialist organ *Vorwärts* was suppressed for a few days by the censorship.

THE ANNEXATION QUESTION.

All sections by now were busy defining their conceptions of an honourable peace. Roughly, two large groups may be distinguished, one for annexation, the other against. The annexationists very early on received encouragement. The Kaiser, in an address to his people at the end of July, spoke of a peace "which will guarantee us the necessary military, political, and economic guarantees for the future and realise the conditions for the unhindered development of our creative forces at home and on the free sea." The phrase of "real guarantees" was extracted from the Chancellor. It is worth noticing that both Kaiser and Chancellor always treated the war as a war of defence, and never defined the actual objects for which they were fighting, as was done in England by Mr. Asquith, in France by M. Viviani, and in Russia by M. Sazonoff. By this means they would save their prestige with the people in case of failure. Other important personages were less discreet. On June 9th, in a speech before the Bavarian Canal League, the King of Bavaria remarked how glad he was that England had joined in the coalition against Germany—"because now at length we can settle accounts with our foes and hope to secure more favourable connections with the sea for South and West Germany."

A large section of opinion—including notably the supporters of Admiral von Tirpitz—agree with the King of Bavaria in considering expansion in the West as more urgent than expansion elsewhere. It is in the light of this opinion that the meaning of one of Germany's widest-circulated slanders, the slander that England intends to keep Calais, becomes clear. The new campaign of Hindenburg in Poland meant, it must be remembered, a good deal more than the fact that the military staff

had decided to transfer their offensive from the West to the East—it was a definite sign of change in the German Government's policy. Concessions were to be obtained chiefly from Russia, not from France. Against this the navy party strongly protested. Their call was for an energetic renewal of the attack in France, in order to secure the large sea-board which they thought necessary for effective naval development. The slander about Calais may perhaps best be construed as a means of propaganda to this end. If the English had made up their minds to keep Calais, must not the Germans, out of sheer self-defence, drive them out and establish themselves there?



The great wooden statue of Von Hindenburg in Berlin, into which nails could be knocked by the patriotic public for a small fee, the proceeds going to war charities.

[Photopress.]

The annexationists, who were composed chiefly of the agrarians, the great industrialists, and the jingoes, were not troubled about the fate of the alien populations whom they proposed to bring under German rule. On the contrary, they were afraid that the Chancellor, who is probably by nature a mild Liberal, would show himself weak when it came to the peace negotiations. A series of attacks on Herr von Bethmann-Hollweg was begun by the leader of the National Liberal party, Herr Bassermann. They did not succeed in shaking the Chancellor's position, but they probably had their influence on Herr von Bethmann-Hollweg, who, in his speech in the Reichstag in August, used the words: "We have put aside sentimentality." These words

were welcomed and re-echoed throughout the whole country. There is no doubt they struck a particularly responsive chord in the German people, which has always been taught that its political failures have been due to excessive consideration. The words, however, are significant in themselves. They represent that uneasiness and mistrust of self which is felt by most people whose actions are guided—as those of the Germans' so often are—by impulse. The sentimentalist fluctuates between kindness and absolute unscrupulousness—in brutality he is inclined to see an escape from his sentimentality. The course of the war has illustrated this aspect of the German mind more than once, and in the matter of annexation it was evident again

PETITIONS AND COUNTER-PETITIONS.

The most striking expression of the annexationist views was in a petition addressed to the Chancellor, at the singularly inopportune moment when the fate of Poland was under discussion in Europe, by representatives of six of the leading agrarian and industrial leagues of Germany. This petition, which was drawn up chiefly by the well known Director of the Gelsenkirchen group of mines, Herr Kirdorf, demanded the annexation of Belgium, of a large portion of the French industrial regions, of the French coast down to the Somme, as well as of formidable masses of territory in the East, to counter-balance the increase in industrial power. "While taking into German hands the economic enterprises and properties necessary for the domination of the countries appropriated, the Germans," says the petition, "must govern and administer them in such a way that the inhabitants acquire no influence over the political destinies of the Empire." Throughout the whole petition there is not one word to show that the writers have any ideal before them beyond that of material power. Even Herr Kirdorf seems to have felt this, for he followed up this first petition with a second petition to the same effect, signed by some not very well-known intellectuals, and this time botched up with some phrases about kultur.


Both these petitions evoked protest within Germany itself. A counter-petition was sent to the Chancellor with eighty-two distinguished names, amongst them that of Herr Dernburg, former Minister for the Colonies. The Socialist party met at a special sitting to decide its attitude, and declared itself in favour of the right of the peoples to decide their own fate—except in the case of Alsace-Lorraine. The Socialist party was, as a matter of fact, drifting more and more with the general current. "I am going over to Hindenburg," wrote the editor of the Socialist paper, the *Chemnitzer Volksstimme*, and his words roused considerable comment. Dr. Liebnicht still held out uncompromisingly for his views, and he was supported by a minority which included Herr Bernstein; but the party, in spite of a show of outward unity, was

split up into divergent groups, and the points of divergence included not only matters of foreign policy, but also the tactics of the party in home policy.

The moment for showing to which side the Government inclined in the matter of annexation seemed to have arrived with the fall of Warsaw. The German troops, it was reported in the papers, had been greeted as liberators by the inhabitants of the town, and there were some who thought that the Chancellor might make a bid for neutral opinion by a revival of the old Polish State under German auspices. As the days passed, however, it became obvious that the problem was to be left untouched. For the time being, Poland, according to the Chancellor, would be administered by the Germans with the help of the population, and a few harmless concessions to Polish national feeling were made, as at Warsaw, where the policing of the city was entrusted to the inhabitants. But whatever references the Chancellor made to the future were vague. "I hope," he declared in the Reichstag in August, "that to-day's occupation of the Polish frontiers represents the beginning of a development which will remove old contrasts between Germans and Poles, and will lead the country liberated from the Russian yoke to a happy future, so that it can foster and develop the individuality of its national life."


It was not merely the desire to avoid controversy at

home, however, which was responsible for the vagueness of the Chancellor's words. The fall of Warsaw had, in the meanwhile, raised the question of Austrian interests in Poland. Considerable indignation was caused in Germany by the manifestoes of the Polish leaders in Austria, who openly declared their preference for that country, and expressed their regret "that the capture of Warsaw did not take place precisely as we wished it"—that is, by the Austrians instead of by the Germans. The incorporation of Poland into the Austrian confederation seemed to hold out to them greater hopes for their national aspirations than any form of German dominion. That the "old contrasts" between Poles and Germans persisted was shown in the course of the succeeding months by




Another national hero is ornamented with nails: A wooden effigy of the Captain of the Emden, erected in the city of Emden.

[Photopress.]



The treatment of German wounded : Exercising the muscles of the arms by means of embroidery work.
[Topical Press.]



Apparatus for exercising the stiff leg-joints of soldiers who have been wounded.

[Newspaper Illustrations.]

sundry outbursts in the German press, and by the report of Polish agitation in the occupied districts—agitation which the commanding general threatened to suppress by all the means at his command.

A YEAR'S WARFARE.

The discussion of peace terms, however, soon died out. It was seen that the campaign in Russia did not look like achieving any supreme results, and peace still hovered far in the distance. What use was it for the Chancellor to declare from his balcony that fortresses were being smashed like earthenware pots if the Russian army eluded the enemy and was ready to strike new blows? The fall of Warsaw, it was reported, was celebrated in Berlin without the display of boisterous confidence so common in the early days of the war. Moreover, whatever hopes there were that the Russian defeats might lead to a revolution in Russia remained unfulfilled. The meeting of the Duma, and its declaration that it would fight to the end, was a distinct disappointment to the Germans. It was denied, of course, that any peace proposals had been made to Russia. In the meantime, the confidence in the German army was never so great, and the public were told to look elsewhere for a really decisive blow.

It may not be out of place at this point to review the general situation at the end of the first year or so of the war as the Germans were persuaded to see it. The Colonial possessions had mostly disappeared, it is true, but it was declared that their fate really depended on the operations in Europe. The intervention of Italy did not make much difference. The first outbursts of fury at "the people of Machiavelli" soon simmered down, when it was seen that a relatively small number of Austrian forces sufficed to hold back the Italians. In France, Joffre was exhausting himself in his vain attempts to pierce the German line. The English were gathering together munitions and men, but otherwise doing nothing against the Germans. The threat of a great offensive in the end did not trouble the people. It was said that an army for a Continental war could not be improvised, and though no one disputed the courage of the British soldier, German critics were constantly pointing out that his officers could not possibly be adequate, and that a vast expenditure of munitions was of no use in itself. In Turkey, the Dardanelles expedition of the English was regarded as a fiasco, and it was believed that the Turks could not only hold their own in Gallipoli, but also threaten Egypt again. The balance of the year's warfare was, they held, on their side, and there was no need to shrink from the future. Germany could hold out yet for a long time. Its trade had succeeded in adapting itself to war conditions; Germany had become self-supporting; and the financial resources of the Empire had proved equal to all demands. The confidence that Germany could stand the financial strain better than any of her enemies was increased not only by the encouraging—at any rate apparently encouraging—result of the second and third War Loans, but also by the statement of the financial secretary, Dr. Helfferich, that the Allies would have to pay indemnities to Germany which would cover the greater part of the war expenses.

NEW HOPES IN THE BALKANS.

It only remained to strike the really decisive blow. For some time attention had been turned to the Balkans. It was claimed that the fates of Turkey and Germany were henceforth inextricably bound up together. Already proposals for economic union between Germany and

Austria had been made; it was desirable to extend this union to Turkey. The moderate Germans probably think that the chief results of the war will be obtained in Turkey. In a singularly frank leader, the editor of the *Berliner Tageblatt* scouted the view that this was a war of cultures. It amounted, he explained, to little more than a contention for the East. In Germany this was well known. From the very beginning everything had been done to prepare the way for German influence in Turkey. Fourteen German professors were appointed to the University of Constantinople, and Turkish was adopted as a language of study in several of the German technical schools. As an instance of the efforts taken to ingratiate Germany with Turkey might be mentioned the fact that wounded Turkish officers from Gallipoli were invited to pass their convalescence at Wiesbaden. At the same time, if Turkey was to be firmly attached to Germany, communications must be kept clear. "It is our task," wrote Herr Wolff, the editor of the *Berliner Tageblatt*, "to open up that free path to Constantinople which shall be not simply a military road improvised for the campaign, but a permanent way for the future."

The phrase appealed to the imagination of the Conservative press no less. By smashing a way through Serbia to Turkey effective aid in the shape of munitions could be given to Turkey, the English could be driven from the Dardanelles, and a renewed and better prepared attack on Egypt might at last strike the fatal blow at the chief enemy, England, who, it had to be admitted, had so far escaped serious injury. In the Reichstag meeting in August, the Chancellor declared that Germany had armies at her disposal to strike new blows, and it was no doubt the prospect of an important campaign in the south-east which reconciled the hotheads to the Government's conciliatory attitude towards America.

When at length it was announced that German artillery had opened fire on the Servian positions near Semendria, a wave of enthusiasm swept over the country. No secret was made of the fact that the final stages of the war were at hand. A few days before, Bulgaria had mobilised her army. German diplomacy had not hitherto been popular with the people, and it was even said that, after the war, a strict enquiry into matters would have to be held, but the engineering of the Turco-Bulgarian convention was considered a distinct triumph. It was expected confidently that Bulgaria would join in the war with the Central Powers, and help to complete the economic, commercial (perhaps even military) alliance of the countries between Germany and Turkey. The cases of Roumania and Greece were more problematic. Ever since it was declared that Bulgaria was the pivot of the Balkans, Roumania had been treated somewhat off-handedly. Her refusal to allow the passage of munitions to Turkey created hardly less indignation than what was alleged to be her attempt to get rid of her harvest at extortionate prices. In Greece, Baron Schenck, the German Ambassador, had organised a remarkably efficient army of agents and propagandists, and the German public was told that the cry of "Long live Hindenburg" had actually been heard in the streets of Athens. Certainly, great confidence was placed in the King, and the resignation of M. Venizelos in the early months of the year was hailed as a sign that the pro-Entente policy was definitely abandoned. There was some perturbation when M. Venizelos returned—the famous Greek statesman, instead of being called "the prudent Herr Venizelos" was now referred to as the "Cretan adventurer"—but on the whole



A Berlin crowd bidding good-bye to Landsturm on their way to the front.

[Newspaper Illustrations.]



A troop train for German reserves, photographed in August, 1915. It will be noticed that the pleasant fiction that the troops are on the way to Paris is still kept up.

[Central News.]

it was felt that Greece and Roumania might both be persuaded to remain passive in face of a German offensive in the Balkans.

Visitors to Germany have testified to the almost hypnotic atmosphere of confidence prevalent in the country. A neutral correspondent of the *Times*, who had been a firm believer in the Allies, describes the eerie change which came over him after crossing the frontier. "It was a remarkable experience. Before many days had passed I made the disagreeable discovery that I was being influenced by the German war atmosphere. The confidence of the people in the invincibility of their armies, the smooth working of the State machine that seemed to leave nothing to chance, the determination everywhere noticeable beneath the subdued expressions of feeling, the daily outpourings of the Press, the contemporary literature—everything in short combined to entice me into a different mood. I began to understand the workings of the "German mind, which had before seemed mysterious to me."

THE INFLUENCE OF THE PRESS.


In creating this atmosphere, the Press naturally played a prominent rôle. A more excellently disciplined body of newspapers it would be hard to find. As soon as German troops pierced into foreign territory German editors followed, and in certain districts special papers in the native tongue—such as the *Gazette des Ardennes*—were instituted. The propaganda abroad was carried on just as energetically, and in Bulgaria the Press, by means of subsidy, was brought almost entirely under German influence. At home, besides the voluntary work of the ordinary papers, there was the Chancellor's organ, the *Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung*, to encourage or explain as the occasion required. It was here that the documents from the Belgian archives were published—with the object of bringing forward neutral evidence that Germany had been the victim of a conspiracy. Here, too, Herr Bethmann-Hollweg carried on an indirect controversy with Sir Edward Grey, and Dr. Helfferich, who soon gave signs of possessing a pawky humour, assured the country of its excellent financial prospects.

One of his glosses proved especially palatable—the one suggesting that English indignation at his pronouncement on indemnities after the war showed that the chief enemy had been touched at his sensitive spot, the purse. The hatred of England had, as a matter of fact, begun to subside a little in intensity. It had been, to a considerable extent, due to Press agitation; and when some of the papers pointed out the absurdity and harmfulness of stamping "Gott strafe England" on commercial letters and the like, a more sober frame of mind began to appear. Even Herr Lissauer, the author of the "Hymn of Hate," wrote to explain that his poem was not dictated by hatred of Englishmen, but of English foreign

policy, and recommended in any case that it should not be placed in the hands of immature persons.

Side by side with the positive work of the Press went the negative—the suppression of facts or opinions. It is interesting to notice that after the first six months of the war it was forbidden to publish any figures with regard to casualties. The lists which the papers gave contained nothing but the units in which casualties had taken place; there was thus no means of discovering the total. The censorship in Germany worked, if not fairly, at least effectively. There was, significantly enough, very little mention in the German press of poisonous gases, and of the other inhumane methods of warfare intro-

duced by the Germans in the West. Even if there had been, however, the Germans would not have worried—where, they would say, is the difference between being dismembered by shot and stifled by gas? Death is death. Another subject of which the German public is ignorant is the outrages on the Armenians which are being committed by the Turks. What complaints were brought against the censorship dealt with lack of uniformity and political bias. The work of examining news was entrusted to the commanding generals in the various districts. These, it was asserted in a discussion in the Reichstag, varied between themselves, and also, as a whole, showed leniency towards the Conservative papers and strictness towards the Socialists. Dr. Delbrück, the Minister of



A memorial to the German and Russian dead who fell on the battle-field of Lowicz. [Newspaper Illustrations.]


the Interior, announced that a central bureau would be formed to introduce uniformity, but considered the other charges not proven.

INTERNAL POLITICS.

There does, however, seem to be evidence that the Social Democrat party was not looked on favourably by the censors—chiefly retired officers who had volunteered their services on the outbreak of war. It was the Social Democrat party which seemed to threaten the political armistice. In its protests against the leisurely legislation of the Federal Council with regard to the food supplies it often attacked the agrarian interests. Moreover, it demanded—even though in vain—the reform of the Prussian electoral system, whose effect is to place the preponderating power in the hands of the large taxpayers. After the enormous sacrifices which the German people had made, it was only fair that they should have their share in governing themselves. Very interesting was the fate which befell the proposal to revise the Reichsvereingesetz, which contains amongst other paragraphs the one regulating the use of languages amongst the subject nationalities. The restrictions on French, Danish, and Polish had naturally been increased by various military orders. Polish, for instance, could not be used near the war zone at all, and in Alsace-Lorraine it was even an offence to have French headings in commercial correspondence. The restrictions on the use of these languages in meetings in normal times were, however, a different matter, and seemed particularly absurd after it had been declared that all Germany had shown itself loyal and

enthusiastic in the "war of defence." In the Reichstag a majority of two-thirds declared itself in favour of their abolition. No encouragement, however, came from the Government. Dr. Delbrück, who spoke for the Chancellor, stated that the Reichsvereingesetz formed part of a whole series of inner reforms, and was best left over until after the war.

One hopeful sign was indeed given—but a very harmless one. The dedicatory words "to the German people," which had been removed from the Reichstag building by order of the Kaiser in 1894, were ordered to be re-inscribed. Great enthusiasm was aroused in the Reichstag in August when the announcement was made. The Kaiser had spoken, vaguely enough, it is true, but still loudly, of "new paths" to be trod after the war, and the Chancellor, who was reported to be personally in favour of internal reforms, was trusted to give effect to the phrase. It should be mentioned, however, that the *Burgfriede* was far from being general. Party and other recriminations had not ceased. Even the agitation against the Jews smouldered on. At one meeting a speaker mentioned the preposterous invention that Signor d'Annunzio (who was regarded in Germany as one of the chief instigators of the Italian attack) was a Jew, and added that Dernburg, another Jew, was betraying German interests in America. The audience gave a great cry of indignation—"And such people want to become reserve officers." It is, of course, still exceptional for a Jew to become an officer, though many are appointed to a convenient rank which carries with it all the duties and responsibilities, but none of the privileges, of an officer.



German women being trained as tramway workers in Berlin.

[Topical Press.]

The Manchester Guardian
HISTORY
of the
WAR




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
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The guns of H.M.S. "Queen Elizabeth."

[Central News.]


CHAPTER XV.

GUNS AND AMMUNITION IN THE WAR.

THE MECHANICS AND CHEMISTRY OF HIGH EXPLOSIVES—RIFLING—BULLETS AND SHELLS—THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN SHRAPNEL AND HIGH-EXPLOSIVE SHELLS—ARTILLERY—THE FRENCH 75'S—A TYPICAL GERMAN GUN.

THOSE branches of engineering which produce military guns and ammunition labour under a great handicap. Their products can only be given a thoroughly practical trial in the dire calamity of war. And those who desire information concerning improvements in this branch of engineering must always go ill served, because in time of war, when only there are made serious contributions to the artillerists' science, and when curiosity is at its height, really salient information must not be given. But behind the veil of half-secrecy there is always going on a process of evolution, which produces improvements and new types much more quickly than they can be tested in war. There is no end to the tale of military inventions which have been carefully and painfully developed only to be superseded by something else before they have ever been tried in warfare. Had the amount of ingenuity so directed been turned instead upon industrial engineering, civil life to-day would be appreciably more comfortable, and warfare would probably be on a smaller scale, and certainly be less horrible. But from the point of view of those technologists whose business it is to devise

weapons and missiles, there is some professional satisfaction in the circumstances that the world war of 1914 broke out at a time when the great nations had just completed their several schemes of armament. Whether the coincidence was fortuitous or not, it is none the less remarkable that this technical preparedness of the nations extended to all branches of their military organisations. Great Britain, France, Russia, and Germany had just set their military air-craft services on a properly organised footing. A little earlier a new view of the relative values of the different types of fighting ships had received a recognition which spread like wildfire, and the war came just at the climacteric moment to test the "Dreadnoughts" which were the tangible result. In the guns, whether on sea or land, there had been no such revolution; but in almost all countries the artillery well represented the latest current ideas at the outbreak of war. In former wars, notably that of 1870, much of the science of artillery was in the melting pot of the engineer and the chemist. In 1914, what controversies there were on the subject were less scientific and radical than of a minor military nature.



Artillery recruits having the mechanism of an 18-pounder explained to them.

[Newspaper Illustrations.]



A machine gun in position in the Belgian trenches.

[Central News.]

In approaching the examination of the guns used in the war, it is necessary to view them through a preliminary understanding of the changes made in fairly recent years. Not only is the "high explosive" of to-day much more powerful than the gunpowder which it superseded, but to make proper use of it requires a different design of gun. Also it permitted corresponding changes in the missiles thrown from guns, abolishing old forms and classifications, and introducing new ones. To fire the old-fashioned standard solid spherical cannon ball from a modern gun would be to make bad use both of the gun and of the weight of metal in the ball; although it would be making in most cases a considerably better use of the ball than could be achieved by it when fired by the appropriate cannon of, say, Nelson's time. The destructive effect of the ball would be much greater to-day owing to the much higher velocity imparted by a modern gun, and also owing to the very great improvement in sights which has taken place concurrently with the major improvements in artillery. With a cannon whose trajectory could never be relied upon to be quite the same twice running, sighting and range finding were not worth developing into the fine art which they have become to-day.

GUNPOWDER AND AFTER.

The extremely rapid combustion, which is the immediate cause of the effect which we know as an explosion, was for centuries typified in gunpowder. The action of gunpowder is merely the very rapid burning of the charcoal, which is one of its constituents, the other main constituent being the saltpetre, which supplies the oxygen necessary to support combustion, so that it is unnecessary to draw the oxygen for this purpose from the atmosphere. It is the intimate mixture of the oxygen-consuming substance with the oxygen-yielding substance which permits the necessary rapidity of combustion. The gaseous products of the burning are produced so freely and quickly that, in a closely-confined space, they will generate almost instantly a pressure which can be measured in terms of tons. The third and last ingredient of gunpowder is sulphur. The part it plays in the action is not essential theoretically, but in practice it is of very

great convenience. Sulphur inflames at a comparatively low temperature. For saltpetre to yield up its oxygen to charcoal the mixture would have to be heated to a temperature of 335 deg. Cen. The function of the sulphur, which inflames at 250 deg. Cen., is to make it possible to initiate the explosion more easily. In the same way, we use first paper and then sticks to start the domestic coal fire. In the analogy, the sulphur corresponds to the sticks and the fuse or percussion cap corresponds to the pieces of paper. Further, the sulphur has the effect of making the explosion of the whole mass of gunpowder more rapid than it otherwise would be—not an unmixed blessing, as will be seen when we come to consider the causes which have influenced the adoption of modern "high explosives."

The structural distinction between these and gunpowder is, that while in all of them the action depends on their containing ingredients that will burn readily, and other ingredients to supply the oxygen necessary for the burning, in gunpowder these ingredients are distinct and separate substances which have been mechanically mixed together as salt may be mixed with pepper; while in the "high explosives" both classes of ingredients exist in one chemical compound, just as hydrogen and carbon exist together in any one molecule of, for instance, paraffin oil. This structural difference is accompanied by a difference in the potential energy contained in a given weight of material. The



Firing a bomb-thrower in the French trenches.

[Photographic Service of the French Armies.]

chemical compound, weight for weight, liberates a greater amount of gas than the mechanical mixture, and at a very much higher pressure, the surrounding conditions being the same in each case. Also, research has made it possible so to treat the "high explosive" that the gas evolved by it does not reach its maximum pressure quite so rapidly as the gas evolved from gunpowder. Paradoxical as it may seem, this is an advantage.


A projectile of whatever shape or weight cannot be set into full flight instantaneously. It resists the attempt to move it, as it also resists the attempt to stop it. We know that the obstruction caused by the atmosphere will not stop a rifle bullet until it has travelled many

hundreds of yards, and so has withstood the action of the atmosphere during a period of several seconds. Yet it is customary to visualise the starting of a bullet as an instantaneous action. Actually, the more nearly the starting approaches the instantaneous, the greater the strain on the gun without there being any compensating advantage; because what matters is not the rapidity with which the bullet is started, but the rapidity with which it emerges from the muzzle of the weapon. Weight for weight, the destructive energy possessed by a bullet is measured by its velocity at the moment when the explosion has *ceased* to act upon it—that is, when it has just left the gun. Obviously, therefore, the ideal explosive would be one which imparted this velocity rather by a continuous and cumulative push of the gases all the way up the barrel until the muzzle was reached, rather than by a very violent momentary application of the pressure in the breech end of the barrel. Modern "high explosives" have this desirable property in a remarkable degree, and allied with it they have the properties of comparative smokelessness. Either property alone is almost a sufficient reward for the immense amount of research which has brought them to light.

The diagram which is annexed presents, in a way which is due to Dr. W. Anderson, F.R.S., a former Director-General of Ordnance Factories, the relative properties of similar charges of gunpowder and

rather more than one foot; and instead of falling away almost immediately, as is the case in the gunpowder curve, it sustains its maximum height for quite a long time. In fact, the projectile has moved more than three feet before the driving pressure begins to drop. Further, the drop, when it does begin, is not so rapid as with gunpowder, and the final pressure before the projectile is clear of the muzzle is about three times that which we get in the case of gunpowder.

This device of a curve relating pressure to distance is a common one amongst mathematicians and engineers, and is such that the total area enclosed by the curve and the base line represents the total amount of mechanical "work" done. It is clear that the area bounded by the cordite curve is much greater than that bounded by the gunpowder curve, and the power imparted to the projectile by a charge of cordite is proportionately more than that which is imparted to it by the same weight of gunpowder. Also, as we have seen, this power is at the beginning generated more slowly, so that the strain on the gun is mitigated, and it is better prolonged, so that the friction between the projectile and the gun barrel is not allowed to exercise such a retarding influence as it does when gunpowder is used. As a result, the cordite-driven projectile leaves the gun with a velocity of 1,960 feet per second, while the powder-driven projectile only has a velocity of 1,000 feet per second. As the energy of any



The Propelling Power of Gunpowder and Cordite compared.

a modern propellent explosive—in this case cordite. The two heavy parallel lines at the bottom of the diagram represent the barrel of the gun, in which the projectile is seen ready to start on its flight at the breech end, at the left side of the illustration. This barrel, it will be seen, is nearly eleven feet long, while the diameter of the projectile is some seven or eight inches. Vertical height in the diagram, as will be seen by reference to the vertical scale at the left-hand side, represents the pressure in tons behind the projectile. Of the three curved lines, the lower one represents the pressures developed by a charge of 13 lbs. 4 ozs. of gunpowder. The highest point of this curve is vertically above a point in the barrel, which is only some nine inches forward of the breech. That is to say, the maximum pressure of gas occurs when the projectile has travelled nine inches, and thereafter the pressure falls away as time goes on and as the projectile moves forward, until by the time the projectile has left the muzzle the pressure is only about a ton and a half.

The next curve, printed in heavy black line, represents the pressures generated by exactly the same weight of cordite. This curve rises to very nearly twice the height of the gunpowder curve, but it has other important differences as well. It does not rise so abruptly as the gunpowder curve. Its maximum height, representing the maximum pressure, does not occur until the projectile has moved


projectile varies as the square of its velocity, the weight being the same in each case, the relative energies in the two cases are almost as four is to one. The third curve, shown by a broken line, illustrates that the result of using 48 lbs. of gunpowder is only to get the same muzzle velocity as accrues from 13 lbs. 4 ozs. of cordite. This big charge of gunpowder gives a somewhat greater pressure at the beginning, but after the first three feet of travel it gives a less pressure than the cordite; and the two differences, each with regard to the distance through which it obtains, will be found to cancel out.

For the gun constructor these curves have several important lessons. First, it is clear that he need not make his gun so strong and thick at the breech end as he must make it if he wants to use gunpowder; or, conversely, for a given thickness or strength of gun he can use a more powerful charge if he determines to use such a high explosive as cordite. Secondly, it is clear that the useful length of a gun is greater for cordite than for powder. It is no use prolonging the length of a gun beyond that point at which the pressure of the explosion gases is no longer great enough to compensate for the retarding effect of friction between the projectile and the gun bore. Thirdly, and perhaps it is the most important, the properties of a high explosive as shown by its curve point to the admissibility of using heavier projectiles. For a given diameter, the length of the pro-

jectile can be increased without putting up the weight (and consequently the inertia, or "resistance to movement") to a point that would cause dangerous strains in the gun. The advantage of a heavy projectile is even more considerable than might at first appear, especially when the extra weight is due to extra length rather than to extra diameter. It is obviously desirable that a projectile should take a comparatively straight course to its target rather than a curved one. The immediate cause of a curved trajectory is the action of gravity. The longer gravity acts upon the projectile, the greater its fall and the more curved must its course be made. At the high velocity now possible the time of flight for a given range is reduced. This is mainly because of the increased initial starting velocity, but another factor which affects the time of flight is the resistance offered by the atmosphere. This resistance increases much more rapidly with the diameter of the projectile than it does with its length. Consequently, without regarding minutely the several steps of progress, we get as the final result a long ogival

it gave too rapid and violent an explosion. Had it not been for its great property of smokelessness, probably no prolonged effort would have been made to adapt it to anything but the purely destructive explosions required in explosive shells, mines, and torpedoes. Its smokelessness tempted chemists to search for a means of making it less violent.

The problem is solved in cordite. Cordite consists of gun cotton and nitro-glycerine, mixed together in acetone, which is afterwards evaporated off. A little vaseline is added to lubricate the surface of the projectile on its way along the gun-barrel; and it is the burning of this and of the silk bag which contains the charge that causes the modicum of smoke which attends the firing even of the "smokeless" explosive. The secret of the comparative gentleness or "tame" of cordite lies, firstly, in the acetone treatment, and secondly, in the fact that the finished product is given a cord-like form which promotes progressive, as opposed to simultaneous, combustion. In fine, we have in cordite an



Krupp 21-centimetre howitzer.

form of projectile, relatively heavy and swift in flight, practically superseding the relatively light spherical projectile which was slow in flight, had a very much curved trajectory and, for another reason which we will see later, could not be so relied upon to travel accurately to the target.

THE EVOLUTION OF CORDITE.

But this state of excellence of the modern high explosive was not brought about easily or quickly. Even gun cotton and nitro-glycerine, though each much more powerful than gunpowder, could not at first be used for propelling a projectile. In their unmodified form they explode in the peculiar way called "detonation." This is a virtually instantaneous burning of the whole mass, in contradistinction to the progressive, though extremely rapid, burning of gunpowder. To turn from gunpowder to unmodified gun cotton as a propellant would be to jump out of the frying pan into the fire. Loose gun cotton occupied far too much space in the gun, and compressed

explosive which is sufficiently tame, does not evolve a destructive degree of heat on explosion, does not erode the gun-barrel excessively, is comparatively smokeless, keeps well without much risk of accidental or spontaneous explosion, and has a high propelling power.

The initiating of an explosion, whether of cordite, gun cotton, gunpowder, or other explosive, involves the use of a small quantity of yet another kind of explosive, a "fulminate," which possesses the properties of being very easily detonated, and of evolving a great amount of heat very quickly, and so gives the certainty of raising the temperature of the main explosive to its inflaming point. In gunpowder this, as we have already seen, is 250 deg. Cen. We can raise a portion of the charge to that temperature by applying a flame, a red-hot metal rod or wire, or by a detonator in the form, familiar to most people, of a percussion cap. This last, without any adjunct, is the most convenient for small arms. It is now commonly included in the cartridge, but in old muzzle-loading shot-guns, such as may still be seen in



Making bombs out of tin cans in Gallipoli.

[Central News.



Taking 9.2-inch shells to a British battery in Gallipoli.

[Central News.

rural districts, the cap is a separate article. In any case it consists of some fulminating substance, commonly fulminate of mercury mixed with potassium chlorate and antimony sulphide, suitably mounted in a little copper cap or case. A comparatively slight percussion or even friction is enough to cause the mixture to detonate, and so ignite the main explosive. When the main explosive is cordite, or some other of the smokeless powders which do not ignite so easily as gunpowder, the percussion cap inflames a small charge of gunpowder, known as an "exploder," which in turn fires the main explosive.


THE RIFLE AND ITS CARTRIDGE.

The rifle grew out of the musket, which in turn grew out of the arquebus. The musket fired a round ball of lead: round, because that was the easiest shape to cast, and the easiest to ram down a barrel from the muzzle end. The elongated or ogival bullet of the modern arm was evolved from several considerations. The pointed cylinder offers, for the same mass of bullet, about half the air resistance of the spherical form, and so helps to promote higher speeds and longer ranges. The length of cylindrical body engages better with the spiral grooves or "rifling" in the barrel than the spherical form, which, obviously, only touches the barrel at a circumferential line, and so allows less escape of the gases of explosion. On the other hand, although rifling was used for firing spherical bullets, it is, to say the least of it, very much more necessary for elongated bullets. The whole idea of rifling is to impart a spinning motion to the projectile, with the final object of making it fly straighter. How this object is achieved we will come to in a moment; but long before it was in the power of scientists to analyse the subtleties of gyroscopic action, it was known to the practical artists, as artillerymen were called in the period when the bow and arrow was just beginning to feel the competition of explosion weapons.

They knew that if an arrow were made to spin it would fly straighter, and they set the feathers at a "cant," windmill or propeller-fashion, to get this result. An all-metal bullet is not to be spun effectively by the action of the air, so it has been found necessary to make the gun itself impart the spin by forming spiral grooves or ribs inside the barrel. This device was first applied to firearms by Gaspard Kollner, a Viennese, in the fifteenth century, but it seems to have failed to attract much attention. At any rate, when one Augustus Kotter, of Nuremberg, revived it in the following century, it was largely accepted as a novelty, and for many years after him it was applied only to sporting weapons. The earliest recorded use of rifling for military firearms seems to have been for Danish troops in the seventeenth century.

Much scientific research has been devoted to analysing the way in which the spinning action realises its known effect. To begin to understand the matter we cannot do better than first study the behaviour of the ordinary toy gyroscope. It is, essentially, a rapidly-rotating disc. Referring to the figure, A is its axis, and it revolves in the direction of the arrow—that is to say, clockwise. Anyone who has experimented with the toy gyroscope knows that forcibly tipping the axis to the left, or towards the point marked P, causes the disc, apparently of its own volition, to tip itself towards the point marked Q₁. In other words, a forced inclination—or, as it is called, "precession"—in any direction gives rise to a natural precession at an angle of 90 deg. further on in the

direction of rotation. Why? To answer the question we must consider the disc not as one unit of mass, but as a conglomeration of many small particles of matter, each contributing its quota of weight to the whole. Consider one such particle, *k*. It is clear that when the upper part of the axis is tilted to the left, *k* is given a downward motion in addition to its motion in the circular path shown in dotted line. This means that while the particle *k* is passing from Q to P it is made to pass through a somewhat longer distance than if the plane of rotation were not being changed during that time. In fact, the speed of *k* is being accelerated owing to the inclining action. Now, every body which has weight has inertia, which is only another way of saying that it resists being moved or being stopped once it is in motion, or having the rate or direction of its motion changed. Consequently, *k* endeavours to resist the downward motion due to the inclination. It tries to keep up to this original level, and to indicate this it is marked with a plus sign. Next, take the particle *l*. The inclination gives it a downward motion too, but its circular motion is tending all the time to reduce the value of its downward motion until it reaches Q₁, when manifestly the inclination of the axis does not affect it at all. As its downward motion is being continuously reduced, its inertia causes it to exercise a pressure in the downward direction. This is indicated by a minus sign. Next, take the two corresponding points in the other half of the disc, which is,



Gyroscopic Disc.

"Manchester Guardian."

of course, rising on account of the inclination. The upward motion of the particle *m* is increasing all the time that its circular motion is taking it away from Q₁ and towards P₁; consequently, it exercises a downward pressure, and is marked with the minus sign. The particle *n* is having its upward velocity reduced all the time that it is moving from P₁ to Q, and consequently it exercises an upward pressure, and is marked with a plus sign. We have, therefore, two upward thrusting particles below the diameter P P₁, and two downward thrusting particles above this diameter. The thrust of each pair acts harmoniously, and the whole disc naturally tilts downward at Q₁, or at right angles to the inclination originally forced upon it.

How does this fundamental principle of rotating bodies apply to the flight of a bullet? In the first place, what would a bullet do if it did not rotate? It is difficult, if not impossible, to make a bullet which is perfectly proportioned and has its weight distributed quite symmetrically. If the manufacturer could be assured that all his bullets would be so made, then so long as they described a perfectly straight path through the air, as a bullet can be considered to do for a certain short distance after it leaves the muzzle, then there would be no need to invoke the aid of gyroscopic action. But in practice a bullet is not symmetrically weighted, and its



French soldiers being taught how to use the trench bomb-throwers.

[Photographic Service of the French Armies]



A French 220-mm. (8 1/2 in.) howitzer and its artillerymen in the Argonne.

[Official Photograph issued by the French War Office.]

path is not a straight line. So that from the very moment it leaves the muzzle it tends to turn so as to bring that point at which its weight may be considered to be concentrated undermost. Next, as the energy may be considered to be concentrated at the same point as the weight, the heavy part will tend to get in front of the lighter parts, which, though of course only in a comparatively small degree, act as the feathers of an arrow by offering a resistance to the wind rather than by contributing appreciable momentum to the missile. At this stage, therefore, we would have the bullet advancing more or less crab-fashion; and then a further cause of erratic flight would begin to act. In this way:

When any elongated body, whether a bullet, the wing of an aeroplane, or the rudder of a dirigible balloon, meets a stream of air at right angles to its main surface, the pressure of the air may be considered to be concentrated on the centre of the surface; but when the stream of air meets the surface obliquely the air pressure acts as though it were concentrated on a comparatively small area near the leading or forward edge of the surface. In the case of the bullet, this means that if the point is already tipped upwards through some irregularity of weight, the air pressure will tend to tip it up still further, and *vice-versa*. But if the bullet is rotating rapidly about an axis which is also the line of flight, any irregularity of weight is moved so rapidly from one side to the other that the bullet behaves virtually as if it were symmetrically weighted about its axis, and all would go well until the influence of gravity makes the bullet drop and begin to describe a curved path. Then, however symmetrically it was weighted, the pressure of the stream of air, which is now oblique to the bullet, acting on its underside and concentrated near the point, would cause the bullet to cant upwards.

It is here that the gyroscopic action in its full beauty gets to work. The forced inclination or precession of the nose upwards causes a natural gyroscopic precession


horizontally to the right (assuming that the bullet is revolving clockwise). If the action were to stop there, it would achieve nothing, but the action continues; the inclination to the right causes, in turn, a downward inclination, thus counteracting, at least to a very great extent, the original upward topple of the bullet. Actually,

of course, the cycle does not stop even at that, and the point of the bullet continues to trace out a spiral course of imperceptibly small diameter around the line of flight. The constraint thus imposed upon the bullet is analogous to the vertical position imposed upon the spinning top. There does remain, however, a small uncanceled balance of this repeated cycle of forces which results in the bullet taking a course slightly to the right or left of its original line of flight, according to whether the spin has been

clockwise or anti-clockwise. That is the price paid—but as it is computable beforehand it can be allowed for with certainty—for keeping the bullet nose-first against its natural tendency. The highest application of the principle is seen in a howitzer projectile, which is fired upwards at a high angle and yet contrives to drop on to its objective with its nose still in front.


Although rifling was essentially a Continental invention, and England was lamentably slow to appreciate it, the most remarkable and systematic development of the principle was ultimately made in England. Sir Joseph Whitworth, easily the greatest mechanic of his time, was invited, in 1860, to make rifles for the Government. He could not see his way to agree to the Government proposal in the form in which it was first made, but eventually he did very much more for them than they had asked, or they had sufficient imagination

to think possible. He experimented with different shapes of bullet and different types of rifling, varying the shape of the grooves, the degree of twist, and so on, till at last he produced a combination which was so much better than the product of the Government factory at Enfield that even the Government repre-



"THE ENGINEER"


German 15-pounder field gun (front view).



"THE ENGINEER"

German 15-pounder field gun (back view).

sentative reported that no comparison was possible. One of the conclusions to which he came was that the twist for a rifle musket bullet must not be less than



(Birmingham Small Arms Co. Ltd.)

The British Service Cartridge.


The British service cartridge with "blunt" bullet, as illustrated, weighs 215 grains, and has a muzzle velocity of 2,060 feet per second. This weight and velocity give it an energy, on leaving the muzzle, of 2,074 foot-pounds.

one turn in twenty inches, the minimum diameter of the barrel (bore) being 0.45 of an inch, for the amount of powder and the weight of bullet to which he was limited. In modern rifles a rather more rapid twist is

spin would damage the bullet in its passage through the barrel, and even may cause it to jam tight before it reaches the muzzle.

BULLETS.

The rifle bullet of to-day has a body or core of heavy metal to give the necessary weight, and an envelope of stronger metal to give such hardness as will ensure the penetration of the target. Out of this arises most, though perhaps not all, of the charges and counter-charges brought by one belligerent against another as to the use of "expansive," or "explosive," or "dum-dum" bullets—terms which are often erroneously supposed to be synonymous. The bullet made of pure soft lead flattens out when it meets much resistance. On that account it cannot penetrate far, but it makes a relatively large and ragged wound. A hard-cased, sharp-nosed




(Birmingham Small Arms Co. Ltd.)

The British Service Rifle.

The British Service Rifle is the Lee-Enfield Magazine Short Mark III. pattern. In spite of its comparatively short barrel it gives the same velocity to the .303 service bullet as the longer and old pattern of service rifle, and it is fitted with better sights. These allow fine vertical and lateral screw adjustments.

found to answer better for the longer ranges made possible by more powerful explosives than were used in Whitworth's time. The greater the spin the greater the gyroscopic effect, and the straighter the flight of

bullet may go through several men in succession, leaving each with such a clean and painless wound that they may not know for some little time afterwards that they have been hit. The legitimate field for the "expansive"



The Breech and Action of a Lee-Enfield Magazine Rifle.

(Birmingham Small Arms Co. Ltd.)

When the magazine, *l*, is detached (the catch, *G*, having been released by finger pressure) by pulling it downwards, 12 cartridges are inserted. To accommodate them as they are pressed in by hand, the platform, *J*, recedes downward against the pressure of the spring, *K*. With the magazine in place again, drawing back the bolt, *l* (by means of a handle—not shown—on the cocking piece, *C*), allows the cartridges to be raised by the spring, *K*, so that the uppermost one comes in line with the axis of the barrel, *Q*. On returning the bolt to its original position the cartridge is thrust into the chamber, *R*, the nose of the bullet reaching the chamfered ends (*R*¹) of the rifling (*R*²). The striker, *A*, however, does not return with the bolt, but is retained in a rearward position by the upper extremity of the sear, *D* (thrust upwards by the spring, *F*), engaging with the recess in the under part of the cocking piece, *C*. Pressure on the trigger, *E*, overcomes the resistance of *F*, and releases the sear from the cocking piece. This, together with the striker, *A*, which is fixed to it at the right-hand end, is at once driven smartly forward by the coiled spring, *B*, and the point of the striker fires the cartridge (position as shown).

T is the wooden handguard round the barrel; *P*, the fore end; *S*, the action body; *U*, the screw retaining the magazine by means of the loose link coupling; *V*, the trigger guard, which is extended forward around the magazine and secured under the head of the screw *U*; *O*, the wooden stock or butt; *N*, the bolt securing the rifle to the stock; *A*¹, the striker keeper-screw; and *M*, the charger guide bridge.


the bullet. The limiting conditions to the rapidity of spin are that it must not impose too severe a strain upon the rifling or upon the bullet itself.

bullet is in the shooting of big game, but unfortunately anyone can make such a missile by taking an ordinary hard-cased bullet and stripping off the case at the

point, so that the soft metal is free to expand or "mushroom" when it hits a bone. In the East such bullets, under the name of "Dum-dum," where they are supposed to have first been made, have been used against wildly charging fanatics, who would fight furiously perhaps for hours after being struck by the ordinary hard-nosed bullet unless it had reached a vital organ. Another way of producing an expanding bullet is to drill a small hole axially into the point. This device produces little effect when used against hard substances, but where, as in the human body, the target is mostly composed of fluid, the hydraulic pressure acting inside the hole conduces to the spreading out of the nose. Bullets treated in these ways, either by authority or surreptitiously, may easily open out so much in the flesh as to cause wounds which nurses, and sometimes even doctors, think could only be caused by "explosive" bullets. These, sometimes a necessity for the hunter, have probably never been used in warfare between civilised people. They are simply small shells containing a charge of explosive to be detonated by contact with the target in the same manner as a familiar class of big-gun shell. They certainly cannot be produced privately by a soldier in the field.

attached to it. Again it fell into disuetude, and so remained until at last the Prussian military authorities took it up in earnest. At the outbreak of war in 1914 it was the standard missile for field artillery, but after some months of trench fighting it became evident that an ordinary high-explosive shell had a greater use. It can destroy trenches, while shrapnel cannot.

There, then, are the two main types of explosive shell. The shrapnel so far has not been sub-divided into any distinct classes, but the ordinary kind takes on three forms which are properly recognised as distinct in function. There is the common hell, which has a certain penetrating effect and a certain bursting effect. It is varied in one direction by increasing the penetrative effect at the expense of the bursting effect, and is then known as an armour-piercing shell. In the other direction it is varied to have a relatively small penetrative effect but a very great bursting effect, and is then known as a high-explosive shell. The reason that the bursting effect is small in the armour-piercing shell is because, in order to make the walls of this shell strong enough to hold together on meeting an armour plate, the space for the bursting charge is necessarily made small. And the reason the high-explosive shell has relatively little penetrative effect is because, used as it



SHELLS.

We saw at the beginning of this chapter how cordite permitted a greater weight of projectile, and how for reasons which were then explained this increased weight was associated with increased length. By making the projectile hollow, the increment in length is greater than that in weight. This, unless qualified in some way, would, on the balance, reduce the destructive power of a projectile; but by filling the hollow space with a high-explosive substance, the destructive effect is actually increased. The shell explodes either on hitting its objective or just before. In the former case the pieces of the broken shell add to the destruction already wrought by the impact of the shell as a whole; in the latter case the destruction is wrought by a number of bullets, included in the hollow space together with the bursting charge, which fly on, exploding as they go. This is shrapnel, and is used against troops in the field. The ordinary bursting shell is used against gun positions or fortifications of one kind or another. Curiously enough, shrapnel was not first invented by the general officer of that name, with whom it is popularly associated. So far as the records tell us, it was used first in an improvised form by a Captain Mercier at the siege of Gibraltar; but though it was largely, if not wholly, instrumental in turning failure into success there, it did not meet subsequently with official favour. Later on, General Shrapnel, probably ignorant of Mercier's work, revived the idea, at any rate sufficiently to have his name


is against unarmoured positions, it is best to make its walls thin, and so to contain a greater amount of explosive for a given diameter.

It is interesting to observe how the development of these three types of shell has pushed the old solid shot out of existence. At one time the solid shot, whether of spherical or ogival shape, was invaluable for piercing armour. It can pierce armour still, but the destruction it causes may be limited to a hole only slightly bigger than itself. It might go right through a ship or a fort and do no significant damage whatever, whereas an armour-piercing explosive shell bursts while it pierces, doing much more damage to the armour, and probably dealing direct destruction to personnel as well.

In recent years armour-piercing shells have been greatly improved by placing on the nose a cap of relatively soft metal. Often this cap is not itself of pointed shape. Its action is curious. When the efficiency of armour plate had been improved to a point at which it scored a complete victory over the projectile, the maker of these found himself in this dilemma: if he made his noses harder than the armour plate they became too brittle, and shattered under the shock of impact; and if he tried to toughen his noses they became softer than the plate. One naturally asks why it should be possible to get a combination of hardness and toughness in a plate which was impossible to get in a projectile? It is because the plate is a compound affair, with a hard metal layer to the front and a tough metal

layer behind it. The problem was solved by accident in 1878. A compound armour-plate target was inadvertently erected with its soft side forward. The projectiles fired at it not only penetrated the soft layer, as they might have been expected to do in any case, but successfully broke down the hard metal behind. The phenomenon suggested to Captain English the plan of putting a comparatively soft-metal cap over the nose of the projectile to act as a sort of buffer between it and the hard surface plate. His experiments were immediately successful;

but, history repeating itself, the authorities were unsympathetic, and the idea was dropped until it was taken up seriously by the Russian authorities about sixteen years later. Now the cap is virtually a standard part of all armour-piercing projectiles. It distributes the shock of impact instead of allowing it to be concentrated at the very point of the nose, and it holds the nose together so that the tip of it is not driven backwards in the form of a conical wedge, tending to split the shell.



BRITISH 18-POUNDER GUN.

The gun barrel, 1, consists of an inner tube, wire wrapped for about two feet of its length at the hind or breech end, and an outer tube embracing the whole length. To each side of the outer tube is rigidly attached a guide rib, 2. These ribs support the gun in the cradle, preventing it from dropping, but allowing it to slide backwards under the recoil shock of firing. The backward movement is controlled and limited by the springs and hydraulic buffer contained (the buffer in the centre and the springs coiled concentrically around its whole length) inside the cylindrical case, 3. The cradle, 4, has trunnions projecting from it, one on each side, which engage in bearings in the carriage body, 9, so that the gun can swivel in the vertical plane; and the carriage body in turn is attached underneath to the axletree in such a way that it is free to be swivelled from side to side. The combined movements allow the gun to be pointed, within limits, in any direction without moving the trail, 10. Attached to the breech, 5, which is of an ordinary "interrupted screw" type, is the firing gear, 6. Pulling back the handle fixed to the curved rod fires the gun, and the spring, 7, afterwards restores the gear to its original position. The plate, 8, shields the gun-layer from the movements of this mechanism while the gun is in action. The spade, 11, by its hold in the ground prevents the carriage from moving back when the gun is fired. The wheel brakes, applied by the handle, 16, help in this. If necessary, the carriage, as a whole, can be swung round by the traversing lever and lifting handles, 12 and 13. The shield, 14 and 15, protects the men working the gun from hostile rifle fire.


Traversing, *i.e.*, swivelling the gun in the horizontal plane, is effected by the handwheel, 21, attached to a screw running through the hind end of the carriage body, 9, which is thus caused to move to either side as required. The mechanism for elevating the gun, *i.e.*, swivelling it in the vertical plane, is not quite so simple, although it also is a screw and nut combination. The complication is caused by the requirement of having the sights, to some extent, independent of the gun. The handwheel, 17, works, through bevel gearing, a nut on the lower part of the elevating screw, 18, the upper extremity of which is attached to the cradle of the gun and whose lower extremity is protected by the case, 19. From the middle portion of the elevating screw a connecting rod, 27, is taken to the rocking

bar, 22, which carries the sights. The forward end of the rocking bar is, like the cradle, pivoted to the carriage body. Hence, turning the handwheel, 17, alters the elevation of the gun and the sights simultaneously. In this way, with the elevating wheel, 17, and the traversing wheel, 21, gun and sights are aimed in the first place; and if the target were so close that the trajectory of the projectile would be quite straight, the gun might at once be fired. But it is virtually always necessary to give the gun some additional elevation; and it is here that the upper part of the elevating screw, 20, which can just be seen behind the connecting rod, 27, functions. The upper end of this screw is not attached unalterably to the cradle of the gun. The connection is made through a nut and bevel gear in much the same way as at 17, except that turning 17 moves the screw bodily up and down, while turning the upper gear (by a handwheel to the right of the gun, and consequently not shown in the drawing) does not move the screw, but moves the cradle up or down on it. It is clear, therefore, that any elevation given to the gun by the upper gear does not affect the position of the sights, which is controlled by the position of the elevating screw only. It saves confusion if this upper elevating gear is called the ranging gear. Its object is to give the gun only the extra elevation necessary to agree with the range, and for this purpose the operating hand-wheel is provided with a graduated disc and pointer (not visible in the picture). The gun-layer, therefore, can aim the gun as he likes with the elevating and traversing wheels, keeping his sights always on the objective, while another man at the ranging wheel receives telephonic, or other, instructions as to the distances of the objects aimed at, and so puts the correct "range" on the gun.


The sights mounted on the rocking bar consist of ordinary open sights fixed to the tubular bar, 26, the foresight, 24, being of the adjustable acorn pattern and the hind sight, 25, of the ordinary notched leaf pattern, roughly similar to rifle sights; and the alternative telescopic sight, 23. The latter is the most used. It is very accurate, and has the great advantage that it does not tire the eye through the effort, unavoidable with open sights, at focusing the vision on near and distant objects simultaneously. Both types of sight are carried on the rocking bar, 22, to which is added a clinometer, or spirit level, and certain minor but very necessary appliances.

ARTILLERY.

Artillery may be horse artillery, in which the guns are comparatively light and mobile; field artillery, which is larger and more powerful; heavy artillery, more powerful still, and used against the enemy's guns as well as against his personnel; howitzers and siege guns. The first two kinds of guns were usually considered to be shrapnel-firing weapons before the war; but, under the need for damaging trenches before they could effectively reach the men in them, all the belligerents soon turned to high-explosive shells for guns of all sizes.



In the war the most used piece of artillery has been the quick-firing field gun. The most interesting example of it is the French 75 millimetre (bore), the famous *Soixante-quinze*. It is not a new gun. According to *The Engineer*, to which journal we are also indebted for our illustrations of the mechanism of this and some of the enemies' guns, two such famous artillerists as Depont and Sainte-Claire Deville had a hand in its design, which was completed in 1897. It represented the first real attempt to produce a field piece that could be truly called a quick-firer. According to *The Engineer*, it can fire twenty rounds a minute, a speed not exceeded much, if at all, by any later gun. The breech is unusual, as it is not closed in the familiar way by an "interrupted" screw thread, nor by a sliding block. It is closed by a revolving block, the axis of which does not coincide with the axis of the gun. At one place a deep notch is cut in this block, and when the block is revolved into a certain position the notch coincides with the bore of the gun, and so allows the cartridge to be passed in. Half a turn of the block moves the notch away from the gun bore and closes the breech. As shown in the figure, the block is rotated by a hand-lever.



["The Engineer."


Breech block of French 75 mm. field gun.

The most typical British field piece is the eighteen-pounder quick-firer, which has a bore of 3.3 inches and a length of 92.62 inches. The length of the rifled part of the barrel is 80.232 inches, and the rifling consists of eighteen grooves, each 0.384 inch wide, 0.04 inch deep, and having a continuous uniform twist at the rate of one complete turn in 99 inches. The breech mechanism is of the familiar interrupted-screw type. That is to say, the block, instead of being screwed into the breech, as a bolt is screwed into a nut—which would be a very slow process indeed, and would make the gun the very reverse

of a quick-firer—is locked into position by a quarter-turn. The recoil cylinder is placed above the gun, and contains the hydraulic buffer which takes the force of the recoil and the spiral springs which thrust the gun forward again ready for the next shot. The gun is provided with both open and telescopic sights, as shown in the illustration. The general method of sighting this, or any gun of the sort, is the same as for sighting small arms, with the important reservation that in the small arm the sights are subject to any change in the vertical or horizontal attitude of the piece, and in the field gun they are not. The gun can be elevated or depressed without elevating or depressing the sights, which can thus be kept continuously on the target while any necessary change of elevation is being made. This is shown in a diagram. The gun itself consists of an inner and an outer steel tube, the inner one being wire-wound for some little distance at the breech end. It weighs, with its breech mechanism, 9 cwt.

A TYPICAL ENEMY GUN.

The chief piece of light artillery in use against us, at any rate in the earlier stages of the war, was the very mediocre German fifteen-pounder quick-firing field gun.



["The Engineer."

Time and Percussion Fuse for Shell.

The drawing is diagrammatic only, but it shows the relation of the several essential parts of a shell nose fuse better than a perfectly correct drawing would. The fuse proper is a filament of slow burning mixture, O, laid spirally round the hollow conical-shaped metal chamber at the nose of the shell. The hammer, M, being only held in the position shown by a light spring, drags behind when the shell is fired and, compressing the spring, strikes the detonating mixture at C, which inflames the ring of compressed powder, X. The flame from this ignites the fuse at the point, Y, where the metal has been previously punctured and burns round the spiral, the bottom extremity of which is in communication with the main explosive charge in the shell. The time between the firing of the gun and the bursting of the shell is regulated by the position of the puncture, Y, which is made by the gunners before the shell is placed in the gun.

The remaining pieces of mechanism are for the purpose of bursting the shell by percussion when it strikes an object, if it has not already burst through the action of the time fuse. When the shell is fired the short tubular piece, m, by reason of its inertia, compresses the spring R, and the pawls, G, inside m, engage with the notched teeth outside the fuse tube, B. During the flight of the shell, therefore, m, B, and R behave virtually as one piece. On the impact of the shell with any hard body, the inertia of these parts carries them forward, compressing the light spring R', so that the point of S strikes the detonating cap a, and the instant fuse in B is ignited.


The particular shell to which these details apply is the French 75 mm.

According to *The Engineer*, it gives a muzzle velocity of only 1,525 feet per second, which is more than 200 feet per second less than the comparable French "*Soixante-quinze*." This low speed entails a highly-curved trajectory for the shell, and that, in turn, means that when using shrapnel the bullets are not projected so far forward after the shell has burst as they are from a shell travelling more nearly in a horizontal direction. They do not "spray" over so great an area of ground. But it is a strong and simple gun. The breech closes on the principle of a simple wedge. The recoil cylinder is below the gun barrel.



Two photographs of British wounded returning to a dressing station after an attack.

(Official photographs taken by permission of the War Office, and passed by the Chief Field Censor for publication.)
 (Central Press.)
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A Red Cross steamer at sea.

[Central News.

CHAPTER XVI.


THE CASUALTIES.

THE UNPRECEDENTED MAGNITUDE OF THE WAR—THE BRITISH CASUALTIES ON THE SEVERAL FRONTS AND THE SEVERAL PERIODS—THE LOSSES OF OUR ALLIES—ESTIMATES OF GERMAN LOSSES—THE WAR OF ATTRITION.

THE hundredth anniversary of the Battle of Waterloo, which occurred on July 18th, 1915, passed almost unnoticed in this country, for every one felt instinctively that he was living in the midst of events which, in the magnitude of their terror, surpassed anything ever known in our history, or in the history of the world. The size of the armies engaged dwarfed even the wildest exaggerations of Herodotus. A very moderate estimate would make the total number of troops at the front, as distinguished from those in training at the bases, nearly sixteen millions, made up as follows:—

	Millions.
Russia.....	3
Austria.....	2½
Germany.....	4½
Italy.....	1—1½
France.....	3
The Eastern Powers.....	1
Great Britain.....	1
Belgium.....	½

The number of Russian troops has certainly been exaggerated, and it is very doubtful whether she ever had more than two million troops at any one time actually fighting on her European frontiers, but, including her Caucasus front and her strong reserves behind the fighting line, the number assigned must be well within the mark. If, again, the figures for Italy seem liberal, the figures for Austria, which are probably low, correct the excess. Add the numbers in reserve at any given time, and we cannot put the total at less than thirty millions. Nothing like these figures has ever been known before in the history of the world. And it must be remembered that the figure of fifteen millions is only the number of men engaged at any given time. Most of the armies used up their quota of the total at least once, Russia and Austria perhaps oftener. With all the countries, the numbers of men engaged were out of proportion with anything known before; and with our own country monstrously so. At Waterloo there were fewer than 24,000 British troops engaged, and the casualties amongst them, which made Wellington weep,



Red Cross workers at Nish with Serbian wounded.

[Central News.



The Russian Minister of War inspecting a Red Cross train leaving for the front.

CC-0. Jangamwadi Math Collection. Digitized by eGangotri [Underwood and Underwood.

were less than 7,000. At Neuve Chapelle we lost nearly as many men as survived at Waterloo. The total number of British lives lost in action in the Crimean War was less than 3,000, a figure which was exceeded in a single month of the Dardanelles campaign.

BRITISH LOSSES IN OFFICERS.

No nation has been so frank in its statements of its casualties as this country, and it would be possible by a very careful study of them to approximate to a fairly accurate calculation of the casualties in the reported battles. But the War Office obviously, by its system of issuing the casualties, did not wish to make these calculations easy, and it is not advisable that curiosity should take advantage of official frankness in publishing complete lists. Sometimes, though rarely, the figures for a complete action, or a series of operations, have been given. In the retreat from Mons, for example, our casualties were given as 15,142; in the month of September 12th to October 8th, which included the Battle of the Aisne, our losses were 561 officers and 12,980 men; at Neuve Chapelle, in the three days' fighting, the casualty lists contained the names of 572 officers and 12,239 men; and the losses in the landing in Gallipoli were 602 officers and 13,377 other ranks. The losses in these battles were on the scale of the big battles of the American Civil War—at Gettysburg, for example, the Federals lost about 13,709 officers and men, and the Confederates about a thousand more—but in these the numbers engaged were considerably larger. In all the major battles there were regiments which lost half, or even three-quarters, of their men. The following table, abstracted from the day-to-day casualty lists for the first three months of the war (down to November 19th), will give some idea of the drain in officers, and will explain a difficulty which became greater as the war progressed, for the lives lost at the beginning of the war were those of men who had made the army their professional career, and could not, therefore, be replaced by officers who though equal in valour could not be equal in experience.

	Killed.	Wounded.	Wounded and Missing.	Missing.	Prisoners.
Army Service Corps	—	3	—	—	4 (1)
Army Veterinary Corps	2	2	—	—	—
Royal Field Artillery	36	104	2	2	14 (3)
Royal Garrison Artillery	4	6	—	—	—
Royal Horse Artillery	8	8	—	1	1 (1)
Royal Artillery	1	2	—	—	1
Bedford Regiment	20	21	2	4	1
Berkshire Regiment	5	9	—	—	1
Bucks. Yeomanry	—	—	—	—	1
Border Regiment	10	6	3	—	1
Cheshire Regiment	6	7	2	7	14 (6)
Cambridge Regiment	—	—	—	—	1
Duke of Wellington's	4	5	—	—	4 (2)
Derbyshire Yeomanry	—	1	—	—	—
Duke of Cornwall's Light Infantry	6	16	1	5	3 (1)
Durham Light Infantry	10	13	—	1	—
Dorset Regiment	10	14	—	5	6 (3)
Devon Regiment	7	13	—	—	—
Royal Engineers	13	25	3	2	2 (1)
Essex Regiment	4	6	—	1	1
Lancashire Fusiliers	5	13	3	2	2
Northumberland Fusiliers	10	14	2	2	—
Royal Flying Corps	4	3	—	1	1
Royal Fusiliers	8	23	5	4	2 (1)
1st Royal Dragoons	3	3	—	—	—
2nd Dragoons (Scots Greys)	2	5	—	1	—
1st Dragoon Guards	2	1	—	—	—
2nd Dragoon Guards	4	13	—	1	—
3rd Dragoon Guards	—	—	—	—	—
4th (R.I.) Dragoon Guards	6	13	—	—	3
5th Dragoon Guards	6	9	—	—	1
6th Dragoon Guards	1	5	—	2	—
7th Dragoon Guards	—	2	—	—	—
Royal Horse Guards	5	5	—	1	—
Coldstream Guards	18	48	—	10	—
Grenadier Guards	15	20	4	4	—
1st Life Guards	3	9	1	1	—
2nd Life Guards	3	10	—	—	2
Gloucester Regiment	11	17	1	3	—
3rd Hussars	1	10	—	1	—
4th Hussars	5	5	—	—	—
7th Hussars	—	2	—	—	—
10th Hussars	2	4	—	—	—
11th Hussars	3	11	—	—	1
13th Hussars	2	3	—	—	—
14th Hussars	—	1	—	—	—
15th Hussars	3	3	1	—	1
18th Hussars	2	8	—	1	1
19th Hussars	2	1	—	—	1
20th Hussars	4	3	—	—	1
Hampshire Regiment	7	10	2	1	2
Intelligence Corps	2	4	—	—	4
West Kent Regiment	14	9	1	1	1 (1)
East Kent Regiment	6	11	1	4	—
West Kent Yeomanry	1	—	—	—	—
Leicester Regiment	6	11	—	1	—
Lincoln Regiment	6	21	3	1	2
5th (R.I.) Lancers	3	6	—	1	1
9th Lancers	8	14	1	1	1
12th Lancers	6	5	—	—	2 (1)
16th Lancers	2	9	—	—	—
21st Lancers	—	5	—	—	—
East Lancashire Regiment	6	7	2	—	2
South Lancashire Regiment	9	10	1	5	3 (1)
Loyal North Lancashire Regiment	11	17	—	9	2 (1)
King's Own Royal Lancasters	10	19	1	2	3 (2)
Liverpool Regiment	10	17	—	2	—
Manchester Regiment	7	10	—	8	4 (3)
Middlesex Regiment	12	19	3	3	9 (1)
Norfolk Regiment	3	10	2	2	3 (2)
Northumberland Yeomanry	—	5	—	—	—
Oxfordshire Yeomanry	1	—	—	—	—
Northampton Regiment	11	17	—	1	—
Oxford and Bucks. Light Infantry	10	12	—	—	2 (2)
R.A.M.C.	22	20	2	14	44 (2)
Rifle Brigade	5	21	3	1	—
K.R. Rifle Corps	11	35	—	10	2 (1)
Somerset Light Infantry	1	10	5	—	2
West Surrey Regiment	12	37	2	1	1 (1)
East Surrey Regiment	6	20	—	—	3 (2)
Suffolk Regiment	3	3	—	3	21 (9)
Sussex Regiment	13	13	1	1	—
Shropshire Light Infantry	4	8	—	—	—
South Stafford Regiment	9	21	1	2	—
North Stafford Regiment	8	5	—	—	—
Warwickshire Regiment	9	17	—	8	12 (5)
Wiltshire Regiment	10	12	—	10	11 (2)
Worcester Regiment	20	23	—	2	2 (2)
K.O. Yorkshire Light Infantry	5	6	—	2	2 (2)
York and Lancaster Regiment	3	11	—	—	—
Yorkshire Regiment	6	11	3	2	1
West Riding Regiment	—	6	—	—	—
West Yorkshire Regiment	13	9	—	2	7 (3)
East Yorkshire Regiment	8	9	—	5	—
Sherwood Foresters	7	12	—	7	5
Army Chaplains' Department	—	1	—	—	—

WELSH REGIMENTS.

Welsh Fusiliers	15	18	1	—	4 (1)
South Wales Borderers	10	11	—	1	—
Welsh Regiment	8	17	1	2	1 (1)


SCOTTISH REGIMENTS.

London Scottish	1	8	—	—	—
Scots Fusiliers	8	23	6	8	1
Gordon Highlanders	11	23	1	10	14 (3)



German prisoners marching past General Joffre on their way to the rear of the French lines.

[Central News.]



A German ambulance corps with their dogs.

[Newspaper Illustrations.]

	Killed.	Wounded.	Wounded and Missing.	Missing.	Prisoners.
<i>SCOTTISH REGIMENTS—continued.</i>					
Scots Guards.....	20	19	—	10	1
Argyll and Southern Highlanders ..	2	4	—	13	1
Black Watch.....	9	23	3	4	—
Cameron Highlanders	9	21	7	2	1 (1)
Royal Scots.....	6	18	—	1	5 (2)
Highland Light Infantry	5	13	—	—	—
Cameronians	3	4	—	2	—
Scottish Borderers	10	9	1	4	5 (2)
Seaforth Highlanders	4	14	—	1	—

Connaught Rangers	16	11	1	2	5 (1)
Dublin Fusiliers	2	3	—	—	8 (3)
Munster Fusiliers	2	2	—	9	10 (2)
Inniskilling Fusiliers	8	18	—	1	1 (1)
Irish Fusiliers	3	8	1	—	1
Irish Guards	8	18	2	1	—
Leinster Regiment	4	10	—	—	3
Irish Regiment	4	12	—	13	7 (4)
Irish Rifles	8	18	—	2	4 (1)
North Irish Horse	—	—	—	1	—

This drain of officers was accelerated in the later quarters of the first year.

From time to time official totals of the casualties were made public in answer to questions in Parliament, and these summaries, though they were not compiled on any uniform system that would make exact comparison easy between the losses in various places and periods, are still very instructive. The figures in the following table are not to be read as the losses in the periods between the dates, but stand for the total losses up to the date of the entry, and include the previous figures :—

By September 7th	18,729	
October 31st	57,000	
February 4th.....	104,000	
April 11th	139,347	
May 31st	258,069	(Dardanelles only.)
June 30th	—	.. 42,434
July 18th	330,580	.. 46,622
August 21st	391,088	.. —

	FRANCE.	
	Officers.	Men.
Killed	3,293 ..	48,402
Wounded	6,807 ..	156,435
Missing	1,207 ..	53,375
	<hr/> 11,307 ..	<hr/> 258,212 = 269,519


Killed	562	..	7,537
Wounded	1,375	..	28,508
Missing	154	..	8,486

2,091

	Officers.		Men.	
Killed	145	..	1,445	
Wounded	248	..	3,247	
Missing	22	..	641	
	<hr/>		<hr/>	
	415	..	5,333	= 5,748
	NAVAL.			
Killed	489	..	7,430	
Wounded	87	..	787	
Missing	29	..	274	
	<hr/>		<hr/>	
	615	..	8,491	= 9,106

THE BLACK MAY.

The period in which our losses took the greatest leap was between the middle of April and the end of May. In the two months ending April 11th, our losses were



A British dressing station in Gallipoli in the shelter of a rock cliff. Just over the top of the crest can be seen the smoke from a bursting Turkish shell. [Central News.]



The Dardanelles operations: Slightly-wounded men waiting in a dugout near an advanced dressing station. [Central News.]

only just over 35,000, although this included the Battle of Neuve Chapelle. But in the next six weeks our losses rose from 139,347 to 258,069, an increase equal to the whole of our losses in the first six months of the war. The later figure, it is true, includes the losses incurred in the landing on Gallipoli (April 23rd), and the fighting for the possession of Krithia and Achi Baba in May, but even when a liberal deduction has been made on their accounts, the remaining losses were not far from 100,000, nearly all of which were incurred in the fighting round Ypres, and in supporting as well as we could the first French offensive towards Arras. In other words, the defeat of the second German attack on Ypres in the spring cost us as much as the autumn campaign from the time that we

left the Aisne, the whole of the winter campaign, and the advance on Neuve Chapelle combined. Before the fighting at Ypres began, our mood was one of great confidence; these losses, though the extreme gravity of the military situation was not realised at the time, changed it to one of anxiety. After the end of May, the rate of our losses in the west declined very sharply. June and July, with a rapidly increasing army, each added no more than we had lost in the first month of the war in an army one-tenth of its size. On the other hand, the casualties in the Dardanelles were approaching 50,000 by the end of July, and in August they took a great upward bound. It is probable that, taking into account

the cases of sickness, which do not appear in the casualty lists, the Dardanelles, after the beginning of August, was the most costly campaign in relation to the numbers engaged. But in the gross number of casualties, nothing in the war approached the fighting round Ypres, beginning with the attack on Hill 60, on April 17th, and the fighting for the Aubers Ridge.

THE FRENCH AND RUSSIAN LOSSES.

Neither the French nor the Russians have published lists of their casualties, and attempts to estimate their number are little better than guess-work. But the French losses were undoubtedly heavy, especially in the first

month of the war, when they suffered a series of heavy defeats. Up to the end of October they cannot have been far short of half a million killed, wounded, and prisoners, or more than ten times the casualties of our own army. The rate afterwards slackened, but the French attacks during the winter were usually costly. The fighting in Champagne, for example, in February, cost 40,000 casualties, and the cost of General Foch's first offensive from Arras was much higher. At the end of the first year of the war, these losses must have been approaching two millions, which, however, was not all real loss. The Russian casualties were much heavier, especially in prisoners. Before the German advance from Warsaw had been checked, their losses in prisoners

alone must have been over 1,500,000, which, on the British proportion, would represent an incredible number of total casualties. If we accept the view, for which there is some support, that the strength of the Russian army in the fighting line in Europe never exceeded two millions, this army must have been lost and re-created twice over, at least, in the first thirteen or fourteen months of the war.

THE GERMAN LOSSES.

At the beginning of the war the German newspapers published full casualty lists, which, though often very belated, were a model in their arrangement of what those lists should be. After that, the Government forbade the publication of complete lists, or any attempt to esti-

mate in print from the local lists what the total German casualties were. In trying to form an estimate of what they amounted to in the first twelve months, it is best to begin by setting out the figures which are based on the addition of the numbers published in the various official lists. These original lists (except such as were published in the newspapers at the beginning of the war) have not, of course, reached this country, and we are dependent for our knowledge of them on calculations made in various neutral countries. Official neutral calculations seem to have yielded very different results, but, such as they are, we reproduce them. It should be noted that the figures are of little use in



German prisoners captured by the French being marched to the rear of the lines. [Central News.]



French wounded being removed during an attack to a farm in the rear of the lines.

[Topical Press.]



British wounded being conveyed from a French hospital train to a general base hospital.

[Central News.]



Dutch soldiers firing a salute at the funeral of 29 British sailors, whose bodies were washed ashore in Holland after the torpedoing of the *Aboukir*, *Hogue* and *Cressy*.

[Newspaper Illustrations.]

estimating the casualties in any given period, and still less in any given action, for the successive lists bear very small relation to the chronological sequence of the actions in which the losses were incurred. Prussia, Bavaria, Saxony, and Württemberg all publish separate lists. The word in brackets after the totals gives the source of the calculations.

CASUALTIES REPORTED.

October	7	Killed	36,531	
		Wounded	153,165	
		Missing	55,622	
			245,318	(Zurich).
October	31	(Prussian only)	601,438	(Copenhagen).
December	16	(Prussian only)	717,319	
		(Prussian & Bavarian) 1,000,000		
		(Saxon & Württemberg) 200,000		
			1,200,000	(Copenhagen).
December	20	(Lists 96, 97, 98 and 99)	22,601	(Amsterdam).
		(Yser losses only)	30,000	(Amsterdam).
February	21	(Prussian only)	1,250,000	(Copenhagen).
March	31	(Prussian only)	1,500,000	(Copenhagen).
May 1-July 1		(Eastern front only)	260,000	(Copenhagen).
June	30	(German)	1,672,444	(British Press Bureau).
July	31	(German)	2,178,683	(Land & Water, Sept. 14th).
August	24	(Prussian only)	1,740,836	(Rotterdam).
September	28	(Prussian only)	1,916,148	(Rotterdam.)

The dates on the left of this table are the dates of the last casualty list included in the calculation of totals,

and the figures opposite them do not, therefore, give the total casualties up to that time, as the British totals do. On the basis of the figures given by the Copenhagen calculation of December 16th, the proportion of Prussian to total casualties would seem to be seven to twelve, but it is hardly safe to accept this proportion as one that favourably holds, for Prussia or the other States may have been prompter in publishing their returns. It is better, perhaps, to calculate the proportion of Prussian losses as two-thirds of the whole; and on that basis, the grand total of German casualties announced in casualty lists by the end of the first year would be 2,611,254 (1,740,836 Prussian plus 870,418 Saxon, Bavarian, and Württemberg). Inasmuch as the German lists are usually very belated, it would be safer to take the figures for September 28th as the figures for the officially announced casualties in the first year's fighting—say, in round numbers, 3,000,000. That is to say, the German casualties for the first year were from seven to eight times as heavy as our own in the same period.

We have now to take note of calculations other than those based on the German official lists. There have been several official French calculations and one British calculation of a semi-official character. The English writer who has given most study to the question of German losses is Mr. Belloc.

THE FRENCH OFFICIAL CALCULATIONS.

The official French estimate of German losses is 260,000 a month, which would give for the first twelve months

3,120,000, much the same figure we have reached from the German casualty lists. The French Official Review of the First Six Months gives some interesting particulars of losses in certain regiments which are obtained from note-books and documents found on officers killed or taken prisoners.

"The 13th Bavarian Regiment in a month and a half (August to September) lost 3,250 men. The 171st Regiment, from the middle of August to the middle of November, lost 2,500 men and 60 officers. The 99th Regiment in the same period had equal losses. The 15th Regiment on the 18th October alone lost 1,786 men and 37 officers. The 132nd Regiment lost, on November 16th, near Ypres, 1,390 men. The losses were still higher in the new formations. The 205th Regiment had 2,040 men *hors de combat* in one battle on the Yser. The 235th Regiment lost 1,320. The 244th Regiment 2,150. The 247th Regiment, in that same battle, 1,900. The 248th Regiment 1,800. The 17th Bavarian Reserve Regiment lost, at Messines and Wyt-schaete, 30 officers and 2,171 men."

The total losses in ten days fighting on the Yser front at the end of October and the beginning of November are estimated by the same authority to have exceeded 150,000 men, and may perhaps have reached 200,000 men.

A BRITISH ESTIMATE.

In a Prize Court Case heard before Sir Samuel Evans, in August, an affidavit was put in evidence by Major Eric Dillon, of the War Office General Staff, in which the number of German troops under arms at the two fronts was estimated at 4,000,000, the number in training at 750,000, and the casualties at 2,000,000. By "casualties" in this connection seems to have been meant the number of men off the strength of the army at one time through sickness or wounds; the figure excludes prisoners and killed. On August 25th there was published "from a well-informed quarter" an estimate, evidently semi-official, of the German casualties. After putting the strength of the German and Austrian armies on the two fronts at rather more than 4½ millions (1,800,000 on the west front, and 2,520,000 on the east)—a very low figure—the compilers of this estimate proceeded:—

"From soon after the outbreak of war the Germans have supplied losses in their first-line and reserve troops by men from second and even third line troops (Landwehr and Landsturm), and it is no longer possible to speak with accuracy of German first-line troops as distinguished from second and third line troops. It is safer to regard all the German troops in the fighting line as of much the same quality, for whilst the original first-line has been largely supplied from the second and third lines, the two latter classes contain a considerable leavening of first-line and reserve troops.

"In the first few months of the war it is calculated that the first-line troops lost about 50 per cent in casualties and the reserve about 25 per cent. Their places were taken by the recruits of 1914 and by men from the other categories. The re-formed units (including now the 1915 class of recruits) have since then again lost about 50 per

cent in casualties, so that it is probable that there remain only about 25 per cent of the original first line troops, to which must be added men slightly wounded who have returned to the fighting line.

"The German casualties in killed, wounded, and missing, officially reported up to the 30th June, totalled 1,672,444 men. Of this number, 306,123 were killed, 15,808 died of disease, whilst 540,723 were either missing, prisoners, or so seriously wounded as to be put out of action for the rest of the war.

"There has been very heavy fighting on both fronts since the beginning of June, and a large proportion of the casualties for June, as well as the whole of those for the later period, are not included in the 1,672,444, because they have not yet been reported.

"Estimating the total loss for the twelve months, provisionally, at 2,000,000 (if we accept the official statement of 1,672,444 in ten months as correct), and assuming that something like 500,000 were only slightly wounded

and have now recovered, the effective loss (men who can never fight again) may fairly be taken to reach 1,000,000. In addition, there are probably 500,000 wounded who are absent from the front on leave, in hospital, &c. This makes a total net loss of 1,500,000 in the twelve months, and of these at least 400,000 to 450,000 have been killed.

"There are no data on which to make, with any degree of accuracy, a calculation of the number of Germans taken prisoners by the Allies."

These figures are probably too low. The proportion in the British army of killed to total casualties is about one in five, which would give 600,000 Germans killed in the first twelve months. The number of German



A monument erected at Bercy to fallen French soldiers.

[Photopress.]

prisoners is less than with the Allies, and may, at a guess, be put at 250,000. That leaves 2,150,000 wounded, which, in the British proportion of nine-twenty-fourths for permanent losses, would give a total permanent loss to the German army in the fighting of the first twelve months of 1,650,000 (600,000 killed + 250,000 prisoners + 800,000 disabled from wounds). Those figures include a number of deaths from disease, but do not include permanent losses to the army by sickness other than those who have actually died. And this estimate of permanent loss is more than 50 per cent higher than the British official estimate. Adding 500,000 for those in hospital from wounds (which is a fairly constant total), the permanent deductions from the military strength of Germany by the end of the first year is over two millions, or more than two-thirds of the total casualties.

THE AUSTRIAN LOSSES.

The one established fact about the Austrian losses is that by the end of July—considerably less than a year of war, because the announcements of losses are always in arrear—the number of Austrians killed in the war (including deaths from sickness) was 501,000. The number of prisoners was officially put at 600,000. The British proportion of killed and missing to the total casualties is one in three. That would give a total number of casualties of 3,300,000, but as the number of Austrians taken prisoners was exceptionally high, we may perhaps reduce this total to 3,000,000. The total is much the same as the German, and Mr. Belloc, who has done a great deal of work on the casualty statistics, has, on the Austrian basis, worked out the German casualties to a slightly higher figure than that given here, but the difference—some 300,000—is not so great as to influence conclusions. Adding

together the German and Austrian totals, we get a gross total of 6,000,000 as the losses of the German Alliance in the first year of the war. The permanent losses of the Austrian army are greater than those of the Germans, owing to the much larger number of prisoners and the prevalence of disease on some sections of their fronts. We shall not be far wrong in putting the permanent reduction of the Austrian military strength in the first twelve months at two millions and a half. This figure, added to the German total, makes a net permanent reduction for the two Powers of four millions and a half.

THE WAR OF ATTRITION.

These are enormous losses, but from the strictly military point of view they do not favour the theory that the attrition of casualties is necessarily in favour of the Allies. The losses of the Allies in the first year almost certainly exceeded this figure; and though the vast numbers of Russia give the Allies much greater reserves of strength than Germany, it is doubtful to what extent these reserves can be mobilised and equipped, and it must not be forgotten that the German alliance with Turkey counterbalances the effects of the accession of Italy to the Entente Powers. Attrition, moreover, is an unsatisfactory way of winning a war, because it is so ruinously costly, and the theory of attrition, though popular with a certain school in this country, is, for these and other reasons, the reverse of attractive. There is, however, some reason to think that Germany at the beginning of the second year of the war was gravely alarmed at its frightful costliness in men. The enormous numbers of Russians oppress her even in peace time, and even victory, if it is postponed long enough, would leave Germany weaker in the competition with her neighbours than she was before the beginning of the war.



A modern battlefield: On the road to Loos after the British advance.

[Sport and General.

(Official photograph taken by permission of the Commander-in-Chief, British Expeditionary Force, and passed by the Chief Field Censor for publication.)



Lord Kitchener making a recruiting appeal at the Guildhall.

[Central News.]

CHAPTER XVII.

OPTIMISTS AND PESSIMISTS.

THE TWO-PARTY HABIT OF MIND—THE GENESIS OF THE PESSIMISTIC POLICY—REASONS FOR ITS RISE—ITS INJURY AND SERVICE TO THE COUNTRY—STAGES OF FEELING ABOUT THE WAR—THE BLACK MONTH.

THE war, as it progressed, divided the British into two parties, the optimists and the pessimists, and this division, which oftener than not was due to differences more of temperament than of opinion, quite superseded the ordinary division into political parties. No nation has retained its attachment to the two-party system so faithfully as England, and it almost seemed as though the bifurcation of opinion were ingrained in the national character, and, denied its usual expression by the political truce, must needs find expression in another form. You may drive out nature with a fork, but it will always return. However that may be, this division of the British into optimists and pessimists was one of the most remarkable facts of the war, and one in which future generations will be most interested. How interested we should be now if we knew the real (as distinguished from the official) thoughts of the country during the progress of the struggle with Napoleon.

Some causes of this temporary division into optimists and pessimists which replaced the old political

differences have already been touched upon. The Englishman's idea of war is (or was until this war) fundamentally different from that of any other country. He conceived of war as a purely political and professional state. It was a condition involving politicians and the military and naval classes and their relatives, but not affecting the life of the nation as a whole. It was half like a general election, half like bad weather, but in either case something that the citizen had to go out to meet, and which did not pursue him past the front door to his fireside. This view of war was not accidental to the British, but so much a matter of course that it was hardly recognised as the privilege that it was. Sea-power made us the "dread and envy of them all"; the "dread" everyone understood, but the meaning of "envy" in the song was not realised until the war came, and we presently found ourselves fighting on land in our millions, just as other nations "not so blessed as we" were doing, not from choice, but from the hard necessity enforced on them by having land frontiers. Nor, even in our case, could this participation on so great a scale in Continental land operations

be said to have been due to deliberate choice. No doubt, had everything been thought out before the war, we could have seen the two alternatives that would lie before us. We could have said to our Allies that we were a naval and not a military power, and that any assistance that we rendered on land over and above the limit of our existing military resources must, being outside our contract, be accounted to us for virtue; or, recognising that there was no such thing as limited liability in a serious war, we might have made ourselves a great military power in anticipation of the struggle. As it was, we slipped without realising what was happening into the greatest revolution that has ever taken place in our policy. For the change of a ruling dynasty, or a great measure of electoral enfranchisement, is the merest trifle in its effect on the life of the people compared with that produced by our entry into the war on the wholly unprecedented military scale of this war. It was a plunge into the unknown, made not only without reflection, but without realising that anything very remarkable was happening.

EFFECTS OF THE CENSORSHIP.


It was inevitable that the old critical habit of mind which is the Englishman's political genius should come back to us. It came back not as regrets for the policy which the country had decided upon—there never was a war in which opinion was so nearly unanimous as in this—but as a vague feeling of unrest and bewilderment. How should it be otherwise? We found ourselves in a military world that was absolutely unfamiliar to us, with our fixed insular notions of war. This feeling was increased by the severity of the censorship, which came as a great shock to a people to whom absolute freedom in the expression of opinion and the supply of news were as essential a part of their scheme of the world as they are to the American. The opera-box view of war, which had been both our shame and our privilege, was suddenly interrupted. There were other reasons, too, why the censorship was felt in England more than elsewhere. We were not fighting alone, and therefore we had to think what publication was desirable not only in our own interests but in that of our Allies too. Moreover, censorship was a trade to which no one in this country had served an apprenticeship, and it was by general consent done extremely badly. Apart, however, from the general question of the censorship, and its wisdom, its effects were serious on opinion both at home and abroad. The change from an England which was the headquarters of free speech and free writing to an England in which news was scanty and the official policy was obscurantist, did us no good in neutral countries, and particularly in the United States of America. It had, moreover, a most chilling effect on sentiment at home. We became the prey of rumours, good and evil. So long as things were going well, it mattered little. But, when the reverses came, the censorship gave wings to every lying rumour, and made a certain depression of spirits the mark of the patriotic and the well-informed man. The unknown by broad daylight may be a sufficient trial; in the dark it is a far more serious test of resolution and faith.

In the first few months of the war the chief mischief done by the lack of frankness was to engender an excessive confidence, and, what was worse, a lack of appreciation of the great work done by the French army. The military might of Russia was almost a superstition with the average Englishman; he never had the least doubts of her success, though the war with Japan might have

taught him that much more goes to victory than the endurance and valour of troops. But the work of the French army, on the other hand, was not properly appreciated. The average Englishman thought, and perhaps still thinks, that it was the 60,000 British troops who fought at Mons who saved France from crushing defeat. There is no doubt that the First Expeditionary force was the finest army for its size that ever fought in Europe, and its services to France were exceedingly great. But the prevailing notion that it was the pivot of the operations in France was as false to perspective as the other strange legend that the defence of Liège saved Europe. It was not the fault of official England that the early work of the French army, unfortunate as much of it was, was not duly appreciated, but of the French censorship, which concealed early reverses. But the result was to produce a type of optimism which did much mischief. In the first winter, when Germany was bracing herself to a struggle far more serious than she had ever thought likely, English opinion was unduly self-satisfied. It failed to realise that the struggle in Western France and Flanders was only a small section of the French front. It knew of the French reverses, and of some instances in which French generals had been at fault. It knew little or nothing of Castelnau's great achievements in the Nancy region, of Sarraill's fine defence of Verdun, and of Foch's brilliant tactics on the Marne—all of which were every whit as important in checking the German invasion as the successes of the British on the left wing. Nor did it realise in the winter how splendid was the work of reorganisation that was being accomplished by General Joffre. Our own War Office knew, and it did not waste its time. But it could have done far more had it had behind it the driving force of a thoroughly instructed public opinion. As it was, public opinion passed the first winter in a dream.


DEPRESSION AS A CULT.

The reaction came very violently in the spring, after the news of Neuve Chapelle had shown us how much remained to be done before victory was in sight. In May, depression became a cult. The political forms taken by the agitation that arose have already (Vol. II., Chapter XXXI.) been described. Here we are concerned rather with its psychology than with its politics. The inwardness of the agitation seems to have been as follows: There had, for long before the war, been a small but active party that wanted universal and compulsory military training. They had not succeeded for a variety of reasons, chief among them being that people did not understand that there was any justification in the policy of the country abroad for a change so revolutionary; and after the war began these efforts had been silenced, partly by the political truce and still more by the extraordinary success of voluntary recruiting. But when things began to go ill, and it was apparent that fresh efforts would have to be made, they reverted to their former belief, and were now reinforced by many who had been converted by the war. The chief obstacle was the success that had attended the voluntary recruiting, and accordingly it became necessary for them if they were to recommend their case to depreciate the work that had already been done, to dwell upon the magnitude of the task, and even to magnify the prescience and the power of the enemy. In that way, pessimism became almost an article of faith with a section of the



Mr. Lloyd George addressing a "Women's Right to Serve" demonstration in London.

[Photopress.]



Mr. Churchill addressing a war meeting at Dundee.

[Newspaper Illustrations.]

The depreciation of what we had done, or could do, under the existing system did us much harm abroad. It was natural that our Allies should take us at our own valuation. Their own sacrifices were visible, and the enemy was on their soil. Our sacrifices were at any rate less obvious, and the work of our fleet was invisible. It was not to be expected that a Frenchman, burning with anger at the presence of the enemy in his beloved land, not knowing the limitations of sea-power and not seeing its very real achievement, should take an impartial and philosophic view of the situation. If we did not remind him, he was not likely to think for himself how great was the breach with our past tradition made by the multiplying of our army tenfold, and how serious, because it was unexpected and unprepared for, the interference with our ordinary life. If he read denunciations in the English Press of the slackness and apathy of the people, it was natural that he should estimate at their face value, and as literal truth, statements which the Englishman, accustomed to the exaggeration of our methods of political controversy, would naturally discount very liberally. Thus our early over-confidence and lack of perspective led us to undervalue the achievement of the French nation; and later, our self-depreciation and cultivated gloom led the French nation, or a large part of it, to undervalue our own achievement.

THE DISEASE AND ITS SYMPTOMS.

But there was more in the view of the pessimistic school than desire for conscription or political intrigue. Large numbers of the people saw that the nation was sick, but failed to diagnose the true cause, though its symptoms were evident enough. The true cause was that we were trying to extemporise within a year the military organisation which it had taken our Allies and our enemies a generation to organise. This, the plainest fact of the situation, was very seldom indicated, because to do so might imply a censure on policy. The Ministerialists could not stress the fact, because to do so would have been to invite the demand why, as they had pursued the policy, they had not prepared for its material support. Nor could the official Opposition put the fact very bluntly, because the majority of their adherents were

than the Government, foreseen the cost of their country's foreign policy, or, if they foresaw it, had not taken the people frankly into their confidence. And so the country, when the disappointments came, was left without real guidance as to their true significance. They looked round for a panacea, and people naturally tended to find it in the directions in which they were most interested—now root and branch temperance reform, now high explosives and munitions, now abolition of party government and substitution of a Coalition, and so on. All these reforms and methods had their value. But they were none of them a panacea, for there is no single prescription for doing the task that we had set ourselves as easily and well as it might have been done had the whole vast

question been carefully thought out beforehand. What was wrong was that we had stumbled unconsciously into a revolution. No other word fits the change accomplished within a year by a nation which had never in its whole history known war in the Continental sense, and was now engaged in extemporising the means of war, both on land and sea, on a scale like nothing previously experienced, and doing it in face of the enemy, in the shade of a censorship, and by purely voluntary appeal. When the future history of the war comes to be written, the accomplishment of the British nation in the first year of the war, with due deduction made for avoidable blunders, and for lamentable improvidence, will still



Lord Kitchener leaving the War Office.

[L.N.A.]

remain as the most stupendous achievement of faith in modern history.

If the professional pessimist did harm, so also did the professional optimist. It is the great vice of British public life that it deals only with blacks and whites, and knows no greys and browns. If one side says anything very strongly, the other side is sure to say the exact opposite with equal insistence, and the mere fact that there were some anxious to draw the very worst picture of our conditions was in itself enough to produce, if it did not already exist, a rival school which cultivated complacency as the chief of the patriotic virtues. Of the two schools the complacent school was the less adapted to the conditions of war. Mr. Lloyd George has made

mistakes, and his gifts of administration are not equal to his powers of persuasion; but he has done one great service to the country in shattering the merely complacent and self-satisfied view of the war which, if it had continued, might have ended in national disaster. "It doesn't matter," a Liberal Minister is reputed to have said after a Council, "what we do say, but let us all say the same thing." With far more truth it may be said that in war what is done matters much less than that what is done should be single-minded and whole-hearted. There is virtue in compromise in dealing with peace problems; but it is nearly always deadly in war. The art of war is not deliberative, and does not consist in choosing a course of action which best reconciles opposing views. In war, it is an invariable rule that of two alternatives either is preferable to a combination.

The conflict between the optimists and the pessimists went through three well-marked stages. In the first, which may be said to have lasted till the spring, the optimists were in a great majority; in the second, from the battle of Neuve Chapelle, the two parties were about evenly balanced; and in the third stage, which began with the Russian defeats in Galicia, pessimism became the fashion. It may help to a clearer idea of these various stages to remind ourselves of the hopes and fears of the future course of the war that were entertained at each of these periods.

AN EARLY FORECAST OF THE WAR.

In the first months there were no pessimists, although Lord Kitchener, when he made his early estimate of a three years' war, was evidently under no misapprehension of the gravity of the task before us. Both Mr. Asquith and Sir John French (if rumours are to be trusted) were much more confident of an earlier end. And in spite of the heavy defeats suffered by the French, confidence certainly seemed justified when the Battle of the Marne brought the first German plans to failure. At that time the situation looked very promising indeed for the Allies. The whole theory on which the German plans had been built up had broken down. Paris had survived, and the French armies had won a strategic victory of the greatest importance. In the week of the Marne, perhaps, a majority of the British people expected the war to be over by spring at the latest, and, indeed, had we had a large army to join with the Belgians at that time it probably would have been. It was not until the fall of Antwerp and the mismanagement of the British relief expedition that any doubts began publicly to be expressed of a fairly speedy victory of the Allies. Certainly at this time there was no conception that this war was destined to be different, except in degree, from any war in which this country had ever been engaged. The first unpleasant shock came with the rapid advance of the Germans through Flanders towards the Straits—a crisis, however, which the country had passed safely through before it realised how serious it was. Then succeeded the long winter campaign in the trenches, in which each engagement was a fresh demonstration of the extraordinary strength of the German positions. Already, before winter came to an end, there were many who thought that the German positions in the west had been made impregnable, that the end of the war could not be reached there, and that our best chance of early victory lay in the crushing of Austria by Russia. An article which appeared in a newspaper while the Battle of Neuve Chapelle was being fought, but before the news

of it arrived, though much less confident than general opinion, is worth quoting as an example of the hopes which sustained the more critical minds at this time. The title of the article was: "How Long will the War Last?"

"Prophecy is the most gratuitous form of error, but the question asked at the head of this article is so often asked that even at the risk of indulging in prophecy it is worth while to attempt an answer. But there is really neither need nor excuse for prophesying. No one can say what will or may happen. What may happen will depend on the following amongst other considerations:—

- "(1) What other Powers come in;
- "(2) whether the 'sentimental' or the practical strain in the German character gets the upper hand; whether the German Government makes up its mind to be extinguished in a great conflagration, or whether, having made up its mind that it cannot win, it decides to liquidate its affairs; and that in its turn depends on
- "(3) what the Allies want and what sort of terms they will demand;
- "(4) what the effect of the economic pressure on Germany will be;
- "(5) what sort of progress is made in the western theatre of war.

This consideration is put last not because it is the least important, but because it is the most incalculable. It is assumed, it will be observed, that the Allies are to win and that the war will not end in a deadlock, and the main ground for that assumption is the weakness of Austria and the excellent prospects against Turkey.

"(1) It is in the highest degree improbable, after the failure of the submarine blockade, that the United States will come in; President Wilson's main anxiety is to avoid a racial split in the United States, whose nationality is not a fixed thing like that of European nations, but is always in a process of formation. He will therefore concentrate his efforts on shaping a distinctively American policy, and seek for opportunities of mediating for peace. But Roumania, Greece, Bulgaria, and Italy may all come in, and perhaps in the order named. The key to what they may do is the success of the operations in the Dardanelles. If all goes well our fleet may be off Constantinople in another month, more or less, and by that time either hope of sharing in the gains or some definite offer from the Allies may have induced Bulgaria to commit herself against Turkey, and so save them the necessity of extensive land operations against the remains of the Turkish military power in Europe. It is conceivable that when the Dardanelles are open Russia might, if Greece consented, send a contingent round to help Serbia by way of Salonica.

"The connection of events would thus be the forcing of the Dardanelles, the consequent strengthening of Russia, the development of a campaign against Hungary, and the formation of a third and southern front of war against Germany. If and when the campaign against Hungary had made such progress as to cut off Bosnia and Herzegovina, and to produce a rebellion in those provinces and serious unrest in the maritime provinces of Austria, Italy might then intervene on the ground that it was necessary for her to save the eastern shores of the Adriatic from anarchy. Things may conceivably reach this pass by next July.

"(2) A grand operative conflagration is very well as an artistic climax to a Ring tetralogy, but the *Realpolitik* which has governed Germany's action in peace time will see the desirability on all grounds of making peace on the most favourable terms as soon as her Government is convinced that she is sure to lose.

"(3) It is important, therefore, that the Allies should be agreed as to the minimum that they want, so as to be prepared to take advantage of any change of mood in Germany and spare effusion of blood beyond what is necessary for the political objects that they have in view. This, however, is mainly a political question with which the writer is not concerned, except to remark once more that there is no hard and fast division between politics and strategy.

"(4) There is plenty of evidence that Germany is feeling the economic pressure of our blockade keenly. It may, however, be doubted whether it will be enough in itself to induce Germany to sue for peace. But the blockade, in conjunction with the loss of any of Germany's existing sources of food supply—Hungary, which normally is an exporting country, Silesia, or East Prussia,—might be decisive in inducing Germany not to face the trials of another winter unless there were solid grounds for hope elsewhere, or unless the terms of peace were regarded as so humiliating as to justify in German eyes the prolongation of the war after all hope of victory had disappeared and in defiance of all reasonable considerations.

"Subject to these reserves, and to the observations that will presently be made on (5), we seem to get a date between late summer and early winter as likely for the first serious talk of peace.

"(5) What will happen in the western theatre is very incalculable. Germany still retains on this front nearly two-thirds of her army, and she will continue to retain this proportion there until the Russians are within reach of the Oder defences and Berlin itself is menaced. Long before that happens, Austria will have been overrun. Italy, if she comes in, will be useful mainly by threatening Vienna and so drawing off Austrians from the defence of Cracow and their advanced positions in Southern Poland. Austria, it will be seen, is performing for Germany in the east the same function of keeping the war off her own territory that Belgium is performing in the west. And of the two advance bastions of Germany, Austria is much the weaker. Moreover, apart from Germany's desire to keep the war off her own territory, her vital spot is much nearer the western than the eastern front. Essen and Westphalia, not Berlin, are the heart of military Germany. Therefore, as far as we can foresee, the Germans are likely to keep very much the larger half of their forces in the west.

"The secret of the British plans has been well kept, and no one can say which of the several obvious alternative plans is the most likely to be adopted. There are certainly no signs as yet of a renewal of the attempts to break the German left flank in Belgium, and one German critic has persuaded himself that the main attack by the British reinforcements will not go through Belgium at all, but 'from the south,' by which he presumably means through Alsace. This uncertainty (provided that there is a real plan behind it) is a very healthy condition for the Allies, and it is important that it should not be disturbed. All that we are concerned about for the present is the effect that victory or a failure of the attack on this front—whatever be the main points of concentration—would have on the duration of the war. Belgium for the Germans is not only an advanced fortress for the defence of Westphalia, but its retention is her main diplomatic lever. Whatever she can retain of Belgium she would use as an offset against demands made by the victors elsewhere.

"The conclusions reached then are these:—

"(1) If the Allies win before next autumn a decisive victory in the west—and decisive victory we should define as the expulsion of the Germans from Belgium, or at the least the driving of them back to the line of the Meuse—Germany will have nothing left to bargain with, and the beginning of winter should see, if not the end of the fighting, at any rate serious proposals for peace; (2) if the fighting is indecisive, and Germany retains any considerable part of Belgium besides the Ardennes, she may decide to go on through another winter; (3) if the fighting in the west goes against the Allies the war will last into next spring, for although armies do not go into winter quarters now, winter is most unfavourable for active offensive operations. In any case it seems possible that the war will end before the Rhine is crossed (except possibly on its upper reaches)."

THE BLACK WEEK.

It was after the German gas attacks at Ypres, and the failure of the British attacks towards Lille in May, that the gravity of the situation came to be widely realised. Of the actual defeat of Great Britain in the

sense in which France was in danger of defeat if she failed to carry the German positions there was no question. The war at sea had been decided definitely in our favour, and the main hopes which France and Russia had in view in seeking our alliance had been fulfilled. But our credit was bound up with our securing victory on land as well as on sea, and it was not till now that people in this country began to suspect what that might ultimately mean. The pessimists (they themselves would have called themselves the realists) were convinced that a problem that was so new in our history, and so unexpected, could only be solved by a complete breach with the old tradition of voluntarism, for this and nothing else was the issue between the new parties which now began to emerge. On both sides the issue was stated with a great deal of exaggeration and misrepresentation of each other's position. What the pessimists would have said had they been quite frank, and avoided the imputation of motives and the levelling of charges against whole classes of the community, was something like this: "For good or evil we are in a Continental war, and all that that implies. Our enemies have organised their whole resources for the one object, and we cannot expect to win unless we do the same. The voluntary system was not made to stand such a strain as is now being put upon it. It has lost its virtue when it has to support a whole nation at war. Only by compulsion in some form or other—compulsion not confined to the troops in the field, but also extended to industry, for the man in the factory may be just as necessary to success as the infantryman—can we attain the necessary organisation." The other party criticised the schemes that were brought forward, argued that a Government which had failed in a lesser task was hardly to be trusted in the much greater task of organising the whole manhood of the nation for war and warlike industry, stressed the value of the British ideal of voluntary service, and generally put the best face on the achievements of the Allied armies in the field. The quarrel between the two schools was not settled by the formation of the Coalition Government, but prolonged or driven underground.

The defeats and retreats of the Russian armies in Galicia and Poland once more brought into the open a controversy which had been conducted in private since the formation of the Coalition Government. By far the frankest statement of the case for drastic action, and, if necessary, for a complete breach with the voluntary tradition, was that of Mr. Lloyd George, in an introduction to a book published in September:—

"For over twelve months Russia has, in spite of deficiencies in equipment, absorbed the energies of half the German and four-fifths of the Austrian forces. Is it realised that Russia has for the time being made her contribution—and what a heroic contribution it is!—to the struggle for European freedom, and that we cannot for many months to come expect the same active help from the Russian armies that we have hitherto received? Who is to take the Russian place in the fight whilst those armies are re-equipping? Who is to bear the weight which has hitherto fallen on Russian shoulders? France cannot be expected to sustain much heavier burdens than those which she now bears with a quiet courage that has astonished and moved the world. Italy is putting her strength into the fight. What could she do more? There is only Britain left. Is Britain prepared to fill up the gap that will be created when Russia has retired to re-arm? Is she fully prepared to cope with all the possibilities of the next few months—in the west, without forgetting the east? Upon the answer which Government, employers, workmen,

* "Student of War," in *Manchester Guardian*, March 10th.

financiers, young men who can bear arms, women who can work in factories—in fact, the whole of the people of this great land—give to this question will depend the liberties of Europe for many a generation.

"A shrewd and sagacious observer told me the other day that in his judgment the course pursued by this country during the next three months would decide the fate of this war. If we are not allowed to equip our factories and workshops with adequate labour to supply our armies because we must not transgress regulations applicable to normal conditions, if practices are maintained which restrict the output of essential war material; if the nation hesitates, when the need is clear, to take the necessary steps to call forth its manhood to defend honour and existence; if vital decisions are postponed until too late; if we neglect to make ready for all probable eventualities; if, in fact, we give ground for the accusation that we are slouching into disaster as if we were walking along the ordinary paths of peace, without an enemy in sight, then I can see no hope; but if we sacrifice all we own and all we like for our native land, if our preparations are characterised by grip, resolution, and a prompt readiness in every sphere, then victory is assured."

Some of the passages in this appeal—notably the references to Russia—were evidently thought to be indiscreet, and Lord Kitchener, speaking in the House of Lords a few days later, on September 15th, was at pains to correct any false impression that might have been drawn. He spoke of the Germans having shot their bolt in Russia, and Mr. Lloyd George himself, a few

days later, made an attempt to define his position more exactly. The whole issue, he pointed out, was not one of principle but of fact.

RISE OF A MIDDLE PARTY.

So far the agitation and the controversy between the optimists and the pessimists had been sterile of actual effect on the war except for the institution of the Ministry of Munitions and the improvement in the supply of shells, which might or might not have taken place in any case. But a middle section of opinion was now arising which promised to resolve the barren conflict between the pessimists and the optimists. The key of its policy may be expressed in the phrase of Mr. Lloyd George that the issue was not one of principle but of fact. This middle party waived the objections to compulsion which were based on principle, and quite frankly laid it down that if the war could only be won by compulsion, compulsion it would have to be. At the same time, most of its adherents remained quite unconvinced that compulsion was either necessary or even a practical contribution to the problem in hand. Its object was to contrive a system by which the whole strength of the State could be organised efficiently for the prosecution of the war without breaking with the voluntary principle. The details of the plan and its execution must, however, be reserved to a later chapter.



The conference of British and French Ministers at Calais on July 6th: Lord Kitchener and Mr. Asquith entering the motor in Calais which bore them to the meeting place. [Record Press.]

The Manchester Guardian HISTORY of the WAR



PHOTO. BY

E.N.A.

M. ALBERT THOMAS, Head of the French War Munitions Department.

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
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
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The King inspecting troops of the New Army at Glasgow.

[Central News.]

CHAPTER XVIII.

THE CITIZEN ARMY.

A TREMENDOUS TASK—THE COUNTRY'S EFFORT—THE PROGRESS OF RECRUITING—THE SPIRIT OF THE NEW ARMY IN THE FIELD.

THE outbreak of war left Great Britain faced with a truly terrific problem. The old Expeditionary Force which sailed for France in August, 1914, was undoubtedly, in point of quality, the finest fighting force in the world. Whatever part economic pressure may have played in recruiting it, such pressure, as was explained in an earlier chapter ("The Spirit of the Army," Vol. I., Chap. XVIII.), would not apply itself to those who had no aptitude at all for soldiering. Whatever else it may have been, the old army was certainly not a refuge for the poor in spirit. And whatever may have been the various agencies which recruited for it, the general result was abundantly plain in a picked body of highly-trained men—more highly trained than the conscript armies of the Continent—and all, in varying degree, with a real temperamental aptitude for arms and adventure. It was a professional, long-service army, and the last of its kind in this war. But from its very nature it was hopelessly too small for the task which confronted it from the beginning of the war onwards. The immense problem which lay before this country was to create its far larger counterpart in the shape not of a professional but of a citizen army.

THE BREAK WITH OLD IDEAS.

The task was very much greater than has, perhaps, been generally realised. As compared with both our Allies and our enemies on the Continent, we are not a military nation. The whole tradition of a citizen army, and the vast and far reaching changes which such a practice and tradition imply in the life and outlook of a nation, were unknown to us. All the exploits of British arms and all the military traditions which we possessed were inseparably bound up with the ideas belonging

to a professional army. The Volunteer movement of the last century—and, of course, to a much greater extent its descendant, the Territorial Force—had done something to acquaint us with the idea of a fighting force with a citizen and unprofessional basis; but it had not done very much. The value of the Territorial army was persistently challenged by those whose dearest hope it was to see its principle extended by the application of compulsion; and in denying the value of the principle of the citizen army, as far as it had then been applied in this country, the hostile critics of the Territorial Force were inevitably doing something which, in the eyes of the ordinary man, seemed not very distinguishable from denying the value of the principle itself. The only army which he had been taught to take seriously was the old regular army, and when he thought of that army he thought of it as a class and profession as specialised, and as much removed from his own life as that of any other trade or profession apart from the one that he happened to have adopted as his own. To think of the old army was to think of the Mulvaney's, of the men who could say with him, "I'm a born scut av the barrick-room. The army's mate and dhrink to me . . . an' the pipe-clay's in the marrow av me." It is not a literally accurate conception of the old army, for such an inveterate aptitude for military life as Mulvaney's was a long way from being the general rule. But it well illustrates the conception of the professional army and the immense gulf which divides it from the conscript armies of the Continent, where military training is an inevitable and accepted part of every citizen's duty, and where, in the vast majority of cases, the pipe-clay is as little innate and in the marrow of a man as the obligation to pay his income tax or poor rate.



An open-air lecture in the Parks, Oxford.

[L.N.A.]



Recruits learning the use of the bayonet.

[Newspaper Illustrations.]

A COMPARISON OF EFFORTS.

It was this new conception of the army—the conception of an army for which every physically-fit citizen is eligible and may be required—with which the country was now suddenly faced. There will be very few observers of any judgment who will deny that, in the circumstances, the response was very wonderful indeed, and the most extraordinary tribute to the spirit and determination of the British people. Not only was this conception of the army something in which the Englishman was very inexperienced, but the war was not being fought on British soil. Let strategists and statesmen proclaim the impossibility of making war on a limited liability as clearly as they will, and as forcibly as is undoubtedly necessary; yet, in considering the recruiting for our new armies, it cannot be overlooked that our undefeated navy was the greatest assurance of the safety of these shores, and, further, that in any event, the Germans had no men to spare from Continental engagements for a serious invasion of this country. When, bearing these considerations soberly in mind, we consider what was done during the first year of the war towards the raising of the first citizen combatant army that these islands had known, the result assuredly denotes a national endeavour that cannot be paralleled in any period of our history. At no time during the Napoleonic campaigns, when the danger to these islands was more imminent than any that the present war has offered, had we more than 300,000 men under regular arms, both abroad and in this country. The Militia Ballot Act was in operation, and from the militia, so compulsorily raised under that Act, the armies on the Continent were fed and reinforced, largely by indirect compulsion, which lay in making the service and discipline in the militia—which was raised for home service—so harsh that the troops serving in it accepted foreign service in the regular army as a welcome escape. Yet even with this important element of compulsion added to the dangers which threatened, the total number of men under arms—300,000—represented only about one out of 43 of the total population. But within one year of the present struggle the voluntary system, with no element of compulsion save the subtle one provided by the pressure of public opinion, had yielded an army which, from the figures that are known, it is quite safe to say amounted to five men for every two, in proportion to the increased population of the country, raised during the Napoleonic wars.

In considering the recruiting and composition of the new citizen armies, the Territorials must at once be taken into account. In character and moral the Territorials can be considered as the advance guard of what very soon came to be known as "Kitchener's Army"—an advance guard recruited and partially trained long before the war was thought of, but with the greatest part of its training still to be undergone. Indeed, the Territorials, who were embodied on the eve of war, were probably more truly typical of the citizen army than the majority of the men who made up the first great rush to the recruiting offices at the very beginning of the struggle. To a very large extent the men who then presented themselves would be of pretty much the same stamp as those from whom the original Expeditionary Force had been drawn. The sum total of the forces which were recruiting the new armies can be conceived as a mesh which grew steadily finer as the war went on. In the first few weeks it was sufficiently loosely drawn to catch only those men with some natural aptitude for adventure and more than usually free from civil ties and responsibilities, including

as in peace time, a good percentage whose civil ties had been arbitrarily severed for them, for in the early days of the war there was considerable unemployment, and the apparent promise of more. Thus the embodied Territorial Force was the first and truest example of the citizen army in being. Its members had been recruited in time of peace from the public-spirited of all classes. To the majority of its members the possibility of active service had been a remote one—there were men in its ranks with very real and onerous civil ties and responsibilities. Moreover, the Territorials had been enrolled originally for home defence only. Simultaneously with the embodiment of the force its members were asked to do vastly more than was contained in their original undertaking. They were asked to volunteer for service abroad, and the response to this request—seventy per cent of the embodied Territorials volunteered at once—represented a spirit very much more significant and prophetic of the later developments of recruiting than the boom enlistment figures of the first few days of August, 1914. It was the forerunner of the spirit which a year after was to bring a nation, that had been slowly awakened to a full realisation of the task and responsibilities which it had undertaken, to accept willingly the National Register, and, as its later outcome, the recruiting scheme which Lord Derby was appointed to direct—a scheme in which the voluntary system was transformed out of all recognition from anything which had previously been understood by the term.

THE AWAKENING OF THE COUNTRY.

Collectively, the awakening was slow, and, from the considerations which have been presented above, and by reason of the complete break with all our national traditions which it implied, it was bound to be so. There have been many journalists, and behind them many more private individuals, who have made this slowness a matter for bitter complaint. How they would have quickened it is not apparent. In pure theory, compulsory military service from the moment the war began would have quickened it, but in practice to have imposed compulsory military service upon a nation to whose general traditions and life it was utterly unfamiliar—and which for the great part had not realised or been prepared for its need—would have been almost certainly disastrous in the dissension and social disorganisation which it would have caused. Rightly or wrongly—with that point this chapter is not concerned—the public attitude of the Government before the war had not prepared the people of this country for a Continental struggle of the kind with which they were now faced; and any consideration of the conduct of that struggle must be conditioned by a full appreciation of that fact. Mr. Kipling, in much the finest poem which he has given us for some years, describes the outlook as it had presented itself to many at the beginning of the war in very stirring lines:—

Once more we hear the word
That sickened earth of old:
"No law except the sword,
Unsheathed and uncontrolled."

Comfort, content, delight—
The ages' slow-bought gain,
They shrivelled in a night;
Only ourselves remain
To face the naked days,
In silent fortitude,
Through perils and dismays
Renewed and re-renewed.




The King at a review of New Army troops in Cambridge.

[Central News.]



Recruits at physical drill in the snow.

[Central News.]



Improving the chest measurement of the New Army.

[Newspaper Illustrations.]

The problem was how to make this point of view appreciated by a democracy which had not been prepared for the war, and whose own soil was in no apparent danger. It was a very great problem, and one which time alone could solve with safety; for though in a democracy the pace of the fleet may not be quite the pace of the slowest ship, it is sufficiently so to make all attempts which do not pay any regard at all to this principle matters of great hazard and possible disaster.


One attempt was made by the recruiting authorities in the early days of the war to speed up the process whereby the idea of a citizen army was being gradually brought home to the whole nation—that is to say, an attempt of more significant novelty than the ordinary recruiting appeals, of which the fullest use and extension were being made. Early in November, 1914, a voluntary canvass of the men eligible for military service was undertaken, and under the same scheme such men were invited either to enlist at once or to register themselves as willing to do so on being notified that their services were required. The intention of the scheme was to ensure a steady stream of recruits in such quantities and at such times as the military authorities could conveniently deal with them. Except by virtue of the indirect influence which it brought to bear on recruiting, the scheme was a failure. It was entirely voluntary, and its results, both in the number of available recruits which it revealed and the response

to the conditions of deferred enlistment, were very disappointing. At the same time the progress of the recruiting for the new citizen army was very creditable, and the mere fact that the Parliamentary Recruiting Committee had considered such a scheme advisable undoubtedly contributed very importantly to the general awakening of the country to the task that lay before it. In the early months of the war the recruiting organisation, overpowered by the problem of dealing with the great numbers of recruits, had adopted for a time the desperate remedy of raising the minimum physical standard for the new army to a pitch which would obviously prevent great numbers of recruits from presenting themselves, and still more from being accepted. The dropping of the standard

was followed by the scheme for a voluntary register; henceforward it was obvious that every available man was needed and could be used.

The recruiting for the new citizen army was now in full swing. And for the first year of the war it is safe to say that the unaided voluntary system was yielding all the men which the military authorities could train and equip, though, inevitably, it was not yielding them with all the steadiness and convenience which were desirable. Within the first three months of the war 700,000 men had enlisted in the new armies. And after this first skimming of the cream of the voluntary system the yield was still more a remarkable tribute to the spirit and determination of the British people. In the Manchester district—the

recruiting returns from which were among the steadiest and most satisfactory of any district in the country—within the third week of November two complete service battalions of the Manchester Regiment were raised. And each new recruit for the citizen army brought home to those who remained behind the need for their help—for the force of example naturally proved one of the most potent of recruiting agencies, and when a man saw his civil friends and associates in the army it became increasingly difficult for him to give himself an honest reason why he should not be there as well. A new responsibility was attached to British citizenship, and the acceptance of it was creating for the first time a



Machine-gun practice.


[G.P.U.]

British citizen army for service beyond our own shores.

THE CITIZEN ARMY IN THE FIELD.

To the fighting capabilities of the new armies, whether in Flanders or the Dardanelles, full tribute has been paid by all the commanders under whom they served. In the measured phrases of a despatch from Sir John French :—

"It is evident that great trouble and much hard work have been expended on these units during their training at home, and it is found that they have received such sound teaching that a short period of instruction in trench life under fire soon enables them to take their places with credit beside their acclimatised comrades of the older formations."



The headquarters of a new division of the Royal Field Artillery, where a number of old tramcars have been turned into divisional offices, etc. [Central News.



The members of an Officers' Training Corps on parade. [Newspaper Illustrations.



A battalion of the New Army on the march.

[Central News.

Nor, in every case, were the new troops given much opportunity to "acclimatise" themselves to the full and terrible rigours of modern warfare. The same blind chance to which each individual soldier commits his life is incalculably at work with the destinies of his regiment; and with the best of plans a tiny accident may leave raw troops receiving a "baptism of fire" from which few will emerge, while more acclimatised units are in reserve and comparative safety. In the Second Battle of Ypres some of the Territorial battalions engaged had landed in France barely a week before they found themselves involved in the most desperate trench fighting. Yet they "acclimatised" themselves and bore their part with admirable fortitude. And when one realises the accumulated horrors which make up the "climate" of a modern battle, there is not much reason to doubt the existence of the old manly virtues among the men from whom Britain's first citizen army was recruited. The overwhelming concentration of artillery fire, the poison gas and asphyxiating shells, and the close quarter fighting with hand grenades and flame projectors, present a combination of scientific terrors to which no warfare of old can offer a parallel. Armageddon has been complicated by all the "many inventions" of the Preacher, and in face of them man may well seem little more than the helpless victim of his own ingenuity.

There is little enough opportunity for the picturesque in such fighting as this. "That was a fine bit," wrote a soldier wounded in the retreat from Mons, after he had watched from a distance the spectacle of a victorious charge by British cavalry. There speaks the professional soldier of a war episode of the older style. But in the fighting to which the new citizen army came out there were no spectacles of this kind. And the true measure of the spirit of the citizen army lies in its frank recognition of the change. In the letters home from the new army one finds over and over again not a tribute to the pageantry of war, but an acceptance of its new hideousness. "However men can possibly live against modern methods of war is indeed wonderful," writes a corporal in the Sherwood Foresters "as the most fiendish


things possible are employed." Or an officer writes of the preliminary bombardment which prepared for the Battle of Neuve Chapelle: "I heard one of my men say, 'Bill, is this the end of the earth?' I don't blame him for thinking so; it seemed to me as if it was. We could see in the distance great masses of flame, smoke, earth, and brick, all ascending together as the great shells screamed over our heads and burst among the German entrenchments and the houses of the villages." And the same writer's acceptance of the situation is conveyed in the reflection, "Modern warfare is such an infernal business that any man who isn't killed ought to be cheerful." "It is nothing but hell here," says another

letter. "The days are just spaces of time followed by nights wherein so many shells can be hurled across from one line to the other." In the official reports such a period would be blandly described by the remark that "there have been artillery duels," or "on the rest of the front there is nothing to report." Only when an attack has developed have the official communications anything of importance to report. And here is, in brief, the soldier's account of a successful German attack:—"Just as we returned to the line after a short rest the attack was made to retake this trench. First, there was a terrible bombardment by guns, bombs, rifles, and machine-guns, and then they sent streams of flaming liquid into our trench.

It was impossible to live in it, and the boys were forced to retire."

THE STICKING POWER OF THE NEW ARMY.

This was the kind of fighting in which the soldiers of the citizen army found themselves, and this was their recognition of it. And yet they withstood these terrors, and the courage which enabled them to do so is all the greater for clear appreciation of them. Precisely what those terrors amounted to, even in the military estimation, is shown in a letter from one of the officers attached to the staff of an infantry brigade during the fighting round Hooze: "Theoretically, the battle was won and lost many times during the day. Judging by text-book standards of losses that troops will stand, our attack was



The New Army in billets.

[Central News.



The New Army in training : A rest by the roadside.

[Topical Press.



Royal Army Medical Corps recruits take a meal in the open.

[Topical Press.



An R.F.A. divisional headquarters.

Central News.


destroyed at various points during the day, and the Germans on at least three occasions submitted to losses out of all proportion to those that men are supposed to be able to suffer without loss of moral." With the Loos fighting and the advance at the end of September, 1915, came, for the majority of the new army in the field, their first experience of anything approaching the mobile warfare of older days, and the difference was at once recognised and appreciated. "It was splendid," writes one soldier. "Line after line of them went up the hill in open order. It was quite a treat to see it after being stuck in the same place for months past, and then to be able to go ahead into, as it seemed, new country. . . . I have experienced real open fighting this time, and like it much better than trench fighting."

But the greatest difference of all between the new citizen army and the old professional army which it replaced lay, naturally enough, in the way the new army, in its letters home, leaned on the life and England which it had left behind. To the "borm scut av the barrick room" active service is the natural and acceptable fulfilment of the career and training he had chosen. To the soldier in the citizen army it was an unanticipated interlude in the world which he had been called so suddenly to abandon, and which he hoped to regain. A London Territorial, writing home in the winter of 1914-1915, described the men of his regiment, when they left their billets in a village behind the lines, as setting out for the trenches very much in the same way as they had set out for their old civilian jobs in the city, giving

and receiving the greetings of their French host for all the world as if their safe return was a matter of time alone, and the task before them no more hazardous than those attached to the office stool and its routine. In action it is the comparisons which are suggested by the old life that present themselves. The London soldier thinks of the illuminations at Earl's Court, and his northern comrade of the fireworks at Belle Vue. "They started firing soon after dawn," writes a north-country Yeomanry officer, of the Turkish attack in Gallipoli. "For all the world it looked like a Belle Vue firework show." And when, a day or two later, he finds a Manchester Territorial, who minds his clothes whilst bathing, "we both recognised the similarity and wished we were there!"

THE UNPROFESSIONAL SOLDIER.

There is extraordinarily little of any conventional parade of courage in the letters home from the new army in the field. The courage is there, but out of all the ways in which it finds written expression the praise of war and the joy of battle is conspicuously absent. The courage of the citizen army is more than ever the courage of men standing up to a thoroughly bad job and pretty well aware both of the badness of the job and the demand which facing it puts upon them. Sometimes it is accepted with that brave gaiety which declines to regard the badness of the job at all, and, flying to the other extreme, persists that it is more tiresome than terrible. The trenches are a weariness, and the daily bombardment a spectacle which



The New Army in training at the Farriers' School.

[Sport and General.



A lecture on the anatomy of the horse.

[Sport and General.



Canadian cavalry cheering the King after being inspected by him at their training ground in England.

Central News.

billets—on, on, on—and nothing bores me so much. And when once a shell has burst twenty yards away you have seen all that you will ever see in a trench." That is one way in which a man may "carry on" in face of the naked days, when all that is ordinarily meant by "comfort, content, delight" seems to have left the world for ever. Another will write home quite frankly that, when the orders for the advance at Neuve Chapelle were received, "the mere idea of attacking sent cold shivers down my spine, and I don't think any of the other spines were much warmer than mine." Yet the writer, until he was wounded, led his men through some of the heaviest fighting of March 10th and 11th with the greatest courage and determination. One finds this full realisation of the horrors of war side by side with a determined acceptance of them again and again in the letters home from Flanders and the Dardanelles. It is rarely expressed with such clearness as in the following extract from the letter of a Manchester officer serving in Gallipoli; but the passage is a very significant illustration of how deep and vital may be the difference between the outlook of the citizen and the professional soldier:—

"There are none of us here who have seen war can ever desire another. I hate it, and everything belonging to it. It all seems so inadequate that might should be right, or, shall I say, that right has to prove itself might to gain the victory? Very few can face such a crisis with equanimity. I cannot, and never shall. Perhaps men who are born soldiers can laugh at death and revel in war; but I, who am only a poor lawyer, who has temporarily doffed the robe to don khaki, must confess that I prefer the robe. I do not say that I am not taking pride in doing my work—I take an immense pride in my work because it is my duty, and I like to do my best. But the work gives me no pleasure of itself."

The "born soldier" who comes to acclimatise himself to the ordeal of modern warfare is at any rate not likely to find it complicated by such reflections as these; but the citizen turned soldier has a bigger task before him, since he carries perpetually with him the ideas and comparisons of his old life. The young officer, journeying to the Flanders front for the first time, cannot "quite get over the feeling of being a tourist." And with a certain pathos he remarks that he is glad that the country is flat and ugly and the weather dull, "as it would be a pity to see beautiful country laid waste, and fine weather makes one think of other things than fighting." Yet man is an organism with a wonderful spiritual capacity for adapting itself to its environment, and many members of "Kitchener's army" seem to have acclimatised themselves to their new life with a thoroughness which could hardly be improved on by the most high-spirited man-at-arms. Bravery and high spirits are, after all, at least as contagious as timidity or panic. And if one soldier is in a mood to write, after a day or two away from the trenches, "it did me good at --- three days ago to hear the snipers' bullets smacking into the parapet behind. It sounds funny, but it is a fact," his attitude is not likely to be without its effect on the men in contact with him. Among the first troops landed at Suvla Bay in August, 1915, was one of the many service battalions of the Manchester Regiment. Although it was night, they were under fire from the Turks, and a difficulty arose in getting the machine-guns ashore. A sergeant of the machine-gun section jumped into the sea—there was nearly six feet of water to be got through—holding his gun above his head. He was out of his depth, and the gun was too heavy for him to swim with it. He tried to walk under the water, but fell, and with him the gun. He reappeared



Cavalry in training: Bringing the horses down a difficult descent.

[Topical Press.



Teaching trench digging to the men of the New Army.

[Whitlock, Birmingham.


without it, but, not to be defeated, dived again and again in the darkness until he had found his gun and carried it to the beach. Here, again, the force of example must have been of great value to the other men; and the citizen soldier who set it had certainly had little enough time to "acclimatise" himself to active service. Collective and individual instances of courage and devotion could be multiplied without end; in truth, the essential spirit and determination of the new citizen army are no more in question than those of the original Expeditionary

Force. The moral which is to be drawn from the disappointments on the British fronts during the period that the new army was coming into action at any rate conveys no reflection on the spirit of the troops. It lies rather in the fact that, great and unexpected as had been the break with national traditions involved in the raising of a British citizen army for service abroad, we had found it easier to raise that army than to train up staffs capable of directing its great numbers with complete success.



Rifle practice "under fire": Harmless bombs are being exploded in front of the trenches so that the recruits may become accustomed to noise and smoke, and not be put off their aim by them.

[Central News.]




The despatching room of one of the great Government stores of soldiers' clothing, etc.

[Photopress.]



Germany's war supplies : Grain in store on Hamburg harbour.

CC-0. Jangamwadi Math Collection. Digitized by eGangotri [Underwood and Underwood.]



A Munitions Court in session at Glasgow: Lord Balfour of Burleigh and Mr. Macassey, K.C., are conducting the enquiry. *Newspaper Illustrations.*

CHAPTER XIX.

ECONOMIC REACTIONS.

THE DISLOCATION OF FOREIGN TRADE—CHANGES IN COMMERCIAL LAW—THE DISPLACEMENT OF CAPITAL AND LABOUR—THE NEW RELATIONS BETWEEN THE STATE AND PRIVATE ENTERPRISE—THE WAR AND FISCAL POLICY.

THE war is not only a great military fact, but it is also a great economic fact. Certain economic aspects have been discussed elsewhere in this history—notably finance, and the reaction on labour. The object of this chapter is to consider other features of the economic influence of the war, both immediate and possibly ephemeral, and remoter and more probably permanent. We may roughly indicate the scope of this inquiry by premising that the war has affected the economic life of the belligerent countries primarily in the following ways: (1) by interference with their trade markets—in other words, with their foreign trade; (2) by dislocating their commercial law, and, consequently, the industry and commerce housed within that framework of commercial law; (3) by displacing labour and capital; (4) by altering the ideas and principles governing industry, and chiefly by modifying the traditional or conventional relations between the State and private enterprise; (5) by modifying taxation and the economic system bound up with fiscal policy. Let us consider these various influences in succession.

EFFECTS OF THE BLOCKADE.

(1) The opening of war closed all enemy markets, in theory at any rate, to British trade, and closed British markets to enemy trade. This is not the

place to consider the relation of these various changes to international law, but only their economic consequences. It is obvious that they affected English industry and commerce in four ways: by depriving them of certain markets; by denying them certain commodities; by deranging the complex system of international adjustments by which the business accounts between nations are settled; and by reducing the amount of apparatus (chiefly shipping) available for international commerce. The shutting of belligerent markets to British trade was a more serious blow in the early weeks of war than later. Such great labour forces were diverted from normal production, either to the army or to supplying the army, that our export trade had a restricted need of the lost markets; but it probably played an obscure but important part in accentuating the evil of the high rate of exchange with the United States, by depriving us of much of the Continental machinery with which in normal times we help to balance our accounts with America. It was felt more severely in relation to our imports than in relation to our exports. But it is interesting to observe how rapidly industry accommodated itself to the changed conditions. This was not due to the loudly-trumpeted campaign for "capturing German trade," of which much was heard in the early days of the war. To some extent British manufacturers took to making



French troops beginning to construct a new railway line.

[Central News.]



First steps in repairing the havoc of war: Temporary buildings erected in a shattered French village, from which the Germans had been driven out.

[Central News.]

substitutes; to some extent they sought substitutes in new markets, notably in the United States and Japan; and to some extent, under licence or with the tacit sanction of the authorities, supplies were allowed to enter this country which, directly or indirectly, came from the old enemy source.

Prices, of course, rose, but the rise was not confined to those commodities for the supply of which in peace time we were largely dependent upon enemy production. It seriously affected, among other things, foodstuffs. The outbreak of war put out of trade, as a result either of capture or of internment, all enemy merchant ships except those which could still ply in the Baltic. This meant a very serious diminution of the world's available tonnage, which might have been corrected to some extent had the United States Government been able to carry out its project of buying interned enemy steamers and running them under the American flag. The Allies, however, announced that they would not recognise such transfers, and later an Order in Council was issued exposing to capture all ships, even though under a neutral flag, in enemy or partially in enemy ownership. As a result of these measures all enemy merchant ships (except prizes) were lost to the commerce of the world. The consequent deficiency of profit was accentuated by losses in the course of warlike operations, and by heavy requisitions for naval and military purposes. At the beginning of 1914 there were over eleven millions of steam and sailing tonnage employed in trading. The Admiralty requisitioned about 800 ships, twenty per cent of all above 1,000 tons, of which 250 were liners and 550 general traders. They later on took up nearly 300 trading steamships of under 1,000 tons, and many tugs, yachts, and trawlers. It has been estimated that owing to losses and the requirements of the Admiralty, there was a net diminution of about twenty-five per cent of the number of vessels available for the ocean overseas trade. There was also a reduction of the foreign shipping available by thirty-five per cent.

THE WAR AND FREIGHTS.

The volume of British imports was almost maintained, and, if account be taken of imports of Government stores, was largely exceeded, though, of course, exports fell heavily. The average freight in wheat in 1915 as compared with 1914 was nearly trebled, and the freight in other commodities went up even more. These averages conceal a good deal of the fluctuation, and the freights varied greatly from market to market. Without doubt, the profits of shipowners increased enormously, and the hunt for the largest profit created other problems, which will be considered elsewhere. True, the rise in freights was not exclusively responsible for the increase in freights, but it was one factor, and not an inconsiderable one.

How far are the war changes which have been sketched above likely to be permanent, and to survive peace? Some are obviously ephemeral. The railways and the ports will, with peace, return to the normal. British shipping, which, in spite of losses, is being increased by new construction, will, when the Admiralty releases it, speedily reconcile itself to more natural conditions. But will certain industries, which have been temporarily built up, here or in neutral countries, or crippled in enemy countries, return with peace to pre-war conditions? Will the old lines of commerce, twisted by war out of the straight, return? We may take, as the industry having a very great interest for Englishmen, that of shipping.


The war, by eliminating the German shipowner (the British shipowners' most serious competitor), and by giving the British shipowner unparalleled prosperity, has given British shipping a greater pre-eminence than ever. Will the German shipowner return to his old place, or will any neutral take it? It is highly improbable that any neutral will take it, for President Wilson's efforts to restore the American mercantile marine have failed badly, in spite of the Panama Canal. If we were to accept Herr Ballin's words at their face value, it is equally improbable that the German shipowner would return. Herr Ballin argued that the war, by showing the uncertainty of the economic basis of the German shipping industry, would prevent capital from flowing into it, unless the war closed with guarantees for the future. The particular guarantees indicated by Herr Ballin—the equivalent of German naval supremacy—may be excluded, though it is just possible that the Powers may take up with a new mind the question of "the freedom of the seas"—in other words, of the status of peaceful commerce during war. But even if it be assumed that the distribution of sea power remains unchanged in any way after the war, it is probable that the German mercantile marine will fight hard to recover, and even extend, its old position. A repetition of the present war during the next fifty years is highly improbable, and that is sufficient security for capital. It should be noted that the great German shipping companies are reported to be ordering ships for the future.

COMMERCE AFTER THE WAR.

One factor which may play a part in determining the future of commerce is sentiment. The intense antipathy between the Allies and the Central Powers may result in efforts, either private or public, to prevent the renewal of the old commercial relations between them. The sentiment of individual traders is not likely to be as powerful a factor as some apparently believe. It may well operate where it involves no monetary loss, but where it does involve loss a private boycott is hardly conceivable in our Western world.

The general conclusion would seem to be that international commerce is not likely to be seriously transformed by the war. There is a further question, whether the world will take long to recover the economic wastage of the war. The most serious elements of this wastage are the loss of arms and the loss of brains. The fine intelligences which have been blotted out, and the labour forces which have been ruined, cannot be replaced speedily; but scientific knowledge, and the mechanism of production which it brings into being, are preserved in the modern world even though the individual perishes. It is reasonable to conclude that the actual material wastage will be made good speedily enough, but the future rate of expansion will be checked by the loss of brains and arms. The world may soon be as rich as it was, but it will never be as rich as it would have been but for the war.

(2) Some reference has already been made to legal changes affecting the conduct of commerce and industry. The Courts and the Legislature interfered radically with contract. Of the moratorium established at the beginning of the war an account will be found in an earlier chapter, but it is possible that the moratorium may be revived and extended in connection with rents. It has been complained that landlords have been raising the rents of workers and the dependants of soldiers, and the Government has promised action if no voluntary remedy is found. There is also at the time of writing much discussion of a moratorium for rent in the event of Lord Derby's



New workmen's dwellings being built at Woolwich, a task undertaken by the Government in order to provide accommodation for the greatly increased number of workmen at the Woolwich Arsenal.

[Record Press.]



Enrolling volunteers for munition work: A group of workmen waiting outside the Manchester Town Hall to be enrolled.

["Manchester Guardian."]

scheme, or some system of compulsion, sweeping yet larger numbers of men into the army. In France, such a provision was made at the beginning of war.

SUSPENSION OF PATENTS.

Of more directly commercial importance is the suspension of enemy patents. It was found that the patent law put the manufacture of some essential and many important commodities under enemy control. A number of private persons saw in the suspension of enemy patent rights the possibility of making large profits, but the administration of the law was more equitable than their imagining. The Controller of Patents was appointed as a tribunal to advise the Board of Trade. The practice adopted was not to grant patents but to grant licences, and, rather than monopoly licences, to make the protected article or preparation the subject of open competition. There were till October 387 applications for licences under 294 enemy-owned patents; 243 licences were granted, and two patents were declared void on the ground that there was no subject matter for patent rights. Three patents were suspended without the grant of a licence, and in thirty-one cases applicants were refused as not competent to carry on the manufacture of the article. No monopoly licences were issued. In some cases branches of enemy firms were allowed to continue the manufacture of patented commodities under the supervision of a receiver. The number of applications does not seem very large, but they covered important commodities, and it was discovered that the Germans had developed a system of protecting by a chain of patents.

The question arises what will be the future of the industries which have been built up on the suspension of German patent rights. One may presume that the importance of the capital converted in this way should not be exaggerated. The Board of Trade's present intention is to make the licences granted to British traders permanent if satisfactory terms can be made with the German owners after the war. In the meantime, the royalties are being collected by the Public Trustee. It should be remembered that whether it is worth while for a British firm to continue manufacturing after the war depends on whether it is cheaper to make the article here or import it, and that is in part affected by the refusal of the Board of Trade to grant monopoly licences. There ought to be no excessive expectations of great permanent changes in British industry as a result of this suspension of patent rights, especially as the total amount of royalties received by the Public Trustee is at the date of the last report only £1,000; the royalties average five per cent on the selling price. Partly this is to be explained by the claims of war work, which is so profitable as not to make speculative new ventures equally attractive; partly it is due to the conviction of manufacturers that war conditions are ephemeral, and the law that the race is to the swift will assert itself once again when the war ends.

Reference may be made to another legal change, which, though limited in its influence, illustrates how lightly the law of contract may be regarded when it stands in the way of State war interests. It was found that German firms had obtained practically a monopoly of the output of spelter in the British Empire, and that in particular the extensive Australian producers of spelter were bound to a German firm. The result was that, while the German firm could not take delivery, the metal (necessary in the manufacture of munitions) was not available for British consumption. A regulation was brought

to have the contracts with the German firm declared not only suspended, but null and void, and a decision to this effect was obtained. The law, it will be seen, can be far less rigid than is commonly supposed.

The war also involved the suspension of the protection of enemy copyright. It cannot be said, however, that this produced notable changes. The general antipathy towards things German prevented any public demand for translations from general German literature, but there were a number of translations of special books bearing upon the war. Most of these, however, were of no literary value, although a few were. The sociologist who is anxious for evidence of the literary reactions of war must look rather to the growing familiarisation with Russian writings, though there, too, he will be disappointed if he sets his hopes too high.

THE MUNITIONS ACT.

The chief interference of the law with industry was by executive act under legislative authority. It affected both distribution and production. Under the defence of the Realm Acts, the Munitions Act, and other statutes--and the regulations made under these Acts--the Government took power to prohibit or control the whole of the export trade, and to control the manufacture of munitions. Under Section 10 of the Munitions of War Act, the Government has the right--

"to regulate or restrict the carrying on of any work in any factory, workshop, or other premises, or the engagement or employment of any workman or all or any classes of workmen therein, or to remove the plant therefrom with a view to maintaining or increasing the production of munitions in other factories, workshops, or premises, or to regulate and control the supply of metals and materials that may be required for any articles for use in war."

Other very extensive powers over industry, and those engaged in industry, are given by the Munitions Act and other statutes. These will be discussed later. For the present it should be noted that the Government has an absolute control over the plant premises, and, to a lesser extent, the workers in any factory which might conceivably be used for the manufacture of munitions, as well as power to start wholly new factories.

A succession of proclamations controlled the export trade. The export of certain classes of goods--mostly those of direct utility in war--is prohibited to all destinations. The exportation of another class is prohibited to destinations abroad other than British Possessions and Protectorates. Another class of goods may be exported not only within the British Empire, but also to certain foreign countries. These prohibitions are not so rigorous as they may seem, for, in many instances, export is allowed under licence, although the procuring of a licence is often a cumbrous procedure, and complaints have been frequent of too numerous changes in the lists of goods and in the mode of administration. The object of all these provisions is not only to prevent contraband trade, but to give effect to the blockade of German commerce aimed at. The same object is furthered by a law requiring declarations as to the ultimate destination of exported goods, and by the restriction of export to certain prescribed channels. It has been the aim of the British authorities to have set up in the neutral countries in contact with Germany Trading Trusts, which should control the import and export trade of that country. The British Government allows consignments to and from these trusts, and these trusts are under an obligation to prevent contraband trade with Germany. Such trusts



A "bread line" of German civilians outside one of the Municipal Stores in Berlin.

[Photopress.]

have been established in Switzerland, Holland, Denmark, and Norway, but efforts to establish one in Sweden broke down. No account of the procedure of these trusts has ever been given to Parliament, and their effectiveness as machinery for harmonising neutral rights with the blockade of Germany must remain, in the absence of full information, a subject for speculation.

It has been complained that this machinery and the blockade generally, have been used to monopolise international trade in British interests, but there is no evidence to justify such a charge. On the contrary, not only has the normal trade of neutrals with neutrals been maintained, but certainly for a long period these neutrals acted as agencies for Germany. One may quote the evidence of a writer in *Die Neue Zeit*, who says that "from neutral and even from enemy lands many bales (of wool and cotton) reached Germany, so that up till now there can be no talk of a real scarcity in raw material." Here, again, the question arises how far all this dislocation of commercial intercourse is likely to have permanent results. Will the neutrals who now export so much to Germany, which normally comes through England, retain this profitable business after the war? The commercial intercourse between Germany and her immediate neighbours was always very close, and it will doubtless not be less close after the war. It is conceivable that the agency business which England, as an emporium of the world, carries on, may in part be diverted to other countries, who are learning how the business is conducted.

Doubtless in these matters the tearing of the veil of mystery counts for something. But against this should be set certain circumstances—the financial pre-eminence

of Great Britain, her extensive empire, her pre-eminence in shipping, her central position, her long tradition of authority. All these make for the retention of an agency business, which is probably more complicated than it appears.

THE FALL IN THE MARGIN.

(3) The displacement of labour and capital may be considered under three aspects—the passage of men out of industry into the army and the navy; the transference of labour and capital from one industry to another; the influx of new forces of labour and capital. The number of men transferred from industry to military or naval duties is hardly likely to amount to less than 4,000,000 by the close of the war. Both absolutely and relatively this figure exceeds anything produced by any previous war, for we are for the first time in our history waging war not only with our full resources of ships and gold, but also with our full resources of soldiers. A variety of circumstances has prevented this loss of labour power from being immediately disastrous—it has been gradual; in the early weeks of war it helped to absorb the unemployed; it has come under a voluntary system which allows of industrial adjustment far better than any other system, for the notion that a Government can dictate the proper distribution of labour forces better than individual self-interest presupposes an intimate knowledge and an efficiency difficult to credit to any existing Government. Nevertheless, the drafting of millions from productive to unproductive employment has had serious consequences, not only in reducing the total national income, but in producing a serious shortage of labour which has mani-

tested itself not only in higher wages, but also in higher prices, in most instances more than counterbalancing higher wages. The reduction of national production has expressed itself most plainly in the decline of our export trade with the serious complication of the exchanges.

The loss of 4,000,000 men—if it be not made good in other ways—is equivalent to a reduction of the national income by some £400,000,000 annually, allowing an average earning capacity of £100. But that does not represent the whole economic loss. Mr. Asquith estimated the cost to the Government of the average soldier, and presumably also of the average sailor, at from £250 to £300 a year. It is not clear whether this estimate is meant to include each soldier's share of the cost of equipment and munitions. What is evident is that where there is a fall in earning power the only way to compensate for it is a corresponding economy in expenditure. These 4,000,000 fighting men, however, who have ceased to earn at all have trebled their expenditure. Has civilian economy made good the deficit? The evidence points the other way, although such matters are very difficult to determine, and the significance of the more obvious signs of extravagance can very easily be overrated. Still, there is no resisting the conclusion that while the national earning power has been lessened by the war there has been no corresponding economy through thrift. The nation is probably not only not saving, but is actually drawing upon its capital—the nation as distinguished from the State, for that the State is living on capital is too obvious to need demonstration. This living on capital expresses itself in a variety of ways: loans to, and other investments in, foreign countries, decline or vanish; apparatus, such as railways, roads, and much machinery,

is not maintained in proper repair; considerable stock disappears; loans are incurred; securities are sold abroad. The pace at which this is going on is difficult to estimate, and neither the Government nor any competent economist has investigated the matter.

THE EFFECT ON CAPITAL.

Has it already gone so far that there is a manifest shortage of capital for carrying on British industry and commerce at present?

Although there is visible a certain tendency to allow fixtures to waste, still there is no evidence that industry is starved for capital. Two circumstances help to explain this phenomenon: The checking of the export of capital has bridged over much of the deficit that might be created by the excess of national spending over national earning; the reduction in labour force means inevitably a reduction in the industrial machinery employed and in the demand for new capital. The uncertainty of the economic situation and the high rate of interest have checked venturesome new undertakings, and probably the vast majority of new ventures have been made in direct relation to war needs. It is plain, however, that the danger of an actual famine in capital comes nearer as the number of men called to the colours grows, for this means an increased wastage, coupled with a diminution of the economic forces which create capital to meet demands. Should that situation arise, it would be accompanied by a rapid depreciation in the economic apparatus, and an under-feeding and under-clothing of the population. If this last phenomenon has not yet shown itself, it is because not only is the country managing by one device or another to acquire what is needed to satisfy current wants, but there has been a temporary redistribution of the nation's revenue. The wages of



Dr. Emil Rathenau.

[E.N.A.]



Herr Ballin.

[E.N.A.]

some classes have risen, the dependants of soldiers belonging to the working classes are in many instances better off than before the war; employment—owing to the drawing of labour to the army—is better and steadier. But all this will be changed when peace comes, and the working classes will be burdened with heavy taxation to pay the interest on loans, while employment and wages will (probably after a period of collapse) have returned to the normal.

A subject for inquiry would be the amount of fixed capital (machinery and the like) which has been wasted as a result of the war, not destroyed in the course of military operations, but rendered useless by the economic dislocation consequent on war. Fixed capital has certainly not been rendered unproductive to the same extent as labour, but waste there has been on a fair scale. Those businesses specially adapted for enemy markets now closed can have been adjusted to new conditions only with loss. Far more important is the transformation of industries adapted to the needs of peace to war needs and the erection of new works for the manufacture of munitions. There will be a double loss—at one end in the change from peace conditions to war conditions, and at the other end in the change from war conditions to peace conditions.

Unfortunately, there are no statistical data of the transference of labour and capital from one industry to another, but the reality of the phenomenon is sufficiently evidenced. Fishermen, for instance, have gone into the coalmines; servant girls have become tramguards; porters have become munition workers. The operations of the Minister of Munitions give the most striking illustration of this phenomenon. This department undertook to form a kind of army of volunteer munition workers out of skilled artisans not already engaged on such work. These volunteers were to work in any factory selected for them. The army actually enrolled did not turn out to be very large, but that was because private enterprise had already drawn heavily on mobile labour. This process of transference when it has been studied will throw a new light on the whole problem of the mobility of both labour and capital. That capital, in the sense of savings, is mobile has always been understood; but it has been generally assumed that fixed capital, in the sense of plant, is specialised in its use, and therefore largely immobile. It would appear that this latter assumption has been too unqualified. Many works and much machinery intended for one purpose has been adapted with relatively slight change to new purposes. For instance, a factory engaged in making furniture has found itself playing an important part in the making of rifles. This extension of the mobility of fixed capital is an economic fact of importance. In the same way, labour has acquired a new mobility. Men and women have discovered that processes are much easier to master than they had imagined, and that in this world of tool-minding the boundaries between trade and trade are often imaginary and artificial. The employers of labour and the owners of capital have learned a similar lesson.

THE PSYCHOLOGICAL CHANGE.

This psychological change in capital and labour, employer and employed, should prove very fruitful in the future. The most serious cause of economic crises, and, therefore, of unemployment, is the rigidity of industries, which fail to respond quickly to change and to correct miscalculations. The chief cause of this rigidity is the conservatism of employers and employed,

which induces them to persist in a trade or a form of production when it would be wise to alter. This conservatism ought to be undermined as a result of the teachings of the war. The workman has discovered that he may, with no excessive effort, pass from a suffering trade to one that is prosperous; the employer has found that there are no insuperable obstacles in the way of adapting a factory to a variety of purposes. We ought, therefore, to expect in the future greater flexibility in meeting economic rises, and consequently less acute economic crises. Not only this, but it would be natural to expect a greater alertness, boldness, originality, and general openness of mind in the future conduct of industry. If these anticipations should prove correct, some economic compensation will have been found for the economic waste of the war.

From the nature of the case, while there has been no little mobility of capital as between industry and industry, and while capital which would, under ordinary conditions, have gone abroad has remained here, there has been little influx of capital. That could only come about as the result of foreign loans, or as the result of investments of foreign capital in British industry. The only loan we are known to have raised abroad is the one for 500 million dollars in America, while there is no evidence of any movement of foreign capital towards investment here. On the other hand, there has been a notable influx of new labour forces into British industry. Such labour forces may be of three kinds—imported from abroad, the return of retired workers to industry, the employment of natives not hitherto engaged in industry. Under all three heads there have been reinforcements of the army of labour. Probably the most notable of foreign recruits were the Belgian immigrants. At first they constituted a source of apprehension, as it was feared that to give them employment would throw British workers out of employment; but the increasing scarcity of labour removed such hesitations, and gradually many thousands were absorbed into British industry as munition workers or in other capacities. In the pursuit of skilled artisans for munition making, these were sought in the Colonies, and apparently even in the United States, though it is not likely that the total thus obtained was considerable.

There is plenty of evidence that the demand for labour, and the higher wages of labour, recalled to the business of production many who had retired from it. These were of two classes. Oldish men and women who on marriage had abandoned the factory. The second class belonged chiefly to the textile trades. These reinforcements constituted an increase in the labour army, but it was not without its darker side. Many women were tempted from the home to the factory who, in the interests of the future of the State, had better been left to the care of their families.

The new recruits to productive industry were of three kinds—persons previously engaged in parasitic occupations, men who had not hitherto worked with their hands, and women who had not hitherto worked. High wages caused a marked movement from the parasitic to the productive occupations, and patriotism induced a number of persons (though not a considerable number) hitherto engaged in professions or idling to labour with their hands. But the great new source of labour was the influx of women. It is difficult to say how far it was an influx of women hitherto not engaged in production, how far it was a transference of women from parasitic industries or domestic service, and how far it was the promotion of women from less skilled and responsible to more skilled

and responsible work. No reliable statistics exist of the number of additional recruits to the army of labour from all these various sources, but it has been estimated that it may have amounted altogether to an addition of ten per cent to the labour forces.

The changes in labour produced very difficult problems, and it cannot be said that at the time of writing they have been either solved or even seriously grappled with. The Government demanded of the Trade Unions that they should abandon for the period of the war all their rules devised for the protection of the standard of life which might restrict output. These rules embrace, among other matters, the relations between Union and non-Union labour, between skilled and unskilled workers, between craft and craft. In addition, there were complicated questions as to the delimitations of various Unions and as to rates of wages. The importance of this obscure code of regulations, vast though it is to labour, is not readily appreciated by outsiders, and the official tendency has been to give not much attention to the difficulties of the present, and no thought at all to the problems accumulating for the future. Some regulations were made by the Ministry of Munitions for the fixing of a minimum wage for women workers in controlled factories, but they are so vague that their effectiveness has been disputed.

Two important questions have been raised by this newly-discovered fluidity of labour, which has, in large measure, broken down the old barriers between skilled and unskilled labour, and which has introduced women to an unprecedented extent into the labour market. Are these changes likely to be permanent? If they are we may expect from the first, in the beginning, a lowering of wages, followed, however, by a transformation in English Trade Unionism. English Trade Unionism, in contradistinction to Australian, has hitherto been aristocratic, resting upon and perpetuating a hierarchy of trades and workers. With the boundaries between skilled and unskilled in large measure eliminated or disputed, there will come about a uniformity of interest and sentiment among English working men, expressing itself in comprehensive labour organisations. This should strengthen labour in its conflict with capital, and it may conceivably give labour a power in politics and the Legislature far greater than it has hitherto enjoyed; for undoubtedly one secret of the political strength of Labour in Australia has been the democratic character of Australian Unionism. In guessing at the future of women in industry, it is as well not to exaggerate the degree of the change which the war has already brought about.

THE STATE OF COMMERCE.

(4) The most notable change in the relations between industry and the State has been the extension of State interference, which has affected finance, commerce, employers and employed. It began with the taking over of the railways by the State and the requisitioning of mercantile ships for Admiralty purposes. The next

step was to suggest, though not to fix, maximum prices for certain foodstuffs. The Government then, in order to keep prices down, entered into considerable purchases of sugar, and later bought up the Indian wheat crop, while under its instructions the Australian Government bought up the meat output. Another step was the limitation of coal prices. Then the State gave assistance on a large scale for the encouragement of the manufacture of dyes in this country. It assumed complete control of public appeals for capital, but it also raised a loan of 500 million dollars for the adjustment of the rate of exchange. It established a system of State insurance—first for the mercantile marine, and later against damage to property caused by aircraft and bombardment. It took powers to requisition ships to maintain the trade with certain markets inadequately supplied, because freight rates in other markets were more profitable, and to regulate trading between foreign ports. But the greatest changes were made in connection with the Ministry of Munitions. The profits in munition factories were limited (after a fashion), and workmen were practically bound to their employers. Special courts were set up for their disciplining, and very drastic regulations were set up for the control of the liquor traffic. The State even began to experiment as a liquor dealer.

An adequate discussion of all these numerous and revolutionary activities would fill a volume, and here we must be content to consider how far what has been done is likely to mean a permanent advance towards State Socialism. It cannot be said that all the Government measures have been well conceived. The Munitions Tribunal and the restrictions upon the liberty of labour have provoked much bitterness, and if anything have made the idea of State Socialism (at least as developed in England in war time) unattractive to working men. The transactions in sugar were so managed that in order to prevent a heavy loss to the State the price of sugar was kept artificially high—a form of taxation bearing with peculiar harshness upon the poor. The handling of the problem of coal prices was timorous, and hardly intelligible. The handling of financial problems left room for criticism. If the degree of success attained be the proper test of permanence, then nearly all the war experiments in State Socialism are not likely to outlast the war, or to encourage similar ventures for the future. This does not mean, of course, that the experiments could not have been more skilfully made, but that distinction will probably be lost sight of. Nor need it be supposed that the talk of the State giving every one his orders and allotting every one his work and his place in society will leave much sediment behind.

(5) In an earlier chapter the introduction by Mr. McKenna of the beginnings of a protective tariff was discussed. Efforts are being made to extend that tariff, and there is some discussion of the possibility or advisability of the perpetuation after war of the Alliance against Germany in the form of a tariff league against Germany. But the project is too visionary.



Trebizond, showing the East Wall and Citadel.



The main business street of Trebizond.



A view in the Trebizond district.

CHAPTER XX.

THE DESTRUCTION OF THE TURKISH ARMENIANS.

THE ARMENIAN QUESTION ONCE MORE—EFFECTS OF TURKISH INTERVENTION IN THE WAR—THE FORMER MASSACRES—ARMENIANS AND THE RUSSIAN CAMPAIGN—A POLICY OF EXTERMINATION—MASSACRE AND EXILE—SOME INSTANCES OF RESISTANCE—GERMAN RESPONSIBILITY—THE WORLD AND THE TURKS.


THE intervention of Turkey in the war promised ill for the Armenian people. All the reasons which had created the "Armenian question," with its history of persecution, massacre, and unfulfilled schemes of reform, persisted still, and were now aggravated by a war with Russia, which would be conducted in the Armenian borderland, and among the Armenian population.

The Armenians had always been a suspect nation in the eyes of the Turks. They were small enough to persecute, but not too small to fear. They were a subject people of capacity and intelligence, peaceful and industrious, anxious to learn. They were material which might have been of great use to the Turkish State had the Turk known how to use it. But the Turkish conqueror, always accomplished in the use of the sword, had added little in course of time to this primitive equipment for statesmanship. A Turkish historian might well reflect on the diverse qualities and capacities of the peoples who had at one time or another been incorporated in the Ottoman State, and how greatly they might have enriched it had the Ottomans known how to tolerate their diversity and employ it to a common end. But

in this respect Young Turk and Old Turk were alike, except that the younger type was more energetic and systematic in his repression of the non-Ottoman elements in the Empire. Of these, the Armenians, with their ancient Christian civilisation—its organised existence went back some fifteen hundred years—were the most conspicuous example.

THE EARLIER MASSACRES.

There had already been two great periods of Armenian persecution. In 1895-1897 Abdul Hamid had tried the policy of massacre on a generous scale, both in Asia Minor and in Constantinople. From one hundred thousand to a quarter of a million Armenians in all had perished. It was said at the time that he had declared that he would exterminate the race, so far as it was to be found in Turkey. But there were difficulties in the way of such a policy of thoroughness. It required a certain amount of organisation, time, and security from interruption, and though Abdul Hamid took great pains to cut off the Armenian regions of Asia Minor from the outer world, and succeeded in destroying a large section of the population, the eyes of the world were on him, and so



MAP TO ILLUSTRATE THE ARMENIAN MASSACRES AND THE DEPORTATIONS TO THE DESERTS.

many foreign powers were hostile that he would no doubt have found himself embarrassed had he attempted to carry out the complete plan of extermination for which he certainly had no lack of inclination. "The way to make an end of the Armenian question," he had said, "was to make an end of the Armenians." The Young Turks had not failed to pick up this crumb of statesmanship which fell from the old Sultan's table. They had, indeed, made an experiment on a small scale in 1909, when massacres took place at Adana, in Cilicia. These, like the Hamidian, were done under orders. By whom exactly they were ordered, and precisely why, is still a matter of debate. Some would make the Young Turk party in general responsible; others, among whom is Sir Edwin Pears, ascribe the responsibility to the Young Turk extremists at Salonica. The reason offered is that the Armenians, interpreting too largely the coming of self-government to Turkey, had read into it a measure of equality and fraternity for the smaller nationalities which the Ottomans observed with astonishment and anger. The blood of the Armenians, they argued, must be cooled; and cooled it was by the time-honoured process of wholesale massacre.

The Armenians had welcomed the fall of Abdul and the grant of the Constitution, and even after Adana there was a party among them which continued to pin its faith to, and to work with, the Young Turks. This was the Dashnakzutiun, who argued that the Young Turk *régime* had come to stay, and that it would arrest the decay of Turkey. Abdul had been weak, and had only held his ground by playing off the foreign Powers against each other, but Turkey, under her new masters, would hold off all foreigners alike, and the Armenians had therefore more both to hope for than to fear from the Young Turks. In the meantime, a new scheme of reform in the administration of Armenia, which involved a certain measure of instruction and control by European officials, was accepted by the Porte, and was about to be put into operation when Turkey entered the war. It was at once cancelled, but for the time the Turks did not attack the Armenians. They were occupied in preparing their campaign against the Russian Caucasus and Egypt, and in organising their armies against possible attack in Europe.

THE ARMENIANS AND RUSSIA.

But the position of the Armenians was clearly critical. They had not always looked towards Russia with confidence, for Russia's Armenian subjects had had their grievances and discontents, but the Liberal administration

of Vorontzoff-Dashkoff, recently Viceroy in the Caucasus, had given them fresh hopes, and in any event the system of government by massacre, handed on by Abdul to his successors, inevitably led them to look to Russian arms for their deliverance. The Armenians, it has been said, are used to persecution. But there is no credible evidence that massacre, rape, and pillage become acceptable by repetition, and we shall not wonder if the only division of opinion among the Armenians, when they learned that Turkey was at war with Russia, was as to whether it would be better for Armenia (with an opening on the Mediterranean at Alexandretta) to become an autonomous State under the protection of Russia, France, and England, or an autonomous element in the Russian Empire. But whatever Armenians at large thought about these questions, to which only the course of the war could give an answer, it is quite certain that they were much too circumspect

to take sides openly against the Turks. The ox does not offer his throat to the butcher's knife. On the Armenian border, beyond doubt, the Armenians waited eagerly for the Russians' coming, and, on their retreat, saw them departing with a sinking of the heart. The Russian Armenians, aided by the community in foreign countries, had given great assistance to the Russian army, hoping thereby to deliver their fellow-countrymen in Turkey, and for this aid the Young Turks took a fearful revenge.

Already, by the beginning of 1915, the Volunteer Armenian regiments serving with the Russians numbered from 8,000 to 10,000 men, and it was estimated that by the time spring came, and the contingents had gathered from overseas, there would be twice that number, or more, available. Some of these were men who had themselves lived in Turkish Armenia in their youth, and had been

driven out by the Hamidian persecutions. Such a man, for instance, was Hamazasp Servantzian, one of the leaders of the Volunteers, who had escaped into Russian Armenia in 1895, and later organised armed resistance to the Moslem mobs who fell on the Armenians in the Caucasian rising of eight years ago. Such men, knowing perfectly the people and the topography of the borderland which the Russians invaded, were undoubtedly of service to the Russian cause. But in this the Turks were only paying the penalty for their gross incompetency as a governing people, and they did not, in fact, allege the activity of the Russian, the foreign, or the refugee Armenians, as the reason for their attempt to destroy their own Armenian population. It was, however, the disasters of the first campaign, culminating in the severe defeat of Sarikamysh, which seems to have




Talat Bey.

[E.N.A.]



Mersina : The water front.

[E.N.A.]



A general view of Erzerum.

[E.N.A.]



Armenian children in the refugee camp at Port Said.



Distributing soup to some of the Armenian refugees in camp at Port Said.

decided the Young Turk leaders to carry out a policy on which, in principle, they may have decided earlier in the war. As the Turkish troops and the Kurds invaded the Russian Caucasus and North-Western Persia they had sacked and destroyed the Armenian villages as they went. But these were either on enemy or neutral soil. In the spring of 1915 the Turks began work within their own borders. They put into execution a systematic plan to make an end of the Armenians.

TALAAT'S SAYING.

Talaat Bay, the Young Turk leader who had been president of the Relief Committee at Constantinople, after the Adana massacres, was the leader in this scheme. When Mr. Morgenthau, the American Ambassador at Constantinople, went to see him—"I am taking the necessary steps," said Talaat, "to make it impossible for the Armenians even to utter the word autonomy during the next fifty years." The policy was carried out with a degree of success in organisation which the Turks seem rarely to attain except in massacres. In April, orders were sent to all the governors of provinces, chief military commanders and heads of police that the Armenian population was to be disposed of. Some general principles, apparently, were laid down, but the details could safely be left to officials not unaccustomed to the execution of such projects. The orders were carried round the countryside. Says a letter from Van:—"On the day before the massacre which took place in the region of Van, couriers on horse visited all the Turkish villages situated far from the telegraph lines, and took the firman of Sultan Mehmet ordering the massacre of all the Armenians."

The Turks have offered certain pretexts for their conduct, but without industry or show of anxiety lest the world should not accept them. The commonest is that the Armenians were guilty of a revolutionary movement, which aimed at setting up a separate independent State, though the truth was that they were in the

border zone which the Russians for a short time occupied, the Armenian villagers were only anxious lest they should be suddenly fallen on by their Moslem neighbours. This pretext, however, was for the foreign public. In the vilayet of Van the reason offered was that some of the able-bodied Armenians had deserted after being called up for service. Doubtless, elsewhere there were other explanations; but it matters little what they were. This was not a case of executions of conspirators, though certainly many Armenian notables were executed; nor even of massacre of the male population, though the males were massacred. It was an attempt to destroy a whole people by murder, outrage, and starvation, without distinction either of age or sex.

THE FIRST STEP.

The able-bodied males were called up for service. Those of them that bore arms were disarmed and employed as workmen on the construction of roads and the like tasks. They were moved from their own districts, and little authentic information about them was afterwards received. Such as reached the outer world declared that they had all been killed. "We learn from a sure source," runs one letter, "that Armenian soldiers of the Erzerum province, working on the Erzerum-Yerzhingha road, had all been massacred." Equally, those of the province of Diarbekir had been massacred on the Diarbekir-Urfa and Diarbekir-Kharput road. From Kharput alone 1,800 young Armenians were sent off as soldiers to Diarbekir to work on the roads there. All of them had been massacred. We have no news about other localities, but there can be no doubt that the soldiers there have been made to suffer the same fate." Had there been even less information, it would have been safe to assume that, in their determination to break up the structure of Armenian society, the Turks would not have spared the young Armenian men.

The men who were not called up for service and afterwards despatched were disposed of in various ways.

A general disarmament first took place, and for the purpose, as for that of guarding their prisoners, the Turks organised a special gendarmerie of released criminals. Large numbers of imprisonments took place; sometimes without pretext, sometimes on the allegation that the possession of books or literature betokened revolutionary designs. Sometimes the accused were executed in prison. Some were tortured. Some were sent from prison to exile and disappeared. The manner of death of this or that notable would be afterwards reported; others were simply not heard of again. At Diarbekir the prisoners were all killed, and the Bishop, refusing to sign a certificate saying that they had died a natural death, committed suicide. His deputy was beaten to death. Many of the bishops were handed over to court-martials, and nothing was learned of their fate. At Constantinople twenty well-known Armenians were hung, and many more were carried off and seen no more. The Armenian members of the Chamber of Deputies were not spared, friends though they might have been of the Young Turk leaders, or Dashnakists, who had worked with the Young Turk party. Zohrab, perhaps the best known of the Armenian deputies, was sent off into Anatolia and murdered—one account says burnt. Haladjian, formerly Minister of Public Works, and a friend of Talaat Bey, was sent on a similar journey and disappeared. Other deputies and notables were sent with Zohrab, and are believed to have died with him. But these were

most part, all the male population was dealt with. The old men were sometimes spared an immediate death, to be reserved for longer suffering.

THE FATE OF THE WOMEN AND CHILDREN.

With the women and children were adopted other methods, the key to which is the determination of the Turks that the Armenian nation should be disrupted so that it could not again be made whole. Says Lord Bryce, in a compendious summary on this point:—

"The fate of the women was, if possible, worse. A large proportion, including most of the younger women, were driven from their houses into the streets. Turkish officials picked out those whom they wished to be sent to their harems, and others were taken to the markets and sold into slavery, into the worst kind of slavery, a life of prostitution. The children shared a similar fate. The elder ones were mostly killed. The younger ones were taken to the market and sold at prices which ranged from eight to fourteen shillings. They were sold only to Mussulmans, and on the condition that they should be brought up as Mohammedans."

The women that were taken to Turkish harems were also forcibly converted to Islam. But for the Armenians generally there was no such freedom to escape death by professing conversion to Islam, as there had been in the massacres of Abdul Hamid. The Turks were not now seeking converts, nor did they take the trouble to pretend it.

THE EXILE.

Death for the men; the harem for the younger

women; the market for the younger children. But there were still large numbers of women and children to be removed. Orders were sent that they should be driven from their homes towards the Euphrates and Tigris, into the deserts that lie to the south of the Armenian vilayets. At the outset of the journey their treatment varied according to the character of the officials. In some places they were given a few days' notice of expulsion, permission to attempt to sell their property, or to hire a waggon for the journey. In others they were told that they could carry with them what they liked, and that their escort would furnish them with food. In all cases their end was the same. No sooner were they well on their



Turkish reserves in Palestine marching to join the colours.

[Newspaper Illustrations.]

only individuals whose prominence drew special notice to their fate. Along the shores of the Black Sea, in Eastern Asia Minor, and in Cilicia an identical policy was followed. One place differed from another only in the mode of murder. At Trebizond, as the Italian Consul bore witness, a large part of the Armenian population, which was from 8,000 to 10,000 in number, was put into boats, taken out to sea, and drowned; the rest, according to the evidence of Armenians, were sent into exile. At another place, some sixty of the citizens were rushed through a court-martial, and at once shot outside the town. At a third, the men were pole-axed in front of graves already dug for them. So, for the

way than they were robbed of their property and money. The escorts joined in the pillage with the Moslems by the wayside and the bands of robbers who came down to share in the spoil. The women were maltreated by their guards or carried away. A survivor of one caravan told how at every village the women and children were paraded, so that the local Mussulmans might make their choice. Food was denied these miserable people, and, added to all, came the terrors of the desert. Of their journey into exile, as piteous as any that history has recorded, we have the narratives of eye-witnesses—the statements of some of the victims and the reports of missionary workers, including Germans, who were on the spot. "They go on foot," says one account. "The women with child are drowned in crossing the rivers. Fathers, mothers, children are separated in different directions. Nothing is more horrible than the sufferings of the girls, who are exposed to the worst outrages imaginable on the part of the gendarmes escorting." The children died by the wayside. "We have discovered fifteen babies," wrote a German missionary. "Three of these are already dead; the others were all terribly emaciated. Oh! if we could write all we see." Another German missionary worker saw and described some of the Armenians when already in the desert:—

"For these mountaineers the desert climate is terrible. I reached a large Armenian camp of goat-skin tents, but most of the unfortunate people were sleeping out in the sun on the burning sands. The Turks had given them a day's rest on account of the large number of the sick. It was evident from their clothing that these people had been well-to-do; they were natives of a village near Zeitun, and were led by their religious head. It was a daily occurrence for five or six children of these people to die by the wayside. They were just burying a young woman, the mother of a little girl of nine years of age, and they besought me to take this little girl with me.

"Those who have no experience of the desert cannot picture to themselves the sufferings entailed by such a journey—a hilly desert without shade, marching over rough and rugged rocks, unable to satisfy one's scorching thirst from the muddy waters of the Euphrates, which winds its course along in close proximity.

"On the next day I met another camp of these Zeitun Armenians. There were the same indescribable sufferings, the same accounts of misery. 'Why do they not kill us once for all?' asked they. 'For days we have no water to drink, and our children are crying for water. At night the Arabs attack us, they steal our bedding, our clothes that we have been able to get together; they carry away by force our girls, and outrage our women. If any of us are unable to walk, the convoy of gendarmes beat us. Some of our women threw themselves down from the rocks into the Euphrates in order to save their honour—some of these with their infants in their arms.'"

The homes of the dispossessed Armenians were filled by Moslem immigrants.

CASES OF RESISTANCE.

Not all the Armenians were led like sheep to the slaughter. Well organised and quickly executed as was the Turkish plan, warning of it was received in some districts, and a defence was rapidly arranged. In a number of villages spoken of by refugees resistance was offered, but the silence which followed was sufficient evidence of the result. Such was the case of Shanan, twenty miles south-east of Trebizond; the last that was heard of it, months ago, was that 800 men were holding it against a Turkish siege. At Karahissar 4,000 Armenians entrenched themselves in the town and held out for a fortnight. Ammunition ran short, and the Turks, bring-

up heavy reinforcements, captured the place and put the population to the sword. So also Vartemis, in the region of Lake Van, where 2,000 Armenians are said to have been burnt to death in the church—a deed that recalls one of the worst horrors of the Hamidian massacres, when the church at Uria was burnt, together with all the women and children seeking refuge in it. A splendid resistance was offered in the Sasun region, west of Lake Van, where there are forty Armenian villages surrounded by Kurdish tribes. Here, some 15,000 Armenians gathered together in May, and for some months beat off the Turks. At the close of the summer it was reported that the Turks had brought up large forces, and that communication with the district was cut off. The Armenians had retreated to the mountain tops, where they hoped to hold out, if they could still succeed in manufacturing their ammunition, and winter did not drive them into the hands of their enemies in the plains or destroy them with its rigours. Most successful of all was the resistance of the Armenians near Antioch. Hearing of the Turkish plans, they retired into the mountains between Antioch and the sea, and were there joined by a number of refugees from the Cilician towns. They were poorly armed, but for almost two months they repulsed a Turkish force of over 3,000 men. Fortunately, when their ammunition was running low, they were able to signal to a French cruiser off the coast, which, with two others, came to their aid. The Armenians, it was found, were anxious only to get more ammunition and continue the struggle, but were finally persuaded to go on board the ships, and, to the number of nearly 5,000, were carried off to safety. Alas! that the gallant resistance of this brave race should elsewhere have been hopeless.

THE REFUGEES.

Only in one district did large numbers of Armenians succeed in making good their escape. In May, the Volunteer Regiments which accompanied the Russians captured the important town of Van and held it until July. Under their protection gathered many Armenians, who would otherwise have fallen in the general massacre. But in July the Turks sent fresh forces against the Russians, who were compelled to fall back to the frontier, and took with them the Volunteers. A great mass of refugees, estimated at about a quarter of a million in number, joined in the retreat—to remain meant certain death—and set out on a painful journey of over 100 miles to safety. "There are no railways nor even good roads in Turkish Armenia," says one account, "the means of transport are very scanty and slow, so that the thousands of sick women and children, exhausted by the sufferings of the last five months, could hardly move on without help. Hard pressed by advancing Turks, who wished to cut off the line of retreat, the Armenian Volunteers fought several bloody rearguard actions to hold back the Turks, and to secure the safety of these 250,000 refugees." The sufferings of many of these hapless people were scarcely less than those of their kinfolk deported to the desert. Hunger and thirst afflicted them, and disease took toll among them. At one time, it is said, there were in Erivan (just over the Russian frontier) more than 3,000 children below ten years of age waiting to be cared for; most of them were orphans.

In all, however, from Van and the northern border regions, over a quarter of a million Armenians are believed to have reached safety in the Russian Caucasus, perhaps many more, for the stream of refugees was flowing across

the frontier before the Turks had given the order for extermination. But apart from their exodus to the Caucasus, it is impossible to speak with certainty of any large body of Armenians as having escaped. A few thousands were carried off from Syria by the French cruisers; some reached Bulgaria from Constantinople, where, since no general massacre broke out, part of the Armenian population probably remained; in other places, as at Smyrna, they profited by the rare leniency of their Moslem neighbours; and we must allow for certain fractions which either maintained themselves, as at Sasun, in the mountain regions, or survived the journey to the desert. But it is estimated that between half a million and eight hundred thousand Armenians perished in the persecution, and by the time that they had made an end the Turks had probably done almost all that lay in their power to destroy the Armenians within their borders.

THE RESPONSIBILITY.

Communication with Constantinople during all this time was fitful and uncertain, except through the German Press, which remained almost completely silent on the massacres. It is not possible, therefore, to say whether Talaat and Enver met with any opposition to their schemes in the ranks of the Young Turk party. If there was any opposition it was again, as in the days when Turkey was carried into the war, invertebrate and without effect on the execution of their plans. But the reports may be set on record. Ahmed Riza, formerly President of the Chamber, is said to have made the massacres one of the counts in his indictment of the Government on the opening of the Parliament in the autumn of 1915, and the Sheikh-ul-Islam, who resigned his office, is said to have done so on this ground. But that is about all. So far as is known, the Turks, Young and Old, leaders and led, exhibited no squeamishness about the destruction of over half a million people, most of whom could, by no stretch of imagination, be suspected of any crime, political or other.

It is necessary, also, to record what can be said about the part played by the Germans at this time. There is no evidence that they exerted themselves in any way, official or unofficial, to stay the hand of the Turks. Formal representations they may have made in the hope of saving their face before the world in later days. The correspondent of the American United Press, in one of his August messages from Constantinople, stated that the American Ambassador had asked the assistance of his German and Austrian colleagues, and that "they had been successful to the extent of securing definite promises from the leading members of the Young Turk Government that no orders will be given for massacres." Unless this referred to Constantinople alone, the appeal to the Turks came much too late to save the Armenians; and if it was limited to the capital, the German-Austrian Ambassadors are sufficiently condemned. But at the end of August, as details accumulated of the horrors which had taken place in the interior, the Ambassadors apparently

became alarmed, and are said--the report is unconfirmed--to have made a protest against the massacres (then almost consummated), and to have asked for a declaration that they were free from responsibility. No declaration of that kind could save them. The one Power which could exercise influence with Turkey at this time was Germany. Whether her influence would have been effectual it is impossible to say, but she made no serious effort to exert it. It was said that when Mr. Morgenthau urged the German Ambassador to intervene, he got the answer, "We are very sorry, but we cannot interfere in the internal affairs of Turkey." The answer may never have been made, but there is little doubt that it faithfully represents the official German attitude. The unofficial mind, as represented by Count Reventlow, adopted it fully and frankly, adding only that the Armenians were a disorderly and rebellious people, who deserved what they had got. A nation, like a man, must be content to be known in some sort by the companionship it keeps. A Power that needed Turkey's military assistance as badly as did Germany would, perhaps, have been slow to antagonise her ally, but it was not a mere accident that the Power which trampled on the Belgians and murdered civilians at sea should have been linked with another which destroyed a helpless people wholesale. At the bottom of all these crimes alike was the naked brutality of the conquering savage. The spirit of Genghiz Khan united German and Turk congenially.

The Entente Powers could not stop the Turks; the Central Powers would not. It was hoped in England that the neutrals, led by the United States, might raise their voices so loudly that Germany would hear and go beyond formal protestations of regret and innocence. The hope was vain. The smaller neutrals, who had been unable to protect even their own citizens from German attacks on the high seas, could scarcely be expected to risk offending her on behalf of the Armenians in distant Anatolia. The generous feelings and humanity of the Americans might have been thought to hold out a better prospect. But popular sympathy found no adequate reflection in the Government's official policy. The President's policy was the defence of American interests, wherever they were threatened, but he was in no way disposed to head a League of Humanity, or make himself the mouthpiece of the civilised neutrals of the world. No doubt, from the standpoint of the difficulties of her domestic politics, and the anxiety of the great mass of Americans to keep out of the war, he could say a good deal on behalf of his policy of caution. But there was no risk here of going to war, or even of severing diplomatic relations. It would have been a great deed in the world's history had the United States, leading the neutrals, laid the fate of the Armenians before the German Government and appealed for its assistance. Who can say positively that Germany dare altogether have rejected the appeal? But the attempt was not made.

The Manchester Guardian
HISTORY
 of the
WAR



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
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
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A general view of Riga.

[E.N.A.]

CHAPTER XXIV.

THE ESCAPE OF THE RUSSIAN ARMIES.

THE TSAR TAKES THE FIELD—THE SUPERSESSION OF THE GRAND DUKE NICHOLAS—RENEWED OFFENSIVE ON THE SOUTHERN FRONT—THE RETREAT IN THE NORTH—HINDENBURG'S GREAT STROKE—RUSSIAN ARMIES IN PERIL—THEIR ESCAPE.

WITH the fall of Kowno and Brest Litowsk, the second line of Russian defence had fallen. Nothing, apparently, remained except a retreat to be indefinitely prolonged until the lengthening of the German communications, the devastation of the country, and the increasing difficulties which nature threw in their way should compel the Germans to call a halt. Poland was entirely lost to Russia, and almost the whole of Courland. From the occupied territories great hordes of fugitives, soon to number between twelve and thirteen millions, were drifting by all the available roads into Central and Eastern Russia; no adequate provision had been made for their support, and the great majority subsisted only on what charity could provide.


In England, attention had been fixed too much on the skill with which the Russian commanders had conducted the retreat. It was, indeed, the greatest retreat that had been known in history, and so far had been conducted without any great disaster to the Russian arms. But it was also, especially from the point of view of the Russians, who saw the whole of their western provinces seized by the enemy, a very great defeat. The situation had been met, to the disappointment of the Germans, by a resolution on the part of the whole Russian people

to make a new and greater effort, and, as the symbol of the national determination, the Tsar now put himself at the head of his armies in the field. "To-day," he declared, "I have taken supreme command of all the forces of the sea and land armies operating in the theatre of war. With firm faith in the clemency of God, with unshaken assurance in final victory, we shall fulfil our sacred duty to defend our country to the last. We will not dishonour the Russian land." The Grand Duke Nicholas was relieved of his post as Commander-in-Chief of the Russian armies, and at the same time General Yanushkevitch, his Chief of Staff, was superseded. The Grand Duke was appointed to a post which, though not unimportant in itself, was almost purely honorific by comparison with that which he had held. He was made Viceroy and Commander-in-Chief in the Caucasus. General Yanushkevitch, who had been closely associated with him in the conduct of the war, and was a personal friend, went with him as Assistant Viceroy. In taking the command, the Tsar expressed in a rescript his thanks to the departing General:—

"At the beginning of the war I was unavoidably prevented from following the inclination of my soul to put myself at the head of the army. That was why I entrusted you with the Commandership-in-Chief of all the land and sea forces.



German engineers building a railway line to support their troops advancing through Russian Poland.
[Newspaper Illustrations.]



A German motor transport in difficulties on a Polish road.

[Sport and General.]

"Under the eyes of the whole of Russia your Imperial Highness has given proof during the war of steadfast bravery which caused a feeling of profound confidence, and called forth the sincere good wishes of all who followed your operations through the inevitable vicissitudes of fortune of war.

"My duty to my country, which has been entrusted to me by God, impels me to-day, when the enemy has penetrated into the interior of the Empire, to take the supreme command of the active forces and to share with my army the fatigues of war, and to safeguard with it Russian soil from the attempts of the enemy.

"The ways of Providence are inscrutable, but my duty and my desire determine me in my resolution for the good of the State.

"The invasion of the enemy on the western front necessitates the greatest possible concentration of the civil and military authorities, as well as the unification of the command in the field, and has turned our attention from the southern front. At this moment I recognise the necessity of your assistance and counsels on our southern front, and I appoint you Viceroy of the Caucasus and Commander-in-Chief of the valiant Caucasian Army.

"I express to your Imperial Highness my profound gratitude and that of the country for your labours during the war."

MEANING OF THE CHANGE.

The removal of the Grand Duke Nicholas was, on purely military grounds, a not unnatural step. Although the Russian defeats were in part due to the failures of the War Office—the Minister of War, it will be remembered, had been changed some time before—and in part to natural difficulties and lack of railways, for which the Grand Duke could not be held to blame, yet, as the supreme commander in the field, he was naturally to be held mainly responsible for the result of the first year's fighting, and as he had received credit for the successes won by the Russians in the earlier stages of the war, so also the blame for the later failures fell on him. There was, however, very much more than this in the change of command. Throughout August, Russia had been declaring with many voices that the war was to be waged till victory was won. At the first meeting of the special conferences which had been held to discuss the organisation of a proper supply of munitions, the Tsar had declared that Parliament had given him resolutely, and without the least hesitation, "the only reply worthy of Russia, the reply which I have expected of them, namely, 'War until victory is complete.'" The Grand Duke might possibly have been given a position as assistant to the Tsar, but those who were responsible for the change desired to signalise the fact that a new era was to be opened, and they thought it better, no doubt, that the Grand Duke, who, whatever his personal merits, was associated with a long series of defeats, should be removed to another sphere.

THE GERMAN VIEW.

The Germans were not able, however, to find any comfort in the deposition of the Grand Duke. In their mind he stood for the most bitter and most unrelenting opposition to Germany and German claims; under him, if anyone, they would have expected Russia to persevere with the war till the bitter end. The *Berliner Tageblatt* called him the chief representative of the "forcible, aggressive, determined policy of war," and sought to suggest that his departure might weaken Russia's warlike resolution. But this was clearly a misreading. The irony of the situation from the German point of view was that the chief enemy of Germany and the chief supporter of the war was only superseded in order to


proclaim, in the most striking and solemn manner possible, Russia's determination to pursue to the end the policy of the Grand Duke himself.

With regard to the character of the Grand Duke as a soldier there was little disagreement either in friendly or in hostile countries. He was a good soldier, with many difficulties to contend against, and he had succeeded not ill until the Germans had made up their mind to stand on the defensive in the west and throw against him all the available weight both of Germany and Austria. He was a man of strong will and ruthless methods, as was shown both by his expulsions of the Jews and by the orders which he gave for the general removal of the whole population from the occupied regions. "One eminent quality of a great leader," wrote the military critic of the *Vorwärts*, "no one will deny him—namely, the iron resolution with which he established order in the army, and ceaselessly demanded the very best of it, and the determination with which he fought for victory, and was never daunted by mischance." "A mighty man," another German writer (who was no favourable critic) called him—"a man such as Shakespeare would have wished for his dramas." It is not unreasonable to believe that it was from his strong and unrelenting will that the decision sprang to abandon provinces and fortresses, to devastate the country, and to retire before the enemy into the interior of Russia. The full results of that decision lay in the future, in the strain and stress of campaigning so far from their own country which would be imposed on the Germans, and in the greater ordeal which would await them if ever the reorganised Russian armies should be able to compel them to retreat through the desolate country which was being prepared for them.

The new general of the Russian Staff was General Alexieff, who had been assistant chief of staff. General Ruzsky now returned to his post as chief of the northern armies. General Evert became the leader of the central armies, and in the south General Ivanoff remained in command of the army which had been driven back through Galicia and had fought well and stubbornly after the initial defeat on the Dunajec at the beginning of May.

GENERAL OFFENSIVE IN GALICIA.

With the fall of Brest Litowsk the Austro-Germans on the southern front awoke to fresh activity. Immediately after Lemberg fell they had driven the Russians back to the River Strypa, a tributary of the Dniester, and there they remained for two months, while the army on their immediate left had advanced north-eastwards to the Brest Litowsk railway and captured Kowel, on the southern border of the great marshes. It was now decided that the offensive should be renewed. The positions which the Germans held on this front were strong, and, it might have been supposed, would have satisfied their commanders while the great task of crushing the main Russian armies was being completed in the north. It is essential to the understanding of this part of the campaign to remember that the great trial of strength was certain to take place in the triangle Dwinsk-Brest Litowsk-Minsk. The Russian Minister of War himself announced about this time that the main forces of both Germans and Russians were concentrated in the neighbourhood of Wilna. It was there, and not in the south, that the Germans had their chance of a really decisive victory. It is, perhaps, a little surprising, therefore, that they did not content themselves with a



AUSTRO-GERMAN POSITIONS AT FOUR STAGES OF THE SUMMER CAMPAIGN.

continued defensive in the southern area while reinforcing their northern armies to the utmost of their power. They would be careful, in any event, not to weaken themselves too much in the south, for General Ivanoff had proved himself a thoroughly tough opponent, and he had had two months' breathing space in which to restore and refit his battered armies. But if they had steadily maintained the defensive, they would have had a good many men to spare for the all-important operations in the north.

The Germans decided otherwise, and at the end of August took up the attack. The precise end which they had in view—the extent to which they meant to press their advance, whether they had in their minds a strong defensive line which they intended to reach and occupy until the spring—remains uncertain. In Russia much discussion took place as to the likelihood of an advance on Kieff, just as it was industriously debated whether the Central German armies meant to march on Moscow, or Von Below on Petrograd. Probably these schemes, so large and hazardous, and involving so tremendous an extension of the German front, did not enter at all into the calculations of the German Staff, who must have been sufficiently occupied with the thoughts of the increasing difficulties which would beset them if, without securing the resounding victory for which they sought, they were compelled to follow the Russian armies farther and farther into the interior.

It is probable that the renewed advance in the south had a much more modest object. The great Petrograd railway, after reaching Dwinsk, runs southward to Wilna, Lida, and Baranowitchi (see the map), and then through the centre of the Pripet Marshes to Rowno. The possession of this railway was one of the minor aims of the general German advance. At present it was an important line of supply for the Russians, running behind the greater part of their front, and the Germans designed to seize it and convert it to a similar purpose for themselves. As part of the general scheme it was necessary that they should secure that portion of the line which ran through the marshes to Rowno. This would strengthen their position in two ways. It would give them the necessary connection with their armies on the north side of the marshes, and it would provide them with a satisfactory system of communications in the rear. For at Rowno the northern Petrograd line is joined by the railway from Warsaw, while a few miles distant is the junction with the line from Lemberg. If the Germans, therefore, could establish themselves at Rowno, their southern armies would be very satisfactorily placed, both for their own security and the support which they could give to the general strategic plans. The importance of the region was recognised by the Russians, who had established there three fortified positions—

Rowno, Dubno (on the Lemberg line), and Luck (just west of the Warsaw railway). These were the fortresses of the "Vollhynian triangle."

RUSSIAN SUCCESSES.

The German offensive was launched in the last week of August, and for some days prospered. In Galicia, the Russians retired over the Strypa, and fell back on the Sereth; farther north, the Germans captured Luck. Then events took a sudden turn. The Russians sallied out in great strength from two points on the Sereth line—Tarnopol, on the railway to Lemberg, and Trembowla, farther down the river. Both German and Austrian forces were driven back, and a large number of guns and many thousand prisoners were taken. The Russians exercised a wise restraint, and ran no risks in following up their victory. In eight days, however, they took 25,000 prisoners, and by September 12th the number had risen to 40,000. The Germans countered by advancing in the Luck region, where they had formed a fresh army under General Puhallo, and they captured Dubno, the second of the fortresses. But they failed to secure Rowno, and the Russians from time to time dealt them some shrewd blows. The fighting swayed to and fro, without decisive issue. In all the September fighting in the southern area it was clear that General Ivanoff's orders were that he should not attempt a general advance, for which he had not the strength and the situation was not ripe, but should lay his plans for a succession of local attacks which should cause the enemy considerable losses, use up his reserves, and draw off troops from other and perhaps more important fronts. In that task he succeeded, and undoubtedly during this period he held the upper hand.




General Evert.

[E.N.A.]

THE CRISIS APPROACHES.


In the north, the Russians were approaching the crisis of the retreat. From the line of the Niemen southward to the region of the marshes beyond Brest Litowsk they were pushed steadily back. Kowno had fallen on August 17th, and Von Eichhorn was beginning his advance on Wilna. He had crossed the Niemen farther up at Olita also, and, advancing towards the main Warsaw-Petrograd railway, was threatening the fortress of Grodno from the north. At the same time, another German army was working past Grodno on the south, so that it was soon outflanked on both sides, and nothing remained but to abandon it. This was accordingly done in the opening days of September. The Russians withdrew the garrison without serious loss.

The dangerous position of the central Russian armies, numbering between a quarter and half a million, may best be explained by a brief account of the railways on which their retreat largely depended. Immediately in



The Kalkstrasse, Riga.

[E.N.A.]



The Railway Bridge Riga.

[E.N.A.]

their rear, and running behind their front, was the trunk line, the importance of which has already been described in relation to the Rowno region. This was the Petrograd line, running through Dwinsk, Wilna, Lida, and the junction of Baranowitchi into the heart of the marsh region west of Pinsk. The cutting of it, however, by the Germans, was not likely to be fatal to the Russians. It would compel them to fall back still farther at the threatened points, and would break up and impede their lateral service of supply, but it would not place the enemy on their line of retreat, nor obstruct the natural course of their withdrawal to the east and north-east.

A second railway, not of the first importance at this moment was that which ran due east, from Brest Litowsk towards Pinsk and the waters of the River Pripet. This line traversed the centre of the marsh region, through which no great number of troops could travel, and it was not, therefore, one of the main avenues of the retirement.

THE THREE CHIEF RAILWAYS.

There were three other railways, and on them depended the security of the Russian armies. It is important to remember that the Russian retreat was directed rather to the north-east than the east. This was due to the configuration of the marshes, which stretched out north-eastward towards Minsk. The railway from Brest Litowsk to Minsk and on to Moscow ran roughly along the northern border of the marshes, and it was, therefore, by this line and in this direction that a large part of the Russian central armies was withdrawing. Roughly parallel with this line was another, which ran from Lida north-eastward towards Polotzk and on to Petrograd; not far from the village of Molodetchno it crossed the third railway with which we are concerned—the line which runs from Wilna south-eastward towards Minsk.

Since the Russian retreat was inevitably pushed towards the north-east by the barrier of the marshes, the German strategy was obviously to strike in towards the south from their flanking position, somewhere south of Dwinsk. In proportion as they could drive the Russians southward away from the natural line of their retreat, they would throw their armies back one upon another, create congestion and confusion in the supply, and bring within sight large captures of men and material, if not the destruction of whole armies. Clearly, also, there was marked out for them one particular line along which, if they could reach it, they might strike at the Russians—that is to say, the railway from Wilna to

Minsk. If they could, either by taking Wilna or by passing round it on the north, place themselves astride of the Minsk railway, they might hope to push the Wilna army southward, and there to entangle it with its supporting armies, or to drive the whole of them towards the railway between Brest and Minsk. If they could carry their stroke still further and reach Minsk itself, then there was virtually no chance of escape for the Russian forces. They must surrender, or be driven into the marshes. In brief, the struggle was a duel between the Germans seeking to reach and to hold either part or the whole of the Wilna-Minsk line in order to shut the door of escape to the retreating Russians, and the Russians trying to head them off, or at least to recover any part of the line that was lost before the means of escape was completely taken from them.

HINDENBURG'S CHOICE.

The point which Hindenburg chose for his blow was the railway between Dwinsk and Wilna. He had in mind here a triple stroke. In the first place, by cutting the Dwinsk-Wilna line, he broke the connection between Russia's northern and central armies, severed an important line of supply, and threatened to outflank Wilna on the north. Secondly, he was within seventy miles of the Lida-Polotzk line, which, as has been said, supported the Russian army south of Wilna, and was a line of retreat almost as important as that of the Moscow railway. Most important of all, he would be within striking distance of the line to Minsk, on the seizure of which, more than on anything else, the German hopes depended. Hindenburg's plans, therefore, fell into three parts. Southward from Wilna, down to the Brest Litowsk railway, the armies of Sholtz, Gallwitz, and Prince Leopold of



General Yanushkevitch. (E.N.A.)

Bavaria were to press the retreating Russians as hotly as possible in order to hold them in their positions; the decisive thrust was to be made against the Russian front on the railway north of Wilna, and a determined attack was to be made west and south of Dwinsk in order to prevent General Ruzsky coming down and cutting off the German forces which had broken through.


The Russians were well aware of the danger which threatened them in the neighbourhood of Wilna, and after the fall of Kowno they for some time conducted an offensive on the right bank of the Wilia, which flows from the east through Wilna, and then turns to the north and makes a loop northward of Kowno. The object of this offensive, as of the resistance of Kowno fortress, was to delay the German advance in the most dangerous quarter, and for some time it succeeded. For about a



Russia draws on her reserves: The medical examination of some of her new recruits. [Central Press.



A group of Caucasian soldiers after the call to the Colours. [Central Press.



The German enveloping movement east of Wilna.


fortnight Von Richhorn advanced at the rate of only three miles per day. By the second week in September, however, the Russian attack had come to a standstill, and the Germans began to draw near to Wilna on both the north and south of the city.

THE GERMAN STROKE.

On the 12th, Hindenburg suddenly launched an attack towards Nowo Swentziany, a point lying some fifty miles north of Wilna, on the railway. Here he broke the Russian front, and threw through the gap a large force of cavalry, accompanied by infantry in motor cars. These columns spread out in three separate directions. Part of them turned north-eastward and threatened Dwinsk with an enveloping movement from the south-east, while at the same time a vigorous attack was made by Von Below towards the west of the fortress. It is improbable that the Germans hoped to capture Dwinsk at this time. Their primary object was certainly to interpose a barrier between the Russian army on the Dwina and the German raiding forces, which were now operating on a more important mission farther south. Other portions of the German cavalry pushed almost due east towards the Lida-Polotzk railway. They made their way over seventy miles of the lake country lying east

of Swentziany, and at one point actually crossed the railway and penetrated a short distance beyond. The attack was pursued even more successfully towards the south-east, where cavalry appeared at several points on the Wilna-Minsk railway, the farthest (at Molodetchno) being seventy miles from Wilna—a good deal more than half the distance to Minsk. Other detachments of the same column seized the Lida railway at Wileika, which lies not far from its junction with the Minsk line.

This startling achievement exposed the Russian armies to the gravest peril of the war. It is difficult to understand the ease with which Hindenburg apparently succeeded in throwing a force of cavalry that was estimated at twelve divisions across so great a stretch of country. Neither German nor Russian reports spoke of any heavy fighting having taken place before the Russian line was broken at Swentziany, and it would seem that Hindenburg had once more succeeded in quietly collecting a largely superior force at a decisive point, and in launching it at the enemy with unexpected rapidity and decision. The situation was now that the Russians had not only lost the Petrograd railway north of Wilna, but that they were deprived of two out of the three lines on which their chances of a successful retreat depended. In times of peril official reports of whatever nation, rarely admit the



A general view of Wilna.

[E.N.A.]

degree of danger in which their armies stand, but on this occasion the Russian Staff were courageous enough to admit the truth. "The Russians," ran their report, "continuously show their high military virtues and maintain a demeanour of calm confidence in circumstances of the utmost gravity." As a raid, Hindenburg's stroke was already brilliantly successful. The question was whether it was only a raid or whether it was to be backed up by strong infantry forces which would hold the points that the cavalry and motor detachments had already seized. If that could be done, it was almost impossible that the Russians should escape disaster. If, however, it was only a raid, even though a formidable one, that was to be dealt with, the Russians might still be able to brush aside the raiders. They might perhaps be able to repair the damage done to the railways, and at all events would be able to draw off their armies past the points which the raiding troops had blocked.

THE RUSSIAN REPLY.

Whatever the weakness which had led to the breaking of their line near Swentziany, the Russians now strained every effort. Time pressed, for the raiding Germans were certain to be followed at no long interval by infantry, which would be much more difficult to dislodge. The Russians attacked the new menace from several quarters. From the direction of Dwinsk they made comparatively little impression on the screen thrown out against them, but they attacked the forces which had reached the

Minsk railway on the line Wornjany-Smorgon-Molodetchno both on the front and on the northern flank, while from Minsk they hurried up reserves who attacked the detachments that had reached the Lida railway at Wileika and Kriwitschi.

The Germans found themselves attacked also from another and perhaps unexpected quarter. It had been the whole aim of their stroke against the Wilna-Minsk railway to force the Russian Wilna army away to the southward of the line, and if they could have substituted a strong force of infantry and artillery for their cavalry they would probably have been successful. But their infantry did not arrive, and the Russians found that they had to deal not with the unbroken front of an enveloping army, but with a number of scattered detachments of cavalry and motor units, which had either reached the Minsk line or were still coming down towards it from the north. Part of the Wilna army was ordered, therefore, to march not southwards away from the threatened envelopment, as the Germans had hoped it would, but eastwards, and to fight its way through the outflanking detachments as it met them. The position of the Germans was not altogether agreeable. The Russians had met them in the front, and were pushing them back from Molodetchno; they were attacking them also on the flank from across the Wilia; and the Wilna army began to take a hand and threaten them from the west and south-west. The German cavalry leaders must have looked anxiously in these days for the support which was required to crown

their opening success, but which was mysteriously lacking. The raid remained a raid, and the Russians gradually gained the upper hand. The Germans were driven off the Lida railway with the loss of guns, and were gradually pushed back from the Minsk line. The Russian armies drew away gradually into safety, escaping the trap which had been laid for them. In the battles round Wilna they lost some 20,000 prisoners to the Germans—a large number in itself, but insignificant compared with the catastrophe which at one time seemed to threaten the whole of their central armies.

AN ESTIMATE.

These operations of Hindenburg were among the most remarkable of the war. They were the end to which the German armies were steadily working from the moment when Warsaw was abandoned and the retreat towards Brest Litowsk and beyond was entered on. It was the weakness of the Russian position, and the good fortune of the Germans, that from the vantage-point of Kowno Hindenburg should be able to take a short cut to the rear of the Russian armies, and that by one blow north of Wilna he could sever three out of the four main arteries of the Russian communications. At the finish everything depended on the degree of surprise with which he dealt the blow, and here, as in earlier engagements, he showed himself a master. But the direction in which the attack would be delivered could not have been unexpected by the Russians, and their comparatively weak resistance requires explanation. In the second stage, Hindenburg failed to complete the success on which he had embarked so fairly, and his failure to make more of the brilliant opening secured for him by his light squadrons is puzzling. The Russians deserve high praise, alike for the promptitude and vigour with which they met the emergency and for the admirable calm and resolution with which they declined to be intimidated by the danger in which they stood. The Wilna army, when it refused to bear away to the south, might easily have been held up by the Germans who were round it on the west, north, and east; but, if this had been its fate, its resistance would have enabled the other Russian armies to pursue their retirement unimpeded. This capacity to keep a cool head and make sacrifices for some larger end was not the least distinguished of the characteristics of the Russian command.

THE RETREAT DRAWING TO A CLOSE.

With the escape of the Wilna army the Russian retreat began gradually to draw to a close. The Germans, for all their many successes and huge captures of men and guns, had failed in their hopes of destroying a large part of the Russian armies. Their advance became slower, especially in the marsh region, where they had reached Pinsk, and where they had eventually to draw back their front before the Russian attacks and the difficulties of the country. It was, indeed, like the whole region north and south of the River Pripiet, an ill country to

fight in or to winter in, as the Germans (and the Russians) were to do.

"According to the figures almost half of the territory is covered by wet, impassable, and uncultivated forest, wooded territory, most of it being useless, bushy, and impenetrable. The ground itself is divided into different kinds of marshy lands, impassable muddy districts, immense weedy and grassy territories, also regions covered by some kind of more solid grassy substance, and other thousands and thousands of acres of land perpetually under water.

"The resources of this gigantic wilderness are naturally very scanty, and the number of inhabitants very small. One may not even think of any military comfort of billeting or the kind, and camping in the open air, on account of the climate, the lack of water, and owing to the millions of most dangerous insects and snakes, seems to be an impossible undertaking. How an army of many hundred thousands of men could undertake an advance movement on this marshy ground covered with thick forest, mud, and water is almost unimaginable, for only the hilly districts contain roads used by pedestrians or the Russian ponies used to these kinds of roads. The climate itself is unbearable for those used to healthy and dry districts; the vapourings of the marshes are liable to cause fever and typhoid."*

Correspondents with the German and Austrian armies sent home gloomy accounts of the conditions prevailing in this desolate region.

"Every tree is a little islet standing out of the gloomy marshland, and shallow lakes which extend for mile after mile. The roads are inundated by the water, which has risen high owing to the floods of rain, and from the miserable cottages, which at intervals are to be seen partly submerged along the highways, strange looking men with long beards and thick, matted hair, mostly woodcutters and others earning a precarious living from the products of the surrounding wilderness, creep out and stare with amazement at the Austrian and German cavalymen."


The Germans in these wastes lost their advantages over the Russians. Their heavy guns were useless because they could not be dragged through such a country, and motor transport was almost impossible. "Generally," said the *Russkoe Slovo*, "the Germans had to be satisfied with horses, or even with their own hands and feet. The contest here is not one of nerves, of which Hindenburg once spoke, but of physical endurance." The policy of retreat, whatever was to be its ultimate result, at least put Russians and Germans on an equality in the region of the marshes. While something like a balance now came to be established over a great part of the front, fighting still continued fiercely round Dwinsk and on the Dwina, where the Germans had apparently not given up all hope of establishing themselves for the winter on the north side of the river, with Dwinsk and Riga for their quarters. Elsewhere the question was how far the Germans were satisfied with the defensive line that they had gained, what policy they would follow throughout the winter, and with what plans they would meet the spring, when the Russians hoped to meet them with armies strengthened and refitted.

* A Hungarian correspondent in the *Pall Mall Gazette*.



The main street in Loos, photographed immediately after the village had been captured by the British, and showing in the distance the famous "Tower Bridge" of Loos.

[Official Photograph: Crown Copyright Reserved.]



A nearer view of some of the ruins in Loos and the "Tower Bridge."

[Official Photograph: Crown Copyright Reserved.]



A German trench captured by the British during the advance near Loos, showing the effect of heavy shell fire.
[Official Photograph : Crown Copyright Reserved.]

CHAPTER XXV.


THE VICTORY OF LOOS.

THE POLICY OF A GENERAL ATTACK IN THE WEST—THE ALLIED PLANS AND DISPOSITIONS—THE BRILLIANT EARLY SUCCESS—THE FAILURE OF THE RESERVES—THE GUARDS' ATTACK AND THE GERMAN COUNTER-ATTACKS—COMMENTS ON THE BATTLE.

BY September the project of a great attack in the West was well forward. Since the trench warfare had begun General Joffre had been "nibbling" at the German lines, and there had been heavy fighting in Alsace, in the Woevre, in Champagne, and also in Artois, on the western section, but there had been nothing that could be called a general attack. The Battle of Neuve Chapelle in March had been an isolated action by the British alone, and was not, so far as can be discovered, part of a concerted plan. A scheme had evidently been prepared for joint action between the French and British armies in Artois in May, but it broke down, so far as we were concerned, through the German gas attacks on Ypres (Vol. II., pages 289 to 312). It is therefore true to say that the first anniversary of the Battle of the Marne had come and gone before any joint general attack on the German lines had been delivered. This delay was of enormous advantage to the Germans, who, recognising that the real military capital of their country, Essen, was vulnerable through Belgium, had spared no labour and ingenuity to make their lines on the West impregnable.

General Joffre had interrupted from time to time the fortification of these lines, but in the main they remained in the moulds in which the arrival of the first winter of the war had frozen them, and had all the time been growing steadily stronger. It was the perception that the German lines in the West were only to be forced, if at all, by an overwhelming superiority in artillery that led to the munitions crisis in England. Neuve Chapelle had shown how the lines might be forced, but further long delay was necessary before the Allies felt themselves in a position to apply those lessons on the scale of a general attack. By September they believed themselves to be fully prepared.

It is known that in England there were two schools of military thought on the strategy of the campaign. There were those who held that the decision must be reached in the West, and that, difficult as the problem of forcing the German lines was, nowhere else could anything like the same results be obtained. Although an attempt to force a settlement there meant delay, the initial loss of time it was thought would be compensated for by the magnitude of the success when it did come. On



FROM LA BASSEE TO VIMY.

the other hand, there were others, and among them Mr. Winston Churchill, who held that in the West we ought to confine ourselves to the defensive, and make our great effort in the East. The one school aimed at delivering a blow at the heart of German power, the other hoped to find a joint in her harness in South-Eastern Europe. Doubtless there were similar divisions of opinion in France. And it is not unlikely that these divisions among the political directors of the war found their counterpart in the armies of both countries. It is a curious fact that this same division of strategical opinion into eastern and western schools also arose in Germany, but in Germany it was fought out during the winter, and ended, broadly speaking, in the defeat of the western school. Among the Allies, however, the division of opinion seems to have persisted through the summer. In the main, however, the western school triumphed in England and France. Our campaign in the Dardanelles was never more than subsidiary to what was regarded as the important campaign in the West. The result was that the whole summer was spent by the Allies in preparations for an attack which they were not in a position to deliver, and opportunities in the East, to which their resources were quite equal, were allowed to slip by. Germany used this summer, as has been described, in driving the Russians out of Galicia and Poland. The failure of the Allies to form to the new front in adequate force was the most serious mistake they had yet made in the war, and its consequences will pursue us through many of the following chapters of this history.

In justice to the Western Allies, however, some facts which may well have disturbed cool judgment should be borne in mind. France was invaded, and for a French soldier to postpone the deliverance of his country to any other object, or to find hundreds of miles east the way round his difficulties at home, argued a detachment of mind which was almost more than could be expected of human nature. This country might have been expected to see more clearly, for we had enormous interests in the East, and we might have realised first the full significance to us as the greatest of Asiatic Powers of what might happen in Turkey and the Balkans. But our vision, too, was clouded. We had made Belgium and France the occasion of our entry into the war, and for months even after Turkey had come in we failed to recognise that though the war grew more menacingly towards the West, its main roots were in the East. Both in Britain and in France there was an exaggerated faith in Russia, a disposition to leave to her everything in the Eastern campaign. Lastly, in deciding our own military policy, we felt ourselves bound in the first instance by our obligations to France. All these facts made us put forward in France surplus energy which, as it turned out later, might probably have been more usefully employed in the East.

THE ATTACK IN MAY.

The attacks of the French in Artois in May had not had the assistance which had been counted upon from the British, because the British left had been engaged in desperate fighting for the defence of Ypres. Nevertheless, the French made considerable progress. The whole of the German lines in Artois are to be regarded as a bastion for the defence of Lille, the most important railway junction in France, and the key to all Flanders. The nearest point in the Allied lines to Lille on the north-west was at Armentières, on the River Ly.

Armentières the British could see the smoke of the Lille factories, and sometimes, when all was quiet and the wind was in the east, hear the bells. But an advance from Armentières was impossible, with the Germans in occupation of the Messines ridge on the north side of the Lys and between it and Ypres. West of Lille were the Heights of Aubers, overlooking the valley of the Layes and running to La Bassée. In this valley were fought the Battles of Neuve Chapelle in March and Aubers in May, both of which failed to make a serious breach in the German defences. A frontal attack on La Bassée was out of the question. The possibilities of successful attack on Lille from the north and west thus seemed to have been exhausted. To the south-west the position earlier in the year had been even more unpromising, for the German positions, still following the direction of the hills which is south-west, formed in front of Lens a great salient, which even crossed the road between Bethune and Arras, the first in British, the second in French occupation. The Germans attached great importance to the possession of this stretch of road, and the whole of the French operations in Artois in spring and summer were devoted to the one object of expelling them from it. By June they had succeeded. First fell Notre Dame de Lorette, then Carency and Neuville, then the so called Labyrinth, an underground fortified city below the Heights of Vimy, and corresponding in relation to the German defence system on the south-west of Lille to Aubers on the west. At Souchez, where the roads from Bethune to Arras and from Lens westwards cross, the struggle was particularly fierce and prolonged, and for a fortnight or more the French and Germans obstinately disputed the possession of a sugar refinery in the town. These operations were exceedingly costly, but though the French failed (as we did at Neuve Chapelle and Aubers) to establish themselves on the hills, they secured freer possession of the valley. This was the position in September, when it was decided to make an attempt to break the German lines. Whether the attempt would have been made just then if the Western Allies had been free to choose their time is perhaps open to doubt; but the military position of Russia was now alarming, and it was thought necessary to do whatever was possible to relieve the pressure upon her.

THE ALLIES' PLANS.

The German lines of occupation of France ran roughly north and south as far as Noyon and then east and west (see map, Vol. II., 143.) The new plan was to attack simultaneously in the middle of these two sides of the triangle, in the hope that if either of them gave way the whole triangle would collapse on to its base. The main French attack was to be delivered on Champagne; its fortunes are described in the next chapter. But the attack on the west side of the triangle, with which we are now concerned, was even more important; for if complete success in Champagne promised the liberation of almost all France from the German invasion, the breaking of the line near Lille would mean the liberation of Flanders too. The operations in the direction of Lille were Anglo-French. The British line had been extended a considerable distance to the south of Arras in the late summer, but a French army still held the positions about Souchez which had been so hardly won in May and June. This French army formed the extreme right of the attack that was now to begin. The whole of the rest of the attack from Souchez to the sea was in the hands of the British. The plan was discussed at numerous meetings between



A remarkable war photograph, taken in a German trench which had been mined and captured by the British. The photograph was taken immediately after the capture of the trench and before the wounded or prisoners had been removed. [Central News.]

General Joffre and Sir John French. "I have had constant meetings," writes Sir John French, "with General Joffre, who has kept me informed of his views and intentions, and explained the successive methods by which he hopes to obtain his ultimate object. After full discussion of the military situation, a decision was arrived at for joint action, in which I acquiesced." The phrasing of this passage is somewhat peculiar, and the use in this connection of the word "acquiesced" by some despatch writers would imply that the writer had no hand in framing the scheme, or that he was not convinced of its soundness. It is very doubtful, however, whether Sir John French's despatches should be made to bear any of these subtler inferences that might be drawn from the words of other more practised writers. The writing of despatches is not his strong point, and it is probably unsafe to read more into them than their plain surface meaning.

It was desirable that the enemy should be kept in ignorance of the exact point at which we meant to deliver our chief attack, and accordingly for a full week before the attack began a general bombardment was opened along the whole Allied front in the west. In addition, two subsidiary attacks were made by the British, with the object of deceiving the enemy and preventing him from concentrating troops at the real point of attack. One of these attacks was east of Ypres, another near Armentières, at Bois Grenier, where our trenches were within six miles of Lille, and a third further south.

AT YPRES.

At Ypres, our lines had moved slightly backwards and forwards since the heavy fighting in May. In the first week of June we took over from the French their trenches to the north of Ypres, as far as Boesinghe (opposite Pilkelm, on the west bank of the Yser Canal)—an extension of our line to the north corresponding to the extension already mentioned to the south. The centre of the Ypres fighting in the summer was at Hooge, on the Menin road. On June 2nd, the Germans made an attack on our positions which failed, and a fortnight later the Fifth Corps captured the enemy's first line near the Bellewaarde Lake; and though they were unable to maintain their advanced position, the net result was to force back the German trenches along a front of 1,000 yards. There was stiff fighting north of Ypres in July, in the course of which the 135th Battery of the Field Artillery did fine work. "To reach its position the guns had to be taken over a high canal embankment, rafted over the canal under fire, pushed up a bank with a slope of nearly 45 degrees, and then dragged over three trenches and a sky-line to its position, seventy yards from the German lines." In this fighting, a frontage of 500 yards was gained, but Pilkelm, lost during the first gas attacks, remained in German hands. At the end of July the enemy used a contrivance for driving burning liquid into our trenches with a strong jet, and in the surprise our first-line trenches at Hooge were lost, but ten days later they were recovered, with the addition of some 400 yards of German trenches north of the Menin road. On the whole the Ypres fighting since May had gone in our favour, though the gains had in no sense modified the general situation. The part played by the forces holding Ypres in the general attack was to contain the enemy's forces in front. A determined attack was made by the Fifth Corps on Bellewaarde Farm, near Hooge, on the morning of the great attack. It made some progress, and is believed to have compelled the Germans to draw on their troops in other parts of their lines. But

the attack (if it was meant to be more than a demonstration) broke down under the enemy's concentrated artillery fire, and the ground gained had to be abandoned.

DEMONSTRATIONS SOUTH OF THE LYS.

A second set of demonstrations near Armentières followed much the same course. Just south of Bois Grenier our trenches make a great bay, the headlands at each end very close to the German trenches, the hollow in the middle nearly half a mile distant from the corresponding projection in the German lines. An attack made early in the morning of September 25th carried every point of the German trenches except in the centre of the bay, where a searchlight chanced to turn on the attacking troops just as they were crossing the open. Forewarned, the Germans in the centre held their ground, even after the rest of their line had been carried; and as neither rifle fire nor bayonet was of much avail in the deep and narrow trenches, they had to be bombed out, which took till five o'clock in the afternoon, so obstinate was the resistance. A portion of the enemy's second line in this section was also occupied for a time, but could not be held owing to the difficulty of getting supplies over the exposed ground between the first and the second line. Nor, if the attack were meant merely as a demonstration, would it have been wise to take risks that were not part of the scheme. In the fighting on this section of the line, the Lincolns and Berkshires distinguished themselves. The Germans are said to have brought up their reinforcements in motor buses.

A still more important demonstration was made further south, in the direction of the Moulin du Piètre (memorable in the Battle of Neuve Chapelle), and against Givenchy. Here a division of the Third Corps and the Meerut Division of the Indian Corps were engaged. No ground was permanently gained, but there is some reason to believe that the Germans for a time mistook the advance north of the La Bassée Canal for the main attack. Herr Kellermann, the correspondent of the *Berliner Tageblatt*, in an article, in which he confessed his failure to construct a consistent plan of the whole battle, found the fighting hottest at Fromelles (near Bois Grenier), Aubers, Festubert, and Givenchy. All those attacks we know to have been, if not mere demonstrations, at any rate subsidiary to the main attack south of the La Bassée Canal; and it is evident that the multiplicity of attacks caused the utmost confusion in the German lines, and was of material assistance to the rapid success of the operations further south. It is to be regretted that they could not continue their assistance by keeping up their attacks on successive days, but the cost was probably prohibitive.

THE ALLIED DISPOSITIONS.

The objective of the main attack south of the Canal was the road running from La Bassée to Lens. The loss of this road would have gained us access to the Douai Plain and opened up the way to an attack on Lille from the south, and would probably have rendered La Bassée itself untenable, and with La Bassée would have fallen Lille, and the whole of the German line north into Flanders and south to the Aisne would have been broken. At the point where this road was crossed by the road from Bethune to Douai stands Lens, the key to the Douai Plain. The scheme of attack was that the French should advance in the direction of Lens from Souchez to the south-west, while the British should gain access to the plain from the west and north-west. The German defences of the approaches to the plain were formidable. South



A view in the quarries of Hulluch.

[Newspaper Illustrations.]



German troops in the shelter of the Hulluch quarries.

[Newspaper Illustrations.]

of the Canal the Hohenzollern Redoubt was thrust forward 500 yards in advance of the German lines, almost under the nose of our trenches at Vermelles. Behind the Redoubt were two strong flanking positions, Fosse No. 8, a high slag heap, on its right rear, the Quarries on its left. Here the German line crossed the road from Vermelles to Hulluch, and curved outwards in a projecting salient that passes between Grenay and Loos, through Augres and in front of Souchez to the wooded Heights of Vimy. The distance between the Allied and the German trenches varied from 100 to 500 yards (see map, page 270).

The disposition of the Allied troops before the battle was as follows:—

INFANTRY.

RIGHT (at Souchez) ... The Tenth French Army.

CENTRE (at Grenay) ... The Fourth (British) Army Corps, consisting of the Forty-seventh Division (right) and the Fifteenth Division (left).

LEFT (at Vermelles) ... The First Army Corps, consisting of the First Division, the Seventh Division, and apparently also of the Ninth Division.

IN RESERVE The Eleventh Corps, consisting of a Guards Division (at Lillers), the Twenty-first Division (at Beuvry), the Twenty-fourth Division (at Nœux-les-Mines), the Twenty-eighth Division (at Bailleul).

CAVALRY.

British Cavalry Corps.. St. Pol and Bailleul.

Indian Cavalry Corps .. Doullens.

Third Cavalry Division .Grenay District (supporting Fourth Army Corps).

The posting of the reserves is somewhat curious. The infantry were towards the northern end of our line. Lillers is some distance west of Bethune, and Beuvry is near the La Bassée Canal, and even Nœux-les-Mines lies on a line somewhat to the north of Loos. Sir John French, in describing the disposition of his reserves, explains "that the corps operating on the French left had to be directed in a more or less south-easterly direction, involving, in the event of our success, a considerable gap in our line." The passage is not very clear, but it would seem that Sir John French was somewhat apprehensive of a German counter-attack along the line of the La Bassée Canal working around the left of our attack. In fact, nothing of the kind seems to have been attempted, but evidently before the battle Sir John French's principal anxieties were about the safety of his left. The re-appearance of the cavalry is very notable. They were posted in the south "in order to co-operate with the French cavalry in exploiting any success which might be attained by the combined French and British Forces." The Germans in Champagne also noted the presence of cavalry in the French lines, which their Headquarters' Report sarcastically observed was a misapprehension of the situation. No occasion for cavalry work arose; but had the success gained been more decisive, they would have had excellent opportunity for very effective action. The hopes that cavalry might have the opportunity for which they had waited for so long were not by any means idle, for there seems no doubt that the Germans were so alarmed by the shock of the general attack that they began to make preparations for removing even their Belgian headquarters back, in anticipation of the necessity for a general retreat. It was in view of such possibilities that the cavalry prepared for action.

The battle, which began in the early morning of November 25th, is like the Battle of Neuve Chapelle in many respects, but especially in this, that it divides itself into two very disproportionate parts, a brief opening lasting for a few hours in which we gained successes that vastly exceeded our highest hopes, and a later period in which our high hopes were reduced to modesty. Like Neuve Chapelle, again, the Battle of Loos has dark and obscure passages—perplexities about which the tongue of rumour has been exceedingly busy, but which evidently are not to be cleared up until the end of the war, and can only be treated for the present with a somewhat embarrassing reserve.

THE BOMBARDMENT.

The bombardment which preceded the attack was the longest and the heaviest that had yet taken place, and over a great part of the front was continuous for three or four days and nights before the morning of the 25th. "It is a mistake," wrote a German witness in the course of a description of this bombardment, "to believe that a man can do no more than die. He can undergo a hundred times the agony of death before death takes him." Even the side from which the bombardment comes has its minor sufferings—the inability to settle down to anything, the sense of straining at a leash, the suspense of waiting for the signal to attack. These things recur constantly in the descriptions of the bombardment, of which there have been many in soldiers' letters. The signal for attack came early in the morning. Just before the attack the British discharged gas. It was not the yellow chlorine gas that the Germans used at Ypres and elsewhere, but something that blew across in white clouds and suffocated, but, it is said, did not torture. Immediately behind the gas clouds followed the bombers wearing masks. There is little evidence that the gas contributed much to our early successes in the attack—in the opinion of at least one competent officer it hindered us—but the wearing of masks added a fresh terror to the attack.

"Whitish fogbanks began to creep slowly nearer. The landscape consists of flat meadows and fields, and in these months a mist hangs over it morning and evening. Thus it happened that our men at first thought the approaching whitish bank of vapour was mist. But very soon they knew what was the matter. It was a gas attack, and the order was issued: 'Put on the gas masks.'

"The bank of fog passed over our trenches. Then came a low bank of smoke creeping towards us, black grey; then again another bank of gas some ten minutes behind the first. Altogether three or four double waves of whitish gas and smoke gas swept over our trenches. There was nothing else to be seen. Some men coughed and fell down. Others stood at the ready as long as possible. The English artillery at the same time fired gas shells on our trenches.

"Behind the fourth gas and smoke cloud there suddenly emerged Englishmen in thick lines and storming columns. They rose suddenly from the earth, wearing smoke masks over their faces, and looking not like soldiers but like devils. Wire was no longer there to hold them back.

"Shortly after seven o'clock no more news reached the divisional fighting headquarters to the rear. Telegraph and telephone wires were shot to pieces, and communications had to be restored by despatch-riders and motors."

The bombardment had been much more successful than in March, and had destroyed the wire entanglements at all points except one. This was near the junction of the two attacking army corps, between which the road from Vermelles to Hulluch was the boundary. Here the right brigade of the First Division was held up for some

* Kellermann in the *Berliner Tageblatt*.

time—apparently, though this has not been expressly stated—by the wire entanglements, and the delay enabled the Germans to bring up reinforcements. The left brigade, however, in spite of the menace to its flank, managed to force its way through to the western outskirts of Hulluch. Further to the left, the Seventh Division captured the quarries, the Cité St. Elie, and even reached Haisnes; and on its left again the Ninth Division carried the Hohenzollern Redoubt and Fosse 8. The Twenty-eighth Brigade, brought up from reserve, advanced across the Vermelles railway and stormed the German trenches on the east side, but had to fall back. On this extreme left on one line our troops were under the fire of the defences at Auchy and La Bassée itself. The fighting at Fosse 8, too, had been extremely heavy, and our hold on it, under the guns of Auchy, was very precarious. But in spite of everything, the advance on this wing was as great as was expected, for the main object of the fighting north of the Hulluch road must have been to secure the flank of the Fourth Corps attacking in the direction of Lens to the south of that road. It was here that the prospects of decisive victory were brightest.

THE BRILLIANT SUCCESS ON THE RIGHT.

The attack of the Fourth Corps opened brilliantly. On the right the Forty-seventh Division, composed of two London Territorial Brigades, stormed the Double Crassier—a huge slag heap—and pushed on to the south side of Loos, where they captured the chalk pit and the cemetery, and established a strong defensive position on the flank before noon. The French on the right, owing to unexplained delays, were not able to begin their advance until one o'clock, so that for the greater part of this advance the right flank of the London Brigades was unsupported. The Germans, however, either failed to realise their advantage or were unable to use it, and no attack was delivered. Later in the day the French advanced from Souchez up to the Vimy Heights, and this right flank was made secure.

But finer even than the advance of the Forty-seventh Division was that of the Scottish Territorials (Fifteenth Division) to the left. With bayonets fixed, they charged across the half-mile of open ground which separated them from the enemy's trenches, carried their first line, streamed out into the open again, carried the second line of trenches just in front of Loos, then into Loos, out again, up Hill 70, down on the far side of the hill into the Douai Plain. And all by 9-30, three hours after the trenches were first left. Had the Scottish troops been supported at this moment, just as their attack was becoming exhausted, there is no setting a limit to the results of the day. But no support came. The Germans rallied as the morning wore on, pressed our troops back up the hill and over the crest, where their advance was stayed. By nightfall more than half the ground won had been lost again. Loos was ours, the western slopes of Hill 70, and the road from Hill 70 as far as Hulluch; but the entrance to the Douai Plain was barred, and the Germans had in some degree recovered from their surprise, and were preparing to counter-attack in strength.

THE RESERVES.

How came it that the Scottish troops after carrying Hill 70 never received any supports? Two whole army corps had been held in reserve for just such a reversal as this. One division—the Twenty-eighth—had come into action early in the day near Auchy, but the Twenty-first

and Twenty-fourth Divisions and the Guards were not used all day. At 9-30 in the morning Sir John French had placed the Twenty-first and Twenty-fourth Brigades at the disposal of the General Officer in command of the attack—presumably Sir John Haig. At half-past eleven the heads of the division were past Bethune and Nœux-les-Mines, not more than three miles behind our trenches. A couple of hours more and they might have been attacking the Germans—late, but not too late to save Hill 70 and its exits into the Douai Plain. It is possible that they arrived at Hill 70 in time to save the western slopes, but that has nowhere been stated, and the first mention in despatches of their coming into action is not till the evening of the following day, by which time the German counter-attacks were in full progress. The Fourth Corps were preparing to attack Hulluch and a redoubt just over the crest of Hill 70, when they were anticipated by strong enemy attacks. "These attacks," we are told by Sir John French, "drove in the advanced troops of the Twenty-first and Twenty-fourth Divisions which were then moving to the attack. Reports regarding this portion of the action," he continues, "are very conflicting, and it is not possible to form an entirely just appreciation of what occurred in this part of the field." There is no further mention of these divisions in Sir John French's despatch; and the only other official references occurred in the course of a debate in the House of Lords on the Staff work, which are discussed later in this chapter. Here it is sufficient to note that the failure of our reserves, first, to reach the front in time, and secondly, having reached there to make their influence felt, was the main cause that disappointed the hopes of a really decisive victory.

THE GUARDS ATTACK ON HILL 70.

On the third day of the battle—Monday—we lost possession of Fosse No. 8. Our hold from the first had been precarious, and the loss of this position did not materially affect the security of our right wing, where the best chances of winning decisive victory still offered. In the afternoon of Monday a determined effort was made by the Guards Division to recover the ground lost on the previous Saturday afternoon in the direction of Hill 70 and Lens. Their attack was, next to the advance of the Scotsmen on the Saturday, the finest military exploit—and certainly the most thrilling military spectacle—in the whole battle. The Guards had been out of the trenches for some weeks before the action, and at the beginning of the battle had been stationed at Lillers. Obviously, they were being kept back for the supreme effort which was now to be made. The Guards were in three brigades, of which the Second, including Grenadiers, Welsh, and Scots Guards, were entrusted with the direct frontal attack on Hill 70 and the positions commanding the road from Hulluch to Lens. The Germans had made good use of their respite to reorganise their positions, and no sooner had the Guards left their trenches than they were bombarded with shell-fire. They had not expected to be shelled so soon. The shells emitted poisonous fumes, and some of the men, among them the Colonel of the Grenadiers, fell wounded or choking with the gas before the gas helmets could be served out. Protected by their helmets, they delivered a brilliant attack on Hill 70 and stormed the crest, but were not able to capture the redoubt, which was some little way below on the reverse slope. Other battalions attacked the positions on the road. The number of casualties began to be very heavy. They were played upon by a terrible fire from

machine-guns concealed in Bois Hugo, the Keep, and Puits 14, and suffered a tragic ordeal. The colonel was wounded, and many other officers of the Scots Guards were wounded or killed. The assault upon Puits 14 was distinguished by extreme gallantry and self-sacrifice. The position itself was won by a party of Scots Guards led by Captain Cutlibert, D.S.O., which engaged in hand-to-hand fighting, routing out the enemy from the houses.

"Some companies of the Grenadiers came to the support of their comrades in the Scots Guards, but suffered heavy losses themselves. A platoon under Lieutenant Ayres Ritchie reached the Puits, and, storming their way into the Keep, knocked out a machine-gun mounted on the second floor by a successful bombing attack. The officer held on in a most dauntless way to the position until almost every man was either killed or wounded, unable to receive support owing to the enfilade fire of the German machine-guns.

"Night had now come on, the sky lightened by the bursting of shells and flares and terrible in its tumult of battle. Some of the Coldstreams had gained possession of the Chalk Pit, which they were organising into a strong defensive position, and various companies of the Guards Division, after heroic assaults upon Hill 70, where they were shattered by the fire which met them on the crest from the enemy's redoubt on the north-east side, had dug themselves into the lower slopes. Before the dawn came the Coldstreams made another desperate attempt to attack and hold Puits 14, but the position was too deadly even for their height of valour; and although some men under Lieutenant Riley pushed on into this very inferno of fire, the survivors had to fall back to the woods, where they strengthened their defensive works.

"The following day the position was the same, the sufferings of our men being still further increased by heavy shelling from 8-inch howitzers, and Colonel Egerton, of the Coldstreams, and his adjutant being killed in the Chalk Pit.

"It was now seen by the Headquarters Staff of the Guards Division that Puits 14 was quite untenable owing to its enfilading by heavy artillery, and the order was given for a retirement to the Chalk Pit, which was a place of sanctuary owing to the magnificent work done throughout the night to strengthen its natural defensive features by sandbags and barbed wire, in spite of machine-guns which raked it from the neighbouring woods.

"The retirement was done as though the men were on parade, slowly and in perfect order across the field of fire, each man bearing himself as though in the presence of the King. It was a wonderful tribute to the strength of tradition among troops. To safeguard the honour of a famous name these men showed such supreme contempt for death that even the enemy must have been moved to admiration. They held that place until relieved by the French; and when they came behind the lines again to wait until their further support was wanted in any hard-pressed place, they brought with them new honours which have added even to the glory of the Guards."

This was the last effort made to recover the lost ground. From now to the end of the battle we were engaged in repelling the obstinate counter-attacks made by the Germans, and on the whole with success. On the two last days in September the Germans recovered at great cost a portion of the Hohenzollern Redoubt, but were compelled later to relinquish most of their gain. The French, by taking over our gains further south, including the village of Loos, were of great assistance in helping us to retain our ground further north. The German attacks continued until the second week of October, and the last attack on October 8th was the most determined of all. The Germans succeeded in making some gains in the Hohenzollern Redoubt, and from the French in the Double Crassier, but only to lose them again, and on October 9th, when the battle may be said to have ended, their positions were exactly the same as they were before the attacks began. Sir John French estimated the German losses in this last counter-attack in killed alone at between 8,000 and 9,000.

COMMENTS AND CRITICISMS.

The successes gained in this battle were considerable. Along a front of four miles a double line of trenches had been carried to a depth at its greatest of four miles. The whole of this area, amounting to at least twelve square miles, was a network of trenches and bomb-proof shelters. Months of labour had been spent on the construction of the shelters, which were, many of them, more than thirty feet deep. Like the Labyrinth, captured by the French near Arras, they were a huge underground city, which the Germans were almost justified in regarding as impregnable. Fifty-seven officers and 3,000 other ranks were taken prisoners, together with 26 field-guns and forty machine-guns. Their losses in killed and wounded must have equalled and probably exceeded our own, which were grievously heavy. Our losses in the action, including the attacks made at Ypres and Givenchy, must have amounted in all to 50,000, among whom were a number of prisoners, though, as in the Battle of Neuve Chapelle, no accounts have made clear when these were taken. Greater, however, than the material losses of the battle was the evidence that it afforded that the German positions in the west were not impregnable. A very little more, and the whole German position in Artois and Flanders would have collapsed. As it was, the Germans received the greatest fright they had yet had in the war.

It is only when one turns from the actual achievement in this battle, which was considerable to what at one time we seemed to be on the point of achieving, which might well have brought the end of the war in sight, that the victory of Loos is seen as a magnificent facade hiding great disappointment. The main cause of this disappointment was the failure of the two reserve divisions to support the advance of the Scottish troops towards Lens, and their further failure, when they did come into action on the following day, to contribute anything. The failures of the artillery at Neuve Chapelle were not repeated; and though mistakes were made by the gunners in the later stages of the battle, their initial work was good enough to lay the foundations of a great victory upon. Nor was the general plan of the battle, so far as a judgment is possible, ill-conceived. The success that was attained showed that the central idea of forcing a way into the Plain of Douai was quite feasible, and that the main conditions of success had been apprehended. The plan may be open to criticism on some grounds. It may be that instead of the attacks at various points of the British front which were evidently not intended to be pressed, and yet were rather too serious to be regarded as mere demonstrations, better results might have been attained by a more concentrated effort at some one point in addition to that selected for the main attack. There are difficulties, again, in grasping the reasons why Sir John French distributed his reserves as he did. But these are matters on which no judgment is possible on the published information. The crux of the battle was in the handling of the two reserve divisions.

The blame of the failure to sustain our early success towards Lens has been sometimes placed on the excessive impetuosity of the Scottish advance, and it has been said that it would have been wiser to restrain its rapidity. It is a hard judgment. Experience in this war has that, though battles last longer than they did, it is the first few hours that are most likely to be decisive, and that the greatness of the victory will depend mainly on the rapidity with which initial success can be improved. To say that troops should not press forward as rapidly as possible when the road is open may be to

deny the first condition which deliverance from the trench warfare is possible. The initial success was evidently speedy beyond anticipation, and the reserves would seem to have been posted too far in the rear to intervene at the best possible moment. Rather than blame the Scottish troops for undue haste, it would seem juster to inquire whether our dispositions had not been unduly influenced by the idea that the decision must necessarily be slow. This battle has rather strengthened the opposite theory, that the really decisive moments of the modern battle are likely to be few in number and to pass with great rapidity.

It seems to be clear that, quite apart from their original distance from the scene of action, the divisions were unnecessarily slow in arriving, and that they failed even after they had arrived. For the delay in their arrival the blame has been put on the Staff work, as though instructions had not been properly framed, or were not delivered, or as though there had been some miscalculation of the distance which Lord Sydenham has urged would naturally seem to point to some Staff blunder. It certainly requires a great deal of explanation how it came about that troops, the need for which was so urgent, should have left Nœux-les-Mines at eleven in the morning on Saturday and apparently not have been deployed for action until the following day. The distance from Nœux

to the scene of action cannot be more than eight miles. The view of the Government, so far as it has been expressed, is that the Headquarters Staff was not at fault. Replying to criticisms by Lord St. Davids, in the House of Lords, on November 16th, Lord Haldane said :—

"Lord St. Davids was also wrong in thinking reserves were not ready to be sent forward on the occasion of the recent advance at Loos. They were ready, but did not succeed in what they ought to have done. It was a matter internal to the divisions, and was not due to want of care or attention on the part of the Commander-in-Chief."

In a later speech Lord Crewe declined to go into details, as the "whole business was *sub judice*, being the subject of close military inquiry by the highest authorities." For these reasons detailed discussion in this place is out of the question, even if the materials were available. But it is permissible to point out that quite apart from the question of the time at which these divisions arrived, is the further question as to the state in which they arrived, and the cause. If we may judge from what happened on the following day, they hardly seem to have been in a fit condition to go into action. These, however, are questions that await authoritative settlement, and it is not too much to say that on the character of the inquiry, and on the vigour with which its conclusions are acted upon, very much may depend.



All that remained of a bombarded German trench taken in the Loos fighting. The remains of a field telephone box can be seen in the photograph.

[Official Photograph: Crown Copyright Reserved.]



Three thousand of the German prisoners taken by the French during their advance in the Champagne.

[Topical Press.]

CHAPTER XXVI.

THE FRENCH ADVANCE IN CHAMPAGNE.


THE OBJECTS OF THE ATTACK—DESCRIPTION OF THE BATTLEFIELD—THE PREPARATIONS FOR ATTACK—THE BOMBARDMENT—THE MEASURE OF FRENCH SUCCESSES—THE BUTTE DE TAHURE AND THE MAIN DE MASSIGES—COMMENTS ON THE BATTLE.

THE ultimate objective of the simultaneous attacks in Artois and Champagne can be read from a glance at the map. The German lines in France run roughly from north of Nieuport at the sea almost due south to Compiègne, then turn almost at right angles to the Argonne. A serious break-through in Champagne, aided by a great holding attack north of Arras, or, better, a break-through north of Arras, would have endangered the whole salient, Arras-Compiègne-Rheims, and, more, would have meant almost inevitably the falling back of the German line as far as the defences of the Meuse. The damage and danger to the whole German invasion of France would have been incalculable. The eastern Champagne country presented other advantages for a grand attack. Its bare, undulating plains and uplands, with few villages and little agricultural ground, make it one of the very few parts of France where great armies can manœuvre on a wide front. For an immediate objective there was the breaking of the Bazancourt-Challerange railway and the capture of the Challerange junction, which would have completely cut off the supplies of the Crown Prince's army in the Argonne, for the other main railway from Germany passes through Verdun, and is, of course, in French hands. The capture of a range of low hills which stretches through the country here was another important consideration. There was, moreover, the vital necessity to compel Germany

to relieve her pressure on Russia, which was in severe straits at that time. But that probably affected the date rather than the operations themselves, the preparations for which must have been going on for months beforehand. In any case, the moral effect on France and on the enemy of an energetic offensive and the destruction of her elaborate defences here were doubtless felt to be a sufficient reason for the campaign. The result did not reach the distant hopes of a great break-through, but with the exception of the Marne fighting it was the greatest demonstration of the new French superiority in guns and men, and its material results were undeniable and impressive. We now know that after the first day the German staff were hurriedly perfecting their plans for the possibility of a great evacuation, and that even in Brussels the German documents and papers had been packed and ready for immediate transport, and all over the invaded territory the German civil government had everything ready for flight. France battered tremendously, and shook the walls of the German occupation, and her blows reverberated throughout Belgium.

THE NUMBERS ENGAGED.

The offensive in Champagne was carried out by the Second and Fourth French armies, part of the army group commanded by General Castelnau, whose defence



THE BATTLEFIELD IN CHAMPAGNE.

of Nancy, in September, 1915, at the time of supreme trial, was one of the great deeds of the war (Vol. II., page 131). The Fourth Army was commanded by a General who had long commanded the same army; the General of the Second Army was a recent appointment. Against them was a group of German armies under General von Buelow. Prussians, Saxons, Bavarians, Westphalians, Wurtenburgers were all engaged (prisoners from fifty-six different regiments were captured), and when the attack on Le Main de Massiges had developed, reinforcements from the Crown Prince's army in the Argonne came to the relief of the beaten Germans, and fought with great desperation, refusing to surrender, and dying in companies. The numbers engaged in the Champagne battles on either side is not known, but the probability is that they reached a total of over half-a-million men, fighting on a front of only eighteen miles. The French Staff estimate the German losses to be about 140,000 men out of action, which is, roughly, an army of three army corps. The number of German prisoners captured on this front were 25,000, which is more than a sixth of that number. The Germans claimed on the 3rd October to have captured 10,721 Frenchmen, which, on the same basis of counting, would mean a French loss of about 60,000 in all. The French state, however, that the Germans have counted wounded and dead as prisoners.

It is useful to compare these figures with the results of other great battles fought by France. At the Jena the French took 15,000 prisoners and 200 cannon, while 12,000 Prussians were slain. At Austerlitz they took 12,000 prisoners and 186 cannon. Their enemies lost 25,000 men. At Saint-Privat the French lost 12,000 men, the Germans 10,000. At Freschwiller the French lost 5,000 slain and 9,000 prisoners.

We may take the French forces to be about 300,000 strong. According to the available information, the Germans had on this front seventy battalions, and to meet the attack twenty-nine battalions were added before the 25th September, which, with artillery and engineers, gives a total of about 115,000 men immediately engaged. The losses during the artillery preparation and the first fighting caused the German staff to gather from many parts all available resources, and ninety-three new battalions were added before the 15th October. This would mean a total German force of about 225,000 men, which is, according to authoritative French estimates, about an eighth of the entire German force on the whole western fronts. The victors captured ground along the whole front, varying from one to five kilometres deep. In all places the very elaborately fortified front lines were carried. The total ground conquered represented forty square kilometres. The spoils are announced in the following Order from General Joffre on the 5th October.

"GENERAL HEADQUARTERS,
"October 5th.

"The Commander-in-Chief addresses to the troops under his orders the expression of his profound satisfaction with the results obtained in the attacks up to to-day.

"Twenty-five thousand prisoners, 350 officers, 150 guns and material which has not yet been enumerated, are the trophies of a victory measured by its renown through Europe.

"None of the sacrifices agreed to has been in vain. Everyone has contributed to the common task. The present is a sure guarantee to us of the future.

"The Commander-in-Chief is proud to command the finest troops France has ever known.

J. JOFFRE."

THE FIELD OF BATTLE.

The country of the battle is as suitable for warfare as any tract of land in a civilised country can be. It is, with a few breaks, rolling chalk terrain, with very little ploughed land, and even little pasture land—a quiet, desolate district, reminding one in many ways of Salisbury Plain, but broken here and there with clumps of pine plantations, which in some cases serve to hide the hangars of the observation balloons and aeroplanes, and provide concealment for the concentrations of huts and dug-outs, stores, ammunition trains, and all the elaborate accompaniments of modern armies in the field. These plantations furnished logs for shoring up and protecting the dug-outs. The villages are few and humble, with the exception of one in which there is a beautiful two-spire Gothic church that stands inviolate in the terribly mutilated village. The Germans spared it in their retreat, as they were using it as a hospital. There are no vines in this part. It is a Champagne very different from the vivacious ideas that the world has of the country. In the west the fighting took place just north of the Camp de Châlons, the desolate flats where Attila the Hun was defeated by the Gauls. To the east, the land is still chalky, but it is cut up with small ravines and little sharp hills, which provide elaborate dug-outs and difficult positions for the searching of the artillery. Vaudesincourt is the village at the extreme west of the attack, and Ville sur Tourbe at the extreme east, where the blue bulks of the Argonne begin to break the sky-line. Both forces were supplied by main railway lines running roughly parallel to one another close behind the front, and both had elaborate systems of field railways, the Germans being worked by horse or man power, and the French by little locomotives. After the victory the French were in possession of 240 kilometres of German railway, which they had to reconstruct to bear the additional weights of their engines. These railways are used not only to provide munitions, food and stores, but also to reconcentrate the troops at parts that are attacked. During the attack the French aeroplane corps heavily bombed the German railway line, and the junctions at Bazancourt and Challerange. The chalky soil differs in parts, at some places being both firm and porous, and dry in almost any weather, and at others of a soft cheamy character, making the trenches ankle deep in white mud, and the fields slippery and heavy under foot. On the day of the grand attack the weather, after a spell of dry, fine days, changed to rain and mist, unfavourable to artillery work, the shells bursting erratically and greatly delaying at many places the movements of the attacking forces in the open.

TRAINING AND WEAPONS.

The French preparations for the attack, were characterised by extraordinary thoroughness in staff work, and in the actual training of the men. In Artois, in May, for the great assault on that tremendous maze of entrenchments and redoubts known as "the Labyrinth," the French front line troops (it may now be stated) who were to undertake the attack were taken out of the trenches and exercised for several months in attacking exercise against a series of works modelled on the actual Labyrinth. On the Champagne front the men were taken out of the trenches at the beginning of September, and practised their attack against field fortifications specially prepared for them. When the morning came each platoon knew exactly what it had to do and how to do it. The new steel helmet had been



The battlefield north of Perthes: The soldiers in the foreground are preparing new positions for heavy artillery in the advanced ground taken from the Germans.

[French Official Photograph, N.I.]



French infantry passing into possession of what was once a German trench in Champagne.

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[French Official Photograph, N.I.]

served out to all the troops engaged. It proved a very useful protection, and is believed to have decreased the casualties to a degree which some place as high as 15 per cent of the total. It is a headpiece finely designed to deflect bullets and pieces of flying explosives from many angles, and its thickness is sufficient to keep out a direct hit from spent bullets and shrapnel. It is particularly useful in the present combats by hand grenade. It is one of the few things where the Allies have an invention superior to that of the enemy. The comments of the German prisoners were sufficient to show the value of the headpiece by the envy it aroused amongst them. It is in shape something like the helmet of antique statues of Mercury, with a narrower brim, and it is coloured horizon-blue, like the new French uniform, and easily mingles with the colour of the country. Another addition to the equipment since the Marne was the trench knife, which the soldiers carry at the waist in front. It has a blade of about six inches long, and is for use when the soldier has jumped into an enemy trench and has to clear a space by fast "in-fighting," when the bayonet cannot be used owing to the confined movements. The soldier uses the knife dagger-ways, striking at the faces of his opponents, and its effect is terrifying, as well as destructive. The method of fighting is that the first wave of the advance breaks up the opposition in the trenches, and rushes down the communication trenches and on the top with bombs and bayonets until the next line is reached. The second and succeeding waves finish the fighting in the trench, call on the men in the dug-out to surrender, and unless they come out at once throw bombs into the dug-outs, where shelter is impossible. In the September offensive the French were well supplied with grenades, the common one being of the shape and size of an ordinary beer bottle, with a pin secured by a wire which has to be wrenched off before it can be used. In the fighting on Le Main de Massiges, where trenches in a steep hill had to be taken by immediate assault, the men at one point were in a line of about six hundred yards passing grenades from hand to hand, the front files of bombers having their places taken as they fell by the succeeding files. The most splendid fire and bravery were shown by the French infantry in these attacks. In one case, near Souain, the infantry took German trenches to the depth of two kilometres in under an hour, and at another point, in the same place, three kilometres were covered in forty-five minutes, which, even without any opposition, is fast going in a region so torn and seamed by heavy shell fire and wide trenches.

THE RECONNAISSANCE WORK.

The staff preparations were done with all the science and care which a year's experience had ripened. In modern war men have gone back to prehistoric devices of underground shelters and burrows; but modern science, in the form of the aeroplane and the camera, has made it possible to note and record the whole system of trenches and shelters so that each army is aware of every line and turn of its enemy, and so long as aeroplanes are not fought away from the lines it is impossible to conceal the vital fact of an entrenched position. The French aeroplane reconnaissance had been done with extreme care, and the photographs taken by their aerial spies showed not only every trench and communication, but in most cases every dug-out as well, the heads of the dug-outs showing black in the grey shadows of the trenches. The German reconnaissance was equally good, and one in a position to speak at this point said that the German

photographs which had fallen into their hands of the French trenches were better than those they had themselves, but that, of course, is explained by the fact that an army does not require to make very close observation records of its own trenches. The German reconnaissance, however, stopped short at a very important point, for the sufficient reason that in the last weeks before the attack they were beaten off from the French position by defending aeroplanes. In that time the French were busy in many parts of the front, especially in the Souain section, burrowing forward by new trenches and connecting up from part to part until, under the eyes and fire of the Germans, they had brought forward their front to within a striking distance of about 200 metres from the enemy. The preparations for the concentration and launching of the huge bodies of troops that had been brought forward for the moment of the great attack were ingenious, and very elaborate in scale. In all places special trenches of departure had been made. In the assault on the Le Main de Massiges nearly 2,000 men had been employed in making the way so that the troops could suddenly well up from their reservoirs and pour over irresistibly, and down the valley and up the fingers of the "hand." In another part of the line a hollow, protected by a palisade of tens of thousands of sandbags, allowed over a thousand soldiers to wait in safety for the moment of advance. This place was called the "Place de l'Opéra." In the modern attack out of trenches, surprise and speed after the artillery has done its work are, of course, the supreme factors.

The line of every trench and organised work being mapped down in the staff plans, it became necessary for convenience to give names to the various localities. These names (or nicknames) were conferred mainly by the French Intelligence Bureau, sometimes by simple extensions of actual places like "Ouvrage de Vederange;" others were imaginative, like "Tranchée des Vandales," "Tranchées des Satyrs," "Boyau du Harem," "Boyau de la Kultur," and "Le Poignard;" others more simply, like "Boyau de Guillaume," "Tranchée d'Hindenburg," and "Tranchée des Dardanelles;" others too highly flavoured with salt Gallic wit for everyday consumption. Nearly all these trenches with names are now in French hands, and some of them are re-christened; some of them are so smashed and flattened that they no longer can be recognised as trenches. They are like long graves filled in by a giant, who has tossed the earth anyway, and fringes of barbed wire, broken logs from the dug-outs, and smashed guns and trench shields stick up from the mounds. Underneath, in the deep shelters, hundreds of smothered Germans still lie hidden.

The same care and ingenuity shown in the methods for concentrating and launching the attack is seen in the plans for bringing the troops to the front lines. For two or three miles back the old roads and the many new roads that had been constructed were lined on the side next the enemy by tall wire frameworks, on which were hung branches of larch and pine and screens of rushes to hide the roads, so that the German observation balloons could not discern the movements of troops upon them. Strong portable bridges of light construction were prepared to set over the trenches for the speedy advance of the French artillery after the attack, and possibly also for the French cavalry. The Germans reported that the French, "misapprehending the situation," employed cavalry after the first attack, and that this cavalry was caught by the German fire and heavily cut up. The French state that the Germans were misinformed. At one part some



French troops passing through one of the bombarded towns in Champagne recaptured from the Germans.
[Newspaper Illustrations.]



All that remained of the windmill at Souain after the French bombardment. The size of the ruins can be measured by the men standing near and behind them.
[Sport and General.]

regimental cavalry was used to cut off German troops who had come into the open to flee from a position that was heavily shelled, and the cavalry were very effective in this way. After that, the cavalry were employed, but as infantrymen, and the horses were sent back. No brigades of cavalry were used at any point.

On the eve of the battle General Joffre issued this address to his armies:—

"SOLDIERS OF THE REPUBLIC.

"After some months of waiting, which have allowed us to increase our forces and our resources, whilst those of the enemy have wasted, the hour has come to attack, that we may conquer and add fresh pages of glory to those of the Marne, of Flanders, of the Vosges, and of Arras.

"Behind the hurricane of steel and fire, let loose by the toil of the factories of France, where your brothers have worked for us night and day, you will go to the assault all together along the whole front in close union with the armies of our Allies.

"Your dash forward will be irresistible.

"It will carry you in the first rush up to the batteries of the enemy, beyond the fortified lines which he opposes to you.

"You will not allow him truce nor rest until victory is achieved.

"Go forward with high heart to deliver the soil of your country, for the triumph of right and of liberty.

J. JOFFRE."

THE BOMBARDMENT.

The bombardment of the German positions began on the 22nd of September, and continued night and day without stop until a quarter past nine on the morning of the 25th. The Germans had been expecting the great attack, and in many of the trenches that were close together the German soldiers had put up notices, and shouted to the French that they would be ready for them "on the 21st," and asked them to come on and begin the attack before the day fixed. It was impossible to conceal the concentrations and the new railway developments. The Germans did everything in their power to strengthen their defences and to watch for fresh indications of the storm. The terrific scale and violence of the artillery outburst, however, seems to have taken them by surprise, and to have smashed their special arrangements for dealing with it. We now know that in many parts it was found impossible to convey food or stores to the front line, as communication trenches had been specially marked for destruction, and letters in the possession of prisoners show that whole divisions had been without food for forty-eight hours, and some regiments were deprived of food for a hundred and twelve hours. The artillery's first aim was the destruction of the barbed wire protections before the trenches. For this purpose their work was assisted by a new contact fuse, particularly sensitive, which caused an instant explosion at the first contact with the ground. Another shell of a special kind was also employed. The effect exceeded the Staff expectations, tearing the wire into useless fragments and leaving a clear way to the trenches. The usual difficulty, however, was found when the Germans had spread their wire cunningly on the far side over the crest of a height. These caused the French at some points to be hung up, but to meet such a possibility at suspected places plans were made to surround the position from easier approaches on either side.

At the same time the French heavy guns were bombarding the second position of the Germans, causing a barricade to prevent reinforcements for the first line; and the headquarters of the divisional staffs, the cantonments and stations, and the field railways were heavily assailed.

Some letters found in the captured trenches give an indication of the efficiency of the bombardment.

"24th September.

"For two days the French have been firing like madmen. To day, for instance, a shelter has been battered in. There were sixteen men in it. Not one of them pulled his bones out of it. They are all dead. Besides that, there are heaps of isolated dead and a great mass of wounded.


"The artillery fires almost as quickly as the infantry. A cloud of smoke covers the entire front of the battle, so that one can see nothing. Men are falling like flies. The trenches are nothing but a pile of débris."

25th September.

"A rain of shells is pouring on us. The kitchen and everything that has been sent us has been bombarded by night. Ah! if only the end were near! It is the cry that you hear everybody raising: Peace! Peace!"


THE ATTACK.

At a quarter-past nine on Saturday, the 25th September, the rain of shells, which had lasted three days and four nights, suddenly ceased for a minute; and before the ears of the Germans could identify the peace that followed, the French army from Massiges on the east to Saint Hilaire on the west had leapt out of their underground cities and were surging over the dead ground and into the trenches where the Germans had faced them for a year. Accounts differ as to how they charged. Eloquent descriptions have been published how they chanted the "Marseillaise," and cheered and sang, but if they did so it was against the army regulations, which demand silence, and to scramble quickly over the shell-ridden ground probably demanded all their breath. One staff officer who saw the advance said grimly that the only noise they made was the grinding of their teeth. When the front wave reached the German trenches they found nearly everywhere that the front line was in ruins, and the defenders killed or sheltering in the dug-outs. The succeeding wave cleared out the trenches, took the prisoners, and stuck the pennons they had brought into the parapets to signal their progress to the artillery. The charging of men with steel helmets and pennons was a sight that France had not seen since the seventeenth century. The flags were rags of red cotton on poles cut in the woods. They signalled great deeds, but after the battle they were trampled into the ground in the grim, unshowy way in which France now conducts her wars. Gas had been used in certain sectors, but not in others. None was used, for instance, at Le Main de Massiges, where the longest distance separated the forces. The long instantaneous attack made it impossible for the defending commanders to get support from the other sectors, and, in any case, the French, with a tremendous curtain of artillery fire, were holding the approaches to the first line. Portions of the first line held out in their second and third trenches, defended by machine-guns in steel casements, concreted in and covered with earth, the slot for the gun muzzle being within a few inches of the ground. This accounted for the prevalence of leg wounds at many parts. The assault on the second lines was more difficult, because the artillery had not the range to the same nicety, and, making the most of the run of the ground, the Germans had very strong barbed wire hedges on the far slopes of the inclines which the French fire had failed to cut. Very soon the French were facing in all directions, as the difficulties of the ground and the obstacles increased. Some troops were even facing south, for at some places what was virtually a field fortress was surrounded and carried from the back. Confusion occurred, units were



Immediately after the Champagne advance: French artillery which has just been moved up to its new position.

[French Official Photograph, S. and G.]



A German first-line trench in Champagne after the French bombardment.

[French Official Photograph, S. and G.]

broken and mixed, flanks "left in the air" and exposed to enfilading fire; but the fruits of the careful preparation were not lost, and units disengaged themselves and re-formed, and the new connections were made with a speed and steadiness that formerly would have been impossible. A year's war now makes a veteran.

THE ARTILLERY WORK.

Meantime, the artillery had rushed out from concealment and over the portable bridges on the French trenches, and up in the open as in a nineteenth century battle. Horses were killed and men took their places. Nothing can exceed the enthusiasm of the soldiers engaged when they speak of how the gunners brought up the guns on the great day, especially over the craters before l'Épine de Vedegrange. One battery of 75's, on the Saturday morning, were brought up close to the trenches of the first line, galloping in the open. They crossed over the crest of a hill and got to work on the German trenches 600 metres away. Then they lengthened their fire as the infantry advanced before them, and concentrated on a point four kilometres behind the German line to prevent the enemy's reinforcement of shells reaching the first position. At two o'clock they followed the infantry and destroyed some obstructions, shells falling around them all the time. The guns were turned on a little collection of farm buildings which the Germans had made into a blockhouse, the doors and windows being filled with sandbags cemented together. The enemy's machine-guns were turned on the battery, which, however, got into action so quickly that after twelve rounds from the battery the mitrailleuses were silenced, and the garrison raised the white flag.

Where the French artillery had made clear practice on the German trenches, the effect was tremendous. Parapets were smashed, and the solid roof protections of shelters tossed about and battered down. The Germans had very large dug-outs, capable of holding sixty and even ninety men, set as deep as thirty feet in the earth, elaborately strengthened with timber props and steel casings. Many of these now lie beneath tons of earth, with their occupants within. Large numbers of prisoners were taken from dug-outs in which they were surprised, without having word of the attack, the men in the trenches being all killed. In some places the men were dazed by the incessant bombardment and worn by lack of food and drink, the communication trenches being choked on the first days of the bombardment. They came out and surrendered gladly. The French do not speak with respect of the physique or fighting qualities of the German infantry over the main part of the line. At Le Main de Massiges, however, where strong reinforcements arrived from the Crown Prince's army in the Argonne, the Germans fought with tremendous bitterness and tenacity, and, refusing to surrender, died in hundreds. The prisoners wounded on the first day were over 16,000.

THE EXTENT OF THE FRENCH GAINS.

The offensive may be described as a series of assaults in five sectors, in which the fortunes of war varied considerably, and the influence of a notable victory in one part did not always sympathetically affect the adjoining operations. In the first two days of the attack the big successes were made in the district in front of the line Saint Souplet-Somme-Py-Manne. The extreme advance was made at the Butte de Tahure, where the French breached the third line of the Germans. At the Butte de Souain, and further west at Hill 193, a depth of about four kilometres was taken. At the extreme ends

of the district engaged the attacks were not pressed home, but the immediately adjoining parts at either end were bastions of enormous strength, and their capture by the French were great achievements.

In the sector l'Épine de Vedegrange to the west, which is immediately north of the Camp de Châlons, the attack of the French left was held up after a kilometre advance, but on the right the French rushed over fortified sloping approaches, and through woods, heavily defended by guns, capturing four trenches successively. In eighteen hours they were in contact with the German second lines. In this whole sector the offensive had carried fifteen square kilometres of ground by the 28th September. The prisoners numbered 3,000, and forty-four cannons were captured.

In the sector of Souain, further east, a great deal of new trench work had been done to carry the French parallels within striking distance of the German lines. The attack was made in three different directions, and the advance was extremely rapid, the centre penetrating to the extent of three kilometres in forty-five minutes. In ten hours they were on a height of the Navarin Farm, where some of the bitterest travails of this campaign took place. To the west, the Moulin de Souain, which had been strongly fortified at the point of the German salient, had been sapped and blown up by a powerful mine, by which the mill and its defenders disappeared, leaving a crater of over two hundred feet long by fifty feet broad. Aided by this, the French advanced over the German trenches to a distance of two kilometres in less than an hour. To the east, the Bois Sabot held out on the first night, but it was captured by encirclement. The Germans ultimately surrendered what was practically a field fortress, with a great store of materials, on the 27th. The fighting in this sector was very desperate. General Marchand, who came into history through the Fashoda crisis in 1898, himself led his Colonial troops here, and fell wounded on the parapet of a captured trench, where he had stood smoking his pipe and encouraging his men. Two brigade commanders fell close to him. By the end of September the French had a footing in the powerful second line west of the Navarin Farm. They finally broke through on a front of less than 500 yards, but the German artillery, concentrating on this narrow gap, were able to stem further French progress, and to give the Germans time to dig themselves in again. It was not till the 6th October that the French organisation was complete for a further attack here. The German reinforcements brought from the Russian front were heavily concentrated at this point, but the French artillery wrought havoc on the new entrenchments, preventing supplies coming through, and the evacuation of the wounded. In the fighting that took place on the 7th and 8th, they did not put up very strong resistance, and what remained of a regiment—482 men and ten officers—surrendered. The French, however, were held up by a series of formidable mitrailleuse redoubts on the north, and had to return with their prisoners to the trenches they had captured before the 6th.

The greatest advance was made in the sector of Perthes, where the attack penetrated to a depth of five kilometres, and established itself on Hill 192, the Butte de Tahure, a position which the Germans thought invulnerable. Its crest was taken on October 6th, after desperate fighting. On the 30th, the Germans, however, succeeded in reoccupying the crest, but the French held to their position on the slope a short distance down. Encircling movements in the first attack led

to the capture of strong positions in the woods and a speedy advance on the last trenches in the first line, where they so surprised the enemy that at one point they captured many officers in their beds in very comfortable dug-outs. Strong German attacks with gas-shells and liquid fire were made in this sector from the 25th October till the 2nd November, but apart from the recapture of the Tahure Hill crest they had no success.

In the sector of Mesnil the enemy was able to develop his strongest resistance. Little progress was made here after the first thrust, and the German line remained a peninsular extending south to the east of Tahure village to within a kilometre of the original front. In the sector of Beauséjour, however, the French attack was brilliantly successful. So curious was their rush that at one point they passed over the German trenches and surprised a battery of German artillery, killing the drivers and capturing the rest. This was near the hills called the Maisons de Champagne. The further point here they could get was the Ouvrage de la Defaite, which was lost and recaptured, and finally evacuated under a severe bombardment. Intermittent fighting continued here till the end of October, without material result.

THE CAPTURE OF MASSIGES.

Perhaps the finest achievement of the whole offensive was the capture of the series of four or five hills called Le Main de Massiges, which roughly resembles a human hand, and was thought by the Germans to be one of their firmest clutches on the heart of France. The German commander here had boasted to a neutral correspondent a few weeks before that one washerwoman with two machine-guns could hold Hill 191, the chief hill of this group, against a French army. The French were on a low hill, about 800 yards off, with a valley between. Very elaborate preparations had been made to launch the attack, two hundred workmen being employed to prepare the trenches of departure. The artillery work was very thoroughly done, but the German trenches here are very deep and well made. In a quarter of an hour the French infantry, with a tremendous dash, had carried the first works, and were on the summit of two of the "fingers," by a complete chain of soldiers, passing grenades from hand to hand. The combat continued from the 26th September to the 3rd October, the Germans rushing up all available reinforcements, which included several battalions from the Crown Prince's army in the Argonne, but without effect, the French capturing and consolidating Hill 191, which is the chief height of the district, and holding the "hand" to a depth of two kilometres.

THE GERMAN COUNTER-ATTACKS.

A striking feature about the operations in Champagne was the sporadic character of the German counter-attacks.

The utmost they could do in the week after the first attack was a series of local spasmodic counter-attacks, heralded by half-hour cannonades of asphyxiating and tear-compelling shells. It was not until the 18th October that the Germans attempted a general offensive, and it was then made in Eastern Champagne, between Rheims and Auberive-sur-Suippes, where the French line formed a salient. The German objective was evidently to throw the French back over the Rheims-Châlons railway and the Vesle river and canal, and thus to endanger the fruits of the victory in Eastern Champagne. The attack was made at night after three hours heavy shelling, the German offensive of several divisions concentrating upon a six-mile front. At dawn on the 18th, in four successive lines separated from each other by about three hundred yards, the third line reached the trenches and got a footing there, but were bombed out again. The fourth line managed to lodge at one place, but were expelled before nightfall, and the Germans retreated with heavy losses. A further attempt was made nearer Rheims, but the Germans were unable to get beyond the wire entanglements. On the 30th October, an offensive was attempted by the Germans over the line from the Butte de Tahure to La Courtine works, north of Le Mesnil-les-Hurlus, the fruits of which were the capture of the crest of the Butte and 1,215 prisoners, but the objective of attacking from their salient, which projected to near its original point of the line at La Courtine, and breaking the new French lines at Tahure, came to nothing.

The effect of the Champagne battles has already been told in terms of prisoners, spoils, and captured positions. Like the fighting in Artois, the offensive was brilliantly successful in the first day and the attack was pushed vigorously home, but the German third line held at all points where it was reached, and the break through, which was doubtless the ultimate objective, was not made. In reaching the crest of the Butte de Tahure the French hopes reached their highest point, and only one or two lines of trenches stood between them and the open country. The question why they did not succeed in pouring through must be answered in the same way as that of the other big offensives of the Allies that all but succeeded. Through the circumstances of the fighting, the advance bodies formed sharp salients in enemy ground, and by their excellent system of telephones and signalling, and very capable artillery work, the Germans were able to concentrate from different quarters so heavy a fire on these particular spots that the French were unable to make headway, and in some cases the front waves of the attack were captured and the succeeding waves could not get through the German fire curtain to their aid. The problem of the break through seems to be the problem of a level, continuous advance of a whole army in battle, or, at any rate, on a sufficient front to thin out the fire of the enemy artillery.

The Manchester Guardian
HISTORY
of the
WAR




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The married man in the army: A street in Swansea containing 39 houses from 30 of which the husband was either called up for active service at the outbreak of the war or enlisted immediately afterwards.

[Newspaper Illustrations.]

CHAPTER XXVII.

PENSIONS AND ALLOWANCES.

FAULTS OF THE OLD POLICY—SUBSTANTIAL IMPROVEMENTS—CONTINENTAL EXAMPLES—OUR RELIANCE ON CHARITY—THE RELIEF FUNDS—EMPLOYMENT SCHEMES—ON BEHALF OF THE TROOPS—HELP FOR ALLIES AND FRIENDS.

NO more striking evidence existed of the modest military pretensions of Britain throughout her history before the great war than in the absence of all State provisions not only for relieving war distress, but even for keeping from want the dependants of men on service. The deliberate policy of successive Governments concerned with a small army serving in remote outposts had been to enlist only single men, and to discourage matrimony by refusing recognition to the marriages of all save a very small percentage of the rank and file, who were allowed to take advantage of what was known as "marriage on the strength." This entitled the wife to live in quarters, rent free, with fuel, light, and furniture; or, if quarters were not available, to an equivalent money grant of 8s. 2d. a week. In the absence of the husband on service, if the wife remained in quarters she was given 4d. a day towards her food, if in lodgings she received 1s. 1d. a day separation allowance and 1½d. a day for each child.

There was clearly little inducement to marriage in such a system, even for the very few to whom it was allowed. Its obvious social dangers, which made most garrison towns notorious, brought it under increasingly severe criticism. As applied to an army of 200,000, recruited almost wholly from the poorer classes, it was,

however, practicable, if not wise. On the outbreak of the great war, and the raising of an army on the Continental scale, it fell to pieces.

In the matter of the rights of the dependants of men killed or broken in our wars, our policy had been scarcely more creditable. In the South African War the claim of a widow married "on the strength" to a pension was for the first time recognised by the State. It was fixed at a flat rate of 5s. a week, with 1s. 6d. for each child. Any supplementing of this meagre sum, as well as the granting of assistance to other wives and dependants, was done out of charitable funds. Large sums collected from the public during the Crimean War, the Indian Mutiny, the Zulu and Ashantee Wars, and other such times of crisis, had been entrusted to a body called the Royal Patriotic Commissioners to administer. They had carried out their work zealously and effectively, with the help of the Soldiers' and Sailors' Families' Association, the Soldiers' and Sailors' Help Society, and other voluntary agencies, but the opinion was strongly held by critics of the system that the payments to the dependants of soldiers should be as rigorously freed from all suggestion of charity as, say, those made under the Workmen's Compensation Act.

And this antiquated and complex policy

of supplementing inadequate pensions by voluntary grants came with the Boer War, but the Government did not take advantage of it. Instead, they appointed a Select Committee of both Houses of Parliament to consider how best the voluntary funds needed to augment State provision could be administered. The Committee, over which Lord James of Hereford presided, reported in 1901, and as a result the old Patriotic Commissioners were replaced by a statutory body called The Royal Patriotic Fund Corporation. It was formed of the Lords Lieutenants of the Counties, the Chairmen of the County Councils, and the Mayors and Provosts, together with representatives of the War Office, the Admiralty, and the various charitable bodies concerned. It had on its Executive Committee only one representative of Labour, none of the Boards of Trade, Agriculture, or Education, and no women. Thus a system that was viewed with distaste by Labour, and indeed by all who felt that the care of soldiers' dependants should be stripped of all connection with patronage or charity, was perpetuated up to the brink of the European struggle, and, as we shall see, beyond.

SUBSTANTIAL INCREASES.

In August, 1914, the War Office had on its books some 1,500 wives married "on the strength." On the 10th of August the Prime Minister announced in the Commons that the distinction between marriage on and off the strength, which it had been a cardinal point of War Office policy to enforce, would be dropped. Within a fortnight 200,000 allowance claims had to be faced. The War Office had no machinery with which to meet this crisis, and recourse was therefore had to the Old Age Pensions Committees and the branches of the Soldiers and Sailors Families' Association in the various districts. They drew for immediate necessities upon the National Relief Fund, which had been opened by the Prince of Wales early in August, and upon the various local funds started in connection with it. Thus from the outbreak of the war the provision for the dependants of the army, admitted on all hands to be a right and not a charity, was made in the main through charitable and self-elected bodies, and met from funds subscribed for charitable purposes. It does not mitigate criticism of the principle involved to say that the means taken were probably the best possible to meet the emergency quickly, and that the work was for the most part extremely well done. Grave delays in payment of allowances were indeed at first caused by men being drafted to the front without declaring their wives, and by lack of local machinery and like causes; but in such vital matters as the provision they made for "unmarried wives" in cases where a real home had been kept, and in their extension of allowances to dependants other than wives, the bodies concerned earned general approval, and forestalled Government action.

Following on the announcement of the Prime Minister, to which reference has been made, a White Paper was issued in November, 1914, dealing with pensions and allowances. The official scale, which its provisions superseded, recognised, as we have said, only wives "married on the strength," and, in the case of the army, granted them a separation allowance of 7s. 7d. per week, with 1s. 2d. for each child, and in case of the soldier's death a pension of 5s. per week, with 1s. 6d. for each child. The wives of seamen and marines drew no separation allowance, but had pensions on the same scale as those of soldiers. The new provisions recognised

the right to pensions and allowances not only of all wives, but of other dependants, including a woman with whom the soldier had kept a real home, though unmarried. This latter concession, decried in some quarters as "putting a premium on concubinage," was generally recognised as some recompense for the old "on the strength" system which had penalised the legal relationship.

The new rate of separation allowance compelled the soldier to allot 3s. 6d. a week from his pay to his wife, to which the Government added 9s. a week, with 2s. 6d. a week for each child up to three, and 2s. a week for the fourth and successive children. The amount paid by the Government to other dependants varied with the contribution made by the soldier. If, for instance, he had allowed his mother 9s. 6d. a week when at home, and would now contribute 2s. 4d., the Government would make up the rest. The November White Paper also recognised for the first time the right of the wives and dependants of sailors and marines to separation allowances, the amounts being less and the compulsory allotment greater than in the case of the army. In dealing with pensions, it raised the weekly amount for the childless widow from 5s. to 7s. 6d., and for the widow with one child from 6s. 6d. to 12s. 6d., allowing 2s. 6d. each for the next two children, 2s. for each additional child beyond three, and 5s. each for motherless children up to three.

CONTINENTAL SYSTEMS.

These were the general terms of the first official economic recognition in this country of the armed forces, not as a class apart following a specialised trade under very heavy disabilities, but as engaging in the greatest of all national activities. The provisions of the White Paper took effect as from the outbreak of war; but it was recognised that they were not a final solution, and in November, 1914, the whole question of allowances and pensions was referred to a Select Committee, consisting of Messrs. Barnes, Chamberlain, Lloyd George, Bonar Law, McKenna, and T. P. O'Connor. They examined witnesses representing the War Office, the Admiralty, the Royal Patriotic Fund, the Chelsea Hospital, and other great war charities, as well as of the great Trades Unions, the Women's Labour League, and various bodies interested and expert in social work. Their deliberations, as published in their report, which appeared in April, 1915, showed how strongly the traditions of a voluntary and limited army could persist in times when our land forces approximated more and more to the conscriptionist scale. The nations engaged in the war provided the Committee with the widest imaginable differences of example in this matter. At the one extreme stood the French and German systems, in which relief to the dependants of men on service was a civil and not a War Office concern. It depended, that is to say, upon the existence of the woman, and not upon her ability to prove to the satisfaction of the army paymaster that she was the wife of a certain soldier. In Germany, the allowance was made partly in cash and partly in kind, and was not determined by an allotment from the purely nominal wage of the soldier. The dependant was assured of housing and food as a civil obligation. France adopted the device of a rent moratorium, which virtually relieved tenants from the payment of all house rents under £40, and business rents under £100, coupled with a small money grant to soldiers' dependants. In Switzerland, on mobilisation, the conscript was automatically relieved of all his civil obligations, and



The soldiers as family men: Highlanders returned from Flanders on leave, and with the mud of the trenches still on them, buying a Christmas turkey for the people at home. [Central News.]

most Swiss contracts contained a mobilisation clause to this effect. In any case, the law put the onus on the creditor of proving that the soldier was in a position to pay.

The Committee were so far attracted by these necessary corollaries of a complete conscriptionist system as to consider making a rent allowance and maintenance grant to dependants from civil and not army funds.

" 'Would it not,' said Mr. Bonar Law, in examining a War Office witness, 'be a splendid thing for the War Office to be saved the constant attacks which this administration causes on the one hand, and would it not be a splendid thing afterwards if this were put on another estimate in the House of Commons, and did not appear as part of the army expenditure?' "—(*Minutes of Evidence of Committee on Pensions and Grants. Par. 122.*)

At the other extreme stood the examples given by our own Dominions, such as Canada and Australia, in paying their expeditionary soldiers a wage—6s. a day in the case of Australia—which made fighting a definitely attractive profession economically. The nearest any considerable body of opinion got to suggesting that system for this country was in the demand made by some 2,000 organisations representative of working-class opinion for a minimum separation allowance of £1 a week for wives of soldiers—a figure that made no real approach to, say the Australian scale, but which would admittedly have raised the standard

of living in the homes of many of the ill-paid workers who had enlisted to a point at which it could not be kept on their return. The Committee considered also the possibility of securing, by means of a sliding scale of allowances, some approach to real "equality of sacrifice." Under any flat rate not dangerously high, the well-paid artisan or clerk with £6 a week could respond to the urgent appeals of his country only by breaking up his home, unless he applied for charitable help, or was aided by his employer. Yet the "moral obligation" to enlist had already extended far beyond the class to whom a separation allowance even of £1 a week would secure the integrity of the home.

Faced with these striking alternatives, the Committee steered a conservative middle course. Despite a growing tendency to regard Britain as "a nation in arms," they thought it best to perpetuate the old system, which clearly differentiated army dependants from other civilians to the extent of making the payment of their grants a charge upon the War Office. At the same time they fixed a separation allowance which, though generous compared with those of the past, entailed a heavy money sacrifice upon families whose bread-winner enlisted, unless they belonged to the less well-paid working classes. Finally they decided that in the many cases in which these provisions would manifestly be inadequate, recourse should be had to charitable funds.

CONTINUED RELIANCE ON CHARITY.

For the administration of pensions and allowances the Committee's report reconstituted the Royal Patriotic Corporation, with a Statutory Committee of twenty-five, of whom only twelve should be appointed by Parliament, and only the chairman paid. It should include representatives of Labour, of the War Office, the Admiralty, the Treasury, the National Relief Fund, the Soldiers' and Sailors' Families' Association, and not less than four women. The main functions of the Statutory Committee were defined as follows:—To decide questions of fact as to pensions payable to dependants other than wives; to decide the scale of such pensions, which would then be paid direct by the Naval and Military Authorities; and "in proper cases to supplement out of voluntary funds of a national character the separation allowances and pensions paid by the State."

When the Bill embodying these proposals was produced, it was met with strong criticism throughout the country, on the ground that it reduced to a minimum the responsibility of the State for what should be an entirely State concern. The Government, it was pointed out, intended to vest in a voluntary body, enjoying no special public esteem, the control of vast sums of public money, and to make it dependent for carrying out its work efficiently upon charitable funds subscribed for relief of distress. The new Statutory Committee of the Royal Patriotic Fund would, it was pointed out, include no representatives of the Boards of Trade, Agriculture, or Education, or of the Labour Exchanges; it proposed to work through the branches of the Soldiers' and Sailors' Families' Association in the various districts, and they, however skilful and zealous, were inseparably associated with the traditions of patronage and charity. Worst of all, it would draw on the National Relief Fund to supplement the State grants.

The House of Commons contented itself with mild criticism. The Government, in supporting the Bill,

contended that if Parliament voted a sum of, say, £5,000,000 for the supplementing of pensions as an alternative to the use of charitable funds, "the stream of voluntary subscriptions would dry up," and that "if so, the whole business of supplementary allowances would assume a different and in some respects an unhappy aspect." This threat of a failure by the State to pay its debts to soldiers' dependants without charitable help did not deter the House of Lords from very drastically amending the Bill on the lines favoured by Labour and other critics. They substituted, for instance, for the Royal Patriotic Committee an independent National body, standing on its own foundation, appointed by Parliament and directly responsible to it. But when the Bill returned to the Commons the Government pleaded that it afforded means of immediately getting to work on a vital task, and they gave a vague promise of a more just and businesslike measure later. The Lords' amendments were not pressed, and the Bill became law.

THE RELIEF FUNDS.

Neutral observers, even in the advanced stages of the war, professed to be astonished at the small change that a world contest had made on the face of Britain, but in one way at least the chaos of Europe advertised itself continuously in this country. Day after day, for month after month, the non-combatant found himself urged in his morning mail, in his newspaper, on his tramcar, in the streets, and even at his entertainments, to give to all manner of war causes that ranged from hot baths for British soldiers to milk for Belgian babies. He might be excused, as the competition of appeals grew hotter, for feeling that his country's immunity from invasion had made him responsible for aiding half Europe from his private purse. The Belgians, the Servians, and the Armenians stood out among a host of stricken peoples that claimed his halfpence or his guineas. He was daily reminded that the "industrial north" of France was

TABLE SHOWING INCREASE IN PENSIONS AND ALLOWANCES.

I.—SEPARATION ALLOWANCES.

	PRE-WAR SCALE.		WHITE PAPER, NOV., 1914.		FROM MARCH 1ST, 1915.
Wife	7s. 7d.	Only if "married on the strength."	9s.	Irrespective of "marriage on the strength," + Compulsory allotment of 3s. 6d. from soldier.	12s. 6d.
and one child	8s. 9d.		11s. 6d.		17s. 6d.
and two children	9s. 11d.		14s.		21s.
and three "	11s. 1d.		16s. 6d.		23s.
and four "	12s. 3d.		18s.		25s.
Other dependants	Nil.		A sum determined by allotment from soldier, but not more than 9s.		Dependants of unmarried men can be rated as wife and children.

II.—PENSIONS.

Widow	5s.	} Gratuity on re-marriage, £13.	7s. 6d.	} Gratuity on re-marriage £39.	10s.	} Rising by 2s. 6d. at 35 and at 45.
and one child	6s. 6d.		12s. 6d.		15s.	
and two children	8s.		15s.		18s. 6d.	
and three "	9s. 6d.		17s. 6d.		20s. 6d.	
and four "	21s.		20s.		22s. 6d.	
Motherless children	3s. each.		5s. up to three ; 4s. thereafter.		5s. each for any number.	
Other dependants	Nil.		At discretion of Pensions Committee, but in no case more than a widow's.		Allowance for 26 weeks, then pension to be determined by authorities.	
Totally disabled soldier	Between 10s. 6d. and 17s. 6d.		Between 14s. and 23s., according to dependants, and 5s. National Insurance.		25s. and 2s. 6d. for each child, and 5s. National Insurance.	
Partly disabled soldier	Between 3s. 6d. and 10s. 6d., according to wage-earning capacity.		Between 3s. 6d. and 17s. 6d.		Difference between 25s. and what he can earn.	

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in the enemy's grip; that Russia had saved Europe by her sacrifices early in the war; that Italian reservists had left many hard-pressed dependants in this country; or that Poland had been crushed and crushed again by the ebb and flow of battle. It seemed as though the Japanese alone of the friendly peoples concerned in the war had no claim to make on British generosity; and had a "Day" been set aside for the provision, say, of field ambulances for the besiegers of Kiao Chau, it is safe to say that few would have been surprised or have buttoned their pockets.

The stupendous stream of charity flowed along three main channels: in relief of general distress at home, in the provision of comforts and medical help for soldiers and sailors, and in aid of Allied and friendly peoples crushed by the war. We describe in another chapter the work of the Red Cross proper (Vol. III., Chap. XXVIII.), and the contribution made by Britain to the help of Belgium has been dealt with (Vol. II., Chap. XIX.).

On the third day of the war the Prince of Wales issued an appeal in which he said that a National Relief Fund had been founded, of which he was "proud to act as treasurer." "At such a moment," he added, "we all stand by one another, and it is to the heart of the British people that I confidently make this most earnest appeal." The response was immediate, and in a week the Fund stood at £1,000,000.

The impossibility of administering the money from London was soon recognised, and, on the lines of a scheme designed by Sir Charles Macara at the time of the South African War, local branches of the fund were started throughout the country, to be administered by local committees, on the pledge that no penny of them should go to the Central Fund till the needs of the district had been met, and that the Central Fund would make good any deficit in the districts. The first use made of the relief funds was, as we have seen, to forestall Government payment of the allowances due to soldiers' dependants.

By October, 1914, the Central Fund, from the £3,000,000 subscribed to it, had allotted to its various districts in

most cases branches of the Soldiers' and Sailors' Families' Association—£600,000 for this purpose, and the local funds had been similarly employed. Despite the money available, there was much initial hardship. In September, 1914, a Manchester observer thus described the scene at the offices of the Charity Organisation Society, where applicants for relief were registered—a scene too common throughout the country:—

"The building is unsuitable for the purpose; the staff has been overwhelmed with work; hundreds of women have waited for hours in confusion and perplexity, and some have had to tramp back to their homes without being able to gain admission to the registration office. Although the need for immediate improvement of the machinery was apparent days ago, the scene yesterday afternoon outside this office

was intolerable to anyone who thought of the things which the husbands and sons of many of the applicants might soon be enduring on the battlefield. At half-past three there were more than 200 women still seeking admission, and some of them had waited patiently in the hot sun for four or five hours without food or refreshment. They sat on scaffold planks, many of them huddling babies, and one heard on all hands complaints of headache, and wistful longings for cups of tea. At intervals a group of a dozen or so was marshalled by a policeman into a dimly-lighted basement office, where the women had to stand until their cases could be dealt with by the harassed officials, who were doing their utmost to cope with the rush of work. One woman had travelled from Middleton for the third day, and she was still waiting her turn at half-past four."



A war charity "flag day" incident: A wounded member of the Canadian Scottish buys a buttonhole. [L.N.O.]

With the raising of the Government allowance, and the

boom in employment which succeeded the early industrial crisis, these shameful scenes came to an end. In the spring of 1915, for instance, a local committee in a typical large industrial centre, which in the autumn had been meeting, say, 2,000 applications a week, had to face only some 300, and found its expenditure reduced from nearly £4,000 to under £1,000. In Manchester, up to March, 1914, the total number of cases assisted was 17,160, at an average cost of £2 17s. each. In Liverpool, in the same time, the number was 15,417, at a cost of £2 11s. 3d. Towards this, the War Office repaid £862, but the Committee submitted an account for £10,000, which they claimed was the amount advanced on separation allowances and not

recovered through the army paymasters—a striking evidence of the inevitable confusion due to leaving the payment of the army's dependants for several weeks to voluntary bodies.

EMPLOYMENT SCHEMES.

Meanwhile, there were bitter complaints that the National Fund published no account of its stewardship, and that it was being used to relieve the State of its obligations instead of meeting the kind of cases for which it was subscribed. By the end of 1914 it had £4,430,000 at its disposal, of which it had spent only £1,420,000, and of that, £1,104,000 had gone to dependants of men on service, and only £186,000 to civil objects. By May, 1915, the Fund had reached £5,000,000, and had spent only £2,000,000. Some centres which had subscribed generously complained that they were being stinted of relief, and even, like Glasgow, went so far as to establish independent funds of their own. It was the deliberate policy of the Central Committee, chosen by the Prince of Wales in consultation with the Premier, to refuse direct money grants to relieve civil distress except in the last resort. They preferred to aid schemes of employment—and for this invoked the aid of the Road Board and the Development Commission—or to set on foot plans for practical training to assist labour to move from one trade to another. In certain trades, where specialisation was too great to admit of the labour being readily turned into new channels, direct help had for a time to be given. But as the steady decline in unemployment which we have traced in an earlier chapter continued, the need for expenditure of this kind almost disappeared, and the Fund was left with valuable reserves.

Local voluntary help for soldiers' dependants took many forms besides that of subscriptions to the regular relief funds. The Pensions Committee, for instance, were much impressed by the example set in the mining districts of Yorkshire, where the workmen, by a voluntary weekly levy, augmented the Government allowance to the wives of their comrades who had enlisted from 12s. 6d. to 19s. 7d., because they regarded the latter as the minimum amount that would save the homes from deterioration. Similar plans were adopted in Herefordshire and elsewhere. Again, most public bodies and many private employers agreed to pay the wives of their enlisted men such addition to the Government allowance as would maintain the homes, and by these voluntary means enlistment was made possible for many well-paid employes to whom, on Government terms, it would have meant ruin. At the same time, however, it became clear that if middle-class married men were to be called upon to the extent that seemed probable at the end of 1915, some such rent provision as obtained in France would be necessary.

The Government, besides making it possible for the Trades Unions to reclaim a third of the money they disbursed in unemployment benefit, initiated many schemes which helped to lessen industrial distress. The construction of roads and parks, civic surveys, and other such public works were subsidised. The holiday resorts, which seemed likely to suffer fatally in their main industry—the letting of lodgings—were relieved by the sensible step of billeting on them the new army in training at fixed rates. Distress was, however, very acute in the Isle of Man, to which no troops could conveniently be sent. A brave attempt to start local industries proved insufficient to meet the desperate need caused by a curtailed steamer service and a dearth of visitors. The world-famous amusements of

Douglas dwindled to a few picture houses; hotels built to house hundreds dismissed their staffs and closed all but their bars; and in the autumn of 1915 the imminent starvation and bankruptcy of the island was the main topic in the House of Keys.

ON BEHALF OF THE TROOPS.

The excellent work of the Young Men's Christian Association, in erecting and manning recreation huts for the troops at home and abroad, should perhaps take first place among the many enterprises directed to the comfort of the forces. By the end of 1915 the Association had 800 recreation centres in the home camps, eighty in France, one in Gallipoli, eleven in Mudros, two in Mesopotamia, twenty-five in Egypt, eight in Malta, and one in Salonika. The huts were used as club-rooms for the men, where notepaper and light refreshments could be had, and where games and concerts were organised. In Britain they served to hearten the troops through the weary evenings of training. At the fronts their psychological value was enormous, and many soldiers bore grateful witness to the renewed courage and spirit they had gained from the brief return to the sanities of life which the huts afforded after the horror of the trenches.

While the Y.M.C.A. took care of the social and spiritual welfare of the troops, a thousand organisations, ranging from small sewing parties to great funds organised by newspapers, provided for their material comfort. Wherever the War Office thought the regulation equipment might with advantage be supplemented, whether by portable hot baths or soup kitchens for Flanders, or by muslin head-nets to ward off the intolerable fly pest of Gallipoli, private effort rushed in to make good the deficiency. The first German gas attacks emptied the London shops of every foot of material from which respirators could be made. Many parts of the line soon suffered from an inevitable surfeit of woollen goods, and the replies to individual soldiers who had appealed through the Press for specific objects was found in many cases so to congest the military post that these private requests were prohibited, and the wiser plan adopted of ascertaining from quarter-master sergeants the needs of their companies. The requests from the firing line were a fair indication both of the rigours of the campaign and of the spirit of the men; and our enemies regarded the fact that mouth-organs, concertinas, playing-cards and footballs were eagerly demanded on our fronts, in addition to mittens and boracic powder, as further evidence of the soulless levity of the British "mercenaries." By the Christmas of 1915 there were few units either in training or abroad who could not rely on having their wants, from plum puddings to private correspondence, satisfied, so far as military necessity would allow. The Belgian army, too, with most of its families and friends behind the German ring of steel, was linked with British homes, and a number of bodies which sprang up with this object were combined under the chairmanship of M. Émile Vandervelde.

HELP FOR OUR ALLIES AND FRIENDS.

Demands were made upon British generosity for foreign causes that could have had the success they did only in a country devoutly thankful for the integrity of its own frontiers. "Days" were allocated for street appeals for the French Red Cross, for Russian distress, for the Boles for the Armenians, for the dependants of Italian reservists, and similar foreign, in addition to many

British, objects. They were marked by the selling in the streets of flowers, flags, or other emblems by women, and not the least interesting of many curious by-products of the war was the earnest controversy in the Press on the propriety of allowing girls to undertake such work. The critics contended that it gave opportunities for the forming of dangerous acquaintanceships. The defenders of the system considered this mere prudishness, and argued, as was true, that street collections obtained a more certain response than any other method of asking for money. The holding of "Days" became at one period so frequent that several Town Councils, headed by London, hastily framed bye-laws to regulate the collections so that they should cause the minimum of disturbance to traffic. But the device died of its own excesses; and it was a notable example of the charity which begins at home also ending there, that the "Our Day" of the British Red Cross, coming as it did after a host of others had wearied people of this mode of appeal, obtained a magnificent response.

The devastated districts of Northern France, which had suffered not less than Belgium, were made the object of at least two notable schemes of assistance. The Society of Friends gave general help in the repairing of homesteads or the building of huts, in assisting with farm work, and in providing medical skill and clothing. The Agricultural Relief of Allies Committee, initiated by the Royal Agricultural Society of England, was enabled, by the generous support of the British farming classes, to replace ruined agricultural implements and supply valuable breeding stock to districts that had been pillaged by the

invaders. The French system of communal farming enabled such goods to be held in common, and it was no unusual thing in the autumn of 1915 to find in Northern France Englishmen busily engaged in relief and restoration work, forming the centre of the gratitude of a devastated commune whose chief pet, as likely as not, would be a shearling ram presented by King George.

Probably no accurate estimate of the total amount of war-giving will ever be made. Mr. Ernest Dowding, an official of the National Relief Fund, in an article in the *Contemporary Review*, put it, up to November, 1915, at some thirty million pounds in money and kind. At that time the National Fund itself stood at five and a half millions, and over two and a half millions had been subscribed to the local relief funds. The joint fund of the Red Cross and St. John Ambulance had gathered nearly two millions in money and kind; the Belgian Relief Fund in Britain over a million; and the value of the comforts sent to the troops was probably not less than five millions. But these notable totals take no account of the money and goods given to a hundred other funds for the help of our people, our forces, and our friends. The expenses of collection in the case of most of the funds was commendably low—in the case of the National Fund, for instance, only 1 per cent, and in many others about 1 per cent. Whatever criticism might be made of our traditional policy of encouraging a flood of benevolence to relieve the State and the War Office of many of their responsibilities, the result was certainly an unparalleled example of the readiness of all classes to open their coffers to meet the great emergency.



Gifts for the troops at the front. Part of the material post for the Dardanelles being packed at the G.P.O., London. [Newspaper Illustrations.]



The open-air treatment of wounded: A general view of one of the open-air wards at the 1st Eastern General Hospital, Cambridge. [Central Press.]



Inside one of the open-air wards at Cambridge.

[Central Press.]



English Red Cross nurses arriving at Dieppe.

[Central News.

CHAPTER XXVIII:

THE RED CROSS.

VOLUNTARY SERVICE IN WAR—MAGNITUDE OF THE WORK—THE FIRST WEEKS IN BELGIUM AND FRANCE—HOSPITAL TRAINS AND MOTOR AMBULANCES—HOSPITALS AND REST STATIONS—WORLD-WIDE CONTRIBUTIONS TO FUNDS—PERSONAL SERVICE IN GREAT BRITAIN—ADMINISTRATIVE ECONOMY.

THE story of the Red Cross work in the first year of the war is one of the most wonderful in the history of voluntary effort, and that of our own Joint War Committee (which unites the resources and energy of the British Red Cross Society and the Order of St. John of Jerusalem) stands out conspicuously because of the world-wide field of service which it covers, the speed with which the machinery was adapted for an undertaking of enormously greater magnitude than had ever been contemplated, the bounteous response to appeals for financial help, and the spectacle which it reveals of humane activities linked up for a common purpose in every part of the empire.

That purpose cannot be stated better than in the words of the writer of the Memoir of Lord Wantage, the "Father of the British Red Cross Movement."

"What Lord Wantage saw and experienced during the Crimean War impressed itself deeply on his mind. He realised that however well organised an Army Medical Service may be, it has never been, and never will be, able to cope adequately with the sudden emergencies of war on a large scale, and he held that voluntary organisations, unimpeded by official restrictions, are alone capable of giving relief and of providing extra comforts and luxuries with the requisite promptitude and rapidity. He felt, moreover, that the British people would always insist on taking a


personal share in alleviating the personal sufferings of their soldiers, and that some recognised and authorised channel through which public generosity could flow was a matter of paramount importance."

The soundness of these ideas has been proved by the European War. When the official medical service of the British army was suddenly faced with the unexampled and unexpected demands imposed upon it by the retreat from Mons, it is not surprising that an urgent need arose for auxiliary help. That help was immediately forthcoming from the Red Cross Society and the Order of St. John—which were then working independently. Both the Royal Army Medical Service and the voluntary societies rapidly expanded their organisation and energy on a scale called for by the growing seriousness of the military situation, but the outside bodies scrupulously preserved their true function of auxiliary helpers. The relations between them and the official service grew close and cordial, the work of each was clearly defined, and at the end of the first year's co-operation Sir Alfred Keogh, Director General of the Army Medical Services (who in the early days of the war was chief of the Red Cross Commission in Belgium and France), warmly thanked the Joint Committee "for the loyal and devoted service" rendered to the R.A.M.C.



Wounded from the Dardanelles' operations being towed out to the hospital ship on barges.

[Universal



Field surgery at the Dardanelles: One of the East Lancashire Territorial field ambulances at work behind the firing line. The operating surgeon is removing a bullet from the arm of a wounded soldier.

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[Official Photograph (C.N.).

Both the Red Cross Society and the Order of St. John had learned valuable lessons in the South African war. In fact it was the experience obtained during that war which led in 1905 to the amalgamation, under the title of the British Red Cross Society, of various bodies with the British National Society for Aid to the Sick and Wounded in War, founded by Lord Wantage in 1870. The St. John Ambulance Brigade, which was founded in 1878, and which numbered in its membership many thousands of miners and other industrial workers, sent a large number of orderlies to staff hospitals in South Africa.

URGENCY MEASURES.

In the intervening years both Societies improved their arrangements for war work, and the enormous expansion which became necessary with the departure of the Expeditionary Force to the Continent was facilitated by the administrative system which they had adopted. The first measures were necessarily dictated by the urgencies of the moment. A Foreign Service department of the Red Cross Society was established, and within a few days of the declaration of war doctors and nurses crossed the Channel to offer their services to the Belgian army. Other parties were quickly organised and sent out to Brussels, and they worked heroically amid the dangers and confusion created by the German advance.


Meanwhile, three Commissioners hurried to Belgium to study the position and inform the Society what further measures of assistance would, in their opinion, be needed. They were soon compelled by the German onrush to leave Belgium for France, and before many days they were grappling with the difficulties and problems of succouring the wounded who were saved from the battlefields of Mons and Le Cateau. Our own Army Medical Service was almost overwhelmed by the unprecedented burden suddenly thrust upon it. There were no specially-constructed hospital trains available; and in the confusion which prevailed on the congested railways, goods waggons had to be utilised sometimes

for the conveyance of wounded to the base hospitals. Only the old fashioned and slow horse-drawn ambulance carts were provided for road service, and owing to the uncertainty of the military situation it was hardly possible to fix upon permanent sites for the establishment of base hospitals.

The doctors and others responsible for the administration of the Army Medical Service laboured unceasingly to alleviate the sufferings of the wounded, while at the War Office preparations to meet the new needs were immediately set on foot. It was at this point that the value of auxiliary organisations, free from the traditions of official routine, and able to call up at a word a host of voluntary helpers, was demonstrated in a more convincing fashion than ever before. The Commissioners travelled along the lines of communication, guiding

observation by expert knowledge, and devising measures of relief which the Red Cross Society could undertake.

They made known to the Society the pressing need for hospital trains, motor ambulances, dressing [and rest stations, additional hospitals, the organisation of staffs of doctors, nurses, and orderlies, and the provision of equipment, stores, and dressings. While the officials of the Society at home set in motion all the forces at their disposal to supply these needs, and to furnish the necessary financial means, the Commissioners devoted themselves at first particularly to the solution of the problem of transport. They realised that by the provision of speedy means of transit from the dressing stations and field




The interior of an ambulance train built by the L. & N.W. Railway Company. [*Manchester Guardian*]

hospitals to the base hospitals or hospital ships many lives might be saved, and that in thousands of cases the loss of limb and the misery of lifelong disablement might be prevented.

THE HOSPITAL TRAINS.

Therefore, one of their first tasks was to make up a hospital train by adapting ordinary passenger coaches as well as they could with the means at their disposal, and arranging for medical men and nurses to accompany the wounded. At home the Society, working in con-



An English hospital ship leaving a French port for England.

[Central News.]



Wounded sailors back from the Dardanelles' operations being landed at Plymouth.

[Newspaper Illustrations.]

sultation with the War Office and the British and French Railway Authorities, arranged for the construction of a train which was described by a high military authority as "the finest hospital on wheels ever constructed." Princess Christian gave much help in raising the necessary funds for this train, which was named after her.

It is nearly one-seventh of a mile long, and carries 450 patients. Thirty-six beds are arranged in three tiers in each of the coaches for lying-down cases, and the beds are removable for use as stretchers. There are four coaches, in each of which fifty sitting-up patients are accommodated, sleeping and dining apartments for the medical and nursing staffs, a surgery with operating table and dispensary, and two kitchens remarkable for ingenuity and compactness of equipment. The change from the miseries of the battlefield to the warm comfort and brightness of the hospital train is for many of the wounded like passing to Elysian happiness.

Four of these trains were constructed under the supervision of the Society, transported in sections to France, staffed by Red Cross doctors, nurses, and orderlies, and presented to the War Office. Part of the cost of one was defrayed by the flour millers of the United Kingdom, out of a large fund subscribed by them for Red Cross work, and another was provided by Lord Michelham. A hospital train usually carried a medical staff of three, besides the officer commanding, a nursing staff of a matron and seven or more sisters, and non-commissioned officers, orderlies, cooks, dispenser and storekeeper, and clerk.

The trains are, in fact as well as in name, hospitals on wheels. The staffs live on them, and their work is organised as it would be in a stationary building. During a journey with wounded work goes on at high pressure. Blood-stained and mud-soaked clothing is removed, clean linen is provided, and warm woollen garments also if they are needed. Wounds are cleansed and dressed, and in urgent cases operations are performed.

MOTOR AMBULANCE CONVOYS.

After the desperate fighting which began at Mons the shortage of ambulance vehicles was so serious that motor luries which had taken stores to the front were requisitioned on the return journey for the conveyance of wounded. Within a few weeks a great change was in progress, and much terrible suffering—inevitable when unsuitable vehicles were used over the cobble roads of North France—was prevented by the Red Cross organisation of motor car services, and a little later by the provision of specially designed motor ambulances. Official recognition of the great pioneer work accomplished by the Society was placed on record by Sir John French in his despatch of February 2nd, 1915. He wrote:—

"The organisation for the first time in war of motor ambulance convoys is due to the initiative and organising powers of Surgeon-General T. J. O'Donnell, D.S.O., ably assisted by Major P. Evans, Royal Army Medical Corps. Two of these convoys, composed entirely of Red Cross Society personnel, have done excellent work, under the superintendence of regular medical officers."

Sir Frederick Treves expressed in less restrained terms his admiration for "the most valuable service ever rendered to the Army Medical Department in the form of voluntary aid." "These ambulances are everywhere," he added. "They are perfectly equipped and organised, and are always at work. In the saving of life, in the lessening of suffering, and in the securing of prompt surgical treatment of the wounded, these ambulances

have done a work the value of which can hardly be exaggerated."

In the second week of the September after the outbreak of war, the Army authorities gave permission for Red Cross motor cars to be landed in France to take part in the search work for wounded and missing, and several members of the Royal Automobile Club offered cars and personal service to the Red Cross Society. In a few days twenty of these cars were employed in the neighbourhood of Boulogne, and many wounded stragglers were rescued by them. Their operations placed beyond doubt the superiority and necessity for motor vehicles for this kind of work, and a few improvised ambulance cars were sent out. Experience soon made it clear, however, that if the cars were to stand the strain of the heavy roads in all weathers they must be specially constructed for the purpose, and that the design must allow for the overhang of the ambulance body without causing oscillation.


The motor ambulance department of the Society, in co-operation with the engineering staff of the Royal Automobile Club, held up the supply of new vehicles for a week, and in that period they designed a motor ambulance which, with few modifications, became generally recognised as the standard type. A few months later the Societies adopted a new pattern, based on experience of the work under all conditions, and although it cost £50 more than the first one the advantages more than justified the additional expense.

HOW THE FUNDS WERE RAISED.

The development of the service was accelerated by every possible means. Appeals for funds touched the imagination and sympathy of the nation. Within three weeks 512 contributions of £400, the amount then required to purchase an ambulance car, had been received, and the fund continued to increase at an amazing rate. Many novel schemes were devised for the provision of additional cars, and all classes of the nation contributed. Women raised a large sum for a fleet of cars which bore the Christian names of the groups of contributors. Mayoresses of many towns raised funds, a separate contribution of cars was made by Scotland, and the Order of St. John purchased about 200. Orders were placed with many manufacturers, who constructed the cars according to design, and in the early weeks worked night and day to effect all the deliveries that were urgently called for.

Volunteers for posts as drivers appeared by the hundred, and many declined to accept wages. The organisation of the service and the equipment of the cars was in itself a heavy task. On one occasion, within twenty-four hours, fifty ambulances were despatched from the garage in response to an emergency call. They were fully equipped, each car containing four stretchers, six rugs, four pillows, one first-aid outfit, a cask or bottle, a macintosh sheet, fire extinguisher, hurricane lamp, electric torch and refills, a canvas bucket, and a thermos flask. For six weeks a vessel was engaged exclusively in carrying motor ambulances, petrol, and supplies across the Channel.

At the end of a year of war over six hundred motor ambulances, and many other accessory motor vehicles, had been sent out by the Joint Committee, and the staff engaged in working them numbered over 1,200. Two perfectly equipped convoys of fifty cars each were with the British army, and two with the French, engaged in the transport of wounded and sick from the field hospitals to the clearing hospitals, and thence to the hospitals. Other convoys were employed in running



The interior of what was once the gaming room, holding 12 baccarat tables. at the Casino, Le Touquet :
It is now a Red Cross ward holding 125 beds. [Topical.]



Wounded soldiers in a hospital at Brignone, listening to a variety show given by a visiting party of English
music hall artistes. [Central News.]

between the trains and base hospitals or hospital ships, and these included a hundred cars at Boulogne, fifty at Etaples, and others at Rouen, Havre, and Calais. The total cost of carrying on the department at this period was about £4,500 a week, and projects for increasing the number of convoys were under consideration in the expectation of military operations on a vaster scale. At this time also the first of three convoys to be provided by coalowners and miners was completed. The scheme was started by Mr. Dennis Bayley, a Nottinghamshire coalowner, and under it the owners agreed to contribute £1 per thousand tons of their 1914 output, while the men levied themselves 6d. per week for twenty weeks, or 3d. for forty weeks, the total contributions of employers and workers being about equal.

A new form of hand ambulance, mounted on bicycle wheels, was devised for the removal of wounded from the first-aid posts, but sometimes ambulance car drivers braved the dangers of approach to these advanced positions under shell fire, and several were mentioned in despatches for gallantry. Great praise has been bestowed upon the drivers for their daily routine work. They have endured stretches of duty extending to forty hours at a time, and neither danger near the firing line, nor mishaps on the road, such as the sudden pitching of a car into a shell hole or ditch at night, daunted them or lessened their devotion to their merciful mission.

It will never be known how many lives were saved by the first convoys which were sent out, but some idea of the immensity of the task which had to be grappled with may be gained from the fact that between October 16th and November 16th, when the Germans were battering at the British lines in the effort to break through to Calais, no fewer than 41,000 wounded were dealt with in Boulogne and its neighbourhood. In one day 3,687 patients were moved by twenty-five cars from trains to hospitals, or from hospitals to ships.

WORLD-WIDE FINANCIAL SUPPORT.

While this supremely important work of the transport of wounded was being organised, the other departments of the Red Cross Society were busy at their respective tasks, selecting doctors and nurses, establishing and staffing hospitals, collecting and supplying stores, arranging for Red Cross service in all the distant fields of war in which British arms were engaged, and in providing help for our sorely-pressed Allies. This work could not have been accomplished without subdivision of functions, and the efficient co-ordination of the duties of an army of volunteers for administrative service.

The need for vast funds was immediately realised. Queen Alexandra, the President of the British Red Cross Society, issued an appeal to the nation, in which she said: "Much money will be needed and many gifts if we are faithfully to discharge our trust, and be able to say when all is over that we have done all we could do for the comfort and relief of our sick and wounded." At the end of August £60,000 had been received in response to that appeal. The seriousness of the war was now being realised by the public, and a further appeal by Lord Rothschild (Chairman of the Council of the Society), Sir Frederick Treves, and Mr. E. A. Ridsdale (Chairman of the Executive Committee), made through the *Times* newspaper, appeared at an opportune moment. In ten days £200,000 had been subscribed, and in twelve months the fund amounted to nearly a million and three-quarters, apart from special amounts which had been raised for hospitals, the provision of motor ambulances and hospital

trains, and for work in the Dardanelles, Egypt, and Serbia.

The money was contributed by all sections of the population at home, and by both British and native inhabitants of the Colonies and Dependencies. Various classes of traders, manufacturers, workers, and societies of all kinds organised their own funds; famous singers and artistes gave their talents to the service; a remarkable sale at Christie's brought in nearly £40,000; a fund raised by farmers aimed at a final total of £250,000, and actually yielded £100,000 within a year; and the Headquarters' Collections Committee, under the chairmanship of Mr. Charles Russell, organised efforts in all parts of the country which produced close upon a million pounds. October 21st, 1915, was celebrated as "Our Day," and it was signalised by national collections, and by gifts of £5,000 from the King, £500 from the Prince of Wales, £500 from Queen Mary, and £100 from Queen Alexandra. The King wrote the following letter to Mr. Stanley:—

"Ever since the beginning of the war the King has followed with interest and satisfaction the splendid work jointly achieved by the two organisations. His Majesty and his people gratefully recognise the relief and alleviation of suffering which has been so promptly rendered to the sick and wounded in the different theatres of war by the capable staff, and the medical and surgical appliances provided by the two Societies. It has been especially gratifying to the King to hear from the lips of many wounded soldiers testimony to the tender and devoted care bestowed upon them by physicians, surgeons, and nurses of the Red Cross and St. John of Jerusalem, and to the splendid work done by the ambulances of the two Societies."

The event commemorated by the "Our Day" collections was the first anniversary of the Joint Committee, which was composed of twelve representatives of each Society, with Mr. Arthur Stanley as chairman. The vice-chairman was Colonel Sir Herbert Perrott, who, with Lady Perrott, had been prominently associated with the work of the Order of St. John. The Duchess of Bedford, Lady Perrott, Lady Ripon, Colonel Sir Herbert Jekyll, the Earl of Plymouth, and Lieutenant-Colonel Sir Richard Temple were also among the representatives of the Order. The representatives of the Red Cross Society included, besides the Chairman, Princess Christian, Lady Lansdowne, Lady Dudley, Sir Frederick Treves, Mr. Charles Russell, Sir Robert Hudson, Mr. Ridsdale, and Surgeon-General Sir Benjamin Franklin.

Sub-Committees were formed to deal with finance, personal service, the motor ambulance service, the collection of funds, the administration of the King George Hospital, and the organisation of the work generally in France and the Near East. Members specialised in the work of one or other of these sub-committees, and in this way intense personal interest was fostered. As the work developed, and the band of helpers grew daily larger, it was found necessary, after one or two habitations, including Devonshire House, had been outgrown, to move into spacious premises which were lent by the Automobile Club in Pall Mall.

HOSPITAL ORGANISATION.

During the first year of the war the Societies established in France eight Red Cross hospitals for the British, and four for the Allies, with a total of two thousand beds, the largest being the St. John Hospital at Etaples, with 500 beds. Of the other large institutions, two were at Etaples, two at Wimereux, one at Rouen, one at Le Touquet, one at Calais, and one at Malo-les-Bains. Four of these hospitals were organised by the




The arrival and despatch of British wounded at a French port: An English doctor taking down particulars of the slightly wounded men. [Collection Tiranty.]



Removing the wounded from an ambulance train. [Collection Tiranty.]



The "stretcher cases" laid out on the quayside before being embarked on the hospital ship.
[Collection Tiranty.]



Carrying the wounded on board a hospital ship.
[Collection Tiranty.]



President Poincaré visits a French hospital in order to bestow war decorations upon the wounded.
[Topical Press.]



French Red Cross dogs leaving for the front after being reviewed in the Tuileries Gardens, Paris.
[Wyndham, Paris.]



A complete motor ambulance convoy, including 41 ambulances, with stores, luries, and all other incidental cars on parade in London before being sent to the front. [Topical.]

Friends' Ambulance Unit, which worked in close association with the Red Cross. All the institutions established by the Societies were equipped and staffed by them, working in conjunction with the Army Medical Service.

This department of the work evolved steadily, and in the light of experience gained in the first weeks of turmoil and uncertainty, when, as was said by Sir Arthur Lawley, one of the Commissioners, "hospitals had to be improvised, equipment to be furnished, stores and rugs and implements had to be supplied, staff had to be found"—on several occasions at a few hours' notice. The Red Cross Society spared no expense to meet the emergency. Doctors, nurses, and orderlies were organised by Sir Frederick Treves, and from the Stores Department, which Mr. Stanley took under his charge, abundant supplies of the things that were needed were quickly sent out. Difficulties were encountered on every hand, but they were gradually surmounted by self-sacrificing labour, and with the end of the Aisne Battle it became possible to devise definite schemes for the establishment of permanent hospitals. Boulogne, which had been evacuated in the perilous earlier weeks, was now organised by the R.A.M.C. as a great hospital town, and the Red Cross not only helped to staff the hospitals both at Boulogne and at Calais, where the Belgian wounded were in a sad plight, but enormous supplies of equipment and stores of all kinds were sent over.

The importance of the work done by the Stores Department may be gauged from the fact that in the first year a sum of well over £150,000 was expended in

purchases, while gifts of the value of £225,000 were received. Sixty-eight thousand bales and cases were despatched overseas, and over two million garments were distributed by the two Societies. With the extension of the war the work of the department became continuously more strenuous and diverse, and supplies were called for from all parts of the world, including the Dardanelles, Egypt, Malta, Servia, Montenegro, Italy, the Persian Gulf, the Cameroons, East Africa, Northern Rhodesia, and China.

At the same time that the hospitals were established, rest stations were organised at Boulogne, Abbeville, Rouen, and other places, where Red Cross and St. John Voluntary Aid Detachment women served refreshments to passing sick and wounded, and in many other ways alleviated pain and hardship. Among other secondary activities of the Red Cross in France may be mentioned an advanced dressing station and vaccination station set up by the Friends' Ambulance Unit, relief work among civilians, and a nursing sisters' convalescent home.

VOLUNTARY WORK AT HOME.

The value of the scheme of Voluntary Aid Detachments, which had been developed by both the Societies before the war, was soon manifested in Red Cross activities all over Great Britain. An army of enthusiastic helpers was mobilised, the production and collection of comforts was organised, classes were started for training nurses and orderlies, preparations were made for the equipment and staffing of hundreds of auxiliary hospitals; and



Epsom grand stand as a Red Cross hospital: Convalescent wounded holding a Derby of their own to replace the one which was cancelled by the authorities. [Alfred Picture Service.]

ambulance car services for the removal of the wounded from railway stations to the military hospitals, and from military hospitals to auxiliary institutions and convalescent homes, were arranged in all parts of the country. Already the Red Cross Society numbered nearly 70,000 members in its 2,300 Voluntary Aid Detachments, all the men having first-aid certificates, and the women home-nursing certificates in addition. Many thousands of men were trained, and within twelve months 600 auxiliary hospitals, with over 20,000 beds had been staffed. The St. John Voluntary Aid Detachments numbered 650, with 14,000 members, who supplied staffs for 125 hospitals, containing over 4,000 beds. Many country mansions and large suburban houses were given over to the Societies by their owners for conversion into hospitals.

Efficient administration was secured by the division of the country into districts, in each of which the work is supervised by a director and committee, representing the two Societies. A statistical statement of the work of the East Lancashire Branch, with its headquarters in Manchester, from the outbreak of the war until the end of October, 1915, will give the reader some idea of the immense philanthropic effort which has been organised under the Red Cross banner in the whole kingdom. Sixty auxiliary hospitals, containing 2,637 beds, were established, and 14,325 patients were treated. By means of seventy-two ambulance cars and 450 motor cars, 80,000 wounded and sick were conveyed from ambulance trains to military hospitals, or from one hospital to another. At Manchester alone 189 ambulance trains were met, and on each occasion refreshments were served out by Red Cross

nurses. Nearly 300 classes were held for training men and women in first-aid and home nursing, and 7,500 certificates were issued, while in the comforts section over 300,000 articles were collected and distributed.

Outside this co-ordination of local activity stand several home hospital enterprises of considerable magnitude which were organised directly from headquarters. The Joint Committee co-operated with the Army Medical Service in converting the new Stationery Office, near Waterloo Station, into the palatial King George Hospital, which has 1,650 beds, a floor space of nine acres, and a roof area of 1½ acres. All the beds were endowed by private benefactors at £25 each. The Joint Committee decided to subscribe £500 per week towards the cost of the civil staff, and from the Farmers' Red Cross Fund six operation theatres, and a throat, ear, and special opthalmic departments were endowed.

At Netley the Committee provided and equipped thirty-three ward huts, accommodating 600 patients, in connection with the Royal Victoria Military Hospital, and at Brockenhurst Park, in the New Forest, the Order of St. John maintains the Lady Hardinge Hospital, where Indian wounded recuperate under ideal conditions.

IN THE NEAR EAST.

Apart from the work in France, the achievements of the Joint Committee in connection with the Near East campaign rank as the most notable of the overseas activities. The unexpected turn taken by the struggle in Gallipoli in its early stages created a need almost as great as that which had to be met in the first crisis in

Belgium and France, but it was of a different character. Fortunately, the Red Cross organisation had become so perfected by this time that it was able to support, with immediate and powerful aid, the efforts of the Army Medical Service to cope with the emergency. At first the transportation of the wounded from the peninsula to the hospital ships proved very difficult, and the Societies sent out, with the greatest possible speed, four motor launches, a picket boat, a lighter, and four motor ambulances and cars for the movement of wounded and the distribution of stores. In course of time depôts were set up at Malta, Alexandria, Cairo, Port Said, Suez, Mudros, Cyprus, and Cape Helles. Eleven Red Cross hospitals and convalescent homes, with a total of 2,000 beds, were established, and stores were despatched for use in the military hospitals, and on the hospital ships and trains, as well as in the Red Cross institutions. Fifty nurses and five masseurs were sent into the war zone, and over 500 other volunteers devoted themselves to incessant service for the many thousands who fell in the desperate battles or were stricken by disease. The cost of the whole work in the Near East was £1,500 a day until the extension of the fighting to the Balkans, when a large increase became necessary.

HELP FOR THE BLIND AND DISABLED.

Many subsidiary activities were undertaken by the Joint Committee. It was arranged that voluntary searchers should visit hospitals at home and abroad each day to obtain lists of patients and to make careful inquiries for news of missing men. In five months over seventeen thousand inquiries were received, and nearly as many items of information were gathered and transmitted to relatives or friends.

Within a year nearly thirty thousand packages of food were sent out to prisoners of war in Germany.


In conjunction with the National Institute for the Blind, the Joint Committee maintains at Regent's Park a hostel for blinded soldiers and sailors, in a Georgian mansion, with fifteen acres of grounds. Instruction is

given in Braille reading and writing, in ordinary type-writing, and in various handicrafts and gardening. Within a few months of its opening a hundred darkened lives were being cheered in this hostel.

From a large fund raised by the auctioneers and estate agents of the United Kingdom, the famous "Star and Garter" Hotel at Richmond was purchased and presented to the Queen, who asked the Joint Committee to take it over and maintain it as a permanent home for paralysed and totally-disabled soldiers and sailors. The Committee assumed this responsibility, and put in hand the necessary alterations and adaptations. On the ground floor 135 helpless men can be accommodated, and in the grounds cottages and bungalows are to be built for fifty others.


All this world-wide service would have been impossible but for the splendid response to the appeals for funds, and the eager and unwearying help of many thousands of voluntary workers. No praise is too great for the work of the doctors, many of whom abandoned lucrative practices, and of the nurses, orderlies, and ambulance car drivers. Labouring far away from the public gaze, they have at least the reward of knowing that they have aided in preventing immeasurable human suffering. Two thousand trained nurses were organised for service; 20,000 or more members of the Aid Detachments have gone out as hospital orderlies, and two thousand women members volunteered to work under the trained nurses in hospitals abroad. Later, arrangements were made for women members to undertake the duties formerly performed in the military hospitals by men, such as dispensing, laboratory work, cooking, and clerical work.

In all the administrative expenses the closest economy has been exercised, and this, in conjunction with the fact that so much of the work is voluntary, accounts for such a low management cost as 4d. in each pound expended during the first twelve months. It may be noted that during this period the motor ambulance fleet cost in round figures half a million pounds, that on the hospital and other work in Belgium and France a quarter of a million was expended, and that over £100,000 was spent in connection with the work in the Near East.



Two views of a great mill fire at Trenton, New Jersey, where a firm engaged on war work for the Allies was burnt out, as a result, it was suspected, of pro-German incendiarism.

[Topical Press.]



A quantity of explosive chemicals and mechanism seized by the American police at the house of a German-American suspected of being concerned in the plots against munition works and shipping. [Topical.]

CHAPTER XXIX.

GERMAN INTRIGUES IN AMERICA.

THE GERMAN AGITATION IN THE UNITED STATES—PRESIDENT WILSON'S REBUKE—THE ARCHIBALD PAPERS—RECALL OF THE AUSTRIAN AMBASSADOR—A CRIMINAL CAMPAIGN.

IN his Annual Message to Congress on December 7th, Mr. Wilson condemned the activities of a section of his fellow-countrymen in as stinging a rebuke as has been administered by any American President since the Civil War. After declaring that there was no immediate or particular danger arising out of the relations of the United States with other nations, he continued:—

"I am sorry to say that the gravest threats against our national peace and safety have been uttered within our own borders. There are citizens of the United States, I blush to admit, born under other flags, but welcomed under our generous naturalisation laws to full freedom of opportunity in America, who have poured poison and disloyalty into the very arteries of our national life, and who have sought to bring the authority and good name of our Government into contempt, to destroy our industries wherever they thought it effective for their vindictive purposes to strike against them, and to debase our policies to the uses of foreign intrigue. . . . America has never witnessed anything like this before, and never dreamed it possible that men sworn into her own citizenship . . . would ever turn in malign reaction against the Government and people who had welcomed and nurtured them, and seek to make this proud country once more a hotbed of European passion.

President Wilson's denunciation of this disloyal propaganda must be interpreted in the light of the fact that some months earlier he had found it necessary to insist on the recall of the Austrian Ambassador, and that, at the moment he spoke, the naval and military attachés of the German Embassy were under sentence of a similar expulsion.

It was only natural that, when the war broke out, the leading German-Americans should wish to make the German case effectively heard in the babel of eager argument on the pros and cons of the struggle. The passionate interest aroused among citizens of German parentage gave a new lease of life to the large number of American journals published in the German language. The most influential of them, the *New York Staats-Zeitung*, whose editor and chief proprietor, Mr. Herman Ridder, had been prominent in the councils of the Democratic Party, had just before been contemplating publication in English instead of German, but the sudden revival of ardent pro-German sentiment among its readers caused the abandonment of this plan. No variety of "*Zeitung*," however, could be expected to reach the

great mass of English-speaking Americans whom it was important to conciliate. Accordingly, Mr. George Sylvester

Viereck, a German-American, of some reputation as a journalist, poet, and playwright, started a propagandist weekly entitled *The Fatherland*. As opportunity offered, the work of influencing neutral opinion was assisted by a group of persons of academic distinction, such as Prof. Hugo Münsterberg, who had been called from Freiburg in 1892 to fill a chair of psychology at Harvard. Another leading propagandist was Congressman Richard Bartholdt, of Missouri, the President of the "Inter-parliamentary Union for the Promotion of International Arbitration." Later in the war he cleverly exploited the President's exhortation to neutrality by establishing a "Neutrality League," in order, professedly, "to re-establish genuine American neutrality and uphold it free from commercial, financial, and political subservience to foreign Powers."

It was obviously impossible for Count Bernstorff, the German Ambassador at Washington, to join the ranks of pro-German "spellbinders." A distinguished substitute was found in Herr Bernhard Dernburg, who, after making a great reputation in the financial and industrial world, had been chosen by Kaiser Wilhelm to promote his imperial policy in the capacity of Colonial Minister. He had received part of his business training in the United States, and the knowledge he had thereby gained of American ideas and methods was expected to prove a valuable asset. Herr Dernburg spent several months on an informal diplomatic mission to the American people, interviewing and being interviewed, writing articles and letters to the papers, accepting invitations to speak at dinners and debating societies, and, in general, leaving no stone unturned except the rock of offence that had been set up by German "frightfulness," and that his efforts were powerless to remove. His ultimate withdrawal was fully justified by his failure, and was reported

to have been hastened by hints from official quarters in Washington that this kind of proselytising by a subject of a foreign Power was not desirable. It is worth noting that the most zealous activities, exercised in person on the spot, of even so eminent a man as Herr Dernburg have had far less influence upon American opinion than the mere report, sent from a distance, of the judgment of Lord Bryce. "It is the misfortune of the German system of statecraft," the *Springfield Republican* aptly remarked, "that Germany has no public man whose word commands equal weight with neutrals."



Count Bernstorff, the German Ambassador in New York. [Record Press.]



Dr. Dumba, the dismissed Austrian Ambassador, and his wife. [Topical Press.]

THE STEGLER CASE.

If the ardour of pro-German sympathisers in America had expressed itself only in writing and speaking it is unlikely that adequate occasion would have arisen for President Wilson's rebuke. Early in 1915 indications began to appear of an activity that could justly be described as malign. In some instances the criminal deeds perpetrated were apparently no more than the irresponsible acts of half-crazy fanatics; as, for instance, the attempt to dynamite a railway bridge on the Canadian border, the placing of a bomb in the Capitol at Washington, and the murderous assault on Mr. Pierpont Morgan. Graver issues were raised when R. P. Stegler, a German naval reservist, declared in a confession that Captain Boy-Ed, the German naval attaché at Washington, was at the head of a German Secret Service organisation in America, one of whose objects was to get German reservists into England as spies by supplying them with false passports from the United States Department of State. Stegler and several other defendants were tried in March for conspiring to obtain fraudulent passports, and were convicted. Before Stegler was condemned to imprisonment for his share in these frauds, his counsel regretted in this matter "was a representative of the German Government, and therefore,

that "the arch-conspirator

under the Federal laws affecting diplomatic officers, was immune from arrest. The State Department subsequently made a formal protest to Berlin against the fraudulent use and forging of American passports by German spies, and requested, it is believed, an assurance that the abuse would be promptly ended.

Suspicion became presently aroused that virtual breaches of neutrality were being committed by means of wireless communications. At the beginning of the war there were two wireless stations in America in German ownership, one at Tuckerton, New Jersey, and the other at Sayville, Long Island. In September, 1914, the Tuckerton station was taken over by the American Government, in pursuance of an executive order by the President. The Sayville station continued to be worked by agents of its German owners, but under a restriction prohibiting the sending of cipher messages unless code books were deposited with the naval censors. The object of the censorship was to prevent communication by wireless with belligerent ships at sea, which would be a violation of the international law forbidding the use of neutral territory as a base of military operations. In June, 1915, charges were made in various newspapers that messages from Sayville, ostensibly commercial, were so framed as to convey information to Germany regarding the movement of vessels carrying war supplies to the Allies from America. It was also alleged that in the temporary absence of the censors, if only for a few minutes at a time, the Sayville operators contrived to communicate by a secret code with the German Admiralty and with German submarines. While the Government was still hesitating, through the lack of evidence definite enough to justify its intervention, the difficulty solved itself. The Sayville proprietors had set up a new plant since the war began. As the



Captain Von Papon, Germany's military attaché in the United States. [Topical.]



Captain Boy-Ed, Germany's naval attaché, who was dismissed, together with Von Papon, by the United States Government.

change made it technically a new station, it was necessary for them to apply to the Secretary of Commerce for a licence to operate it. This was refused, on the ground that it would be an unneutral act to license a new station erected in war time by a company in close relations with the German Government. The company filed formal protests with the Navy Department, and the Washington authorities took over the station, placing it under the control of American naval officers.

Meanwhile, a much more serious cause of trouble had been developing. As early as October, 1914, it became known that American manufacturers had received from the Allies large orders for munitions and other war supplies. By the aid of his paper, *The Fatherland*, Mr. Viereck started an agitation for securing a Government prohibition of such exports as unneutral. In December he went so far as to declare that it was within the power of America to bring about peace in sixty days by shutting off the supply. International law and precedent turned out to be fatal to Mr. Viereck's argument, as was shown by Mr. Bryan in his replies to a letter from Senator Stone and to a memorandum of Count Bernstorff. Presently there was reported a strange epidemic of strikes and labour difficulties in factories engaged on orders for the Allies. It would be absurd to suppose that all these troubles were the result of German or pro-German intrigue. In normal times the strike is by no means a rare industrial weapon in America, and the rush of well-paid orders to be executed at high pressure gave the workmen an opportunity which many of them would have been keen enough to seize without any alien instigation.

DR. ALBERT'S MISADVENTURE.

It was some time before public suspicion could be based upon anything more than unsubstantial rumour.



Robert Fay (on the left) and his two accomplices photographed in court when they were charged with plotting to place bombs on ships bearing munitions to the Allies. [Topical.]

In August, 1915, the *New York World* caused a sensation by publishing a number of confidential papers that made it desirable for the official representatives of Germany to offer some explanation. There is a distinctly Sherlock Holmes atmosphere about the story of how these documents got into the hands of the *World*. The revelation seems to have been due, in part, to the ill-judged parsimony of Dr. Heinrich Albert, an Imperial German Privy Councillor, who has been the chief financial agent of the German Government in the United States. A taxi-cab in New York costs thirty cents for the first half-mile and ten cents for each quarter-mile thereafter, but it would have been cheaper in the long run for Dr. Albert to get about the city by that means, instead of trusting himself to the five-cent Elevated Railroad. The Elevated cars are apt to be congested with strap-hangers, and it was probably in some such crowd of passengers that Dr. Albert was robbed of a "thick portfolio of papers"—by English Secret Service men, so it was afterwards alleged by his friend Captain von Papen.

One group of letters in the Albert portfolio brought to light attempts made by the Embassy to assist the German cause through the Press, the lecture platform, and the picture palace, by means of financial subventions, or, in the case of the kinemas, by the offer of free films illustrating the war. Another batch revealed a carefully planned scheme to corner supplies that would otherwise be available for the Allies—by buying up, for instance, the whole American production of liquid chlorine, and thus hindering a retaliatory use of "poison gas"; by securing the Wright patents in order to hamper the

output of flying machines; by obtaining control of the output of the Aetna Powder Company, and so on. The plans of the intriguers included even the bold stroke of establishing a new munition-making firm, the Bridgeport Projectile Company, with the express object of obtaining orders from the Allies and then causing delays by their non-fulfilment. In its effect upon American opinion, perhaps the most damaging item in this revelation was the correspondence relating to the fomenting of strikes in factories making munitions for the Allies. In view of the general suspicion that recent labour troubles were not due to purely industrial difficulties, it was significant to find in the Albert portfolio a letter from a Mr. McLane offering the Embassy "a plan for precipitating a strike of automobile workers," and suggesting that, for about \$50,000, a strike could be brought about in the munitions factories of Detroit, Cleveland, and Cincinnati.

Some surprise has been expressed in this country that the United States Government did not lay Dr. Albert by the heels when the *World* published these letters. The explanation of its inaction is that the Department of Justice, after carefully weighing the evidence, came to the conclusion that it would not justify a prosecution. An objector to this decision might reasonably be asked to suggest under what statutes Dr. Albert or his assistants should have been brought to trial. We must remember that during the war America has not been living under any code of emergency legislation, but under the ordinary law. Further, under the American constitutional system, the enforcement of the main body of criminal law, as well as its enactment, is a matter

not of Federal but of State jurisdiction, with regard to which the Washington authorities have no voice. For example, even if there were adequate legal proof that an outsider had organised a strike in a munition factory, the question of a prosecution would depend upon whether the laws of the State in which that factory was situated had made the use of such influence a penal offence. In his message to Congress in December, President Wilson expressly deplored the inefficiency of the means at the disposal of the Federal authorities for punishing the offences of the "creatures of passion, disloyalty, and anarchy." "We are without adequate Federal laws," he declared, to deal with "the ugly and incredible thing" that has happened. "I urge you," he continued, "to enact such laws at the earliest possible moment." How futile would have been any attempt to prosecute on the basis of the *World* revelations is evident from the adroit reply which Dr. Albert communicated to the Press. The correspondence about strikes in munition factories, for instance, was entirely one-sided. It was inevitable, said Dr. Albert, that all sorts of wild and irresponsible proposals should be addressed from every quarter to the accredited agents of a great beligerent Power. The receipt of such vagrant offers proved nothing against the receiver. There was nothing to show that these suggestions were approved by the Embassy. On the whole, the reasonable conclusion to be drawn from the *World's* disclosures was that of the

New York Evening Post—that, while they gave no adequate evidence of "a conspiracy against the United States," they did provide fresh proof of "the extraordinary stupidity with which the pro-German campaign has been conducted from the beginning," and that they brought to light extra-diplomatic activities which, on the moral and political side, all loyal Americans must resent.

THE ARCHIBALD PAPERS.

While these matters were still a topic of lively discussion, events were rapidly moving towards a denouement which was to supply the Washington Government with valid and ample ground for action. The

letters in the stolen portfolio had to do with an agreement by which the Austro-Hungarian Consulate was to supply Mr. J. F. J. Archibald with a quantity of moving-picture films to illustrate his lectures on the war. Mr. Archibald is an American journalist and magazine writer, with long and varied experience as a war correspondent—in Cuba, in the Soudan, in the Transvaal, in Venezuela, in the Philippines, in Manchuria, in Morocco, in Albania, and elsewhere. He had practised his adventurous calling at the beginning of the present war at the German and Austrian front, and had returned from the field to give American audiences the benefit of his observations. Almost immediately after the publication of the *World's* disclosures he went abroad again. The

vessel in which he was a passenger was intercepted by a British cruiser, and taken to Falmouth, where Mr. Archibald's cabin trunks were searched. The documents in his possession subsequently formed the text of a White Paper (Cd. 8012). They included confidential communications of the highest interest which Mr. Archibald was bearing from the German and Austrian Embassies to Berlin and Vienna. One of them was a despatch from Dr. Constantin T. Dumba, the Austrian Ambassador, to Baron de Burian, the Austrian Foreign Minister, giving His Excellency's private opinion of Mr. Woodrow Wilson's attitude and character. He advised against any renewal of the protest against the manufacture of munitions in America




A factory fire in Brooklyn, the result, it was suspected, of a pro-German plot. [Topical.]


for the Allies, advising that a return to the question would not only be useless, "but even, having regard to the somewhat self-willed temperament of the President, harmful." "The President has broken all the bridges behind him, and has made his point of view so definite that it is impossible for him to retreat from this position." Dr. Dumba further saw ground for encouragement in the prospect that the Chicago packers would respond to England's "arbitrary acts" by refusing to export meat to England in any circumstances. "If England stood face to face with the danger of not being able to get any meat from the United States of America, or the Argentine, she would soon give in." Captain von



The hut in the woods near Fort Lee, New Jersey, where Robert Fay and his accomplices kept some of their explosives and carried out their tests. [Topical.]



A motor boat owned by Fay, by means of which he hoped to approach vessels lying in New York harbour and attach infernal machines to their rudders just before they left port. [Topical.]



The fire at the Bethlehem Steel Works on November 15th, 1915.

[Topical Press.]

Papen, the German military attaché at Washington, was also a contributor to this curious miscellany. He was sending to the Ministry of War a statement intended to reassure the home authorities respecting the effect upon American opinion of the publication of the Albert portfolio. "From a business point of view," the only damage it had done was that the Russian and English Commission had broken off negotiations with the Bridgeport Projectile Company, "and accordingly our prospects of preventing other firms here from embarking on the supply of war material by the undertaking and the non-delivery of a shrapnel contract have come to nothing." At the same time the attaché wrote an entirely unofficial letter to his wife, enclosing in it a few newspaper cuttings that he thought would amuse her. The theft of documents from "our good Albert" was unfortunate, "but things like that must occur." In the same optimistic vein he continued: "How splendid on the Eastern front. I always say to these idiotic Yankees they had better hold their tongues—it's better to look at all this heroism full of admiration."

DR. DUMBA'S RECALL.

But perhaps the most notable document in Mr. Archibald's luggage was an autograph letter from Dr. Dumba to the Austrian Foreign Minister, dated August 20th. The Americans would certainly have deserved Captain von Papen's epithet if they had passed this over with indifference. His Excellency enclosed a memorandum from the editor of *Szabadsag*, a Hungarian paper published in the United States. This suggested methods by which strikes might be brought about at Mr. Schwab's steel

and munition factories at Bethlehem, Pennsylvania, as well as in the Middle West. Dr. Dumba added, on his own account:—

"I take this rare and safe opportunity of warmly recommending the proposals to your Excellency's favourable consideration. It is my impression that we can disorganise and hold up for months, if not entirely prevent, the manufacture of munitions in Bethlehem and the Middle West, which, in the opinion of the German military attaché, is of great importance, and amply outweighs the comparatively small expenditure of money involved."

Dr. Dumba believed that, even if these projected labour troubles came to nothing, it would be possible to compel, under pressure of the crisis, favourable working conditions for the poor "white slaves" employed at Bethlehem. Provision was to be made forthwith for the exit of German skilled workmen at present employed there, and a private registry office had already been established to find them work elsewhere. The Austrian Embassy intended to take similar steps. The Foreign Minister was asked to reply by wireless as to whether he approved the suggestions of this letter.

Some day, perhaps, the world will know how our Government came to suspect that it would be worth while to overhaul the luggage of a private passenger like Mr. Archibald. Here, again, there appears to be material for a Sherlock Holmes story. The discovery was made on August 30th. The White Paper was issued on September 21st. Long before the latter date our Foreign Office had advised the American Government, through our representative at Washington, of what it had found. There could be no two opinions as to the course

to be adopted by President Wilson. It was announced on September 9th that the American Ambassador at Vienna had been instructed to deliver to the Austro-Hungarian Foreign Minister a Note briefly summarising the essential facts, and continuing:—

"By reason of the admitted purpose and intent of Mr. Dumba to conspire to cripple legitimate industries of the people of the United States, and to interrupt their legitimate trade, and by reason of the flagrant violation of diplomatic propriety in employing an American citizen, protected by an American passport, as a secret bearer of official despatches through the lines of the enemy of Austria-Hungary, the President directs me to inform your Excellency that Mr. Dumba is no longer acceptable to the Government of the United States as the Ambassador of his Imperial Majesty at Washington."

The Austrian Government accepted the inevitable, and the recall of the too-zealous Ambassador gave the finishing touch to one of the most curious episodes in the history of diplomacy.


Dr. Dumba's punishment proved to be no deterrent to the pro-German faction in America. It may have inspired a temporary caution in some quarters, but there was no real cessation of the plots to hamper the provision of supplies for the Allies. They became, indeed, even more malevolent than before. One began to hear of mysterious explosions and fires in munitions factories, and of the discovery of bombs among the cargoes of vessels carrying the supplies. The "dynamite squad" of the New York police accordingly set on foot a careful scrutiny of every place in the city where high explosives were manufactured, stored, or sold, and followed up every man who had transactions with these establishments. The vigilance of the detectives was rewarded in October, in the case of two Germans who had been making purchases of picric acid, and who, when tracked to their lodgings, were found to be in possession not only of high explosives, but of various papers of interest to the Secret Service officers. One of these men, who gave the name of

Robert Fay—it was afterwards found that he had represented himself to prominent German-Americans under

the more typical German names of Frey, Frehe, and Freihe—made a confession which there was reason to believe was very close to the truth. According to his own story, he was a lieutenant in the Sixteenth Provisional Regiment of Prussian Infantry. On his own initiative he had received a commission from the Intelligence Office in the Wilhelmstrasse to visit the United States and carry out plans for stopping shipments of munitions to the Allies. He had worked out an idea of his own for attaching clockwork mines to ships. The mechanism was started by a cable attached to the rudder of the boat, which connected with a lever operating a ratchet wheel inside the mine. Every time the rudder was moved the cable was pulled, the lever was jerked up, and one cog in the wheel slipped down. After a certain number of cogs had slipped past the end of the lever, a hammer was released which struck on the cap of a cartridge and fired the mine. Thus the time at which the mine was fired would depend on the frequency with which the rudder was moved during the voyage. Fay estimated that it would be from one to four days. He had experimented with an empty mine, which he attached to a ship in New York harbour, and had thereby found that it would take about ten minutes to fasten the mines on. He had communicated his invention, he said, to Captain von Papen and Captain Boy-Ed, but they had refused to lend him any aid unless he went to Canada and operated from the other side of the border.




A chest containing an infernal machine seized in Fay's house by the police. [Topical.]



One of seven large bombs seized by the police in a raid on a house in East 78th Street, New York. [Topical.]

THE CONFESSION OF FAY.

The original charge against Fay, which was of conspiracy against the United States, was changed to an indictment for conspiracy to commit murder. Before it came on for hearing at New York was occupied with an important trial for



Sing-Sing Prison, New York State.

[Record Press.]

conspiracy against the United States and violations of the Customs Laws. The defendants were Karl Buenz, managing director of the Hamburg-American line, and three officers and agents of that company. The facts alleged by the prosecution were fully admitted by the counsel for the defence. Early in the war, Buenz and his accomplices had supplied cargoes of coal and food to German cruisers, by causing the communicating vessels to be provided with false clearing papers and manifests. The plea of the defendants was that this constituted no offence against the United States, and that the false papers were made solely with a view to deceiving the enemies of Germany, of which country they were subjects. The hearing began on November 22nd, and concluded on December 4th, with conviction and sentences of imprisonment. It was proved that this conspiracy stretched from coast to coast, and had ramifications in Philadelphia, Newport News, New Orleans, and San Francisco. Seventeen or eighteen boats were chartered from neutral shipping lines, and loaded as fast as possible with provisions and coal. Each boat carried a supercargo, whose instructions were to be followed by the captain. As soon as these vessels got outside the three-mile limit, the supercargoes would tell the captains they were to make for some other destination than the port for which they had cleared. One of the most interesting witnesses was Captain Falkenburg, master of the American steamship *Berwind*, which had cleared for Buenos Aires. His supercargo instructed him to make for a point off Trinidad. In this neighbourhood they steamed to and fro for about thirty-six hours. Then they met five German war vessels.

They spent sixteen days with this fleet, discharging cargo meanwhile into the *Cap Trafalgar* and the *Eleanor Wäurmer*. The task was completed on September 13th. While the *Berwind* was taking on some fresh water from one of the German vessels, the British cruiser *Carmania* appeared. Captain Falkenburg thus became an eye-witness of the naval engagement in which the *Cap Trafalgar* went down. The *Berwind* then proceeded to Rio, and there obtained a cargo for New York.


Less exciting, but more amusing, was an adventure of the *Maria Quesada*. At Pernambuco the customs officials demanded her clearance papers. Her captain had good reason for not wanting them inspected, so he put them in a leather case and dropped them overboard. Some time afterwards, the crew of a Brazilian warship in the harbour caught a shark, and, upon cutting it open, found the papers in its stomach.

In one instance the judgment of the conspirators was sadly at fault. Captain Emil Olsen, master of the *Unita*, told how, after sailing from Philadelphia, ostensibly for Cadiz, he was instructed by the supercargo to meet German warships on the high seas. He refused to change his course, in spite of the offer of a bribe of \$500, raised three days later to \$10,000. "Nothing doing," Olsen told him; "not for a million dollars." The disgusted supercargo was then invited to inspect Olsen's naturalisation papers, which showed that, a native of Norway, he had become a British subject in Canada. So he sailed the *Unita* to Cadiz, and, on arriving there, sold his cargo, and then looked up the British Consul.

It is important to notice—for the point has been

misunderstood in some quarters—that the Hamburg-American officials were not charged with any violation of the neutrality laws. There was no attempt to prove that they had made, or sought to make, American ports a base for naval operations. The evidence was confined to the question of false manifests and deceptive clearance papers. The trial, however, had an indirect result of considerable importance. It came out during the hearing that Captain Boy-Ed had supplied the money by which the Hamburg-American conspiracy was financed. He had sent as much as \$600,000 to San Francisco for the chartering and equipment of vessels to carry coal and

food to the *Leipsic* and *Dresden*, and had also given similar assistance to vessels sailing from Philadelphia. This evidence was recognised by the American Government as affording adequate ground for informing the German Government that its naval attaché at Washington had rendered himself a *persona non grata*. At the same time it was stated that the "improper activities" of his military colleague, Captain von Papen, had made him also no longer acceptable. The recall of these two diligent conspirators early in December brought to an end an illuminating chapter in the history of German diplomacy in America.



The Manhattan Bridge, New York.

[Hall-tones Ltd.]

The Manchester Guardian
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of the
WAR



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
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
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Allied commanders in the Dardanelles: Left to right, Vice-Admiral Boue de Lapeyrere, General Sir Ian Hamilton, Vice-Admiral de Robeck, and General Bulloud.


CHAPTER XXXIV.

ANZAC AND SUVLA.

CRITICISM OF DARDANELLES OPERATIONS CONSIDERED—SIR IAN HAMILTON'S NEW PLANS—THE PREPARATIONS FOR ATTACK—THE ASSAULTS FROM ANZAC—THE TRAGEDY OF THE SOUTH LANCASHIRES—THE FAILURE AT SUVLA AND ITS CAUSES—RENEWED ATTACKS ON THE ANAFARTA RIDGE—BREAKDOWN OF THE OPERATIONS IN GALLIOLI.

IN three early chapters of this volume (pp. 11-45) the story of the Gallipoli expedition has been brought down to the middle of July, when the attempt to obtain control of the Narrows by frontal attack had unmistakably failed. The general scheme of the Turkish defences on the peninsula was as simple as their detail was complicated. They were, roughly, in the form of two crescents placed back to back (see plan, p. 37). One crescent had Achi Baba for its star and Krithia for one of its horns. The other, and more northerly crescent, had Sari Bair and the Narrows for its tips. Up to the middle of July the active offensive operations had been directed against the Achi Baba crescent. They had been in some ways the most brilliant operations that the British army had ever conducted. The landings on the peninsula in the face of opposition—which the Turks after long notice had had ample time to prepare—will become the classic model for all such joint operations of army and fleet. Nor had the later attacks been in any sense failures. The attack of June 4th had, it is true, failed to carry Krithia, but it had made a fair advance, and another

general attack would almost certainly have given us Krithia itself. Unfortunately, Krithia had ceased to be the key to Achi Baba, for the Turks had built an entirely new system of defences on the western slope of Achi Baba, which would have enabled them to hold the hill even after Krithia had fallen into our hands. The delays after the landing, inevitable under the circumstances, had been fatal to the chances of success for the original plan. The alternatives that confronted General Hamilton after he had secured his footing on the peninsula were painful. He had either to attack at once, in insufficient strength and with insufficient supplies of ammunition, or to wait and allow the Turks to strengthen their defences. He chose the first, and narrowly failed to carry Krithia, which, at the end of April, was the key of Achi Baba. It is eloquent of the value of time in military operations that the first attempt, made as it was with insufficient resources, came nearer to decisive success than the second attempt on Achi Baba in June. The Turkish preparedness for defence outstripped the growth in the strength of the attack. By July, General Hamilton had formed new plans for the attack, which was now to be directed



A view of Achi Baba.



Morto Bay, De Tott's Battery, and the Asiatic Coast.

no longer against the southern crescent of the Turkish defences but against the northern.

THE DIFFICULTIES AT SEDDIL-BAHR.

Meanwhile, the difficulties had been steadily growing. The ground slopes more gently to the sea on the southern side of Achi Baba than elsewhere on the peninsula, and there is a certain amount of space. But this very fact, though it doubtless influenced General Hamilton's choice of landing-places, made some difficulties after he had landed. He had landed on the toes of the peninsula, and Achi Baba was the instep. The whole of his positions were under observation from the crest of Achi Baba, behind which the enemy's guns were posted. Even worse was the cross-fire from the forts and batteries on the Asiatic side of the Straits. It was one of the commonplaces of soldiers' experience in France that by far the worst place in the field was the reserve trenches. In the front line there was the protection of a strong parapet, and when the battle was joined it was unsafe for either side to fire on the fighters for fear of hitting its own men. The "curtain of fire," mentioned so often in official despatches, descended not on the fighting line but on the area in which the reserve trenches were situated. The whole of our army at Seddil-Bahr behind the firing line was permanently in the position of men waiting in the reserve trenches, only with this difference, that they could not remain under cover, but had constantly to be going about work which in areas where the space is not so confined would have been done at the advanced base, usually at a point a little beyond the range of the enemy's artillery.

"At intervals, generally about three or four times a day, the enemy turns on an outburst of 'hate.' Shells come howling through the air from Achi Baba's insalubrious acclivity (as the album poet would have called it), or across the Strait from 'Asia.' One soon gets to know the sound not only of the gun but of the howling shell itself, and can judge its destination fairly well as it passes overhead. But if it is passing, not overhead, but at your head, you have no time to decide exactly where it is going, and before the increasing howl of its approach has died upon your ears it is you who have died. That is the terrible and always surprising part of it all. You sit working, let us suppose, in some tent upon a landing beach. The accustomed noontide 'hate' begins. One after another with fair regularity you hear the shells approaching, passing, bursting. Some fall into the sea, and you are interested enough to look out and watch the splash. 'A near thing for that trawler,' you say, and return to work. Then comes a horrible crash, and before you can think what is happening to the tent and your comrades this world has ceased to exist for you.

"It happens. It may happen to almost anyone here at almost any moment. But on the whole the escapes are stranger than the destruction, and space is mercifully wide.

"On the whole I think the firing line is about the safest place. One day after another I have been along pretty nearly the whole of it now, except in the French section, where the English are not allowed. The trenches cut deep and narrow, the carefully piled sandbags, the entanglements and screens afford almost complete protection to the men holding the front in their turn. Here and there a point of danger is marked, and one has to spurt across. And, of course, in moments of assault or of violent bombardment preceding an attack the scene is very different. But on ordinary days like the present there is not much to fear beyond the persistent sniper and an occasional bomb thrown by hand (and sometimes fielded and thrown back again before it can burst, so proud rumour tells). By curious devices of the periscope and other means you may contemplate the Turkish labyrinths of trench and sandbag only a few yards ahead, and sometimes see a Turkish shovel throwing up earth over the top. That is about all we see of the enemy just now, or the enemy of us.

"The worst part of life in the firing-line on days like these is the intense heat in narrow and winding trenches where no

breeze can penetrate. Even where a man can lie almost naked under a little edge of shadow, the heat is almost intolerable between 11 and 4, and to myself, at all events, it seems much worse to lie still than to run about; but in the firing-line there is no running about. Further back, among the second line or the so-called 'rest camps' in the centre, there is perhaps greater danger from shell, but also greater freedom of movement and a little more chance of shade."


At Anzac the conditions were somewhat different. Here the first trenches, being nearer to the heart of the enemy's positions, were more exposed to constant attack, and the fighting with bombers and snipers was more continuous; but behind the firing line the steep cliffs gave more security than was to be had at Seddil-Bahr, nor was there the cross-fire from the Asiatic shore.

CRITICISM OF GENERAL HAMILTON.

It was natural, especially after the exaggerated hopes which the success of the early naval bombardments had excited, that the failure to achieve any striking advance, the growing casualty lists, and the descriptions of life and conditions that came in soldiers' letters, should give rise to doubts and criticism. The apparent inactivity in Gallipoli coincided with the great German offensive in Galicia, and all through the summer the popular mind was being attuned to gloom. Much the ablest of these critics was Mr. Ashmead Bartlett, a newspaper correspondent, who, believing as some others did at the front that the people at home could not know all the facts, came home and criticised the conduct of the expedition. He argued that it was a mistake to attempt landing on the peninsula, and that the best plan would have been to land on Thrace and occupy the lines of Bulair, which run across the neck of Gallipoli. The landing at Anzac, again, was in his view a wasteful dispersion of force, and if the Australians had been used to reinforce the troops at Seddil-Bahr the Turkish positions at Achi Baba might have been captured in April. After the failure to capture Krithia, he held that we should either have sent a very large army to Gallipoli and broken through, whatever the cost, or else have withdrawn at once and cut our losses. Instead, we did neither the one nor the other, but continued to make frontal attacks on Achi Baba which never had much prospect of success. In his opinion, false optimism was responsible for much useless bloodshed. It encouraged us to hold on in the hope that the enemy's resistance would collapse, whereas, in fact, the Turks were all the time growing stronger. Some support was given to these views by Greek criticism. The Greek General Staff had given a great deal of study to the question, and they were understood to favour an advance from Enos, in Thrace, and an attack against the Bulair lines.

This criticism is weighty, but cannot be said to have established itself as sound. Whereas in the Greek plans the functions of the fleet were subsidiary to those of the army, it should not be forgotten that with us the whole idea of a military expedition arose out of the failure of the fleet to force its way through the Straits. The problem, as it presented itself to us, was not one of conquering Turkey in Europe, or even occupying Constantinople, but of enabling our fleet to open the Dardanelles and the Bosphorus for the passage of corn and munitions. A mere blockade of Constantinople would have sufficed for our purposes. For this reason the military problem was conceived not as a separate campaign, but as a mere appendix to the failure of the attack of March 18th, which Sir Ian Hamilton had witnessed. It was not so much a

* Mr. H. W. Nevinston.



The Gallipoli Peninsula.

campaign against Turkey or for Constantinople, but a campaign for the possession of Kilid Bahr. This limited object, further, might it was thought be secured by a comparatively small army; in fact, it is not unlikely that the Government may have impressed upon Sir Ian Hamilton before his departure that we had no desire to embark on ambitious land operations that would require a great expenditure of military strength. There was no

reason when the military operations in Gallipoli were first decided upon to think that the peninsula was held in great military strength; indeed, at the beginning of March, 10,000 men could have gone from end to end of the peninsula. Some help, too, was expected from the Russians, who had hoped to co-operate across the Black Sea, but the defeats in Galicia knocked all that on the head. It is just to Sir Ian Hamilton to acknowledge that he

was not slow to realise that the Gallipoli expedition was developing into a great land campaign. He asked for two fresh divisions on May 10th, and again on May 17th. He got one, and by the time it reached him the Russians had given up all idea of land operations against Turkey, and the Turkish divisions which had been watching the Black Sea coast were free to go to the Dardanelles. The result was that in spite of the reinforcements we were relatively no stronger when the action of June 4th was fought than we had been in May. In June, in response to further requests, he was promised three Regular divisions and the infantry of two Territorial divisions; but the first of these reinforcements did not reach Mudros till July 10th. There was slowness at home in shaking off the old idea of a limited campaign on land and in meeting the new demands; but Sir Ian Hamilton is not justly blamed for that. It would, however, have been better if he had asked for two army corps in May instead of in June.

ALTERNATIVES CONSIDERED.

There were, as Sir Ian Hamilton has pointed out, two alternatives to the plan of landing at the tip of the peninsula. He might, as Mr. Bartlett has argued, have landed men for an attack on the Bulair lines. This alternative was discussed with Admiral de Robeck, and rejected on account of difficulties of transport. As it was, owing to the appearance of German submarines, all supplies and reinforcements had to be brought up by night in fleet sweepers and trawlers. A landing at Bulair would have added another fifty miles to their course, which it was thought was more than the flotilla could manage. Further, there is no good beach near Bulair, and Enos is so far away that the enemy would have had time to organise a formidable opposition before the Bulair lines could be reached. Besides, was it certain that the Turkish army in the Narrows could be forced to surrender by our occupation of the Bulair lines? Would it not be possible for them to transport supplies across the Narrows from Chanak? The second alternative, namely, to land on the Asiatic coast and seize Chanak, attracted the British Commander-in-Chief. He had had it in his mind

in April, when the French landed there, but was much too weak to maintain itself. Anzac and Kum Kale were evidently to be the two wings of the main force at Seddil-Bahr. He decided against the revival of the project, though for reasons which, on the assumption that the supply of troops was strictly limited, are quite convincing.

"Although much of the Asiatic coast had now been wired and entrenched, the project was still attractive. Thereby the Turkish forces on the peninsula would be weakened; our beaches at Cape Helles would be freed from Asiatic shells; the threat to the enemy's sea communications was obvious. But when I descended into detail I found that the expected reinforcements could not run to a double operation. I mean that unless I could make a thorough whole-hearted attack on the enemy on the peninsula I should reap no advantage

in that theatre from the transference of the Turkish peninsula troops to reinforce Asia, whereas if the British forces landed in Asia were not strong enough in themselves seriously to threaten Chanak, the Turks for their part would not seriously relax their grip upon the peninsula."

It is evident from this passage that if he had had troops enough he would have liked to attack the Narrows forts from the Asiatic as well as from the European side. There is no evidence that he asked for more troops than he received; but there is some evidence that he thought he could not have got more if he had asked.

THE NEW PLANS.


Accordingly, Sir Ian Hamilton having rejected the alternatives of attack on Chanak and the Bulair lines, was left

with a plan of attack from Anzac. It will be remembered (p. 25) that the point at which the Australians had landed was a mile north of that which had been intended. The result was that, instead of being on the tip of the southern or Achi Baba crescent, they were just within the Sari Bair crescent, and since April there had been no real co-operation between the Anzacs and the Seddil-Bahr army. Sir Ian Hamilton now proposed to transfer his attack to the Sari Bair crescent, to capture Sari Bair from Anzac, and at the same time to land a strong force further up the coast near Suvla, in the hope of confusing the enemy as to the main point of attack.

Sir Ian Hamilton had apparently adopted this plan



Admiral de Robeck and General Sir Ian Hamilton on board H.M.S. Triad on the afternoon of the General's departure for England.



A view in Anzao Cove.

[Topical Press.



Another view in the Anzao region.

soon after the attack of June 4th. Until his reinforcements should arrive, his main object, apart from maintaining the *moral* of his troops, was to keep the enemy's eyes fixed upon Helles rather than Anzac. The fighting at the end of June (p. 43) in the Gully Ravine had given us possession of the Saghir Dere up to a point just south of Krithia; and on July 12th and 13th a similar attempt was made from the Kereves Dere, on the eastern shore of the peninsula. The operations were fairly successful, and the Allied lines, which at the end of June were across the Maidos road (plan, p. 43), were extended down the Kereves Dere to the sea. The newly-arrived Fifty-second (Territorial) Division took part in the action with the French on their right. Unfortunately, the Scottish troops pressed on too impetuously, and after carrying the third line of trenches began to charge up the hill—the south-eastern slopes of Achi Baba—where the 4th King's Own Scottish Borderers came under the "curtain of fire" (*feu de barrage*) of the French artillery, and lost very heavily. The same thing happened on the next day, and at the same place, to the Portsmouth Battalion of the Naval Division.

This was the last formal attack made in the direction of Achi Baba, for later movements were feints to distract the enemy's attention from some other part of the front which mattered more; and its results must have convinced Sir Ian Hamilton that there was nothing to gain by persistence at the Seddil Bahr end. The first of his promised reinforcements had now arrived, and he was now full of his preparations for the coming attack on the Sari Bair front. There was fighting at Anzac at the end of July, but its purpose was defensive. The extension of a Turkish trench threatened the extreme right of the Anzac line at Tasmania Post, and the Eleventh Australian Regiment was detailed to capture it. This was successfully done. The attack was delivered in four columns of fifty men, to each of which a specified length of the trench had been assigned. By this time most of the reinforcements had arrived, and the date for the new attack on Sari Bair had been fixed for the morning of August 7th. The problems of organising the new attack were many, but three stood out above all the rest—secrecy and surprise, transport, and water; and the last was to turn out the greatest of all. To all Sir Ian Hamilton gave much careful forethought.

General Hamilton has described in detail the difficulties which were made by the narrowness of his foothold on Gallipoli; and it is so easy and would be so unjust to overlook the work done by the Navy in these operations, that the passage is worth quoting:—

"Within the narrow confines of the positions I held on the peninsula it was impossible to concentrate even as much as one-third of the fresh troops about to be launched to the attack. Nor could Mudros and Imbros absorb the whole of the remainder. The strategic concentration which precedes a normal battle had in my case to be a very wide dispersion. Thus of the forces destined for my offensive, on the day before the battle, part were at Anzac, part at Imbros, part at Mudros, and part at Mitylene. These last three detachments were separated respectively by fourteen, sixty, and 120 miles of sea from the area in which they were simultaneously to appear. To ensure the punctual arrival of all these masses of inexperienced troops at the right moment and spot, together with their material, munitions, stores, supplies, water, animals and vehicles, was a prodigious undertaking, demanding not only competence but self-confidence; and I will say for my General Staff that I believe the clearness and completeness of their orders for this concentration and landing will hereafter be studied as models in military academies. The need for economy in sea transport, the awkwardness and restriction of open beaches, the impossibility of landing guns, animals, or vehicles rapidly—all these made it necessary to create a special separate

organisation for every single unit taking part in the adventure. A pack mule corps to supply 80,000 men had also to be organised for that specific purpose until such time as other transport could be landed."

As many as 3,700 mules (in addition to the 950 mules already at Anzac) were supplied for transport. The problem of water supply gave even more trouble. Our information, which turned out to be accurate, was that there were good wells and springs in the Anafarta Valley and on Suvla Plain; but it was decided to leave nothing to chance. As early as June 17th (the date is interesting as showing how early the plans for the new movement had taken shape) the War Office was asked to supply water receptacles for pack transport with each reinforcing division; and when the War Office was unable to supply as many as were wanted, the balance was obtained from India and Egypt. At Anzac a high-level reservoir was constructed, with a capacity of 30,000 gallons, and fitted with pipes and distribution tanks, and an engine was brought over from Egypt to fill the reservoir. Enormous quantities of petroleum tins were fitted with handles for transport. These arrangements were to break down very badly, and to contribute more than any other single cause to the breakdown of the attack; but the failure of supply was certainly not due to any lack of forethought on the part of General Hamilton and his Staff. Nor was the danger overlooked of throwing fresh troops immediately into the firing line. The Thirteenth Division, the first of the reinforcements to arrive, was put into the trenches in place of the famous Twenty-ninth Division, which was withdrawn for a rest. At the same time, General Sir Frederick Stopford, who was in command of the reinforcements, was appointed to temporary command at Helles, in order to gain experience of local conditions. General Hamilton would no doubt have wished that all the reinforcements should have the same breaking-in as the Thirteenth Division, but this, unfortunately, was impossible. It was necessary for the success of the attack that it should be made when there was no moon. That fixed the date about the 9th of the month. The two last reinforcements—the Fifty-third and Fifty-fourth Divisions—were due to arrive a couple of days before that; and to give them some experience of the conditions before committing them to the attack would have meant a delay of another month. General Hamilton decided against further delay.

THE BRITISH FORCES.

It is not possible to give the complete composition of the British forces in Gallipoli, but the following details are obtainable from the published despatches, and may, therefore, be legitimately set forth. The new troops are indicated by italics; but it should be noted that they did not all arrive at the same time. The Fifty-second Division, for example, seems to have arrived late in May; the Thirteenth, the Tenth, and Eleventh Divisions in July; while the Fifty-third and Fifty-fourth Divisions were not in action until the 11th and 12th of August.

A. —THE SEDDIL-BAHR SECTION

(General Davies).

29th Division (*see* p. 25)

• (Till August 20th).

42nd Division.—General Douglas.
(Lancashire Territorials.)

13th Division.—General Shaw.
(Five battalions only after August 6th.)
Naval Division.
French Troops.
(Extreme right.)



A consultation of officers at Suvla Bay before going into action.

[Central Press.



Men waiting, in the cover of small beach in the Suvla Bay region, for the order to attack.

[Central Press.

B.—THE ANZAC SECTION
(General Birdwood).

Australian Division.
New Zealand and Australian Division.
13th Division.

(After August 6th, less five battalions in Seddil-Bahr section.)
29th Indian Infantry Brigade.
10th Division, 29th Brigade.
In all, 37,000 rifles.

C.—THE SUVLA SECTION
(General Stopford).

10th (Irish) Division.
30th Brigade. 31st Brigade.
11th Division.—General Hammersley.

32nd Brigade. 33rd Brigade. 34th Brigade.
53rd Division.—General Lindley.
54th Division.
29th Division
(After August 20th).

THE DIVERSIONS.

General Hamilton's plans for the attack that was now to begin were, in his own words, these:—

(1) To break out with a rush from Anzac and cut off the bulk of the Turkish army from land communication with Constantinople.

(2) To gain such a command for big artillery as to cut off the bulk of the Turkish army from sea traffic, whether with Constantinople or with Asia.

(3) Incidentally, to secure Suvla Bay as a winter base for Anzac and all the troops operating in the northern theatre.

From Anzac, it will be observed, was to be delivered the main attack, and that from Suvla Bay was only secondary. In order the better to direct the enemy's attention from his main objective, he ordered two subsidiary attacks, one from Seddil-Bahr, the other at the southern end of Anzac. The results of the attack from Seddil-Bahr were disappointing. It so happened that the enemy at the moment when our attack was launched was himself preparing to attack us. His front trenches and communication trenches were packed with troops, and at no point had any progress been made by us by nightfall on the first day (August 6th). Sir Ian Hamilton was disappointed at the stout resistance of the enemy, which he attributed partly to the unfortunate coincidence that we attacked just at the moment when they were preparing to attack us, and were therefore in great strength; but also to the immunity from attack which they had enjoyed for a month, and to the news that they had had of the German successes over Russia. In June, and the beginning of July, all ranks had felt "as an army feels, instinctively, yet with certitude, that they had fairly got the upper hand of the enemy, and they had given the wherewithal, they could have gone on steadily advancing. Now that selfsame half-broken enemy were again making as stout a resistance as they had offered us at our original landing." It is difficult to reconcile this view of the prospects of success in attack on this southern section with the decision which we know had been taken two months before to deliver his next great attack elsewhere. He persisted, however, in his attacks on the following day (August 7th), and the enemy in his counter-attacks. We held our own, and at some points temporarily gained ground. The Sixth and Seventh Lancashire Fusiliers and the Fourth East Lancshires in particular distinguished themselves in the light

for possession of a vineyard west of the Krithia road, and it was here that Lieutenant Forshaw, V.C., performed a feat of endurance and tenacity which has few parallels in war. With his section he captured a Turkish trench, blocked up the end of the communication trench leading into it, defended it against repeated attacks, shot with his revolver three Turks who forced an entry, and, in spite of the loss of six men killed and twenty wounded, held it until he was relieved forty-one hours later, bombing almost without intermission the whole time.

THE ATTACK ON LONE PINE.

The other subsidiary attack developed into so fierce and prolonged a struggle that to call it a diversion, as it was in intention, would seem ironic. Near the extreme south of Anzac is a sandy plateau, covered with heather, of which the Australians held the western and the Turks the eastern end. The two sides had burrowed through the sand until their trenches were not more than one hundred yards apart. A solitary pine, which had long since lost its leaves, marked the centre of the Turkish position. It was a place of importance to the enemy, as it commanded some good springs. The engagement opened in the afternoon of August 6th with a heavy bombardment from H.M.S. *Bacchante* and a monitor, and the infantry attack was delivered by the First Australian Brigade (New South Wales). In the face of a heavy fire they surmounted the wire entanglements on to the Turkish parapets. There they stood, strung on the ledge as men might string along a kerb when they run up to see a street procession. "Those," writes Captain Bean, "who came up behind poked along among their comrades until they found a place, and they stood there, too, obviously puzzled.


"As a matter of fact they had found themselves looking down not into a trench but upon a very solid roof, made of logs, with withered boughs and earth spread over them. Some of those timbers were nine by six, and there was no more chance of pushing them down than of pushing in the roof of a church. We possess a powerful and effective bomb which used to explode in the enemy's trench with a peculiarly formidable crunch, and the Turks were driven to cover in their trenches as a protection against it. They made no mistake about that protection, and our bombardment, though it probably put out of action a good number of Turks, made no perceptible difference to this headcover. The men knew there would be some parts of the trench covered, but there appeared to be scarcely any of it uncovered. The Turks were shooting through the loopholes between their feet.

"This is what in military parlance may be called a check. The first two lines were stopped there, puzzled what to do. Shrapnel had begun to rain by this time, machine-guns were spitting from the trenches to right and left, the Turks at their feet were firing through the loopholes—but the one thing that no man seemed to dream of doing was to come back. Some fired down into the loopholes, some who happened to find small gaps in the line of headcover in front of them jumped down there and began to work into the dark shelters under the headcover where the Turks were—others went on over the first trench and even over the second trench, and into communication trenches which had no headcover over them, but through which the Turks were fleeing—for prisoners say, and there is no doubt of it, that the Turks are afraid of the Australians. Others noticed that in the solid roof in front of them, near the edge where the loopholes are, there were man-holes left at intervals, apparently to allow the listening patrols to creep at night. They were just large enough to allow a man to wriggle through, and that was enough for the First Brigade. They wriggled down into them, feet foremost, as a burglar might wriggle into a skylight.

"It was a deed for which, if it were a solitary instance, any man might get a Victoria Cross. What could the Turks do with a brigade like that? Once they got into the trench



The problem of water supply at the Dardanelles: Filtered water being stored in cans. Even petrol cans, as shown in the photograph, were cleaned and used for this purpose.



A fine spring of clear water was discovered in this rock, and was promptly carefully guarded and used.

"I never saw the least sign of hesitation in making that crossing, nor a single unwounded man, except a messenger, turn back. They were even anxious for a place on the fire step, so as to get an early start. 'Is there any room up there?' I heard a man in the trench ask of those who were crouching under the parapet. One of the men on the fire step looked down, 'I dare say we could make room for one,' he said, 'Shift along, you blokes—we can squeeze in a little one.' The man in the trench was clearly relieved. 'I want to get up here along with Jim,' he said. 'Him and me are mates.' I have often hoped that the two mates arrived at the end of that perilous trip together.

"It was a quarter of an hour before the last of the men who had lined the parapet of the enemy's trench disappeared into it. Many of them had lain down there firing over it into the communication trenches beyond. Lots of them over on the right lay there still lining that parapet for an hour after the first charge, and we wondered what was keeping them there until we realised that they were not moving, and that they would never move again."

But the fighting at Lone Pine was only just beginning with the capture of the Turkish trenches. The enemy in the evening made a desperate counter-attack, which was repeated at intervals through the night and all the next afternoon. It was not until August 12th that the enemy, after suffering extremely heavy losses, gave up the position as lost.

THE SARI BAIR HILLS.

Sir Ian Hamilton had decided to deliver his main attack from the extreme northern end of Anzac. From the Lone Pine the front trenches followed the line of the cliffs, at a distance of half to three-quarters of a mile from the sea, to Fisherman's Hut, just north of the Ari Burnu promontory. Here the range of the Sari Bair comes down from the north-east almost to the sea, leaving just enough room for a force marching north to squeeze past along the beach. Past this point the main range gradually recedes from the sea, leaving a plain three miles across round Suvla Bay, but as it recedes it sends a number of spurs down to the coast, like waves from the bow of a ship. The sides of these spurs are very steep, and at the bottom there is a watercourse, which in August was quite dry. The names of these watercourses from south to north are Sazli Beit, Chailak, Aghyl, and (at a considerably longer interval) Asmak; and they all lead down from the main chain of the Sari Bair. This chain does not form a continuous plateau, but is a succession of heights, Chunuk Bair, Hill Q, and Koja Chemen Tepe, with shoulders between. From the southern shoulder of Chunuk Bair the Sazli Beit makes its way to the sea by the southern side of Rhododendron Spur; the Chailak, rising near the Sazli Beit, goes by the northern side of Rhododendron Spur past a round-topped

hill, named Table Top from its shape. On the shoulder between Chunuk Bair and Hill Q rises Aghyl, and between Hill Q and Koja Chemen there is another steep clough which joins on to the Aghyl on the north side of Bauchop's Hill. Between Aghyl and Asmak, again, there is a lower hill called Damakjelic Bair. (See Map, p. 369.)

The Turks did not occupy the sea shore north of Ari Burnu except with isolated sentry posts, and were content to occupy the ends of the spurs running down from Sari Bair. Sir Ian Hamilton's plan of attack was to move north along the sea-shore from Anzac and strike up the cloughs leading up to Chunuk Bair and Koja Chemen Tepe. These heights gained, he hoped—and with good reason—to force his way to the Narrows, cut off the Turkish forces on Achi Baba, and open up the passage of the Straits to the fleet. His first anxiety was to protect the flanks of the assaulting columns, for to get to the points which he now proposed to attack he had had to leave the Anzac positions behind him, and to march round the seaward shoulder of Sari Bair. Accordingly, he arranged that the assaulting columns should be protected by two covering columns. The right covering column was to seize Table Top and the foothills; the left covering column to march along the shore for a mile further north and occupy Damakjelic Bair, between Asmak Dere and Aghyl. The assaulting columns were to march up the cloughs of Chailak and Aghyl, then to Sari Bair, the left column to Koja, the right to Chunuk Bair. The composition of these columns has been given by Sir Ian Hamilton as follows:—



General Birdwood.

[Elliott and Fry Ltd.]

"The whole of this big attack was placed under the command of Major-General Sir A. J. Godley, General Officer Commanding New Zealand and Australian Division. The two covering and the two assaulting columns were organised as follows:—

"Right Covering Column, under Brigadier-General A. H. Russell.—New Zealand Mounted Rifles Brigade, the Otago

Mounted Rifles Regiment, the Maori Contingent and New Zealand Field Troop.

"Right Assaulting Column, under Brigadier-General F. E. Johnston.—New Zealand Infantry Brigade, Indian Mountain Battery (less one section), one Company New Zealand Engineers.

"Left Covering Column, under Brigadier-General J. H. Travers.—Headquarters Fortieth Brigade, half the Seventy-second Field Company, Fourth Battalion South Wales Borderers, and Fifth Battalion Wiltshire Regiment.

"Left Assaulting Column, under Brigadier-General (now Major-General) H. V. Cox.—Twenty-ninth Indian Infantry Brigade, Fourth Australian Infantry Brigade, Indian Mountain Battery (less one section), one Company New Zealand Engineers.

"Divisional Reserve.—Sixth Battalion South Lancashire Regiment, and Eighth Battalion Welsh Regiment (Pioneers) at Chailak Dere, and the Thirty-ninth Infantry Brigade and half Seventy-second Field Company at Aghyl Dere.



A busy scene at Suvla Bay.



The office of the commandant of the advanced base, Suvla Bay.

Little or no communication was possible between the various columns, and the attack inevitably resolved itself into as many separate actions as there were columns. The columns left in succession at nightfall on August 6th, and marched along the beach in dead silence, each turning off in succession as it reached its appointed place. The right covering column had good success. No. 3 Post, half way to Sazli Beit, was captured by stratagem. H.M.S. *Colne* for several nights, at 9 p.m. precisely, threw her searchlight on the fort and opened fire for ten minutes, repeating the experiment before 9-30. In this way it had educated the Turks to leave their posts when the searchlight was turned on. The trick worked excellently, and by 11 o'clock the whole of the entrenchments here were won. Bauchop's Hill was also carried by surprise, and though the force ascending the Chailak Dere had great difficulty at the entrance with the wire entanglements, they, too, succeeded in opening a passage into the clough for the assaulting column soon after midnight. About the same time Table Top was stormed by the New Zealanders, in spite of its precipitous slopes. It was one of the finest feats of the campaign. Far away to the north the left covering column had captured the Damakjelic Hill soon after midnight. Affairs were in good train.

THE HELLESPONT SIGHTED.

The right assaulting column entered the Sazli Beit and Chailak soon after midnight and seized the seaward end of Rhododendron Spur. The left assaulting column had further to go, but made even greater progress. The greatest difficulty was not the opposition of the enemy, who were taken by surprise, but the darkness and the extraordinary difficulty of marching through the rough scrub with which the sides of the cloughs were covered. At dawn, we were just not on the crest. On the right we held the crest of Rhododendron Spur, a quarter of a mile from Chunuk Bair; the Gurkhas were a similar distance from Chunuk on the north-east side; and away to the left the Fourth Australian Brigade and a battalion of Sikhs were moving to the attack on Koja. By this time the Turks, who had been expecting attack from the south, were moving along the Sari Bair chain to form front to the new attack from the north and west. The chance of complete surprise had been lost, and our men waited for the approach of night, when the attack could be renewed. The second attack was delivered just before dawn in three columns. The centre and left made no progress; the right, a fresh column under Brigadier-General Johnston, consisting of New Zealanders, Eighth Welsh Pioneers, and the Seventh Gloucesters, stormed Chunuk Bair. Every single officer of the Gloucesters was killed by midday, but the battalion fought on and the position was held. Away on the left the Australians had made a desperate effort to reach Koja by a flanking attack round by the north, but had failed after suffering heavy losses. It was in order to assist such a movement that Sir Ian Hamilton had arranged for the attack from Suvla Bay. What was happening there?

The attack was again renewed after midnight, again in three columns, one of which was now commanded by Brigadier-General Baldwin, the other two as before by Brigadier-Generals Johnston and Cox. General Cox's column—whose attack was directed against Hill Q—succeeded, and had General Baldwin's column been in its place the whole ridge would certainly have been ours. Unfortunately, the column lost its way, and did not arrive until too late. As it was, the Sixth

the Sixth South Lancashires not only reached the crest of Hill Q, but some of them, excited by the view that now spread below them of the waters of the Hellespont and of Asia beyond, began charging down the slope. It was the supreme moment of the whole campaign.

"It was well after daylight when the guns of the warships and of the artillery, which had been landing shell after shell on to the crest line, abruptly ceased their bombardment. The Fifth Gurkhas, with the South Lancashires in line with them, advanced up the ridge. The low scrub made it impossible to run—you could only force your way through it waist high as a man wades through the surf. They came nearer and nearer to the top, losing very few men. Before them, through the scrub, ran a shallow newly-dug Turkish trench. They jumped on to the low earth parapet. And there below them there spread itself out a new world.


"In the foreground the top of the ridge fell away from them, one or two fairly gentle folds before it dipped into the ravine. Down the nearer of these folds, hopping, jumping, clambering through the scrub, was the Turkish company—about two hundred men, which had held the trench over which the Gurkhas were standing. They had clearly retired from the trench, and were waiting down the slope of the hill until that bombardment ended; and as soon as the heads of our men appeared over the rise they had run. Further down the slope was another two hundred or so, obviously the supports, who had not been unnerved by the bombardment, and were waiting a little below the firing line. And away and beyond them all was the view that had been hidden from the Australians and New Zealanders all these long months. There it was, all spread out below them like a map—the long white thread of the main road down the peninsula, with the traffic of a large army coming and going along it—motor cars, waggons, traffic of all sorts. And over beyond it all, glistening in the light of the morning, the long ribbon of the Dardanelles.

"As they stood and looked a shower of high-explosive shell descended on the trench on whose edge they were standing. Missile after missile rushed down upon it, and blew great showers of earth and men into the air. The line of men on the parapet wavered and fell back. A few brave officers and one or two men remained. But the Turkish supports below had seen the check. They pushed on up the hill. And before the line could be rallied the Turks were up again in their old trench. General Baldwin's column of British troops had been delayed in the tangled country—General Baldwin was killed as he led his column—and the attack for that day was ended."

Neither Sir Ian Hamilton nor any of the correspondents has said from where came this "unexpected salvo" which blotted out the promised land as soon as it had been descried. In the following night a further misfortune followed. The crest of Chunuk Bair was lost owing to a misapplication of the experience of the South African War. The practice there was to occupy not the actual crest but a little way below it, as being more secure from gun-fire. This was sound against Boer skirmishers, but against massed attacks it was dangerous, for the power of collecting overwhelming numbers at very close quarters rested with whichever side held the sky-line in force. But though the Turks drove our men from the crest they could not stay there themselves, and it remained neutral ground, with the opposing armies some little way down on either side. The New Zealanders on Chunuk Bair were relieved by the Sixth Loyal North Lancashires and Fifth Wiltshires, and on the next day—August 10th—the Turks, now in great strength, began a series of massed attacks. The Loyal North Lancashires were crushed by weight of numbers; the Wiltshires were annihilated; the Hampshires and General Baldwin's column were outflanked; and now followed the most terrific hand-to-hand fighting in the whole campaign. Generals fought in the ranks, and men dropped their weapons and caught one another by the throats. Thanks in no small measure to the fire of the fleet, which decimated the Turkish lines as they



The fighting at Anafarta: Infantry advancing under fire across the shores of Salt Lake.
[Alfieri Picture Service.]



The bombardment of Anafarta across the Salt Lake. [Alfieri Picture Service.]



Red Cross waggons waiting on the edge of the Salt Lake.
CC-0. Jangamwadi Math Collection. Digitized by eGangotri [Alfieri Picture Service.]

poured over the crest, there was not a single Turk alive on our side of the hill by morning. But no advance was possible for us either.

At the end of the four days' fighting General Birdwood's losses, out of a strength of not less than 30,000 men in all, amounted to 12,000. The Thirteenth Division had lost 6,000 out of 10,500. The Warwicks and Worcesters had lost every one of their officers, and both the Thirteenth and the Twenty-ninth Brigades (Tenth Division) had lost twice the number that the accepted German calculation recognised as the limit of human endurance. Both sides had now fought themselves to a standstill; and as we were attacking, that meant for us that the battle was lost unless success in some other part of the field brought relief.

THE LANDING AT SUVLA.

It is time now to turn to our fortunes on the left, where a strong force had been launched against Suvla Bay. In arranging his plans, Sir Ian Hamilton had hoped that General Stopford would by daybreak on the 7th have been in possession of the foothills of the Anafarta ridge, and had this hope been fulfilled, even by the morning following, the whole course of events in the Anzac attack would have been altered to our advantage.

Suvla Bay forms a semi-circle about 3,000 yards across from north to south. The tips of the semi-circle are both rocky, with little hills which the Turks had fortified—Ghazi Baba at the north end and Lala Baba at the south; but between these two the shores of the bay are sandy and flat, and make a narrow causeway which separates the sea from the Salt Lake, waterless in summer, but always impassable. On the north side of the plain the shore hills, Karakol Dag and Kiretch Tepe Sirt, are high as at Anzac, and run parallel with the shore to Ejelmer Bay, which is some five or six miles up the coast; and south of the bay the coast is again flat as far as the hills near Asmak Dere. The whole district is like the stage of a great amphitheatre, formed by the hills extending round from near Suvla Point through the two Anafartas to the hills in which the Anzacs had been fighting so desperately. Between the Anafartas there is a gap in the semi-circle of hills, but this gap is flanked on both sides by two spurs running down towards the sea, the northern spur beaded with heights—the Yilghin Burnu (Chocolate Hill), Scimitar Hill, and Green Hill—and a southern spur, of which the principal height is Ismail Oglu Tepe (Hill 100). The key position is Hill 100, for it flanks Koja on the north side, with only the Azmak ravine in between; and with this hill in our possession it is probable that the attack by the Australians on Koja

could have been renewed with material prospect of success.

The landing of the Eleventh Division in Suvla Bay was successfully accomplished in the dark in the early hours of August 7th, and the Turks were completely taken by surprise. Snipers from the Lala Baba and Ghazi Baba positions gave some trouble, and even succeeded, knowing every inch of the ground, in getting in the midst of our troops in the darkness. But they were few in numbers and soon despatched; and at daybreak the Ninth West Yorks and Sixth Yorkshire Regiments stormed Lala Baba. At the north end of the bay some confusion and loss was caused by our own misdirected fire—it was still dark—but the Eleventh Manchesters did fine work in clearing the Turks from the Karakol Dag.

As dawn broke, the Tenth Division came into the bay, and were landed, some at Ghazi Baba, others, for an unexplained reason, south of Nibrunesi Point, where they were far from the main action. The Turks now began to shell the troops who had marched round to the east side of the Salt Lake, and whether by accident or design the heather and gorse caught fire, thus increasing the confusion inseparable from the landing of large bodies of troops on an open beach.* It was a hot day, and although, as has been seen, very elaborate arrangements had been made for the supply of water, these, for reasons which will be discussed later, had gone wrong, and the troops were tortured with thirst. Thirst and the bush fires—not the opposition of the enemy, who were very weak in numbers—were the reasons why the troops made such little progress in the course of the day. By evening, however, General Hammersley had seized Chocolate Hill, after an engagement in which the Sixth Lincolns and the



General Mahon.


[Elliott and Fry Ltd.]

Sixth Border Regiment distinguished themselves, but, owing to the exhaustion of his troops, was unable to advance further to Ismail Oglu Tepe, which can hardly have been strongly held, and the capture of which would probably have decided the battle in our favour. Away on the left wing, General Mahon had by the same evening secured the flank of the operations by firmly occupying Karakol Dag and the coast range. After nightfall the Turks withdrew their artillery.


FATAL INACTIVITY.

On the next day—the 8th—nothing at all seems to have been done. The Turks were now very heavily


* Sir Ian Hamilton dismisses this fire very briefly, but it seems to have been important. Chocolate Hill got its name from the colour after the bush fires had died down, and the same fires gave Scimitar Hill its other name of Burnt Hill. Green Hill was so called presumably because it escaped the fire.



A French siege gun being fired on a Turkish battery on the Asiatic coast.



An Indian battery under cover in Gallipoli.



The Sari Bair Hills.

engaged at Seddil-Bahr, Lone Pine, and in Sari Bair, and were certainly not in a position to resist an attack had it been made. The cause of this inaction was again the exhaustion of the troops due to lack of water. General Hamilton admits that these pleas were well-founded, but complains that it was overlooked that the half-defeated Turks in front were equally exhausted and disorganised, and that an advance was the simplest and swiftest way of settling all troubles.

"Be this as it may, the objections overbore the corps commander's resolution. He had now got ashore three batteries (three of them mountain batteries), and the great guns of the ships were ready to speak at his request. But it was lack of artillery support which finally decided him to acquiesce in a policy of going slow, which, by the time it reached the troops, became translated into a period of inaction. The divisional generals were, in fact, informed that 'in view of the inadequate artillery support' General Stopford did not wish them to make frontal attacks on entrenched positions, but desired them, so far as was possible, to try and turn any trenches which were met with. Within the terms of this instruction lies the root of our failure to make use of the priceless daylight hours of the 8th of August."


At five in the morning of August 8th, though the fighting on Sari Bair was approaching its most critical stage, General Hamilton himself went to Suvla.

At an interview with General Stopford, Sir Ian Hamilton urged that the Eleventh Division even now should make an attack. The difficulties of the morning had been overcome, and the men had been watered and rested. By dawn the Turks would be in strength on the hills. Accordingly, General Hamilton issued an order for an attack. The Thirty-second Brigade was in the first position to move, but even it was unable to start

until four o'clock the next morning. The attack made good progress at first, but later was taken in flank and broke down. Attacks by the other brigades at dawn had no better success, though some leading troops did actually reach the top of Ismail Oglu Tepe. During the night the Fifty-third Division arrived, and two nights afterwards the Fifty-fourth. In an attack towards Anafarta on the 12th, the colonel of a Norfolk Battalion, Sir H. Beauchamp, with some sixteen officers and 250 men, pressed onwards through a wood on the hillside, driving the Turks before him. "Nothing more was ever seen or heard of any of them. They charged into the forest and were lost to sight and sound. Not one of them ever came back."

On the 15th General Stopford handed over the command of the Ninth Corps to General de Lisle. Sir Ian Hamilton now calculated that the Turks had in front of Suvla some 20,000 men against our 30,000, in Seddil-Bahr 35,000 against the British and French 40,000, and in Anzac 75,000 against our 23,000. He believed that with another 50,000 men he could still carry the Turkish positions and win his way to the Narrows; and he asked for them. They were refused, the reason doubtless being that we were now committed to the offensive at Loos, which took place at the end of September. Sir Ian Hamilton decided to mass every man that he could lay his hands on in a final attempt to carry Ismail Oglu Tepe. The famous Twenty-ninth Division was brought round from Seddil-Bahr, and the attack was delivered on August 21st.

The difficulty of carrying the hill, now that the Turks had had time to entrench themselves and bring up artillery,



Suvla Bay.

was that the approaches to it were without cover and enfiladed from the Turkish positions on the Scimitar and neighbouring hills. One brigade of the Twenty-ninth Division carried the Scimitar Hill, but was unable to advance further owing to the failure of the Thirty-second Brigade of the Eleventh Division to advance on the left. Another brigade of the Twenty-ninth Division was checked by a forest fire that broke out on their front. After the failure of the Eleventh Division, the Second South Midland Brigade moved out from behind Chocolate Hill, and, advancing slowly through the bush fires, seized a knoll south of Scimitar Hill, which it was thought at first to be Ismail Oglu Tepe. It was not, and the ground had to be abandoned. Our losses in this last action were 5,000, most of which fell on the war-worn Twenty-ninth Division. This last defeat, if the War Office refusal to furnish more troops still held, meant the failure of the Gallipoli expedition.

COMMENTS.

The decision of the Government not to send the reinforcements for which Sir Ian Hamilton asked was probably a mistake. It may be that 50,000 men would still have been insufficient to carry the Turkish positions, and that before they had arrived the Turks would have been reinforced by greater numbers still. It may be, too, that the Government felt that having given General Hamilton all the troops that he had asked for, it would

the time for which he had asked them, they had exhausted the chances of the Gallipoli expedition and were not justified in staking any more. Yet the probability is that the decisive reason for the refusal was the projected offensive in France. As between the chances in France and the chances in the Dardanelles, there is no doubt that their choice ought to have fallen otherwise than it did. However good the prospects in France—and, as it turned out, they were not to be realised—it is hard to believe that 50,000 men could possibly have so much effect in turning the scale there as they would probably have in Gallipoli; or that the Government had thought out the consequences of abandoning the offensive in Gallipoli. It is a sound rule in war that effort should not be dispersed but concentrated, but the right time to invoke that rule against the Dardanelles expedition was before it was launched, and not after our military credit had been committed and thousands of casualties suffered. Having once begun the land campaign, it was our duty to carry it through to a successful conclusion, unless it threatened to imperil graver interests elsewhere. This duty, as ought to have been foreseen, might also impose upon us the necessity of suspending the offensive in France, and, as it turned out, we should have been the gainers by bowing to this necessity. The vast bulk of the British armies was wasted throughout 1915, so far as practical results went. Very different would have been the results if one half of this effort had

been put forward in Gallipoli. When full allowance had been made for the magnitude of our reverses in Gallipoli in August, the fact remained that at the end of them all we were still in a better position to inflict a blow on Turkey by the expenditure of a given amount of energy than we were ever likely to be later in any other conditions. Besides, although the strategic centre of the war might be in France, it must never be forgotten that the chief cause of the war was Germany's ambitions in the Near East.

The Battles of Anzac and Suvla present many difficult problems of detail which will not be cleared up satisfactorily until after the end of the war, but their main outline is clear enough. The plan was good, and ought to have succeeded; that it came so near to success as it did disposes of the view very widely held that the whole enterprise was a mistake, and that if any attempt had to be made to force the Narrows it should have been in some one of a dozen different ways from that actually attempted. But good as the plan was, it had its defects. It is not clear whether the vital importance of the Suvla operations to the success of the attack on Sari Bair was as clearly grasped as it should have been. Was it understood by everyone in important command at Suvla that so much depended on the seizure of Ismail Oglu Tepe? Or how widespread was the idea that these operations at Suvla were not in the strict sense offensive so much as a defensive covering of the Anzac attacks? To answer that question fairly, and to decide how far if such an erroneous idea existed it had warrant, one would need to see all the orders that were issued. But if it was understood that the whole success of the Anzac operations depended on the capture by the Suvla Bay army of certain positions within a certain time, the delay on August 7th, and still more on August 8th, seems quite inexplicable. One cannot quite get rid of the impression that there must have been some misunderstanding of the real military motives of the Suvla landing to explain the delays. The importance of time ought not, one would think, to have depended on the military instinct of the commanders, but to have been a question of obedience or disobedience to orders. It has been said in defence of General Stopford that if he was helpless in face of his Divisional Commanders' opposition, so also was General Hamilton when he went to Suvla; but that is not just. It took him some hours to interview General Stopford, and to take all the bearings of the situation, but long before midnight he had given orders to which no disobedience was possible. Unfortunately, he was too late in arriving.

Much has been made of the rawness and inexperience of the troops at Anzac, and of the way in which they were thrown into the battle-line without any experience of the conditions of fighting in the country. There is some suspicion that something of the same kind happened at the Battle of Loos, and was the cause of the failure of the Reserves at a critical moment. In this case, however, the facts are admitted, and details have been made public on official authority. Much the frankest statement on the condition of the troops in the first few days at Suvla is that given by Colonel F. R. Freemantle, the Deputy Assistant Director of Medical Services:—

"These were fresh troops, straight out from a life of healthy training at home, but with no experience of war. From two to three weeks they had spent on the sea, cooped up on board ship, where, with the best will and discipline in the world, athletic fitness could not be maintained. They were suddenly landed in almost tropical heat, and thrown straight into action in a very sparsely cultivated country—and that a new line without trenches and with no cover."

"There were few local wells, giving little water, and that of variable, mostly inferior, quality. The mules that brought food and water up by night were heavily shelled. The difficulties of distribution were great, the heat and strain severe, the casualties many. If in England, as is officially taught, a soldier loses a quart of water in marching seven and a half miles, what must have been his water-needs under these conditions? And yet often he could not get even the pint of water allowed him at that time for all purposes in the twenty-four hours.

"Hunger, thirst, fatigue, strain, continued day and night (inevitable under the circumstances), were bound to tell on the troops. They would have told even on the hardened veterans of Helles and Anzac. It was a severe military baptism for Territorials. The effect was a general weakening of bodily resistance to the microscopic foes which fight impartially against both sides in every campaign, and which it is the peculiar privilege and most difficult task of the medical service to resist.

"In the Suvla Bay fighting during the week after landing the regimental medical officer, like the combatants, had to do what he could and how he could. Like them, he was advancing in darkness under fire through unknown, roadless, broken country, rock and scrub (thick bushes), hillocks and gullies, affording little cover, and no opportunity of taking any long or broad views of his battalion or of his work. For some time he could not establish any one regimental aid-post; he crawled about bandaging wounds, with his stretcher-bearers and himself helping to bring in the wounded, sometimes by day, mostly by night.

"The strain was intense, and four strong, healthy, mature regimental medical officers out of the twelve in the division succumbed to it in the first few days. One had dysenteric diarrhoea as his main symptom; one was suffering from exhaustion capped by a shell explosion within a few feet; the third, a jolly young giant from a prosperous suburban practice, finally succumbed to the shock of being called to attend four of his best pals laid out by a single shell. The fourth had lost his brother in the action, a combatant officer in the same regiment, and was brought down on a stretcher as if moribund. With the utmost pluck he pulled himself together in twenty-four hours and set out again for the trenches, but fainted on the way up, and was packed off on a hospital ship. If such was the result of strain on the medical officers, it may be imagined what its effects were on the troops."

General Hamilton argues with much force that the most elaborate preparations had been made for the supply of water to the troops at Suvla, and some figures have already been quoted (p. 359) of his transport arrangements. But whether or not sufficient water was brought in the ships, it is quite clear that it was not distributed to where it was wanted. No doubt General Hamilton is justified in blaming the officers of the Suvla force for the failure in distribution: the arrangements for filling a reservoir in Anzac also went wrong, but, says Sir Ian Hamilton, "It was not with folded arms that the officers there met their difficulties." Undoubtedly some of the officers at Suvla, especially in the higher ranks, failed very miserably to rise to a great opportunity. General Stopford, in particular, was quite unequal to the emergency. Yet he had been selected for the command at this most important part of the front by General Hamilton himself, and unless the accounts given by General Hamilton of his conduct does him grave injustice, it is strange that his unfitness had not shown itself before.

General Hamilton throughout these luckless operations in Gallipoli showed that he had one of the best minds of the army. He had clearness of strategic vision, great energy, as well as capacity for detail. It is not easy to suggest the name of anyone in the army who would have done the work better, and a great deal of the criticism passed on his plans strikes one as unjust. He had every quality of the general except that of being lucky, which

* *The Lancet*, Jan. 14th, 1916.

Napoleon—perhaps not wholly unreasonably—insisted was indispensable in his generals. It may have been that he was inclined to pay too much deference to the opinions of others, and lacked the remorselessness of military logic, or perhaps his tactical combinations were too subtle and presented too many openings for the wrecking of chance. But that the luck was always against General Hamilton is evident. This, the gravest charge that can fairly be brought against him, may to some seem so light as to do no more than establish a claim to sympathy. It amounts, however, to rather more than

that, for, as Napoleon thought, the absence of luck may be symptomatic of very real faults.

Suvla was the worst defeat a British army has ever suffered, and it had the gravest consequences on the course of the war. Followed, as it was, by the refusal of the Government to despatch reinforcements, it meant the failure of the Gallipoli expedition. The three great events of the war up to the present have been the Marne, Gorlice, and Suvla; and of these three, the two last, both heavy defeats, have fallen to the volume that is now closing under the darkest clouds since the beginning of the war.



At an Allied base in the Dardanelles: Mudros, with French soldiers in the foreground.

[All the illustrations in this chapter, save where specific acknowledgment is made to another source, are from official photographs of the Dardanelles Campaign circulated on behalf of the Press Bureau.]

A RETROSPECT.

IN the third volume of this History a great decline in the military fortunes of the Allies has taken place. At the beginning of spring Russian armies were hammering at the gates of the Carpathians, and Constantinople was in panic over the British attempts to force the Dardanelles. It looked as though the south-east of Europe might soon be lost to Germany, with Russian armies on the Hungarian plains and a British fleet off Constantinople; and though this eastern bastion was less important to Germany than the bastion which she had made in front of Westphalia in Belgium, it was certain that, shut off from the East and exposed to the rigours of British sea-power on the West, the end of her resistance could not be very long postponed. Before summer was over, all was changed. Russia had lost all Galicia except a small corner east of Lemberg, all Poland, and most of the Baltic Provinces. Instead of menacing East Prussia and Cracow, Russia was anxious for the safety of Riga, Minsk, and even Kieff. Between the most westerly point reached by her advance and her new lines in the Pripet Marshes was a distance of more than three hundred miles; and though the front of the Russian army was still intact, and irretrievable disaster had been averted, every milestone in the retreat had taken toll of a legion from the strength of Russia. By August, too, we were beaten in Gallipoli, and Turkish national spirit ran higher than it had done for a century. Nor were there any successes in the West to compensate for these disasters and reverses in the East. At Ypres, we were harder pressed in the spring than we had been in the previous autumn, and the perimeter of our defences had had to be greatly contracted. The expected general attack on the German lines talked of for the spring was postponed till the autumn, and then, though it shook the confidence of the enemy, and inflicted heavy loss on him, it both failed in its main object and was exceedingly costly. In the Battle of Loos we had twice as many casualties as Napoleon at Borodino, the type of the bloody and indecisive battle. The prospect at the end of the summer was black indeed, nor did it bring any consolation to reflect that it was not so bad as had seemed likely when Brest-Litowsk fell. There was abundant reason to fear that they were right who held that some of the worst consequences of this disastrous success were yet to come.

The causes of the Russian reverses have already been discussed. There was no inferiority in the quality of the troops; indeed, one of the saddest lessons of this war is that individual valour is the cheapest and most widespread of military virtues. Nor, though some of his subordinates were badly at fault, was the Grand Duke outgeneralled by Hindenburg. The chief cause was the marked inferiority of the Russians on the mechanical side of war, the poorer equipment of her forces, their lack of good communications, and especially of railways, and in too many instances it must be added the lack of honesty in the supply services. It has already been noted that all through the first autumn and winter the

Russians but rarely outnumbered their enemies, and were oftener outnumbered. It needed no genius, but only competence, good organisation, and heavy reinforcements of men and material, for the Germans to turn the tables on this front. There were two ways in which this danger of German concentration against Russia could be met. One was by vigorous attack on the West, and it was to anticipate such movement that the Germans made their gas attacks north of Ypres. The other way was by forcing the Dardanelles. The British Government tried both ways, and failed in both; but it is obvious enough now that one-half of the effort vainly spent in forcing the German lines in the West would, if it had been applied early in the Dardanelles, have put this country in a winning position by the end of the year. The just censures on the mismanagement of the Gallipoli expedition have redounded quite unjustly to the discredit of the whole enterprise. In reality, the attack on the Dardanelles, considered as a piece of strategy, was one of the two examples of real military insight that the war had yet produced from the British side. The other example was Sir John French's transference of the British army into Flanders, which, combined with the occupation of Ypres by General Rawlinson's Division, saved France in a sense in which neither British valour in the retreat from Mons nor the Battle of the Marne can be said to have done.

Of two alternatives, one: Either the Dardanelles enterprise was a mistake from the beginning, and we ought to have cut ourselves from it at the earliest possible moment, or, having begun it, our wisest policy was to employ such force as would have ensured success. The second alternative was surely the sounder. It was most unfortunate that the attack was delivered by the fleet alone before an army was ready to co-operate. There was no need for hurry; and had the attacks been deferred until an army had been collected, the probability is that the Turks would have been no more prepared to meet them then than they were when the first naval attacks were made. Twenty thousand men in March or April could have done more than three times their number three months later or than six times six months later. It would appear that Sir Ian Hamilton was given as many troops as he asked for, though not always as soon as he asked for them, or of the seasoned quality that the exceptional difficulty of the ground required, and when the attack described in the last chapter was delivered there was a very confident expectation both there and at home that it would succeed. Mr. Asquith has described his deep disappointment. But when an enterprise comes so near to success and fails after all, it is evident that its plan has left too little margin for accidents. The art of directing war is, first, to determine which is the decisive area in the war, and secondly, having determined, to establish such a superiority in that field that nothing is left to chance and victory is, humanly speaking, certain.

If this standard be applied, the Government, obviously, did not regard Gallipoli as the decisive area, but France.

It was to France that the greater part of the British reinforcements were directed in the summer, and no doubt it was true that in the long run France was the decisive field for us. The error lay in mistiming the moment at which we could attack in the West with a probability of victory. After the failure in spring the attack in the West was postponed till autumn; but even that was too early to obtain the desired results. There were evidently serious miscalculations of the problem in the West, which not only cost us dear there, but, also—by diverting our energies—prevented us from exerting them in the area where success could have been made morally certain. It is fair to censure the blunders of the Gallipoli campaign; but it must also be remembered that miscalculations about the West helped to make those blunders possible.

The miscalculations were these. In the first place, we underestimated the strength of field entrenchments, and the superiority both of men and material necessary to carry them. Yet we had had some warning. The British army held Ypres against numbers frequently three times as great as their own, and a superiority in artillery which was greater still; and, even allowing for the fact that the defenders of Ypres were British long-service soldiers—probably the best ever seen on the continent of Europe—it was reasonable to suppose that to win a victory over defences that had been elaborated for a year at least, that superiority would be required over the Germans. At the opening of Neuve Chapelle, and in some passages of the action at Loos, the attack probably reached and even exceeded this excess of strength over the enemy. But greater numbers in the attack were only one factor out of many necessary to secure success. Others that were even more important were superiority in guns, and in high-explosive shell, which alone could break down the elaborate works; good staff work to meet the enemy's counter-attacks; and, generally, the highest possible efficiency in the commissioned ranks. A great deal of work had been done towards the first of these objects, thanks to the restless energy of the Minister of Munitions. But the problems of command were much more difficult. An army is more than the sum of the men

who are in it; it is more even than the machine. It is a collective intelligence. Brilliant as the British gift of extemporisation is, it cannot extemporise the trained military mind. The British army had at the outset of the war many exceedingly competent and a few brilliant leaders, and a good General Staff. But their numbers were only proportionate to the size of the army. When that army came to be multiplied by five and ten a very real shortage of trained military thinkers began to show itself. That this deficiency should exist reflected no discredit on the army; but it was strange that it was not recognised earlier and more generally. Had it been, there would have been less tragic waste of the young minds of the country in the ranks of the junior subalterns.

It was natural that the disappointments of the year should have their reflection in politics, and the political events of the summer added not a few to the discomforts of war time. Home politics are not seen at their best in war, and Parliament, which should have taken the lead in rational and healthy criticism—never more valuable to a Government than in war—rarely rose to the occasion. After the Coalition, again, a real Opposition party (which after all is as necessary to the Government of the country as the Government itself) became impossible, and the extreme reticence of the Government did not make rational appreciation of the facts of the war any easier. Such opposition as there was was transferred to the newspapers. Politics seemed singularly unreal for the most part, and discussion had a difficulty in fastening on the true points at issue. There was much intrigue, and perhaps even more rumours of intrigue. The main result was an unsettlement of the popular mind, and the creation of a political atmosphere strangely electrical, in which men had the constant feeling of great impending change.

Amid these uncertainties and disappointments the resolution of the country never changed except to harden. Through all the perplexities of the military situation it was sustained by confidence in the fleet, which was never more brilliantly justified than when the military prospects were most clouded.



British staff officers questioning captured Turkish officers on the field of battle.

APPENDICES.

GENERAL HAMILTON'S DESPATCHES.

I.—THE LANDING.

From the General Commanding the Mediterranean Expeditionary Force.

To the Secretary of State for War, War Office, London, S.W.

General Headquarters,
Mediterranean Expeditionary Force,
20th May, 1915.

MY LORD,

I have the honour to submit my report on the operations in the Gallipoli Peninsula up to and including the 5th May.

The covering force of the Twenty-ninth Division left Mudros Harbour on the evening of 23rd April for the five beaches, S, V, W, X, and Y.* Of these, V, W, and X were to be main landings, the landings at S and Y being made mainly to protect the flanks, to disseminate the forces of the enemy, and to interrupt the arrival of his reinforcements. The landings at S and Y were to take place at dawn, whilst it was planned that the first troops for V, W, and X beaches should reach the shore simultaneously at 5.30 a.m. after half an hour's bombardment from the fleet.

The transports conveying the covering force arrived off Tenedos on the morning of the 24th, and during the afternoon the troops were transferred to the warships and fleet-sweepers in which they were to approach the shore. About midnight, these ships, each towing a number of cutters and other small boats, silently slipped their cables and, escorted by the Third Squadron of the Fleet, steamed slowly towards their final rendezvous at Cape Helles. The rendezvous was reached just before dawn on the 25th. The morning was absolutely still; there was no sign of life on the shore; a thin veil of mist hung motionless over the promontory; the surface of the sea was as smooth as glass. The four battleships and four cruisers which formed the Third Squadron at once took up the positions that had been allotted to them, and at 5 a.m., it being then light enough to fire, a violent bombardment of the enemy's defences was begun. Meanwhile, the troops were being rapidly transferred to the small boats in which they were to be towed ashore. Not a move on the part of the enemy; except for shells thrown from the Asiatic side of the Straits the guns of the Fleet remained unanswered.

(After describing the landings on S and Y beach, the despatch proceeds.)

The landing-place known as X beach consists of a strip of sand some 200 yards long by eight yards wide at the foot of a low cliff. The troops to be landed here were the First Royal Fusiliers, who were to be towed ashore from H.M.S. *Implacable* in two parties, half a battalion at a time, together with a beach working party found by the Anson Battalion, Royal Naval Division. About 6 a.m. H.M.S. *Implacable*, with a boldness much admired by the army, stood quite close in to the beach, firing very rapidly with every gun she could bring to bear. Thus seconded, the Royal Fusiliers made good their landing with but little loss. The battalion then advanced to attack the Turkish trenches on the Hill 114, situated between V and W beaches, but were heavily counter-attacked and forced to give ground. Two more battalions of the Eighty-seventh Brigade soon followed them, and by evening the troops had established themselves in an entrenched position extending from half a mile round the landing-place and as far south as Hill 114. Here they were in touch with the Lancashire Fusiliers, who had landed on W beach. Brigadier-General Marshall, commanding the Eighty-seventh Brigade, had been wounded during the day's fighting, but continued in command of the brigade.

The landing on V beach had been planned to take place on the following lines:—

As soon as the enemy's defences had been heavily bombarded by the fleet,

three companies of the Dublin Fusiliers were to be towed ashore. They were to be closely followed by the collier *River Clyde* (Commander Unwin, R.N.), carrying between decks the balance of the Dublin Fusiliers, the Munster Fusiliers, half a battalion of the Hampshire Regiment, the West Riding Field Company, and other details.

The *River Clyde* had been specially prepared for the rapid disembarkation of her complement, and large openings for the exit of the troops had been cut in her sides, giving on to a wide gang-plank by which the men could pass rapidly into lighters which she had in tow. As soon as the first tows had reached land the *River Clyde* was to be run straight ashore. Her lighters were to be placed in position to form a gangway between the ship and the beach, and by this means it was hoped that 2,000 men could be thrown ashore with the utmost rapidity. Further, to assist in covering the landing, a battery of machine guns, protected by sandbags, had been mounted in her bows.

The remainder of the covering force detailed for this beach was then to follow in tows from the attendant battleships.

V beach is situated immediately to the west of Seddil-Bahr. Between the bluff on which stands Seddil-Bahr village and that which is crowned by No. 1 Fort the ground forms a very regular amphitheatre of three or four hundred yards radius. The slopes down to the beach are slightly concave, so that the whole area contained within the limits of this natural amphitheatre, whose grassy terraces rise gently to a height of a hundred feet above the shore, can be swept by the fire of a defender. The beach itself is a sandy strip some 10 yards wide and 350 yards long, backed along almost the whole of its length by a low sandy escarpment about four feet high, where the ground falls nearly sheer down to the beach. The slight shelter afforded by this escarpment played no small part in the operations of the succeeding thirty-two hours.

At the south-eastern extremity of the beach, between the shore and the village, stands the old fort of Seddil-Bahr, a battered ruin with wide breaches in its walls, and mounds of fallen masonry within and around it. On the ridge to the north, overlooking the amphitheatre, stands a ruined barrack. Both of these buildings, as well as No. 1 Fort, had been long bombarded by the fleet, and the guns of the forts had been put out of action; but their crumbled walls and the ruined outskirts of the village afforded cover for riflemen, while from the terraced slopes already described the defenders were able to command the open beach, as a stage is overlooked from the balconies of a theatre. On the very margin of the beach a strong barbed-wire entanglement, made of heavier metal and longer barbs than I have ever seen elsewhere, ran right across from the old fort of Seddil-Bahr to the foot of the north-western headland. Two-thirds of the way up the ridge a second and even stronger entanglement crossed the amphitheatre, passing in front of the old barrack and ending in the outskirts of the village. A third transverse entanglement, joining these two, ran up the hill near the eastern end of the beach, and almost at right angles to it. Above the upper entanglement the ground was scored with the enemy's trenches, in one of which four pom-poms were emplaced; in others were dummy pom-poms to draw fire, while the debris of the shattered buildings on either flank afforded cover and concealment for a number of machine-guns, which brought a cross-fire to bear on the ground already swept by rifle fire from the ridge.

Needless to say, the difficulties in the way of previous reconnaissance had rendered it impossible to obtain detailed information with regard either to the locality or to the enemy's preparations.

As often happens in war, the actual

with the intentions of the Commander. The *River Clyde* came into position off Seddil-Bahr in advance of the tows, and, just as the latter reached the shore, Commander Unwin beached his ship also. Whilst the boats and the collier were approaching the landing place the Turks made no sign. Up to the very last moment it appeared as if the landing was to be unopposed. But the moment the first boat touched bottom the storm broke. A tornado of fire swept over the beach, the incoming boats, and the collier. The Dublin Fusiliers and the naval boats' crews suffered exceedingly heavy losses while still in the boats. Those who succeeded in landing and in crossing the strip of sand managed to gain some cover when they reached the low escarpment on the further side. None of the boats, however, were able to get off again, and they and their crews were destroyed upon the beach.

Now came the moment for the *River Clyde* to pour forth her living freight; but grievous delay was caused here by the difficulty of placing the lighters in position between the ship and the shore. A strong current hindered the work, and the enemy's fire was so intense that almost every man engaged upon it was immediately shot. Owing, however, to the splendid gallantry of the naval working party, the lighters were eventually placed in position, and then the disembarkation began.

A company of the Munster Fusiliers led the way, but, short as was the distance, few of the men ever reached the farther side of the beach through the hail of bullets which poured down upon them from both flanks and the front. As the second company followed, the extemporised pier of lighters gave way in the current. The end nearest to the shore drifted into deep water, and many men who had escaped being shot were drowned by the weight of their equipment in trying to swim from the lighter to the beach. Undaunted workers were still forthcoming, the lighters were again brought into position, and the third company of the Munster Fusiliers rushed ashore, suffering heaviest loss this time from shrapnel, as well as from rifle, pom-pom, and machine-gun fire.

For a space the attempt to land was discontinued. When it was resumed the lighters again drifted into deep water, with Brigadier-General Napier, Captain Costeker, his Brigade Major, and a number of men of the Hampshire Regiment on board. There was nothing for them all but to lie down on the lighters, and it was here that General Napier and Captain Costeker were killed. At this time, between 10 and 11 a.m., about 1,000 men had left the collier, and of these nearly half had been killed or wounded before they could reach the little cover afforded by the steep, sandy bank at the top of the beach. Further attempts to disembark were now given up. Had the troops all been in open boats but few of them would have lived to tell the tale. But, most fortunately, the collier was so constructed as to afford fairly efficient protection to the men who were still on board, and, so long as they made no attempt to land, they suffered comparatively little loss.

Throughout the remainder of the day there was practically no change in the position of affairs. The situation was probably saved by the machine-guns on the *River Clyde*, which did valuable service in keeping down the enemy's fire and in preventing any attempt on their part to launch a counter-attack. One half-company of the Dublin Fusiliers, which had been landed at a cumber just east of Seddil-Bahr village, was unable to work its way across to V beach, and by mid-day had only twenty-five men left. It was proposed to divert to V beach that part of the main body which had been intended to land on V beach; but this would have involved considerable delay owing to the distance, and the main body was diverted to W beach, where the Lancashire Fusiliers had already effected a landing.

*See Map, p. 27.

Late in the afternoon part of the Worcestershire Regiment and the Lancashire Fusiliers worked across the high ground from W beach, and seemed likely to relieve the situation by taking the defenders of V beach in flank. The pressure on their own front, however, and the numerous barbed-wire entanglements which intervened, checked this advance, and at nightfall the Turkish garrison still held their ground. Just before dark some small parties of our men made their way along the shore to the outer walls of the Old Fort, and when night had fallen the remainder of the infantry from the collier were landed. A good force was now available for attack, but our troops were at such a cruel disadvantage as to position, and the fire of the enemy was still so accurate in the bright moonlight, that all attempts to clear the fort and the outskirts of the village during the night failed one after the other. The wounded who were able to do so without support returned to the collier under cover of darkness; but otherwise the situation at daybreak on the 26th was the same as it had been on the previous day, except that the troops first landed were becoming very exhausted.

Twenty-four hours after the disembarkation began there were ashore on V beach the survivors of the Dublin and Munster Fusiliers and of two companies of the Hampshire Regiment. The Brigadier and his Brigade-Major had been killed; Lieutenant-Colonel Carrington Smith, commanding the Hampshire Regiment, had been killed, and the Adjutant had been wounded. The Adjutant of the Munster Fusiliers was wounded, and the great majority of the senior officers were either wounded or killed. The remnant of the landing-party still crouched on the beach beneath the shelter of the sandy escarpment which had saved so many lives. With them were two officers of my General Staff—Lieutenant-Colonel Doughty-Wylie and Lieutenant-Colonel Williams. These two officers, who had landed from the *River Clyde*, had been striving, with conspicuous contempt for danger, to keep all their comrades in good heart during this day and night of ceaseless imminent peril.

Now that it was daylight once more, Lieutenant-Colonels Doughty-Wylie and Williams set to work to organise an attack on the hill above the beach. Any soldier who has endeavoured to pull scattered units together after they have been dominated for many consecutive hours by close and continuous fire will be able to take the measure of their difficulties. Fortunately, General Hunter Weston had arranged with Rear-Admiral Wemyss about this same time for a heavy bombardment to be opened by the ships upon the Old Fort, Seddil-Bahr village, the Old Castle north of the village, and on the ground leading up from the beach. Under cover of this bombardment, and led by Lieutenant-Colonel Doughty-Wylie and Captain Walford, Brigade-Major R.A., the troops gained a footing in the village by 10 a.m. They encountered a most stubborn opposition, and suffered heavy losses from the fire of well-concealed riflemen and machine-guns. Undeterred by the resistance, and supported by the naval gunfire, they pushed forward, and soon after midday they penetrated to the northern edge of the village, whence they were in a position to attack the Old Castle and Hill 141. During this advance Captain Walford was killed. Lieutenant-Colonel Doughty-Wylie had most gallantly led the attack all the way up from the beach through the west side of the village, under galling fire. And now, when, owing so largely to his own inspiring example and intrepid courage, the position had almost been gained, he was killed while leading the last assault. But the attack was pushed forward without wavering, and, fighting their way across the open with great dash, the troops gained the summit and occupied the Old Castle and Hill 141 before 2 p.m.

W beach consists of a strip of deep, powdery sand some 350 yards long and from fifteen to forty yards wide, situated immediately south of Tekke Burnu, where a small gully running down to the sea opens out a break in the cliffs. On either flank of the beach the ground rises precipitously but, in the centre, a number of sand dunes

afford a more gradual access to the ridge overlooking the sea. Much time and ingenuity had been employed by the Turks in turning this landing place into a death trap. Close to the water's edge a broad wire entanglement extended the whole length of the shore, and a supplementary barbed network lay concealed under the surface of the sea in the shallows. Land mines and sea mines had been laid. The high ground overlooking the beach was strongly fortified with trenches to which the gully afforded a natural covered approach. A number of machine-guns were also cunningly tucked away into holes in the cliff so as to be immune from a naval bombardment whilst they were converging their fire on the wire entanglements. The crest of the hill overlooking the beach was in its turn commanded by high ground to the north-west and south-east, and especially by two strong infantry redoubts near point 138. Both these redoubts were protected by wire entanglements about twenty feet broad, and could be approached only by a bare glacis-like slope leading up from the high ground above W beach or from the Cape Helles lighthouse. In addition, another separate entanglement ran down from these two redoubts to the edge of the cliff near the lighthouse, making the intercommunication between V and W beaches impossible until these redoubts had been captured.

So strong, in fact, were the defences of W beach that the Turks may well have considered them impregnable, and it is my firm conviction that no finer feat of arms has ever been achieved by the British soldier—or any other soldier—than the storming of these trenches from open boats on the morning of 25th April.

The landing at W had been entrusted to the First Battalion Lancashire Fusiliers (Major Bishop), and it was to the complete lack of the senses of danger or of fear of this daring battalion that we owed our astonishing success. As in the case of the landing at X, the disembarkation had been delayed for half an hour, but at 6 a.m. the whole battalion approached the shore together, towed by eight picket boats in line abreast, each picket boat pulling four ship's cutters. As soon as shallow water was reached, the tows were cast off and the boats were at once rowed to the shore. Three companies headed for the beach, and a company on the left of the line made for a small ledge of rock immediately under the cliff at Tekke Burnu. Brigadier-General Hare, commanding the Eighty-eighth Brigade, accompanied this latter party, which escaped the cross-fire brought to bear upon the beach, and was also in a better position than the rest of the battalion to turn the wire entanglements.

While the troops were approaching the shore no shot had been fired from the enemy's trenches, but as soon as the first boat touched the ground a hurricane of lead swept over the battalion. Gallantly led by their officers, the Fusiliers literally hurled themselves ashore and, fired at from right, left, and centre, commenced hacking their way through the wire. A long line of men was at once mown down as by a scythe, but the remainder were not to be denied. Covered by the fire of the warships, which had now closed right in to the shore, and helped by the flanking fire of the company on the extreme left, they broke through the entanglements and collected under the cliffs on either side of the beach. Here the companies were rapidly re-formed, and set forth to storm the enemy's entrenchments wherever they could find them.

In making these attacks the bulk of the battalion moved up towards Hill 114, whilst a small party worked down towards the trenches on the Cape Helles side of the landing-place.

Several land mines were exploded by the Turks during the advance, but the determination of the troops was in no way affected. By 10 a.m. three lines of hostile trenches were in our hands, and our hold on the beach was assured.

About 9-30 a.m. more infantry had begun to disembark, and by 11 a.m. the troops who had landed on Hill 114 with the troops

On the right, owing to the strength of the redoubt on Hill 138, little progress could be made. The small party of Lancashire Fusiliers which had advanced in this direction succeeded in reaching the edge of the wire entanglements, but were not strong enough to do more, and it was here that Major Frankland, Brigade Major of the Eighty-sixth Infantry Brigade, who had gone forward to make a personal reconnaissance, was unfortunately killed. Brigadier-General Hare had been wounded earlier in the day, and Colonel Woolly-Dod, General Staff 29th Division, was now sent ashore to take command at W beach and organise a further advance.

At 2 p.m., after the ground near Hill 138 had been subjected to a heavy bombardment, the Worcester Regiment advanced to the assault. Several men of this battalion rushed forward with great spirit to cut passages through the entanglement; some were killed, others persevered, and by 4 p.m. the hill and redoubt were captured.

An attempt was now made to join hands with the troops on V beach, who could make no headway at all against the dominating defences of the enemy. To help them out, the Eighty-sixth Brigade pushed forward in an easterly direction along the cliff. There is a limit, however, to the storming of barbed-wire entanglements. More of these barred the way: Again the heroic wire-cutters came out. Through glasses they could be seen quietly snipping away under a hellish fire as if they were pruning a vineyard. Again some of them fell. The fire pouring out of No. 1 Fort grew hotter and hotter, until the troops, now thoroughly exhausted by a sleepless night and by the long day's fighting under a hot sun, had to rest on their laurels for a while.

When night fell the British position in front of W beach extended from just east of Cape Helles lighthouse, through Hill 138, to Hill 114. Practically every man had to be thrown into the trenches to hold this line, and the only available reserves on this part of our front were the Second London Field Company R.E. and a platoon of the Anson Battalion, which had been landed as a beach working party.

During the night several strong and determined counter-attacks were made, all successfully repulsed without loss of ground. Meanwhile, the disembarkation of the remainder of the division was proceeding on W and X beaches.

The Australian and New Zealand Army Corps sailed out of Mudros Bay on the afternoon of April 24th, escorted by the Second Squadron of the Fleet, under Rear-Admiral Thursby. The rendezvous was reached just after half-past one in the morning of the 25th, and there the 1,500 men who had been placed on board H.M. ships before leaving Mudros were transferred to their boats. This operation was carried out with remarkable expedition, and in absolute silence. Simultaneously the remaining 2,500 men of the covering force were transferred from their transports to six destroyers. At 2-30 a.m. H.M. ships, together with the tows and the destroyers, proceeded to within some four miles of the coast, H.M.S. *Queen* (flying Rear-Admiral Thursby's flag) directing on a point about a mile north of Kaba Tepe. At 3-30 a.m. orders to go ahead and land were given to the tows, and at 4-10 a.m. the destroyers were ordered to follow.

All these arrangements worked without a hitch, and were carried out in complete orderliness and silence. No breath of wind ruffled the surface of the sea, and every condition was favourable save for the moon, which, sinking behind the ships, may have silhouetted them against its orb, betraying them thus to watchers on the shore.

A rugged and difficult part of the coast had been selected for the landing, so difficult and rugged that I considered the Turks were not at all likely to anticipate such a descent. Indeed, owing to the tows having failed to maintain their exact direction the actual point of disembarkation was rather more than a mile north of that which I had selected, and was more closely overhung by steeper cliffs. Although this accident increased the initial difficulty of driving the enemy off the heights inland, it has since proved itself to have been a blessing in disguise, inasmuch as the actual base of

the force of occupation has been much better defiled from shell fire.

The beach on which the landing was actually effected is a very narrow strip of sand, about 1,000 yards in length, bounded on the north and the south by two small promontories. At its southern extremity a deep ravine, with exceedingly steep, scrub-clad sides, runs inland in a north-easterly direction. Near the northern end of the beach a small but steep gully runs up into the hills at right angles to the shore. Between the ravine and the gully the whole of the beach is backed by the seaward face of the spur which forms the north-western side of the ravine. From the top of the spur the ground falls almost sheer, except near the southern limit of the beach, where gentler slopes give access to the mouth of the ravine behind. Further inland lie in a tangled knot the under features of Sari Bair, separated by deep ravines, which take a most confusing diversity of direction. Sharp spurs, covered with dense scrub, and falling away in many places in precipitous sandy cliffs, radiate from the principal mass of the mountain, from which they run north-west, west, south-west, and south to the coast.

The boats approached the land in the silence and the darkness, and they were close to the shore before the enemy stirred. Then about one battalion of Turks was seen running along the beach to intercept the lines of boats. At this so critical a moment the conduct of all ranks was most praiseworthy. Not a word was spoken—everyone remained perfectly orderly and quiet awaiting the enemy's fire, which sure enough opened, causing many casualties. The moment the boats touched land the Australians' turn had come. Like lightning they leapt ashore, and each man as he did so went straight as his bayonet at the enemy. So vigorous was the onslaught that the Turks made no attempt to withstand it, and fled from ridge to ridge pursued by the Australian infantry.

This attack was carried out by the Third Australian Brigade, under Major (temporary Colonel) Sinclair MacLagan, D.S.O. The first and second Brigades followed promptly, and were all disembarked by 2 p.m., by which time 12,000 men and two batteries of Indian Mountain Artillery had been landed. The disembarkation of further artillery was delayed owing to the fact that the enemy's heavy guns opened on the anchorage and forced the transports, which had been subjected to continuous shelling from his field-guns, to stand further out to sea.

The broken ground, the thick scrub, the necessity for sending any formed detachments post-haste as they landed to the critical point of the moment, the headlong valour of scattered groups of the men who had pressed far further into the peninsula than had been intended—all these led to confusion and mixing up of units. Eventually the mixed crowd of fighting men, some advancing from the beach, others falling back before the oncoming Turkish supports, solidified into a semi-circular position, with its right about a mile north of Kaba Tepe and its left on the high ground over Fisherman's Hut. During this period parties of the Ninth and Tenth Battalions charged and put out of action three of the enemy's Krupp guns. During this period also the disembarkation of the Australian Division was being followed by that of the New Zealand and Australian Division (two brigades only).

From 11 a.m. to 3 p.m. the enemy, now reinforced to a strength of 20,000 men, attacked the whole line, making a specially strong effort against the Third Brigade and the left of the Second Brigade. This counter-attack was, however, handsomely repulsed with the help of the guns of H.M. ships. Between 5 and 6-30 p.m. a third most determined counter-attack was made against the Third Brigade, who held their ground with more than equivalent stubbornness. During the night again the Turks made constant attacks, and the Eighth Battalion repelled a bayonet charge; but in spite of all the line held firm. The troops had had practically no rest on the night of the 24th-25th; they had been fighting hard all day over most difficult country, and

they had been subjected to heavy shrapnel fire in the open. Their casualties had been deplorably heavy. But, despite their losses and in spite of their fatigue, the morning of the 26th found them still in good heart and as full of fight as ever.

It is a consolation to know that the Turks suffered still more seriously. Several times our machine-guns got on to them in close formation, and the whole surrounding country is still strewn with their dead of this date.

The reorganisation of units and formations was impossible during the 26th and 27th owing to persistent attacks. An advance was impossible until a reorganisation could be effected, and it only remained to entrench the position gained and to perfect the arrangements for bringing up ammunition, water, and supplies to the ridges—in itself a most difficult undertaking. Four battalions of the Royal Naval Division was sent up to reinforce the Army Corps on the 28th and 29th April.

Throughout the events I have chronicled the Royal Navy has been father and mother to the Army. Not one of us but realises how much he owes to Vice-Admiral de Robeck; to the warships, French and British; to the destroyers, mine sweepers, picket boats, and to all their dauntless crews, who took no thought of themselves, but risked everything to give their soldier comrades a fair run in at the enemy.

Throughout these preparations and operations Monsieur le Général d'Amade has given me the benefit of his wide experiences of war, and has afforded me, always, the most loyal and energetic support. The landing of Kum Kale, planned by me as a mere diversion to distract the attention of the enemy, was transformed by the Commander of the Corps Expéditionnaire de l'Orient into a brilliant operation, which secured some substantial results. During the fighting which followed the landing of the French Division at Seddil-Bahr no troops could have acquitted themselves more creditably under very trying circumstances, and under very heavy losses, than those working under the orders of Monsieur le Général d'Amade.

Lieutenant-General Sir W. R. Birdwood, K.C.S.I., C.B., C.I.E., D.S.O., was in command of the detached landing of the Australian and New Zealand Army Corps above Kaba Tepe, as well as during the subsequent fighting. The fact of his having been responsible for the execution of these difficult and hazardous operations—operations which were crowned with a very remarkable success—speaks, I think, for itself.

Major-General A. G. Hunter-Weston, C.B., D.S.O., was tried very highly, not only during the landings, but more especially in the day and night attacks and counter-attacks which ensued. Untrifling, resourceful, and ever more cheerful as the outlook (on occasion) grew darker, he possesses, in my opinion, very special qualifications as a commander of troops in the field.

Major-General W. P. Braithwaite, C.B., is the best Chief of the General Staff it has ever been my fortune to encounter in war. I will not pile epithets upon him. I can say no more than what I have said, and I can certainly say no less.

I have many other names to bring to notice for the period under review, and these will form the subject of a separate report at an early date.

I have the honour to be,
Your Lordship's most obedient servant,
IAN HAMILTON,
General Commanding Mediterranean Expeditionary Force.

II.—THE BATTLE OF JUNE 4th.

I now return to the southern zone and to the battle of the 4th June.

From 25th May onwards the troops had been trying to work up within rushing distance of the enemy's front trenches. On the 25th May the Royal Naval and Forty-second Divisions crept 100 yards nearer to the Turks, and on the night of 28th-29th May the whole of the British line made a further small advance. On that night the French Corps Expéditionnaire was success-

in capturing a small redoubt on the extreme Turkish left west of the Kereves Dere. All Turkish counter-attacks during 29th May were repulsed. On the night of 30th May two of their many assaults effected temporary lodgment, but on both occasions they were driven out again with the bayonet. On every subsequent night up to that of the 3rd-4th June assaults were made upon the redoubt and upon our line, but at the end of that period our position remained intact.

This brings the narrative up to the day of the general attack upon the enemy's front line of trenches, which ran from the west of the Kereves Dere in a northerly direction to the sea.

21,000 MEN ENGAGED.

Taking our line of battle from right to left, the troops were deployed in the following order:—The Corps Expéditionnaire, the Royal Naval Division, the Forty-second (East Lancashire) Division, and the Twenty-ninth Division.

The length of the front, so far as the British troops were concerned, was rather over 4,000 yards, and the total infantry available amounted to 21,000 men, which permitted the General Officer Commanding Eighth Army Corps to form a corps reserve of 7,000 men.

My general headquarters for the day were at the command post on the peninsula. At 8 a.m. on 4th June our heavy artillery opened with a deliberate bombardment, which continued till 10-30 a.m. At 11 a.m. the bombardment recommenced, and continued till 11-20 a.m., when a feint attack was made, which successfully drew heavy fire from the enemy's guns and rifles. At 11-30 a.m. all our guns opened fire, and continued with increasing intensity till noon.

On the stroke of noon the artillery increased their range, and along the whole line the infantry fixed bayonets and advanced. The assault was immediately successful. On the extreme right the French First Division carried a line of trench, whilst the French Second Division, with the greatest dash and gallantry, captured a strong redoubt called the "Haricot," for which they had already had three desperate contests. Only the extreme left of the French was unable to gain any ground, a feature destined to have an unfortunate effect upon the final issue.

The Second Naval Brigade of the Royal Naval Division rushed with great dash; the Anson Battalion captured the southern face of a Turkish redoubt, which formed a salient in the enemy's line; the Howe and Hood Battalions captured trenches fronting them, and by 12-15 p.m. the whole Turkish line forming their first objective was in their hands. Their consolidating party went forward at 12-25 p.m.

The Manchester Brigade of the Forty-second Division advanced magnificently. In five minutes the first line of Turkish trenches were captured, and by 12-30 p.m. the brigade had carried with a rush the line forming their second objective, having made an advance of 600 yards in all. The working parties got to work without incident, and the position here could not possibly have been better.

On the left, the 20th Division met with more difficulty. All along the section of the Eighty-eighth Brigade the troops jumped out of their trenches at noon and charged across the open at the nearest Turkish trench. In most places the enemy crossed bayonets with our men, and inflicted severe loss upon us. But the Eighty-eighth Brigade was not to be denied. The Worcester Regiment was the first to capture trenches, and the remainder of the Eighty-eighth Brigade, though at first held up by flanking as well as fronting fire, also pushed on doggedly until they had fairly made good the whole of the Turkish first-line.

Only on the extreme left did we sustain a check. Here the Turkish front trench was so sited as to have escaped damage from our artillery bombardment, and the barbed-wire obstacle was intact. The result was that, although the Fourteenth Sikhs, on the right flank, pushed on despite losses amounting to three-fourths of their effectives, the centre of the brigade could make

no headway. A company of the Sixth Gurkhas, on the left, skillfully led along the cliffs by its commander, actually forced its way into a Turkish work, but the failure of the rest of the brigade threatened isolation, and it was as skillfully withdrawn under fire. Reinforcements were therefore sent to the left, so that if possible a fresh attack might be organised.

Meanwhile, on the right of the line, the gains of the morning were being compromised. A very heavy counter-attack had developed against the "Haricot." The Turks poured in masses of men through prepared communication trenches, and under cover of accurate shell-fire were able to recapture that redoubt. The French, forced to fall back, uncovered in so doing the right flank of the Royal Naval Division. Shortly before 1 p.m. the right of the Second Naval Brigade had to retire with very heavy loss from the redoubt they had captured, thus exposing in their turn the Howe and Hood Battalions to enfilade, so that they, too, had nothing for it but to retreat across the open under exceedingly heavy machine-gun and musketry fire.

By 1-30 p.m. the whole of the captured trenches in this section had been lost again, and the brigade was back in its original position, the Collingwood Battalion, which had gone forward in support, having been practically destroyed.

The question was now whether this rolling up of the newly-captured line from the right would continue until the whole of our gains were wiped out. It looked very like it, for now the enfilade fire of the Turks began to fall upon the Manchester Brigade of the Forty-second Division, which was firmly consolidating the furthest distant line of trenches it had so brilliantly won. After 1-30 p.m. it became increasingly difficult for this gallant brigade to hold its ground. Heavy casualties occurred; the brigadier and many other officers were wounded or killed. Yet it continued to hold out with the greatest tenacity and grit. Every effort was made to sustain the brigade in its position. Its right flank was thrown back to make face against the enfilade fire, and reinforcements were sent to try to fill the diagonal gap between it and the Royal Naval Division. But ere long it became clear that unless the right of our line could advance again it would be impossible for the Manchesters to maintain the very pronounced salient in which they now found themselves.

Orders were issued, therefore, that the Royal Naval Division should co-operate with the French Corps in a fresh attack, and reinforcements were despatched to this end. The attack, timed for 3 p.m., was twice postponed at the request of General Gouraud, who finally reported that he would be unable to advance again that day with any prospect of success.

By 6-30 p.m., therefore, the Forty-second Division had to be extricated with loss from the second-line Turkish trenches, and had to content themselves with consolidating on the first line, which they had captured within five minutes of commencing the attack. Such was the spirit displayed by this brigade, that there was great difficulty in persuading the men to fall back. Had their flanks been covered, nothing would have made them loosen their grip.

No further progress had been found possible in front of the Eighty-eighth Brigade and Indian Brigade. Attempts were made by their reserve battalions to advance on the right and left flanks respectively, but in both cases heavy fire drove them back. At 4 p.m., under support of our artillery, the Royal Fusiliers were able to advance beyond the first line of captured trenches, but the fact that the left flank was held back made the attempt to hold any isolated position in advance inadvisable.

As the reserves had been largely depleted by the despatch of reinforcements to various parts of the line, and information was to hand of the approach of strong reinforcements of fresh troops to the enemy, orders were issued for the consolidation of the line then held.

Although we had been forced to abandon so much of the ground gained in the first rush, the net result of the day's operations was considerable—namely, an advance of 200 to 400 yards along the whole of our

centre, a front of nearly three miles. That the enemy suffered severely was indicated not only by subsequent information, but by the fact of his attempting no counter-attack during the night except upon the trench captured by the French First Division on the extreme right. Here two counter-attacks were repulsed with loss.

The prisoners taken during the day amounted to 400, including eleven officers; amongst these were five Germans, the remains of a volunteer machine-gun detachment from the *Goeben*. Their commanding officer was killed and the machine-gun destroyed. The majority of these captures were made by the Forty-second Division, under Major-General W. Douglas.

In addition to its normal duties, the Signal Service, under the direction of Lieutenant-Colonel H. G. E. Bowman-Manifold, director of army signals, has provided the connecting link between the Royal Navy and the Army in their combined operations, and as rapidly readjusted itself to amphibious methods. All demands made on it by sudden expansion of the fighting forces or by the movement of General Headquarters have been rapidly and effectively met. The working of the telegraphs, telephones, and repair of lines, often under heavy fire, has been beyond praise. Casualties have been unusually high, but the best traditions of the Corps of Royal Engineers have inspired the whole of their work. As an instance, the Central Telegraph Office at Cape Helles (a dug-out) was recently struck by a high-explosive shell. The officer on duty and twelve other ranks were killed or wounded, and the office entirely demolished. But No. 72003, Corporal G. A. Walker, Royal Engineers, although much shaken, repaired the damage, collected men, and within thirty-nine minutes reopened communication by apologising for the incident and by saying he required no assistance.

The Royal Army Medical Service have had to face unusual and very trying conditions. There are no roads, and the wounded who are unable to walk must be carried from the firing line to the shore. They and their attendants may be shelled on their way to the beaches, at the beaches, on the jetties, and again, though I believe by inadvertence, on their way out in lighters to the hospital ships. Under shell fire it is not as easy as some of the critically disposed seem to imagine to keep all arrangements in apple-pie order. Here I can only express my own opinion that efficiency, method, and even a certain quiet heroism have characterised the evacuations of the many thousands of our wounded.

In my three commanders of corps I have indeed been thrice fortunate.

General Gouraud brought a great reputation to our help from the battlefields of the Argonne, and in so doing he has added to its lustre. A happy mixture of daring in danger and of calm in crisis, full of energy and resource, he has worked hand in glove with his British comrades in arms, and has earned their affection and respect.

Lieutenant-General Sir W. R. Birdwood has been the soul of Anzac. Not for one single day has he ever quitted his post. Cheery and full of human sympathy, he has spent many hours of each twenty-four inspiring the defenders of the front trenches, and if he does not know every soldier in his force, at least every soldier in the force believes he is known to his chief.

Lieutenant-General A. G. Hunter Weston possesses a genius for war. I know no more resolute commander. Calls for reinforcements, appeals based on exhaustion or upon imminent counter-attacks are powerless to divert him from his aim. And this aim, in so far as he may be responsible for it, is worked out with insight, accuracy, and that wisdom which comes from close study in peace combined with long experience in the field.

In my first despatch I tried to express my indebtedness to Major-General W. P. Braithwaite, and I must now again, however inadequately, place on record the untiring loyal assistance he has continued to render to me ever since. The thanks of everyone serving in the peninsula are due to Lieutenant-General

Sir John Maxwell. All the resources of Egypt and all of his own remarkable administrative abilities have been ungrudgingly placed at our disposal.

Finally, if my despatch is in any way to reflect the feelings of this force, I must refer to the shadow cast over the whole of our adventure by the loss of so many of our gallant and true-hearted comrades. Some of them we shall never see again; some have had the mark of the Dardanelles set upon them for life; but others, and, thank God, by far the greater proportion, will be back in due course at the front.

I have the honour to be your Lordship's most obedient servant,

IAN HAMILTON,
General Commanding Mediterranean
Expeditionary Force.

III.—THE ANZAC BATTLE.

The first step in the real push—the step which above all others was to count—was the night attack on the summits of the Sari Bair ridge. The crest line of this lofty mountain range runs parallel to the sea, dominating the underfeatures contained within the Anzac position, although these fortunately deflected the actual landing-place. From the main ridge a series of spurs run down towards the level beach, and are separated from one another by deep, jagged gullies choked up with dense jungle. Two of these leading up to Chunuk Bair are called Chailak Dere and Sazli Beit Dere; another deep ravine runs up to Kojia Chemen Tepe (Hill 305), the topmost peak of the whole ridge, and is called the Aghyl Dere.

It was our object to effect a lodgment along the crest of the high main ridge with two columns of troops, but, seeing the nature of the ground and the dispositions of the enemy, the effort had to be made by stages. We were bound, in fact, to undertake a double subsidiary operation before we could hope to launch these attacks with any real prospect of success.

(1) The right covering force was to seize Table Top, as well as all other enemy positions commanding the foothills between the Chailak Dere and the Sazli Beit Dere ravines. If this enterprise succeeded it would open up the ravines for the assaulting columns, whilst at the same time interposing between the right flank of the left covering force and the enemy holding the Sari Bair main ridge.

(2) The left covering force was to march northwards along the beach to seize a hill called Damajkelik Bair, some 1,400 yards north of Table Top. If successful it would be able to hold out a hand to the Ninth Corps as it landed south of Nibrunesi Point, whilst at the same time protecting the left flank of the left assaulting column against enemy troops from the Anafarta valley during its climb up the Aghyl Dere ravine.

(3) The right assaulting column was to move up the Chailak Dere and Sazli Beit Dere ravines to the storm of the ridge of Chunuk Bair.

(4) The left assaulting column was to work up the Aghyl Dere and prolong the line of the right assaulting column by storming Hill 305 (Kojia Chemen Tepe), the summit of the whole range of hills.

To recapitulate, the two assaulting columns, which were to work up three ravines to the storm of the high ridge, were to be preceded by two covering columns. One of these was to capture the enemy's positions commanding the foothills, first to open the mouths of the ravines, secondly to cover the right flank of another covering force whilst it marched along the beach. The other covering column was to strike far out to the north until, from a hill called Damajkelik Bair, it could at the same time facilitate the landing of the Ninth Corps at Nibrunesi Point, and guard the left flank of the column assaulting Sari Bair from any forces of the enemy which might be assembled in the Anafarta valley.

The whole of this big attack was placed under the command of Major-General Sir A. J. Godley, General Officer Commanding New Zealand and Australian Division. The covering and the two assaulting columns were organised as follows:—

Right Covering Column, under Brigadier-General A. H. Russell.—New Zealand

Mounted Rifles Brigade, the Otago Mounted Rifles Regiment, the Maori Contingent and New Zealand Field Troop.

Right Assaulting Column, under Brigadier-General F. E. Johnston.—New Zealand Infantry Brigade, Indian Mountain Battery (less one section), one Company New Zealand Engineers.

Left Covering Column, under Brigadier-General J. H. Travers.—Headquarters Fortieth Brigade, half the Seventy-second Field Company, Fourth Battalion South Wales Borderers, and Fifth Battalion Wiltshire Regiment.

Left Assaulting Column, under Brigadier-General (now Major-General) H. V. Cox.—Twenty-ninth Indian Infantry Brigade, Fourth Australian Infantry Brigade, Indian Mountain Battery (less one section), one Company New Zealand Engineers.

Divisional Reserve.—Sixth Battalion South Lancashire Regiment and Eighth Battalion Welsh Regiment (Pioneers) at Chailak Dere, and the Thirty-ninth Infantry Brigade and half Seventy-second Field Company at Aghyl Dere.

The right covering column, it will be remembered, had to gain command of the Sazli Beit Dere and the Aghyl Dere ravines, so as to let the assaulting column arrive intact within striking distance of the Chunuk Bair ridge. To achieve this object it had to clear the Turks off from their right flank positions upon Old No. 3 Post and Table Top.

Old No. 3 Post, connected with Table Top by a razor back, formed the apex of a triangular piece of hill sloping gradually down to our No. 2 and No. 3 outposts. Since its recapture from us by the Turks on 30th May working parties had done their best with unstinted material to convert this commanding point into an impregnable redoubt. Two lines of fire trench, very heavily entangled, protected its southern face—the only one accessible to us—and, with its head cover of solid timber baulks and its strongly revetted outworks, it dominated the approaches of both the Chailak Dere and the Sazli Beit Dere.

Table Top is a steep-sided, flat-topped hill, close on 400 feet above sea level. The sides of the hill are mostly sheer and quite impracticable, but here and there a ravine, choked with scrub, and under fire of enemy trenches, gives precarious foothold up the precipitous cliffs. The small plateau on the summit was honeycombed with trenches, which were connected by a communication alley with that underfeature of Sari Bair known as Rhododendron Spur.

Amongst other stratagems the Anzac troops, assisted by H.M.S. *Colne*, had long and carefully been educating the Turks how they should lose Old No. 3 Post, which could hardly have been rushed by simple force of arms. Every night, exactly at 9 p.m., H.M.S. *Colne* threw the beams of her searchlight on to the redoubt, and opened fire upon it for exactly ten minutes. Then, after a ten minutes' interval, came a second illumination and bombardment, commencing always at 9-20 and ending precisely at 9-30 p.m.

The idea was that, after successive nights of such practice, the enemy would get into the habit of taking the searchlight as a hint to clear out until the shelling was at an end. But on the eventful night of the 6th, the sound of their footsteps drowned by the loud cannonade, unseen as they crept along in that darkest shadow which fringes the searchlight's beam—came the right covering column. At 9-30 the light switched off, and instantly our men poured out of the scrub jungle and into the empty redoubt. By 11 p.m. the whole series of surrounding entrenchments were ours.

Once the capture of Old No. 3 Post was fairly under way, the remainder of the right covering column carried on with their attack upon Bauchop's Hill and the Chailak Dere. By 10 p.m. the northernmost point, with its machine-gun, was captured, and by 1 o'clock in the morning the whole of Bauchop's Hill, a maze of ridge and ravine, everywhere entrenched, was fairly in our hands.

The attack along the Chailak Dere was not so cleanly carried out—made, indeed, just about as ugly a start as any enemy could wish. Pressing eagerly forward through the night, the little column of stormers found

themselves held up by a barbed-wire erection of unexampled height, depth, and solidity, which completely closed the river bed—that is to say, the only practicable entrance to the ravine. The entanglement was flanked by a strongly-held enemy trench running right across the opening of the Chailak Dere. Here that splendid body of men, the Otago Mounted Rifles, lost some of their bravest and their best, but in the end, when things were beginning to seem desperate, a passage was forced through the stubborn obstacle with most conspicuous and cool courage by Captain Shera and a party of New Zealand Engineers, supported by the Maoris, who showed themselves worthy descendants of the warriors of the Gate Pah. Thus was the mouth of the Chailak Dere opened in time to admit of the unopposed entry of the right assaulting column.

Simultaneously the attack on Table Top had been launched under cover of a heavy bombardment from H.M.S. *Colne*. No General on peace manoeuvres would ask troops to attempt so break-neck an enterprise. The flanks of Table Top are so steep that the height gives an impression of a mushroom shape—of the summit bulging out over its stem. But just as faith moves mountains, so valour can carry them. The Turks fought bravely. The angle of Table Top's ascent is recognised in our regulations as "impracticable for infantry." But neither Turks nor angles of ascent were destined to stop Russell or his New Zealanders that night. There are moments during battle when life becomes intensified, when men become supermen, when the impossible becomes simple—and this was one of those moments. The scarped heights were scaled, the plateau was carried by midnight. With this brilliant feat the task of the right covering force was at an end. Its attacks had been made with the bayonet and bomb only; magazines were empty by order; hardly a rifle shot had been fired. Some 150 prisoners were captured, as well as many rifles and much equipment, ammunition and stores. No words can do justice to the achievement of Brigadier-General Russell and his men. There are exploits which must be seen to be realised.

The right assaulting column had entered the two southerly ravines—Sazli Beit Dere and Chailak Dere—by midnight. At 1-30 a.m. began a hotly-contested fight for the trenches on the lower part of Rhododendron Spur, whilst the Chailak Dere column pressed steadily up the valley against the enemy.

The left covering column, under Brigadier-General Travers, after marching along the beach to No. 3 Outpost, resumed its northerly advance as soon as the attack on Bauchop's Hill had developed. Once the Chailak Dere was cleared the column moved by the mouth of the Aghyl Dere, disregarding the enfilade fire from sections of Bauchop's Hill still uncaptured. The rapid success of this movement was largely due to Lieutenant-Colonel Gillespie, a very fine man, who commanded the advance guard, consisting of his own regiment, the Fourth South Wales Borderers, a corps worthy of such a leader. Every trench encountered was instantly rushed by the Borderers, until, having reached the predetermined spot, the whole column was unhesitatingly launched at Damakjelik Bair. Several Turkish trenches were captured at the bayonet's point, and by 1-30 a.m. the whole of the hill was occupied, thus safeguarding the left rear of the whole of the Anzac attack.

Here was an encouraging sample of what the New Army, under good auspices, could accomplish. Nothing more trying to inexperienced troops can be imagined than a long night march, exposed to flanking fire, through a strange country, winding up at the end with a bayonet charge against a height, formless and still in the starlight, garrisoned by those spectres of the imagination, worst enemies of the soldier.

The left assaulting column crossed the Chailak Dere at 12-30 a.m., and entered the Aghyl Dere at the heels of the left covering column. The surprise, on this side, was complete. Two Turkish officers were caught in their pyjamas; enemy arms and ammunition were scattered in every direction. The grand attack was not without its own interest. The country gave new sensations in cliff

climbing even to officers and men who had graduated over the goat tracks of Anzac. The darkness of the night, the density of the scrub, hands and knees progress up the spurs, sheer physical fatigue, exhaustion of the spirit caused by repeated hairbreadth escapes from the hail of random bullets—all these combined to take the edge of the energies of our troops. At last, after advancing some distance up the Aghyl Dere, the column split up into two parts. The Fourth Australian Brigade struggled, fighting hard as they went, up to the north of the northern fork of the Aghyl Dere, making for Hill 305 (Koja Chemen Tepe). The Twenty-ninth Indian Infantry Brigade scrambled up the southern fork of the Aghyl Dere and the spurs north of it to the attack of a portion of the Sari Bair ridge known as Hill Q.

Dawn broke, and the crest line was not yet in our hands, although, considering all things, the left assaulting column had made a marvellous advance. The Fourth Australian Infantry Brigade was on the line of the Asmak Dere (the next ravine north of the Aghyl Dere) and the Twenty-ninth Indian Infantry Brigade held the ridge west of the farm below Chunuk Bair and along the spurs to the north-east. The enemy had been flung back from ridge to ridge; an excellent line for the renewal of the attack had been secured, and (except for the exhaustion of the troops) the auspices were propitious.

Turning to the right assaulting column, one battalion, the Canterbury Infantry Battalion, clambered slowly up the Sazli Beit Dere. The remainder of the force, led by the Otago Battalion, wound their way amongst the pitfalls and forced their passage through the scrub of the Chailak Dere, where fierce opposition forced them ere long to deploy. Here, too, the hopeless country was the main hindrance, and it was not until 5-45 a.m. that the bulk of the column joined the Canterbury Battalion on the lower slopes of Rhododendron Spur. The whole force then moved up the spur, gaining touch with the left assaulting column by means of the Tenth Gurkhas, in face of very heavy fire and frequent bayonet charges. Eventually they entrenched on the top of Rhododendron Spur, a quarter of a mile short of Chunuk Bair—i.e., of victory.

At 7 a.m., the Fifth and Sixth Gurkhas, belonging to the left assaulting column, had approached the main ridge north-east of Chunuk Bair, whilst, on their left, the Fourteenth Sikhs had got into touch with the Fourth Australian Brigade on the southern watershed of the Asmak Dere. The Fourth Australian Brigade now received orders to leave half a battalion to hold the spur, and, with the rest of its strength, plus the Fourteenth Sikhs, to assault Hill 305 (Koja Chemen Tepe). But by this time the enemy's opposition had hardened, and his reserves were moving up from the direction of Battleship Hill. Artillery support was asked for and given, yet by 9 a.m. the attack of the right assaulting column on Chunuk Bair was checked, and any idea of a further advance on Koja Chemen Tepe had to be, for the moment, suspended. The most that could be done was to hold fast to the Asmak Dere watershed whilst attacking the ridge north-east of Chunuk Bair, an attack to be supported by a fresh assault launched against Chunuk Bair itself.

At 9-30 a.m. the two assaulting columns pressed forward whilst our guns pounded the enemy moving along the Battleship Hill spurs. But in spite of all their efforts their increasing exhaustion, as opposed to the gathering strength of the enemy's fresh troops, began to tell—they had shot their bolt. So all day they clung to what they had captured, and strove to make ready for the night. At 11 a.m. three battalions of the Thirty-ninth Infantry Brigade were sent up from the general reserve to be at hand when needed, and, at the same hour, one more battalion of the reserve was despatched to the First Australian Division to meet the drain caused by all the desperate Lone Pine fighting.

By the afternoon the position of the two assaulting columns was unchanged. The right covering force were in occupation of Table Top, Old No. 3 Post and Bauchop Hill, which General Russell had been ordered to maintain with two regiments of Mounted

Rifles, so that he might have two other regiments and the Maori Contingent available to move as required. The left covering force held Damakjelik Bair. The forces which had attacked along the front of the original Anzac line were back again in their own trenches. The Lone Pine work was being furiously disputed. All had suffered heavily, and all were very tired.

So ended the first phase of the fighting for the Chunuk Bair ridge. Our aims had not fully been attained, and the help we had hoped for from Suvla had not been forthcoming. Yet I fully endorse the words of General Birdwood when he says: "The troops had performed a feat which is without parallel."

Great kudos is due to Major-Generals Godley and Shaw for their arrangements; to Generals Russell, Johnston, Cox, and Travers for their leading; but most of all, as every one of these officers will gladly admit, to the rank and file for their fighting. Nor may I omit to add that the true destroyer spirit with which H.M.S. *Cole* (Commander Claude Seymour, R.N.) and H.M.S. *Chelmer* (Commander Hugh T. England, R.N.) backed us up will live in the grateful memories of the army.

In the course of this afternoon (7th August) reconnaissances of Sari Bair were carried out, and the troops were got into shape for a fresh advance in three columns, to take place in the early morning.

The columns were composed as follows:—

Right Column, Brigadier-General F. E. Johnston.—Twenty-sixth Indian Mountain Battery (less one section), Auckland Mounted Rifles, New Zealand Infantry Brigade, two battalions Thirtieth Division, and the Maori Contingent.

Centre and Left Columns, Major-General H. V. Cox.—Twenty-first Indian Mountain Battery (less one section), Fourth Australian Brigade, Thirty-ninth Infantry Brigade (less one battalion), with Sixth Battalion South Lancashire Regiment attached, and the Twenty-ninth Indian Infantry Brigade.

The right column was to climb up the Chunuk Bair ridge; the left column was to make for the prolongation of the ridge north-east to Kojia Chemen Tepe, the topmost peak of the range.

The attack was timed for 4-15 a.m. At the first faint glimmer of dawn observers saw figures moving against the sky-line of Chunuk Bair. Were they our own men, or were they the Turks? Telescopes were anxiously adjusted; the light grew stronger; men were seen climbing up from our side of the ridge; they were our own fellows—the topmost summit was ours.

On the right, General Johnston's column, headed by the Wellington Battalion and supported by the Seventh Battalion, Gloucestershire Regiment, the Auckland Mounted Rifles Regiment, the Eighth Welsh Pioneers, and the Maori Contingent, the whole most gallantly led by Lieutenant-Colonel W. G. Malone, had raced one another up the steep. Nothing could check them. On they went, until, with a last determined rush, they fixed themselves firmly on the south-western slopes and crest of the main knoll known as the height of Chunuk Bair. With deep regret I have to add that the brave Lieutenant-Colonel Malone fell mortally wounded as he was marking out the line to be held. The Seventh Gloucesters suffered terrible losses here.

The fire was so hot that they never got a chance to dig their trenches deeper than some six inches, and there they had to withstand attack after attack. In the course of these fights every single officer, company sergeant-major, or company quartermaster-sergeant, was either killed or wounded, and the battalion by midday consisted of small groups of men commanded by junior non-commissioned officers or privates. Chapter and verse may be quoted for the view that the rank and file of an army cannot long endure the strain of close hand-to-hand fighting unless they are given confidence by the example of good officers. Yet here is at least one instance where a battalion of the New Army fought right on, from midday till sunset, without any officers.

In the centre the Thirty-ninth Infantry Brigade and the Twenty-ninth Indian Brigade moved along the gullies leading up to the Sari Bair ridge, the right moving south of the farm on Chunuk Bair, the left

up the spurs to the north-east of the farm against a portion of the main ridge north-east of Chunuk Bair and the col to the east of it. So murderous was the enemy's fire that little progress could be made, though some ground was gained on the spurs to the north-east of the farm.

On the left the Fourth Australian Brigade advanced from the Asmak Dere against the lower slopes of Abdul Rahman Bair (a spur running due north from Kojia Chemen Tepe) with the intention of wheeling to its right and advancing up the spur. Cunningly placed Turkish machine-guns and a strong entrenched body of infantry were ready for this move, and the brigade were unable to get on. At last, on the approach of heavy columns of the enemy, the Australians, virtually surrounded, and having already suffered losses of over 1,000, were withdrawn to their original position. Here they stood at bay, and, though the men were by now half dead with thirst and with fatigue, they bloodily repulsed attack after attack delivered by heavy columns of Turks.

So matters stood at noon. Enough had been done for honour, and much ground had everywhere been gained. The expected support from Suvla hung fire, but the capture of Chunuk Bair was a presage of victory; even the troops who had been repulsed were quite undefeated—quite full of fight—and so it was decided to hold hard as we were till nightfall, and then to essay one more grand attack, wherein the footing gained on Chunuk Bair would this time be used as a pivot.

In the afternoon the battle slackened, excepting always at Lone Pine, where the enemy were still coming on in mass, and being mown down by our fire. Elsewhere the troops were busy digging and getting up water and food, no child's play, with their wretched lines of communication running within musketry range of the enemy.

That evening the New Zealand Brigade, with two regiments of New Zealand Mounted Rifles, and the Maoris, held Rhododendron Spur and the south-western slopes of the main knoll of Chunuk Bair. The front line was prolonged by the columns of General Cox and General Monash (with the Fourth Australian Brigade). Behind the New Zealanders were the Thirty-eighth Brigade in reserve, and in rear of General Monash two battalions of the Fortieth Brigade. The inner line was held as before, and the Twenty-ninth Brigade (less two battalions) had been sent up from the general reserve, and remained still further in rear.

The columns for the renewed attack were composed as follows:—

No. 1 Column, Brigadier-General F. E. Johnston.—Twenty-sixth Indian Mountain Battery (less one section), the Auckland and Wellington Mounted Rifles Regiments, the New Zealand Infantry Brigade, and two Battalions of the Thirtieth Division.

No. 2 Column, Major-General H. V. Cox.—Twenty-first Indian Mountain Battery (less one section), Fourth Australian Brigade, Thirty-ninth Brigade (less the Seventh Gloucesters, relieved), with the Sixth Battalion South Lancashire Regiment attached, and the Indian Infantry Brigade.

No. 3 Column, Brigadier-General A. H. Baldwin, Commanding Thirty-eighth Infantry Brigade. Two battalions each from the Thirty-eighth and Twenty-ninth Brigades, and one from the Fortieth Brigade.

No. 1 column was to hold and consolidate the ground gained on the 6th, and, in co-operation with the other columns, to gain the whole of Chunuk Bair, and extend to the south-east. No. 2 column was to attack Hill Q on the Chunuk Bair ridge, and No. 3 column was to move from the Chailak Dere, also on Hill Q. This last column was to make the main attack, and the others were to co-operate with it.

COLUMNS WHICH LOST THEIR WAY.

At 4-30 a.m. on August 9th, the Chunuk Bair ridge and Hill Q were heavily shelled. The naval guns, all the guns on the left flank, and as many as possible from the right flank (whence the enemy's advance could be enfiladed) took part in this cannonade, which rose to its climax at 5-15 a.m. when the whole ridge seemed a mass of flame and smoke, whence huge clouds of dust drifted slowly upwards in strange patterns on to

the sky. At 5-16 a.m. this tremendous bombardment was to be switched off on to the flanks and reverse slopes of the heights.

General Baldwin's column had assembled in the Chailak Dere, and was moving up towards General Johnston's headquarters. Our plan contemplated the massing of this column immediately behind the trenches held by the New Zealand Infantry Brigade. Thence it was intended to launch the battalions in successive lines, keeping them as much as possible on the high ground. Infinite trouble had been taken to ensure that the narrow track should be kept clear, guides also were provided; but in spite of all precautions the darkness, the rough scrub-covered country, its sheer steepness, so delayed the column that they were unable to take full advantage of the configuration of the ground, and, inclining to the left, did not reach the line of the Farm—Chunuk Bair—till 5-15 a.m. In plain English, Baldwin, owing to the darkness and the awful country, lost his way—through no fault of his own. The mischance was due to the fact that time did not admit of the detailed careful reconnaissance of routes which is so essential where operations are to be carried out by night.

And now, under that fine leader, Major C. G. L. Allanson, the Sixth Gurkhas of the 29th Indian Infantry Brigade pressed up the slopes of Sari Bair, crowned the heights of the col between Chunuk Bair and Hill Q, viewed far beneath them the waters of the Hellespont, viewed the Asiatic shores along which motor transport was bringing supplies to the lighters. Not only did this battalion, as well as some of the Sixth South Lancashire Regiment, reach the crest, but they began to attack down the far side of it, firing as they went at the fast-retreating enemy. But the fortune of war was against us. At this supreme moment Baldwin's column was still a long way from our trenches on the crest of Chunuk Bair, whence they should even now have been sweeping out towards Q along the whole ridge of the mountain. And instead of Baldwin's support came suddenly a salvo of heavy shell.

These falling so unexpectedly among the stormers threw them into terrible confusion. The Turkish commander saw his chance. Instantly his troops were rallied and brought back in a counter-charge, and the South Lancashires and Gurkhas, who had seen the promised land, and had seemed for a moment to have held victory in their grasp, were forced backwards over the crest, and on to the lower slopes whence they had first started.

But where was the main attack—where was Baldwin? When that bold but unlucky commander found he could not possibly reach our trenches on the top of Chunuk Bair in time to take effective part in the fight, he deployed for attack where he stood—i.e., at the farm to the left of the New Zealand Brigade's trenches on Rhododendron Spur. Now his men were coming on in fine style, and, just as the Turks topped the ridge with shouts of elation, two companies of the Sixth East Lancashire Regiment, together with the Tenth Hampshire Regiment, charged up our side of the slope with the bayonet. They had gained the high ground immediately below the commanding knoll on Chunuk Bair, and a few minutes earlier would have joined hands with the Gurkhas and South Lancashires, and, combined with them, would have carried all before them. But the Turks by this time were lining the whole of the high crest in overwhelming numbers.

The New Army troops attacked with a fine audacity, but they were flung back from the height and then pressed still further down the slope, until General Baldwin had to withdraw his command to the vicinity of the Farm, whilst the enemy, much encouraged, turned their attention to the New Zealand troops and the two New Army battalions of No. 1 Column still holding the south-west half of the main knoll of Chunuk Bair. Constant attacks, urged with fanatical persistence, were met here with a sterner resolution, and although, at the end of the day, our troops were greatly exhausted, they still kept their footing on the summit. And if that summit meant inner to us, it meant even more to the Turks. For the ridge covered our landing places, it is true, but it covered not only the Turkish beaches at Kilit-Bay and

Maidos, but also the Narrows themselves, and the roads leading northward to Bulair and Constantinople.

That evening our line ran along Rhohoden-dron Spur up to the crest of Chunuk Bair, where about 200 yards were occupied and held by some 800 men. Slight trenches had hastily been dug, but the fatigue of the New Zealanders and the fire of the enemy had prevented solid work been done. The trenches in many places were not more than a few inches deep. They were not protected by wire. Also many officers are of opinion that they had not been well sited in the first instance. On the South African system the main line was withdrawn some twenty-five yards from the crest instead of being actually on the crest line itself, and there were not even look-out posts along the summit. Boer skirmishers would thus have had to show themselves against the sky-line before they could annoy. But here we were faced by regulars taught to attack in mass with bayonet or bomb. And the power of collecting overwhelming numbers at very close quarters rested with whichever side held the true sky-line in force.

From Chunuk Bair the line ran down to the Farm and almost due north to the Asmak Dere southern watershed, whence it continued westward to the sea near Asmak Kuyu. On the right the Australian Division was still holding its line, and Lone Pine was still being furiously attacked. The First Australian Brigade was now reduced from 2,000 to 1,000, and the total casualties up to 8 p.m. on the 9th amounted to about 8,500. But the troops were still in extraordinarily good heart, and nothing could damp their keenness. The only discontent shown was by men who were kept in reserve.

During the night of the 9th-10th the New Zealand and New Army troops on Chunuk Bair were relieved. For three days and three nights they had been ceaselessly fighting. They were half dead with fatigue. Their lines of communication started from sea level, ran across trackless ridges and ravines to an altitude of 800 feet, and were exposed all the way to snipers' fire and artillery bombardment. It had become imperative, therefore, to get them enough food, water, and rest; and for this purpose it was imperative also to withdraw them. Chunuk Bair, which they had so magnificently held, was now handed over to two battalions of the Thirteenth Division, which were connected by the Tenth Hampshire Regiment with the troops at the Farm. General Sir William Birdwood is emphatic on the point that the nature of the ground is such that there was no room on the crest for more than this body of 800 to 1,000 rifles.

The two battalions of the New Army chosen to hold Chunuk Bair were the Sixth Loyal North Lancashire Regiment and the Fifth Wiltshire Regiment. The first of these arrived in good time and occupied the trenches. Even in the darkness their commanding officer, Lieutenant-Colonel Levinge, recognised how dangerously these trenches were sited; and he began at once to dig observation posts on the actual crest and to strengthen the defences where he could. But he had not time given him to do much. The second battalion, the Wiltshires, were delayed by the intricate country. They did not reach the edge of the entrenchment until 4 a.m., and were then told to lie down in what was believed, erroneously, to be a covered position.

At daybreak on Tuesday, 10th August, the Turks delivered a grand attack from the line Chunuk Bair Hill Q against these two battalions, already weakened in numbers, though not in spirit, by previous fighting. First our men were shelled by every enemy gun, and then, at 5-30 a.m., were assaulted by a huge column, consisting of no less than a full division plus a regiment of three battalions. The North Lancashire men were simply overwhelmed in their shallow trenches by sheer weight of numbers, whilst the Wilts, who were caught out in the open, were literally almost annihilated. The ponderous masses of the enemy swept over the crest, turned the right flank of our line below, swarmed round the Hampshire and General Baldwin's column, which had to give ground, and were only extricated with great difficulty and very heavy losses.

Now it was our turn. The warships and

the New Zealand and Australian Artillery, the Indian Mounted Artillery Brigade, and the Sixty-ninth Brigade Royal Field Artillery were getting the chance of a lifetime. As the successive solid lines of Turks topped the crest of the ridge gaps were torn through their formation, and an iron rain fell on them as they tried to re-form in the gullies.

Not here only did the Turks pay dearly for their recapture of the vital crest. Enemy reinforcements continued to move up Battleship Hill under heavy and accurate fire from our guns, and still they kept topping the ridges and pouring down the western slopes of the Chunuk Bair as if determined to regain everything they had lost. But once they were over the crest they became exposed not only to the full blast of the guns, naval and military, but also to a battery of ten machine-guns belonging to the New Zealand Infantry Brigade, which played upon their serried ranks at close range until the barrels were red-hot. Enormous losses were inflicted, especially by these ten machine-guns; and of the swarms which had once fairly crossed the crest line only the merest handful ever straggled back to their own side of Chunuk Bair.

At this same time strong forces of the enemy (forces which I had reckoned would have been held back to meet our advance from Suvla Bay) were hurled against the Farm and the spurs to the north-east, where there arose a conflict so deadly that it may be considered as the climax of the four days' fighting for the ridge. Portions of our line were pierced and the troops driven clean down the hill. At the foot of the hill the men were rallied by Staff Captain Street, who was there supervising the transport of food and water. Without a word, unhesitatingly, they followed him back to the Farm, where they plunged again into the midst of that series of struggles in which generals fought in the ranks and men dropped their scientific weapons and caught one another by the throat. So desperate a battle cannot be described. The Turks came on again and again, fighting magnificently, calling upon the name of God. Our men stood to it, and maintained, by many a deed of daring, the old traditions of their race. There was no flinching. They died in the ranks where they stood.

Here Generals Cayley, Baldwin, and Cooper and all their gallant men achieved great glory. On this bloody field fell Brigadier-General Baldwin, who earned his first laurels on Caesar's Camp at Ladysmith. There, too, fell Brigadier-General Cooper, badly wounded; and there, too, fell Lieutenant-Colonel M. H. Nunn, commanding the Ninth Worcestershire Regiment; Lieutenant-Colonel H. G. Levinge, commanding the Sixth Loyal North Lancashire Regiment; and Lieutenant-Colonel J. Carden, commanding the Fifth Wiltshire Regiment.

Towards this supreme struggle the absolute last two battalions from the General Reserve were now hurried, but by 10 a.m. the effort of the enemy was spent. Soon their shattered remnants began to trickle back, leaving a track of corpses behind them, and by night, except prisoners or wounded, no live Turk was left upon our side of the slope.

That same day, 10th August, two attacks, one in the morning and the other in the afternoon, were delivered on our positions along the Asmak Dere and Damakjelik Bair. Both were repulsed with heavy loss by the Fourth Australian Brigade and the Fourth South Wales Borderers, the men of the New Army showing all the steadiness of veterans. Sad to say, the Borderers lost their intrepid leader, Lieutenant-Colonel Gillespie, in the course of this affair.

By evening the total casualties of General Birdwood's force had reached 12,000, and included a very large proportion of officers. The Thirteenth Division of the New Army, under Major-General Shaw, had alone lost 6,000 out of a grand total of 10,500. Baldwin was gone, and all his staff. Ten commanding officers out of thirteen had disappeared from the fighting effectives. The Warwicks and the Worcesters had lost literally every single officer. The old command was shattered, and would stand a loss of more than 25 per cent had been

completely falsified. The Thirteenth Division and the Twenty-ninth Brigade of the Tenth (Irish) Division had lost more than twice that proportion, and, in spirit, were game for as much more fighting as might be required. But physically, though Birdwood's forces were prepared to hold all they had got, they were now too exhausted to attack—at least until they had rested and reorganised. So far they had held on to all they had gained, excepting only the footholds on the ridge between Chunuk Bair and Hill Q, momentarily carried by the Gurkhas, and the salient of Chunuk Bair itself, which they had retained for forty-eight hours. Unfortunately, these two pieces of ground, small and worthless as they seemed, were worth, according to the ethics of war, 10,000 lives, for by their loss or retention they just marked the difference between an important success and a signal victory.

At times I had thought of throwing my reserves into this stubborn central battle, where probably they would have turned the scale. But each time the water trouble made me give up the idea, all ranks at Anzac being reduced to one pint a day. True thirst is a sensation unknown to the dwellers in cool, well-watered England. But at Anzac, when mules with water "pakhsals" arrived at the front, the men would rush up to them in swarms, just to lick the moisture that had exuded through the canvas bags. It will be understood, then, that until wells had been discovered under the freshly-won hills, the reinforcing of Anzac by even so much as a brigade was unthinkable.

The grand coup had not come off. The Narrows were still out of sight and beyond field-gun range. But this was not the fault of Lieutenant-General Birdwood or any of the officers and men under his command. No mortal can command success; Lieutenant-General Birdwood had done all that mortal man can do to deserve it. The way in which he worked out his instructions into practical arrangements and dispositions upon the terrain reflect high credit upon his military capacity. I also wish to bring to your Lordship's notice the valuable services of Major-General Godley, commanding the New Zealand and Australian Division. He had under him at one time a force amounting to two divisions, which he handled with conspicuous ability. Major-General F. C. Shaw, commanding Thirteenth Division, also rose superior to all the trials and tests of these trying days. His calm and sound judgment proved to be of the greatest value throughout the arduous fighting I have recorded.

As for the troops, the joyous alacrity with which they faced danger, wounds and death, as if they were some new form of exciting recreation, has astonished me—old campaigner as I am. I will say no more, leaving Major-General Godley to speak for what happened under his eyes:—"I cannot close my report," he says, "without placing on record my unbounded admiration of the work performed, and the gallantry displayed, by the troops and their leaders during the severe fighting involved in these operations. Though the Australian, New Zealand, and Indian units had been confined to trench duty in a cramped space for some four months, and though the troops of the New Armies had only just landed from a sea voyage, and many of them had not been previously under fire, I do not believe that any troops in the world could have accomplished more. All ranks vied with one another in the performance of gallant deeds, and more than worthily upheld the best traditions of the British Army."

Although the Sari Bair ridge was the key to the whole of my tactical conception, and although the temptation to view this vital Anzac battle at closer quarters was very hard to resist, there was nothing in its course or conduct to call for my personal intervention.

IV.—THE LANDING AT SUVLA.

The conduct of the operations which were to be based upon Suvla Bay was entrusted to Lieutenant-General the Hon. Sir F. Stopford. At his disposal was placed the Ninth Army Corps, less the Thirteenth

Division and the Twenty-ninth Brigade of the Tenth Division.

We believed that the Turks were still unsuspecting about Suvla, and that their only defences near that part of the coast were a girdle of trenches round Lala Baba, and a few unconnected lengths of fire trench on Hill 10 and on the hills forming the northern arm of the bay. There was no wire. Inland a small work had been constructed on Yilghin Burnu (locally known as Chocolate Hills), and a few guns had been placed upon these hills, as well as upon Ismail Oglu Tepe, whence they could be brought into action either against the beaches of Suvla Bay or against any attempt from Anzac to break out northwards and attack Chunuk Bair.

The numbers of the enemy allotted for the defence of the Suvla and Ejlmer areas (including the troops in the Anafarta villages, but exclusive of the general reserves in rear of the Sari Bair) were supposed to be under 4,000. Until the Turkish version of these events is in our hands it is not possible to be certain of the accuracy of this estimate. All that can be said at present is that my Intelligence Department were wonderfully exact in their figures as a rule, and that, in the case in question, events, the reports made by prisoners, &c., &c., seem to show that the forecast was correct.

Arrangements for the landing of the Ninth Corps at Suvla were worked out in minute detail by my General Headquarters Staff in collaboration with the staff of Vice-Admiral de Robeck, and every precaution was taken to ensure that the destination of the troops was kept secret up to the last moment.

Whilst concentrated at the island of Imbros the spirit and physique of the Eleventh Division had impressed me very favourably. They were to lead off the landing. From Imbros they were to be ferried over to the peninsula in destroyers and motor-lighters. Disembarkation was to begin at 10-30 p.m., half-an-hour later than the attack on the Turkish outposts on the northern flank of Anzac, and I was sanguine enough to hope that the elaborate plan we had worked out would enable three complete brigades of infantry to be set ashore by daylight. Originally it had been intended that all three brigades should land on the beach immediately south of Nibrunesi Point, but in deference to the representations of the Corps Commander I agreed, unfortunately, as it turned out, to one brigade being landed inside the bay.

The first task of the Ninth Corps was to seize and hold the Chocolate and Ismail Oglu Hills, together with the high ground on the north and east of Suvla Bay. If the landing went off smoothly, and if my information regarding the strength of the enemy were correct, I hoped that these hills, with their guns, might be well in our possession before daybreak. In that case I hoped, further, that the first division which landed would be strong enough to picket and hold all the important heights within artillery range of the bay, when General Stopford would be able to direct the remainder of his force, as it became available, through the Anafartas to the east of the Sari Bair, where it should soon smash the mainspring of the Turkish opposition to Anzacs.

ARRANGEMENTS FOR THE LANDING.

On the 22nd July I issued secret instructions and tables showing the number of craft available for the Ninth Corps Commander, their capacity, and the points whereat the troops could be disembarked; also what numbers of troops, animals, vehicles, and stores could be landed simultaneously. The allocation of troops to the ships and boats was left to General Stopford's own discretion, subject only to naval exigencies, otherwise the order of the disembarkation might not have tallied with the order of his operations.

The factors governing the hour of landing were: First, that no craft could quit Kephalos Bay before dark (about 9 p.m.); secondly, that nothing could be done which would attract the attention of the enemy before 10 p.m., the moment when the outposts on the left flank of the Anzac position were to be rushed.

General Stopford next framed his orders

on these secret instructions, and after they had received my complete approval he proceeded to expound them to the general officer commanding the Eleventh Division, and general officer commanding the Tenth Division, who came over from Mudros for the purpose.

As in the original landing, the luck of the calm weather favoured us, and all the embarkation arrangements at Kephalos were carried out by the Royal Navy in their usual ship-shape style. The Eleventh Division were to be landed at three places, designated and shown on the map as A, B, and C. Destroyers were told off for these landing places, each destroyer towing a steam lighter and picket-boat. Every light was to be dowsed, and as they neared the shore the destroyers were to slip their motor-lighters and picket-boats, which would then take the beach and discharge direct on to it. The motor-lighters were new acquisitions since the first landing, and were to prove of the greatest possible assistance. They moved five knots an hour under their own engines, and carried 500 men, as well as stores of ammunition and water. After landing their passengers they were to return to the destroyers, and in one trip would empty them also. Ketches with service launches and transport life-boats were to follow the destroyers and anchor at the entrance of the bay, so that in case of accidents or delays to any one of the motor-lighters a picket-boat could be sent at once to a ketch to pick up a tow of lifeboats and take the place of a disabled motor-lighter. These ketches and tows were afterwards to be used for evacuating the wounded.

H.M.S. *Endymion* and H.M.S. *Theseus*, each carrying a thousand men, were also to sail from Imbros, after the destroyers, and, lying off the beach, were to discharge their troops directly the motor-lighters—three to each ship—were ready to convey the men to the shore, i.e., after they had finished disembarking their own loads and those of the destroyers. When this was done—i.e., after three trips—the motor-lighters would be free to go on transporting guns, stores, mules, &c.

The following craft brought up the rear:—

- (1) Two ketches, each towing four horse-boats carrying four 18-pounder guns and twenty-four horses.
- (2) One ketch, towing horse-boats with forty horses.
- (3) The sloop *Aster*, with 500 men, towing a lighter containing eight mountain guns.
- (4) Three ketches, towing horse-boats, containing eight 18-pounder guns and seventy-six horses.

Water-lighters, towed by a tank steamer, were also timed to arrive at A beach at daylight. When they had been emptied they were to return at once to Kephalos to refill from the parent water-ship.

A specially fitted-out steamer, the *Prah*, with stores (shown by our experience of 25th April to be most necessary)—i.e., water-pumps, hose, tanks, troughs, entrenching tools, and all ordnance stores requisite for the prompt development of wells or springs—was also sent to Suvla.

ARRANGEMENTS FOR SUPPLY.

When originally I conceived the idea of these operations, one of the first points to be weighed was that of the water supply in the Biyuk Anafarta valley and the Suvla plain. Experience at Anzac had shown quite clearly that the whole plan must be given up unless a certain amount of water could be counted upon, and, fortunately, the information I received was reassuring. But, in case of accidents, and to be on the safe side, so long ago as June had I begun to take steps to counter the chance that we might, from one cause or another, find difficulty in developing the wells. Having got from the War Office all that they could give me, I addressed myself to India and Egypt, and eventually from these three sources I managed to secure portable receptacles for 100,000 gallons, including petrol tins, milk cans, camel tanks, water bags and pakhalas.

Supplementing these were lighters and water-ships, all under naval control. Indeed, by arrangement with the Admiral, the responsibility of the army was confined to the lighters and the

distribution of the water to the troops. The navy undertaking to bring the lighters to the shore to replace the empties, thus providing a continuous supply.

Finally, 3,700 mules, together with 1,700 water carts, were provided for Anzac at Suvla—this in addition to 950 mules already at Anzac. Representatives of the Director of Supplies and Transport at Suvla and Anzac were sent to allot the transport which was to be used for carrying up whatever was most needed by units ashore, whether water, food, or ammunition.

This statement, though necessarily brief, will, I hope, suffice to throw some light upon the complexity of the arrangements though, out beforehand in order, so far as was humanly possible, to combat the disorganisation, the hunger, and the thirst which I need in wait for troops landing on a hostile beach.

On the evening of 6th August the Eleventh Division sailed on its short journey from Imbros (Kephalos) to Suvla Bay, and, meeting with no mischance, the landing took place, the brigades of the Eleventh Division getting ashore practically simultaneously; the Thirty-second and Thirty-third Brigades at B and C beaches, the Thirty-fourth at A beach.

The surprise of the Turks was complete. At B and C the beaches were found to be admirably suited to our purpose, and there was no opposition. The landing at A was more difficult, both because of the shallow water and because there the Turkish picket and sentries—the normal guardians of the coast—were on the alert and active. Some of the lighters grounded a good way from the shore, and men had to struggle toward the beach in as much as four feet six inches of water. Ropes in several instances were carried from the lighters to the shore to help to sustain the heavily-accoutred infantry. To add to the difficulties of the Thirty-fourth Brigade the lighters came under flanking rifle fire from the Turkish outposts at Lala Baba and Ghazi Baba's. The enemy even, knowing every inch of the ground, crept down in the very darkness of the night on to the beach itself, mingling with our troops and getting between our firing line and its supports.

Fortunately, the number of these enterprising foes was but few, and an end was soon put to their activity on the actual beaches by the sudden storming of Lala Baba from the south. This attack was carried out by the Ninth West Yorkshire Regiment and the Sixth Yorkshire Regiment, both of the Thirty-second Brigade, which had landed at B beach and marched up along the coast. The assault succeeded at once, and without much loss, but both battalions deserve great credit for the way it was delivered in the inky darkness of the night.

The Thirty-second Brigade was now pushed on to the support of the Thirty-fourth Brigade, which was held up by another outpost of the enemy on Hill 10 (117 R. and S.), and it is feared that some of the losses which occurred here were due to misdirected fire. While this fighting was still in progress the Eleventh Battalion Manchester Regiment, of the Thirty-fourth Brigade, was advancing northwards in very fine style, driving the enemy opposed to them back along the ridge of the Karakol Daghi towards the Kiretch Tepe Sirt. Beyond doubt, these Lancashire men earned much distinction, fighting with great pluck and grit against an enemy not very numerous perhaps, but having an immense advantage in knowledge of the ground.

As they got level with Hill 10 it grew light enough to see, and the enemy began to shell. No one seems to have been present who could take hold of the two brigades, the Thirty-second and Thirty-fourth, and launch them in a concerted and cohesive attack. Consequently there was confusion and hesitation, increased by gorse fires lit by hostile shell, but redeemed, I am proud to report, by the conspicuously fine, soldierly conduct of several individual battalions. The whole of the Turks locally available were by now in the field, and they were encouraged to counter-attack by the signs of hesitation, but the Ninth Lancashire Fusiliers and the Eleventh Manchester Regiment took them on with the bayonet, and fairly drove them back in disorder over the flaming Hill 10.

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herefore, to land these six battalions of
he Tenth Division at A beach, and, seeing
Brigadier-General Hill, he told him that as
he left of the Thirty-fourth Brigade was
being hard pressed he should get into touch
with General Officer Commanding Eleventh
Division, and work in support of his left
and until the arrival of his own Divisional
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authorities having discovered a suitable
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place near Ghazi Baba, these bat-
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were landed there, together with one
battalion
of the Thirty-first Brigade, which
had not
yet been sent round to C beach.
By this
means it was hoped that both the
brigades
of the Tenth Division would be
able to
rendezvous about a mile to the
north-
west of Hill 10.

Lala
about Hill 10, they retreated in an easterly
direction towards Sulajik and Kuchuk
Anafarta Ova, followed by the Thirty-
fourth and Thirty-second Brigades of the
Eleventh Division, and by the Thirty-first
Brigade of the Tenth Division, which had
entered into the fight, not, as the Corps
Commander had intended, on the left of the
Eleventh Division, but between Hill 10 and
the Salt Lake. I have failed in my
endeavours to get some live human detail
about the fighting which followed, but I
understand from the Corps Commander that
the brunt of it fell upon the Thirty-first
Brigade of the Tenth (Irish) Division which,
consisted of the Sixth Royal Inniskilling
Light Fusiliers, the Sixth Royal Irish Fusiliers,
Batt and the Sixth Royal Dublin Fusiliers, the
last-named battalion being attached to the
Thirty-first Brigade.

By the evening General Hammersley had
seized Yilghin Burnu (Chocolate Hills) after
a fight for which he specially commends
the Sixth Lincoln Regiment and the Sixth
Border Regiment. At the same time he
reported that he was unable to make any
further progress towards the vital point,
Ismail Oglu Tepe. At nightfall his brigade
and the Thirty-first Brigade were extended
from about Hetman Chair through Chocolate
Hills, Sulajik, to near Kuchuk Anafarta Ova.

This same day Sir B. Mahon delivered a
spirited attack along the Kiretch Tepe Sirt
ridge, in support of the Eleventh Battalion
Manchester Regiment, and, taking some
small trenches en route, secured and estab-
lished himself on a position extending from
the sea about 135 p., through the high
ground about the p. of Kiretch Tepe Sirt,
to about 135 Z. 8. In front of him, on the
ridge, he reported the enemy to be strongly
entrenched. The Sixth Royal Munster
Fusiliers have been named as winning
special distinction here. The whole advance
was well carried out by the Irishmen on
difficult ground against an enemy—500 to

700 Gendarmerie—favoured by the lie of the land.

The weather was very hot, and the new
troops suffered much from want of water.
Except at the southernmost extremity of
the Kiretch Tepe Sirt ridge, there was no
water in that part of the field, and although
it existed in some abundance throughout
the area over which the Eleventh Division
was operating, the Corps Commander reports
that there was no time to develop its
resources. Partly this seems to have been
owing to the enemy's fire; partly to a
want of that nous which stands by as second
nature to the old campaigner; partly it
was inevitable. Anyway, for as long as
such a state of things lasted, the troops
became dependent on the lighters and upon
the water brought to the beaches in tins,
pakhals, &c.

Undoubtedly, the distribution of this
water to the advancing troops was a matter
of great difficulty, and one which required
not only well-worked-out schemes from
Corps and Divisional Staffs, but also energy
and experience on the part of those who had
to put them into practice. As it turned
out, and judging merely by results, I regret
to say that the measures actually taken in
regard to the distribution proved to be
inadequate, and that suffering and dis-
organisation ensued. The disembarkation
of artillery horses was therefore at once,
and rightly, postponed by the Corps Com-
mander, in order that mules might be landed
to carry up water.

And now General Stopford, recollecting
the vast issues which hung upon his success
in forestalling the enemy, urged his Divi-
sional Commanders to push on. Otherwise,
as he saw, all the advantages of the surprise
landing must be nullified. But the Divi-
sional Commanders believed themselves, it
seems, to be unable to move. Their men,
they said, were exhausted by their efforts
of the night of the 6th-7th, and by the
action of the 7th. The want of water had
told on the new troops. The distribution
from the beaches had not worked smoothly.

In some cases the hose had been pierced
by individuals wishing to fill their own
bottles; in others, lighters had grounded
so far from the beach that men swam out
to fill batches of water-bottles. All this had
added to the disorganisation inevitable after
a night landing, followed by fights here and
there with an enemy scattered over a
country to us unknown. These pleas for
delay were perfectly well founded. But it
seems to have been overlooked that the
half-defeated Turks in front of us were
equally exhausted and disorganised, and
that an advance was the simplest and
swiftest method of solving the water trouble
and every other sort of trouble. Be this
as it may, the objections overbore the
Corps Commander's resolution. He had
now got ashore three batteries (two of
them mountain batteries), and the great
guns of the ships were ready to speak at his
request. But it was lack of artillery support
which finally decided him to acquiesce in
a policy of going slow, which, by the time
it reached the troops, became translated
into a period of inaction. The Divisional
Generals were, in fact, informed that, "in
view of the inadequate artillery support,"
General Stopford did not wish them to make
frontal attacks on entrenched positions, but
desired them, as far as was possible, to try
and turn any trenches which were met with.
Within the terms of this instruction lies the
root of our failure to make use of the price-
less daylight hours of the 8th of August.

Normally, it may be correct to say that
in modern warfare infantry cannot be
expected to advance without artillery pre-
paration. But in a landing on a hostile
shore the order has to be inverted. The
infantry must advance and seize a suitable
position to cover the landing and to provide
artillery positions for the main thrust.
The very existence of the force, its water
supply, its facilities for munitions and
supplies, its power to reinforce, must
absolutely depend on the infantry being able
instantly to make good sufficient ground
without the aid of the artillery other than
can be supplied for the purpose by floating
batteries.

This is not a condition that should take
the commander of a covering force by
surprise.

ing power was required, and even a certain
ruthlessness, to brush aside pleas for a
respite for tired troops. The one fatal
error was inertia. And inertia prevailed.

Late in the evening of the 7th the enemy
had withdrawn the few guns which had been
in action during the day. Beyond half-a-
dozen shells dropped from very long range
into the bay in the early morning of the 8th,
no enemy artillery fired that day in the
Suvla area. The guns had evidently been
moved back, lest they should be captured
when we pushed forward. As for the
entrenched positions, these, in the ordinary
acceptance of the term, were non-existent.
The General Staff Officer whom I had sent
on to Suvla early in the morning of the 8th
reported by telegraph the absence of hostile
gun-fire, the small amount of rifle fire,
and the enemy's apparent weakness. He
also drew attention to the inaction of our
own troops, and to the fact that golden
opportunities were being missed. Before
this message arrived at General Head-
quarters I had made up my mind, from the
Corps Commander's own reports, that
all was not well at Suvla. There was risk
in cutting myself adrift, even temporarily,
from touch with the operations at Anzac
and Helles; but I did my best to provide
against any sudden call by leaving Major-
General W. P. Braithwaite, my Chief of the
General Staff, in charge, with instructions
to keep me closely informed of events
at the other two fronts; and, having done
this, I took ship and set out for Suvla.

On arrival at about 5 p.m. I boarded
H.M.S. *Jonquil*, where I found corps head-
quarters, and where General Stopford
informed me that the General Officer com-
manding Eleventh Division was confident
of success in an attack he was to make at
dawn the next morning (the 9th). I felt
no such confidence. Beyond a small ad-
vance by a part of the Eleventh Division
between the Chocolate Hills and Ismail
Oglu Tepe, and some further progress along
the Kiretch Tepe Sirt ridge by the Tenth
Division, the day of the 8th had been lost.
The commander of the Eleventh Division
had, it seems, ordered strong patrols to be
pushed forward so as to make good all the
strong positions in advance which could be
occupied without serious fighting; but, as
he afterwards reported, "little was done
in this respect." Thus a priceless twelve
hours had already gone to help the chances
of the Turkish reinforcements which were,
I knew, both from naval and aerial sources,
actually on the march for Suvla. But
when I urged that even now, at the eleventh
hour, the Eleventh Division should make a
concerted attack upon the hills, I was met
by a *non possumus*. The objections of the
morning were no longer valid; the men were
now well rested, watered, and fed. But
the Divisional Commanders disliked the
idea of an advance by night, and General
Stopford did not care, it seemed, to force
their hands.

So it came about that I was driven to see
whether I could not, myself, put concentra-
tion of effort and purpose into the direction
of the large number of men ashore. The
Corps Commander made no objection. He
declared himself to be as eager as I could be
to advance. The representations made by
the Divisional Commanders had seemed to
him insuperable. If I could see my way
to get over them no one would be more
pleased than himself.

Accompanied by Commodore Roger Keyes
and Lieutenant-Colonel Aspinall, of the
Headquarters General Staff, I landed on
the beach, where all seemed quiet and peace-
ful, and saw the Commander of the Eleventh
Division, Major-General Hammersley. I
warned him the sands were running out
fast, and that by dawn the high ground to
his front might very likely be occupied in
force by the enemy. He saw the danger,
but declared it was a physical impossibility
at so late an hour (6 p.m.) to get out orders
for a night attack, the troops being very
much scattered. There was no other
difficulty now, but this was insuperable;
he could not recast his orders or get them
round to his troops in time. But one
brigade, the Thirty-second, was, so General
Hammersley admitted, more or less con-
centrated, and ready to move. The General
Staff Officer of the Division, Colonel Neil
Malcolm, a soldier of experience, on whose

opinion I set much value, was consulted. He agreed that the Thirty-second Brigade was now in a position to act. I, therefore, issued a direct order that, even if it were only with this Thirty-second Brigade, the advance should begin at the earliest possible moment, so that a portion at least of the Eleventh Division should anticipate the Turkish reinforcements on the heights and dig themselves in there upon some good tactical point.

In taking upon myself the serious responsibility of thus dealing with a detail of divisional tactics I was careful to limit the scope of the interference. Beyond directing that the one brigade which was reported ready to move at once should try and make good the heights before the enemy got on to them I did nothing, and said not a word calculated to modify or in any way affect the attack already planned for the morning. Out of the thirteen battalions which were to have advanced against the heights at dawn, four were now to anticipate that movement by trying to make good the key of the enemy's position at once and under cover of darkness.

I have not been able to get a clear and coherent account of the doings of the Thirty-second Brigade: but I have established the fact that it did not actually commence its advance till 4 a.m. on the 9th of August. The reason given is that the units of the brigade were scattered. In General Stopford's despatch he says that, "One company of the Sixth East Yorks, Pioneer Battalion succeeded in getting to the top of the hill north of Anafarta Sagir, but the rest of the battalion and the Thirty-second Brigade were attacked from both flanks during their advance, and fell back to a line north and south of Sulajik. Very few of the leading company or of the Royal Engineers who accompanied it got back, and that evening the strength of the battalion was nine officers and 380 men."

After their retirement from the hill north of Anafarta Sagir (which commanded the whole battlefield) this Thirty-second Brigade then still marked the high-water level of the advance made at dawn by the rest of the division. When their first retirement was completed they had to fall back further, so as to come into line with the most forward of their comrades. The inference seems clear. Just as the Thirty-second Brigade in their advance met with markedly less opposition than the troops who attacked an hour and a half later, so, had they themselves started earlier, they would probably have experienced less opposition. Further, it seems reasonable to suppose that had the complete division started at 4 a.m. on the 9th, or, better still, at 10 p.m. on the 8th, they would have made good the whole of the heights in front of them.

That night I stayed at Suvla, preferring to drop direct cable contact with my operations as a whole to losing touch with a corps battle which seemed to be going wrong.

At dawn on the 9th I watched General Hammersley's attack, and very soon realised, by the well-sustained artillery fire of the enemy (so silent the previous day) and by the volume of the musketry, that Turkish reinforcements had arrived; that with the renewed confidence caused by our long delay the guns had been brought back; and that, after all, we were forestalled. This was a bad moment. Our attack failed; our losses were very serious. The enemy's enfilading shrapnel fire seemed to be specially destructive and demoralising. The shell bursting low and all along our line. Time after time it threw back our attack just as it seemed upon the point of making good. The Thirty-third Brigade at first made most hopeful progress in its attempt to seize Ismail Oglu Tepe. Some of the leading troops gained the summit, and were able to look over on to the other side. Many Turks were killed here. Then the centre seemed to give way.

Whether this was the result of the shrapnel fire or whether, as some say, an order to retire came up from the rear, the result was equally fatal to success. As the centre fell back the steady, gallant behaviour of the Sixth Battalion Border Regiment and the Sixth Battalion Lincoln Regiment

on either flank was especially noteworthy. Scrub fires on Hill 70 did much to harass and hamper our troops. When the Thirty-second Brigade fell back before attacks from the slopes of the hill north of Anafarta Sagir and from the direction of Abrika they took up the line north and south through Sulajik. Here their left was protected by two battalions of the Thirty-fourth Brigade, which came up to their support. The line was later on prolonged by the remainder of the Thirty-fourth Brigade and two battalions of the 150th Brigade of the Fifty-third Division. Their right was connected with the Chocolate Hills by the Thirty-third Brigade on the position to which they had returned after their repulse from the upper slopes of Ismail Oglu Tepe.

Some of the units which took part in this engagement acquitted themselves very bravely. I regret I have not had sufficient detail given me to enable me to mention them by name. The Divisional Commander speaks with appreciation of one freshly-landed battalion of the Fifty-third Division, a Herefordshire, which attacked with impetuosity and courage between Hietman Chair and Kaslar Chair, about Azmak Dere, on the extreme right of his line.

During the night of the 8th-9th and early morning of the 9th, the whole of the Fifty-third (Territorial) Division (my general reserve) had arrived and disembarked. I had ordered it up to Suvla, hoping that by adding its strength to the Ninth Corps General Stopford might still be enabled to secure the commanding ground round the bay. The infantry brigades of the Fifty-third Division (no artillery had accompanied it from England) reinforced the Eleventh Division.

On August 10th the Corps Commander decided to make another attempt to take the Anafarta ridge. The Eleventh Division were not sufficiently rested to play a prominent part in the operation, but the Fifty-third Division, under General Lindley, was to attack, supported by General Hammersley. On the Tenth there were one brigade of Royal Field Artillery ashore, with two mountain batteries, and all the ships' guns were available to co-operate. But the attack failed, though the Corps Commander considers that seasoned troops would have succeeded, especially as the enemy were showing signs of being shaken by our artillery fire. General Stopford points out, however, and rightly so, that the attack was delivered over very difficult country, and that it was a high trial for troops who had never been in action before, and with no regulars to set a standard.

Many of the battalions fought with great gallantry, and were led forward with much devotion by their officers. At a moment when things were looking dangerous two battalions of the Eleventh Division (not specified by the Corps Commander) rendered very good service on the left of the Territorials. At the end of the day our troops occupied the line hill east of Chocolate Hill—Sulajik, whilst the enemy—who had been ably commanded throughout—were still receiving reinforcements, and, apart from their artillery, were three times as strong as they had been on the 7th August.

Orders were issued to the General Officer Commanding Ninth Corps to take up and entrench a line across the whole front from near the Azmak Dere, through the knoll east of the Chocolate Hill, to the ground held by the Tenth Division about Kiretch Tepe Sirt. General Stopford took advantage of this opportunity to reorganise the divisions, and, as there was a gap in the line between the left of the Fifty-third Division and the right of the Tenth Division, gave orders for the preparation of certain strong points to enable it to be held.

The Fifty-fourth Division (infantry only) arrived, and were disembarked on August 11th and placed in reserve. On the following day—August 12th—I proposed that the Fifty-fourth Division should make a night march in order to attack, at dawn on the 13th, the heights Kavak Tepe—Teke Tepe. The Corps Commander, having reason to believe that the enclosed country about Kuchuk Anafarta Ova and the north of it

was held by the enemy, ordered one brigade to move forward in advance, and make good Kuchuk Anafarta Ova, so as to ensure an unopposed march for the remainder of the division as far as that place. So that afternoon the 163rd Brigade moved off, and, in spite of serious opposition, established itself about the A of Anafarta (118m. 4 and 7), in difficult and enclosed country.

In the course of the fight, creditable in all respects to the 163rd Brigade, there happened a very mysterious thing. The 1/5th Norfolks were on the right of the line, and found themselves for a moment less strongly opposed than the rest of the brigade. Against the yielding forces of the enemy Colonel Sir H. Beauchamp, a bold, self-confident officer, eagerly pressed forward, followed by the best part of the battalion. The fighting grew hotter, and the ground became more wooded and broken. At this stage many men were wounded or grew exhausted with thirst. These found their way back to camp during the night. But the Colonel, with sixteen officers and 250 men, still kept pushing on, driving the enemy before him. Amongst these ardent souls was part of a fine company enlisted from the King's Sandringham estates. Nothing more was ever seen or heard of any of them. They charged into the forest, and were lost to sight or sound. Not one of them ever came back.

The night march and projected attack were now abandoned, owing to the Corps Commander's representations as to the difficulties of keeping the division supplied with food, water, &c., even should they gain the height. General Birdwood had hoped he would soon be able to make a fresh attack on Sari Bair, provided that he might reckon on a corresponding vigorous advance to be made by the Eleventh and Fifty-fourth Divisions on Ismail Oglu Tepe. On August 13th I so informed General Stopford. But when it came to business, General Birdwood found he could not yet carry out his new attack on Sari Bair—and, indeed, could only help the Ninth Corps with one brigade from Damakjelik Bair. I was obliged, therefore, to abandon this project for the nonce, and directed General Stopford to confine his attention to strengthening his line across his present front. To straighten out the left of this line General Stopford ordered the General Officer Commanding the Tenth Division to advance on the following day (15th August), so as to gain possession of the crest of the Kiretch Tepe Sirt, the Fifty-fourth Division to co-operate.

The Thirtieth and Thirty-first Infantry Brigades of the Tenth Irish Division were to attack frontally along the high ridge. The 162nd Infantry Brigade of the Fifty-fourth Division were to support on the right. The infantry were to be seconded by a machine-gun detachment of the Royal Naval Air Service, by the guns of H.M.S. *Grampus* and H.M.S. *Foxhound* from the Gulf of Saros, by the Argyll Mountain Battery, the Fifteenth Heavy Battery, and the Fifty-eighth Field Battery. After several hours of indecisive artillery and musketry fighting, the Sixth Royal Dublin Fusiliers charged forward with loud cheers, and captured the whole ridge, together with eighteen prisoners. The vigorous support rendered by the naval guns was a feature of this operation. Unfortunately, the point of the ridge was hard to hold, and means for maintaining the forward trenches had not been well thought out. Casualties became very heavy, the Fifth Royal Irish Fusiliers having only one officer left, and the Fifth Inniskilling Fusiliers also losing heavily in officers. Reinforcements were promised, but before they could arrive the officer left in command decided to evacuate the front trenches. The strength of the Turks opposed to us was steadily rising, and had now reached 20,000.

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